5530 Final Project Please Read The Attached Document

Please read through this attachment documents it must be exactly like the professor instructions or I will ask for full refundchat1bid665530 Final Project Please Read The Attached Documentprofiletommyb1972MAINSIMILAR QUESTIONSFinancial markets homework helpFINAL24Page2of 2RESM 5530 – Fall 2021Looking at the Law Differently AssignmentAssignment Name. Transforming Information – Looking at the Law Differently Introduction & Purpose. Sir William Bragg, a Nobel prize winning physicist, chemist and mathematician, once said: “the important thing in science is not so much to obtain new facts as to discover new ways of thinking about them.” This course introduced you to new legal concepts, doctrines, and principles; touched on select legal theories; demonstrated how the “Law” and legal concepts can (and should) be factor in strategic decision; and hopefully propelled you to think in new ways about how the law applies to managing risks in sports, recreation, and events. This assignment starts with something with which you are familiar – the risk management process. You will be provided a risk management process from another industry (the U.S. Army) to see how the military thinks about managing risk when planning missions and operations. It’s logical to ask “what does another industry have to do with sports, recreation, or events?” But try reframing the question: “can I learn from the other industry’s risk management process?” Or, “what can I learn from how another industry manages risks?” In other words, discover new ways of thinking about old things. Assignment. Re-read the article “Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation.” Afterwards, read Chapter 2 of the U.S. Army Field Manual entitled “Risk Management Process.” Your assignment is to transform the first seven pages of the chapter from a risk management process that pertains to the U.S. Army’s combat mission to one that applies to a sports management, recreation, or events operation that interests you or with which you have experience.  Starting the Assignment. Select an area that interests you (“area of interest”’). The operation or experience can be coaching a team or even coaching a particular position; preparing for a professional draft; preparing for an upcoming University Interscholastic League or intercollegiate conference realignment; operating or managing a recreation facility; developing a fund-raising campaign for a nonprofit organization; organizing a major event, etc.  Develop an Acronym. Identify the potential hazards that are present in the area of interest you selected and develop an acronym that assists in identifying the hazards (like the army’s METT-T acronym). Your acronym must include an “L” for law(s). In other words, you must identify at least one legal concept that applies to your area of interest. (Think about the Chen v. MLB and Dallas Wave assignments). NOTE: You do not have to identify all of the legal concepts, but, you should be able to identify one or two. You are free to talk to each other or reach out to me.  Writing the Paper. To assist you, I have underlined words that are peculiar to the Army and stricken through the word “military.” (I may have missed a few). Once you have decided on the area of interest and created an acronym, one way to begin writing the paper is to replace the underlined words with ones that are Looking at the Law Differently AssignmentPage 2applicable to the area of interest you have chosen. Or, you may find that some of the underlined words apply to your area of interest, for example, the word “leader.” You can use the Figures in the material as they are or modify them; or, you do not have to use them if they do not apply. You can transform the seven pages any way you desire as long as it is consistent with the intent of the assignment.  Paper Format. In writing your paper, you can use the same format as the material you are transforming or develop one that works best for you. It can be from 5-10 pages. Whatever format you chose:o use headings as transitions;o 12-point font; o Arial, Calibri or Times New Roman font style;o single-space, and only your product will determine whether it is too short. (Meaning don’t ask me how short it can be). Rubric. You will be graded on your ability to apply the material to your area of interests; your ability to develop an acronym to identify hazards present in your area; whether you incorporate “Law” into your acronym; and the organization of your paper. Again, you can follow the format in document you are transforming. There are a lot of ways to complete this assignment. Don’t be scared, timid, or worse – intellectually lazy. Be creative. Be innovative. Be Transformative.

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Chapter 2

Risk Management Process

First reckon, then risk

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk
management process. It illustrates the application of
each step to military operations through the factors
of METT-T.

THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW

Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling
hazards to conserve combat power and resources.

The five steps of
risk management are—
• Step 1. Identify hazards.
• Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risks.
• Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
• Step 4. Implement controls.
• Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.
This five-step process is integrated into the military decision-making
process as shown in Figure 2-1.
FM 100-40 provides insight into the context in which the risk
management process is applied herein. Areas of particular interest in
FM 100-40 include—
• Solving tactical problems (Chapter 1).
• The science and art of tactics (Chapter 1).
• Hasty versus deliberate operations (Chapter 1).
• The plan-prepare-execute cycle (Chapter 1).
• Basic tactical control measures (Chapter 2).
• The factors of METT-T (Chapter 2).

FM 100-14

2-1

Mission Receipt
Mission Analysis
COA Development
COA Analysis
COA Comparison
COA Approval
Orders Production
Rehearsal1
Execution and1 Assessment
Step 1
IdentifyHazards
Step 2
Assess
Hazards
Step 3
Develop
Controls
and
Make Risk
Decision
Step 4
Implement
Controls
Step 5
Supervise and
EvaluateMilitary Decision-
Making Process
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Risk Management Steps
X X X
X X X
1All boxes are marked to emphasize the continued use of the risk management
process throughout the mission

Risk decisions should be based upon awareness rather than
mechanical habit. Leaders should act on a keen appreciation for the
essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from
conditioned response. Throughout the entire operational continuum,
the commander must consider US Government civilians and contract
support personnel in his risk management process. Hazards can exist,
regardless of enemy or adversary actions, in areas with no direct
enemy contact and in areas outside the enemy’s or adversary’s

Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with
Military Decision-Making Tasks

Risk Management

2-2

influence. The two types of risk that exist across the wide range of
Army operations are

tactical risks

and

accident risks.

•

Tactical risk

is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of
the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. It applies to all
levels of war and across the spectrum of operations.
•

Accident risk

includes all operational risk considerations other
than tactical risk. It includes risks to the friendly force. It also
includes risks posed to civilians by an operation, as well as an
operations impact on the environment. It can include activities
associated with hazards concerning friendly personnel,
civilians, equipment readiness, and environmental conditions.

STEPS 1 AND 2

Steps 1 and 2 together comprise the risk assessment. In Step 1,
individuals identify the hazards that may be encountered in executing
a mission. In Step 2, they determine the direct impact of each hazard on
the operation. The risk assessment provides for enhanced situational
awareness. This awareness builds confidence and allows soldiers and
units to take timely, efficient, and effective protective measures.

STEPS 3 THROUGH 5

Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to
effectively manage risk. In these steps, leaders balance risk against
costs—political, economic, environmental, and to combat power—
and take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk. During
execution, as well as during planning and preparation, leaders
continuously assess the risk to the overall mission and to those
involved in the task. Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate the
effectiveness of controls and provide lessons learned so that others
may benefit from the experience.

THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED

STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS

hazard

is an actual or potential condition where the following
can occur due to exposure to the hazard:
• Injury, illness, or death of personnel.
• Damage to or loss of equipment and property.
• Mission degradation.

FM 100-14

2-3

Hazards are sources of danger or risks due to enemy or adversary
presence and other conditions not due to enemy or adversary
capabilities. Hazards are found in all operational environments.
Combat operations, stability operations, base support operations, and
training present unique hazards for units involved in these kinds of
missions. Hazards are identified during the first four steps of the
military decision-making process:

mission receipt, mission analysis, COA
development

, and

COA analysis

.
The ability of unit leaders and staffs to identify hazards is key. One
reality of today’s missions is that the aspect of a hazard can change
rapidly. Things of little risk initially can quickly become major threats
due to unforeseen natural or man-made events. Leaders should be
aware of this possibility. Complacency to the fact that existing controls
may not continue to control hazards in rapidly changing situations
should be viewed as a hazard in itself.
The factors of METT-T provide a sound framework for identifying
hazards when planning, preparing, and executing operations. When
applying risk management to METT-T during mission analysis,
leaders and staffs should look for hazards that affect both tactical and
accident risks. They must identify all hazards that may present
significant risks to the mission.

Mission

Leaders first analyze the assigned mission. They look at the type
of mission to be accomplished and consider possible subsequent
missions. Certain kinds of operations are inherently more dangerous
than others. For example, a deliberate frontal attack, because of the
associated movement, is more likely to expose a unit to losses than
would a defense from prepared positions. Identifying missions that
routinely present great risk is imperative. Leaders also look for
hazards associated with complexity of the plan such as—
• A scheme of maneuver that is difficult to understand or too
complex for accurate communications down to the lowest level.
• The impact of operating under a fragmentary order (FRAGO).

Enemy

Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant
hazards to the operation. For example, “What can the enemy do to

Risk Management

2-4

defeat my operation?” Common shortfalls that can create hazards
during operations against an enemy include failure to—
• Assess potential advantages to the enemy provided by the
battlefield environment.
• Fully assess the enemy’s capabilities.
• Understand enemy collection capabilities and friendly
vulnerabilities to those capabilities.
• Accurately determine the enemy’s probable COAs.
• Plan and coordinate active ground and aerial reconnaissance
activities.
• Disseminate intelligence about the enemy to lower levels.
• Identifying terrorist threats and capabilities.
Intelligence plays a critical part in identifying hazards associated
with tactical risk. Intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) is a
dynamic staff process that continually integrates new information and
intelligence that ultimately becomes input to the commander ’s risk
assessment process. Intelligence assists in identifying hazards during
operations by—
• Identifying the opportunities and constraints the battlefield
environment offers to threat and friendly forces.
• Thoroughly portraying threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
• Collecting information on populations, governments, and
infrastructures.
FMs 34-130 and 34-60, respectively, provide detailed information on
IPB and on counterintelligence operations and multidiscipline
counterintelligence analysis.

Terrain and Weather

In addition to those due to the enemy or adversaries, the most
obvious hazards to military operations are due to terrain and weather.
Terrain and weather affect the type of hazard encountered. When the
enemy uses terrain to his advantage, the risk is clearly tactical. The
aspects of terrain and weather may create situations where accident
risks predominate. When looking at this from a purely mission
perspective, familiarity of the unit with the terrain and its associated
environment must be paramount. Basic issues include—
• How long the unit has operated in the environment and climate.
• Whether the terrain has been crossed before.

FM 100-14

2-5

Terrain.

The five main military aspects of terrain—

observation and
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain and decisive terrain,
and avenues of approach (OCOKA)—

can be used to identify and assess
hazards impacting on friendly forces. Chapter 2 of FM 100-40 has
details on OCOKA. The terrain analysis includes both map and on-the-
ground reconnaissance to identify how well unit capabilities and
mission demands can be accommodated by the terrain.
•

Observation and fields of fire.

Hazards associated with this usually
involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and
when friendly unit weapons capabilities allow it to effectively
engage the enemy.
•

Cover and concealment.

Hazards associated with cover and
concealment are created by the enemy’s ability to place direct or
indirect fire on friendly forces.
•

Obstacles.

Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or
tactical. They may be due to natural conditions such as rivers or
swamps or man-made such as minefields or built-up areas.
•

Key terrain and decisive terrain.

Hazards are a marked advantage
terrain provides to the enemy if he controls such terrain or
denies its use to friendly forces.
•

Avenues of approach.

Hazards associated with avenues of
approach can affect both tactical and accident risks. Such
hazards include conditions where an avenue of approach
impedes deployment of friendly combat power or where it
supports deployment of enemy combat power.

Weather.

Weather works hand-in-hand with terrain to create
hazards. To identify weather hazards, leaders and soldiers must
assess the impact on operating systems. Mistakes include not
considering the—
• Adverse effects of heat and cold hazards on the performance
of soldiers.
• Effects of climate and weather on maintenance of vehicles and
equipment before beginning an operation.
• Hazardous effects of weather on the five military aspects
of terrain.

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2-6

Troops

Leaders analyze the capabilities of available friendly troops.
A s s o c i a t e d h a z a rd s i m p a c t b o t h t h e s o l d i e r a n d u n i t . K e y
considerations are level of training, manning levels, the condition and
maintenance of vehicles and equipment, morale, availability of
supplies and services, and the physical and emotional health of
soldiers. Leaders and soldiers must be vigilant to the fact that hazards
in these areas can adversely affect a mission, even when all tactical
considerations point to success. Mission failure can be caused by—
•

Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers.

Inadequate
sanitation facilities, water purification capabilities, medical
attention, and evacuation capabilities are key hazards that can
arise from incomplete logistical planning. Care of troops requires
long-range projections of all classes of supply, with close
monitoring of mission changes that could impact availability or
depletion of supplies. When beginning an operation immediately
upon arriving in theater, hazards include not implementing
measures to help soldiers overcome fatigue or acclimatize them to
the geographical area and associated climate.
•

Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation.

Hazards include how long units have worked together under a
particular command relationship. During stability operations,
task organizations may change often. Hazards include poor
communication, unfamiliarity with higher headquarters SOPs,
and insufficient combat power to accomplish the mission.
•

Hazards associated with long-term missions.

Long-term missions
include nation building, peacekeeping, or insurgency/
counterinsurgency operations. Hazards associated with these
missions include the turmoil of personnel turnover, lack of
continuity of leadership, inexperience, and lack of knowledge of
the situation and the unit’s operating procedures. An especially
insidious hazard is critical-skills atrophy that results from not
performing METL-related missions.

Time Available

The hazard is insufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute
operations. Planning time is always at a premium. Leaders routinely
apply the one-third/two-thirds rule to ensure their subordinate units
are given maximum time to plan. Failure to accomplish a mission on

FM 100-14

2-7

time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units
to accomplish their mission.

Civilians

The commander ’s legal responsibility is to consider hazards to,
and safeguarding of, civilians in his area of operations.

Civilians

include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary
organizations (PVOs), US Government civilians, foreign national
civilians, the media, and dislocated civilians put at risk by military
operations. The commander must consider hazards that can occur
across the range of operations, such as—
•

In a wartime environment.

The commander must consider the
hazard of collateral damage which may result in creating
new adversaries.
•

In a

peacetime environment.

The commander must consider the
political attitudes and previous actions of civilians in identifying
hazards to friendly forces and the populace itself.

Adversaries

are hostile elements other than the enemy that may be
encountered during any operation. They present additional hazards.
They may be organized opposition or individuals that challenge
authority. They may include such diverse elements as rioters,
criminals, rogues, or gangs that might want to harass a peace
enforcement mission.

STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS

Step 2 completes the risk assessment. Risk is the chance of hazard
or bad consequences. This step examines each hazard in terms of
probability and severity to determine the risk level of one or more
hazardous incidents that can result from exposure to the hazard. This
step is conducted during three steps of the military decision-making
process—

mission analysis, COA development,

and

COA analysis.

This
step is also conducted after controls are developed.
The incident must be credible in that it must have a reasonable
expectation of happening. The end result is an estimate of risk from
each hazard and an estimate of the overall risk to the mission caused
by hazards that cannot be eliminated. Leaders must also assess the
risk to civilians posed by the operation. They may need to assess the
operations’ impact on the environment. This step is conducted in
three substeps.

Risk Management

2-8

Substep A

Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the

probability

of a hazardous incident. The probability levels estimated for each
hazard may be based on the mission, COAs being developed and
analyzed, or frequency of a similar event. Figure 2-2 provides a
summary of the five degrees of probability. The letters in parentheses
following each degree (A through E) provide a symbol for depicting
probability. For example, the letter

represents

frequent

probability.

FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced

Single item Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur
several times over duration of a specific mission or
operation. Always occurs.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
operation, or over a service life.
Individual soldier Occurs very often in career. Expected to occur several
times during mission or operation. Always occurs.
All soldiers exposed Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
operation.

LIKELY (B) Occurs several times

Single item Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur
during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently
(regular intervals, generally often,).
Individual soldier Occurs several times in career. Expected to occur during
a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.

OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically

Single item Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as
often as not during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs several times in service life.
Individual soldier Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific
mission or operation, but not often.
All soldiers exposed Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes).

Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability

FM 100-14

2-9
Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)

Substep B

Substep B addresses the

severity

of each hazard. It is expressed in
terms of—
• Degree of injury or illness.
• Loss of or damage to equipment or property.
• Environmental damage.
• Other mission-impairing factors such as lost combat power.
The degree of severity estimated for each hazard may be based on
knowledge of the results of similar past events. Figure 2-3 provides a
summary

of the four degrees of hazard severity. The

Roman numerals
in parentheses following each degree (I through IV) provide a
convenient symbol for depicting severity. For example,

represents
the

catastrophic

degree of severity.

SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time

Single item Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not
expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur some time
in service life, but rarely. Usually does not occur.
Individual soldier Occurs as isolated incident during a career. Remotely
possible, but not expected to occur during a specific
mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated
incidents.

UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible

Single item Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost
never occur in service life. Can assume will not occur
during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
items
Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents
may occur over service life.
Individual soldier Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur
in career or during a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.

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CATASTROPHIC (I)

Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or
mission failure. Death or permanent total
disability (accident risk). Loss of major or
mission-critical system or equipment. Major
p r o p e r t y ( f a c i l i t y ) d a m a g e . S e v e r e
environmental damage. Mission-critical
security failure. Unacceptable collateral
damage.

CRITICAL (II)

Significantly (severely) degraded mission
capability or unit readiness. Permanent
partial disability, temporary total disability
exceeding 3 months time (accident risk).
Extensive (major) damage to equipment or
systems. Significant damage to property or
t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . S e c u r i t y f a i l u r e .
Significant collateral damage.

MARGINAL (III)

Degraded mission capability or unit
readiness. Minor damage to equipment or
systems, property, or the environment. Lost
day due to injury or illness not exceeding 3
months (accident risk). Minor damage to
property or the environment.

NEGLIGIBLE (IV)

Little or no adverse impact on mission
capability. First aid or minor medical
treatment (accident risk). Slight equipment
or system damage, but fully functional and
s e r v i c e a bl e. L i t t l e o r n o p r o p e r t y o r
environmental damage.

Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity

Substep C

In this substep leaders and staffs expand what they understand
about probable hazardous incidents into estimates of levels of risk for
each identified hazard and an estimate of the overall risk for the
operation. Estimating risk follows from examining the outcomes of
Substeps A and B; that is, both the probability and severity of
hazardous incidents. This substep is more art than science. Much
depends on the use of historical lessons learned, intuitive analysis,

FM 100-14

2-11

Risk Assessment Matrix
Probability
Severity Frequent
A
Likely
B
Occasional
C
Seldom
D
Unlikely
E
Catastrophic
Critical
Marginal
Negligible
I
II
III
IV
E
E
H
M
E
H
M
L
H
H
M
L
H
M
L
L
M
L
L
L
E –
H –
M –
L –
Extremely High Risk
High Risk
Moderate Risk
Low Risk

experience, and judgment. Uncertainty can arise in the assessment of
both the probability and severity of a hazardous incident. Uncertainty
results from unknowns about a situation; from incomplete, inaccurate,
undependable, or contradictory information; and from unforeseen
circumstances. Therefore, assessment of risk requires good judgment.
Figure 2-4 is a standardized matrix that can be used to assist in this
process. Leaders and staffs enter the estimated degree of severity and
probability for each hazard in Substeps A and B from the severity row
and probability column, respectively. The point where the severity
row and probability column intersect defines the level of risk. For
example, if the hazard is estimated to have a

critical

severity (II) and a

likely

probability (B), the level of risk is high (H).
Figure 2-5 provides a summary of the levels of risk. It also
provides examples of hazardous incidents for each risk level. Several
examples illustrate the trade-off between tactical and accident risks.

Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix

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2-12

E – E x t r e m e l y H i g h :

Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazardsoccur during mission. A

frequent

or likely probability of catastrophic loss(IA or IB) or

frequent

probability of

critical

loss (IIA) exists.

E x a m p l e :

A commander finds that one of his implied tasks to attack anobjective involves crossing a normally shallow riverbed. After looking at
the factors of METT-T, he discovers that three days of intense rain have
raised the water level to rise above flood stage, with currents far in
excess of his ability to safely ford with armored vehicles. After
discussing COAs with his staff, he determines the accident risk is
extremely high because of the likely probability and catastrophic
severity of losing vehicles and killing soldiers. His conclusions are
based on his experience with and knowledge of fording armored
vehicles under the existing conditions of water depth and current
speed.

H – H i g h :

Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the
mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if hazards
occur during the mission.

Occasional

seldom

probability ofcatastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A

likely

occasional

probabilityexists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring.

Frequent

probability of

marginal

losses (IIIA) exists.

E x a m p l e :

During a preplanned ambush, the leader discovers that theforce he intends to ambush has significantly more combat power than
his own force can accommodate. He realizes that he could only delay
rather than destroy the enemy. He knows his casualty estimates would
be very high if the enemy reorganized and counterattacked. He also
knows that the size of the enemy force could seriously impact adjacent
units conducting a movement to contact. He determines the situation is

high risk

because he estimates (based on his training and experience)t h e r e i s a l i ke l y p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e e n e my r e o r g a n i z i n g a n d
counterattacking and the severity of loss to his unit would be critical.

M – M o d e r a t e :

Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if
hazards occur during mission. An

unlikely

probability of catastrophicloss (IE) exists. The probability of a

critical

loss is

seldom

(IID).

Marginal

losses occur with a

likely

occasional

probability

(IIIB or IIIC). A

frequent

probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists.

E x a m p l e :

A commander in a defensive position receives a warning orderto be prepared to counterattack if the enemy attacks again. He chooses
to use pre-positioned ammunition caches to support his defense, as
opposed to moving his ammunition resupply forward by truck. He
determines that the severity of not having an immediate resupply of
ammunition available during the counterattack will have a

critical

impacton his combat power. He realizes that if the enemy forces him to
abandon his forward positions, the severity of the loss of his

Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk

FM 100-14

2-13

likely

, but that the probabilityof the enemy being reinforced and attacking in overwhelming force is
remote

(seldom)

. The commander concludes that the risk of conductinga counterattack with limited ammunition is greater than the

moderate

risk of the enemy pushing him back.

L – L o w :

Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing themission. The probability of

critical

loss is

unlikely

(IIE), while that of

marginal

loss is

seldom

(IIID) or

unlikely

(IIIE). The probability of a

negligible

loss is likely or less (IVB through (IVE).
E x a m p l e : A mechanized task force (TF) conducting a movement tocontact in a desert environment is overtaken by nightfall before
reaching its limit of advance (LOA). The terrain along the axis of
advance is flat and open. Visibility is about 800 meters under a clear sky
illuminated by a full moon. Estimates put the enemy, which has been
hastily withdrawing for the past three days, at approximately 30 percent
strength. Contact has been light with no defensible terrain along the
TF’s axis. The TF commander considers all the factors. In addition, the
TF is 100 percent operational in using night vision devices. The TF
commander estimates that it is unlikely that his unit will incur losses ofcritical severity by being surprised by the enemy or lose critical combatpower due to an accident. He estimates the risk to his force in
continuing a nighttime movement is low.
Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk (continued)
STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS
Risk management is the recognition that decision making
occurs under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions must remain
consistent with the commander’s stated intent and offer a good
e x p e c t a t i o n o f s u c c e s s . T h e r i s k – t a k i n g s k i l l re q u i re s
competency as a prerequisite.
FM 100-7, Decisive Force:
The Army in Theater Operations, May 1995
Step 3 is accomplished in two substeps: develop controls and
make risk decisions. This is done during the COA development, COA
analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval of the military
decision-making process.
Substep A – Develop Controls
After assessing each hazard, leaders develop one or more controls
that either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or

Risk Management
2-14
severity) of a hazardous incident. When developing controls, they
consider the reason for the hazard not just the hazard itself.
Types of Controls. Controls can take many forms, but fall
into three basic categories—educational controls, physical controls,
and avoidance.
• Educational controls. These controls are based on the knowledge
and skills of the units and individuals. Effective control is
implemented through individual and collective training that
ensures performance to standard.
• Physical controls. These controls may take the form of barriers
and guards or signs to warn individuals and units that a hazard
exists. Additionally, special controller or oversight personnel
responsible for locating specific hazards fall into this category.
• Avoidance. These controls are applied when leaders take positive
action to prevent contact with an identified hazard.
Criteria for Controls. To be effective, each control developed
must meet the following criteria:
• Suitability. It must remove the hazard or mitigate (reduce) the
residual risk to an acceptable level.
• Feasibility. The unit must have the capability to implement
the control.
• Acceptability. The benefit gained by implementing the control
must justify the cost in resources and time. The assessment of
acceptability is largely subjective. Figure 2-6 gives criteria for
determining acceptability of controls for each identified hazard.
Support Availability of adequate personnel, equipment,
supplies, and facilities necessary to implement a
suitable controls.
Standards Guidance and procedures for implementing a control
are clear, practical, and specific.
Training Knowledge and skills are adequate to implement a
control.
Leadership Leaders are competent to implement a control.
Individual Individual soldiers are sufficiently self-disciplined to
implement a control.
Figure 2-6. Criteria for Determining Acceptability of Controls

FM 100-14
2-15
Examples of Controls. Examples of controls include—
• Engineering or designing to eliminate or control hazards.
• Selecting a COA that avoids identified hazards.
• Limiting the number of people and the amount of time they are
exposed to hazards, consistent with mission requirements.
• Selecting personnel with appropriate mental, emotional, and
physical capabilities.
• Providing protective clothing, equipment, and safety and
security devices.
• Providing such services as adequate sanitation facilities and
water purification capabilities.
• Providing warning signs and signals.
• Scheduling vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
• Planning training, including rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills,
and so forth.
• Programming communications links for key civilian organizations.
• Establishing battlefield controls such as areas of operations and
b o u n d a r i e s , d i re c t fi re c o n t ro l m e a s u re s , fi re s u p p o r t
coordination measures, rules of engagement, airspace control
measures, bridge classification, traffic control, and so forth.
• Developing terrorist attack warning systems and response plans.
The key is to specify who, what, where, when, and how each
control is to be used. For example—
• Planning and scheduling intensive threat and friendly vehicle
identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air defense
weapons crews before the mission reduces the probability of
engaging a friendly vehicle or aircraft (fratricide).
• Programming installation of crashworthy passenger seats in the
UH-60 Blackhawk, when mission circumstances do not indicate
their removal, can reduce the severity of injuries in crashes.
• Requiring soldiers to wear flak vests and helmets during
movement to contact, or when riding in vehicles in areas where
enemy fire is likely, can reduce the probability and severity of a
wound from small arms fire or fragments.

Risk Management
2-16
• Establishing strong continuity documents and planning overlap
tours for key leaders facilitate smooth transitions during
extended operations.
Residual Risk. Once the responsible leader develops and
accepts controls, he determines the residual risk associated with each
hazard and the overall residual risk for the mission.
• Residual risk is the risk remaining after controls have been
selected for the hazard. Residual risk is valid (true) only if the
controls for it are implemented. As controls for hazards are
identified and selected, the hazards are reassessed as in Step 2
and the level of risk is then revised. This process is repeated until
the level of residual risk is acceptable to the commander or leader
or cannot be further reduced. See Figures A-3 through A-5.
• Overall residual risk of a mission must be determined when more
than one hazard is identified. The residual risk for each of these
hazards may have a different level, depending on the assessed
probability and severity of the hazardous incident. Overall
residual mission risk should be determined based on the incident
having the greatest residual risk. Determining overall mission risk
by averaging the risks of all hazards is not valid. If one hazard has
high risk, the overall residual risk of the mission is high, no matter
how many moderate or low risk hazards are present.
Substep B – Make Risk Decision
A key element of the risk decision is determining if the risk is
justified. The commander must compare and balance the risk against
mission expectations. He alone decides if controls are sufficient and
acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he
determines the risk level is too high, he directs the development of
additional controls or alternate controls, or he modifies, changes, or
rejects the COA.
Leaders can use the risk assessment matrix in Figure 2-4—in
conjunction with their commanders’ guidance—to communicate how
much risk they are willing to delegate. For example, a commander may
place constraints on his subordinates that restrict their freedom of action
to accept risk in instances where the risk might imperil his intent, his
higher commander’s intent, or a critical capability of the unit.

FM 100-14
2-17
STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS
Leaders and staffs ensure that controls are integrated into SOPs,
written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and staff estimates. The
critical check for this step, with oversight, is to ensure that controls
are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood at all
l e v e l s . I m p l e m e n t i n g c o n t r o l s i n c l u d e s c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d
communication with—
• Appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and those
executing the mission.
• Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) organizations
and civilian agencies that are part of the force.
The media, NGOs, and PVOs must be included in coordination when
their presence impacts or is impacted by the force.
Leaders must explain how supervisors will implement controls.
Examples of control implementation include—
• Conducting vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
• Conducting rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills, and so forth.
• Conducting intensive threat and friendly vehicle
identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air
defense weapons crews.
• Conducting orientation for replacement personnel.
• Installing and maintaining communications links for key
civilian organizations.
• Operating in convoys of four vehicles minimum.
• Carrying weapons and wearing flak jackets and helmets when
outside secure compounds.
STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE
Leaders must supervise the execution of their orders. The more
untrained the troops, the more detailed this supervision must be.
Infantry in Battle, 1939
During mission preparation and execution, leaders must ensure
that their subordinates understand how to execute risk controls.
Leaders continuously assess risks during the conduct of operations,

Risk Management
2-18
especially during long-term missions. Leaders maintain situational
awareness. They guard against complacency to ensure that risk
control standards are not relaxed or violated. To gain insight into areas
needing improvement, leaders must continuously evaluate their
units’ effectiveness in managing mission risks.
Supervise
Leaders supervise mission rehearsal and execution to ensure
standards and controls are enforced. Techniques may include spot-
checks, inspections, situation reports and brief-backs, buddy checks,
and close supervision. During the mission, leaders continuously
monitor controls to ensure they remain effective. They modify them as
necessary. Leaders and individuals anticipate, identify, and assess new
hazards to implement controls. They continually assess variable
hazards such as fatigue, equipment serviceability, and the environment.
Leaders modify controls to keep risks at an acceptable level.
During sustained operations, leaders continue planning to ensure
that controls emplaced at the beginning of the mission apply to
changes in the operation’s current situation and to hazardous
conditions. Leaders must maintain an extraordinary degree of
discipline. They must avoid complacency, which can result from
boredom and overconfidence. Leaders must ensure that soldiers do
not relax their vigilance due to performing repetitive tasks—despite
changing roles and missions, unit turbulence and turnover, and
declining skills. Leaders maintain a close overwatch on controls put in
place to reduce risks over a prolonged period. For example, during
stability operations, land mine hazards may not be solved in the near
term, but may require continual attention. Other examples of long-
term hazards that may be encountered include—
• Climatic extremes.
• NBC and hazardous waste contamination.
• Diseases native to a particular area of operation or indigenous
population.
• Terrorist threats.
Evaluate
After a mission, leaders and individuals evaluate how well the
risk management process was executed. They—
• Determine how to ensure that successes are continued to the
next mission.

FM 100-14
2-19
• Capture and disseminate lessons learned so that others may
benefit from the experience.
• Consider the effectiveness of the risk assessment in identifying
and accurately assessing the probability and severity of hazards
that resulted in mission degradation.
• Determine whether the level of residual risk of each hazard and
of the overall mission were accurately estimated.
• Evaluate the effectiveness of each control in reducing or
removing risk, including whether controls were effectively
communicated, implemented and enforced.
Leaders and individuals determine why some controls were
ineffective and what should be done when the hazard is encountered
again. A control may be altered; the way it is implemented or
supervised may be changed to make it effective; or a completely
different control may be more effective. Leaders must energize the
system to fix systemic problems that hinder combat effectiveness.
Figure 2-7 shows that the risk management process continues
throughout a mission as well as from mission to mission. It is
integral to the military decision-making process. Its application
requires good judgment and intuitive analysis borne of confidence,
experience, and situational awareness.
TOOLS AND PITFALLS
The appendix provides examples of risk management tools to
help leaders assess identified hazards, develop controls, and make
risk decisions. The tools should be tailored to suit particular situations
and missions. The examples in Figures A-3 through A-5 are tools to
manage risk at the tactical level. The example in Figure A-6 is a tool to
manage risk at the operational level. Units may develop additional
tools suitable for their needs.
Units train to a standard. They operate and train regardless of the
degree of real or perceived difficulty. Risk reduction begins with
commanders identifying their METLs. Commanders use the risk
management process to assess the degree of risk related to each METL
their unit must perform. From this assessment, risk reducing standard
operating procedures evolve.
F i g u r e A – 7 p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f r i s k m a n a g e m e n t
considerations integrated into a mission training plan (MTP) task.

Risk Management
2-20
Step 1. Identify Hazards
Step 2. Assess Hazards
Determine risk level for each hazard and overall
mission risk
Estimateprobability
Estimateseverity
1As controls for hazards are identified and selected the hazards are
reassessed as in Step 2
Step 4. Implement Controls
Step 5. Supervise and Evaluate
Supervise Evaluate
MISSIONS
New Controls
New Hazards
LessonsLearned
Apply METT-T
Makedecision
Step 3. Develop Controls and
Make Risk Decision
Determine residual risk
level for each hazard
and overall residual
mission risk1
Developcontrols
Figure 2-7. Continuous Application of Risk Management

FM 100-14
2-21
Pitfalls arise when risk management tools are used without
adaptation to the factors of METT-T. Using a standardized risk
assessment card or checklist may be of some value initially in the
mission analysis and COA development or in cases where a routine
task is performed in an unchanging environment or static situation.
However, such a tool used alone will not likely identify all hazards for
every mission in a changing operational environment.
Completing the risk assessment alone, but failing to identify
effective controls, usually results in a GO or NO-GO decision based on
the initial risk. If the risk assessment does not accurately identify the
hazards and determine the level of residual risk, the leader is likely to
make his risk decision based upon incomplete or inaccurate
information. If the risk assessment places missions in a routine, low-
risk category, the commander may not be informed of a risk decision
resulting in an accepted risk level that could imperil his or his higher
commander ’s intent or other affected organizations. The risk
management process is intended to provide reasonable controls to
support mission accomplishment without exposing the force to
unnecessary residual risk.

Page

of 22

ZOOM

2-0

Chapter 2

Risk Management Process

First reckon, then risk

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk
management process. It illustrates the application of
each step to military operations through the factors
of METT-T.

THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW

Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling
hazards to conserve combat power and resources.

FM 100-14

2-1

Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with
Military Decision-Making Tasks

Risk Management

2-2

influence. The two types of risk that exist across the wide range of
Army operations are

tactical risks

and

accident risks.

•

Tactical risk

is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of
the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. It applies to all
levels of war and across the spectrum of operations.
•

Accident risk

STEPS 1 AND 2

STEPS 3 THROUGH 5

THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED

STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS

hazard

FM 100-14

2-3

mission receipt, mission analysis, COA
development

, and

COA analysis

Mission

Enemy

Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant
hazards to the operation. For example, “What can the enemy do to

Risk Management

2-4

Terrain and Weather

FM 100-14

2-5

Terrain.

The five main military aspects of terrain—

observation and
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain and decisive terrain,
and avenues of approach (OCOKA)—

Observation and fields of fire.

Hazards associated with this usually
involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and
when friendly unit weapons capabilities allow it to effectively
engage the enemy.
•

Cover and concealment.

Hazards associated with cover and
concealment are created by the enemy’s ability to place direct or
indirect fire on friendly forces.
•

Obstacles.

Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or
tactical. They may be due to natural conditions such as rivers or
swamps or man-made such as minefields or built-up areas.
•

Key terrain and decisive terrain.

Hazards are a marked advantage
terrain provides to the enemy if he controls such terrain or
denies its use to friendly forces.
•

Avenues of approach.

Weather.

Risk Management

2-6

Troops

Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers.

Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation.

Hazards associated with long-term missions.

Time Available

FM 100-14

2-7

time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units
to accomplish their mission.

Civilians

The commander ’s legal responsibility is to consider hazards to,
and safeguarding of, civilians in his area of operations.

Civilians

In a wartime environment.

The commander must consider the
hazard of collateral damage which may result in creating
new adversaries.
•

In a

peacetime environment.

The commander must consider the
political attitudes and previous actions of civilians in identifying
hazards to friendly forces and the populace itself.

Adversaries

STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS

mission analysis, COA development,

and

COA analysis.

Risk Management

2-8

Substep A

Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the

probability

represents

frequent

probability.

FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced

LIKELY (B) Occurs several times

OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically

Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability

FM 100-14

2-9
Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)

Substep B

Substep B addresses the

severity

of the four degrees of hazard severity. The

Roman numerals
in parentheses following each degree (I through IV) provide a
convenient symbol for depicting severity. For example,

represents
the

catastrophic

degree of severity.

SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time

UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible

Risk Management

2-10

CATASTROPHIC (I)

CRITICAL (II)

MARGINAL (III)

NEGLIGIBLE (IV)

Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity

Substep C

FM 100-14

2-11

critical

severity (II) and a

likely

Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix

Risk Management

2-12

E – E x t r e m e l y H i g h :

Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazardsoccur during mission. A

frequent

or likely probability of catastrophic loss(IA or IB) or

frequent

probability of

critical

loss (IIA) exists.

E x a m p l e :

H – H i g h :

Occasional

seldom

probability ofcatastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A

likely

occasional

probabilityexists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring.

Frequent

probability of

marginal

losses (IIIA) exists.

E x a m p l e :

high risk

M – M o d e r a t e :

Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if
hazards occur during mission. An

unlikely

probability of catastrophicloss (IE) exists. The probability of a

critical

loss is

seldom

(IID).

Marginal

losses occur with a

likely

occasional

probability

(IIIB or IIIC). A

frequent

probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists.

E x a m p l e :

critical

impacton his combat power. He realizes that if the enemy forces him to
abandon his forward positions, the severity of the loss of his

Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk

FM 100-14

2-13

likely

, but that the probabilityof the enemy being reinforced and attacking in overwhelming force is
remote

(seldom)

. The commander concludes that the risk of conductinga counterattack with limited ammunition is greater than the

moderate

risk of the enemy pushing him back.

L – L o w :

Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing themission. The probability of

critical

loss is

unlikely

(IIE), while that of

marginal

loss is

seldom

(IIID) or

unlikely

(IIIE). The probability of a

negligible

Page

of 22

ZOOM

2-0

Chapter 2

Risk Management Process

First reckon, then risk

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk
management process. It illustrates the application of
each step to military operations through the factors
of METT-T.

THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW

Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling
hazards to conserve combat power and resources.

FM 100-14

2-1

Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with
Military Decision-Making Tasks

Risk Management

2-2

influence. The two types of risk that exist across the wide range of
Army operations are

tactical risks

and

accident risks.

•

Tactical risk

is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of
the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. It applies to all
levels of war and across the spectrum of operations.
•

Accident risk

STEPS 1 AND 2

STEPS 3 THROUGH 5

THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED

STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS

hazard

FM 100-14

2-3

mission receipt, mission analysis, COA
development

, and

COA analysis

Mission

Enemy

Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant
hazards to the operation. For example, “What can the enemy do to

Risk Management

2-4

Terrain and Weather

FM 100-14

2-5

Terrain.

The five main military aspects of terrain—

observation and
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain and decisive terrain,
and avenues of approach (OCOKA)—

Observation and fields of fire.

Hazards associated with this usually
involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and
when friendly unit weapons capabilities allow it to effectively
engage the enemy.
•

Cover and concealment.

Hazards associated with cover and
concealment are created by the enemy’s ability to place direct or
indirect fire on friendly forces.
•

Obstacles.

Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or
tactical. They may be due to natural conditions such as rivers or
swamps or man-made such as minefields or built-up areas.
•

Key terrain and decisive terrain.

Hazards are a marked advantage
terrain provides to the enemy if he controls such terrain or
denies its use to friendly forces.
•

Avenues of approach.

Weather.

Risk Management

2-6

Troops

Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers.

Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation.

Hazards associated with long-term missions.

Time Available

FM 100-14

2-7

time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units
to accomplish their mission.

Civilians

The commander ’s legal responsibility is to consider hazards to,
and safeguarding of, civilians in his area of operations.

Civilians

In a wartime environment.

The commander must consider the
hazard of collateral damage which may result in creating
new adversaries.
•

In a

peacetime environment.

The commander must consider the
political attitudes and previous actions of civilians in identifying
hazards to friendly forces and the populace itself.

Adversaries

STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS

mission analysis, COA development,

and

COA analysis.

Risk Management

2-8

Substep A

Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the

probability

represents

frequent

probability.

FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced

LIKELY (B) Occurs several times

OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically

Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability

FM 100-14

2-9
Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)

Substep B

Substep B addresses the

severity

of the four degrees of hazard severity. The

Roman numerals
in parentheses following each degree (I through IV) provide a
convenient symbol for depicting severity. For example,

represents
the

catastrophic

degree of severity.

SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time

UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible

Risk Management

2-10

CATASTROPHIC (I)

CRITICAL (II)

MARGINAL (III)

NEGLIGIBLE (IV)

Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity

Substep C

FM 100-14

2-11

critical

severity (II) and a

likely

Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix

Risk Management

2-12

E – E x t r e m e l y H i g h :

Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazardsoccur during mission. A

frequent

or likely probability of catastrophic loss(IA or IB) or

frequent

probability of

critical

loss (IIA) exists.

E x a m p l e :

H – H i g h :

Occasional

seldom

probability ofcatastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A

likely

occasional

probabilityexists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring.

Frequent

probability of

marginal

losses (IIIA) exists.

E x a m p l e :

high risk

M – M o d e r a t e :

Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if
hazards occur during mission. An

unlikely

probability of catastrophicloss (IE) exists. The probability of a

critical

loss is

seldom

(IID).

Marginal

losses occur with a

likely

occasional

probability

(IIIB or IIIC). A

frequent

probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists.

E x a m p l e :

critical

impacton his combat power. He realizes that if the enemy forces him to
abandon his forward positions, the severity of the loss of his

Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk

FM 100-14

2-13

likely

, but that the probabilityof the enemy being reinforced and attacking in overwhelming force is
remote

(seldom)

. The commander concludes that the risk of conductinga counterattack with limited ammunition is greater than the

moderate

risk of the enemy pushing him back.

L – L o w :

Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing themission. The probability of

critical

loss is

unlikely

(IIE), while that of

marginal

loss is

seldom

(IIID) or

unlikely

(IIIE). The probability of a

negligible

Running Head: TRANSFORMING INFORMATION 1

TRANSFORMING INFORMATION 4

Transforming Information.

Tommy T Bush

University of North Texas

12/15/2021

Basically, in any project, there has to be a continuous process that should be implemented from inception to the completion of the respective project. In most cases, risk management becomes effective at the early stages of the project. It is worth noting that risk is any unforeseen condition or event that has a negative or a positive impact on the respective project when it occurs (Ray, 2021). However, there is a need to apply laws and legal concepts when developing strategic decisions in the risk management process. Regulations play a significant role in the risk management process where they define and manage the actual approaches to risk within and outside the respective organization. This paper aims at discussing how the laws apply in managing risks in a recreational facility.

Risk management in a recreational facility helps provide high-level information about the risk. According to Moorhead & Vaughan (2015), the risk management process plays several roles in the organization that it is being applied. One of the most influential roles is the balancing of the risk and the profit made by the organization. Through this role, the risk management factor develops a facilitative role in the respective organization (Ray, 2021). On the other hand, the risk management process controls risk occurrences through decision-making processes, assessment, and control. There is a need to have legal concepts to identify the natural source of the risk.

Risk management in recreational facilities helps to control and avoid cases of injuries to guests and also the employees within the recreational facility. It is the moral responsibility of the operators within the recreational facility to ensure that every person within that recreational facility is safe. Some of the laws that guide recreational facilities in managing risk include the provisions on reducing any unforeseen hazard, reducing consequences of the event, and providing cost-effective and comprehensive insurance. However, many initiatives are enforced by government agencies and are required by law. Therefore, without laws and legal concepts, risk management could be a difficult task to perform.

Risk is generally categorized into three different levels, which include real risk, perceived risk, and inherent risk. The real risk is a justified likelihood of an incident by analyzing statistics and the relevant data (O’Conno, 2021). On the other hand, perceived risk is the perception of the people involved in evaluating and undertaking different roles within the organization. Lastly, inherent risk is the type of risk that occurs through the existence of certain activities in an organization. These are the common types of risk that are considered during the risk management process.

The recreational facility can perform the risk management process through different steps. The first step in the risk management process is assessing the risk. Risk assessment can be done through discussions with the leaders in the management positions and the junior staff. More so, the team involved in the risk management process of the recreational facility has to ensure that the objectives of the recreational facility are defined as it provides confidence in the process of risk assessment (O’Conno, 2021).

Risk assessment clearly understands what to consider when identifying risks within the recreational facility. On the other hand, information should be gathered from various sources to determine the risk. Some of the most reliable sources include Political, Economic, Social, Technological Environment & Legal PEST (EL). Through the help of risk identification tools such as judgment-based, brainstorming, checklists, among others, will help in managing risk in the respective recreational facility. After identifying the risk fully, it is very important to document the risk identified as it helps guide future risk identification exercises.

The second step in the risk management process in a recreational facility is risk analysis. In this stage, the probability of the risk occurrence is determined. More so, the risk management team determines the severity of the risk if it occurs. Risk analysis embraces two primary concepts: avoidance to exposure and loss reduction. Basically, loss reduction is a situation where steps to mitigate the damage of the risk are acknowledged. Exposure avoidance is a situation where mitigation strategies are used to avoid direct exposure to the risk (Martins, 2021). Some of the laws that support exposure to risk involve policies that govern access to some environmental regions due to certain threats. However, the recreational facility may decide to control the number of guests attending the recreational facilities due to health issues.

References

Martins, J. (2021, May 7). The project risk management process in 6 clear steps • Asana. Retrieved from https://asana.com/resources/project-risk-management-process

O’Conno, S. W. (2021, March 30). The project risk management process | 5 tips for success. Retrieved from https://www.northeastern.edu/graduate/blog/project-risk-management/

Ray, S. (2021, February 26). The risk management process in project management. Retrieved from https://www.projectmanager.com/blog/risk-management-process-steps

Rowe, C. (2021). The 5 step risk management process. Retrieved from https://www.clearrisk.com/risk-management-blog/bid/47395/the-risk-management-process-in-5-steps-1

RESM 5530

Final Project – Looking at the Law Differently

Student ______________________________ Grade _________

· Identify Hazards Present in Area of Interests

· Create Acronym

· Acronym Relates to Area of Interest

· “Legal” included as Factor in Acronym

· Identify Legal Concept

· Legal Concept ______________________

· Underlined-Words Transformation Clearly Related to Area of Interest (Can Identify Area of Interest)

· Organization of Paper

· Overall Comments

Chapter 2

Risk Management

Process
First reckon, then risk

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk
management process. It illustrates the application of
each step to military operations through the factors
of METT-T.

THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW
Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling

hazards to conserve combat power and resources. The five steps of
risk management are—

• Step 1. Identify hazards.

• Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risks.

• Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.

• Step 4. Implement controls.

• Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.

This five-step process is integrated into the military decision-making
process as shown in Figure

2-1

FM 100-40 provides insight into the context in which the risk
management process is applied herein. Areas of particular interest in
FM 100-40 include—

• Solving tactical problems (Chapter 1).

• The science and art of tactics (Chapter 1).

• Hasty versus deliberate operations (Chapter 1).

• The plan-prepare-execute cycle (Chapter 1).

• Basic tactical control measures (Chapter 2).

• The factors of METT-T (Chapter 2).

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[A mnemonic used by U.S. Army commanders to remember and prioritize what to analyze during the planning phase of an operation. It stands for Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain – Time].

FM 100-14

Mission Receipt

Mission Analysis

COA Development

COA Analysis

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Orders Production

Rehearsal 1

Execution and 1
Assessment

Step 1
Identify
Hazards

Step 2
Assess
Hazards

Step 3
Develop
Controls

and
Make Risk
Decision

Step 4
Implement
Controls

Step 5
Supervise and

Evaluate
Military Decision-
Making Process

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Risk Management Steps

X X X

1All boxes are marked to emphasize the continued use of the risk management
process throughout the mission

Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with
Military Decision-Making Tasks

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(Course of Action)

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Risk Management

influence. The two types of risk that exist across the wide range of
Army operations are tactical risks and accident risks.

• Tactical risk is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of
the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. It applies to all
levels of war and across the spectrum of operations.

• Accident risk includes all operational risk considerations other
than tactical risk. It includes risks to the friendly force. It also
includes risks posed to civilians by an operation, as well as an
operations impact on the environment. It can include activities
associated with hazards concerning friendly personnel,
civilians, equipment readiness, and environmental conditions.

STEPS 1 AND 2
Steps 1 and 2 together comprise the risk assessment. In Step 1,

individuals identify the hazards that may be encountered in executing
a mission. In Step 2, they determine the direct impact of each hazard on
the operation. The risk assessment provides for enhanced situational
awareness. This awareness builds confidence and allows soldiers and
units to take timely, efficient, and effective protective measures.

STEPS 3 THROUGH 5
Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to

effectively manage risk. In these steps, leaders balance risk against
costs—political, economic, environmental, and to combat power—
and take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk. During
execution, as well as during planning and preparation, leaders
continuously assess the risk to the overall mission and to those
involved in the task. Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate the
effectiveness of controls and provide lessons learned so that others
may benefit from the experience.

THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED

STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS

A hazard is an actual or potential condition where the following
can occur due to exposure to the hazard:

• Injury, illness, or death of personnel.
• Damage to or loss of equipment and property.
• Mission degradation.

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The ability of unit leaders and staffs to identify hazards is key. One
reality of today’s missions is that the aspect of a hazard can change
rapidly. Things of little risk initially can quickly become major threats
due to unforeseen natural or man-made events. Leaders should be
aware of this possibility. Complacency to the fact that existing controls
may not continue to control hazards in rapidly changing situations
should be viewed as a hazard in itself.

The factors of METT-T provide a sound framework for identifying
hazards when planning, preparing, and executing operations. When
applying risk management to METT-T during mission analysis,
leaders and staffs should look for hazards that affect both tactical and
accident risks. They must identify all hazards that may present
significant risks to the mission.

Mission

• A scheme of maneuver that is difficult to understand or too
complex for accurate communications down to the lowest level.

• The impact of operating under a fragmentary order (FRAGO).

Enemy

Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant
hazards to the operation. For example, “What can the enemy do to

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Risk Management

defeat my operation?” Common shortfalls that can create hazards
during operations against an enemy include failure to—

• Assess potential advantages to the enemy provided by the
battlefield environment.

• Fully assess the enemy’s capabilities.
• Understand enemy collection capabilities and friendly

vulnerabilities to those capabilities.
• Accurately determine the enemy’s probable COAs.
• Plan and coordinate active ground and aerial reconnaissance

activities.
• Disseminate intelligence about the enemy to lower levels.
• Identifying terrorist threats and capabilities.
Intelligence plays a critical part in identifying hazards associated

with tactical risk. Intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) is a
dynamic staff process that continually integrates new information and
intelligence that ultimately becomes input to the commander ’s risk
assessment process. Intelligence assists in identifying hazards during
operations by—

• Identifying the opportunities and constraints the battlefield
environment offers to threat and friendly forces.

• Thoroughly portraying threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
• Collecting information on populations, governments, and

infrastructures.
FMs 34-130 and 34-60, respectively, provide detailed information on
IPB and on counterintelligence operations and multidiscipline
counterintelligence analysis.

Terrain and Weather
In addition to those due to the enemy or adversaries, the most

obvious hazards to military operations are due to terrain and weather.
Terrain and weather affect the type of hazard encountered. When the
enemy uses terrain to his advantage, the risk is clearly tactical. The
aspects of terrain and weather may create situations where accident
risks predominate. When looking at this from a purely mission
perspective, familiarity of the unit with the terrain and its associated
environment must be paramount. Basic issues include—

• How long the unit has operated in the environment and climate.
• Whether the terrain has been crossed before.

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FM 100-14

Terrain. The five main military aspects of terrain—observation and
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain and decisive terrain,
and avenues of approach (OCOKA)—can be used to identify and assess
hazards impacting on friendly forces. Chapter 2 of FM 100-40 has
details on OCOKA. The terrain analysis includes both map and on-the-
ground reconnaissance to identify how well unit capabilities and
mission demands can be accommodated by the terrain.

• Observation and fields of fire. Hazards associated with this usually
involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and
when friendly unit weapons capabilities allow it to effectively
engage the enemy.

• Cover and concealment. Hazards associated with cover and
concealment are created by the enemy’s ability to place direct or
indirect fire on friendly forces.

• Obstacles. Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or
tactical. They may be due to natural conditions such as rivers or
swamps or man-made such as minefields or built-up areas.

• Key terrain and decisive terrain. Hazards are a marked advantage
terrain provides to the enemy if he controls such terrain or
denies its use to friendly forces.

• Avenues of approach. Hazards associated with avenues of
approach can affect both tactical and accident risks. Such
hazards include conditions where an avenue of approach
impedes deployment of friendly combat power or where it
supports deployment of enemy combat power.

Weather. Weather works hand-in-hand with terrain to create
hazards. To identify weather hazards, leaders and soldiers must
assess the impact on operating systems. Mistakes include not
considering the—

• Adverse effects of heat and cold hazards on the performance
of soldiers.

• Effects of climate and weather on maintenance of vehicles and
equipment before beginning an operation.

• Hazardous effects of weather on the five military aspects
of terrain.

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Troops
Leaders analyze the capabilities of available friendly troops.

A s s o c i a t e d h a z a rd s i m p a c t b o t h t h e s o l d i e r a n d u n i t . K e y
considerations are level of training, manning levels, the condition and
maintenance of vehicles and equipment, morale, availability of
supplies and services, and the physical and emotional health of
soldiers. Leaders and soldiers must be vigilant to the fact that hazards
in these areas can adversely affect a mission, even when all tactical
considerations point to success. Mission failure can be caused by—

• Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers. Inadequate
sanitation facilities, water purification capabilities, medical
attention, and evacuation capabilities are key hazards that can
arise from incomplete logistical planning. Care of troops requires
long-range projections of all classes of supply, with close
monitoring of mission changes that could impact availability or
depletion of supplies. When beginning an operation immediately
upon arriving in theater, hazards include not implementing
measures to help soldiers overcome fatigue or acclimatize them to
the geographical area and associated climate.

• Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation.
Hazards include how long units have worked together under a
particular command relationship. During stability operations,
task organizations may change often. Hazards include poor
communication, unfamiliarity with higher headquarters SOPs,
and insufficient combat power to accomplish the mission.

• Hazards associated with long-term missions. Long-term missions
include nation building, peacekeeping, or insurgency/
counterinsurgency operations. Hazards associated with these
missions include the turmoil of personnel turnover, lack of
continuity of leadership, inexperience, and lack of knowledge of
the situation and the unit’s operating procedures. An especially
insidious hazard is critical-skills atrophy that results from not
performing METL-related missions.

Time Available
The hazard is insufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute

operations. Planning time is always at a premium. Leaders routinely
apply the one-third/two-thirds rule to ensure their subordinate units
are given maximum time to plan. Failure to accomplish a mission on

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time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units
to accomplish their mission.

Civilians
The commander ’s legal responsibility is to consider hazards to,

and safeguarding of, civilians in his area of operations. Civilians
include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary
organizations (PVOs), US Government civilians, foreign national
civilians, the media, and dislocated civilians put at risk by military
operations. The commander must consider hazards that can occur
across the range of operations, such as—

• In a wartime environment. The commander must consider the
hazard of collateral damage which may result in creating
new adversaries.

• In a peacetime environment. The commander must consider the
political attitudes and previous actions of civilians in identifying
hazards to friendly forces and the populace itself.

Adversaries are hostile elements other than the enemy that may be
encountered during any operation. They present additional hazards.
They may be organized opposition or individuals that challenge
authority. They may include such diverse elements as rioters,
criminals, rogues, or gangs that might want to harass a peace
enforcement mission.

STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS

The incident must be credible in that it must have a reasonable
expectation of happening. The end result is an estimate of risk from
each hazard and an estimate of the overall risk to the mission caused
by hazards that cannot be eliminated. Leaders must also assess the
risk to civilians posed by the operation. They may need to assess the
operations’ impact on the environment. This step is conducted in
three substeps.

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Risk Management

Substep A

Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the probability
of a hazardous incident. The probability levels estimated for each
hazard may be based on the mission, COAs being developed and
analyzed, or frequency of a similar event. Figure 2-2 provides a
summary of the five degrees of probability. The letters in parentheses
following each degree (A through E) provide a symbol for depicting
probability. For example, the letter A represents frequent probability.

FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced

Single item Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur
several times over duration of a specific mission or
operation. Always occurs.

Fleet or inventory of
items

Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
operation, or over a service life.

Individual soldier Occurs very often in career. Expected to occur several
times during mission or operation. Always occurs.

All soldiers exposed Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
operation.

LIKELY (B) Occurs several times

Single item Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur
during a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of
items

Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently
(regular intervals, generally often,).

Individual soldier Occurs several times in career. Expected to occur during
a specific mission or operation.

All soldiers exposed Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.

OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically

Single item Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as
often as not during a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of
items

Occurs several times in service life.

Individual soldier Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific
mission or operation, but not often.

All soldiers exposed Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes).

Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability

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FM 100-14

Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)

Substep B

Substep B addresses the severity of each hazard. It is expressed in
terms of—

• Degree of injury or illness.

• Loss of or damage to equipment or property.

• Environmental damage.

• Other mission-impairing factors such as lost combat power.

The degree of severity estimated for each hazard may be based on
knowledge of the results of similar past events. Figure 2-3 provides a
summary of the four degrees of hazard severity. The Roman numerals
in parentheses following each degree (I through IV) provide a
convenient symbol for depicting severity. For example, I represents
the catastrophic degree of severity.

SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time

Single item Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not
expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of
items

Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur some time
in service life, but rarely. Usually does not occur.

Individual soldier Occurs as isolated incident during a career. Remotely
possible, but not expected to occur during a specific
mission or operation.

All soldiers exposed Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated
incidents.

UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible

Single item Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost
never occur in service life. Can assume will not occur
during a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of
items

Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents
may occur over service life.

Individual soldier Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur
in career or during a specific mission or operation.

All soldiers exposed Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.

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Risk Management

CATASTROPHIC (I) Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or
mission failure. Death or permanent total
disability (accident risk). Loss of major or
mission-critical system or equipment. Major
p r o p e r t y ( f a c i l i t y ) d a m a g e . S e v e r e
environmental damage. Mission-critical
security failure. Unacceptable collateral
damage.

CRITICAL (II) Significantly (severely) degraded mission
capability or unit readiness. Permanent
partial disability, temporary total disability
exceeding 3 months time (accident risk).
Extensive (major) damage to equipment or
systems. Significant damage to property or
t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . S e c u r i t y f a i l u r e .
Significant collateral damage.

MARGINAL (III) Degraded mission capability or unit
readiness. Minor damage to equipment or
systems, property, or the environment. Lost
day due to injury or illness not exceeding 3
months (accident risk). Minor damage to
property or the environment.

NEGLIGIBLE (IV) Little or no adverse impact on mission
capability. First aid or minor medical
treatment (accident risk). Slight equipment
or system damage, but fully functional and
s e r v i c e a bl e. L i t t l e o r n o p r o p e r t y o r
environmental damage.

Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity

Substep C

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Figure 2-4 is a standardized matrix that can be used to assist in this
process. Leaders and staffs enter the estimated degree of severity and
probability for each hazard in Substeps A and B from the severity row
and probability column, respectively. The point where the severity
row and probability column intersect defines the level of risk. For
example, if the hazard is estimated to have a critical severity (II) and a
likely probability (B), the level of risk is high (H).

Figure 2-5 provides a summary of the levels of risk. It also
provides examples of hazardous incidents for each risk level. Several
examples illustrate the trade-off between tactical and accident risks.

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Risk Assessment Matrix

Probability

Severity Frequent
A

Likely
B

Occasional
C

Seldom
D

Unlikely

Catastrophic

Critical

Marginal

Negligible

III

E
E

E
H
M

H
H
M
L
H
M
L
L
M
L
L
L

E –
H –
M –
L –

Extremely High Risk
High Risk
Moderate Risk
Low Risk

Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix

Risk Management

E – E x t r e m e l y H i g h : Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazards
occur during mission. A frequent or likely probability of catastrophic loss
(IA or IB) or frequent probability of critical loss (IIA) exists.
E x a m p l e : A commander finds that one of his implied tasks to attack an
objective involves crossing a normally shallow riverbed. After looking at
the factors of METT-T, he discovers that three days of intense rain have
raised the water level to rise above flood stage, with currents far in
excess of his ability to safely ford with armored vehicles. After
discussing COAs with his staff, he determines the accident risk is
extremely high because of the likely probability and catastrophic
severity of losing vehicles and killing soldiers. His conclusions are
based on his experience with and knowledge of fording armored
vehicles under the existing conditions of water depth and current
speed.

H – H i g h : Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the
required mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the
mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if hazards
occur during the mission. Occasional to seldom probability of
catastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A likely to occasional probability
exists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring. Frequent probability of
marginal losses (IIIA) exists.
E x a m p l e : During a preplanned ambush, the leader discovers that the
force he intends to ambush has significantly more combat power than
his own force can accommodate. He realizes that he could only delay
rather than destroy the enemy. He knows his casualty estimates would
be very high if the enemy reorganized and counterattacked. He also
knows that the size of the enemy force could seriously impact adjacent
units conducting a movement to contact. He determines the situation is
high risk because he estimates (based on his training and experience)
t h e r e i s a l i ke l y p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e e n e my r e o r g a n i z i n g a n d
counterattacking and the severity of loss to his unit would be critical.

M – M o d e r a t e : Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of the
required mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if
hazards occur during mission. An unlikely probability of catastrophic
loss (IE) exists. The probability of a critical loss is seldom (IID). Marginal
losses occur with a likely or occasional probability (IIIB or IIIC). A
frequent probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists.
E x a m p l e : A commander in a defensive position receives a warning order
to be prepared to counterattack if the enemy attacks again. He chooses
to use pre-positioned ammunition caches to support his defense, as
opposed to moving his ammunition resupply forward by truck. He
determines that the severity of not having an immediate resupply of
ammunition available during the counterattack will have a critical impact
on his combat power. He realizes that if the enemy forces him to
abandon his forward positions, the severity of the loss of his

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Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk

FM 100-14

ammunition caches will critically impact his combat power. He
considers that his unit is deployed in excellent defensive positions. He
has repelled two attacks that resulted in the destruction of an estimated
50 percent of the enemy’s combat power. He receives information that
the probability of the enemy attacking is likely, but that the probability
of the enemy being reinforced and attacking in overwhelming force is
remote (seldom). The commander concludes that the risk of conducting
a counterattack with limited ammunition is greater than the moderate
risk of the enemy pushing him back.

L – L o w : Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the
mission. The probability of critical loss is unlikely (IIE), while that of
marginal loss is seldom (IIID) or unlikely (IIIE). The probability of a
negligible loss is likely or less (IVB through (IVE).
E x a m p l e : A mechanized task force (TF) conducting a movement to
contact in a desert environment is overtaken by nightfall before
reaching its limit of advance (LOA). The terrain along the axis of
advance is flat and open. Visibility is about 800 meters under a clear sky
illuminated by a full moon. Estimates put the enemy, which has been
hastily withdrawing for the past three days, at approximately 30 percent
strength. Contact has been light with no defensible terrain along the
TF’s axis. The TF commander considers all the factors. In addition, the
TF is 100 percent operational in using night vision devices. The TF
commander estimates that it is unlikely that his unit will incur losses of
critical severity by being surprised by the enemy or lose critical combat
power due to an accident. He estimates the risk to his force in
continuing a nighttime movement is low.

Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk (continued)

STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

Risk management is the recognition that decision making
occurs under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions must remain
consistent with the commander’s stated intent and offer a good
e x p e c t a t i o n o f s u c c e s s . T h e r i s k – t a k i n g s k i l l re q u i re s
competency as a prerequisite.

FM 100-7, Decisive Force:
The Army in Theater Operations, May 1995

Step 3 is accomplished in two substeps: develop controls and
make risk decisions. This is done during the COA development, COA
analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval of the military
decision-making process.

Substep A – Develop Controls
After assessing each hazard, leaders develop one or more controls

that either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or

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Risk Management

severity) of a hazardous incident. When developing controls, they
consider the reason for the hazard not just the hazard itself.

Types of Controls. Controls can take many forms, but fall
into three basic categories—educational controls, physical controls,
and avoidance.

• Educational controls. These controls are based on the knowledge
and skills of the units and individuals. Effective control is
implemented through individual and collective training that
ensures performance to standard.

• Physical controls. These controls may take the form of barriers
and guards or signs to warn individuals and units that a hazard
exists. Additionally, special controller or oversight personnel
responsible for locating specific hazards fall into this category.

• Avoidance. These controls are applied when leaders take positive
action to prevent contact with an identified hazard.

Criteria for Controls. To be effective, each control developed
must meet the following criteria:

• Suitability. It must remove the hazard or mitigate (reduce) the
residual risk to an acceptable level.

• Feasibility. The unit must have the capability to implement
the control.

• Acceptability. The benefit gained by implementing the control
must justify the cost in resources and time. The assessment of
acceptability is largely subjective. Figure 2-6 gives criteria for
determining acceptability of controls for each identified hazard.

Support Availability of adequate personnel, equipment,
supplies, and facilities necessary to implement a
suitable controls.

Standards Guidance and procedures for implementing a control
are clear, practical, and specific.

Training Knowledge and skills are adequate to implement a
control.

Leadership Leaders are competent to implement a control.

Individual Individual soldiers are sufficiently self-disciplined to
implement a control.

Figure 2-6. Criteria for Determining Acceptability of Controls

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Examples of Controls. Examples of controls include—

• Engineering or designing to eliminate or control hazards.

• Selecting a COA that avoids identified hazards.

• Limiting the number of people and the amount of time they are
exposed to hazards, consistent with mission requirements.

• Selecting personnel with appropriate mental, emotional, and
physical capabilities.

• Providing protective clothing, equipment, and safety and
security devices.

• Providing such services as adequate sanitation facilities and
water purification capabilities.

• Providing warning signs and signals.

• Scheduling vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.

• Planning training, including rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills,
and so forth.

• Programming communications links for key civilian organizations.

• Establishing battlefield controls such as areas of operations and
b o u n d a r i e s , d i re c t fi re c o n t ro l m e a s u re s , fi re s u p p o r t
coordination measures, rules of engagement, airspace control
measures, bridge classification, traffic control, and so forth.

• Developing terrorist attack warning systems and response plans.

The key is to specify who, what, where, when, and how each
control is to be used. For example—

• Planning and scheduling intensive threat and friendly vehicle
identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air defense
weapons crews before the mission reduces the probability of
engaging a friendly vehicle or aircraft (fratricide).

• Programming installation of crashworthy passenger seats in the
UH-60 Blackhawk, when mission circumstances do not indicate
their removal, can reduce the severity of injuries in crashes.

• Requiring soldiers to wear flak vests and helmets during
movement to contact, or when riding in vehicles in areas where
enemy fire is likely, can reduce the probability and severity of a
wound from small arms fire or fragments.

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Risk Management

• Establishing strong continuity documents and planning overlap
tours for key leaders facilitate smooth transitions during
extended operations.

Residual Risk. Once the responsible leader develops and
accepts controls, he determines the residual risk associated with each
hazard and the overall residual risk for the mission.

• Residual risk is the risk remaining after controls have been
selected for the hazard. Residual risk is valid (true) only if the
controls for it are implemented. As controls for hazards are
identified and selected, the hazards are reassessed as in Step 2
and the level of risk is then revised. This process is repeated until
the level of residual risk is acceptable to the commander or leader
or cannot be further reduced. See Figures A-3 through A-5.

• Overall residual risk of a mission must be determined when more
than one hazard is identified. The residual risk for each of these
hazards may have a different level, depending on the assessed
probability and severity of the hazardous incident. Overall
residual mission risk should be determined based on the incident
having the greatest residual risk. Determining overall mission risk
by averaging the risks of all hazards is not valid. If one hazard has
high risk, the overall residual risk of the mission is high, no matter
how many moderate or low risk hazards are present.

Substep B – Make Risk Decision

A key element of the risk decision is determining if the risk is
justified. The commander must compare and balance the risk against
mission expectations. He alone decides if controls are sufficient and
acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he
determines the risk level is too high, he directs the development of
additional controls or alternate controls, or he modifies, changes, or
rejects the COA.

Leaders can use the risk assessment matrix in Figure 2-4—in
conjunction with their commanders’ guidance—to communicate how
much risk they are willing to delegate. For example, a commander may
place constraints on his subordinates that restrict their freedom of action
to accept risk in instances where the risk might imperil his intent, his
higher commander’s intent, or a critical capability of the unit.

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STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

Leaders and staffs ensure that controls are integrated into SOPs,
written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and staff estimates. The
critical check for this step, with oversight, is to ensure that controls
are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood at all
l e v e l s . I m p l e m e n t i n g c o n t r o l s i n c l u d e s c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d
communication with—

• Appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and those
executing the mission.

• Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) organizations
and civilian agencies that are part of the force.

The media, NGOs, and PVOs must be included in coordination when
their presence impacts or is impacted by the force.

Leaders must explain how supervisors will implement controls.
Examples of control implementation include—

• Conducting vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.

• Conducting rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills, and so forth.

• Conducting intensive threat and friendly vehicle
identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air
defense weapons crews.

• Conducting orientation for replacement personnel.

• Installing and maintaining communications links for key
civilian organizations.

• Operating in convoys of four vehicles minimum.

• Carrying weapons and wearing flak jackets and helmets when
outside secure compounds.

STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

Leaders must supervise the execution of their orders. The more
untrained the troops, the more detailed this supervision must be.

Infantry in Battle, 1939

During mission preparation and execution, leaders must ensure
that their subordinates understand how to execute risk controls.
Leaders continuously assess risks during the conduct of operations,

2-17

Risk Management

especially during long-term missions. Leaders maintain situational
awareness. They guard against complacency to ensure that risk
control standards are not relaxed or violated. To gain insight into areas
needing improvement, leaders must continuously evaluate their
units’ effectiveness in managing mission risks.

Supervise
Leaders supervise mission rehearsal and execution to ensure

standards and controls are enforced. Techniques may include spot-
checks, inspections, situation reports and brief-backs, buddy checks,
and close supervision. During the mission, leaders continuously
monitor controls to ensure they remain effective. They modify them as
necessary. Leaders and individuals anticipate, identify, and assess new
hazards to implement controls. They continually assess variable
hazards such as fatigue, equipment serviceability, and the environment.
Leaders modify controls to keep risks at an acceptable level.

During sustained operations, leaders continue planning to ensure
that controls emplaced at the beginning of the mission apply to
changes in the operation’s current situation and to hazardous
conditions. Leaders must maintain an extraordinary degree of
discipline. They must avoid complacency, which can result from
boredom and overconfidence. Leaders must ensure that soldiers do
not relax their vigilance due to performing repetitive tasks—despite
changing roles and missions, unit turbulence and turnover, and
declining skills. Leaders maintain a close overwatch on controls put in
place to reduce risks over a prolonged period. For example, during
stability operations, land mine hazards may not be solved in the near
term, but may require continual attention. Other examples of long-
term hazards that may be encountered include—

• Climatic extremes.
• NBC and hazardous waste contamination.
• Diseases native to a particular area of operation or indigenous

population.
• Terrorist threats.

Evaluate
After a mission, leaders and individuals evaluate how well the

risk management process was executed. They—
• Determine how to ensure that successes are continued to the

next mission.

2-18

FM 100-14

• Capture and disseminate lessons learned so that others may
benefit from the experience.

• Consider the effectiveness of the risk assessment in identifying
and accurately assessing the probability and severity of hazards
that resulted in mission degradation.

• Determine whether the level of residual risk of each hazard and
of the overall mission were accurately estimated.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of each control in reducing or
removing risk, including whether controls were effectively
communicated, implemented and enforced.

Leaders and individuals determine why some controls were
ineffective and what should be done when the hazard is encountered
again. A control may be altered; the way it is implemented or
supervised may be changed to make it effective; or a completely
different control may be more effective. Leaders must energize the
system to fix systemic problems that hinder combat effectiveness.

Figure 2-7 shows that the risk management process continues
throughout a mission as well as from mission to mission. It is
integral to the military decision-making process. Its application
requires good judgment and intuitive analysis borne of confidence,
experience, and situational awareness.

TOOLS AND PITFALLS
The appendix provides examples of risk management tools to

help leaders assess identified hazards, develop controls, and make
risk decisions. The tools should be tailored to suit particular situations
and missions. The examples in Figures A-3 through A-5 are tools to
manage risk at the tactical level. The example in Figure A-6 is a tool to
manage risk at the operational level. Units may develop additional
tools suitable for their needs.

Units train to a standard. They operate and train regardless of the
degree of real or perceived difficulty. Risk reduction begins with
commanders identifying their METLs. Commanders use the risk
management process to assess the degree of risk related to each METL
their unit must perform. From this assessment, risk reducing standard
operating procedures evolve.

F i g u r e A – 7 p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f r i s k m a n a g e m e n t
considerations integrated into a mission training plan (MTP) task.

2-19

Risk Management

2-20

Step 1. Identify Hazards

Step 2. Assess Hazards

Determine risk level for
each hazard and overall
mission risk

Estimate
probability

Estimate
severity

1As controls for hazards are identified and selected the hazards are
reassessed as in Step 2

Step 4. Implement Controls

Step 5. Supervise and Evaluate

Supervise Evaluate

MISSIONS

New
Controls

New
Hazards

Lessons
Learned

Apply METT-T

Make
decision

Step 3. Develop Controls and
Make Risk Decision

Determine residual risk
level for each hazard
and overall residual
mission risk 1

Develop
controls

Figure 2-7. Continuous Application of Risk Management

FM 100-14

Pitfalls arise when risk management tools are used without
adaptation to the factors of METT-T. Using a standardized risk
assessment card or checklist may be of some value initially in the
mission analysis and COA development or in cases where a routine
task is performed in an unchanging environment or static situation.
However, such a tool used alone will not likely identify all hazards for
every mission in a changing operational environment.

Completing the risk assessment alone, but failing to identify
effective controls, usually results in a GO or NO-GO decision based on
the initial risk. If the risk assessment does not accurately identify the
hazards and determine the level of residual risk, the leader is likely to
make his risk decision based upon incomplete or inaccurate
information. If the risk assessment places missions in a routine, low-
risk category, the commander may not be informed of a risk decision
resulting in an accepted risk level that could imperil his or his higher
commander ’s intent or other affected organizations. The risk
management process is intended to provide reasonable controls to
support mission accomplishment without exposing the force to
unnecessary residual risk.

2-21

chapter no. – Chapter 2

chapter title – Risk Management Process

sec quote – First reckon, then risk
sec quote byline – Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke
intro text – This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk management process. It illus…

1st subhead – THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW

Body –

Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling hazards to conserve combat p…

bullet – • Step 1. Identify hazards.
bullet – • Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risks.
bullet – • Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
bullet – • Step 4. Implement controls.
bullet – • Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.
Body – This five-step process is integrated into the military decision-making process as shown in…
Body – FM�100�40 provides insight into the context in which the risk management process is applie…
bullet – • Solving tactical problems (Chapter 1).
bullet – • The science and art of tactics (Chapter 1).
bullet – • Hasty versus deliberate operations (Chapter 1).
bullet – • The plan-prepare-execute cycle (Chapter 1).
bullet – • Basic tactical control measures (Chapter 2).
bullet – • The factors of METT�T (Chapter 2).
Body – Risk decisions should be based upon awareness rather than mechanical habit. Leaders should…
bullet – • Tactical risk is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of the presence of eit…
bullet – • Accident risk includes all operational risk considerations other than tactical risk. I…

2nd sub – STEPS 1 AND 2

Body – Steps 1 and 2 together comprise the risk assessment. In Step 1, individuals identify the h…

2nd sub – STEPS 3 through 5

Body – Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to effectively manage risk. In …

1st subhead – THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED
2nd sub – STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS

Body – A hazard is an actual or potential condition where the following can occur due to exposure…
bullet – • Injury, illness, or death of personnel.
bullet – • Damage to or loss of equipment and property.
bullet – • Mission degradation.
Body – Hazards are sources of danger or risks due to enemy or adversary presence and other condit…
Body – The ability of unit leaders and staffs to identify hazards is key. One reality of today’s …
Body – The factors of METT�T provide a sound framework for identifying hazards when planning, pre…

3rd sub – Mission

Body – Leaders first analyze the assigned mission. They look at the type of mission to be accompl…
bullet – • A scheme of maneuver that is difficult to understand or too complex for accurate commu…
bullet – • The impact of operating under a fragmentary order (FRAGO).

3rd sub – Enemy

Body – Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant hazards to the operation. For…
bullet – • Assess potential advantages to the enemy provided by the battlefield environment.
bullet – • Fully assess the enemy’s capabilities.
bullet – • Understand enemy collection capabilities and friendly vulnerabilities to those capabil…
bullet – • Accurately determine the enemy’s probable COAs.
bullet – • Plan and coordinate active ground and aerial reconnaissance activities.
bullet – • Disseminate intelligence about the enemy to lower levels.
bullet – • Identifying terrorist threats and capabilities.
Body – Intelligence plays a critical part in identifying hazards associated with tactical risk. I…
bullet – • Identifying the opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to th…
bullet – • Thoroughly portraying threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
bullet – • Collecting information on populations, governments, and infrastructures.
Body – FMs�34�130 and 34�60, respectively, provide detailed information on IPB and on counterinte…

3rd sub – Terrain and Weather

Body – In addition to those due to the enemy or adversaries, the most obvious hazards to military…
bullet – • How long the unit has operated in the environment and climate.
bullet – • Whether the terrain has been crossed before.

4th sub – Terrain.

Body – The five main military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire, cover and concea…
bullet – • Observation and fields of fire. Hazards associated with this usually involve when the …
bullet – • Cover and concealment. Hazards associated with cover and concealment are created by th…
bullet – • Obstacles. Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or tactical. They may be …
bullet – • Key terrain and decisive terrain. Hazards are a marked advantage terrain provides to t…
bullet – • Avenues of approach. Hazards associated with avenues of approach can affect both tacti…

4th sub – Weather.

Body – Weather works hand-in-hand with terrain to create hazards. To identify weather hazards, le…
bullet – • Adverse effects of heat and cold hazards on the performance of soldiers.
bullet – • Effects of climate and weather on maintenance of vehicles and equipment before beginni…
bullet – • Hazardous effects of weather on the five military aspects of terrain.

3rd sub – Troops

Body – Leaders analyze the capabilities of available friendly troops. Associated hazards impact b…
bullet – • Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers. Inadequate sanitation facili…
bullet – • Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation. Hazards include h…
bullet – • Hazards associated with long-term missions. Long-term missions include nation building…

3rd sub – Time Available

Body – The hazard is insufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute operations. Planning time is…

3rd sub – Civilians

Body – The commander’s legal responsibility is to consider hazards to, and safeguarding of, civil…
bullet – • In a wartime environment. The commander must consider the hazard of collateral damage …
bullet – • In a peacetime environment. The commander must consider the political attitudes and pr…
Body – Adversaries are hostile elements other than the enemy that may be encountered during any o…

2nd sub – STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS

Body – Step 2 completes the risk assessment. Risk is the chance of hazard or bad consequences. Th…
Body – The incident must be credible in that it must have a reasonable expectation of happening. …

3rd sub – Substep A

Body – Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the probability of a hazardous incide…

Body –
fig 2-2 head – FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced

fig 2-2 body – Single item
fig 2-2 body – Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur several times over duration o…
fig 2-2 body – Fleet or inventory of items
fig 2-2 body – Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation, or over a service life.
fig 2-2 body – Individual soldier
fig 2-2 body – Occurs very often in career. Expected to occur several times during mission or ope…
fig 2-2 body – All soldiers exposed
fig 2-2 body – Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation.

fig 2-2 head – LIKELY (B) Occurs several times
fig 2-2 body – Single item

fig 2-2 body – Occurs several times in service life.

Expected to occur during a specific mission …

fig 2-2 body – Fleet or inventory of items

fig 2-2 body – Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently (regular intervals, generall…

fig 2-2 body – Individual soldier

fig 2-2 body – Occurs several times in career. Expected to occur during a specific mission or ope…

fig 2-2 body – All soldiers exposed

fig 2-2 body – Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.

fig 2-2 head – OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically
fig 2-2 body – Single item

fig 2-2 body – Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as often as not during a specifi…

fig 2-2 body – Fleet or inventory of items
fig 2-2 body – Occurs several times in service life.
fig 2-2 body – Individual soldier

fig 2-2 body – Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific mission or operation, but …

fig 2-2 body – All soldiers exposed

fig 2-2 body – Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes).

Body –
Body –
fig 2-2 head – SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time
fig 2-2 body – Single item

fig 2-2 body – Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not expected to occur during a…

fig 2-2 body – Fleet or inventory of items

fig 2-2 body – Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur some time in service life, but rar…

fig 2-2 body – Individual soldier

fig 2-2 body – Occurs as isolated incident during a career. Remotely possible, but not expected t…

fig 2-2 body – All soldiers exposed

fig 2-2 body – Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated incidents.

fig 2-2 head – UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible
fig 2-2 body – Single item

fig 2-2 body – Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost never occur in service life….

fig 2-2 body – Fleet or inventory of items

fig 2-2 body – Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents may occur over service …

fig 2-2 body – Individual soldier

fig 2-2 body – Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur in career or during a spe…

fig 2-2 body – All soldiers exposed

fig 2-2 body – Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.

Caption – Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)
3rd sub – Substep B

Body – Substep B addresses the severity of each hazard. It is expressed in terms of—
bullet – • Degree of injury or illness.
bullet – • Loss of or damage to equipment or property.
bullet – • Environmental damage.
bullet – • Other mission-impairing factors such as lost combat power.
Body – The degree of severity estimated for each hazard may be based on knowledge of the results …
fig 2-3heading – CATASTROPHIC (I) Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. D…
fig 2-3heading – CRITICAL (II) Significantly (severely) degraded mission capability or unit readi…
fig 2-3heading – MARGINAL (III) Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to eq…
fig 2-3heading – NEGLIGIBLE (IV) Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. First aid or …

Caption – Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity
3rd sub – Substep C

Body – In this substep leaders and staffs expand what they understand about probable hazardous in…
Body – Figure 2-4 is a standardized matrix that can be used to assist in this process. Leaders an…
Body – Figure�2-5 provides a summary of the levels of risk. It also provides examples of hazardou…
new fig 2-5 – E – Extremely High: Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazards occur duri…
new fig 2-5 – Example: A commander finds that one of his implied tasks to attack an objective inv…
new fig 2-5 – H – High: Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the required …
new fig 2-5 – Example: During a preplanned ambush, the leader discovers that the force he intends…
new fig 2-5 – M – Moderate: Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of the required missi…
new fig 2-5 – Example: A commander in a defensive position receives a warning order to be prepare…
new fig 2-5 – L – Low: Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission. The…
new fig 2-5 – Example: A mechanized task force (TF) conducting a movement to contact in a desert …

Caption – Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk (continued)
2nd sub – STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

sec quote – Risk management is the recognition that decision making occurs under conditions of un…
sec quote byline – FM 100-7, Decisive Force:
sec quote byline – The Army in Theater Operations, May 1995
Body – Step 3 is accomplished in two substeps: develop controls and make risk decisions. This is …

3rd sub – Substep A – Develop Controls

Body – After assessing each hazard, leaders develop one or more controls that either eliminate th…

4th sub – Types of Controls

Body – Controls can take many forms, but fall into three basic categories—educational controls, p…
bullet – • Educational controls. These controls are based on the knowledge and skills of the unit…
bullet – • Physical controls. These controls may take the form of barriers and guards or signs to…
bullet – • Avoidance. These controls are applied when leaders take positive action to prevent con…

4th sub – Criteria for Controls.

Body – To be effective, each control developed must meet the following criteria:
bullet – • Suitability. It must remove the hazard or mitigate (reduce) the residual risk to an ac…
bullet – • Feasibility. The unit must have the capability to implement the control.
bullet – • Acceptability. The benefit gained by implementing the control must justify the cost in…
fig 2-6 – Support Availability of adequate personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities necessa…
fig 2-6 – Standards Guidance and procedures for implementing a control are clear, practical, and …
fig 2-6 – Training Knowledge and skills are adequate to implement a control.
fig 2-6 – Leadership Leaders are competent to implement a control.
fig 2-6 – Individual Individual soldiers are sufficiently self-disciplined to implement a control.

Caption – Figure 2-6. Criteria for Determining Acceptability of Controls
4th sub – Examples of Controls.

Body – Examples of controls include—
bullet – • Engineering or designing to eliminate or control hazards.
bullet – • Selecting a COA that avoids identified hazards.
bullet – • Limiting the number of people and the amount of time they are exposed to hazards, cons…
bullet – • Selecting personnel with appropriate mental, emotional, and physical capabilities.
bullet – • Providing protective clothing, equipment, and safety and security devices.
bullet – • Providing such services as adequate sanitation facilities and water purification capab…
bullet – • Providing warning signs and signals.
bullet – • Scheduling vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
bullet – • Planning training, including rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills, and so forth.
bullet – • Programming communications links for key civilian organizations.
bullet – • Establishing battlefield controls such as areas of operations and boundaries, direct f…
bullet – • Developing terrorist attack warning systems and response plans.
Body – The key is to specify who, what, where, when, and how each control is to be used. For exam…
bullet – • Planning and scheduling intensive threat and friendly vehicle identification refresher…
bullet – • Programming installation of crashworthy passenger seats in the UH�60 Blackhawk, when m…
bullet – • Requiring soldiers to wear flak vests and helmets during movement to contact, or when …
bullet – • Establishing strong continuity documents and planning overlap tours for key leaders fa…

4th sub – Residual Risk.

Body – Once the responsible leader develops and accepts controls, he determines the residual risk…
bullet – • Residual risk is the risk remaining after controls have been selected for the hazard. …
bullet – • Overall residual risk of a mission must be determined when more than one hazard is ide…

3rd sub – Substep B – Make Risk Decision

Body – A key element of the risk decision is determining if the risk is justified. The commander …
Body – Leaders can use the risk assessment matrix in Figure�2�4—in conjunction with their command…

2nd sub – STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

Body – Leaders and staffs ensure that controls are integrated into SOPs, written and verbal order…
bullet – • Appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and those executing the mission.
bullet – • Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) organizations and civilian agencies that…
Body – The media, NGOs, and PVOs must be included in coordination when their presence impacts or …
Body – Leaders must explain how supervisors will implement controls. Examples of control implemen…
bullet – • Conducting vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
bullet – • Conducting rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills, and so forth.
bullet – • Conducting intensive threat and friendly vehicle identification refresher training for…
bullet – • Conducting orientation for replacement personnel.
bullet – • Installing and maintaining communications links for key civilian organizations.
bullet – • Operating in convoys of four vehicles minimum.
bullet – • Carrying weapons and wearing flak jackets and helmets when outside secure compounds.

2nd sub – STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

sec quote – Leaders must supervise the execution of their orders. The more untrained the troops, …
sec quote byline – Infantry in Battle, 1939
Body – During mission preparation and execution, leaders must ensure that their subordinates unde…

3rd sub – Supervise

Body – Leaders supervise mission rehearsal and execution to ensure standards and controls are enf…
Body – During sustained operations, leaders continue planning to ensure that controls emplaced at…
bullet – • Climatic extremes.
bullet – • NBC and hazardous waste contamination.
bullet – • Diseases native to a particular area of operation or indigenous population.
bullet – • Terrorist threats.

3rd sub – Evaluate

Body – After a mission, leaders and individuals evaluate how well the risk management process was…
bullet – • Determine how to ensure that successes are continued to the next mission.
bullet – • Capture and disseminate lessons learned so that others may benefit from the experience.
bullet – • Consider the effectiveness of the risk assessment in identifying and accurately assess…
bullet – • Determine whether the level of residual risk of each hazard and of the overall mission…
bullet – • Evaluate the effectiveness of each control in reducing or removing risk, including whe…
Body – Leaders and individuals determine why some controls were ineffective and what should be do…
Body – Figure 2-7 shows that the risk management process continues throughout a mission as well a…

1st subhead – TOOLS AND PITFALLS

Body – The appendix�provides examples of risk management tools to help leaders assess identified …
Body – Units train to a standard. They operate and train regardless of the degree of real or perc…
Body – Figure�A�7 provides an example of risk management considerations integrated into a mission…
Body – Pitfalls arise when risk management tools are used without adaptation to the factors of ME…
Body – Completing the risk assessment alone, but failing to identify effective controls, usually …

Caption – Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk
Caption – Figure 2-7. Continuous Application of Risk Management
Caption – Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with Military Decision-Making Tasks
Caption – Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability
Caption – Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix

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