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Theories of Development
Concepts and Applications
William Crain
Sixth Edition

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ISBN 10: 1-292-02262-0
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Table of Contents
P E A R S O N C U S T O M L I B R A R Y
I
1. Early Theories: Performationism, Locke, and Rousseau
1
1William Crain
2. Gesell’s Maturational Theory
21
21William Crain
3. Ethological Theories: Darwin, Lorenz and Tinbergen, and Bowlby and Ainsworth
35
35William Crain
4. Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
71
71William Crain
5. Werner’s Organismic and Comparative Theory
93
93William Crain
6. Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
119
119William Crain
7. Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
159
159William Crain
8. Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
183
183William Crain
9. Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
209
209William Crain
10. Vygotsky’s Social-Historical Theory of Cognitive Development
231
231William Crain
11. Freud’s Psychoanalytic Theory
261
261William Crain
12. Erikson and the Eight Stages of Life
289
289William Crain
13. Mahler’s Separation/Individuation Theory
315
315William Crain

II
14. A Case Study in Psychoanalytic Treatment: Bettleheim on Autism
331
331William Crain
15. Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
341
341William Crain
16. Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
351
351William Crain
17. Jung’s Theory on Adulthood
373
373William Crain
18. Humanistic Psychology and Developmental Theory
387
387William Crain
References
399
399William Crain
421
421Index

Early Theories:
Preformationism,
Locke, and Rousseau
The two great pioneers in child psychology were John Locke and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Locke was the father of environmentalism
and learning theory; his heirs are scientists such as Ivan Pavlov and
B. F. Skinner. Rousseau began the developmental tradition in psy-
chology; his followers include Arnold Gesell, Maria Montessori,
Heinz Werner, and Jean Piaget. Both Locke and Rousseau made rad-
ical departures from an earlier outlook called preformationism.
PREFORMATIONISM
For centuries, people seem to have looked on children as fully formed
miniature adults. The French historian Philippe Ariès (1914–1984)
described how this view was predominant during the Middle Ages.
Medieval paintings and sculptures, for example, routinely portrayed
children—even newborns—with adult body proportions and facial
characteristics. The children were distinguished only by their size. It
was as if the children had arrived preformed in the adult mold (Ariès,
1960, pp. 33–34).
In medieval social life, too, Ariès argued, children were treated
like adults. When they were 6 or 7 years old, they were typically sent
off to other villages to begin working as apprentices. They learned car-
pentry, farming, domestic service, weaving, and other crafts and trades
on the job. The child lived as a boarder in a master’s house and often
worked alongside other apprentices who were much older than he or
she. No one paid much attention to the child’s age, for the child had
basically entered adult society. The child wore the same clothes, played
the same games, and participated in the same festivals as the grownups
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
1

Early Theories
(Ariès, 1960, pp. 71–72, 411). “Wherever people worked,” Ariès said, “and
also wherever they amused themselves, even in the taverns of ill repute,
children mingled with the adults” (p. 368).
Ariès acknowledged that younger children—before the age of 6 or 7—
were treated differently. People recognized their need for protection and care.
But on the whole, Ariès suggested, people were indifferent to children’s
special characteristics. No one bothered to study, for example, the infant’s
developing speech or motor development; and when artists included chil-
dren in their paintings, they depicted even newborns as miniature adults.
Some historians have challenged Ariès’s views. Because medieval
written documents are sparse, it’s difficult to evaluate all the disagree-
ments, but historians such as Barbara Hanawalt (1986) and Shulamith
Shahar (1990) have gathered enough evidence to indicate that Ariès was
sometimes prone to overstatement. It appears that apprenticeships, while
common, were not as universal as Ariès claimed, and that 6- and 7-year-olds
sometimes entered the adult workplace more gradually than Ariès implied.
Still, by the age of 12 or so, most children were carrying out adult respon-
sibilities, and I believe that Ariès’s critics have done more to qualify Ariès’s
accounts than to refute them.
Moreover, other sources have shown that the image of children that Ariès
highlighted—that of the child as a little adult—has been prevalent through-
out the ages. This image is perhaps most evident in preformationistic theories
in embryology. For centuries, many scientists believed that a tiny, fully formed
human, or homunculus, is implanted in the sperm or the egg at conception
(see Figure 1). They believed that the human is “preformed” at the instant of
FIGURE 1
Drawing by Hartsoeker (1694) of a fully
formed human in the sperm.
(Reprinted in Needham, 1959, p. 206.)
2

Early Theories
conception and only grows in size and bulk until birth. Preformationism in
embryology dates back at least to the fifth century B.C.E. and is found in
scientific thinking throughout the ages. As late as the 18th century, most sci-
entists held preformationist views. They admitted that they had no direct
evidence for a fully formed homunculus, but they argued that this was only
because it is transparent or too small to see (Balinsky, 1981, p. 11; Needham,
1959, pp. 34–35, 91, 213–222).
As we look back on the “little adult” views of the past, it’s easy to regard
them as quaint and antiquated. But we often lapse into the same thinking
today, as when we expect young children to be able to sit as still as we can
in social settings, or when we assume that their thinking is the same as ours.
For example, I was recently standing in a supermarket checkout line and
heard a mother next to me upbraid her toddler for having put several items
that he liked into the shopping cart: “You know I can’t afford those things,”
the mother said, as if the toddler had an adult knowledge of grocery budgets.
We are vulnerable to an adult egocentrism and assume that even young chil-
dren think as we do, even if our attitude isn’t as dominant as it once was
(Ausubel, 1958, p. 24).
In embryology, preformationism gave way during the 18th century,
when microscopic investigations showed that the embryo developed in a
gradual, sequential manner. In European social thought, preformationism
began to decline earlier, in the 16th century, accompanying changes in the
occupational world.
During the Middle Ages, most of the occupations—such as farming, car-
pentry, domestic service, metal work, and weaving—required skill, but the
adults believed that 6- and 7-year-olds could begin learning them on the job.
Children, therefore, were able to mix in with adults. After 1500 or so, the occu-
pational world showed clear signs of change. With the invention of the print-
ing press, the growth of commerce and market economies, and the rise of
cities and nation-states, the occupational world began to take on a “white-
collar” look. New opportunities arose for merchants, lawyers, bankers, jour-
nalists, and government officials—occupations that required reading, writing,
and math. The members of a rising middle class saw that they could advance
their families’ fortunes by providing their children with the academic instruc-
tion that these new occupations required. This new demand for education
sparked a tremendous growth of schools in 16th- and 17th-century Europe
(Crain, 1993).
The upshot was that growing numbers of parents (especially in the
middle class) were no longer willing to send their children off to work at the
age of 6 or 7 years. Parents wanted their children to go to school first. Parents
began keeping their children in school at least until they were 12 years old, and
often until they were well into their teens. Thus the growth of schools gave the
child a new status. The child was no longer someone who was ready for the
adult world, but someone who had to be kept apart from it while undergoing
3

Early Theories
an extensive education. The child was seen less as a little adult and more as
a future adult (Ariès, 1960, pp. 329, 412).
LOCKE’S ENVIRONMENTALISM
Biographical Introduction
As the rising middle class pursued new opportunities, it challenged the tra-
ditional feudal order. The middle class no longer accepted a society in which
everyone’s place was predetermined by birth. It sought a brighter future, pin-
ning great hopes on education to bring it about. In so doing, it helped usher
in the modern way of life.
But the feudal regime wasn’t about to just hand over its authority. It
imposed economic regulations and waged an ideological war. It accused the
new middle class—the bourgeoisie—of selfishly abandoning loyalty, honor,
and the old ways.
In these battles, those seeking change drew inspiration from the intellec-
tuals of the 18th-century Enlightenment, such as Denis Diderot and Nicolas de
Condorcet. These writers argued that if people could rid themselves of the
authoritarian state and church, people could live freely and democratically, and
science, technology, and education would produce great progress for all. These
writers, in turn, drew heavily on the late-17th-century theories of the British
philosopher John Locke (1632–1704).
Writing in language that was refreshingly clear and sensible, Locke rejected
the widespread belief that there are vast, innate differences among people.
Instead, Locke argued, people are largely shaped by their social environments,
especially by their education. Locke then showed how this happens and how
education could be improved. To many Enlightenment thinkers, Locke’s writings
were full of wonderful possibilities. If one could change people’s environments
and education, one could produce an egalitarian, democratic society (Gay, 1969,
pp. 511–516).
Locke was born in the village of Somerset, England. His father, a small
landowner, was the first to instill in him a belief in democracy. Locke
attended the Westminster School and Oxford University, but found both
plagued by the pedantic lessons so prevalent in his day. Although he seems
to have been a rather shy boy, he frequently became so bored and restless
in class that he preferred to talk to his classmates rather than pay attention
to the instructor (Pheardon, 1952, p. vii; Quick, 1880, p. xx; Sahakian &
Sahakian, 1975).
Still, Locke did well enough at Oxford to gain appointments at the uni-
versity tutoring Greek and moral philosophy. For a while, Locke had trouble
deciding on his future. A devout Christian, he thought he might become
ordained in the Church of England, but he decided to study medicine instead,
4

Early Theories
primarily so he could learn about the natural sciences. He assisted a note-
worthy chemist, Robert Boyle, and was deeply impressed by the scientific
method and its reliance on empirical evidence. As a physician, Locke suc-
cessfully treated Lord Ashley, later the Earl of Shaftesbury; became Shaftes-
bury’s friend and personal secretary; and also tutored his grandson. His
association with Shaftesbury, however, eventually proved troublesome. When
Shaftesbury was imprisoned for criticizing the king, Locke was forced to flee
England and find asylum in Holland. There, Locke wrote a series of letters to
his friend Edward Clark, offering advice on the upbringing of Clark’s son.
These letters inspired Locke’s most important work on education, Some
Thoughts Concerning Education (1693). After the successful Revolution of 1688,
Locke returned to England and saw the publication of two other great books.
The first was his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), which esta-
blished him as the father of empiricism in philosophy and learning theory in
psychology. His other great book was Two Treatises on Government (1689), which
set forth many of the central ideas in the U.S. Constitution (Lamprecht, 1928;
Russell, 1945).
Locke’s View of Development
The starting point of Locke’s theory was his refutation of the doctrine of
innate ideas. Prior to Locke, many philosophers held that some ideas, such
as mathematical truths and beliefs in God, are innate, existing in the mind
prior to experience. Locke argued that observations of children will show
that these ideas are not present from the beginning and that they are
learned. He said it is more accurate to think of the child’s mind as a blank
slate, and whatever comes into the mind comes from the environment. We
might consider
the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characteristics, with-
out any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? . . . Whence has it all the
materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from
experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ulti-
mately derives itself. (1690, vol. 1, bk. 2, sec. 2, emphasis in original)
Locke did qualify this statement a bit. He noted that although most of a
person’s knowledge comes from the environment, a person also can learn, in
time, by reflecting on his or her own thinking and beliefs (1690, vol. 1, bk. 2,
chap. 1). Locke also acknowledged that there are some innate differences
among individuals (1693, sec. 1).
But on the whole, Locke said, it’s the environment that molds the mind.
And the environment’s influence, Locke emphasized, is especially powerful
in the child’s early years. This is when the child’s mind is most pliable, when
5

Early Theories
we can mold it as we wish. And once we do so, its basic nature is set for life
(1693, secs. 1, 32).
Precisely how does the environment exert its effects? First, many of our
thoughts and feelings develop through associations. Two ideas regularly occur
together, so we cannot think of one without simultaneously thinking of the
other. For example, if a child has had bad experiences in a particular room, the
child cannot enter it without automatically experiencing a negative feeling
(Locke, 1690, vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 33, sec. 15).
Much of our behavior also develops through repetition. When we do
something over and over, such as brushing our teeth, the practice becomes a
natural habit, and we feel uneasy when we have failed to perform it (Locke,
1693, sec. 66).
We also learn through imitation. We are prone to do what we see others
do, so models influence our character. If we are frequently exposed to silly
and quarrelsome people, we become silly and quarrelsome ourselves; if we are
exposed to more noble minds, we too become more noble (1693, sec. 67).
Finally, and most important, we learn through rewards and punishments.
We engage in behavior that brings praise, compliments, and other rewards; we
refrain from those actions that produce unpleasant consequences (sec. 54).
These principles, Locke believed, often work together in the develop-
ment of character. For example, a little girl is likely to hang up her clothes
if she sees her parents hang theirs up, through imitation. After she hangs
up her clothes a few times in succession, this good trait becomes a habit,
and this habit becomes all the stronger if she receives some praise or com-
pliment for it.
The previous example illustrates the usefulness of Locke’s ideas for
bringing up a child. Let us now look more closely at his views on education.
Locke’s Educational Philosophy
Locke thought of education broadly, as the formation of the child’s character
as well as academic learning. In fact, he gave greater weight to character devel-
opment, so we will consider this first.
Self-Control. Locke said the main goal of education is self-control: “It
seems plain to me that the principle of all virtue and excellency lies in a power
of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own desires, where reason does
not authorize them” (1693, sec. 38).
To instill self-discipline, we first should tend to the child’s physical
health. When the body is sick and weak, one has little ability to control its
demands. Accordingly, Locke advised us to give children plenty of exercise so
their bodies will become strong, and he suggested that children play outdoors
in all seasons so they will learn to endure the hardships of all kinds of weather
(secs. 1–16, 33).
6

Early Theories
If children are to acquire discipline, we must be firm with them from
the start. Many parents coddle their children and give in to their every whim;
the parents think that such indulgence is all right because their children are
still small. But the adults fail to realize that early habits are difficult to break.
Children who find that they can get whatever they want, simply by asking or
crying out, never unlearn this bad habit. So parents should never reward chil-
dren when they desire things they do not need. Children should learn that
they will get favorable results only when they ask for things that their parents
consider appropriate (secs. 38–40).
The Best Rewards and Punishments. From the beginning, then, we
should pay close attention to how we reinforce our children’s behavior. We
should reward only reasonable behavior, never behavior that is unreasonable or
self-indulgent.
The use of rewards and punishments, however, is a tricky matter. Not all
rewards and punishments produce desirable effects. Locke was especially
opposed to the use of physical punishment. In the first place, its use establishes
undesirable associations. If a child is beaten or chastised for letting her mind
wander during reading lessons, she will not only associate pain with mind
wandering, but with the sight of books as well. Further, physical punishment
is often ineffective. The child submits while the rod is in sight, but just as soon
as the child sees that no one is looking, she does whatever she wants. Finally,
when physical punishment does work, it usually works too well. It succeeds
in “breaking the mind; and then, in the place of a disorderly young fellow,
you have a low-spirited moped creature” (sec. 51).
Similarly, not all kinds of rewards are desirable. Locke opposed the
use of money or sweets as rewards because their use undermines the main
goal of education: to curb desires and to submit to reason. When we reward
with food or money, we only encourage children to find happiness in these
things (sec. 52).
The best rewards are praise and flattery, and the best punishment is dis-
approval. When children do well, we should compliment them, making them
feel proud; when they do poorly, we should give them a cold glance, making
them feel ashamed. Children are very sensitive to approval and disapproval,
especially from their parents and those on whom they depend. So we can use
these reactions to instill rational and virtuous behavior (sec. 57).
We also can strengthen the effectiveness of our approval and disapproval
by pairing these reactions with other consequences. For example, when a little
boy asks politely for a piece of fruit, we give it to him, and we also compliment
him on his politeness. In this way, he learns to associate approval with agreeable
consequences and thus becomes more concerned about it. Alternatively, when
he breaks something he likes, we add a look of disappointment in him, so he
will come to associate our disapproval with negative consequences. Through
such practices, we deepen the child’s concern for the opinions of others. Locke
7

Early Theories
said that if you can make children “in love with the pleasure of being well
thought on, you may turn them as you please, and they will be in love with all
the ways of virtue” (sec. 58).
Small Steps. Locke was concerned that children acquire many fears.
For example, children are initially attracted to animals, but when one hurts
a child’s finger, she associates the sight of the animal with pain and fears
all animals of the same species. Locke wanted children to grow up to be
brave adults, so he recommended a method for eliminating fears. He didn’t
advise adults to just rush in and try to break the child of fears, but to elim-
inate them by “gentle degrees” (sec. 115). If a child fears a chicken, we should
first let someone else sit beside the chicken at some distance from the child,
until the child can watch the animal without fear. Then we should slowly and
gradually bring the child closer to the chicken, making sure the child can
observe the chicken without anxiety. Finally, we let the child touch the
chicken while the chicken is held by another, until the child herself can han-
dle the animal comfortably.
Rules. Most parents set down all kinds of rules and then punish their
children when they disobey them. This practice is basically useless. Children
have great difficulty comprehending and remembering rules in the abstract,
and they naturally resent getting punished for failing to comply with a rule
that they could barely keep in mind. As an alternative to commands, Locke
suggested two procedures.
First, since children learn more from example than precept, we can teach
them much by exposing them to good models. Children will eagerly model
their behavior after that of a virtuous person, especially when we compliment
them for doing so (sec. 68).
Second, Locke suggested that, instead of issuing commands, we have
children practice the desired behavior. For example, instead of instructing
children to bow whenever they meet a lady, it is better to give them actual
practice in bowing, complimenting them each time they bow correctly. After
repeated practice, they will bow as naturally as they breathe, without any
thought or reflection, which is essentially foreign to them anyway (sec. 66).
Children’s Special Characteristics. Locke’s discussion of the futility
of teaching rules that exceed a child’s understanding introduced something
new into his system. Before this, he had written as if the child’s mind were a
lump of clay that we could mold in any way we wished. Now, however, he
was saying that children have their own cognitive capacities that set limits
on what we can teach. He also suggested that children have temperaments
peculiar to their age, such as a liking for noise, raucous games, and gaiety,
and he added that it would be foolish to try to change their natural disposi-
tions (sec. 63). Thus Locke seemed to admit that children are not blank slates
8

Early Theories
after all. As various scholars have pointed out (e.g., Kessen, 1965, pp. 59, 72;
Russell, 1945, p. 606), Locke was not above a certain amount of inconsistency.
If he had insights that contradicted his basic environmentalism, the inconsis-
tency didn’t trouble him.
Academic Instruction. Locke was upset by the academic instruc-
tion of his time, which forced children to spend long hours a day struggling
with material that made no sense to them. Locke pointed out that instruc-
tion is most effective when children enjoy it. He suggested that children
could learn many things, such as reading letters and words, through games
(secs. 148, 150). Locke also recommended that instruction be arranged in
steps, so children could thoroughly master one topic before going on to the
next, and he wanted children to see the order and usefulness of their stud-
ies (secs. 180, 195).
Locke acknowledged that children will dislike some of the lessons that
adults consider necessary for their future. In these cases, the teacher should
try to ease the children through them. Certainly the teacher should avoid
physical punishment or strong verbal rebukes. Harsh discipline simply makes
the child fearful, and a teacher can’t do much with a fearful child. As Locke
put it, “’Tis as impossible to draw fair and regular characters on a trembling
mind as on shaking paper” (1693, sec. 167). It is better to rely on the kinds of
rewards and punishments discussed earlier—praise and disapproval.
In an interesting passage (secs. 118–119), Locke emphasized the need
to take advantage of the child’s natural curiosity. Children, he said, learn
for the sake of learning; their minds seek knowledge like the eye seeks light.
If we simply listen to their questions and answer them directly, their minds
will expand beyond what we would have imagined possible. In fact, Locke
attributed such power to the child’s natural curiosity that it makes one won-
der about his general thesis. If the child’s curiosity is so powerful, why do
we need to use external rewards and punishments for learning? Perhaps
they are necessary in the training of the child’s character, but it may be that
children will develop their intellectual powers through intrinsic curiosity
alone. But if Locke saw such a possibility, he didn’t say anything about it, and
in the end he reverted to his environmental thesis. When children reason
clearly, we should compliment and flatter them. In this way, we teach them
to reason (sec. 119).
Evaluation
As a psychologist, Locke was far ahead of his time. His principles of learning—
the principles of association, repetition, modeling, and rewards and
punishments—all have become cornerstones of one or another version of
modern learning theory. His thoughts on changing behavior by “gentle
degrees” is fundamental to some of the most contemporary thinking in
9

Early Theories
the field. We shall see the extent to which Locke anticipated modern think-
ing in later chapters.
Locke’s ideas on education, in addition, are pretty much those of the
contemporary educator. Most teachers use rewards and punishments, such
as praise, grades, and criticism, to motivate children to learn. Most enlightened
teachers are also aware of the influence of models and the need to proceed in
arranged steps and are opposed to physical punishment.
Most modern educators even share Locke’s inconsistencies. Although they
believe it is necessary to shape or mold the child through rewards and punish-
ments, they also recognize that such social influences are not all-powerful. They
are sensitive to the child’s readiness to learn different things, and they recognize
that children learn best when they are spontaneously curious about a particular
subject. Nevertheless, like Locke, educators are not prepared to rely too heavily
on children’s intrinsic motivation to learn on their own. Teachers believe it is up
to them, the adults, to teach children the right things. They do not really believe
children would learn what they should without external inducements such as
praise and grades. In general, they share Locke’s view that education is essen-
tially a socialization process. The child learns to gain adults’ approval, and in
this way the child learns what he or she needs to know to become a useful and
virtuous member of society.
ROUSSEAU’S ROMANTIC NATURALISM1
Biographical Introduction
We have now reviewed two early conceptions of development. We have dis-
cussed the preformationist view, which considered the child as a miniature
adult. We also have looked at the views of Locke, who argued that children
are like empty containers that are filled by adult teachings.
The true developmentalist position is different again. Its first forceful
expression is found in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778).
Rousseau agreed with Locke that children are different from adults, but he
made the point more positively. Children are not empty containers or blank
slates but have their own modes of feeling and thinking. This is because they
grow according to nature’s plan, which urges them to develop different capac-
ities and modalities at different stages.
Rousseau believed that it is vital for us to give nature the chance to guide
the child’s growth. Unlike Locke, he had no faith in the powers of the envi-
ronment, especially the social environment, to form a healthy individual. Well-
socialized adults, he felt, are far too dependent on the opinions of others. They
have forgotten how to see with their own eyes and to think with their own
1This heading is suggested by Muuss (1975, p. 27).
10

Early Theories
minds; they see and think only what society expects them to. So, instead of
rushing in to teach children to think in the “correct” ways, we should allow
them to perfect their own capacities and to learn in their own ways, as nature
intends. Then they will learn to trust their own powers of judgment.
Rousseau’s beliefs, especially his faith in nature as opposed to societal
influences, sparked the Romantic movement in the history of ideas. At the
same time, his belief in a natural ground plan for healthy growth ushered in
the developmental tradition in psychology.
Rousseau’s revolt against society grew out of his personal life. He was
born in Geneva, the son of a watchmaker and a beautiful, sentimental mother
who died giving birth to him. For the first 8 years of his life, he was raised
by his father and an aunt. He said his father was devoted to him, but he
added that his father never let him forget he had caused his mother ’s death
(Rousseau, 1788, p. 5). His aunt also was kind, but she refused to let him play
in the street with the other children. Rousseau therefore spent most of his
time reading, and by the age of 7 he had read every novel in his mother ’s
library.
When Rousseau was 10 years old, his father got into a bitter dispute and
had to flee Geneva to avoid prison. For the next 6 years, Rousseau was shut-
tled through several homes. He rarely got along with his masters, who often
humiliated him, intensifying his already timid and self-conscious nature. He
told, for example, of wanting to buy some pastry but of being afraid to enter
the shop because he imagined that acquaintances would spot him and laugh
at him (1788, p. 36). His main relief came from fantasies, in which he imagined
himself in the heroic situations he had read about. He also engaged in a good
deal of stealing and cheating.
When Rousseau was 16 he began the life of a vagabond. He traveled
about, trying to earn what money he could, but he was never successful. His
main talent, he found, was winning the favors of older women. He was not
exactly a Don Juan—he was very timid when it came to sex—but he did get
several ladies to take care of him.
At the age of 29, Rousseau invented a new system of musical nota-
tion, which he took to Paris. It was poorly received, and he was deeply dis-
appointed. Still, his efforts to publish the system brought him into contact
with some of the great minds of the 18th-century Enlightenment—people
such as Diderot, Voltaire, and Condorcet. Rousseau even contributed some
articles (mostly on music) to Diderot’s Encyclopedia. But even among such
creative and courageous thinkers—who were frequently arrested for their
writings—Rousseau felt like an outsider. For one thing, he felt too shy to
participate in the witty and clever dialogue of the Paris salons and social life.
Moreover, Rousseau was developing a viewpoint that differed from that of
other Enlightenment intellectuals. He, too, rejected dogmatic authority, but
he didn’t share their optimistic belief in progress. In some ways, Rousseau
believed, people in the modern metropolis were worse off than ever. They
11

Early Theories
were so busy making a good impression and saying the right things that
they had no thoughts or feelings of their own (Berman, 1970; Cranston,
1982, pp. 163–164, 217–221; Rousseau, 1788, pp. 267–268, 346, 354).
At the age of 33, Rousseau’s personal life underwent a major change.
He took up with an illiterate servant girl named Thérèse, with whom he spent
the rest of his life. She gave birth to five children, but Rousseau placed them
all in a state foundling home. He said that he later realized his action was
wrong, but at the time he did not have the money to raise them, and he felt
that if he did they would wind up living a life as miserable as his own
(Rousseau, 1788, p. 367).
Rousseau’s first major literary success came at the age of 37, when he
entered an essay contest that asked whether the arts and sciences had con-
tributed to the betterment of morals. Rousseau argued in the negative and
won the prize (Rousseau, 1750). During the next several years, he wrote sev-
eral essays and books, the most important of which are The Social Contract
(1762a) and Emile (1762b). The Social Contract opens with the famous line,
“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” That is, humans are natu-
rally good and could live happily according to their spontaneous passions,
but they are enslaved by social forces. This book describes a better society.
Emile is Rousseau’s main book on child development and education. It is titled
after the fictitious boy whom Rousseau proposed to tutor according to nature’s
plan for healthy development.
In the course of his writings, Rousseau challenged the feudal state and
church. He considered himself a devout Christian, but he argued against
uncritical conformity to religious authority. As a result, officials in Paris tried
to arrest him and those in Geneva barred him from the city, and he spent
many of his last years in exile, paranoid and miserable. When Rousseau
died, he was buried in the French countryside, where his body remained
until after the French Revolution, which his writings had helped inspire.
His remains were then triumphantly removed to Paris and placed in the
Pantheon.
Many people have found Rousseau so deficient as a man that they have
refused to take his ideas seriously, especially on education. How can a man
who abandoned his own children to an orphanage have the audacity to pre-
scribe the right upbringing for others? However, it sometimes takes one who
has lived on the outside of the conventional social order to create a radical
vision. Rousseau said that he was “thrown, in spite of myself, into the great
world, without possessing its manners, and unable to acquire or conform to
them” (1788, p. 379). He believed his only legitimate response was to rail
against society and to seek, in its place, a different vision of how life might
unfold. He tried to show how the healthiest development might come not
from society’s influence, but from nature. In so doing, Rousseau became the
father of developmental psychology.
12

Early Theories
Rousseau’s Theory of Development
Childhood has a special place in the sequence of human life, yet we know
nothing about it. This is because we are so exclusively concerned with the
child’s future—with the things the child will need to know to fit into adult soci-
ety. Even “the wisest writers devote themselves to what a man ought to know,
without asking themselves what a child is capable of learning. They are always
looking for the man in the child, without considering what he is before he
becomes a man” (Rousseau, 1762b, p. 1).
When we take the time simply to observe children, we find that they are
very different from us. “Childhood has its own ways of seeing, thinking, and
feeling” (Rousseau, 1762b, p. 54). This is according to nature’s design. Nature
is like a hidden tutor who prompts the child to develop different capacities at
different stages of growth (p. 181). Her product might not be an individual well
trained to fit into a social niche, but rather a strong, complete person. If we
wish to aid nature in this process, we must first learn all we can about the
stages of development. Rousseau believed there are four main stages.
Stage 1: Infancy (birth to about 2 years). Infants experience the world
directly through the senses. They know nothing of ideas or reason; they sim-
ply experience pleasure and pain (p. 29). Nevertheless, babies are active and
curious and learn a great deal. They constantly try to touch everything they
can, and by doing so they learn about heat, cold, hardness, softness, and other
qualities of objects (p. 31). Infants also begin to acquire language, which they
do almost entirely on their own. In a sense, they develop a grammar that is
more perfect than ours; they employ grammatical rules without all the excep-
tions that plague adult speech. Pedantically, we correct their mistakes, even
though children will always correct themselves in time (p. 37).
Stage 2: Childhood (about 2 to 12 years). This stage begins when
children gain a new independence; they can now walk, talk, feed themselves,
and run about. They develop these abilities, too, on their own (p. 42).
During this stage, children possess a kind of reason. But it is not the kind
that deals with remote events or abstractions. Rather, it is an intuitive reason
that is directly tied to body movement and the senses. For example, when a girl
accurately throws a ball, she demonstrates an intuitive knowledge of velocity
and distance. Or when a boy digs with a stick, he reveals an intuitive knowle-
dge of leverage. However, thinking is still extremely concrete. A child can be
taught about a globe, with all the countries, towns, and rivers. But when asked,
“What is the world?,” he is likely to say, “A piece of cardboard” (p. 74).
Stage 3: Late Childhood (about 12 to 15 years). This third stage is a
transitional one between childhood and adolescence. During this period, chil-
dren gain an enormous amount of physical strength; they can plow, push
13

Early Theories
carts, hoe, and do the work of adults (p. 128). They also make substantial
progress in the cognitive sphere and can, for example, do relatively advanced
problems in geometry and science. Still, they are not yet disposed to think
about purely theoretical and verbal matters. Instead, they can best exercise
their cognitive functions through concrete and useful tasks, such as farming,
carpentry, and mapmaking.
During the first three stages, children are by nature presocial. That is,
they are primarily concerned with what is necessary and useful to them-
selves and have little interest in social relationships. They enjoy working
with physical things and learning from nature; the world of books and soci-
ety is foreign to them. Even as late as the third stage, between 12 and 15
years, the model for the child’s life should be Robinson Crusoe, a man who
lived alone on an island and who became self-sufficient by dealing effec-
tively with the physical environment (p. 147).
Stage 4: Adolescence. Children become distinctly social beings only at
the fourth stage, which begins with puberty. Rousseau said that puberty begins
at age 15, somewhat later than we would date it today. At this time, the child
undergoes a second birth. The body changes and the passions well up from
within. “A change of temper, frequent outbreaks of anger, a perpetual stirring
of the mind, make the child almost ungovernable” (p. 172). The young person,
who is neither child nor adult, begins to blush in the presence of the opposite
sex, for he or she is dimly aware of sexual feelings. At this point, the youngster
is no longer self-sufficient. The adolescent is attracted to and needs others.
The adolescent also develops cognitively. He or she can now deal with
abstract concepts and takes an interest in theoretical matters in science and
morals.
These, then, are Rousseau’s four stages, which he believed unfold in an
invariant sequence according to nature’s plan. His stages, especially adoles-
cence, would seem to emerge more slowly than we would expect today, and
this might partly reflect a genuine historical difference. Rousseau, however,
also believed that the true course of human development is slower than we
ordinarily recognize. We are always looking at children as if they were already
adults, whereas nature would have children take the time to develop the
capacities and interests of childhood (p. 181).
Rousseau also proposed that these stages recapitulate the general evolu-
tion of the human species. Infants are similar to the earliest “primitives,” who
dealt with the world directly through their senses and were concerned only
with pleasure and pain. The next two stages of childhood parallel the “savage”
era, when people learned to build huts, make tools, fish, trap, and utilize other
skills. People formed loose associations with others, but they still were largely
self-sufficient.
Adolescence, finally, parallels the beginning of true social life. Historically,
social existence began with the division of labor. As work became specialized,
14

Early Theories
people could no longer produce all they needed by themselves. Thus they had
to rely on others. As they became increasingly immersed in society, they became
the slaves of conventions and social approval. Even savages, to be sure, were
somewhat concerned with the opinions of others, but this concern deepened as
people became embedded in social life. As a result, modern individuals no longer
think for themselves. “The savage,” Rousseau said, “lives within himself; the
sociable man, always outside himself, knows how to live only in the opinion of
others” (Rousseau, 1755, p. 179).
Rousseau’s Educational Method
Rousseau thought we were most fulfilled as savages, but he realized that those
days are gone forever. Still, we do not need to become the weak conformists
that we presently are. Nature will continue to guide children’s development
along the road to independence. Under its urging, children will spontaneously
perfect their capacities and powers of discrimination by dealing with physi-
cal things, without adult teaching. So, if one follows nature’s guidance, it
should be possible to bring the child to adolescence with an independent
mind. Then, when the young person does enter the social world, he or she
can cope effectively with it.
Rousseau told how this would happen in the case of Emile, his imagi-
nary pupil.
Emile’s Education. Rousseau would have a basic faith in Emile’s capa-
city to learn much on his own, from nature’s inner promptings. For example, as
an infant Emile would have a strong urge to explore the world through his senses.
Accordingly, Rousseau would remove all harmful objects from the house and let
Emile explore it. If Emile wished to inspect an object, Rousseau would bring it
to him. No adult guidance would be necessary (Rousseau, 1762b, pp. 31, 35).
At the same time, Rousseau would not permit Emile to rule over him. He
would bring Emile an object when Emile had a genuine need to learn about
it, but never when Emile simply had a capricious desire to have his tutor do
his bidding (p. 52).
Emile also would learn to walk and talk on his own. Rousseau would
never push or correct his pupil. Such practices only make children timid and
anxious. They begin looking to others for correction and thereby lose their
independence (pp. 39–40).
As Emile moved into the second stage, that of childhood, he would have
an urge to run, jump, shout, and play. Rousseau would never check these
activities, for Emile would be following nature’s inner prompting to develop
his body through vigorous exercise. Rousseau would not, like many adults,
always be saying, “Come here, go there, stop, do this, don’t do that” (p. 82),
for Emile would then turn to his tutor for guidance and “his own mind would
become useless” (p. 82).
15

Early Theories
Rousseau would present various lessons, but only those that fit Emile’s
age. Since children at this stage are developing their senses, Rousseau would
suggest games such as finding one’s way in a completely dark room, thus
developing the sense of touch (p. 98). Because children do anything that
keeps them moving freely, he would take advantage of this impulse to help
Emile learn to judge heights, lengths, and distances. He would point to a
cherry tree and ask Emile to select a ladder of the proper height. Or he would
suggest that they cross a river, and ask Emile which plank would extend
across the banks (p. 105).
In all such lessons, Emile would be able to judge his successes by him-
self. Emile could see for himself if he had chosen a plank that was large enough
to extend across the river. He could make this judgment because the lesson cor-
responds to his current capacities. It requires only the use of his senses. There
is nothing in the lesson that is beyond his grasp, nothing that would force
him to turn to his tutor for help (p. 141).
Rousseau said that each stage “has a perfection, a ripeness, of its own”
(p. 122). We are used to thinking about a “grown man,” but it is no less
pleasing to consider a “grown child,” and to look at Emile at age 10 or 12.
His face, his bearing, his expression speak of confidence and content-
ment; health shines in his countenance. . . . I see him keen, eager, and full
of life. . . . His manner is free and open. . . . [He excels] at running, jump-
ing, raising weights, estimating distances, inventing games. . . . He will
not be so stupid as to go ask other people about what he sees; he will
examine it on his own account. . . . His ideas are few but precise, he
knows nothing by rote and much by experience. . . . So do not expect
set speeches or studied manners from him, but just the faithful expres-
sion of his thoughts and the conduct that springs from his inclinations.
(pp. 122–126)
To most observers, Emile will be simply a rough, happy boy, but raised in con-
cert with nature he will have “reached the perfection of childhood” (p. 126).
During the third stage, that of late childhood, Emile’s maturing cog-
nitive powers would enable him to learn mathematics and science, but he
would reason effectively in these spheres only in connection with concrete
activities. Accordingly, Rousseau would encourage him to think about mathe-
matical problems that naturally emerged in the course of activities such as
farming and carpentry. Rousseau would provide only minimal guidance
and, again, he would never correct Emile’s mistakes. His goal would not be
to teach Emile the right answers but to help him learn to solve problems on
his own.
Let him know nothing because you have told him, but because he has
learned it for himself. Let him not be taught science, let him discover it.
16

Early Theories
If ever you substitute authority for reason he will cease to reason; he
will be a mere plaything of other people’s thoughts. (p. 131)
Only at adolescence would Emile begin reading many books and
receive his introduction into the larger social world. By this time he would
have developed an independent nature, and with his new capacities for
theoretical reasoning, he could judge society at its true worth (p. 183).
Comparison with the Usual Practices. Rousseau, then, would encour-
age Emile to perfect his capacities at each stage, according to nature’s own
schedule, and he would never present anything that Emile could not judge
for himself. Rousseau’s method would differ radically from that of most
educators.
Most schools are not content to treat children as children, with their own
needs and ways of learning. Instead, they try to instill adult knowledge as
quickly as possible. As a result, they present many lessons that exceed the
child’s understanding. For example, they give lessons in history, geography,
and mathematics that have nothing to do with the child’s direct experience and
assume a capacity for reasoning that the child lacks. As children struggle with
such lessons, they find learning a miserable experience. And not only this.
Because they cannot fully comprehend what the adult is saying, they are
forced to take things on faith, to accept answers simply because the adult has
explained them to be true. They have no recourse but to ask their parents or
teachers, “Did I get the right answer here?” “Is this right?” They thereby learn
to depend on others and cease to think for themselves.
When children are asked to learn things that exceed their grasp, they
become lazy and unmotivated. To motivate them, teachers use threats, bribes,
disapproval, and flattery. They try to get children to learn in order to win the
adult’s approval. Such procedures only reinforce the child’s dependency on
the approval of others (p. 54).
Rousseau said that his own method, in contrast, would be “merely
negative” (p. 57). That is, he would exercise Emile’s body and senses but
keep his mind idle as long as possible. He would shield Emile from all opin-
ions until his capacity for reasoning had developed, at which point he could
judge them for himself. At the age of 12 or 15 years, Emile would appear
ignorant in the conventional sense. He would know nothing of society or
morals and have no precocious knowledge to display. But he would have
learned to judge everything according to his own experience. He therefore
would be capable of real thinking (pp. 127, 170).
Rousseau anticipated the impatience others would have with his advice.
It would seem as if he were failing to prepare the child for the future. How
could we be certain that the child would know what was necessary when the
time came? Rousseau’s reply was that societies change so rapidly that it is really
impossible to predict what knowledge will be useful. But more importantly,
17

Early Theories
our obsession with the future contains the greatest of all traps; in our hurry to
teach children what we think they will need, we present lessons that exceed
their understanding and force them to turn to us for help. Rousseau wanted us
to slow down and give children a chance to learn in ways that come naturally
to them and to learn on their own (pp. 141, 157).
Evaluation
Rousseau introduced several key ideas into developmental theory. First, he
proposed that development proceeds according to an inner, biological
timetable. For the first time, we have a picture of development unfolding fairly
independently from environmental influences. Children are no longer sim-
ply shaped by external forces, such as adult teachings and social reinforce-
ments. They grow and learn largely on their own, according to nature’s plan.
Today we would call this plan biological maturation.
Second, Rousseau suggested that development unfolds in a series of
stages, periods during which children experience the world in different ways.
Children differ from adults not because they are blank slates that will gradu-
ally take on adult teachings; rather, at each stage, the child’s patterns of
thought and behavior have their own unique characteristics.
Third, Rousseau proposed a new philosophy of education, one which
we would today call child centered. He said, “Treat your scholar according to
his age” (p. 55), by which he meant we should fit our lessons to the child’s
particular stage. In this way, children will be able to judge matters according
to their own experience and powers of understanding.
All three of these ideas have become central tenets of many develop-
mental theories. At the same time, though, many developmental theorists
would disagree with parts of Rousseau’s theory. Many would argue, in par-
ticular, that the child is not nearly as asocial as Rousseau suggested. For exam-
ple, modern ethologists point out how babies become strongly attached to
their caretakers. This attachment, they say, is genetically governed; it has
evolved because proximity to parents has enhanced babies’ chances for sur-
vival. Actually, Rousseau was aware of such attachments (p. 174), but he con-
veniently ignored them when outlining his overall theory. He wanted children
to learn to reason on their own, apart from society’s corrupting influences,
and he therefore declared that nature intends for them to live apart from the
social world, even if he knew better.
When Rousseau argued that we should protect children from society,
he had particular concerns in mind. He saw adults teaching children social
manners and beliefs before children have the ability to judge them according
to their own powers of reasoning. In this process, adults make children the
slaves of social conventions.
18

Early Theories
But contemporary psychology includes developmentalists (e.g.,
Kohlberg) who prize independent thinking as much as Rousseau did, but who
believe, nevertheless, that children can make their way through the social
world. They believe that children will form social and moral theories on their
own, fairly independent of adult teachings. Furthermore, if children think long
and hard about social problems, they will reach stages that transcend conven-
tional modes of social thought. So it may be that children can live in the social
world without being undone by it.
All the same, it was Rousseau who introduced the crucial question into
modern developmental and humanistic thinking: Can inner growth lead to
ways of experiencing and feeling that can stand up to the crushing pressure
of social conformity?
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Gesell’s Maturational
Theory
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
21

Gesell’s Maturational
Theory
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
Rousseau believed behavior unfolds according to nature’s inner plan
or timetable. Today we would call this process biological maturation,
and the person who did the most to initiate the study of maturation
was Arnold Gesell (1880–1961).
Gesell grew up in Alma, Wisconsin, a small town on the bank
of the upper Mississippi River. In an autobiographical account, he
described an almost idyllic midwestern childhood, in which “hills,
valley, water and climate concurred to make the seasons distinct and
intense in my home town. Each season had its own challenges and
keen pleasures, accentuated by the ever-changing, yet enduring
river” (Gesell, 1952a, p. 124). Gesell used similar language to describe
the beauty he saw in the growth process, with “its seasons and
sequences” (Gesell & Ilg, 1943, p. 57). This is not to say, however,
that Gesell was merely a gushing romantic. He studied children’s
development with painstaking observation. To increase his knowl-
edge of the underlying physiological processes, he went to medical
school at the age of 30, even though he already had a Ph.D. and had
been working successfully as a psychologist. In his 50 years at the
Yale Clinic of Child Development, he and his colleagues engaged in
incredibly extensive and detailed studies of the neuromotor develop-
ment of babies and children. They developed behavior norms that are
so complete that they still serve as a primary source of information
for pediatricians and psychologists today. Gesell also developed one
of the first tests of infant intelligence (Gesell & Amatruda, 1941) and
was one of the first researchers to make extensive use of film
observations.
Gesell also wrote on child rearing, advocating a child-centered
approach. He was the best known “baby doctor” in the early 1940s, until
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
22

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
Dr. Benjamin Spock published his famous book in 1946. Nevertheless, Spock
was partly influenced by Gesell.
PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT
The Concept of Maturation
The child’s growth or development, Gesell said, is influenced by two major
forces. First, the child is a product of his or her environment. But more fun-
damentally, Gesell believed, the child’s development is directed from
within, by the action of the genes. Gesell called this process maturation
(Gesell & Ilg, 1943, p. 41).
An outstanding feature of maturational development is that it always
unfolds in fixed sequences. This can first be seen in the developing embryo,
where, for example, the heart is always the first organ to develop and func-
tion. Soon afterward, the rapidly differentiating cells begin to form the cen-
tral nervous system—the brain and the spinal cord. The development of the
brain and the head, in turn, begins before the other parts, such as the arms
and the legs. This order, which is directed by the genetic blueprint, is never
violated.
Similarly, sequential development continues after birth. For example,
just as the head develops early in the embryo, it also takes the lead in early
postnatal development. Babies first have control over their lips and tongues,
then gain control over their eye movements, followed by control over the
neck, shoulders, arms, hands, fingers, trunk, legs, and feet. In both prenatal
and postnatal development there is a head-to-foot (cephalocaudal) trend
(Gesell, 1946, p. 339).
As babies grow, they learn to sit up, to stand, to walk, and to run, and
these capacities, too, develop in a specific order. They emerge with the growth
of the nervous system, which itself is directed by the genes.
Children, of course, vary in their rates of development. They do not all
stand up and walk at the same age. Nevertheless, they all proceed through
the same sequences. Moreover, individual differences in growth rates, in
Gesell’s view, are largely controlled by the internal genetic mechanism
(Gesell, 1945, p. 161).
As indicated, the effects of maturation are contrasted with those of the
environment. In prenatal development, this means that maturation is distin-
guished from aspects of the internal environment, such as the embryo’s tem-
perature and the oxygen it receives from its mother. These environmental
factors are certainly vital—they support proper growth—but they play no
direct role in the sequential unfolding of structures and action patterns. This
is the work of the maturational mechanism.
23

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
Once the baby is born, she enters a different kind of environment. It is
not only an environment that meets the child’s physical needs but also a
social and cultural environment that tries to induce the child to behave in
the proper ways. Gesell said that the child clearly needs the social environ-
ment to realize his or her potentials, but he also argued that socializing forces
work best when they are in tune with inner maturational principles (Gesell
& Ilg, 1943, p. 41).
Gesell was particularly opposed to efforts to teach children things ahead
of schedule. Children will sit up, walk, and talk when they are ready, when
their nervous systems have sufficiently matured. At the right moment, they
will simply begin to master a task, from their own inner urges. Until then,
teaching will be of little value, and may create tensions between caretakers and
children.
Some evidence for the maturational position on teaching has come from
studies with identical twins. For example, Gesell and Thompson (1929) gave
one twin practice at such activities as stair-climbing and the grasping and
manipulation of cubes. This twin did show some skill superior to that of the
other, but the untrained twin soon caught up, with much less practice. And
he did so at about the age at which we would expect him to perform the var-
ious tasks. Apparently, then, there is an inner timetable that determines the
readiness to do things, and the benefits of early training are relatively tem-
porary. The question of early stimulation is controversial, but it does seem that
our efforts to speed up early motor development produce only small effects
(De Hart, Sroufe, & Cooper, 2004, p. 145; Zelazo, Zelazo, & Kolb, 1972).
Maturation, then, refers to the process by which development is gov-
erned by intrinsic factors—principally the genes, which are chemical sub-
stances contained within the nucleus of each cell (see Figure 1). The genes
determine the sequence, timing, and form of emerging action-patterns.
However, the mechanisms by which the genes work are complex. Even
today, not everything is completely understood. We know that the genes do
not work in isolation from one another, and they respond to outside signals.
Some signals come from other parts of the nucleus and from the cell’s cyto-
plasm (see Figure 1). Other signals come from outside the cell (Campbell &
Reece, 2005, pp. 362, 420). So even when describing the action of the gene, we
must consider its external environment. Nevertheless, we can still think of
Nucleus
Cytoplasm
FIGURE 1
A group of cells. The nucleus contains
chromosomes, which contain genes.
24

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
maturation as the process by which the genes direct development, albeit in
conjunction with environmental factors.
So far, I have primarily been illustrating maturational growth with early
motor behavior, which was Gesell’s main scientific focus. However, Gesell
believed that maturation governs the growth of the entire personality. He said,
for example,
[The child’s] nervous system matures by stages and natural sequences.
He sits before he stands; he babbles before he talks; he fabricates before
he tells the truth; he draws a circle before he draws a square; he is self-
ish before he is altruistic; he is dependent on others before he achieves
dependence on self. All his capacities, including his morals, are subject
to the laws of growth. (Gesell & Ilg, 1943, p. 11)
The Study of Patterns
Gesell said that when we study growth we should not just measure things in
quantitative form but should examine patterns. A pattern may be anything that
has a definite shape or form—for example, an eyeblink. But what is most
important is the patterning process, the process by which actions become
organized (Gesell & Ilg, 1943, pp. 16–17).
We find good illustrations of the patterning process in the case of babies’
vision. At birth, babies’ eyes are apt to rove around aimlessly, but after a few
days or even hours babies are able to stop their eyes and look at objects for
brief periods. They can stop their eyes and stare “at will” because a new pat-
terned connection has been made between the nerve impulses in the brain
and the tiny muscles that move the eyes (pp. 17–18).
By the age of 1 month, babies can usually regard a ring that is dangled
before them and then follow it through an arc of about 90°. This ability implies
a new organization—that between the eye muscles and the grosser muscles
that rotate the head (p. 19).
Patterning continues to widen when babies organize their eye move-
ments with their hand movements, when they look at what they hold. By
4 months, babies can usually look at a rattle that they have been holding. “This
is a significant growth gain. It means that eyes and hands are doing team
work, coming into more effective coordination. Mental growth cannot be mea-
sured in inches and pounds. So it is appraised by patterns” (p. 19).
Still, hand-eye coordination is by no means complete at 4 months. For
some time, the eyes will be in the lead. At 4 months, for example, babies can
often “pick up” a 1-inch cube or even a small candy pellet with their eyes;
that is, they can focus intently on the cube or pellet and consider it from
slightly different angles. But they cannot yet grasp it with their hands. Babies
may be seen looking at the cube and then looking at their hands, as if they have
an idea of grasping the cube, but they simply cannot do it. The nervous
25

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
(a) Four months:
sees but cannot contact.
(b) Six months:
palmar grasp.
(c) Ten months:
pincer grasp
(index finger and thumb).
FIGURE 2
Developments in hand-eye coordination.
(From A. Gesell, An Atlas of Infant Behavior, Vol. 1, New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1934. By permission.)
system has not yet sufficiently grown. It is not until 6 months that babies are
usually able to pick up the cube with a crude palmar grasp, and not until
10 months that they can pick up the cube or a pellet with a pincer grasp, with
opposing thumb and index finger (see Figure 2). Hand-eye coordination devel-
ops slowly—it becomes gradually more organized and comes to include more
differentiated or refined movements.
Other Principles of Development
Gesell’s observations suggested several other principles of growth. We will con-
sider three: reciprocal interweaving, functional asymmetry, and self-regulation.
Reciprocal Interweaving. Humans are built on a bilateral basis; we
have two hemispheres of the brain, two eyes, two hands, two legs, and so on.
Our actions, too, have a dualistic quality, as when we either flex or extend our
limbs. Reciprocal interweaving refers to the developmental process by which
two tendencies gradually reach an effective organization. For example, in the
development of handedness, the baby first uses one hand, then both together
again, then prefers the other hand, then both together again, and so on, until
he or she ultimately reaches one-handed dominance. This back-and-forth qual-
ity of preferences suggests the metaphor of weaving, hence the term “recip-
rocal interweaving.” Gesell showed how reciprocal interweaving describes
the patterning of many behaviors, including visual behavior and crawling
and walking (Gesell, 1946, pp. 342–349).
Gesell also believed that reciprocal interweaving characterizes the
growth of the personality. Here, we see the organism integrating introverted
and extroverted tendencies. For example, the child who was self-composed at
age 3 turns inward at , becoming timid and unsettled. This period of intro-
version is followed by a swing to extroversion at age 4, and the two tendencies
3 1�2
26

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
finally become integrated and balanced at 5. Cycles such as this begin in
infancy and continue at least until age 16. The organism temporarily loses its
equilibrium as it expands into new inner or outer realms, but it then reorga-
nizes itself at new levels (Gesell, Ilg, & Ames, 1956, pp. 16–20).
Functional Asymmetry. Through the process of reciprocal interweav-
ing, then, we balance the dualities of our nature. But we rarely achieve perfect
balance or symmetry. In fact, a degree of asymmetry is highly functional; we are
most effective when we confront the world from an angle, favoring one hand,
one eye, and so on.
The infant’s asymmetric tendency is seen in the tonic neck reflex, a reflex
Gesell discovered in humans. Gesell noted that babies prefer to lie with their
heads turned to one side, and when they do so they automatically assume the
tonic neck reflex posture. They extend the arm on the side to which the head
is turned (as if looking at the hand) and flex the other arm behind the head.
The tonic neck reflex posture looks very much like the basic stance of a fencer
(see Figure 3). This reflex is dominant during the first 3 months after birth
FIGURE 3
The tonic neck reflex.
27

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
and then eclipses, with new developments in the nervous system (Gesell,
1946, pp. 349–354).
Self-Regulation. Gesell believed that intrinsic developmental mech-
anisms are so powerful that an organism can, to a considerable degree, regu-
late its own development. In one series of studies, he showed how babies can
regulate their cycles of feeding, sleep, and wakefulness. When the babies were
permitted to determine when they needed to nurse and sleep, they gradually
required fewer feedings per day and stayed awake for longer periods during
the daytime. Progress did not follow a straight line; there were many fluctu-
ations, including regressions. But the babies did gradually work out stable
schedules (pp. 358–364).
Gesell also wrote about self-regulation from a slightly different angle,
focusing on the organism’s capacity to maintain an overall integration and
equilibrium. Growth, of course, also involves disequilibrium. As we just saw,
infants’ sleeping and feeding patterns frequently fluctuate. We also saw com-
parable fluctuations in the development of the personality, where periods of
stability are followed by periods of instability as children enter new intro-
verted or extroverted phases. Tensions arise when children venture into new
unknowns. But self-regulatory mechanisms are always at work, ensuring that
the organism never goes too far in one direction before it catches its balance,
consolidating its gains before moving forward once again.
Because of intrinsic self-regulating processes, children sometimes resist
our efforts to teach them new things. It is as if something inside tells them not
to learn too much too soon. The integrity of the organism must be preserved.
Individuality
We have now reviewed many of Gesell’s ideas about growth. One general issue,
however, needs to be discussed. This is the problem of individuality. Gesell
strongly believed in the uniqueness of each child. Unfortunately, however, his
position was obscured by the way in which he summarized his findings. For
example, he wrote about the child at ages 2, , 3, and so on, as if we could
expect all children at each age to behave in exactly the same way. He did warn
that he was using age norms only as shortcut devices (Gesell & Ilg, 1943,
pp. 60–61), but he never indicated the actual amount of individual variation that
does occur at each age, so individuality did often become lost in his writings.
Gesell’s actual position, as mentioned, was that all normal children go
through the same sequences, but they vary in their rates of growth. He also
suggested that growth rates might be related to differences in temperament
and personality. In an interesting discussion (pp. 44–45), Gesell presented
three hypothetical children—one who grows slowly, one who grows rapidly,
and one who grows irregularly—and suggested how each growth style might
show up in a variety of personal dispositions. Child A, who grows slowly,
2 1�2
28

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
might be generally slow and cautious, able to wait, even-tempered, and gen-
erally wise about life’s problems. Child B, who develops rapidly, might be
quick-reacting, blithe and happy, up and at it, and generally bright and clever.
Child C, who develops irregularly, might sometimes be overcautious and
sometimes undercautious, be moody, have trouble waiting, and show flashes
of brilliance. Gesell believed that each individual temperament and growth
style makes different demands on the culture, and that the culture should try
to adjust to each child’s uniqueness.
PHILOSOPHY OF CHILD REARING
According to Gesell, child rearing should begin with a recognition of the implicit
wisdom of maturational laws. Babies enter the world with an inborn schedule,
which is the product of at least 3 million years of biological evolution; they are
preeminently “wise” about their needs, and what they are ready and not ready
to do. Thus parents should not try to force their children into any preconceived
pattern but should take their cues from the children themselves.
On the topic of feeding, for example, Gesell strongly advocated demand
feeding—feeding when the baby indicates a readiness—as opposed to feeding
by any predetermined schedule. He wrote,
There are two kinds of time—organic time and clock time. The former
is based on the wisdom of the body, the latter on astronomical science
and cultural conventions. A self-demand schedule takes its departure
from organic time. The infant is fed when he is hungry; he is allowed to
sleep when he is sleepy; he is not roused to be fed; he is “changed” if he
fusses on being wet; he is granted some social play when he craves it. He
is not made to live by the clock on the wall, but rather by the internal
clock of his fluctuating needs. (Gesell & Ilg, 1943, p. 51)
As parents suspend their ideas about what the baby “ought” to be
doing—and instead follow the baby’s signals and cues—they begin to appre-
ciate the baby’s inherent capacity for self-regulated growth. They see how
the baby regulates her own cycles of feeding, sleep, and wakefulness. A little
later, they see how the baby learns to sit up, creep, and crawl on her own,
without pushing and prodding. Parents begin to trust the child and the
growth process.
Gesell emphasized that the first year is the best time for learning to
respect the child’s individuality (p. 57). Parents who are alertly responsive to
the child’s needs during infancy will naturally be sensitive to the child’s
unique interests and capacities later on. They will be less inclined to impose
their own expectations and ambitions on the child and more inclined to give
the child’s individuality a chance to grow and find itself.
29

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
Gesell believed that parents need, besides an intuitive sensitivity to the
child, some theoretical knowledge of the trends and sequences of develop-
ment. In particular, they need to realize that development fluctuates between
periods of stability and instability. This knowledge fosters patience and under-
standing. For example, the parent will be helped by the knowledge that
go through a troubled period during which they can be very
obstinate. Knowing this, the parent will not feel an urgent need to stamp out
this behavior before it is too late. Instead, the parent will be able to deal with
the child more flexibly, and perhaps even enjoy this child who so intently tries
to establish her independence (pp. 197, 296).
One of Gesell’s followers, Louise Bates Ames (1971), offered parents the
following advice:
1. Give up the notion that how your child turns out is all up to you and
there isn’t a minute to waste.
2. Try to appreciate the wonder of growth. Observe and relish the fact that
every week and every month brings new developments.
3. Respect his immaturity. Anticipate the fact that he will, in all likelihood,
need to creep before he walks, express himself with single words before
he talks in sentences, and say “No” before he says “Yes.”
4. Try to avoid thinking always in terms of what comes next. Enjoy, and let
your child enjoy each stage he reaches before he travels on (pp. 108, 125).
So far, Gesell’s philosophy sounds like one of extreme indulgence and
permissiveness. One might ask, “Doesn’t this attitude lead to spoiling?”
“Won’t children start becoming bossy, always wanting their own way?”
Gesell’s answer was that, of course, children must learn to control their
impulses and get along with the demands of their culture. However, he
argued that children best learn to do this when we pay attention to their own
maturing ability to tolerate controls. For example, with respect to feedings,
the baby at first should not be made to wait too long. “The most vital crav-
ings of the infant have to do with food and sleep. These cravings have an
individual, organic nature. They cannot be transformed or transgressed”
(Gesell & Ilg, 1943, p. 56). But a little later—by 4 months or so—the baby’s
gastrointestinal tract no longer dominates life as it did before, and the baby’s
less intense and less frequent cries tell the parent that she is now able to
wait for feedings.
Later on, developments in language and an increased time perspective
help children delay immediate gratification. At years, they do not need
their juice immediately because they understand when the parent says, “Pretty
soon.” At 3 they may understand, “When it’s time.” And by 4, they want to
help prepare the meals themselves. The culture, then, can ease children into
its fabric by gearing itself to children’s own maturing readiness to tolerate
controls (p. 54).
2 1�2
2 1�2-year-olds
30

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
Thus Gesell believed that alert caretakers can achieve a reasonable bal-
ance between maturational forces and enculturation. But it is clear that Gesell
wanted the culture to do most of the adjusting. Enculturation, he said, is nec-
essary, but our first goal should not be to fit the child into the social mold.
This is the aim of authoritarian regimes. In democracies we prize autonomy
and individuality, qualities that have their deepest roots in the biological
impulse toward optimal growth (p. 10).
Enculturation takes place in the school as well as in the home. Schools
teach children the skills and habits they will need as adult members of soci-
ety. But teachers, like parents, should not think so exclusively in terms of cul-
tural goals that they overlook the manner in which the child grows. For
example, although our culture values accurate work, teachers need to recog-
nize that children are naturally less precise at one age than another. Vigorous,
unstable 6-year-olds are error prone, whereas more stable 7-year-olds readily
take to drills and perfectionistic work. Accordingly, the developmentally
minded teacher will not force 6-year-olds to learn in a way that runs counter
to their nature, but will save drills for the time when the child benefits from
them (Gesell & Ilg, 1946, pp. 374–381).
At the same time, it is not enough to adjust techniques to each age or
grade; for children also vary widely in their growth rates, as well as in their
special talents. Accordingly, teachers need to gear their work to the individ-
ual child’s state of readiness and special abilities. At present, most schools do
not do this. They overemphasize uniform achievement standards, such as
grade-level reading scores, thereby ignoring children’s need to grow accord-
ing to their own timing and to develop their unique potentials. Schools, of
course, do need to teach standard cultural skills, but in a democracy their first
task is to help children develop their full personalities. To do this, they must
let children guide them, just as children themselves are guided by a biologi-
cal ground plan for optimal growth (pp. 388–392).
EVALUATION
In Gesell’s hands, Rousseau’s idea of an inner developmental force became
the guiding principle behind extensive scholarship and research. Gesell
showed how the maturational mechanism, while still hidden, manifests itself
in intricate developmental sequences and self-regulatory processes. Gesell
indicated that there are good reasons to suppose that development follows
an inner plan.
Nevertheless, most contemporary psychologists would consider Gesell’s
maturational position too extreme. Most psychologists acknowledge the role
of maturation but nevertheless believe teaching and learning are much more
important than Gesell claimed. They believe the environment does more than
merely support inner patterning; it also structures behavior. For example,
31

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
although children cannot learn to throw a ball or play a piano before attain-
ing some level of neuromotor maturation, they also acquire such behavior
patterns through teaching and reinforcement. Still, it is largely because of
Gesell’s work that even the most ardent learning theorists take some notice
of inner maturational processes.
The most frequently voiced criticisms of Gesell center on his manner of
presenting age norms. As mentioned, his norms imply too much uniformity
and give us no idea of how much variation to expect at any given age. More-
over, Gesell’s norms were based on middle-class children in a university
setting (Yale) and may not apply perfectly in other cultural contexts.
In recent years, Gesell’s age norms have been challenged by research
focusing on newborns (babies under 1 month of age). Newborns, it now seems,
have many surprising capacities. Under the right conditions, they can visually
follow moving objects for short distances, can reach for objects, and can dis-
criminate among shapes, colors, sounds, tastes, and odors. They can imitate
movements such as tongue-protrusions and they exhibit a walking reflex
(Fogel, 2009, pp. 247–249, 221; McFarlane, 1981). In light of such findings, the
developmental picture provided by Gesell seems too slow. Newborns now
appear to be “a lot smarter” than anyone thought, and researchers are find-
ing remarkable qualities of babies’ minds in the following few months as well
(Lipsitt, 1971; Siegler & Alibali, 2005, p. 180). Indeed, researchers sometimes
make it sound as if babies are so advanced that they are really little adults, as
the preformationists said.
These new findings are important, but they must be viewed with cau-
tion. In the first place, many of the newborn’s advanced competencies,
including visual following and hand-reaching, are very fragile and diffi-
cult to elicit. Experimenters must sometimes wait for hours and even days
for babies to demonstrate them (Als, 1978; Bower, 1982, p. 169; Fogel, 2009,
p. 227; MacFarlane, 1981).
Furthermore, some precocious abilities, including reflexive walking,
reaching, and imitation, ordinarily disappear after a month or two. Some of
these, to be sure, may be maintained by exercise (Bower, 1982), but they ordi-
narily seem to drop out as behavior comes under the control of higher corti-
cal centers. Then, when they do reappear, they have a much more voluntary
appearance (Hofer, 1981, pp. 120–123). Thus some of the early, precocious
capacities are only temporary. Perhaps they are vestiges of our evolutionary
past, of a time when we developed much more rapidly than we now do.
In any case, the new research on newborns at most supplements, rather
than directly contradicts, the developmental picture Gesell provided. Con-
temporary pediatricians and infant specialists still consider Gesell’s norms of
great value, using them to help determine what babies should be able to do
at various ages.
Gesell also provided a coherent philosophy of child rearing. We should
not, he said, try to force children into our predetermined designs, but should
32

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
follow their cues as they express basic biological forces of growth. The research
findings bearing on Gesell’s position have often been ambiguous (Caldwell,
1964), but some interesting studies do support him (Appleton, Clifton &
Goldberg, 1975). In a particularly impressive study, Bell and Ainsworth (1972)
asked what happens when parents respond promptly to their babies’ cries
(rather than acting on their own ideas about when it is all right for them to cry).
The clear finding was that responsiveness does not lead to spoiling. On the
contrary, by the age of 1 year these babies, in comparison to babies of less
responsive parents, cried less and were more independent. They enjoyed being
held, but if the mother put them down they did not cry or protest but happily
ventured off into exploratory play. They might check back on the mother’s
presence from time to time, as is natural at this age, but they were basically
quite independent. Apparently, then, when babies’ signals are heeded, they
become confident that they can always get help when needed and therefore
can relax and venture forth on their own.
There also is some evidence, though only impressionistic and anecdo-
tal, that things can go very wrong when Gesell’s principles are excessively
violated. This evidence comes from the study of schizophrenic patients,
whose childhood experiences often seem precisely the opposite of those that
Gesell recommended. These patients seem to have felt, as children, that their
own natural impulses and desires counted for little, or threatened others,
and that they were forced to fulfill others’ predetermined images and expec-
tations (Laing, 1965; R. White, 1963). I would like to illustrate the point with
a brief description of a 9-year-old boy whom I saw for a psychological eval-
uation. The boy found life very frightening and probably was on the verge
of psychosis. The parents had not wanted a child—they were in their 40s and
the mother had a number of physical ailments that made it taxing for her to
care for him. Consequently, she wanted a good, well-disciplined boy—an
adult, really—who would cause her no trouble. She tried to toilet-train him
at 6 months of age, long before he showed any readiness to participate in the
process. And when he began walking and vigorously exploring the world at
1 year, she became distressed; he was becoming a nuisance and “getting into
things.” She even perceived his behavior as abnormal. Because of her cir-
cumstances, then, she practically reversed Gesell’s advice: She had a fixed
image of the good child she wanted and was unable to accept and follow her
son’s natural inclinations. As a result, the boy developed an intense fear that
any action he might take, unless approved by his parents beforehand, was
extremely dangerous. He did not trust himself or his natural impulses.
There is some evidence, then, in support of Gesell’s position—that it is
desirable to respond to children’s cues and inclinations as they follow an inner,
biological schedule. But there also is evidence that might argue partly against
Gesell. In particular, research by Baumrind (1967, 1989) suggests that inde-
pendent, self-reliant, and mature children have parents who demand a great
deal of them. Baumrind thinks these parents set tasks that are within their
33

Gesell’s Maturational Theory
children’s abilities, and to this extent the parents follow Gesell’s recommen-
dations. But these parents also seem more demanding and controlling than
Gesell might have thought necessary.
Perhaps philosophies such as Gesell’s will never be completely proven
or refuted by empirical evidence alone; too much may depend on one’s
own values. All the same, it would seem that we have much to gain by lis-
tening to Gesell. Although it is true that we must control, direct, and instruct
our children to some extent, we usually seem to be in quite a hurry to do
these things. What seems more difficult for us is to take the time to watch,
enjoy, and appreciate our children as we give them a chance to do their
own growing.
34

Ethological Theories:
Darwin, Lorenz
and Tinbergen, and
Bowlby and Ainsworth
Ethology is the study of animal and human behavior within an
evolutionary context (Lorenz, 1981, p. 1). The person most identified
with modern evolutionary theory is Darwin.
DARWIN AND THE THEORY
OF EVOLUTION
Biographical Introduction
Charles Darwin (1809–1882) was born into a distinguished English
family. His grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, was a renowned physician,
poet, and philosopher, and his father also was a prominent physi-
cian. Young Darwin, in contrast, seemed headed for no great heights.
As his father once said, “You care for nothing but shooting, dogs, and
rat-catching, and you will be a disgrace to yourself and your family”
(Darwin, 1887, p. 28).
Darwin studied medicine for a while, and then began studying for
the Anglican clergy at Cambridge, but he was generally bored and his
grades were uneven. Still, he made a favorable impression on some of
his professors at Cambridge, especially those who shared his fascina-
tion with nature and wildlife. One professor, John Henslow, recom-
mended Darwin for the position of naturalist on the worldwide voyage
of the H.M.S. Beagle, the voyage on which Darwin made observations
that eventually led to his theory of evolution.
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
35

Ethological Theories
of speed and strength will become increasingly prevalent in the population
of the species.
Evolution usually seems to occur extremely slowly, revealing noticeable
changes only after numerous generations. Consequently, we do not usually
get a chance to see evolution at work in any simple way. However, biologists
did have such an opportunity in England in the mid-1800s. In Manchester,
there were numerous white moths that blended in well with the white trees
in the area, making it difficult for birds to spot and kill them. Among the
moths, there were a small number of dark ones (the products of mutations),
who were easily detected by the predators. Consequently, only a few dark
moths lived and reproduced. But when industrialization took place, coal
smoke darkened the trees, making the white moths easy prey. Now the dark
ones had the best chance of surviving long enough to reproduce, and over
the next 50 years their number increased from less than 1% to 99% (Ehrlich
& Holm, 1963, pp. 126–130).
The Case of Humans
In The Origin of Species (1859), Darwin discussed evolution but barely men-
tioned the evolution of humans. The topic was too incendiary. He waited to
address it in a book he published 12 years later, The Descent of Man (the first
edition was published in 1871; the second edition in 1874). In that book he
firmly argued that our species is not separate from others—not the act of a spe-
cial creation, as almost everyone believed. Rather, humans and other species
descended from common ancestors. Long ago, Darwin speculated, humans
and apes branched off from a common ape-like animal. At an even more dis-
tant time, humans and other mammals probably evolved from an amphib-
ian, and before that, from aquatic life forms. Sharing common ancestors, we
and other living species are all related. We are part of one extended family.
There are, of course, differences among species. But if we look with an open
mind, we see similarities between ourselves and other species—similarities
that bear the stamp of our common heritage (1874, pp. 160, 629–632).
We see, for example, that we are like other animals on the physical
level. Our bones are similar to those of animals as diverse as monkeys, bats,
and seals, and “so it is with our muscles, nerves, blood vesicles, and inter-
nal viscera” (p. 6).
Darwin also observed that early human embryos are highly similar to
the embryos of other animals. This fact, too, suggests common ancestry (p. 25).
The strongest argument of this kind was made by Ernst Haeckel, who, in the
late 1860s, proposed that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. That is, the develop-
ment of an individual organism (ontogeny) repeats in an abbreviated way the
evolutionary history of its species (phylogeny). The human embryo goes
through phases when it looks like a fish, then an amphibian, and so on, reca-
pitulating the ancient evolutionary history of our species. This proposition has
37

Ethological Theories
As Darwin examined fossils and variations among living species, he
concluded that the various species had a common ancestor, and newer species
either had died out or had changed to meet the requirements of their chang-
ing environments. If this conclusion were correct, then the common theolog-
ical view on the origin of the species must be wrong; the species had not been
created in a fixed and perfect form, but had evolved. Although the idea of
evolution had been expressed before, its plausibility deeply distressed Darwin.
It caused religious doubts in his mind and he knew it would shock others
(Gruber, 1981). He wrote to a friend that it was “like confessing a murder”
(Murphy, 2007).
Darwin wanted to make sure the evidence supported his theory, and he
didn’t publish it until 17 years after he first sketched it out on paper (Carroll,
2009, p. 43). In fact, he wouldn’t have published it then had he not learned that
Alfred Wallace was going to publish a similar theory. Since the theory was
going to be made public anyway, Darwin wanted partial credit for it. Upon the
recommendation of their colleagues, Darwin and Wallace presented their the-
ory in 1858 under joint authorship. A year later, Darwin published his great
work, The Origin of Species. Darwin continued developing his theory the rest
of his life, and, despite the bitter reactions it produced, he became widely rec-
ognized for his monumental achievements. When Darwin died, he was buried
in Westminster Abbey, next to Isaac Newton.
The Theory of Natural Selection
As mentioned, Darwin was not the first to propose a theory of evolution.
In Darwin’s day, biologists had been debating the views of Jean Baptiste
Lamarck, who proposed that evolution occurred through the inheritance of
acquired characteristics. For example, giraffes stretched their necks to reach
the leaves on high trees and then passed along their lengthened necks to the
next generation. Lamarck’s theory, however, turned out to be wrong.
In the Darwin-Wallace theory, no new characteristics need be acquired
during an individual’s lifetime. In essence, Darwin’s theory is as follows.
Among the members of a species, there is endless variation; and among the
various members, only a fraction of those who are born survive to reproduce.
There is a “struggle for existence” during which the fittest members of a
species live long enough to transmit their characteristics to the next genera-
tion. Over countless generations, then, nature “selects” those who can best
adapt to their surroundings—hence the term natural selection (Darwin, 1859,
chaps. 3 and 4).
Darwin asked us to consider, for example, the situation of wolves (p. 70).
During seasons when prey is scarce, the swiftest and strongest wolves have
the best chances for survival. They are therefore more likely than the others
to live long enough to reproduce and pass on their traits—today we would
say their genes—to the next generation. After many such seasons, the traits
36

Ethological Theories
raised considerable skepticism, and it would be wrong to say that the human
embryo ever resembles the adult forms of other species. However, it does re-
semble the early forms (Thain & Hickman, 1994, p. 67).
Darwin also discussed how some physical structures he called “rudi-
ments,” such as our tailbone, reveal our descent from earlier forms (1874,
p. 23). But Darwin’s most innovative proposal was that evolutionary conti-
nuity is seen in the behavioral realm, in the areas of reason and emotion. He
challenged the long-held Western view that reason and emotion are exclusive
to our species.
Darwin recognized that humans developed rational thought to a higher
degree than other species. Because our species is physically weaker and
slower than many others, we had to rely on intelligence and inventions
(including tools) to survive (1874, p. 65). But humans didn’t develop intel-
lectual powers out of the blue. These capacities emerged gradually, in the
course of our evolutionary past, and intelligence is evident in the many ani-
mals who share our ancestry.
Darwin told, for example, about a bear in captivity who could not reach a
piece of bread floating in some water. So the bear dug a ditch to the water, which
resulted in the bread sailing down the ditch to him (p. 79). This certainly required
creative thinking. Darwin said the more that naturalists study the behavior of any
particular animal, the more intelligent they find the animal to be (p. 77).
Other species also share our capacity for rich emotional lives. Many ani-
mals, for example, express joy, which is most apparent when the young mem-
bers of other species, such as puppies, kittens, and lambs, are at play. Like
human children, they happily frolic about (1874, p. 70).
Darwin was especially interested in the moral emotions, the concern for
others. He recognized that human morality differs from that of other animals. We
bring greater intellect to moral issues and reflect more on them (1874, p. 115).
But Darwin suggested that many animals have developed the fundamentals of
morality, the building blocks on which human morality was built.
The members of many species want their companions near them, send
out warning calls in times of danger, and sometimes come to one another’s aid.
To illustrate, Darwin (1874, p. 104) told the story of a troop of baboons mov-
ing through a valley and up a hill. While some of the baboons were still in
the valley, a pack of dogs attacked. Hearing the attack, some of the older males
came down from the hill and roared so ferociously that the dogs drew back.
By the time the dogs resumed their attack, all the baboons had climbed out of
danger—except for one. This 6-month-old baboon was still below and called
loudly for help. He was surrounded by the dogs. “Now one of the largest
males, a true hero, came down again from the mountain, slowly went to the
young one, coaxed him, and triumphantly led him away—the dogs being too
much astonished to make an attack” (Darwin, 1874, p. 104).
Darwin’s emphasis on mutual aid and altruism has puzzled scholars
because he also wrote about the “struggle for existence” which includes
38

Ethological Theories
competition among individuals within a species (1859, chap. 3). For example,
male deer engage in combat in the spring (1874, p. 531). These battles ensure
that the strongest males, rather than the frail ones, transmit their characteris-
tics to the next generation. But Darwin also believed in the importance of
helpful behavior for group survival. Those groups of animals (including
humans) who banded together and looked out for one another must have had
a better chance of surviving (1874, pp. 124, 137).
In summary, Darwin emphasized the continuities between our species
and other species, in both physical characteristics as well as cognitive and emo-
tional characteristics. He did not suggest that animals share all our emotions, and
certainly not all our cognitive powers, but he did say that no sharp line sepa-
rates the minds of humans from other animals. After two lengthy chapters on
this topic in The Descent of Man (1874), Darwin concluded that the “various emo-
tions and faculties . . . of which man boasts may be found in incipient, or even
sometimes in well-developed form in the lower animals” (p. 130).
Evaluation
Contemporary biologists generally consider Darwin’s theory to be correct in its
broad outline. Biologists agree with Darwin that there is enormous variation
within species, and that species change because only some members survive
long enough to reproduce and pass their traits on. But Darwin didn’t under-
stand the mechanisms underlying variation and the transmission of traits. It was
only after the work of Gregor Mendel and others that we began to understand
how these activities are performed by the genes. In other ways, Darwin was far
ahead of his time. His thoughts on group selection, for example, have only
recently received serious consideration from eminent biologists (Wade, 2009).
Darwin believed, as we have seen, that natural selection applies not only
to physical characteristics (such as coloring) but also to various kinds of
behavior. Thus Darwin opened the way to ethology—the field in biology
that studies animal behavior from an evolutionary perspective. We will now
review some of the ideas of modern ethologists and then look at the applica-
tions of these ideas to the study of human development.
MODERN ETHOLOGY: LORENZ
AND TINBERGEN
Biographical Introduction
Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) is often called the father of modern ethology. He
did not necessarily make more discoveries than other ethologists, but his
bold, vivid, and often humorous writing style did much to call attention to
this new field.
39

Ethological Theories
Lorenz was born and raised in Austria. His father was a prominent
physician who wanted Lorenz to become a doctor too, so Lorenz dutifully
earned a medical degree. However, he never lost his boyhood enthusiasm for
the study of nature and wildlife, and he next studied zoology at the Univer-
sity of Vienna, earning a Ph.D. in this field. Lorenz began his studies in ethol-
ogy in the early 1930s, when he became convinced that one can see the
landmarks of evolution in the innate behavior patterns of animals just as surely
as in their physical characteristics (Lorenz, 1981, p. 101). He made many of his
observations on his own large Austrian estate, where numerous species of
wild animals freely roamed.
Niko Tinbergen (1907–1988) worked quietly in Lorenz’s shadow.
Despite this, ethologists consider his work equally substantial. Tinbergen
was born in the Hague, the Netherlands, and like Lorenz was fascinated by
animals and wildlife as a boy. In school, Tinbergen’s work was erratic; he did
well only in subjects that interested him, and he struck many of his teach-
ers as a lazy youngster whose primary enthusiasm was for sports. Never-
theless, Tinbergen went on to earn a Ph.D. in biology at the University of
Leiden in 1932 and began doing brilliant ethological studies. His research
was interrupted during World War II when the Germans put him in a prison
camp for protesting the dismissal of Jewish professors at the university.
During his imprisonment, Tinbergen wrote on ethology as well as writing
stories for children. After the war he became a professor at Oxford. In 1973
Tinbergen and Lorenz, along with a third eminent ethologist, Karl Von
Frisch, won the Nobel Prize in physiology and medicine (Baerends, Beer, &
Manning, 1975).
Methodological Approach
Ethologists are convinced that we can understand an animal’s behavior
only if we study the animal in his or her natural setting. Only in this way
can we watch an animal’s behavior patterns unfold and see how they serve
in the adaptation of the species. We cannot, for example, understand why
birds build nests where they do unless we see how such behavior protects
the species from predators in the natural environment. Psychologists who
only study animals in their laboratories miss out on a great deal. In such
captive situations, many species do not even reproduce, and one frequently
has no opportunity to observe their nesting, mating, territorial, or parental
behavior.
When ethologists study a new species, their first step is simply to get to
know the species as well as possible. That is, the ethologist engages in
naturalistic observation; the ethologist observes an animal’s characteristic behav-
ior and then compares the behavior with that of other species. Only after ethol-
ogists have gathered a great deal of descriptive material do they attempt
experiments to test their ideas or try to formulate general laws.
40

Ethological Theories
Instinctive Behavior
Ethologists are interested in instincts. In everyday language, we casually refer
to any unlearned behavior as “instinctive” or as an “instinct,” but ethologists
consider instincts as a special class of unlearned behavior.
An instinct, in the first place, is released by a specific external stimulus. This
is the case, for example, in the rescuing behavior of the chicken. The hen
appears to respond any time her chicks are in danger, but a closer examina-
tion reveals that she is actually reacting to a very specific stimulus—the chicks’
distress call. This point has been demonstrated in an experiment by Brückner
(cited in Tinbergen, 1951, p. 34). When chicks were tied to a post and hidden
behind a screen, the mother still rescued them because she heard the distress
calls. When, however, the screen was removed and the struggling chicks were
covered by a glass enclosure—so the hen could see her chicks in trouble but
could not hear them call—she ignored them. She needed to hear the specific
distress call.
Similarly, a specific stimulus releases the tendency to fight in the male
three-pronged stickleback fish (Tinbergen, 1951, p. 48). In the spring the adult
male establishes a territory, builds a nest, and courts females. He also devel-
ops a bright red spot on his belly. When other sticklebacks enter his territory,
he may or may not fight—depending on the sight of a specific stimulus, the
red spot on the invader’s belly.
If a pregnant female enters his territory, his behavior is different. When
he moves toward her, she tilts her body upward, exposing her full belly, and
this stimulus causes him to go into a zigzag dance. This dance is a signal for
her to approach, and when she does, he returns to the nest. Once there, his
behavior signals her to enter. This intricate ritual continues until the eggs are
fertilized, with each component of the ritual governed by a specific releasing
stimulus (pp. 48–50).
Specific releasing stimuli also determine the reactions of the young to
their parents. For example, a young jackdaw bird will follow its parent into
the air only when the parent takes off at a certain angle and speed (Lorenz,
1935, pp. 157–161).
Instincts also are species-specific, which means particular behavior pat-
terns are found only in members of a specific species. There may be some
overlap; for example, we may see young birds in several species following a
mother in single file. But on close inspection, there are distinctive differences
in the following or in the way the parent’s behavior releases following in each
species (Lorenz, 1935, p. 157).
In addition, instinctive behaviors always include some fixed action pattern,
some stereotyped motor component. Fighting gestures, courtship behavior,
and modes of following always contain some fixed aspect.
Not every part of an instinct, however, must be of a fixed nature. For
example, peregrine falcons engage in free flight when searching for prey.
There is no rigid pattern to their search; they glide around in various areas
41

Ethological Theories
where past experience has taught them to look. But once they spot their prey
(e.g., a starling bird), their actions do become stereotyped. Their swoop and
their manner of catching their prey constitute a fixed action pattern (Lorenz,
1952a, p. 306).
The fixed action pattern also has an underlying drive component, an inner
urge to engage in the instinctive behavior. Consequently, if the behavior has
not been released for a long time, the drive behind it can build up to the point
that less specific stimuli will suffice, as when males court females who lack the
specific releasing stimuli. In some cases, the internal pressure for release builds
up to such a high pitch that the fixed action pattern goes off “in a vacuum”
(Lorenz, 1963, pp. 52–53).
Finally, instincts, as the products of evolution, have some survival value.
However, as Freedman (1971) observes, it is often all too easy to create plausible-
sounding explanations of a behavior’s adaptive value. What is really needed is
research on the question. For example, Tinbergen (1965) wondered why herring
gulls remove their young’s egg shells after hatching. After all, this requires them
to spend time away from the nest, endangering their young. He hypothesized
that the glistening of the shells in the sun attracts predators, and he conducted
an experiment to see if this were so. He scattered some egg shells in one area
and found that, in fact, predators investigated this area much more than a com-
parable area lacking the shells.
As mentioned earlier, ethologists distinguish instincts from other kinds
of unlearned behavior. Ethologists have given the most attention to the differ-
ences between instincts and reflexes (Hess, 1962). Instincts may contain
reflexes, but instincts also may be more complex. For example, the stickle-
back’s zigzag dance must involve many reflexes. Also, a reflex, such as an
eyeblink, can be released by many stimuli—wind, noise, dust, bright lights,
and so on. There does not seem to be a specific external releaser.
Imprinting
In many instances, an animal’s responsiveness to specific releasers is innate
or inborn. But in many other instances, the animal is born with a gap in his or
her knowledge. The animal is innately equipped with all the patterns of an
instinct but lacks some information about the releasing stimulus. When this
information is filled in during an early critical period, the process is called
imprinting.
Many species of young birds and mammals enter the world with incomplete
knowledge about the stimuli that will release their following response. It’s as if a
gosling, for example, were to say, “I know I have an instinct to follow, I know I’m
supposed to get into single file, and I know something about the releaser—it’s my
mother when she departs. But what does she look like?” This is the information
the gosling acquires when she follows the first moving object she sees during an
early critical period. Ordinarily, this object is the real mother, but when orphan
42

Ethological Theories
Greylag goslings were raised by Lorenz, they took him for their “mother.” They
energetically followed him about in single file wherever he went, ignoring other
geese (see Figure 1). They had imprinted on him (Lorenz, 1935, p. 124).
FIGURE 1
These goslings have imprinted on Lorenz.
(Thomas D. McAvoy/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images.)
43

Ethological Theories
Although Lorenz was not the first to observe imprinting, he was the first
to state that it occurs during a critical period. This means the young animal
will form an attachment to an object only if she is exposed to and follows that
object during a specific time early in life. If the young animal is exposed to an
object before or after the critical period, no attachment is formed. And once the
critical period has passed, it may be impossible to induce the animal to attach
itself to another kind of object (p. 127).
Lorenz found that species differ with respect to the range of objects on
which they will imprint. Greylag goslings seem to imprint on almost any-
thing that moves (some even have imprinted on boats). Mallard ducklings, in
contrast, are more finicky. Lorenz found that they would imprint on him only
if he stooped below a certain height and made a quacking sound as he moved
about. Mallards, then, have an innate schema of certain aspects of the proper
parent—the parent must move, be of a certain height, and make a certain
sound. Imprinting only fills in the rest of the visual pattern (Lorenz, 1935,
p. 135; 1952b, pp. 42–43).
Once imprinted on a mother-figure, goslings, ducklings, and other young
birds follow the mother the best they can, but they occasionally become sep-
arated or fall behind. They then search for the mother while uttering “lost
piping” calls (which vary somewhat from species to species). When a mal-
lard mother hears the piping, she sounds a loud guiding call, and if the duck-
ling still cannot reach her, she turns back and fetches the straggler. When she
reaches the duckling she utters a greeting, and she and her duckling exchange
joyful sounds (Lorenz, 1935, pp. 176–177; 1981, p. 276).
Imprinting can determine not only the following response in the
young but later social behavior as well. In particular, early imprinting can
affect later sexual preferences, as Lorenz also learned from personal expe-
rience. One of his neighbors hand-raised an orphan jackdaw bird that
imprinted on humans, and when this bird reached sexual maturity he
courted Lorenz. He attempted to seduce Lorenz in typical jackdaw fash-
ion, by inserting crushed worms into Lorenz’s mouth. When Lorenz shut
his mouth, the bird put the worms into his ear. This bird, then, having been
exposed only to humans during his early life, focused on humans as the
objects of his later sexual advances. The critical period for sexual imprint-
ing may differ from that for parental imprinting, but it too occurs very early,
long before sexual behavior actually emerges (Lorenz, 1935, p. 132; 1937
p. 280; 1952b, pp. 135–136).
Lorenz found that among Greylag geese, the attachment of adult
“lovers” is as strong as young ones’ attachment to their parents. When adult
geese lose sight of a partner, they search frantically. “The goose moves about
restless by day and night, flying great distances and visiting all places where
the partner might be found, uttering all the time the penetrating trisyllabic
long-distance call” (1963, p. 208). If the goose’s partner is lost forever, the
goose appears grief-stricken and loses all confidence.
44

Ethological Theories
So far, we have been discussing the formation of social attachments,
parental as well as sexual. Imprinting-like processes also can govern other
kinds of learning, including the learning of territorial maps, food preferences,
and songs. In pioneering research Marler and Tamura (1964) found that
white-crowned sparrows in the San Francisco area learn aspects of their songs
during an early critical period. The birds don’t learn the entire song—the
basic structure is inborn—but they pick up “regional dialects” during the
critical period (so, for example, the birds sing differently if they grew up in
Berkeley instead of Sunset Beach). Other researchers have uncovered similar
findings with respect to numerous species of songbirds around the world
(Ball & Hulse, 1998).
Nevertheless, most research on imprinting has focused on the forma-
tion of social attachments, especially on the early following response. Some of
this research has raised questions about some of Lorenz’s initial formulations.
For instance, Lorenz (1935)) initially proposed that parental imprinting is
always supraindividual. That is, he believed the young imprint on a particu-
lar species of parent but not on an individual parent. But other ethologists
observed that young animals do imprint on individual parents (Bateson, 1990),
and Lorenz modified his position (Lorenz, 1965, p. 57).1
Other research, especially that conducted in laboratories, has questioned
Lorenz’s view of the critical period as completely fixed. If, in particular, one
initially rears a bird in conditions of sensory deprivation, one can slow neural
development and extend the critical period (Bateson, 1991). Some researchers
therefore prefer the term sensitive period to critical period, suggesting greater
flexibility in the boundaries (Maestripieri, 2001).
Several ethologists have looked for the conditions associated with the
boundaries of the critical or sensitive period. In large part, the beginning seems
to be ushered in by inner, maturational promptings; the young animal spon-
taneously searches for a parent on which to imprint. This search has an urgent
quality (Bateson, 1991). Lorenz said the Greylag gosling behaves as if she feels
very lonely; the gosling utters her lost piping call and looks for somebody to
follow (1981, p. 280).
Hess (1962, 1973) gathered evidence that the critical period ends with the
onset of the fear response. Once the young animal starts showing fear, she
avoids any new or strange object and wants to stay near her imprinted par-
ent. Even laboratory researchers who look for ways of extending the critical
period (e.g., Bateson, 1991) recognize the importance of fear in bringing the
period to a close.
Imprinting occurs in many birds and mammals (including sheep,
deer, and buffalo) that live in groups, move about soon after birth, and are
1Sexual imprinting, in contrast, usually seems to determine only the species that the young
will later court, not the particular member of the species. One can only be sure that the young will
not court its imprinted parent; this is somehow excluded (Lorenz, 1935 p. 132).
45

Ethological Theories
under strong predator pressure. In these species, imprinting ensures that
the animal will follow an escaping parent in times of danger (Freedman,
1974, p. 19). It also enables the young to form a special bond with a particular
parent.
But imprinting may also occur, if more slowly, in other species, includ-
ing primates such as chimpanzees. Young chimpanzees do not show much
concern over whom they are with until they are about 3 or 4 months old.
Then they develop a marked preference for their mother (or foster parent)
and become distinctly wary of other adults. After this, they stay fairly near
her, returning to her from time to time, and if she should signal that she is
about to depart, they rush over and climb aboard. Thus chimps clearly attach
themselves to a particular adult during a certain period in life (Bowlby, 1982,
pp. 190, 196). A similar process may occur in human children, as we shall dis-
cuss momentarily.
Evaluation
Ethology was primarily developed in continental Europe, and it took some
time for it to be accepted in the United States. During the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s, U.S. psychologists widely criticized it for ignoring the role of the envi-
ronment and experience.
In a prominent study, Bernard Riess (1954) showed that rats deprived
of experiences with sticks failed to show the nest-building instinct. Such
experiments, however, miss the ethologists’ point. Ethologists recognize that
instincts have evolved because they have been adaptive within certain envi-
ronments and that instincts need the right environment to develop properly.
The environment is important. All that ethologists claim is that instinctive
behaviors have a large innate component and that, given the environment to
which the instinct is preadapted, the instinct will emerge without elaborate
conditioning or learning.
Ethologists have produced many insights with respect to nonhuman
species, but they generally have been slow to apply these insights to humans.
I suspect that they fear intense resistance if they talk about humans and other
animals in the same breath. They would be told that humans are different
from other species, that human behavior is more determined by culture and
learning. There is a degree of truth to this, but I believe the resistance more
fundamentally stems from the centuries-old belief that our species is simply
too magnificent to be associated with “lowly” animals (Balcombe, 2006,
pp. 25–27). In any case, let us now consider a great, pioneering effort to apply
ethological insights to human development—the work of Bowlby and
Ainsworth.
46

Ethological Theories
BOWLBY AND AINSWORTH ON HUMAN
ATTACHMENT
Bowlby
Biographical Introduction
John Bowlby (1907–1990) was born in London, the son of an upper-class
English family. In his interpersonal relations, Bowlby maintained an old-
fashioned British reserve, but his career was hardly traditional. He taught in
two progressive schools for children, received psychoanalytic training when
it was still new, and in 1936 became one of the first British psychiatrists to
work in the area of child guidance.
Early on, Bowlby became concerned about the disturbances of children
growing up in understaffed orphanages and nurseries, where the caretakers
couldn’t provide the children with much emotional interaction. The children
frequently showed an inability to form intimate and lasting relationships with
others. It seemed to Bowlby that the children were unable to love because
they missed an opportunity to form a solid attachment to a mother figure
early in life. In 1948 the World Health Organization commissioned Bowlby to
pull together the research evidence on such institutional deprivation, which
he summarized in his 1951 report, Maternal Care and Mental Health. The report
produced widespread interest in the effects of institutional upbringing.
But Bowlby’s greater interest was in another group of children—toddlers
who had formed firm attachments to their parents and then went into the hos-
pital for a period of one to several weeks. Bowlby and his coworkers began
gathering information on these toddlers’ experiences in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. At the time, most hospitals kept parents off the children’s wards.
Hospital staff believed that parents would disrupt routines and spread infec-
tions. But when parents dropped off their children at the hospitals, the chil-
dren became extremely upset. For days, the toddlers cried loudly and searched
for their parents. They kept asking, “Where’s my Mummy?” After a while
they became more subdued, as if in a state of mourning, but they continued
to yearn for their parents. With Bowlby’s support, a young coworker, James
Robertson, worked feverishly to convince hospitals to allow parents to stay
with their children. In 1952, Robertson produced a film, A Two-Year-Old Goes to
Hospital, to show the suffering of a little girl named Laura. She was a very
pretty girl who was exceptionally self-controlled, but her emotions broke
through. She tried in vain to escape the hospital and get back home, and she
became increasingly miserable, sobbing to herself when alone. She kept cry-
ing,“I want my Mummy. Where has my Mummy gone?”
For a long time most medical professionals refused to take such obser-
vations seriously. They came up with alternative explanations for the children’s
47

Ethological Theories
behavior, such as the possibility that Laura wasn’t properly brought up.
People tended to believe that children should act more maturely. But Bowlby,
feeling that the toddlers’ distress was natural, searched for a theoretical
perspective that could shed light on his impression. His answers came from
ethology (Bowlby, 1980, chap. 1; 1982, pp. 25–28; Karen, 1994, chap. 6).
Theory of Attachment: Overview
Earlier, we saw how young birds imprint on their parents and then follow
them about. If the babies should lose contact, they utter distress calls. Bowlby
pointed out that such behavior is common in a wide variety of animals. Of
course, not all species are physically capable of following their parents soon
after birth. But they initially have other ways of maintaining contact with
the parent. A young infant chimpanzee, for example, clings to the adult.
Bowlby called actions such as following, crying out, and clinging—actions
that maintain proximity to a parent—attachment behaviors. He said attach-
ment behaviors became part of an animal’s instinctive nature because they
proved highly adaptive. A young animal who lacked the urge to maintain
proximity to the mother—a youngster who was content to remain apart from
her—would have become relatively easy prey (Bowlby, 1982, pp. 180–190;
1973, pp. 57–59).
Bowlby stated that similar attachment behaviors occur in human
babies. Human babies, too, want to be close to their mothers. As soon as
they can crawl, babies try to follow their mothers, and they become upset
when separated. They cry out and redouble their efforts to regain contact.
Bowlby said we should consider attachment behaviors in humans to be in
the same category as those in other species. In our species, like others,
attachment behaviors became part of our biological equipment because
they helped the young survive, providing protection from predators
(1982, p. 183).
Today, the mention of predators might sound odd. Greater dangers are
posed by automobiles and industrial chemicals, but Bowlby asked us to con-
sider our environment of adaptedness, the basic environment in which we
evolved. He believed that anthropological data provide a pretty good picture
of human life beginning about 2 million years ago, when our ancestor Homo
habilis began using crude stone tools. Throughout nearly all of the subsequent
2 million years, our ancestors probably moved about in small groups, search-
ing for food and risking attacks by large predators. When threatened, humans
cooperated to drive off the predators and to protect the sick and young. The
largest humans fended off the predators while the young followed their moth-
ers to a safer position behind them (1982, pp. 58–64). If a toddler lacked the
urge to follow the mother, he or she became “a more or less easy meal for a
lurking leopard or a pack of hunting dogs” (Bowlby, 1973, p. 143).
During this huge span of time, attachment behavior undoubtedly
acquired some of the characteristics we see today. But Bowlby also believed
48

Ethological Theories
that human attachment behavior began evolving earlier, in ancestors we
shared with other animals (Bowlby, 1982, pp. 59, 183).
As we saw earlier, Lorenz and others advanced the concept of imprint-
ing to describe a process by which attachment to a parent can develop. Bowlby
suggested that a kind of imprinting also occurs in human children, although
it develops more slowly than in other animals. It certainly develops more
slowly than in birds, and even more slowly than in chimpanzees and gorillas.
Briefly, human imprinting develops along the following lines. In the first
months of life, babies cannot actively crawl after a departing parent, but they
have other signals and gestures for keeping the parent close. One way is to cry.
The cry is a distress call; when the infant is in pain or is frightened, she cries
and the parent is impelled to rush over to see what is wrong. Another attach-
ment behavior is the baby’s smile; when a baby smiles into a parent’s eyes, the
parent feels love for the baby and enjoys being close.
Initially, babies’ social gestures are largely indiscriminate. For example,
they will smile at any face or cry for any person who leaves their sight. But
between about 3 and 6 months of age, babies narrow their responsiveness to
a few familiar people, develop a clear-cut preference for one person in par-
ticular, and then become wary of strangers. Soon after this, they become more
mobile, crawling about, and they take a more active role in keeping their prin-
cipal attachment figure nearby. They monitor this parent’s whereabouts, and
any sign that the parent might suddenly depart releases following on their
part. The whole process—focusing on a principal attachment figure whose
departure then releases following—parallels imprinting in other species. This
attachment figure, usually a parent, is incredibly important to the young child,
and the child wants to stay in proximity to the parent.
In his writings, Bowlby used the ethological terms instinct and imprinting
in a purposely loose sense. He wanted to show that these concepts apply to
human behavior in a general way, not as extremely precise, detailed definitions
(1982, pp. 136, 220). Nevertheless, Bowlby felt that these ethological concepts
provided the powerful explanations he had been looking for. He said that
when he first learned about them, in the 1950s, it was a “eureka” experience
(Karen, 1994, p. 90). In particular, he understood why toddlers like Laura (in
James Robertson’s film) become so shaken when separated from their par-
ents. As a product of evolution, the human child has an instinctual need to stay
close to the parent on whom she has imprinted. This need is built into the
very fiber of the child’s being. So when the toddler loses contact with the par-
ent, the toddler tries to find the parent and cries out with distress calls. The
child isn’t being “babyish”; she is simply engaging in natural behaviors that
have brought safety to young humans for millions of years. Without these
behaviors, it’s unlikely that human populations would have survived. If,
despite the child’s efforts, she cannot regain contact with the parent, the child’s
anxiety becomes intense. On some level, the child may feel she will die.
Let us now look at the phases through which babies normally develop
their attachment to caretakers.
49

Ethological Theories
FIGURE 2
The sight of a baby smiling into
one’s eyes stirs love and fosters
attachment.
Phases of Attachment
Phase 1 (birth to 3 months): Social Gestures with Limited Selectivity.
Within a few days after birth, infants have some capacity to discriminate
among people. They prefer their mothers’ voices, odors, and faces to those of
other people (Fogel, 2009, pp. 121, 240–241, 244). But during the first 3 months
babies’ selectivity is often limited. Much of the time, they respond to every-
one in the same ways, as we shall see as we review their social gestures.
The most endearing early gesture is the social smile. Social smiles begin
at 3 or 4 weeks of age and are usually directed at a high-pitched human voice.
Beginning at 6 to 8 weeks of age, babies’ smiles become brighter and more
energetic and are primarily directed at a visual stimulus—the face (Bowlby,
1982, pp. 283–286; Fogel, 2009, p. 286).2 One can tell when visual smiles are
about to start. About a week beforehand, the baby starts to gaze intently at
faces, as if studying them. Then the baby breaks into open smiles (Figure 2).
This is often an electrifying moment in a parent’s life; the parent now has
2Actually, babies begin smiling right after birth. They emit eyes-closed smiles, usually
as they fall off to sleep. But these smiles are not yet social; they are not yet directed at people
(Freedman, 1974, p. 178).
50

Ethological Theories
“proof” of the baby’s love. The sight of one’s baby looking deeply into one’s
eyes and smiling causes a feeling of love to well up from within. (Even if you
are not a parent, you might have had a similar feeling when any baby smiled
at you. You cannot help but smile back, and you think that you and the baby
share a special bond.)
Actually, until 3 months or so, these smiles aren’t selective. Babies will
smile at any face, even a cardboard model of one. The main stipulation is
that the face be presented in the full or frontal position. A profile is far less
effective. Also, a voice or a caress is a relatively weak elicitor of smiling
during this stage. It seems, then, that the baby’s social smile is released by
a fairly specific visual stimulus (Bowlby, 1982, pp. 282–286; Freedman, 1974,
pp. 179–181, 187; Fogel, 2009, p. 286).
In Bowlby’s view, smiling promotes attachment because it maintains the
proximity of the caretaker. When the baby smiles, the caretaker enjoys being
with the baby; the caretaker “smiles back, ‘talks’ to him, strokes and pats him,
and perhaps picks him up” (Bowlby, 1982, p. 246). The smile itself is a releaser
that promotes loving and caring interaction—behavior that increases the
baby’s chances for health and survival.
At about the time that babies begin smiling at faces, they also begin
babbling (and cooing and gurgling). They babble primarily at the sound of a
human voice and, especially, at the sight of a human face. As with smiling, bab-
bling is initially unselective; babies will babble when almost any person is
around. The baby’s babbling delights the caretaker, prompting the caretaker
to talk back. “Babbling, like smiling, is a social releaser [that] has the function
of maintaining a mother-figure in proximity to an infant by promoting social
interaction between them” (p. 289).
Crying also results in proximity between caretaker and child. It is like a
distress call; it signals the baby needs help. Babies cry when they are in pain,
hungry, cold, or experience discomfort. They even cry when a person at whom
they had been looking leaves their field of vision, although during the first
weeks the particular person in question matters little. Babies also will permit
almost any person to quiet them through rocking or by attending to their
needs (pp. 289–296).
Proximity also is maintained by the baby’s holding on. The newborn is
equipped with two holding responses. One is the grasp reflex; when any object
touches the baby’s open palm, the hand automatically closes around it. The
other is the Moro reflex, which occurs either when babies are startled by a
loud noise or when they suddenly lose support (as when one holds their head
from underneath and then suddenly lets it drop). Their response is to spread
their arms and then to bring them back around the chest. The action looks as
if the baby were embracing something (see Figure 3). In earlier times, Bowlby
thought, these reflexes served the purpose of keeping hold of the parent who
carried them about. If, for example, a mother saw a predator and suddenly ran,
the chances were that the baby had a grasp of some part of her with the hand
51

Ethological Theories
FIGURE 3
The Moro reflex: A startled baby
exhibits an embracing action.
(see Figure 4). And if the baby lost hold, he or she would embrace the mother
again (p. 278).
Babies also are equipped with rooting and sucking reflexes. When their
cheek is touched, they automatically turn their head to the side from which
the stimulation came and then “root” or grope until their mouth touches some-
thing, which they then suck. The rooting and sucking reflexes obviously aid
breast-feeding, but Bowlby also regarded them as attachment patterns because
they bring the baby into interaction with the mother (p. 275).
Phase 2 (3 to 6 months): Focusing on Familiar People. Beginning at
about 3 months, the baby’s behavior changes. For one thing, many reflexes—
including the Moro, grasp, and rooting reflexes—drop out. But more impor-
tantly for Bowlby, the baby’s social responses begin to become much more
selective. Between 3 and 6 months, babies gradually restrict their smiles to
familiar people; when they see a stranger, they simply stare (Bowlby, 1982,
52

Ethological Theories
FIGURE 4
With her grasp reflex, this month-old baby has a hold on
her mother’s shirt.
pp. 287, 325). Babies also become more selective in their cooing and babbling;
by the age of 4 or 5 months, they make these sounds only in the presence of
people they recognize (p. 289). Also, by this age (and perhaps long before),
their crying is most readily quieted by a preferred figure. By age 5 months,
finally, babies begin to reach for and grasp parts of our anatomy, particularly
our hair, but they do so only if they know us (pp. 279, 300).
During this phase, then, babies narrow their responsiveness to familiar
people. They usually prefer two or three people—and one in particular. They
most readily smile or babble, for example, when this person is near. This
principal attachment figure is usually the mother, but it doesn’t have to be.
It can be the father or some other caretaker. Babies seem to develop the
strongest attachment to the one person who has most alertly responded to
their signals and who has engaged in the most pleasurable interactions with
them (pp. 306–316).
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Ethological Theories
Phase 3 (6 months to 3 years): Intense Attachment and Active
Proximity-Seeking. Beginning at about 6 months of age, the infant’s attach-
ment to a particular person becomes increasingly intense and exclusive. Most
notably, infants cry out when the mother figure leaves the room, demonstrat-
ing separation anxiety.
Observers have also noted the intensity with which the baby greets the
mother after she has been away for a brief time. When she returns, the baby
typically smiles, reaches to be picked up, and when in the mother ’s arms,
hugs her and crows with delight. The mother, too, displays her happiness at
the reunion (1982, pp. 295, 300).
The new exclusiveness of the baby’s attachment to a parent is also evi-
dent at about 7 or 8 months when the baby exhibits a fear of strangers. This
reaction ranges from a slight vigilance to outright cries at the sight of a
stranger, with the stronger reactions usually occurring when the baby feels
ill or is in an unfamiliar setting (pp. 321–326).
But babies are not restricted to the expression of strong emotions. By
8 months, they can usually crawl and therefore can begin to actively follow a
departing parent. Babies will make the most concerted efforts to regain con-
tact when a parent departs suddenly rather than slowly, or when they are in
unfamiliar surroundings (pp. 256–259). (See Figure 5.)
Once infants can actively follow a parent, their behavior begins to con-
solidate into a goal-corrected system. That is, babies monitor the parent’s where-
abouts, and if the parent starts to leave, they urgently follow, “correcting” or
adjusting their movements until they regain proximity. When they get near the
parent, they typically reach up with their arms, gesturing to be picked up.
When held, they calm down again (p. 252).
Babies, of course, often move away from attachment figures as well as
toward them. This is particularly evident when they use the caretaker as a
secure base from which to explore. If a mother and her 1- or 2-year-old child enter
a park or playground, the child will typically remain close for a moment or two
and then venture off to explore. However, the child will periodically look
back, exchange glances or smiles with her, and even return to her from time
to time before venturing forth once again. The child initiates brief contacts
“as though to assure himself that she is still there” (p. 209).
Using the mother as a secure base, babies and toddlers are happy explor-
ers. Although they periodically monitor the mother’s presence, they are com-
fortable investigating things at some distance from her. But this situation can
quickly change. If, when a child glances back at the mother, she seems inac-
cessible (or, more threatening yet, seems ready to depart) the child will hurry
back to her. The child also will rush back if he or she is frightened by some
event, such as a loud noise. In these circumstances the child will want close
physical contact and may require a good deal of comforting before he or she
will venture away from the mother once again (Bowlby, 1988, p. 62; 1982,
pp. 257–259, 373).
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Ethological Theories
FIGURE 5
An 8-month-old baby struggles to follow her mother.
By the end of the first year, an important variable is the child’s general
working model of the attachment figure. That is, the child has begun to build
up, on the basis of day-to-day interactions, a general idea of the caretaker’s
accessibility and responsiveness. So, for example, a 1-year-old girl who has
developed some general doubts about her mother’s availability will tend to
be anxious about exploring new situations at any distance from her. If, in con-
trast, the girl has basically concluded that “my mother loves me and will
always be there when I really need her,” she will explore the world with more
courage and enthusiasm. Even so, she will occasionally monitor her mother’s
presence, for her need for her mother is vital (Bowlby, 1973, pp. 203–206; 1982,
pp. 354, 373).
Phase 4 (3 years to the end of childhood): Partnership Behavior. Prior
to the age of 2 or 3 years, children are concerned only with their own need to
maintain a certain proximity to the caretaker; they do not yet consider the care-
taker’s plans or goals. For the 2-year-old, the knowledge that mother or father
is “going next door for a moment to borrow some milk” is meaningless; the
55

Ethological Theories
child simply wants to go, too. The 3-year-old, in contrast, has some under-
standing of such plans and can visualize the parent’s behavior while he or
she is away. Consequently, the child is more willing to let the parent go. The
child begins acting more like a partner in the relationship. Still, there are limits
on the amount of physical separation 3-year-olds can tolerate, for they still
have a great need for the parent’s care.
Attachment as Imprinting
Now that we have examined the child’s attachment in some detail, we are in
a position to appreciate Bowlby’s thesis that attachment follows a course sim-
ilar to imprinting in animals. Imprinting, you will recall, is the process by
which animals learn the releasing stimuli for their social instincts. In particu-
lar, young animals learn which moving objects to follow. They begin with a
willingness to follow a wide range of objects, but this range quickly narrows,
and at the end of the imprinting period they usually will follow only the
mother. At this point the fear response limits the ability to form new attach-
ments. The sensitive period for imprinting has ended.
In humans, we can observe a similar process, although it develops much
more slowly. During the first weeks of life, babies cannot actively follow
objects through locomotion, but they do direct social responses toward people.
They smile, babble, hold on, cry, and so on—all of which keep people close.
At first, babies direct these responses toward anyone. However, by
6 months of age they have narrowed their attachment to a few people and
one in particular. They primarily want this person near. At this point they
become afraid of strangers, and, as they learn to crawl, they follow their prin-
cipal attachment figure whenever she departs. They have imprinted on a
particular person; it is she who releases following.
Institutional Deprivation
Early in his career, Bowlby was struck by the inability of many institution-
ally reared children to form deep attachments later in life. He called these
individuals “affectionless characters”; such individuals use people solely
for their own ends and seem incapable of forming loving, lasting ties to others.
In his 1951 World Health Organization report, Bowlby speculated that they
lacked the opportunity to form an early relationship with a mother-figure
(Bowlby, 1965).
The conditions in many institutions do seem unfavorable for the for-
mation of intimate human ties. In many institutions, babies receive care from
several nurses who can meet their physical needs but who have little time to
interact with them. Frequently, no one is around to heed the babies’ cries, to
56

Ethological Theories
return their smiles, to talk to them when they babble, or to pick them up when
they desire. Consequently, it is difficult for the baby to establish a strong bond
with any particular person.
When writing his report, Bowlby had not yet read about imprinting, but
he intuitively felt that there is a sensitive period for forming the first, vital
attachment. Bowlby never seemed perfectly confident about the age when
the sensitive period ends, but his writings suggest it ends with the appearance
of fear responses, as in other species (1982, pp. 222–223). If so, the sensitive
period might end at 8 or 9 months, the age by which babies ordinarily have
shown a fear of separation (6 months) as well as a fear of strangers (8 or 9
months). If the baby hasn’t formed an attachment by this age, the baby may
have missed the sensitive period for developing bonds in general.
The most relevant recent research has looked at institutionalized chil-
dren in Romania. In 1989, political turmoil forced many babies into extremely
understaffed orphanages. Many caring families in the United Kingdom
adopted children in the orphanages, and researchers have followed the chil-
dren’s progress up to the age of 11 years. It appears that babies adopted prior
to the age of 6 months escaped social deficits. In contrast, about a quarter of
the children who were adopted between the ages of 6 and 42 months exhib-
ited social deficits, such as shallow relationships with others. Thus the water-
shed appears to be 6 months, when the initial fear response (separation
anxiety) ordinarily emerges (Dozier & Rutter, 2008).
On the basis of this finding, Mary Dozier and Michael Rutter (2008, pp.
707–708) suggest there may be a genetically programmed period, ending at 6
months, for the normal attachment to a parental figure. If the baby does not
form a bond with a parental figure by this age, subsequent relationship prob-
lems can occur. But Dozier and Rutter acknowledge that more research is
needed on this topic.
Separations
Although Bowlby was interested in early institutional deprivation, he was
much more interested in cases where the child forms a normal attachment
and then suffers a separation. This was the kind of separation illustrated by
James Robertson’s 1952 film, A Two-Year-Old Goes to Hospital. Bowlby and
Robertson (Bowlby, 1980, chap. 1; 1982, chap. 2) proposed that when separa-
tions are forced on 1- to 3-year-olds, and last from one to several weeks, the
child’s behavior typically goes through three stages.
First, children protest. They cry and scream for their mother. They
search for her and are alert to any sight or sound indicating she is present
after all. Sometimes they insist their mother is coming soon, ignoring what
they’ve been told. During this phase, the children usually reject all forms of
substitute care.
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Ethological Theories
Second, they go through a period of despair. They become quieter and
less active, and appear to be in a deep state of mourning. But although their
hopelessness deepens, they continue to look for their mother.
Finally, a stage of detachment sets in. During this period, the child is live-
lier and may accept the care of nurses and others. The hospital staff may think
the child has recovered. However, all is not well. When the mother returns, the
child seems not to know her; the child turns away from her and acts as if he
has lost all interest in her. The reactions are probably a defense against further
disappointment.
Fortunately, most children do reestablish their tie to the mother after a
while. But this is not always the case. If the separation has been prolonged or
is repeated, the child may give up on people altogether. The result here, too,
is an “affectionless character,” a person who no longer cares for others in any
deep way.
Attachment and Separation through
the Life Cycle
Although Bowlby wrote primarily about attachment in childhood, he
believed that attachment is important throughout the life cycle. Adolescents
break away from parental dominance, but their attachment to parents per-
sists; adults consider themselves independent, but they seek proximity to
loved ones in times of crisis; and older people find that they must increas-
ingly depend on the younger generation. In general, Bowlby said, being
alone is one of the great fears in human life. We might consider such a fear
silly, neurotic, or immature, but there are good biological reasons behind it.
Throughout human history, humans have best been able to withstand crises
and face danger with the help of companions (Bowlby, 1982, p. 207; 1973,
pp. 84, 143, 165).
In his writings on adult attachment, Bowlby emphasized how people
provide each other with a secure base of support. You will recall that such
behavior begins early. When, for example, a 1- or 2-year-old goes to a new
park with a caretaker, the child uses the caretaker as a base from which to
explore. Knowing that the caretaker is available if needed, the child enthusi-
astically explores the surroundings. Bowlby suggested that similar behavior
characterizes the healthiest adult partnerships (1979, pp. 204–205). Each part-
ner knows he or she has an unwavering backup, someone who can be trusted
to provide emotional support and assistance when needed. Knowing that
support will be there, individuals have the courage to venture forth and meet
life’s challenges. Secure bases of support also are provided by relatives and
friends. Bowlby said, “All of us, from the cradle to the grave, are happiest
when life is organized as a series of excursions, long or short, from a secure
base provided by our attachment figure(s)” (1988, p. 62).
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Ethological Theories
Because attachments are vital throughout life, separations and losses
can cause personal upheaval. This is evident, for example, when a person
loses a parent, goes through a divorce, or becomes a widow. Attachment
researchers have most thoroughly studied cases of widowhood, and they have
found that the reactions of the bereaved display many similarities to those of
children who suffer separations. Most dramatically, the bereaved also search
for the lost person.
“I walk around searching,” said one widow. “I go to the grave . . . but he’s
not there.” Others feel drawn to the old haunts they and their loved ones used
to frequent, as if they might find their loved ones there. Sometimes they call
out for the deceased. “Oh Fred, I do need you,” shouted one widow during a
research interview, before bursting into tears (Bowlby, 1980, p. 90). A 1993
study found that a full year after a spouse’s death, 63% of the respondents
sensed that their spouse was with them at times (Shaver & Fraley, 2008,
p. 51). Sometimes the bereaved think they see their deceased partner on the
street or hear the partner moving about the house at night (Bowlby, 1980,
p. 89). This desperate searching reminds one of the adult geese described by
Lorenz (1963, p. 208).
Many friends and professionals see the behavior of bereaved adults as
irrational. They tell them to pull themselves together, to face reality, and to
focus on the future instead of dwelling on the past. Bowlby’s view was differ-
ent. He suggested that in the course of evolution, an urge to find missing loved
ones became a powerful part of our biological makeup. Underlying the urge
is the assumption that “all losses are retrievable”; hoping for the impossible,
we keep searching (Bowlby, 1979, p. 86). And because the drive to reunite with
loved ones is natural, it should be respected, even when it might strike us as
unrealistic. To be helpful, we should give bereaved individuals a chance to talk
freely about their feelings and wishes. Research indicates that this opportu-
nity facilitates a healthy readjustment (Bowlby, 1979, pp. 86, 97, 100–101).
Bowlby gave attachment theory its start, but much of its progress—as well
as its current popularity—owes to the work of his colleague Mary Ainsworth.
Ainsworth
Biographical Introduction
Mary D. S. Ainsworth (1913–1999) grew up in Toronto and at the age of 16
entered the University of Toronto. There, she was impressed by the psycho-
logical theory of William Blatz, who emphasized how parents may or may
not provide children with security. Ainsworth felt Blatz’s ideas helped her
understand why she was a bit retiring in social settings. She stayed on at the
university to earn a doctorate and taught psychology for a few years. In 1950
she married Len Ainsworth, and the couple went to England, where she
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Ethological Theories
answered a newspaper ad for a research assistant to John Bowlby. Thus began
a 40-year collaboration. In 1954 Len accepted a position teaching in Uganda,
and Ainsworth used her two years there to go to the villages near Kampala
to make careful, naturalistic observations of how babies become attached to
their mothers (Karen, 1994). This research, later published in her 1967 book,
Infancy in Uganda, sketched out the phases of attachment that Bowlby out-
lined in his writings. Ainsworth’s Uganda research also described how babies
use the mother as a secure base from which to explore. Indeed, Bowlby (1988)
credited Ainsworth with discovering infants’ secure-base behavior. And, tak-
ing a first stab at a groundbreaking formulation, she described three patterns
of attachment—three different forms the attachment process may take among
individual babies.
After arriving in the United States from Africa, Ainsworth began a study
of 23 middle-class babies and their mothers in Baltimore. The Baltimore study,
which was more elaborate than the Uganda study, replicated and expanded
the Uganda findings on the patterns of attachment and stimulated a tremen-
dous amount of research on the topic.
Patterns of Attachment
In the Baltimore study, Ainsworth and her students observed the babies
and their mothers in their homes for the first year of the babies’ lives, vis-
iting them for about 4 hours every 3 weeks. When the infants were 12 months
old, Ainsworth wanted to see how they would behave in a new setting, so
she brought them and their mothers to a playroom at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. She was particularly interested in how the babies would use the
mother as a base from which to explore and how they would react to two
brief separations. In the first separation, the mother left the baby with a
stranger (a friendly female graduate student); in the second, the baby was
left alone. Each separation lasted 3 minutes, but was shortened if the baby
showed too much distress. The entire procedure, which lasts 20 minutes, is
called the Strange Situation. Ainsworth and coworkers (Ainsworth, Bell,
& Stanton, 1971; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) observed three
patterns.
1. Securely Attached Infants. Soon after entering the playroom with
the mother, these babies used her as a base from which to explore. When the
mother left the room, however, their exploratory play diminished and they
sometimes became visibly upset. When the mother returned, they actively
greeted her and remained close to her for a moment or two. Once reassured,
they eagerly ventured forth to explore the environment once again.
When Ainsworth examined the earlier home observations of these chil-
dren, she found the mothers had typically been rated as sensitive and
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Ethological Theories
promptly responsive to their babies’ cries and other signals. The mothers had
been lovingly available when the babies needed comforting. For their part,
the babies cried very little at home and used the mother as a base from which
to explore in the home as well.
Ainsworth believed these infants demonstrated the healthy pattern of
attachment behavior. The mother’s day-in and day-out responsiveness had
given the baby faith in the mother as a protector; her simple presence in the
Strange Situation gave the child the courage to actively explore the sur-
roundings. At the same time, the child’s responses to the mother’s departure
and return in this new environment revealed the baby’s strong need for prox-
imity to her—a need that has had enormous survival value throughout human
evolution. This pattern has been found to characterize about 65% of the
1-year-olds evaluated in the Strange Situation in U.S. samples (Goldberg, 1995;
van IJzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008).
2. Insecure-Avoidant Infants. These infants appeared quite inde-
pendent throughout the Strange Situation. As soon as they entered the room,
they rushed off to inspect the toys. Although they explored, they didn’t use
the mother as a secure base, in the sense of checking in with her from time
to time. They simply ignored her. When the mother left the room, they didn’t
become upset, and they didn’t seek proximity to her when she returned.
If she tried to pick them up, they tried to avoid her, turning their bodies
away or averting their gaze. This avoidant pattern has been found in about
20% of the infants in U.S. samples (Goldberg, 1995; van IJzendoorn & Sagi-
Schwartz, 2008)
Because these infants display such independence in the Strange Situa-
tion, they have struck many people as exceptionally healthy. But when
Ainsworth saw their avoidant behavior, she guessed they were suffering from
some degree of emotional difficulty. Their detachment reminded her of chil-
dren who had experienced painful separations.
The home observations supported Ainsworth’s guess that something
was wrong. The mothers had been rated as relatively insensitive, interfer-
ing, and rejecting. And the babies often seemed insecure. Although some
were very independent in the home, many were anxious about the mother ’s
whereabouts.
Ainsworth’s overall interpretation, then, was that when these babies
entered the Strange Situation, they suspected they couldn’t count on their
mother for support and they therefore reacted in a defensive way. They
adopted an indifferent, self-contained posture to protect themselves. Hav-
ing suffered so many rejections in the past, they attempted to block out
their need for their mother to avoid further disappointment. And when the
mother returned from the separation episodes, they refused to look at her,
as if denying any feelings for her. They behaved as if they were saying,
“Who are you? Am I supposed to know you?—you who won’t help me
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Ethological Theories
when I need it” (Ainsworth, Bell, & Stanton, 1971, p. 47; Ainsworth et al.,
1978, pp. 241–242, 316).
Bowlby (1988, pp. 124–125) speculated that this defensive behavior can
become a fixed and pervasive part of the personality. The child becomes an
adult who is overly self-reliant and detached, a person who can never let
down his or her guard and trust others sufficiently to form close relationships.
3. Insecure-Ambivalent Infants. In the Strange Situation, these infants
were so clingy and preoccupied with the mother ’s whereabouts that they
hardly explored at all. They became extremely upset when the mother left the
room, and they were markedly ambivalent toward her when she returned.
At one moment they reached out for her; at the next moment they angrily
pushed her away.
In their homes, these mothers had typically treated their babies in an
inconsistent manner. The mothers had been warm and responsive on some
occasions but not on others. This inconsistency had apparently left the babies
uncertain whether the mothers would be there for them when called on. As a
result, they usually wanted to keep the mother close at hand—a desire that
intensified greatly in the Strange Situation. These babies became very dis-
tressed when the mother left the playroom, and they urgently tried to regain
contact with her when she returned, although they also vented their anger
toward her. The ambivalent pattern is sometimes called “resistance” because
the children not only desperately seek contact but resist it. This pattern usu-
ally characterizes 10 to 15% of the 1-year-olds in U.S. samples (Goldberg, 1995;
van IJzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008).
Disorganized/Disoriented Infants. For some time, researchers found
that some children’s Strange Situation behavior didn’t fit perfectly into the
three types. In the late 1980s, Mary Main and Judith Solomon examined 200
anomalous cases and saw that many of the children exhibited peculiar behav-
ior, especially when the mother returned to the room. For example, they
walked toward the mother, but with their faces averted, or they froze in a
trance-like state. It seemed that the children were at a loss as to how to act
because they wanted to approach their mother but were afraid to do so. To
classify such behavior, Main and Solomon proposed a fourth category,
Disorganized/Disoriented, and subsequent research sometimes includes it. The
category generally captures about 14 to 24% of children in the samples.
Research on the causes of such fearful behavior points to the possibility of
physical abuse (Lyons-Ruth & Jacobvitz, 2008).
Follow-Up Studies. If the Strange Situation taps fundamental differ-
ences among children, it should predict differences in their later behavior.
A number of studies have found that the infants classified as securely attached
in the Strange Situation have continued to behave differently from the others
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Ethological Theories
in childhood and adolescence. On cognitive tasks, the securely attached chil-
dren have scored higher on measures of persistence and self-reliance. In social
settings, such as summer camps, they have received higher ratings on friend-
liness and leadership. Infant attachment alone doesn’t determine all later
behavior, of course. Other factors, such as ongoing family support, have an
effect. But a secure attachment in infancy gets the child off to a good start
(Weinfield et al., 2008).
Ainsworth reported that secure attachment was the product of maternal
sensitivity to children’s signals and needs. This finding is theoretically impor-
tant because ethologists believe children have built-in gestures that must be
heeded for development to unfold properly. Ainsworth’s finding has been
replicated by other investigators with great consistency. In addition, interven-
tion programs that increase mothers’ sensitivity to their children’s cues do pro-
mote more secure attachments. At the same time, the estimated relationship
between maternal sensitivity and secure attachment is often more modest than
attachment theorists would like to see. So there is a need for more exploration
of the variables that foster secure attachment (Belsky & Fearon, 2008). There also
is a need to clarify the role of fathers in the attachment process.
Marinus van IJzendoorn and Abraham Sagi-Schwartz (2008) have led
efforts to test the cultural universality of Ainsworth’s first three patterns. They
report that the Strange Situation produces the same three patterns in various
parts of the world, including Israel, Africa, Japan, China, Western Europe,
and the United States. In all the samples, secure attachment is the dominant
type, but there also are differences. The U.S and Western European samples
contain the highest percentages of avoidant children. Perhaps the West’s cul-
tural emphasis on independence leads parents to rebuff babies’ needs, and
the babies defend themselves with avoidant behavior.
Working Models in Children and Adults. Attachment research has
been moving forward at a rapid pace, and one of the most popular topics is
that of internal working models. Bowlby, you will recall, conceived of the
working model as the child’s expectations and feelings about the attachment
figure’s responsiveness. Because the working model involves internal mental
events, it is difficult to investigate in infancy; we cannot interview babies about
their thoughts and feelings. But after the age of 3 years or so, research becomes
feasible. Bretherton, Ridgeway, and Cassidy (1990) found that 3-year-olds
could complete stories about an attachment situation. They could provide
endings, for instance, to a story about a child who fell and hurt her knee while
taking a walk with her family. As predicted, the securely attached children,
compared to the others, most frequently depicted the parents in their story
endings as responsive and helpful (saying, for example, that a parent will put
a bandage on the child’s knee).
Adults, too, have developed thoughts and feelings about attachment,
and their attitudes undoubtedly influence the way they treat their children.
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Ethological Theories
Mary Main and her colleagues (Main et al., 1985; Main & Goldwyn, 1987)
interviewed mothers and fathers about their own early memories in an Adult
Attachment Interview. Focusing on the openness and flexibility of the par-
ents’ responses, Main developed a typology that has proven to correlate quite
well with children’s classifications in the Strange Situation (Hesse, 2008).
Main’s types include:
Secure/autonomous speakers, who talk openly and freely about their own
early experiences. These parents tend to have securely attached chil-
dren. Apparently the parents’ acceptance of their own feelings goes
hand-in-hand with an acceptance of their infants’ signals and needs.
Dismissing of attachment speakers, who talk as if their own attachment
experiences are unimportant. These parents tend to have insecure-
avoidant children; the parents reject their own experiences in much the
same way that they reject their infants’ proximity-seeking.
Preoccupied speakers, whose interviews suggest that they are still strug-
gling, inwardly or outwardly, to win their own parents’ love and
approval. It may be their own neediness that makes it difficult for them
to respond consistently to their infants’ needs. (Main & Goldwyn, 1987)
Following the introduction of the Disorganized/Disoriented category
of infant attachment, researchers have looked for a corresponding pattern in
the Adult Attachment Interview. Investigators have found that parents of
Disorganized/Disoriented children sometimes exhibit lapses in conscious-
ness and logical thinking (Lyons-Ruth & Jacobvitz, 2008). These lapses might
be associated with outbursts that generate fear in their babies, but this is
merely conjecture at this time.
Several studies have found that when parents are interviewed prior to
the birth of their babies, their interview classifications correlate with their
babies’ attachment behavior in the Strange Situation at 1 year of age. Gener-
ally, the overlap is about 70%. However, it has been more difficult to find an
adult interview classification that predicts the Disorganized/Disorganized
infant category (Main, 1995, p. 446).
Practical Applications of the
Bowlby/Ainsworth Endeavor
Institutional Care. Bowlby and his colleagues have had a tremen-
dous impact on child care issues.
Bowlby’s 1951 World Health Organization report significantly raised
awareness with respect to emotional deprivation in orphanages. This does
not mean that countries have consistently taken steps to provide more loving
care, but Bowlby did a lot to bring attention to the problem.
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Ethological Theories
Bowlby, together with James Robertson, also battled against the hos-
pital practice of separating toddlers and young children from their parents.
On this front, Bowlby and Robertson had great success. True, health care
professionals initially resisted his recommendations to allow parents to
room-in with their children. But in the 1970s rooming-in did become a com-
mon hospital practice. Most hospitals now allow parents to stay with their
children (Karen, 1994, chap. 6).
Day Care. As increasing numbers of U.S. mothers work outside the
home, families are turning to day care for assistance, and they are placing
their children in day care settings at younger and younger ages. Indeed,
day care for infants (children under 12 months of age) is already quite
common.
To some extent, day care has become a political issue. Some people argue
that day care supports a woman’s right to pursue a career. Others lobby for day
care because it enables economically disadvantaged parents to work and make
more money. Nevertheless, Bowlby (Karen, 1994, chap. 22) and Ainsworth (1973,
p. 70) have raised questions about it. Does early day care prevent a baby from
forming a bond with her parents? What are the emotional effects of daily sep-
arations from the parents in the first few years of life?
The research on such questions is still ongoing but it is clear that even
young infants who attend day care for several hours a day become pri-
marily attached to their parents, not to their day care providers (Clarke-
Stewart, 1989).
But research does raise the possibility that children who spend a great
deal of time in day care can suffer some ill effects. A major study by the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD)
found that the more time young children spend in day care up to the age
of 4 1/2 years, the more likely the children are to display aggressive and dis-
obedient behavior (2003). The NICHD generally found these effects to occur
regardless of the quality of the day care (whether or not the settings pro-
vided lots of nurturance and individual attention). However, a more recent
study found the relationship between time in day care and aggressive
behavior to be modest, and high-quality day care diminished the adverse
effects (McCartney et al., 2010). Still, taken as a whole, the research evi-
dence is sufficient to raise concerns.
In a sense, the search for quality day care really reflects wider problems
in contemporary societies, as Bowlby (1988, pp. 1–3) and Ainsworth (Karen,
1994, p. 415) tried to indicate. In earlier village societies, parents could take
their children to work with them in the fields or in the shops, and parents
received a good deal of child care assistance from grandparents, aunts and
uncles, teenagers, and friends. There was also time for games and socializ-
ing with the children. In today’s hectic world, the situation is different. Par-
ents usually live apart from their relatives and must raise their children
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Ethological Theories
alone, and parents often come home from work too exhausted to be very
responsive to their children. Although quality day care may seem desirable,
what parents really need are new occupational and social arrangements that
permit them to spend considerably more relaxed and enjoyable time with
their children.
A Child-Centered Approach to Child Rearing. Bowlby (1982, p. 356)
said that parents as well as professionals repeatedly asked one basic question:
Should a mother always meet her baby’s demands for her presence and atten-
tion? The fear is that too much attention will lead to spoiling.
The Bowlby/Ainsworth position is the same as Gesell’s. Evolution has
provided infants with signals and gestures that promote healthy development,
and it is wisest to respond to them. As parents, we should follow our impulse
to go to our babies when they cry, to return their smiles, to talk back when they
babble, and so on. Infants are biologically prepared to guide us with respect
to the experiences they need, and our relationships with them will develop
most happily when we follow their cues.
As indicated, this position is buttressed by the research of Ainsworth
and others. Parents who respond sensitively and promptly to their infants’
signals tend to produce babies who, at 1 year of age, are securely attached. In
home settings, these babies cry less than other babies and are relatively inde-
pendent. They seem to have developed the feeling that they can always get the
parents’ attention when necessary, so they can relax and explore the world.
Such infants do, to be sure, monitor the parents’ whereabouts; the attachment
system is too strong to ever completely shut down. But even in new settings,
they do not worry excessively about the mother’s presence. Instead, they use
her as a secure base from which to explore. They venture away from her to
investigate the surroundings, and even though they glance back at her and
perhaps return to her from time to time, it is not long before they venture forth
once again. “The picture,” Bowlby said, is “that of a happy balance between
exploration and attachment” (1982, p. 338).
Parents, Bowlby said, can in fact produce a spoiled or overmothered
child. But they do not accomplish this by being too sensitive and responsive
to the baby’s signals. If we look closely, we see that the parent is taking all
the initiative. A parent might insist on being close to a child, or showering the
child with love, whether the child wants it or not. The parent is not taking his
or her cues from the child (p. 375).
In recent years, many parents have found a new way to be intrusive.
They provide their infants and toddlers with all kinds of early stimulation,
from flash cards to computers, in an effort to accelerate their children’s intel-
lectual development. Ainsworth believed that such parental behavior is
unhealthy because it takes too much control away from the child (Karen,
1994, p. 416).
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Ethological Theories
Parents can be more helpful, Ainsworth and Bowlby say, by giving
children opportunities to pursue their own interests. Parents can frequently
do this simply by being available to the child, by providing the child with
a secure base from which to explore. When, for example, a young girl wants
to climb some large rocks, or wade into the ocean surf, the parent’s pres-
ence is necessary for the sake of the child’s safety and to help out if called
on. But the child doesn’t want or need the parent’s supervision or instruc-
tions. All she needs is the parent’s patient availability. This alone gives her
the assurance she needs to boldly try out new activities and explore the
world on her own.
EVALUATION
Darwin argued that humans share many emotions and cognitive capaci-
ties with other species, reflecting our common ancestry. Darwin’s position
was revolutionary at the time, and it still meets with resistance today. Many
scientists believe that our species is vastly different from and superior to
other animals (Balcombe, 2006, pp. 25-27). Despite this sentiment, Bowlby
emphasized the similarities between attachment behavior in humans and
other animals. When a human child follows her mother and cries out when
separated, the child is engaging in behavior similar to that of ducklings,
goslings, fawns, young monkeys and chimpanzees, and numerous other
young animals.
Adopting this perspective, Bowlby cast children’s behavior in a new
light. Prior to Bowlby, people often saw the child’s need to stay close to a par-
ent as merely babyish and immature. But Bowlby suggested that it became
part of our species’ innate make-up because it served the same adaptive func-
tion as in other species: It provided children with protection. If human chil-
dren had lacked the need to maintain proximity to their parents, many of
them would have died.
If a need is part of an organism’s biological nature, it is important that
the need be met. If we meet a child’s need for nutritious food, the child grows
up healthier than if the need is frustrated. Bowlby, Ainsworth, and their col-
leagues have tried to show that the same principle applies to attachment.
When caregivers are available in case their children need them, and are respon-
sive to their children’s cries and other attachment gestures, the children
develop well. They are relatively independent at 1 year of age and generally
approach life with courage and initiative in the years that follow. To be sure,
all the evidence isn’t overpowering, but it’s largely consistent with the
Bowlby/Ainsworth position.
This does not mean that everyone agrees with the Bowlby/Ainsworth
viewpoint. Jerome Kagan (1984) has argued that Ainsworth ignores the role
of innate temperament. Kagan says that the avoidant infants, for example,
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Ethological Theories
ignore the mother in the Strange Situation not because they are defending
themselves against rebuffs but because they are innately fearless. However,
attachment theorists have mounted a good deal of evidence suggesting the
patterns of attachment cannot be reduced to innate temperament (Vaughn,
Bost, & van IJzendorn, 2008).
As attachment theory moves forward, I hope writers will clarify the rela-
tionship between attachment and love. Bowlby (1979, p. 130) and others (see
Feeney, 2008) sometimes write as if all the nuances of love can be reduced to
the attachment model. This is doubtful. Love can include sexual desire, per-
ceptions of beauty, and a host of feelings and fantasies that extend beyond
attachment, which is more limited to one’s faith in another’s support. True,
attachment and love can overlap, but we need clear discussions of when this
overlap occurs and when it does not.
Nevertheless, attachment theory has produced great insights. More-
over, Bowlby’s general approach, which centers on the continuity of human
behavior with that of other animals, can be applied to other areas. I will con-
clude by suggesting how this approach can deepen our understanding of
children’s play.
Extending Bowlby’s Approach:
The Case of Play
Play, especially free, physically active play, is endangered today. Educational
policymakers believe children should be doing more important things—
namely, mastering academic skills. Schools have therefore largely eliminated
play from kindergartens (Miller & Almon, 2009). Many schools also have
eliminated or reduced recess in the elementary grades. Parents, too, are often
willing to sacrifice play for early academic instruction, which they believe
will give their children a jump-start on future success.
But is children’s play expendable? Or is it an innate need that must be
respected for children to develop fully?
First, let us consider play in nonhuman species. One of the remarkable
facts about play is that it is ubiquitous in mammals, especially young mam-
mals. We see it in young chimps, monkeys, cats, dogs, wolves, sheep, goats,
rats—every mammal one can think of. Play also is common in birds. Even
octopuses have been seen at play (Balcombe, 2006).
What’s more, the animals appear to be innately driven to play. If you
have observed kittens or puppies, I bet this has been your impression.
I was recently struck by the play of a baby goat, Boomer, who was born on
the farm animal sanctuary my wife Ellen and I founded. Within 10 days
after birth, Boomer scampered about and performed jumping stunts. He
climbed on rocks and tried jumping down, forward and backward, spinning
in different directions before he landed. When he ran about, he periodically
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Ethological Theories
leapt into the air and threw his legs out in new ways. All the while, his
mother kept an eye on him but she never intervened. I had never seen the
other goats (all adults) engage in such antics. Boomer clearly hadn’t learned
his maneuvers from the others. He was inwardly motivated to perform
them.
Scholars have entertained various hypotheses on the adaptive value of
play. One key possibility is that play develops the capacity to improvise and
therefore enables animals to handle unexpected events. If Boomer had to jump
from a rock to escape a predator, he would have a number of acrobatic alter-
natives at his disposal (Spinka, Newberry, & Bekoff, 2001).
What, then, are the implications for humans? In evolutionary theory, the
fact that play is found in all other mammals is highly significant. It suggests
that the human need to play didn’t just develop in our species’ unique cultural
or evolutionary history, after we branched off from other species. Rather, the
need to play, like much of our physical structure, is rooted in the ancestry we
share with other mammals.
Moreover, play in human children probably has served a similar adap-
tive function—the development of the capacity to improvise. To be sure,
human children don’t just run, jump, and engage in physical play like other
young animals do. Human children also make use of symbolic fantasy, as
when they use sticks to represent people and create imaginary scenarios. But
the urge to improvise—and to create and to imagine—has undoubtedly helped
our species survive, and the urge may be an evolutionary continuation of a
similar drive in other young animals.
If the human child’s play expresses an innate urge or need, we should
see consequences of permitting, rather than frustrating, it. Several studies sug-
gest that preschool play enhances cognitive capacities such as problem solv-
ing and creativity, as well as the ability to see things from others’ perspectives
(Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2009; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). When children are deprived
of play, they seem to become depressed and stressed out, but more research
is needed to document this possibility (Ginsburg, 2007).
Additional evidence that play is an innate drive comes from George
Eisen’s (1990) little-known account of children in the ghettos and in the con-
centration camps of the Holocaust. One might suppose that hunger, anguish,
and terror would have completely suppressed their desire to play, but this
did not happen. Summarizing the diaries and reports of victims, Eisen says,
“Play burst forth spontaneously and uncontrollably without regard to the
external situation” (1988, p. 66). Lacking manufactured toys, the children made
their own—out of mud, snow, rags, and bits of wood. When a skeptical inter-
viewer asked a little girl how she could have played in Auschwitz, her face lit
up and she said, “But I played! I played with nothing! With the snow! With
the balls of snow!” (p. 72).
In the Lodz ghetto, children played games with cigarette boxes, which
became treasures. One observer wrote, “Children’s eyes beg for those boxes,
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Ethological Theories
children’s hands reach out for them” (Eisen, 1988, p. 69). Hanna Levy-Haas,
an inmate of the Bergen Belsen concentration camp, concluded that children’s
yearning for play is an “instinctual impulse.” “I feel,” she wrote, “it is an urge
that springs from the soul of the children themselves” (pp. 60–61).
It seems quite possible, then, that the child’s urge to play is just as innate
in the human child as in other animals. If so, educational policymakers who
ignore it ignore a fundamental and creative aspect of our species.
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Montessori’s
Educational Philosophy
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
Most of the developmentalists we discuss in this book had ideas on
education, but only Maria Montessori dedicated herself to the actual
teaching of children. Montessori (1870–1952) was born in the
province of Ancona, Italy. Her father was a successful civil servant
with traditional ideas on the role of women in society. Her mother,
in contrast, hoped that Montessori would go as far as she could in
life. It was this hope that took hold. It is said that when Montessori
was seriously ill as a 10-year-old, she told her anxious mother, “Don’t
worry, Mother, I cannot die; I have too much to do” (Kramer, 1976,
p. 28). At the age of 26, Montessori became the first woman physician
in Italy’s history.
Montessori’s first professional interest was in mental retardation.
She was impressed by the extent to which institutionalized children
with this diagnosis hungered for experience; she felt they might be
teachable if the right methods were used. She read as much as she could
find on mental retardation and education in general and found that
her own intuitions had guided an earlier line of educators, including
Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Edouard Séguin, and Friedrich Froebel—
educators who had worked in the spirit of Rousseau. Their writings
helped convince Montessori that we cannot simply begin teaching chil-
dren with developmental delays the things we think they ought to
know, such as reading and writing. This will lead only to frustration.
Instead, we must first simply observe the children and take note of
their natural tendencies and spontaneous interests. Then we will be in
a position to take advantage of the children’s own natural inclinations
and ways of learning. For example, Séguin found that children with
developmental delay, like typically developing children at younger
ages, are most interested in objects that stimulate their senses and
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
permit physical activity. Accordingly, he gave them objects to place in different-
sized holes, beads to thread, pieces of cloth to button and lace, and other
concrete and useful tasks (Kramer, 1976, p. 61).
Montessori followed Séguin’s approach, using many of his materials
and trying out new materials of her own. To her delight, this new approach
worked, and she ventured to teach more difficult matters, including reading
and writing, in the same way. Since the children with developmental delay
seemed to learn best by touching and feeling objects, she gave them wooden
script letters that they liked to run their hands over again and again. By such
methods, she taught many of the children to read and write as skillfully as
typical school children of the same age.
During her work with the children with developmental delay, Montessori
worked closely with another physician, Dr. Giuseppe Montessano, with whom
she had a love affair. The result was a son, Mario. Montessori and Montessano
never married, apparently because his parents objected (Kramer, 1976, p. 92). At
that time in Italy, news of an illegitimate child would have ruined her career, so
she followed the advice of her friends and secretly sent Mario to a wet nurse in
the country. She did continue to visit her son, who later became an important edu-
cator in the Montessori movement. Nevertheless, the episode threw Montessori
into a crisis, which she weathered by deepening her Catholic faith.
In 1907 Montessori took over responsibility for educating children who
lived in a tenement in the slums of San Lorenzo, a section of Rome. There, she
established a school for over 50 extremely poor children—the sons and daugh-
ters of unemployed laborers, beggars, prostitutes, and criminals. In this
school—called the Casa dei Bambini, or Children’s House—Montessori con-
tinued to develop her ideas and techniques, and she was so successful that by
1913 she was one of the most famous women in the news. It seemed that her
ideas were about to change the course of education throughout the world.
However, her ideas apparently turned out to be too radical for the educational
mainstream, and within 5 years she was all but forgotten except by a small
band of followers. It was not until the 1960s that her work once again began
to catch the attention of psychologists, educators, and the general public
(Kramer, 1976; Lillard, 1972).
THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT
Although Montessori’s interests were more practical than theoretical, she did
develop a definite theoretical position, one that owed much to Rousseau. She
argued that we are wrong to assume that children are whatever we make
them, for children also learn on their own, from their own maturational
promptings (Montessori, 1936a, p. 22; 1949, pp. 17, 223). And, like Rousseau,
she argued that children often think and learn quite differently from adults
(Montessori, 1936b, p. 69).
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
A central component of Montessori’s theory is the concept of sensitive
periods. Sensitive periods are similar to critical periods; they are genetically
programmed blocks of time during which the child is especially eager and
able to master certain tasks. For example, there are sensitive periods for the
acquisition of language and for the beginning use of the hand. During these
periods, the child works with all her might at perfecting these abilities. And,
“if the child is prevented from enjoying these experiences at the very time
when nature has planned for him to do so, the special sensitivity which
draws him to them will vanish, with a disturbing effect on development”
(Montessori, 1949, p. 95).
The Sensitive Period for Order
During the first sensitive period, which takes place primarily during the first
3 years, the child has a strong need for order.1 As soon as children can move
about, they like to put objects where they belong; if a book or a pen is out of
place, they resolutely put it back. And even before this, they often become
upset at the sight of something out of order. Montessori told, for example, of
a 6-month-old girl who cried when a visitor put an umbrella on the table. The
girl looked at the table and cried for some time. She became calm only when
the mother, with a flash of insight, put the umbrella on the rack where it
belonged (Montessori, 1936b, p. 50).
To us, such reactions, which are quite common, seem silly. This is because
the adult need for order is on a different plane. For the adult, order provides
a certain measure of external pleasure, but for the young child, it is essential.
“It is like the land upon which animals walk or the water in which fish swim.
In their first year [infants] derive their principles of orientation from their
environment which they must later master” (p. 53).
The Sensitive Period for Details
Between 1 and 2 years of age, children fix their attention on minute details. For
example, they detect small insects that escape our notice. Or, if we show them
pictures, they seem to disregard the main objects, which we consider impor-
tant, and focus instead on tiny objects in the background. This concern for
details signals a change in children’s psychic development. Whereas they
were at first attracted to gaudy objects and brilliant lights and colors, they are
now trying to fill in their experience as completely as possible. To adults, the
small child’s concern for the minutest details is perplexing. It is further evi-
dence that a child’s “psychic personality is far different from our own, and it
is different in kind and not simply in degree” (Montessori, 1936b, p. 69).
1Montessori was rather vague about the ages of her sensitive periods, so the ages listed in
this chapter are not definite.
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
The Sensitive Period for the Use of Hands
A third sensitive period involves the use of the hands. Between about 18 months
and 3 years of age, children are constantly grasping objects. They particularly
enjoy opening and shutting things, putting objects into containers and pour-
ing them out, and piling objects up (Montessori, 1936b, p. 83). During the next
2 years or so, they refine their movements and their sense of touch. For ex-
ample, 4-year-olds enjoy identifying objects by touching them with their eyes
closed—a game that has far greater interest for the child than the adult
(Montessori, 1948a, pp. 127, 229).
The Sensitive Period for Walking
The most readily visible sensitive period is for walking. Learning to walk,
Montessori said, is a kind of second birth; the child passes from a helpless to
an active being (Montessori, 1936b, p. 77). Children are driven by an irre-
sistible impulse in their attempts to walk, and they walk about with the great-
est pride as they learn how.
We frequently fail to realize that walking, like other behaviors, means
something different to the child than it does to us. When we walk, we have a
destination in mind; we wish to get somewhere. The toddler, in contrast, walks
for the sake of walking. For example, the child may walk up and down the
staircase, over and over. The child does not walk to get somewhere, but to
“perfect his own functions, and consequently his goal is something creative
within himself” (p. 78).
The Sensitive Period for Language
A fifth sensitive period—and perhaps the most remarkable one of all—
involves the acquisition of language. What is remarkable is the speed with
which children learn such a complex process. To learn a language, children
must learn not just words and their meanings, but a grammar, a system of
rules that tells them where to place the various parts of speech. If, for ex-
ample, we say, “The tumbler is on the table,” the meaning we give those words
derives from the order in which we say them. If we had said, “On tumbler the
is table the,” our meaning would have been hard to grasp (Montessori, 1949,
p. 25). The rules underlying grammars are so elusive and abstract that lin-
guistic scholars are still trying to understand them in a formal way. Yet chil-
dren master them without much thinking about it. If a child is exposed to two
languages, the child masters them both (p. 111).
Because the child’s ability to grasp language is so great, Montessori con-
cluded that the child must be endowed with a special kind of language recep-
tivity or “mechanism” (p. 113). This mechanism is very different from anything
in the mental life of the older child or the adult. Whereas we learn a second
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
language with great deliberation, consciously struggling to memorize rules
regarding tenses, prefixes, modifiers, and so on, the child absorbs language
unconsciously.
From Montessori’s descriptions, the child’s language acquisition sounds
very much like a kind of imprinting. At a certain critical time—from the first
few months of life until or 3 years—children are innately prepared to
absorb sounds, words, and grammar from the environment. “The child absorbs
these impressions not with his mind, but with his life itself” (p. 24). Sounds
create impressions of incredible intensity and emotion; they must set in motion
invisible fibers in the child’s body, fibers that start vibrating in the effort to
reproduce those sounds (p. 24). We adults can hardly imagine what this expe-
rience is like, except perhaps by recalling the feeling we get when we are pro-
foundly moved by a symphony, and then imagining a similar feeling that is
several times stronger. This particular sensitivity for language comes into play
during the first 3 years or so, and then is gone.
Montessori suggested that because language acquisition is governed by
innate, maturational factors, children develop language in the same stages no
matter where they grow up (p. 111). For example, they all proceed from a stage
of babbling to a stage where they begin speaking words. Next, they enter a stage
in which they put two-word sentences together (e.g., “Boy go”), and there fol-
lows a period in which they master increasingly complex sentence structures.
These stages, Montessori emphasized, do not emerge in a gradual, con-
tinuous manner. Instead, there are several times during which the child seems
to be making no progress, and then new achievements come in explosions. For
example, the child bursts out with a number of new words, or suddenly mas-
ters a set of rules for forming parts of speech, such as suffixes and prefixes, in
a sudden explosion (p. 114).
Between the ages of about 3 and 6 years, children no longer absorb words
and grammar unconsciously, but they still are in the general sensitive period
for language. During this time they are more conscious of learning new gram-
matical forms and take great delight in doing so (see Figure 1).
2 1�2
Walking
6 yrs
Concern for details
Need for order
Unconscious grasp of language Conscious grasp of language
Use of hand; Refinement of hand movements and touch
5 yrs4 yrs3 yrs2 yrs1 yr0
FIGURE 1
Some early sensitive periods.
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
By the time the child is 5 or 6, then, and is ready for the traditional school,
the child has already learned to talk. “And all this happens without a teacher.
It is a spontaneous acquisition. And we, after he has done all this by himself,
send him to school and offer as a great treat, to teach him the alphabet!” (p. 115).
We are also so presumptuous as to focus on the child’s defects, which are
trivial in comparison to the child’s remarkable achievements. We see how
adults assume that what they teach the child amounts to everything and how
they grossly underestimate the child’s capacity to learn on her own.
EARLY EDUCATION IN THE HOME
At various sensitive periods, then, children are driven by an inner impulse to
independently master certain experiences. The goal of education is to assist
this process. Since children do not ordinarily enter nursery or Montessori
schools until they are 2 or 3 years old, parents and caretakers are really the first
educators.
To be of help, we do not necessarily need a formal knowledge of child
psychology. What we need is a certain attitude. We need to realize that it is not
our job to direct our children’s learning, for we must, above all, respect their
efforts at independent mastery. We must have faith in their powers of inner
construction. At the same time, we do not have to simply ignore or neglect our
children. What we can do is give them the opportunities to learn what is most
vital to them. We can watch for their spontaneous interests and give them the
chance to pursue them.
For example, Montessori (1936b, p. 49) told about a nurse who pushed her
5-month-old girl in the carriage through the garden. Each day, the girl was
delighted to see a white marble stone cemented to an old gray wall. Apparently
the girl took pleasure in her discovery that the stone was in the same place; she
was developing her sense of order in the world. In any case, the nurse, noting
the girl’s interest, stopped each day to permit the child to look at the sight. The
nurse did not just push the girl along at her own pace, but let the infant’s spon-
taneous interest guide her. She was not teaching the child in the ordinary sense,
but she was behaving like the ideal teacher. She was giving the baby the oppor-
tunity to make whatever spontaneous connection she was working on.
To take another example, parents can help their children during the sen-
sitive period for walking. Some parents enjoy following their child about as he
or she masters this new skill. These parents follow their children as they walk
and stop with them when they stop to examine new sights. They also give
their children time to master new aspects of walking, such as stair-climbing.
They follow their children’s own rhythms and enjoy watching the pride
children take in mastering new skills (chap. 11).
Other parents, however, fail to give their children full opportunities to
master walking on their own and in their own way. Some try to teach the child
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
to walk—a practice that probably gives the child the sense that his or her own
efforts are inadequate. Or parents fail to realize what walking means to the
child; they assume the child, like themselves, wants to get somewhere. So
they pick up their children and carry them, or push them in strollers, so as to
reach their destination more rapidly. Or parents become afraid of where the
child’s walking may lead, so they surround the child with safeguards, such as
playpens (chap. 11).
Children, of course, do eventually learn to walk, but the parental reac-
tions affect the children’s feelings about their inner rhythms and indepen-
dence. In one case, they gain the feelings of freedom and pride that come from
mastering an important skill on one’s own. In the other case, they find that
their own efforts at mastery produce negative reactions. The result may be a
lingering inhibition with respect to one’s inner promptings. It is possible that
later athletic ability and physical grace are related to the manner in which
children first learn to walk.
Once the child can walk easily, she can venture outdoors and explore the
natural settings around her. Montessori was deeply impressed by the extent to
which nature invigorates the child. Hiking with parents through parks or mea-
dows or climbing hills, 2-year-olds show amazing energy and stamina; they
happily cover distances the adults wouldn’t have imagined possible. Natural
settings also stimulate the young child’s powers of observation. While on a
walk, the child will frequently stop to examine a brook, an animal, or a fallen
branch for long stretches of time, completely absorbed in quiet contemplation.
When young children are given opportunities to freely explore and study
nature, they become happy and serene. Contact with nature seems to fulfill a
vital emotional need (Montessori, 1948a, chap. 4).
THE MONTESSORI SCHOOL
When children are about years old, they can enter a Montessori school. There,
they learn in the same class with children up to age 6 or so—approximately the
same age range as in Montessori’s Children’s House. Increasingly, Montesso-
rians are opening schools so that children can continue with Montessori’s more
advanced methods—sometimes even through high school. But the ages are
still mixed (e.g., 6 to 9) because Montessori found that children enjoy this
arrangement.
Independence and Concentration
The goal of education in the Montessori school is the same as that in the home.
The teacher does not try to direct, instruct, drill, or otherwise take charge of the
child; instead, the teacher tries to give the child opportunities for independent
mastery. The assumption is that if the school environment contains the right
2 1�2
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
FIGURE 2
A boy works on wooden cylinders.
(St. Michael’s Montessori School, New York City, Haledjian
photo.)
materials—those that correspond to the children’s inner needs at various
sensitive periods—the children will enthusiastically work on them on their
own, without adult supervision.
To create the right environment, Montessori first spent considerable time
simply observing children’s behavior with respect to various materials. She
then retained those that the children themselves told her were the most valu-
able to them. They told her this in a rather dramatic way; when they came
across materials that met deep, inner needs, they worked on them with amaz-
ing concentration.
Montessori first became aware of the child’s capacity for concentrated
effort when she saw a 4-year-old girl in the Children’s House working on
cylinders. That is, the girl was placing different-sized cylinders in the holes
of a wooden frame until she had them all in place (see Figure 2). Then she
would take them out again, mix them up, and start over. All the while she
was oblivious to the world around her. After she had repeated this exercise 14
78

Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
times, Montessori decided to test her concentration. She had the rest of the
class sing and march loudly, but the girl simply continued with her work.
Montessori then lifted the girl’s chair—with the child in it—onto a table. But
the girl merely gathered up her cylinders in her lap and kept on working,
hardly aware of the disturbance. Finally, after 42 repetitions, the child stopped
on her own, as if coming out of a dream, and smiled happily (Montessori,
1936b, p. 119).
After that, Montessori observed the same phenomenon on countless
occasions. When given tasks that met inner needs at sensitive periods, the
children worked on them over and over. And when they finished, they were
rested and joyful; they seemed to possess an inner peace. It seemed that chil-
dren were achieving, through intense work, their true or normal state; Montes-
sori therefore called this process normalization (Montessori, 1949, p. 206). She
then made it her goal to create the most favorable environment for this kind
of concerted effort.
Free Choice
In preparing her environment, Montessori tried to suspend her own ideas
about what children should learn and to see what they selected when given
a free choice. Their free choices, she learned, usually led to work on the tasks
that most deeply engrossed them. For example, she noticed that the 2-year-olds,
when free to move around in the room, were constantly straightening things
up and putting them in order. If, for example, a glass of water slipped from a
child’s hands, the others would run up to collect the broken pieces and wipe
the floor (Montessori, 1936b, p. 121). What she observed was their need for
order. Accordingly, she altered the environment so they could fulfill this need.
She made small washbasins so the children could wash their hands and
brushes; she made small tables and chairs so they could arrange them just
right; and she lowered the cupboards so they could put their materials away
where they belonged. In this way, activities of daily living became part of the
curriculum. All the children enjoyed these activities, but the 2-year-olds took
them the most seriously. They constantly inspected the room to see if any-
thing was out of place. For them, ordering the environment met the deepest
inner need (Montessori, 1948a, p. 48).
Today, the core Montessori materials are largely set, but the teacher still
relies heavily on the principle of free choice. Each child goes to the cupboard
and selects the apparatus that she wants to work on. The teacher has faith
that the children will freely choose the tasks that meet their inner needs at the
moment.
Although the teacher permits free choice, the teacher will from time to
time introduce a new task to a child who seems ready for it. This is done most
delicately. The teacher presents the material clearly and simply and then steps
back to observe the child’s behavior. The teacher watches for concentration and
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
repetition. If the child does not seem ready for the new task, it is put aside for
another day. The teacher must be careful to avoid giving the impression that
the child “ought” to learn a particular task; this would undermine the child’s
ability to follow her own tendencies. If the child does begin to work actively
on the material, the teacher moves away and lets the child work indepen-
dently (Lillard, 1972, pp. 65–68).
The teacher ’s attitude, Montessori said, is essentially a passive one—
that of an observer (Montessori, 1936a, p. 39). He or she spends most of the
time simply watching the children, trying to guess each one’s particular needs
and state of readiness.
Rewards and Punishments
The Montessori teacher, then, is not so much a director but a follower. It is the
child who leads the way, revealing what she most needs to work on. In this,
the Montessori teacher behaves very differently from the typical teacher, who
has set goals for the children and tries to take charge of their education.
The typical teacher often finds that children lack enthusiasm for the
things they are asked to learn. The teacher therefore relies heavily on external
rewards and punishments—praise, grades, threats, and criticism. Yet these
external inducements often seem to backfire. Quite often, children become so
concerned with external evaluations—so afraid of getting wrong answers and
looking stupid—that they cannot concentrate deeply on their work. Driven by
such pressure, they will learn a certain amount of material, but they can eas-
ily come to dislike school and the learning process (Holt, 1964; Montessori,
1948a, p. 14).
Equally damaging, external evaluations rob children of their indepen-
dence. Children soon begin looking to external authorities, such as the teacher,
to know what they should do and say. Montessori felt that authorities use
rewards and punishments primarily to make the child submissive to their
will. Like Rousseau, she wondered how a child who becomes anxious about
external approval will ever learn to think independently or will ever dare to
criticize the conventional social order (Montessori, 1948a, pp. 14–18).
Thus rewards and punishments have no place in the Montessori class-
room. Montessori teachers trust that if they pay attention to children’s spon-
taneous tendencies, they can find the materials on which children will work
intently on their own. The children will do so out of an inherent drive to per-
fect their capacities, and external inducements will become superfluous.
The traditional teacher often justifies reward and criticism as necessary
because children need to know when they are right or wrong. Montessori
agreed that children need to learn from their errors, but she did not want the
children to have to turn to adults for this information. Accordingly, she devel-
oped many materials with a built-in control of error. For example, the cylin-
ders, which teach spatial dimensions, have this control. If a child has not put
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
each cylinder in the proper hole, there will be one cylinder left over. When
children see this, their interest is heightened. They then figure out how to
correct the matter on their own.
Gradual Preparation
Montessori found that children cannot learn many skills all at once. For ex-
ample, 4-year-olds often desperately want to learn to button their coats and
tie their own shoes, as a consequence of their natural urge toward indepen-
dence, but these tasks are too difficult for them. They lack the fine motor skills.
To deal with such problems, Montessori developed materials that would
enable the children to learn skills in steps, at levels they could master. In the
case of shoe-tying, she developed a large tying frame (see Figure 3) so the
children could practice the correct tying pattern with grosser muscle move-
ments (Montessori, 1948a, p. 93). She also utilized the principle of indirect
preparation (p. 224). That is, she gave them unrelated tasks, such as cutting
vegetables (see Figure 3) and holding a pencil, through which they could
simultaneously perfect their dexterity. Then, when the children decided to
attempt to tie their own shoes, they could readily do so, for they had gradu-
ally mastered all the necessary subskills.
Reading and Writing
I have mentioned, by way of illustration, some of the tasks that are part of the
Montessori method (e.g., the cylinders and the exercises of daily living). We
cannot review every component of the Montessori curriculum in this book, but
I will indicate how Montessori approached one important area: reading and
writing.2
Montessori found that if one begins at the age of about 4 years, children
will learn to read and write with great enthusiasm. This is because they are still
in the general sensitive period for language. They have just mastered lan-
guage unconsciously and are now eager to learn all about it on a more con-
scious level, which reading and writing permit them to do. If, in contrast, one
waits until the age of 6 or 7 years to teach written language, the task is more
difficult because the sensitive period for language has already passed (p. 276).
Four-year-olds usually master writing before reading. This is because
writing is the more concrete and sensory activity and therefore better suits
the young child’s style of learning (p. 233). Still, one cannot teach writing all
at once. If one asks 4-year-olds to make a sound and write it, they will be
unable to do so; one must introduce writing through a series of separate
preparatory exercises.
2For a summary of the method for teaching arithmetic, see Montessori, 1948a, chaps.
18 and 19.
81

FIGURE 3
Children at work on a tying frame and an exercise of daily living.
(St. Michael’s Montessori School, New York City, Haledjian photo.)
Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
82

First, the child is shown how to hold a pencil and then practices draw-
ing by staying within outlines. Children love to practice drawing as precisely
as possible, for they are in the sensitive period for precise hand movements.
They also have been mastering hand-eye coordination through exercises of
daily living, such as cutting vegetables, pouring water, and polishing silver.
In another exercise, children trace their fingers over sandpaper letters
that are pasted onto blocks of wood (see Figure 4). For example, they make the
“m” sound and trace it as they do so. The letters are written in script, rather
than print, because children find the movements of script freer and more nat-
ural. Through this exercise, then, they learn to make the movements of the
letters. They love repeating this exercise, for they are still in the sensitive peri-
ods for learning about sounds and refining their sense of touch. Frequently
they like to close their eyes and trace the letters with their fingers alone. Six-
Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
FIGURE 4
A girl works on sandpaper letters.
(St. Michael’s Montessori School, New York City, Haledjian
photo.)
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
year-olds, in contrast, derive no particular pleasure from the sandpaper letters,
for they have already moved out of the sensitive period for touch. The letters,
incidentally, have a built-in control of error, since the child can tell when her
finger has strayed off the letter and onto the wood because the wood feels
different (p. 229).
In a third exercise, children are given a moveable alphabet that permits
them to form the letters of words. For example, they look at a picture of a cat,
sound out the letters, and then make the word with the letters. This, too, they
repeat endlessly, out of their spontaneous interest in the elements of spoken
language (pp. 234–237).
Through these and other separate exercises, then, children learn the var-
ious skills involved in writing. When they finally put these skills together and
begin to write letters, there usually follows an “explosion of writing.” They
will write all day long (p. 239).
Writing paves the way for reading. Through writing, children form a mus-
cular and visual memory of the letters and words and therefore can recognize
them. Consequently, the 5- or 6-year-old who has learned to write can usually
learn to read with very little help from the teacher (Lillard, 1972, p. 122). Children
often say that nobody taught them to read at all. Montessori did aid the process,
though. Her essential method was to show a word printed on a card, ask the
child to sound it out, and then ask the child to sound it out more quickly. In most
cases, children rapidly catch on and begin reading words on their own.
During the entire preparatory period for writing and reading, the chil-
dren do not even look at a book. Then, when they first pick a book up, they
can usually begin reading it immediately. Consequently, they avoid all the
frustrating experiences that children so often associate with books. There fol-
lows an “explosion of reading.” Children delight in reading everything they
see (Montessori, 1948a, p. 253).
The sensitive care with which Montessori prepared each small step is
impressive. The exercises are arranged so that each comes easily to the child,
for each corresponds to the child’s natural way of learning. Montessori noted
that her method contrasts sharply with that of most teachers, who simply give
children lessons and then spend most of their time criticizing them for their
mistakes. Criticism, Montessori felt, is humiliating and pointless. Instead of
criticizing, which only tears down, the teacher should figure out ways of help-
ing children build their skills (Montessori, 1949, p. 245).
Misbehavior
We have emphasized how Montessori teachers prize the child’s independence—
how they avoid imposing expectations on the child, or even praising or criti-
cizing the child. This is true with respect to intellectual work. Moral misconduct
is another matter. Children are not permitted to abuse the materials or their
classmates.
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
In the Montessori school, respect for the materials and for others usually
develops quite naturally. The children know how important the work is for
themselves, so they respect the work of the other children. If they do bother
a child who is in deep concentration, the child usually insists on being left
alone in such a way that they automatically respect this wish. Sometimes,
though, the teacher must intervene. Montessori (1948a, p. 62) recommended
isolating the child for a moment. In this way, the child has a chance to see the
value of the work for others and to sense what he or she is missing. The child
will then begin constructive work without any further prompting.
In general, the Montessori view of discipline is different from that of
most teachers, who think that it is their job to gain control over the class.
They shout: “I want everyone in their seats!” “Didn’t you hear what I just
told you?” “If you don’t behave this instant you won’t go out for recess!”
The Montessori teacher is not interested in such obedience. Real discipline
is not something imposed from without, from threats or rewards, but some-
thing that comes from within, from the children themselves as they “pass
from their first disordered movements to those that are spontaneously
regulated” (p. 56).
Misbehavior, in Montessori’s view, usually indicates that the children
are unfulfilled in their work. Accordingly, one’s task is not to impose one’s
authority on the children but to observe each child more closely, so one will
be in a better position to introduce materials that will meet his or her inner
developmental needs. The teacher expects a certain amount of restlessness
and distracted behavior during the first days of the year, but once the chil-
dren settle into their work they become so absorbed in it that discipline is
rarely a problem.
Nature in Education
So far I have described Montessori education as if it occurs completely indoors.
Actually, Montessori believed that even though children go to school, they
still need rich contact with nature outdoors. In making this point, she believed
she was bucking a modern trend. Modern societies devalue nature. They have
built artificial indoor environments that make us feel so safe and comfortable,
we don’t realize the extent to which we have lost our connection to the soil,
plants, wildlife, and the elements. We do not realize how much our lives have
become impoverished because of this loss, and, more tragically, we overlook
the importance of nature for children (chap. 4).
The child, Montessori said, has a stronger affinity for nature than we do
and benefits more fully from rich contact with it. In natural settings, children
spontaneously become quiet and watchful, developing strong powers of
patient observation. They also benefit emotionally. The sight of a flower, an
insect, or an animal fills the child with joy and wonder, and as the child
contemplates such things, she develops a love of life (pp. 70–71).
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
BOX 1 Two 6-Year-Old Boys’ Views on School Matters
Note the differences in the role of the teacher in the minds of these two children.
1. Who taught you to read?
Regular School Child: “My teacher.”
Montessori Child: “Nobody, I just read the book, and to see if
I could read it.”
2. Do you get to work on anything you want?
Regular School Child: “No. But we can go to the bathroom any-
time we want. But we’re not allowed to go
to the bathroom more than four times.”
Montessori Child: “You can work on anything you want.”
3. What would happen if you bothered another kid who was working?
Regular School Child: “I’d get in trouble from the teacher.”
Montessori Child: “He’ll just say, ‘Please go away, I’m busy.’”
(What would you do?) “I’d just go away,
’cause I don’t want to bother someone
working.”
Montessori didn’t commit herself to the precise ages at which the child
is especially attuned to nature, but she suggested that this special sensitivity
lasts at least until adolescence (Montessori, 1948b, p. 35). In any case, she
believed it is terrible that modern life separates children from nature so thor-
oughly that their powers of observation and feelings of love for the world just
wither away.
In cities, it is particularly difficult to bring children into contact with
untamed nature, so Montessori relied on gardening and animal husbandry,
which she introduced in the Children’s House (ages 3 to 6) and continued to pro-
vide in the elementary school years (Montessori, 1909, chap. 10; 1948a, p. 75).
These activities help children develop several important virtues. One is respon-
sibility. Without any prodding, children diligently and lovingly water seedlings
and care for animals. Children also learn patient foresight. They see how plants
grow in their season and learn to wait for life to unfold according to its own tim-
ing. Finally, children strengthen their feeling for nature. As they help things live
and grow, they develop the sense that they are a part of living creation, a part
of something much larger than themselves. They grow spiritually.
Fantasy and Creativity
Montessori was critical of attempts to enrich children’s fantasy lives through
fairy tales, fables, and other fanciful stories. She saw fantasy as the product
of a mind that has lost its tie to reality (Montessori, 1917, p. 255).
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
Montessori’s position on fantasy would appear to contradict one of her
most basic tenets—namely, that we should follow children’s natural inclina-
tions. She acknowledged that children have a natural bent toward fantasy. As
she put it, the child’s “mentality differs from ours; he escapes from our
strongly marked and restricted limits, and loves to wander in the fascinating
worlds of unreality” (p. 255). But she wanted to help the child overcome these
tendencies. When we read children fairy tales or tell them about Santa Claus,
we only encourage their credulity. When they hear these stories, furthermore,
their basic attitude is passive; they simply take in the impressions we give
them. They believe fantastic things because they have not yet developed their
powers of discrimination and judgment. And it is just these powers that they
need to build.
Montessori did recognize the uses of a creative imagination, such as that
possessed by the artist. But the artist’s creativity, she maintained, is always tied
to reality. The artist is more aware of forms, colors, harmonies, and contrasts
than we are. If we wish children to become creative, then, we must help them
refine such powers of discrimination (pp. 250–251).
When it came to drawing, for example, Montessori recognized that chil-
dren have a strong inner urge to draw, but she didn’t encourage their “free
drawing.” Instead, she tried to help them discriminate among forms and col-
ors through activities such as filling in insets and cutting colored paper.
Montessori didn’t actually suppress children’s free drawing, but her own
goal was to enhance children’s powers of observation and discrimination
(Montessori, 1948a, chap. 20).3
Elementary and Secondary Education
Montessori is best known for the methods she developed for the Children’s
House, for children 3 to 6 years of age. These are the ages of the sensitive peri-
ods and the unique power to absorb impressions in such a powerful way. But
Montessori also developed fairly detailed programs for the elementary school
years (ages 6 to 12) and outlined general ideas for education in the adoles-
cent and young adult years. In recent decades, increasing numbers of ele-
mentary schools, middle schools, and even some high schools have developed
Montessori programs.
Montessori’s philosophical approach to elementary and later education
was the same as that with respect to young children. She didn’t believe that
education should begin with adults’ ideas about what children should learn
(Lillard, 1996, p. 75). When adult goals dominate, too many lessons have noth-
ing to do with children’s own developing needs and interests: “We make them
listen when they have no desire to hear, write when they have nothing to say,
3For a discussion of instruction in music, see Montessori, 1948a, chap. 21.
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
observe when they have no curiosity” (Montessori, 1917, p. 269). Instead, edu-
cation should continue to nourish the vital growth forces at work within the
child. The growing child has an inner need—indeed a yearning—for certain
activities to develop herself, and we should make these activities available.
Elementary Education (ages 6 to 12). At the age of 6 or 7 years, chil-
dren’s developing needs do undergo a major shift. Before this, their deepest
needs were to develop personal capacities such as walking, language, and the
senses. Now, they become more intellectual and their focuses turn outward.
Children want to learn all there is to know about the world, including the
social world and what is right and wrong. They want to understand why
things are as they are and gain some mastery over the world. In this, they are
quite ambitious. They aren’t interested in isolated skills and information, as
taught in textbooks and workbooks; rather, they want to understand the world
in a full way—to grasp the big picture.
Montessori therefore introduced a series of stories, under the heading of
the “cosmic plan,” which tells about the beginning of the earth, the origins of
life, early humans, the growth of technology, and so on. These stories aren’t
meant to hand down the ultimate truth, but to excite the child’s imagination
and stimulate the child to ask questions and do research to find answers. For
example, the child might want to know how early peoples made their clothes
and what food they ate. As with younger children, the Montessori school
respects the child’s inner urge to find answers and figure things out for her-
self (Lillard, 1996, chap. 4; Montessori, 1948a, pp. 4, 15).
Six- to 12-year-olds also wish to explore the world by physically mov-
ing away from family and school. To meet this need, Montessori proposed
activities she called “going out” expeditions. The child, usually with two or
three others, carries out research in the community. The children might visit
museums, zoos, a planetarium, ponds, libraries, artists’ studios, or botanical
gardens. The range is wide. Typically, the children go on their own—without
the teacher—although the teacher lets relevant people in the community know
the children may be coming. She also may give the children safety instruc-
tions and perhaps a letter of introduction. The teacher creates a safe and favor-
able environment for exploration, but the children choose the expeditions and
conduct their investigations on their own (Lillard, 1996, chap. 7).
Secondary School. Montessori didn’t fully develop educational meth-
ods for the secondary school years, but she did offer some thoughts (e.g.,
Montessori, 1948b). She believed that the adolescent has a deep, personal need
to improve society, but the young person also is plagued by the self-doubts that
characterize this stage. Perhaps the single-best means of gaining confidence,
Montessori said, is through real, meaningful work—work in which students
engage in cooperative business ventures. Because adolescents still have a feel-
ing for nature, an ideal kind of work is farming, and young people should
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
take as much responsibility for running a farm as possible. As an alternative,
teenagers might run a hotel in the countryside. They could figure out expenses,
fees, guest schedules, publicity, and so forth. Students can learn a considerable
amount of academic material through such economic ventures (e.g., math
through hotel accounting), and real work gives adolescents a feeling of worth.
In today’s Montessori secondary schools, educators make room for business
activities such as running salad bars and shops (Coe, 1996).
Montessori definitely favored rustic settings, where young people can
breathe pure air, get good exercise, and maintain their feelings for nature. But
she also valued technological innovation and wanted teenagers to understand
how modern farming techniques and other machinery contribute to civiliza-
tions. Indeed, she thought that teenagers can gain feelings of self-esteem by
identifying with the technological progress of the human race (Montessori,
1948b, pp. 117–118).
EVALUATION
A cornerstone of developmental or child-centered education is a faith in the
child—or, better put, a faith in nature’s laws guiding the child from within.
Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Gesell, and others made this point. Adults shouldn’t
constantly set goals and try to influence children; they should try to provide
tasks that give children opportunities to pursue their naturally emerging inter-
ests. Before Montessori, however, no one knew how much children seem to
need such tasks, or how much energy they will pour into them. In the Chil-
dren’s House, 3- to 6-year-olds freely chose certain tasks and worked on them
with the deepest concentration. And when they finished, they emerged happy,
refreshed, and serene. They seemed at peace because they had been able to
develop themselves. This intensity of concentration seems to be especially
great in the first 6 years of life, but Montessori believed all education should
consider what children themselves are most eager to learn.
How effective is Montessori education? In my experience, people who
have visited Montessori schools, or have children in them, are impressed. At
the early level (ages 3 to 6 years), people are typically struck by the quiet dig-
nity of the classroom. The atmosphere is often like that of a monastery, with
everyone so seriously at work. No teacher is shouting, and the children are
respectful of one another. Parents see their children becoming increasingly
independent and loving school. With respect to elementary school classes,
parents and visitors are again impressed by children’s purposefulness.
Psychologists want to know, however, about the empirical research on
the effectiveness of Montessori education. Good studies are scarce, and they
are not terribly conclusive, but they generally indicate that Montessori
preschools advance children’s test scores about as well or better than other
preschool programs. Montessori children may read and spell particularly well.
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Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
But researchers have generally been more impressed by the attitudes that
Montessori schools foster—concentration, confidence, and independence
(Chattin-McNichols, 1992; Evans, 1975, pp. 270–275; Kahn, 1993, p. 18; Miller
& Dyer, 1975). One study that included both 5- and 12-year-olds found that
Montessori schools fostered greater creativity as well as greater respect for
peers (Lillard & Else-Quest, 2006).
If Montessori were to hear of this pattern of results, she probably would
be pleased. Her primary goal was not high scores on achievement tests but
positive attitudes. If children in Montessori schools typically learn to read and
write at an early age, this is fine, but in terms of her overall philosophy, it is
just a fortunate happenstance. Montessori chose to teach writing and reading
to 4-year-olds only because they revealed an inner urge to write at this young
age. If she had found no such urge until, say, age 10, she would not have
taught it until then. She did not want to impose tasks on children just because
adults are anxious that they learn them as soon as possible. She cared little
about how rapidly children learn standard skills or about advancing them
along the ladder of achievement tests. Rather, she was concerned with chil-
dren’s attitudes toward learning. She wanted to unharness their natural love
for learning and their capacities for concerted and independent work, which
unfold according to an inner timetable. As she once said,
My vision of the future is no longer of people taking exams and pro-
ceeding on that certificate from the secondary school to the University,
but of individuals passing from one stage of independence to a higher,
by means of their own activity, through their own effort of will, which
constitutes the inner evolution of the individual. (Montessori, 1936, cited
in Montessori, 1970, p. 42)
Although Montessori is well known as a teacher, she is underestimated as an
innovative theoretician. She anticipated much that is current in developmen-
tal thinking. For one thing, she was among the first to argue for the possibil-
ity of sensitive or critical periods in intellectual development. Even more
impressive were her insights into language acquisition. Early on, she sug-
gested that children unconsciously master complex grammatical rules and
must possess an innate mechanism that enables them to do so—ideas that
anticipated the work of Chomsky.
Montessori also was among the first to call attention to the child’s need
for contact with nature. She said children are especially attuned to nature and
benefit from rich exposure to it. She didn’t specify a precise sensitive period
when this is so, but she believed children need experience with nature to
develop their powers of observation and other qualities, such as a feeling of
connection to the living world. Today, we find such thoughts among
researchers advancing the “biophilia hypothesis” (Wilson, 1993). These schol-
ars speculate that if by some age children don’t develop a feeling for nature,
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this feeling will never take hold. I should add, though, that the number of
scholars and researchers investigating such possibilities is still very small.
Most research seems guided by our modern society’s general assumption that
a feeling for nature isn’t terribly important. What counts is the child’s social
development and the intellectual skills she will need for the indoor high-tech
workplace. Montessori was among the few scholars ever to take the child’s tie
to nature seriously (Crain, 1997).
What are the criticisms of Montessori? Dewey (Dewey & Dewey, 1915)
thought the Montessori teacher sometimes limits the child’s freedom and cre-
ativity. When, in particular, a child finds an apparatus too difficult and there-
fore plays with it in some new way (e.g., rolling cylinders), the teacher will
suggest working on something else. The child is not allowed to innovate.
Montessori teachers respond that children inwardly feel inadequate with
respect to such tasks and will feel far more creative working on tasks for which
they are ready. Still, the teachers hope the times they must intervene are few.
More generally, Montessori had little patience for many of the more
expressive, emotional aspects of childhood. She not only discouraged free
play in the classroom, but fantasy and free drawing as well. Until the ele-
mentary years, even social interactions aren’t particularly prominent in the
classroom. Early Montessori education has an impersonal, matter-of-fact qual-
ity. Children become deeply absorbed in their work, which is extremely mean-
ingful to them, but Montessori might have given more recognition to young
children’s social, imaginative, and artistic development.
In the case of drawing, Montessori overlooked the remarkable qualities
of children’s works. Young children’s spontaneous drawing goes through
phases when it is fresh, lively, and beautifully organized (Gardner, 1980).
Montessori recognized the natural impulse to draw in the young child and
didn’t want to hinder it, but she overlooked its natural blossoming.
I believe Montessori also was wrong about fairy tales. Montessori said
that fairy tales and imaginary stories encourage the child to depart from real-
ity. She also believed fairy tales force children into passive listening, a state in
which they merely receive impressions from adults. But Bettelheim’s (1976)
book on fairy tales makes a strong case for a different view. Bettelheim argued
that the fairy tales do not really teach children to believe in imaginary hap-
penings because children know the fairy tale is make-believe. The stories
themselves make this point with their opening lines—“Once upon a time,”
“In days of yore and times and tides long ago,” and so on (p. 117). Children
intuitively understand that the story addresses itself not to real, external
events, but to the inner realm of secret hopes and anxieties. For example,
“Hansel and Gretel” deals with the child’s fear of separation and does so in a
way that points to a solution. It indirectly encourages children to become inde-
pendent and use their own intelligence.
Furthermore, the process of listening to a fairy tale may be much more
active than Montessori realized. When children listen to a story, they interpret
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it in their own way and fill in the scenes with their own images. When a story
speaks to an issue with which the child is inwardly struggling, the child wants
to hear it over and over, much as Montessori children work repeatedly on
external exercises. And, finally, children often emerge from the story in a state
of calm and peace, as if they have resolved some issue.4
Montessori, then, may have undervalued some components of the
childhood years, such as play, drawing, and fairy tales. But whatever
Montessori may have overlooked, her oversights are minor in comparison
to her contributions. Montessori, as much or more than anyone, demon-
strated how the developmental philosophies of Rousseau, Gesell, and oth-
ers can be put into practice. She showed how it is possible to follow
children’s spontaneous tendencies and to provide materials that will per-
mit them to learn independently and with great enthusiasm. Montessori
was one of history’s great educators.
4The process of listening to a fairy tale seems much more active, for example, than most
television watching. Television itself usually supplies the child with all the images.
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Werner’s Organismic
and Comparative Theory
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
Heinz Werner (1890–1964) was born and grew up in Vienna, Austria.
He was a studious boy who also loved music, taking up the violin when
he was 7 years old. After completing the Gymnasium (roughly the
equivalent to our high school), Werner thought briefly about becoming
an engineer, but he changed his mind and entered the University of
Vienna, hoping to become a composer and a music historian. At the
university, however, his interests quickly broadened to include phi-
losophy and psychology. This change began one day when he mis-
takenly went to the wrong lecture hall. He had thought he was
attending a music class but found himself listening to a lecture on the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Since he thought it would be too
embarrassing to walk out, he stayed, and he became so engrossed in
the topic that he soon decided to major in philosophy and psychology
(the two fields were still combined). Still, Werner ’s interest in music
remained, and he wrote his doctoral dissertation on the psychology of
aesthetic enjoyment.
In 1917 Werner joined the Psychological Institute at Hamburg,
where he participated in lively discussions about a new psycholo-
gical movement: Gestalt psychology. Gestalt psychologists argued
that when we perceive things, we perceive whole forms, gestalts,
which cannot be analyzed in terms of their separate elements. In
Figure 1, for example, we directly perceive circles, and it does not
matter whether the circles are comprised of dots or dashes. There is
a sense in which the circle is a whole pattern that is more than its
parts.
Gestalt psychologists went on to assert that our experience of
forms is governed by organizing forces in the central nervous sys-
tem, and they tried to show the principles by which these forces work.
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Werner’s Organismic and Comparative Theory
FIGURE 1
An example of Gestalt perception: We perceive both forms as circles
despite their different elements.
FIGURE 2
The Gestalt principle of closure: We tend to
close or complete figures into whole patterns.
One principle is closure, a tendency to complete patterns. Figure 2, for exam-
ple, is not perceived merely as two lines but as a triangle with pieces miss-
ing. We tend to perceive it as a whole, meaningful pattern.
Although Werner was strongly influenced by Gestalt psychology, it was
not the Gestalt psychology with which we are familiar. That form was brought
here by Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang Kohler, who gave us
examples like those just mentioned. These psychologists were sometimes
called the Berlin School. Werner identified more closely with the Leipzig
School of Felix Krueger, Friedrich Sander, and others—people who are still
hardly known in the United States. The Leipzig School agreed with the gen-
eral Gestalt principles, but it believed the Berlin orientation was not genuinely
holistic because it focused too narrowly on perception instead of on the whole,
acting, feeling organism. The Leipzig School was also more developmentally
oriented. As we shall see, the Leipzig viewpoint had a strong influence on
Werner’s organismic-developmental writings.
Werner’s years at Hamburg were extremely productive, and it was there
that he published the first edition (1926) of his famous book, Comparative
Psychology of Mental Development (2nd edition, 1948). This book was a bold,
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Werner’s Organismic and Comparative Theory
sweeping venture. In it, Werner tried to show how the concept of develop-
ment, properly defined, could be used to compare patterns found in humans
across various cultures and even between humans and other species.
In 1933 Werner was dismissed from Hamburg by the Nazis because he
was Jewish. He spent a few months in Holland and then came to the United
States, where he held a number of positions, including that of research psy-
chologist at the Wayne County Training School in Michigan. There, between
1936 and 1943, he did a great deal of research on developmentally delayed
and brain-injured children. In 1943 Brooklyn College gave him his first full-
time teaching position in the United States, assigning him to what we would
now consider the ridiculously low rank of instructor. Werner was simply not
recognized here as the great theorist he was.
But he continued with his work, and in 1947 Clark University hired him
as a professor of psychology and education. At Clark he found a true intel-
lectual home, working with sympathetic colleagues and inspired students.
Former students remember Werner as a formal but kindly man who was
extremely open-minded and had a rare ability to draw out the best in his stu-
dents (Franklin, 2004; Witkin, 1965).1
WERNER’S VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT
Werner wanted to tie development to both an organismic and a comparative
orientation. We first review his conception of development and then relate it
to these two orientations.
Psychologists usually talk about development in loose ways, but Werner
believed the concept needed a precise definition. Development, he argued,
refers to more than the passage of time; we may grow older but without devel-
oping. Furthermore, development refers to more than increases in size; we
may grow taller or fatter, but such growth is not necessarily developmental.
Development involves changes in structure, which may be defined according
to the orthogenic principle:
Whenever development occurs, it proceeds from a state of relative lack
of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation and hierarchic
integration. (Werner & Kaplan, 1956, p. 866)
Let us look at these two concepts—differentiation and hierarchic
integration—more closely. Differentiation occurs when a global whole separates
into parts with different forms or functions. For example, the embryo begins
as a global unit that separates into different organs, such as the brain, heart,
1Margery Franklin and Joseph Glick provided helpful comments and recollections for this
biographical introduction.
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liver, and kidney. Similarly, the fetus’s motor activity becomes more differen-
tiated when its limbs and trunk no longer all move together in one “mass
action” but move separately.
As behavior becomes differentiated, it also becomes hierarchically inte-
grated. That is, behaviors come under the control of higher regulating centers.
In the fetus, for example, limb and trunk movements become not only more
differentiated but also more fluid and coordinated as they come under the
control of higher organizing circuits in the central nervous system (Hofer,
1981, pp. 97–100).
The orthogenic principle describes behavior in many realms. For example,
when children begin to draw, they first make the same kinds of back-and-forth
movements, producing circular scribbles. Their drawing becomes more dif-
ferentiated as they experiment with different kinds of strokes. We also see
hierarchic organization when their drawing comes under the control of their
plans. Instead of drawing away and deciding what it looks like afterward,
they start off with a plan or image that guides their strokes.
The orthogenic principle applies to personality development, too. For
example, adolescents differentiate between the goals they want to pursue in
life and those they do not. The goals they select then assume hierarchical con-
trol over much of their daily behavior. A girl who decides to become a doctor,
for instance, will organize many of her daily activities with this goal in mind.
Until young people do settle on their goals, they often feel their lives lack
coherence and structure. They complain they cannot find themselves. They
need a purpose to guide them.
A Major Theme: Self-Object Differentiation
Werner wrote extensively on the many applications of the orthogenic prin-
ciple. However, he was particularly interested in the process of self-object dif-
ferentiation, the gradual process by which children separate themselves from
the environment. This process often seems to progress through three levels.
These levels roughly correspond to infancy, childhood, and adolescence, but
Werner was not concerned with ages; he was interested only in differing devel-
opmental patterns.
Initially, at the sensorimotor-affective level, infants hardly experience an
outside world apart from (differentiated from) their own immediate actions,
sensations, and feelings. They know objects only insofar as they are sucking
them, touching them, grasping them, and so on. If, as Piaget (1936b) showed,
a young baby loses hold of a toy, the baby will act as if the toy no longer exists.
There is little sense of objects existing apart from oneself.
Gradually, children come to function on a more purely perceptual level,
perceiving things “out there,” apart from themselves. They stand back and
look at objects, point to them, ask their names, and describe them. They gain
a measure of objectivity. Still, their perceptions remain strongly bound up
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with their actions and feelings. For example, Katz and Katz (cited in Werner,
1948, p. 383) observed that preschool children take a great interest in furniture
that can be used for climbing and jumping, as well as houses in which acquain-
tances live, whereas other furniture and houses hardly seem to enter into their
awareness.
The extent to which children’s perceptions are colored by their per-
sonal needs and actions is sometimes revealed by the words they use. For
example, 4-year-old Laura called a certain tree the “resting tree” because she
often sat under its cool branches on the way home from school. She called
the yard where the “resting tree” was located the “resting place,” and the
family who lived there “the resting people.” Her perceptions were still
bound up with her personal needs and activities (Smart & Smart,
1978, p. 89).
To gain the most detached, objective view of the world, we must rise to a
conceptual level of thought. That is, we must begin to think in very general and
abstract dimensions, such as height, volume, and velocity, which lend them-
selves to precise measurement. For example, the rule
enables us to quantify space objectively, without any reference to our personal
feelings about it. Such detached, impersonal analysis has long been the goal of
Western science.
Returning to Primitive Levels
Werner believed development is teleological, which means that it directs
itself toward mature end-states. Humans, therefore, naturally progress
toward abstract, conceptual modes of thought. This does not mean, however,
that once we develop these intellectual operations, we must rely on them
alone. If we did, our lives would become empty, abstract, and barren. The
world would become, in Whitehead’s words, “a dull affair, soundless, scent-
less, colorless” (1929, p. 88). We would long for the kinds of thinking that
characterized earlier levels, in which images were tied to feelings, sensations,
and actions.
Sometimes, Werner said, adults preserve the rich, earlier kinds of expe-
rience to a greater extent than it might initially seem. A biologist might
write up her research results in a highly abstract manner, but her research
is actually based on direct perceptions of living organisms. Her abstract
formulations bring order to her sensory impressions, which remain in the
background (Werner, 1948, p. 52).
Werner also said we return to earlier, richer modes of experience in
dreams or in states induced by hallucinogenic drugs (1948, p. 82). In his later
writings, however, Werner (1957; Werner & Kaplan, 1963) increasingly empha-
sized a new concept—microgenesis.
Microgenesis refers to the developmental process that occurs each time
we confront a task, such as perceiving an object or figuring out a problem.
“area = height * width”
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Werner’s Organismic and Comparative Theory
In each instance, our mental process goes through the same sequences that
characterize development during the life span. That is, we begin with vague,
global impressions that are fused with feelings and bodily sensations. These
impressions give way to more differentiated perceptions, which finally become
integrated into a coherent whole. Microgenesis, then, is a self-renewing process
in which we continually begin at undifferentiated levels.
Microgenesis often occurs so rapidly that we are unaware of the process,
but we may become aware of it at times, as when we find ourselves in new,
unfamiliar settings. Imagine, for example, that we enter a foreign city. At first
our perception is likely to be global, diffuse, and heavily colored by feelings.
We are struck by the strange sounds, lights, odors, shapes, and colors. We feel
disoriented, vaguely wondering if we are safe and how we are going to find
anything. Soon, however, our picture of the city becomes more differentiated;
we identify a hotel, a restaurant, a bus route. And finally we may begin to see
how the various parts of the city are interrelated; we form a more conceptual
map of the city. Thus, within a fairly short time, our knowledge of the city
goes through a developmental process similar to that which characterizes
development during childhood.
Werner suggested that people differ in the extent to which they engage
in the microgenetic process. Some people have greater microgenetic mobility;
they can regress farther back and fully utilize both primitive and advanced
forms of thinking. Above all, this ability to regress characterizes the creative
person, the person who is willing to start anew. Many creative scientists, for
example, have admitted that they begin thinking about problems on a pre-
conceptual level, starting out with vague intuitions, hunches, dreamlike
images, and gut-level feelings (Dubos, 1961). As a group, the ethologists make
a special point of forming rich perceptions of animals with whom they feel a
certain empathy before detaching themselves and moving on to a formal, con-
ceptual plane (Lorenz, 1981; Tinbergen, 1977).
Some thinking, in contrast, is distinctly lacking in microgenetic mobil-
ity. Schizophrenic patients regress to primitive forms of thought, but they get
stuck there and their thinking remains disorganized. Conversely, many of us
seem to shift too quickly to conventional, rational modalities, so our thinking
lacks richness and creativity. In general, Werner said, “[T]he more creative the
person, the wider his range of operations in terms of developmental level, or
in other words, the greater his capacity to utilize primitive as well as advanced
operations” (1957, p. 145).
The Organismic Orientation
We have seen how mental processes such as perception and cognition emerge
from contexts in which they are fused with actions, sensations, and feelings.
This occurs in the development of the child, and it keeps recurring, microge-
netically, in us as adults. For Werner, this conception of development coincided
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with a position to which he was deeply committed—the holistic or organis-
mic position. Essentially, this position maintains that we should, as far as
possible, study psychological processes as they occur within the whole acting,
feeling, striving organism. We should not, for example, study perceptual activ-
ities in isolation, but as they emerge from the more primitive matrices of action
and feeling in which they are embedded.
Despite Werner’s appeals, the organismic orientation has been more the
exception than the rule in psychology. Researchers usually study processes
such as perception, cognition, language, and memory as if they were self-
contained activities. This compartmentalized approach, Werner noted (1948,
p. 49), is convenient, and it does not strike us as too inappropriate when study-
ing adults because adult functioning has become fairly differentiated. For
example, as adults we can usually distinguish between our thoughts and our
feelings, so we believe it is all right to study thinking as an isolated activity.
But even adults do not become disembodied minds. We still need to know
how cognitive processes are related to the rest of the organism. Here, the con-
cept of microgenesis is helpful. Microgenesis indicates how cognitive
processes, even in adults, continually emerge from physical, emotional, and
sensory experiences.
Compartmentalized research becomes most problematic when we turn
to children, for whom the various psychological processes are far less dif-
ferentiated. The child’s perception, for example, is strongly fused with
motor action and emotion. A child, upon seeing a wooden triangle, does
not see it as we do, as simply a geometric form. Because it looks sharp, it
is something one might dig with, or something that is threatening. When
we examine and measure the child’s “form perception” as an isolated activ-
ity, as is usually done, we miss out on the chance to see how it is distinc-
tive in the child’s experience. We examine form perception as if it were
already differentiated from action and emotion, which it is not (see Wapner,
Kaplan, & Cohen, 1973).
The Comparative Approach
Werner wanted to study development not only from an organismic viewpoint
but also from a comparative viewpoint. That is, he wanted to show how the
orthogenic principle enables us to compare developmental patterns across
many diverse areas, including various cultures, species, and pathological
states.
Werner was particularly interested in parallels between humans and
cultures in their early phases of development. In many ways, he argued, the
mental lives of children and indigenous peoples have underlying similarities.
Werner said, for example, that the thought of both is often characterized by a
lack of differentiation between the self and the external world. Both children
and indigeneous peoples may perceive trees, clouds, and wind expressing
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emotions that they themselves experience. We will discuss such parallels, but
as Baldwin (1980) has demonstrated, it is first useful to point to some misun-
derstandings concerning Werner’s purpose.
First, Werner was not trying to show that children and indigenous peoples
think in completely identical ways. The thinking of children in industrialized
cultures, for example, is not nearly as rich, complex, and fully formed as that
of adults in small tribal cultures. Children may have some impressions of the
emotions and forces expressed by the natural elements, but they have noth-
ing resembling the complex mythologies of early peoples.
Second, Werner was not advancing a theory of recapitulation (such as
that proposed by Rousseau or Haeckel). That is, he did not believe that chil-
dren resemble indigenous peoples because children are repeating the evolu-
tionary history of the species. He believed that the recapitulation theory takes
the similarities between children and people in early tribal societies too liter-
ally, ignoring the differences between them.
Werner, moreover, was not interested in evolutionary history itself. That
is, he was not interested in when behavior appeared, but in its developmental
status in a formal sense, as defined by the orthogenic principle. In some
instances, the thinking of extinct cultures may have been more differentiated
than that found in some contemporary cultures. In any event, when Werner
used terms such as primitive, early, or advanced, he was referring to develop-
mental status in terms of a formal, theoretical model.
The greatest problem with Werner’s comparative theory is that it seems
to have political overtones. When Werner described indigenous peoples as
primitive and compared them to children, he seemed to be implying they are
inferior.
Werner wanted to avoid such value judgments. He noted (1948, p. 34)
that in earlier stable environments, primitive modes of thought were highly
adaptive. And, as we saw in our discussion of microgenesis, even Western
adults may need to return to primitive levels to think in creative ways. Fur-
thermore, as we shall later see, artists still develop primitive forms of experi-
ence and thereby enrich our lives. For Werner, the term “primitive” hardly
need carry any negative connotations.
SOME COMPARATIVE STUDIES
Pictorial Imagery
Werner said that children, compared to Western adults, often think in pictures.
We can sometimes see this when we ask them to define words. If a 5-year-old
is asked to define the word girl, he might say, “She has long hair and a dress.
She’s pretty.” The boy’s definition is based on a specific pictorial image.
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The boy does not yet define the term in broad, conceptual categories (“a young
female member of the human species”).
Werner observed that pictorial imagery is so dominant in young chil-
dren that many possess eidetic imagery, or what we commonly call photo-
graphic memory. Children can describe a scene in such vivid detail that we are
amazed to find they are no longer looking at it. Strong forms of eidetic imagery
seem to be present in only a minority of children, but many children possess
some form of it, and it is very rare in Western adults (Haber, 1969; Werner,
1948, p. 143).
Werner believed that indigenous peoples commonly have had eidetic
imagery, but this is difficult to document. In any case, their languages indi-
cate a preference for pictorial images over general categories. There are often
few general terms, but many words, that evoke specific images. In one Bantu
language, for example, there is no general term “to go,” but many special-
ized words for different kinds of walking. There is a word that means “to
walk along slowly and carefully with a convalescent man” and another one
that means “to hop across earth seared by great heat” (Werner, 1948, p. 267).
One anthropologist observed that the Solomon Islanders would never say
anything so general and abstract as, “Five people arrived.” They might say,
“A man with a large nose, an old man, a child, a man with a skin disease, and
a little fellow are waiting outside” (p. 288).
Social scientists have long debated the capacity of indigenous peoples to
think in abstract terms. I believe that whenever we look closely at the matter,
we find the tribe or society has the capacity to use abstract categories but
doesn’t always see the point to it. To indigenous peoples, it is frequently much
more important to describe objects and events in precise detail. They use
words in the way many Western poets and writers do—to depict the world in
vivid, picturelike images.
Physiognomic Perception
If there was a single topic on which Werner wrote with the deepest feeling, it
was physiognomic perception. We perceive stimuli physiognomically when
we react to their dynamic, emotional, expressive qualities. For example, we
might perceive a person as happy and energetic or sad and tired. Werner
called this perceptual mode physiognomic because it is the physiognomy—
the face—that most directly conveys emotion to us, although we may also
perceive emotion in other ways—for instance, through a person’s posture.
Physiognomic perception is contrasted with geometric-technical percep-
tion. Here, we perceive objects in terms of shape, length, hue, width, and
other objective, measurable properties. Geometric-technical perception is
more realistic and matter-of-fact. It is the perceptual modality of the scientist
and technician.
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FIGURE 3
A 5-year-old’s drawing reveals physiognomic perception (the sun is smiling).
As rational adults, we believe physiognomic perception is appropriate
only when stimuli are animate. We feel it is silly to perceive emotions in rocks,
sticks, cups, and other inanimate objects. Occasionally, of course, we wax
poetic and respond to the physical environment physiognomically, as when
we say a landscape is majestic or subdued. Usually, however, we perceive
the physical environment in a more impersonal, matter-of-fact manner
(Werner, 1956).
For children the situation is very different. Children, lacking clear
self/environment boundaries, perceive the whole world as full of life and
emotion. A child, seeing a cup lying on its side, might say the cup is tired.
Watching a stick being broken in two, the child might feel that the stick is
being hurt. Or, looking at the number 5, the child might say the number is
angry or mean, finding a facial expression in it. Children, Werner (1948)
argued, quite naturally experience the inanimate world in terms of the same
forces and emotions they feel within themselves (pp. 67–82; see Figure 3).
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Like children, indigenous peoples have felt a strong unity with the rest
of the world, and they too have displayed a greater degree of physiognomic
perception than adults in modern society. Native Americans, for example,
typically grew up feeling that they were one with nature and that everything
around them—the wind, the trees, even the stones—possessed life and feel-
ing (Lee, 1959, p. 61). Consequently, they were often shocked at the white
people’s indifference toward the environment. As an old Wintu woman said,
We don’t chop down the trees. We only use dead wood. But the White
people plow up the ground, pull up the trees, kill everything. The tree
says, “Don’t. I am sore. Don’t hurt me.” But they chop it down and cut
it up. The spirit of the land hates them. . . . The White people destroy
all. They blast rocks and scatter them on the ground. The rock says,
“Don’t. You are hurting me.” But White people pay no attention. . . .
Everywhere the White man has touched it, the earth is sore. (Lee, 1959,
pp. 163–164)
This old woman’s attitude is completely different from the geometric-technical
approach of the engineer or surveyor. She perceives the environment physiog-
nomically, as teeming with life and emotion.
In advanced cultures, dramatic examples of physiognomic perception
may be found in the reports of schizophrenic patients who regress to primi-
tive mental states. These patients may lose their sense of detachment from
physical objects and experience them as dangerously alive. One patient looked
fearfully at some swinging doors and exclaimed, “The door is devouring me!”
(Werner, 1948, p. 81).
So far I have probably managed to convey the impression that phys-
iognomic perception is something fairly strange and unusual—something
that most of us have long overcome. And to an extent this is true. As we
develop, Werner (1956) said, physiognomic perception is superseded by a
geometric-technical outlook. We increasingly come to view the world through
the eyes of the engineer or technician. We evaluate things in terms of their
measurable properties and practical uses. Even people become categorized
in terms of impersonal, quantifiable dimensions. We define them in terms of
their IQ, age, income, property holdings, number of dependents, and so on.
Nevertheless, we never lose our capacity for physiognomic perception,
and it too develops within us, if at a slower rate than geometric-technical per-
ception. Werner and others have devised some simple demonstrations to show
that we can still perceive physiognomic properties in supposedly impersonal
forms. Figure 4 shows two lines: Which is happy and which is sad? Most
adults immediately report that the upwardly moving line expresses gaiety
and the downward sloping line conveys sadness. We can see that simple
lines—which, of course, are merely inanimate figures—do express feelings
through their dynamic patterns.
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FIGURE 4
Lines express feelings. Which is happy and which is sad?
Most of all, we are aware of physiognomic qualities when we perceive
them aesthetically, through the eyes of the artist. For in modern industrial cul-
tures, it is primarily painters, poets, musicians, and others who alert us to the
expressive features of forms, colors, sounds, and movements. They help us
experience the sad posture of a willow tree, the anger of thunder, the caress
of a tonal pattern, the smile of a sunny sky, and the upward striving of a geo-
metric column (Arnheim, 1954; Werner, 1956).
The extent to which artists develop physiognomic sensitivities is suggested
by the painter Wassily Kandinsky:
On my palette sit high, round rain-drops, puckishly flirting with each
other, swaying and trembling. Unexpectedly they unite and suddenly
become thin, sly threads which disappear in amongst the colors, and
roguishly slip about and creep up the sleeves of my coat. . . . It is not
only the stars which show me faces. The stub of a cigarette lying in an
ash-tray, a patient, staring white button lying amidst the litter of the
street, a willing, pliable bit of bark—all these have physiognomies for me.
(Werner, 1948, p. 71)
Because artists like Kandinsky have developed physiognomic capacities, our
world is a richer place.
The Unity of the Senses
Physiognomic perception, as we have noted, is based on a unity between one-
self and objects. That is, we perceive objects as full of the same dynamic forces
we feel within ourselves. Physiognomic perception is also based on synesthesia,
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the syncretic unity of the senses. Sounds, for example, may simultaneously
involve several of our senses. A sad tone may seem dark and heavy. A cheer-
ful tone may strike us as bright, clear, and light in weight.
Werner believed that intersensory experiences are developmentally prim-
itive; they exist prior to the differentiation of the senses into separate modal-
ities. If this is so, synesthesia might be especially prominent in children, and
Werner offered several anecdotes to this effect. For example, a 4-year-old girl
says, “Father talks . . . boom boom boom! As dark as night . . . ! But we talk light,
like the daytime . . . bim bim bim!” (Werner, 1948, p. 262). There is also some
experimental evidence that synesthesia, especially color hearing, is more com-
mon in children than in adults (Marks, 1975; Werner, 1948, pp. 89–91).
Intersensory modes of experience are often well developed among
indigenous peoples. In West African languages, for example, a high pitch
may express something that is fine, pointed, alert, fresh, energetic, loud of
color, sharp of taste, quick, or agile. A low pitch may express something big,
plump, awkward, muggy, dull, colorless, stupid, or slow (Werner, 1948,
pp. 259–260).
Intersensory experiences also become prominent in contemporary West-
ern adults who regress to primitive states in psychosis or under the influence
of hallucinogens. One subject experimenting with mescaline said, “I think
that I hear noises and see faces, and yet everything is one and the same. I can-
not tell whether I am seeing or hearing. I feel, taste, and smell the sound. It’s
all one. I, myself, am the tone” (p. 92).
Intersensory experiences, finally, are the special domain of the artist.
The painter Kandinsky, for example, wrote that for him even geometric
shapes have “inner tones” and “their own inimitable fragrances” (Werner,
1956, p. 4). And through his great paintings, colors affect us as warm or cold,
sharp or soft, and so on. Fine music, too, affects us through many senses, as
when tones seem golden or pale, bright or dull, sweet or harsh, sharp or soft,
light or heavy.
When we have truly intersensory experiences, Werner added, we do not
experience colors or sounds objectively, as “out there,” but feel them within
our bodies. Colors and sounds invade us or envelop us or fill us up. Werner
believed the various senses influence one another through general bodily
feelings because “they develop out of a common primitive level . . . that is
bodily, motoric, and affective” (Werner, 1934, p. 164).
SYMBOL FORMATION: AN ORGANISMIC VIEW
Although Werner wrote many articles, he published only two books. The first
was the Comparative Psychology of Mental Development (1948), which I have
been summarizing. The other, Symbol Formation (Werner & Kaplan, 1963), was
on language.
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The study of language has mushroomed in recent years, but from
Werner’s perspective the general approach has been nonorganismic. That is,
researchers have focused on the elements of speech and grammar as if these
developed in a vacuum, unrelated to a living, acting, feeling organism. Werner
believed, in contrast, that language initially emerges out of an undifferentiated
matrix that includes bodily, gestural, and affective (emotional) processes.
Language does eventually become a relatively separate activity, but it never
completely loses touch with its rich organismic grounding.
As the title Symbol Formation suggests, Werner ’s focus was on the for-
mation of symbols. A symbol is a word, image, or action that represents
something else—some other object, concept, or event. For example, the word
tree symbolizes a tree. When we use symbols, we implicitly recognize that
the symbol is different from its referent (e.g., the word tree is different from
the tree itself).
How are symbols formed? Probably the most common view is what
might be called the label theory. We simply learn our culture’s labels for things.
We learn the word tree goes with trees, cup with cups, and so on. In this view,
the connections between symbols and things are purely arbitrary. They are
mere conventions handed down to us by our culture.
Werner viewed the process quite differently. He acknowledged, of
course, that children do learn the culture’s labels, but he argued that symbolic
activities initially emerge out of bodily-organismic activities—motoric actions,
physical and vocal gestures, and feelings. The process of referring to things,
for example, begins with the physical act of pointing. The child points to an
object of interest and says something like “da,” inviting the mother to look at
it too (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, pp. 70–71).
Many of the child’s first “natural” symbols are motoric imitations. Chil-
dren might flutter their eyelids to depict the flickering of lights, or they
might tremble their hands to portray the agitation of water stirred by a
boat (p. 89).
Most of the child’s early symbols, like ours, are sounds they make. These,
too, initially emerge out of bodily-emotional actions, such as expressions of
pleasure, cries, and calls. For example, a baby in a high chair might call out for
a doll that has dropped to the floor. At first she might just cry out, but on later
occasions she might say her word for the doll, too (e.g., “Bappa”!).
Babies’ first names for objects often center on their actions toward the
objects. For example, an 11-month-old girl used the same word for a pin, a
breadcrumb, and a caterpillar—apparently because they are all things to be
picked up gingerly with one’s fingers (p. 118).
Among the most active, dynamic aspects of the world are the sounds
animals and things make. It’s no surprise, then, that many of the child’s
own “baby talk” words are onomatopoeic—imitations of the sounds. A child
might refer to a dog as “wfff,” a coffee grinder as “rrrr,” and a hammer as
“boom” (p. 46).
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A bit later, children use expressive intonation to capture other qualities
of objects. A girl might speak of tiny objects in a high, peeping voice and large
objects in a deep, gruff voice. Or she might say something rapidly or slowly
to indicate how fast an object is moving. Werner called such speech
physiognomic because it depicts the active, expressive aspects of things.
Underlying the child’s symbolic activities—her pointing, naming, imi-
tating, and expressing—is a supporting emotional context. This is the pres-
ence or availability of the mother (or other loving adult). Without this, the
child wouldn’t feel safe in the world and could not take a lively interest in
describing it (p. 71).
It is clear that children do not feel that their natural symbols are related
to objects in an arbitrary manner. The symbol “wfff,” for instance, conveys
the most striking property of a dog.
When, however, children begin using conventional language, the con-
nection between symbols and referents would seem to dissolve. What, after
all, is the inner relationship between the word hammer and a hammer? For a
while, children may preserve the tie by using combinations of their own nat-
ural symbols and conventional words, as when they say “boom-hammer” or
“bah-sheep.” But with the shift to purely conventional speech, any felt simi-
larity between symbol and referent would seem to disappear.
But Werner believed the tie is never completely broken. In his studies,
he found that adults can still respond to words as physiognomic forms that
directly express the dynamic, expressive qualities of objects. One man reported
that when he said the word hammer, the short “ha” seemed to come down
sharply on the “mmm,” evoking the sensation of hammering (p. 130). Another
subject, looking at the German word wolle (wool), spoke of the dull, stringy
quality of the “ll” (p. 209).
Readers might wonder if these subjects weren’t simply giving Werner the
responses he wanted to hear. However, writers and poets have also tried to get
us to see that words have physiognomic properties. Balzac, for instance, asked
us to consider how the sound of an abstract word like vrai (true) expresses
the feeling-tone of truth itself. Is there not, he asked, in the word
a fantastic strength of honesty? Does one not find in the short sound
which it commands a vague image of modest nakedness, of the inherence
of the truth in everything? This syllable breathes forth an indefinable
freshness. (Werner, 1948, pp. 257–258)
According to Werner, we may perceive words physiognomically more
frequently than we realize. We may do so whenever we first try to recognize
them (during the early microgenetic phases of word perception). To investi-
gate this possibility, Werner presented words for a very short time, without
giving subjects a chance to recognize them fully, and he found that their
impressions were dominated by feelings and bodily reactions. Subjects said
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that although they couldn’t make out a word, it felt “warm,” “heavy,” “dis-
tressing,” and so on—qualities they later said corresponded to the word’s
meaning for them (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 215).
In summary, then, Werner argued that even conventional words are not
merely empty, arbitrary labels. They seem to be such only when we examine
their external structure in a purely objective manner. Inwardly, we may per-
ceive words as expressive forms that resonate with life and feeling, evoking
the same emotional and bodily reactions as their referents. An inner, organis-
mic tie between symbol and referent is maintained.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
We have now reviewed Werner’s writing on several topics, including phys-
iognomic perception and the development of language. But Werner was never
just interested in particular topics; he was also concerned with the larger
theoretical issues that the topics addressed.
The Multilinear Nature of Development
One of Werner’s theoretical concerns was whether development is unilinear
or multilinear, whether it proceeds along a single line or along many sepa-
rate lines (Werner, 1957). A consideration of physiognomic perception helped
him answer this question.
Physiognomic perception, as we have seen, is attuned to the dynamic
and expressive qualities of things. It is an early form of perception, dominant
in children, and in our culture is superseded by a more geometric-technical
outlook. We may sometimes revert to physiognomic modes, as in moments of
creative regression, but we generally rely on more logical, rational modes of
thought.
If this were the whole story, we could conclude that development is uni-
linear; one cognitive mode follows another. Yet physiognomic perception itself
develops. In most of us, to be sure, it develops only modestly, since we do not
nurture it, but in artists it becomes quite advanced. So we must conceive of
development as a multilinear branching-out process, with separate lines fol-
lowing their own course. Figure 5 attempts to diagram this conception of
development.
The Discontinuity Issue
An even more fundamental issue is whether development is continuous or dis-
continuous. Basically, when we say change is continuous, we are proposing
that we can measure it along a single quantitative dimension. Just as we can
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Werner’s Organismic and Comparative Theory
Con
cep
tual
thou
ght
Phys
iogn
om
ic
pe
rc
ep
tio
n
Sensori
moto
r ac
tio
n
Per
cep
tio
n
FIGURE 5
Werner thought that different lines
of development branch out.
(Adapted from J. Langer, Theories
of Development. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1969, p. 153.)
measure a child’s height with a tape measure, we can measure a child’s vocab-
ulary, attention span, memory capacity, and a host of other psychological
variables along one quantitative scale. A vast amount of research in develop-
mental psychology has assumed that change is measurable in this manner.
To many, the concept of continuous, quantifiable measurement seems to be the
essence of science.
Actually, biologists in particular have long recognized that many changes
are discontinuous, involving qualitative transformations. Early forms emerge
into new forms that are different in kind; they have different patterns and
modes of functioning. Particularly dramatic examples of qualitative changes
are metamorphoses, such as the emergence of a caterpillar into a butterfly. In
such cases, many quantitative comparisons become meaningless. It makes no
sense, for instance, to measure the speed with which caterpillars can fly. They
have their own mode of locomotion.
Since Rousseau, developmentalists have been more like the biologists
who emphasize qualitative change. The transformations from childhood to
adulthood may not be as dramatic as the metamorphoses, but, as Rousseau
argued, “Childhood has its own way of seeing, thinking, and feeling” (1762b,
p. 54). If this position is correct, we cannot measure children in terms of an
adult yardstick without missing what is unique to the child.
Werner, taking the broadest possible perspective, noted that both quan-
titative and qualitative changes occur. Like Rousseau, however, he really
believed that the most important changes are qualitative. The adult’s abstract
thought, for example, differs in kind from the child’s perceptual-motor-affective
thinking.
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Werner’s Organismic and Comparative Theory
FIGURE 6
A 6-year-old boy’s drawing of a girl jumping rope (left) expresses liveliness and bal-
ance. Howard Gardner (1980) compares it to a work by the master Paul Klee (right),
although the child’s work is livelier.
(From Artful Scribbles by Howard Gardner. Copyright © 1980 by Howard Gardner.
Reprinted by permission of Basic Books, a Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. The
Klee work is reprinted by permission of the Artists Rights Society.)
In many respects, comparing the child to the adult is like comparing the
artist to the scientist. The child, like the artist, approaches the world through
a physiognomic, intersensory, vividly pictorial style. Especially between the
ages of about 2 and 7 years, children love to draw, sing, and engage in make-
believe (theatric) play, and their activities are energetic and imaginative.
Howard Gardner (1980) has shown how children’s drawings reach a special
kind of perfection. Between the ages of about 5 and 7, they routinely produce
drawings that are fresh, lively, and beautifully balanced; the drawings express
gaiety, playfulness, and a strong sense of life. Indeed, many great artists have
said that they have tried to recapture the artistic qualities of the young child
(Gardner, 1973, p. 20). Gardner (1980, p. 99) has called this the “golden period”
of artistic development. Then, at about the age of 8 years or so, children’s
drawings undergo a major change; they become more precise and geometric
(Gardner, 1980, chap. 6). It seems that geometric-technical thinking is taking
over. The fresh liveliness of the young child is lost (see Figures 6 and 7).
Young children, to be sure, do not just demonstrate artistic exuberance;
they reveal the beginnings of scientific skills as well. There is continuity with
later orientations. But young children’s dominant outlook seems more naturally
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FIGURE 7
Andy’s drawings illustrate the shift from a livelier to a more
geometric style.
artistic, and it seems almost beside the point to persist in evaluating them in
terms of the rational, logical skills of adults, although this is what researchers
usually do.
Developmentalists, then, emphasize that development is often
discontinuous—that it involves a qualitative change. Such changes need not
be sudden. Abstract thinking, for example, may differ in quality from ear-
lier thinking but emerge gradually. Discontinuity only means the change
involves a qualitative shift; the suddenness of the change is another matter
(Werner, 1957).
Phenomenology
A school of thought with which Werner was very familiar was phenomenol-
ogy. Phenomenologists believe the first thing we should do when studying
children (or anyone else) is to abandon our preconceptions about them. We
cannot assume children think as we do; we need to take a fresh look at chil-
dren themselves. Above all, we need to learn about children’s subjective expe-
riences of things. We need to explore their phenomenal world—how it appears
to them.
Most developmentalists have been phenomenological only up to a point.
They have believed we should suspend any preconceptions that the child
thinks as we do, but they have generally analyzed the child’s thinking from
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the outside instead of trying to see things through the child’s eyes. Werner, too,
usually described thinking from an external viewpoint (e.g., as differentiated).
Still, he provided some fine insights into children’s subjective experiences,
suggesting, for instance, that they tend to perceive objects physiognomically.
Werner (1948, chap. 12) also wrote enthusiastically about the phenom-
enological research of his colleagues Jacob von Uexküll and Martha
Muchow. Von Uexküll was an ethologist who tried to show how different
the environment looks to different species. By analyzing the reactions of a
fly, for example, he indicated how a room must look very different to her
than it does to us. Muchow, following von Uexküll’s lead, thought everyday
scenes might appear different to children from the way they do to adults.
She therefore observed children and adults in some everyday settings, includ-
ing a canal dock in Hamburg, and inferred how these settings might appear
to them (Wohlwill, 1984).
The dock was at the bottom of a steep slope, and to get to it one could
walk down a narrow path that was fenced in. This is what adults did. Chil-
dren, however, ignored the path. Instead, they spent their time climbing and
swinging on the fence and rolling and sliding down the grassy slopes beside
it. Because the children were so much more motorically inclined, they seemed
to perceive the entire scene very differently from the adults. To them, the fence
and the slopes—mere background elements for the adults—were the main
features.
A second setting was a large new department store in the city. The
youngest children (ages 6 to 9) did not approach the store as we do. They paid
little attention to the merchandise, rushing instead to areas that provided
opportunities for action and games. They were particularly attracted to the
stairs, elevators, and escalators, on which they liked to run up and down in
the wrong direction. Here again, Muchow inferred, young children experi-
enced the setting very differently from adults.
Muchow, who died at an early age, did not develop her research as fully
as we might have wished. She inferred children’s perceptions from their
behavior alone; we would like other evidence, such as drawings, to show how
they viewed the scenes. Still, she made a beginning effort to depict the child’s
phenomenal world.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
Werner was first and foremost a theoretician, and he wrote very little on the
practical applications of his work. He offered scant advice on child rearing,
education, or therapy. Nevertheless, his writing has practical relevance in a
number of settings.
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Clinical Settings
In the treatment of schizophrenia, psychoanalysts such as Searles (1965) have
found Werner ’s concepts to be of great value. Searles believes we cannot
understand most schizophrenic patients without appreciating the undiffer-
entiated quality of their experience. These patients have little sense of them-
selves as separate from inanimate objects or other people. They may feel they
are actually part of a room or the therapist. The therapist’s recognition of this
can in itself be beneficial, because one thing that helps patients is their sense
that someone else understands what life is like for them. Searles discusses
such points and many specific ways in which Werner ’s concepts guide his
therapeutic interventions.
Werner ’s own work with patients was pioneering diagnostic research
on children suffering from brain injuries. Between 1937 and 1945, he and
Alfred Strauss carried out a number of studies comparing the cognitive
behavior of these children to that of children with a diagnosis of mental
retardation (Barten & Franklin, 1978, part 3). They found that whereas chil-
dren diagnosed with mental retardation often thought in ways that seemed
simple, vague, and global, children diagnosed with brain injuries exhibited
special kinds of disorganization. When copying designs, for example, they
were often unable to concentrate on the main figure because they were so
distracted by background details. They were, in Werner ’s terms, stimulus-
bound; everything jumped out at them. They could not stand back from a
design and differentiate between the main figure and the background details.
Today many children Werner called “brain injured” would receive different
labels (e.g., “attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder”). But Werner’s insights
into figure/background problems are still fundamental, and educators often
try to keep rooms and backgrounds simple and uncluttered so distractible
children can focus on the tasks at hand.
The Push for Early Literacy
Werner composed no treatises on mainstream education, but his general ori-
entation has become quite relevant today. Our nations’ educational policy-
makers are pressing for formal academic instruction at younger and younger
ages. They are calling for instruction in literacy—in reading and writing—
even in preschool. But from Werner’s holistic perspective, we shouldn’t focus
on any specific intellectual process, such as literacy, without considering the
broader context out of which it develops. In this case, we need to consider
how literacy can develop out of rich experiences with oral language and other
symbolic activities.
Werner described how children’s oral language develops out of actions
and feelings. Before children learn many conventional words, they create their
own words that resonate with the sounds and actions of life around them, as
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when they refer to a dog as “rfff” and a hammer as “boom.” Additional
research reveals that much early language is also melodic; babies like to play
with the rhythms and rhymes of sounds, and parents join them in their
melodic cooing, babbling, and baby talk. As children grow, they continue to
engage in wordplay as they run, climb, jump, and play, saying things such
as, “Up a lup a dup, up a dup I go.” They also create lovely poems. In the
preschool and early elementary school years, they are eager to hear and tell
stories, and they engage in a good deal of make-believe play, using dolls,
sticks, and other objects to symbolize the people and things in their dramas.
They also love to draw, which involves further symbols, and when they
become absorbed in drawing they often make up songs and stories (Crain,
2003). Through all such experiences, children develop a love of language—of
its rhythms and beauty and its power to convey excitement and adventure.
These experiences with oral language, in turn, enrich and energize their writ-
ing and reading. They want to read books to gain access to the riches that
books contain, and they are eager to write their own stories, jokes, poems,
and important messages.
However, early academic instruction is crowding out these rich early
experiences. Today’s kindergartens (and even many preschools) are so dom-
inated by formal academic instruction that there’s little time for children to
make up rhymes or engage in make-believe play, or to draw, sing, or swap sto-
ries. Instead, adults rush in and teach them literacy skills in an abstract, mech-
anistic manner. The children do not look forward to books and writing to
further the joys and adventures of oral language, for they haven’t had a chance
to experience these joys and adventures. Werner did not specifically address
such literacy instruction, but his holistic and organismic orientation asks us
to pay much more attention to the variety of experiences out of which liter-
acy more naturally emerges.
Adult Education
Werner also offered a concept that may prove of considerable importance for
the education of adults. This is the concept of microgenetic mobility. Werner,
you will recall, proposed that the most creative thinking does not restrict itself
to advanced, rational analysis, but it begins with the full use of preconcep-
tual processes—global impressions fused with bodily sensations, intuitions,
and so on. If so, educators in many fields, including the arts and sciences,
medicine, and architecture, may wish to broaden the range of the thinking
they try to nurture and enhance in their students.
A case in point is the education of physicians, where there is a growing
effort to teach strictly rational problem-solving skills. Young doctors are
encouraged to make diagnostic evaluations in a purely logical, step-by-step
fashion, often employing decision trees, flow charts, and other devices derived
from computer-based theories of cognition. Werner’s concept of microgenetic
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mobility, however, suggests that doctors make fuller clinical judgments when
they begin at preconceptual levels, with the impressions, sensations, and feel-
ings that patients arouse in them.
Following Werner’s lead, my wife (a pediatrician) and I (Crain & Crain,
1987) asked pediatricians at different levels of competence to report their
thoughts and impressions as they examined infants with fevers who had come
to the emergency room of a large urban hospital. Analyses of the tape record-
ings revealed that the beginning doctors tried to think about the patients in a
purely objective, logical manner throughout the examination. In contrast, the
most experienced and esteemed pediatricians initially engaged the babies in
informal interactions, trying to get a global sense of the baby’s health through
the sensations and feelings the baby evoked in them. Their approach demon-
strated greater microgenetic mobility; they initially engaged in more primitive,
intuitive processes before advancing to a conceptual approach. Thus educa-
tors who stress a purely rational approach to medical decision making may be
overlooking the rich preconceptual ground from which the most mature clini-
cal judgments emerge.
EVALUATION
Today many consider Werner a historical relic. People vaguely remember him
as someone who constructed a theory similar to Piaget’s—both began writing
in the 1920s—but it was Piaget, not Werner, who became the dominant figure
in developmental psychology. Werner, to be sure, did contribute his well-
known definition of development (the orthogenic principle), and he did influ-
ence some important people. But by and large, he has receded into the
background.
Let us look first at some possible reasons for this neglect and then consider
the need to take him seriously once again.
Werner has been overlooked partly because his theory is so abstract
and difficult. Moreover, on major issues he was often vague and noncom-
mittal. One thing we would like to know of any developmental theorist is
his or her view of developmental change. To what extent does the writer see
change as an innate maturational process? Or as a product of environmental
influences? Werner ’s biological model is that of a maturationist (Baldwin,
1980), but if we look to Werner for a clear statement, we look in vain. Instead,
we find statements such as, “Developmental psychology directs its efforts
not toward the solution of the tricky problems of innate versus acquired func-
tion, but only the establishment and description of . . . types of mental activ-
ity” (Werner, 1948, p. 18). He simply skirted a basic issue.
In a similar vein, we might like to know the extent to which Werner
believed that the child spontaneously creates his or her ideas, as opposed to
absorbing the ideas of adults. Again, Werner was surprisingly noncommittal.
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Symbol Formation (1963), for example, extensively describes early symbols that
are so different from ours that they must be spontaneous creations, yet Werner
and Kaplan said, “In our opinion the problem of free ‘inventions’ has been
unduly stressed in the literature” (p. 102). Here again, Werner took no stand,
saying he was only interested in the pattern of the child’s thought.
Werner may seem noncommittal partly because he was a tolerant man
who tried to see the value in all points of view. He also believed a degree of
theoretical looseness was a good thing. He wanted to keep his concepts gen-
eral and tentative so others would feel free to specify the details in their par-
ticular areas of investigation (Glick, 1983). So, for example, he never committed
himself to any single set of levels or stages. He proposed some levels (senso-
rimotor, perceptual, and conceptual), but he hoped others would feel at lib-
erty to find their own.
Complaints about Werner’s vagueness, then, may be unfair because they
ignore his purpose. But the fact remains that Werner has been generally
neglected, and a major reason is that he failed to give us much we can sink our
teeth into. If he had proposed a set of clear-cut stages, as Piaget did, researchers
could test them and try to prove him right or wrong. This he didn’t do.
But no matter how vague and difficult, Werner ’s theory is becoming
increasingly important. The reason has to do with broad trends in our culture,
of which psychology is a part.
If social critics such as Theodore Roszak (1972) are correct, our culture
has steadily become dominated by science and technology. That is, we have
come to view the world almost exclusively through the mental categories of
logic, number, and mechanistic connection. Taking the computer as our model,
we have translated mental life into flow charts and decision trees, and we
have made precision, objectivity, and rationality our ultimate goals. In the
process, Roszak says, we have lost touch with nonrational modes of experi-
ence. We have cut ourselves off from the fluid world of dreams, emotions,
and intuitions and the organic rhythms of the body. Simultaneously, we have
lost our feeling for nature, reducing her to mere physical matter to be exploited
and controlled. Employing our great technological powers, we have turned the
organic world into an artificial environment “as lifeless and gleamingly ster-
ile as the glass and aluminum, stainless steel and plastic of the high-rise archi-
tecture and its interiors that now fill the urban-industrial world” (p. 89). We
have, Roszak says, pressed technology forward against the natural world to
such an extent that we are startled when anxious ecologists remind us that
our survival still depends on air, water, soil, plants, and animals (p. 10).
Developing this theme, David Abram’s book The Spell of the Sensuous
(1996) calls attention to how we have lost connection to nature through our
language. The oral languages of the indigenous peoples, Abram says, res-
onate with the sounds and forms of the animate landscape. The Kaluli of
New Guinea still sing along with the birds, insects, frogs, and tumbling water-
falls. Like other indigenous peoples, the Kaluli’s names for animals are often
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onomatopoeic, imitating the animals’ sounds and activities. But modern
industrial societies, which are driving indigenous peoples out of existence,
emphasize literacy. And literacy insulates us from nature. To learn to read, we
must shut out the sights and sounds of the out-of-doors and concentrate on
the printed page. As literate individuals, we no longer see language as some-
thing we share with animals, trees, and the wind, but as a distinctly human
form of communication. Written language is abstract and cerebral. And so we
encase ourselves in buildings, using computer technology to send written
messages to anywhere in the world, insulated from the breezes and bird-
songs just outside.
Still, Abram argues, linguistic connections to the natural world cannot
be entirely severed. In its depths, language remains a physical process that
has been nourished by nature’s sounds, and we still use words that echo
nature. “It is not by chance,” Abram says, “that when hiking in the moun-
tains, the English terms we spontaneously use to describe the surging waters
of the nearby river are words like ‘rush,’ ‘splash,’ ‘gush,’ ‘wash’” (p. 82). Abram
hopes we can recover our connections to the “varied contours and rhythms of
a more-than-human earth” (p. 272).
Abram covers much of the same theoretical ground as Werner did.
Werner, too, wrote about how speech, at its foundations, resonates with the
expressive and dynamic features of the world. Like Abram, Werner saw this
expressive speech as being stronger among indigenous peoples than among
us in technological, literacy-based societies.
Werner, in addition, indicated that this speech is strong in children. He
observed how children’s initial symbols are often onomatopoeic, imitating
the sounds of animals and objects. He also described how children physiog-
nomically perceive the expressive qualities in the outer world and how this
perception is developed by artists. Poets, painters, and other artists convey the
joy of a flower at sunrise, the whisper of the wind in the trees, and the explo-
siveness of thunder.
Whether flowers, wind, and thunder really possess these qualities is
open to debate. But in our technologically advanced society, in which so many
of us have lost our sensitivity to the natural world, Werner showed where
this sensitivity is to be found.
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Piaget’s
Cognitive-
Developmental Theory
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Piaget’s
Cognitive-Developmental
Theory
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
In all psychology, few theorists are as important as Jean Piaget
(1896–1980), who forged the single-most comprehensive and com-
pelling theory of intellectual development.
Piaget was born in Neuchâtel, a small college town in Switzer-
land where his father was a medieval historian at the university. Piaget
(1952) described his father as a careful and systematic thinker. His
mother, in contrast, was highly emotional, and her behavior created
tensions within the family. Piaget adopted his father’s studious ways
and found refuge from the family’s conflicts in solitary research.
Piaget showed promise as a scientist from the start. At the age of
10 he published an article on an albino sparrow he had seen in the
park. While he was still in high school, his research on mollusks
brought invitations to meet with foreign colleagues and a job offer to
become the curator of a museum—all of which he turned down
because of his age.
At 15 years of age, Piaget experienced an intellectual crisis when
he realized his religious and philosophical convictions lacked a scien-
tific foundation. He therefore set out to find some way of bridging phi-
losophy with science. He read widely and worked out his new ideas in
writing, even though the writing was intended for no one but himself.
This search did not occupy all his time—he still managed to earn his
doctorate in the natural sciences at the age of 21—but Piaget’s broader
quest did at times leave him confused and exhausted. Finally, at the
age of 23, he settled on a plan. He would first do scientific research in
child psychology, studying the development of the mind. He then
would use his findings to answer broader questions in epistemology,
philosophical questions concerning the origin of knowledge. He called
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
this new enterprise “genetic epistemology” (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, pp. 2–3;
Piaget, 1952).
Piaget decided to study children in 1920 while working in the Binet
Laboratory in Paris. There, his assignment was to construct an intelligence test
for children. At first he found this work very boring—he had little interest in
scoring children’s answers right and wrong, as intelligence testing requires.
However, Piaget soon became interested in the younger children’s responses,
especially their wrong answers. Their mistakes, he found, fit a consistent pat-
tern that suggested their thinking might have a character all its own. Young
children, Piaget speculated, might not simply be “dumber” than older chil-
dren or adults, but might think in an entirely different way (Ginsburg &
Opper, 1988, p. 3).
In order to learn about children’s potentially unique ideas, Piaget aban-
doned the standardized tests, which forced children’s responses into “artifi-
cial channels of set question and answer,” and devised a more open-ended
clinical interview that “encourages the flow of spontaneous tendencies”
(Piaget, 1926, p. 4). He also spent many hours observing children’s sponta-
neous activities. The point was to suspend his own adult preconceptions about
children’s thinking and to learn from the children themselves.
While in Paris, Piaget published two studies based on his new approach,
but he did most of this new research at the Rousseau Institute in Geneva,
where he settled in 1921. He primarily interviewed children between the ages
of 4 and 12 years, and he found that the younger children, before the age of
7 or so, do indeed think in a qualitatively different way about dreams, morals,
and many other topics.
In 1925 Piaget’s first child, Jacqueline, was born—an event that initiated
an important series of studies on the cognitive behavior of infants. Piaget and
his wife, Valentine Châtenay, made very careful observations of Jacqueline’s
behavior, as they also did of their next two babies, Lucienne and Laurent.
Beginning about 1940 Piaget returned to the study of children, and ado-
lescents as well, but he changed his research focus. Whereas his earlier inves-
tigations covered such topics as dreams, morality, and other matters of
everyday interest to the child, his new studies focused on the child’s under-
standing of mathematical and scientific concepts—a focus that dominated his
work until the end of his life (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, pp. 15–16).
In the 1950s Piaget finally turned to philosophical questions in episte-
mology, although he continued to study children’s cognitive development.
In this book I will say little about Piaget’s epistemological theory; rather, our
task is to gain some understanding of his developmental theory.
Piaget’s research has evoked different responses from psychologists at
different times. His first work caught the attention of psychologists in many
parts of the world. After this initial enthusiasm, however, interest in Piaget
declined, especially in the United States. For one thing, psychologists had dif-
ficulty understanding his orientation. They also objected to his methodology.
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
Piaget sometimes changed his questions during an interview if he thought
this might help him understand a particular child’s thinking; this, many psy-
chologists pointed out, violates the canon of standardized interviewing. Piaget
also ignored such matters as reports on his sample sizes and statistical sum-
maries of his results. He seemed to regard such matters as less important than
rich, detailed examples of children’s thinking (Flavell, 1963, pp. 10–11, 431;
Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 6).
By and large, Piaget’s research suffered from the same methodologi-
cal shortcomings throughout his career, but the 1960s saw a remarkable
revival of interest in his work. In the decades that followed, growing num-
bers of psychologists recognized the stature and importance of his theory.
Many have been skeptical of his claims, and many have tried to prove him
wrong, but they have recognized Piaget’s theory as something to be reck-
oned with. Today there is hardly a study of children’s thinking that does not
refer to Piaget.
OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY
Although Piaget’s research changed over the years, each part of it contributes
to a single, integrated stage theory. The most general stages, or periods, are
listed in Table 1.
Before we examine these stages in detail, it is important to note two the-
oretical points. First, Piaget recognized that children pass through his stages
at different rates, and he therefore attached little importance to the ages asso-
ciated with them. He did maintain, however, that children move through the
stages in an invariant sequence—in the same order.
Second, as we discuss the stages, it is important to bear in mind
Piaget’s general view of the nature of developmental change. Because he proposed
TABLE 1 The General Periods of Development
Period I. Sensorimotor Intelligence (birth to 2 years). Babies organize
their physical action schemes, such as sucking, grasping,
and hitting, for dealing with the immediate world.
Period II. Preoperational Thought (2 to 7 years). Children learn to
think—to use symbols and internal images—but their thinking
is unsystematic and illogical. It is very different from that of
adults.
Period III. Concrete Operations (7 to 11 years). Children develop the
capacity to think systematically, but only when they can
refer to concrete objects and activities.
Period IV. Formal Operations (11 to adulthood). Young people develop
the capacity to think systematically on a purely abstract and
hypothetical plane.
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
an invariant stage sequence, some scholars (e.g., Bandura & McDonald,
1963) have assumed he was a maturationist. He was not. Maturationists
believe stage sequences are wired into the genes, and stages unfold accord-
ing to an inner timetable. Piaget, however, did not think his stages are
genetically determined. They simply represent increasingly comprehensive
ways of thinking. Children are constantly exploring, manipulating, and
trying to make sense out of the environment, and in this process they
actively construct new and more elaborate structures for dealing with it
(Kohlberg, 1968).
Piaget did make use of biological concepts, but only in a limited way. He
observed that infants inherit reflexes, such as the sucking reflex. Reflexes are
important in the first month of life but have much less bearing on development
after this.
In addition, Piaget sometimes characterized children’s activities in terms
of biological tendencies that are found in all organisms. These tendencies are
assimilation, accommodation, and organization. Assimilation means taking
in, as in eating or digestion. In the intellectual sphere, we have a need to
assimilate objects or information into our cognitive structures. For example,
adults assimilate information by reading books. Much earlier, a baby might
try to assimilate an object by grasping it, trying to take it into her grasping
scheme.
Some objects do not quite fit into existing structures, so we must make
accommodations, or changes in our structures. For example, a baby girl might
find that she can grasp a block only by first removing an obstacle. Through
such accommodations, infants begin constructing increasingly efficient and
elaborate means for dealing with the world.
The third tendency is organization. For example, a 4-month-old boy might
have the capacity to look at objects and to grasp them. Soon he will try to
combine these two actions by grasping the same objects he looks at. On a more
mental plane, we build theories. We seem to be constantly trying to organize
our ideas into coherent systems.
So, even though Piaget did not believe that stages are wired into the
genetic code, but constructed by children themselves, he did discuss the
construction process in terms of biological tendencies (Ginsburg & Opper,
1988, pp. 16–19).
If Piaget was not a maturationist, he was even less a learning theorist.
He did not believe children’s thinking is shaped by adult teachings or other
environmental influences. Children must interact with the environment to
develop, but it is they, not the external environment, who build new cogni-
tive structures.
Development, then, is not governed by internal maturation or external
teachings. It is an active construction process, in which children, through their
own activities, build increasingly differentiated and comprehensive cognitive
structures.
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
PERIOD I. SENSORIMOTOR INTELLIGENCE
(BIRTH TO 2 YEARS)
Piaget’s first developmental period consists of six stages.
Stage 1 (birth to 1 month)1:
The Use of Reflexes
When Piaget talked about the infant’s action-structures, he used the term
scheme or schema (e.g., Piaget, 1936a, p. 34). A scheme can be any action pat-
tern for dealing with the environment, such as looking, grasping, hitting, or
kicking. As mentioned, although infants construct their schemes and later
structures through their own activities, their first schemes consist primarily of
inborn reflexes. The most prominent reflex is the sucking reflex; babies auto-
matically suck whenever their lips are touched.
Reflexes imply a certain passivity. The organism lies inactive until some-
thing comes along to stimulate it. Piaget, however, showed that even a reflex
like sucking quickly becomes part of the human infant’s self-initiated activ-
ity. For example, when his son Laurent was only 2 days old, he began mak-
ing sucking movements when nothing elicited them. Since he did this between
meals, when he wasn’t hungry, he seemed to suck simply for the sake of suck-
ing. Piaget said that once we have a scheme, we also have a need to put it to
active use (pp. 25–26, 35).
Furthermore, when babies are hungry, they do not just passively wait for
the mother to put the nipple into their mouth. When Laurent was 3 days old,
he searched for the nipple as soon as his lips touched part of the breast. He
groped, mouth open, across the breast until he found it (p. 26).
Babies do not confine themselves to sucking on nipples. Piaget’s chil-
dren sucked on clothes, pillows, blankets, their own fingers—on anything
they chanced upon. In Piaget’s terms, they assimilated all kinds of objects into
the sucking scheme (pp. 26, 32, 34).
Although assimilation is the most prominent activity during stage 1, we
also can detect the beginnings of accommodation. For example, babies must
learn to adjust their head and lip movements to find the breast and nurse.
Such adjustments also demonstrate the beginnings of organization; babies
organize their movements so that nursing becomes increasingly smooth, rapid,
and efficient (pp. 29–31, 39).
1The age norms for this period follow those suggested by Flavell (1963). I use the stage
headings suggested by Ginsburg and Opper (1988).
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
Stage 2 (1 to 4 months):
Primary Circular Reactions
A circular reaction occurs when the baby chances upon a new experience and
tries to repeat it (Piaget, 1936a, p. 55). A prime example is thumb-sucking.
By chance, the hand comes into contact with the mouth, and when the hand
falls the baby tries to bring it back. For some time, however, babies cannot do
this. They hit the face with the hand but cannot catch it, or they fling their
arms wildly, or they chase the hand with the mouth but cannot catch it
because the whole body, including the arms and hands, moves as a unit in the
same direction. In Piaget’s language, they are unable to make the accommo-
dations necessary to assimilate the hand to the sucking scheme. After
repeated failures, they organize sucking and hand movements and master the
art of thumb-sucking.
As with thumb-sucking, most of the primary circular reactions involve
the organization of two previously separate body schemes or movements. For
example, when we see a baby girl repeatedly bring her hand next to her face
and look at it, she is exercising a primary circular reaction. She is coordinat-
ing looking with hand movements (pp. 96–97).
These circular reactions provide a good illustration of what Piaget means
by intellectual development as a “construction process.” The baby actively
“puts together” different movements and schemes. It is important to empha-
size the amount of work involved; the baby manages to coordinate separate
movements only after repeated failures.
Stage 3 (4 to 8 months):
Secondary Circular Reactions
The developments of the second stage are called primary circular reactions
because they involve the coordination of parts of the baby’s own body.
Secondary circular reactions occur when the baby discovers and reproduces
an interesting event outside herself (Piaget, 1936a, p. 154). For example, one day
when Piaget’s daughter Lucienne was lying in her bassinet, she made a move-
ment with her legs that stirred the dolls hanging overhead. She stared at the
dolls a moment and then moved her legs again, watching the dolls move
again. In the next few days, she repeated this scene many times, kicking her
legs and watching the dolls shake, and she often would squeal with laughter
at the sight of the moving dolls (pp. 157–159).
Piaget sometimes referred to secondary circular reactions as “making
interesting sights last” (p. 153). He speculated that infants smile and laugh at
the recognition of a moderately novel event. At the same time, it seems they
are enjoying their own power, their ability to make an event happen again
and again.
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
Stage 4 (8 to 12 months):
The Coordination of Secondary Schemes
In stage 3, the infant performs a single action to get a result—for example, kick-
ing to move some dangling dolls. In stage 4, the infant’s actions become more
differentiated; he or she learns to coordinate two separate schemes to get a
result. This new accomplishment is most apparent when infants deal with
obstacles. For example, one day Laurent wanted to grab a matchbox, but Piaget
put his hand in the way. At first, Laurent tried to ignore the hand; he tried to
pass over it or around it, but he did not attempt to displace it. When Piaget kept
his hand in the way, Laurent resorted to “storming the box while waving his
hand, shaking himself, [and] wagging his head from side to side”—various
“magical” gestures (1936a, p. 217). Finally, several days later, Laurent suc-
ceeded in removing the obstacle by striking the hand out of the way before he
grabbed the box. Thus Laurent coordinated two separate schemes—striking
and grabbing—to obtain the goal. One scheme, striking, became a means to
an end, grabbing the box.
Such simple observations are very important for our understanding of
how children develop the basic categories of experience, of space and time. We
cannot talk to babies and ask them about their experiences of space and time,
but we can see how these categories are developing through their actions.
When Laurent learned to move the hand to get the box, he showed a sense that
some objects are in front of others in space, and that some events must precede
others in time (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 52).
Stage 5 (12 to 18 months):
Tertiary Circular Reactions
At stage 3, infants perform a single action to obtain a single result—to make
an interesting sight last. At stage 4, they perform two separate actions to obtain
a single result. Now, at stage 5, they experiment with different actions to
observe the different outcomes.
For example, one day Laurent became interested in a new table. He hit
it with his fist several times, sometimes harder, sometimes more gently, in
order to hear the different sounds his actions produced (Piaget, 1936a, p. 270).
Similarly, one day when our son Tom was 12 months old, he was sitting
in the bathtub, watching the water pour down from the faucet. He put his
hand under the faucet and noticed how the water sprayed outward. He
repeated this action twice, making the interesting sight last (stage 3). But he
then shifted the position of his hand, sometimes nearer, sometimes farther
away from the faucet, observing how the water sprayed out at different angles.
He varied his actions to see what new, different results would follow.
It is worth pausing to note that the infants were learning entirely on their
own, without any adult teaching. They were developing their schemes solely
out of an intrinsic curiosity about the world.
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
Stage 6 (18 months to 2 years):
The Beginnings of Thought
At stage 5, children are little scientists, varying their actions and observing
the results. However, their discoveries all occur through direct physical
actions. At stage 6, children seem to think out situations more internally, before
they act.
The most widely known example of stage 6 behavior involves Luci-
enne and a matchbox. Piaget placed a chain in the box, which Lucienne
immediately tried to recover. She possessed two schemes for getting the
chain: turning the box over and sticking her finger in the box’s slit. But nei-
ther scheme worked. She then did something curious. She stopped her
actions and looked at the slit with great attention. Then, several times in
succession, she opened and shut her mouth, wider and wider (Piaget, 1936a,
p. 338). After this, she promptly opened the box and obtained the chain.
Piaget (p. 344) noted that at stage 5 the child probably would have
obtained the chain through a slow trial-and-error process of experimenting
with different actions. Because Lucienne stopped acting and thought out the
situation, she was able to achieve the result much more quickly. She did not
yet have a good grasp of language, so she used motor movements (her mouth)
to symbolize the action she needed to perform.
Children’s progress at stage 6 can also be seen in their efforts at imita-
tion. Piaget observed that for some time children cannot imitate new mod-
els at all; they can only reproduce actions that already exist in their behavioral
repertoires. By stage 5, though, they can make the necessary accommoda-
tions to imitate new behavior through experimental trial and error. But it is
only at stage 6 that children are capable of deferred imitation—the imitation of
models hours or days after observing them. For example, at 16 months of
age Jacqueline
had a visit from a little boy . . . whom she used to see from time to time,
and who, in the course of the afternoon, got into a terrible temper. He
screamed as he tried to get out of a play-pen and pushed it backwards,
stamping his feet. J. stood watching him in amazement, never having
witnessed such a scene before. The next day, she herself screamed in her
play-pen and tried to move it, stamping her foot lightly several times in
succession. The imitation of the whole scene was most striking. (Piaget,
1946, p. 63)
Piaget argued that because Jacqueline’s imitation came an entire day later, she
must have carried within her some internal representation of the model. Since
she lacked the vocabulary to represent his actions in words, she probably used
some form of motoric representation. She may have imitated his behavior with
very brief muscle movements when she saw it, and these movements served
as the basis for her later imitation.
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
The Development of Object Permanence
We have so far described only some of the main features of the six sensori-
motor stages. Piaget studied other developments during this period; he
showed how infants construct concepts of permanent objects, time, space, and
causality. Because of space limitations, we will briefly review only one impor-
tant development—that of object permanence.
During stages 1 and 2, babies have no conception of objects existing out-
side themselves. If a person or an object leaves their field of vision, the most
babies do is to continue to look for a moment to where they last saw it. If the
object does not reappear, they go on to something else. They make no attempt
to search for it. For the baby, out of sight is out of mind (Piaget, 1936b).
At stage 3, new progress is made. As babies increasingly explore and
interact with the outer world, they gain a better sense of the permanence of
external things. If objects are dropped from their line of vision, they now look
to the place where the object has fallen. They also can find partly hidden
objects (if, for example, a blanket covers only part of a toy). Also, if they
momentarily put an object aside and look elsewhere, they can return their
attention to the object and recover it. But they only recover the object when it
was related to their own actions. At this stage they cannot find objects that are
completely hidden by others.
Stage 4 marks the beginning of a genuine sense of object permanence.
Babies can now find completely hidden objects. If we completely cover a toy
with a blanket, the baby will lift the blanket and find it.
However, Piaget found an interesting limitation at this stage. When he
hid an object at point A, his children could find it, but when he then hid the
same object at point B, they again tried to find it at point A—the place of their
prior success. In Piaget’s terms, they could not follow a series of displace-
ments (movements from hiding place to hiding place).
At stage 5, children can follow a series of displacements, so long as they
can see us making them. It is only at stage 6 that infants can follow invisible
displacements. For example, it was only at the sixth stage that Jacqueline could
recover a ball that rolled under the sofa by making a detour around the sofa.
She could do this because she now had the ability to visualize to herself,
internally, the ball’s trajectory path even when it was invisible.
For Piaget, such detour behavior is very important. It shows that the
child has constructed a sense of space that has the characteristics of a mathe-
matical model called a group. For example, Jacqueline’s detours demonstrate
the principle of associativity, that one can reach a point through different
interconnected paths. She also demonstrates the group principle of
reversibility by bringing the ball back. Similarly, detour behavior reveals the
other principles that define a coherent group structure (Piaget & Inhelder,
1966, pp. 15–17).
Less technically, we can note the tremendous progress that infants make.
At the beginning of life, they have no sense of objects existing apart from
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
themselves—from their vision and actions. By the end of the sensorimotor
period, objects are separate and permanent. Children have developed a uni-
verse containing independent objects, in which they are only one object among
many. Along with object permanence, then, they have a clear sense of them-
selves as independent beings (Piaget, 1936b, pp. 108–109).
PERIODS II AND III. PREOPERATIONAL
THOUGHT (2 TO 7 YEARS) AND CONCRETE
OPERATIONS (7 TO 11 YEARS)
By the end of the sensorimotor period, the child has developed efficient and
well-organized actions for dealing with the immediate environment. The child
continues to use sensorimotor skills throughout life, but the next period, that
of preoperational thought, is marked by a major change. The child’s mind
rapidly advances to a new plane, that of symbols (including images and
words). As a result, the child must organize her thinking all over again. This
cannot be done at once. For some time, during the entire preoperational
period, the child’s thinking is basically unsystematic and illogical. It is not
until the age of 7 or so, the beginning of concrete operations, that thinking
becomes organized on a mental plane (Piaget, 1964a, p. 22).
The Growth of Symbolic Activity
Children begin to use symbols when they use one object or action to represent
an absent one (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 70). Actually, as we have seen, chil-
dren begin to do this during the sixth stage of sensorimotor development. For
example, when Lucienne opened her mouth before opening the matchbox,
she used her mouth to represent an action she had not yet performed. Piaget
emphasized that the first symbols are motoric, not linguistic.
We also see nonlinguistic symbols in children’s make-believe play, which
also begins toward the end of the sensorimotor period. One day Jacqueline
pretended that a piece of cloth was her pillow. She put her head on the cloth
and, laughing, pretended to go to sleep. Her play was symbolic because she
used one object, a piece of cloth, to represent an absent one, the pillow (Piaget,
1946, p. 96).
As their make-believe play develops, children start adding words. When
Jacqueline had just turned 2 years old, she moved her finger along a table and
said, “Horse trotting.” A few days later, she slid a postcard along the table
and said, “Car.” Her words, like her finger and the postcard, symbolized
objects not present in the immediate situation (Piaget, 1946, p. 124).
Language develops rapidly during the early preoperational years (from
about age 2 to 4), and it vastly widens the child’s horizons. Through language,
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
the child can relive the past, anticipate the future, and communicate events to
others. But precisely because the young child’s mind is so rapidly expanding,
it initially lacks the properties of a coherent logic. This is apparent in the young
child’s use of words. He or she does not use words to stand for true classes of
objects, but merely as preconcepts. For example, when Jacqueline was 3 years
old, she said that a daddy is a man who “has lots of Luciennes and lots of
Jacquelines” (p. 255). She did not yet possess the concept of a general class,
children, within which those with the names Lucienne and Jacqueline com-
prise only a small subset.
Because children lack general classes, their reasoning is frequently
transductive, shifting from the particular to the particular. At years Luci-
enne said, “I haven’t had my nap yet so it isn’t afternoon” (p. 232). She did not
yet understand that afternoons are general time periods that contain many
particular events, of which her nap was only one.
Some psychologists believe that children learn to think more logically as
they master language. In this view, language provides us with our concep-
tual categories (see Brown, 1965). Piaget, however, disagreed. Although lan-
guage is tremendously important—it provides us with a source of shared
symbols for communicating with others—it does not itself provide the struc-
ture of logical thinking. Logic, instead, stems from actions. Infants develop
logically coherent action systems during the sensorimotor period, before they
talk, and later logic is simply organized actions of a more internal kind (Piaget
& Inhelder, 1966, pp. 86–90). To study how internal actions form logical sys-
tems, Piaget gave children various scientific tasks. He usually began such
experiments with children at age 4 years, because they could now sit down,
focus on the tasks, and communicate with the examiner.
Scientific Reasoning
Conservation of Continuous Quantities (Liquids). This is Piaget’s
most famous experiment. In one version (Piaget & Szeminska, 1941, p. 17),
the child is shown two glasses, A1 and A2, that are filled to the same height
(see Figure 1). The child is asked if the two glasses contain the same amount
of liquid, and the child almost always agrees that they do. Next, the experi-
menter (or the child) pours the liquid from A2 to glass P, which is lower and
wider. The child is asked if the amount of liquid is still the same. At the
preoperational level, the responses fall into two substages.
At the first substage, the children clearly fail to conserve—that is, they
fail to realize that the quantity is the same. Usually, they say that A1 now has
more because it is taller. Occasionally, the child says that P now has more
because it is wider. In either case, the child “centers” on only one dimen-
sion, the height or the width. The child is so struck by a single perceptual
dimension—the way it looks—that he or she fails to understand that logically
the liquid must remain the same.
4 1�2
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
FIGURE 1
Conservation-of-liquid experi-
ment. A child sees that
beakers A1 and A2 contain
the same amount of liquid.
He then pours A2 into P
and claims that now A1 has
more because it is taller.
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At the second substage, the child takes steps toward conservation but
does not achieve it. A boy might at one moment say that A1 has more because
it is taller, then change his mind and say that P has more because it is wider,
and then become confused. The boy is showing “intuitive regulations”; he is
beginning to consider two perceptual dimensions, but he does not yet rea-
son about the two dimensions simultaneously and recognize that a change
in one dimension cancels out a change in the other. His confusion, however,
means he is becoming aware that he is contradicting himself, and it is a good
bet that he will soon resolve the contradiction and move on to the stage of
conservation.
Children generally achieve conservation of liquids at about 7 years.
When they do so, they are entering the stage of concrete operations. Basically,
children demonstrate conservation by using three arguments. First, the child
might say, “You haven’t added any or taken any away, so it has to be the
same.” This is the identity argument. Second, the child might say, “This glass
is taller here, but the other one is wider here, so they’re still the same.” This
is the argument of compensation—that the changes cancel each other out. The
child assumes that the changes are part of an organized system—that a change
in one dimension is necessarily related to a compensating change in another
dimension. Third, the child might say, “They are still the same because you can
pour this one back to what it was before.” This is the argument of inversion
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1966, p. 98). Piaget believed the concrete operational child
can use all three arguments, although the child might not spontaneously do
so on any given task.
Underlying these arguments are logical operations—mental actions that
are reversible (p. 96). When the child argues that a change in height is canceled
out by a change in width, the child understands that the end result is a return,
or reversal, to the original amount. The principle of reversibility is obvious, of
course, when the child uses the inversion argument, pointing out that “You
can pour it back.”
Operations, it is important to note, are mental actions. The child has not
actually performed or seen the transformations she is talking about. She is
only thinking, for example, about pouring water back. Operations are similar
to the actions of the infant (as when an infant places a toy under a blanket
and pulls it back out), but operations are on a more mental plane.
People sometimes wonder if young children might fail to conserve
simply because of their difficulties with language. They might think that
what the experimenter means by “more” is “taller,” and therefore they point
to the taller glass. One can get around such difficulties by changing one’s
wording—for example, by asking, “Which one would give you more to
drink?” Usually we find that the young child still fails to conserve (Peill, 1975,
p. 7, chap. 2).
How does the child learn conservation? The most ready answer is that
conservation is taught. However, as we shall see, the teaching of conservation
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frequently meets with unexpected resistance. The preoperational child does
not genuinely believe the adult’s explanations.
Piaget argued that children master conservation spontaneously. The cru-
cial moment comes at the second substage, when the child first says that one
glass has more because it is taller, then says the other has more because it is
wider, and then becomes confused. The child is in a state of internal contra-
diction, which she resolves by moving on to a higher stage. Sometimes we can
see this change happen before our very eyes. The child says, “This has
more . . . no, that one is wider, no, wait. They’re both the same. This looks
taller, but you’ve poured it into a wider glass.”
Conservation of Number. In one of his experiments Piaget gave
children a row of egg cups and a bunch of eggs (Piaget & Szeminska, 1941,
pp. 49–56; Inhelder, 1971). Piaget then asked the children to take just enough
eggs to fill the cups. Again, the responses at the preoperational period fell
into two substages.
At the first substage, the children simply made the rows equal in length,
ignoring the number of eggs in the row. When Piaget then asked them to actu-
ally put the eggs in the cups, they were surprised to find they had too many
or too few eggs.
At the second preoperational stage, the children spontaneously created a
one-to-one correspondence, placing one egg beneath each cup (see Figure 2).
According to Piaget, they used an intuitive approach to achieve a precise per-
ceptual order. However, their success was limited to this simple perceptual
arrangement. When Piaget then bunched up (or sometimes spread out) one of
the rows, the children claimed that now one had more. As with conservation of
liquids, the children failed to conserve because they were more influenced by
their immediate perceptions than by logic. Because one row now looked so
much longer, they failed to reason that the number must remain the same.
At this stage, in addition, children sometimes begin to waver in their
answers. One moment they say that one row has more because it is longer, but
the next moment they think the other row has more because it is denser. This
state of conflict marks the transition to concrete operations.
At the stage of concrete operations, children realize that the number in
each row is the same despite the different appearances in length. They reason
that the two rows are the same because “you haven’t taken any away or added
any” (identity), because “one row is longer here but this one is more bunched
in” (compensation), or because “you could make this row long again and
make them equal” (inversion).
Other Conservation Experiments. Piaget has studied several other
kinds of conservation, such as the conservation of substance, weight, volume,
and length. For example, in a conservation-of-substance experiment, the child
is shown two equal balls of plasticine or play dough and then watches as one
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FIGURE 2
Conservation of number experiment. Young children can often create two rows of
equal number, but if we shorten or bunch up one row, they think that the number has
changed.
ball is rolled into a longer, thinner shape, like that of a hot dog. At the pre-
operational level, the child thinks the two balls now have different amounts
of play dough.
We will not describe the various kinds of conservation here, but simply
note that they all are thought to involve the mastery of the same logical
concepts—identity, inversion, and compensation. Nevertheless, some kinds of
conservation appear more difficult than others and are mastered later.2 Thus
the attainment of conservation is a gradual process within the concrete oper-
ational period.
Classification. In a typical classification experiment, Piaget (Piaget
& Szeminska, 1941, pp. 161–181) presented children with 20 wooden beads—
18 brown and 2 white. Piaget made sure the children understood that
although most beads were brown and two were white, they all were made
of wood. He then asked the children, “Are there more brown beads or more
wooden beads?” At the preoperational level, the children said there were
more brown beads. Apparently they were so struck by the many brown
beads in comparison to the two white ones that they failed to realize that
2In fact, the mastery of one series—conservation of substance, weight, and volume—
may always occur in the same invariant sequence (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, pp. 151–153; Piaget
& Inhelder, 1966, p. 99).
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both brown and white beads are parts of a larger whole—the class of wooden
beads. As with conservation, children master such classification tasks dur-
ing the period of concrete operations, and the same logical operations appear
to be involved (p. 178).
Social Thinking
Egocentrism. Piaget believed that at each period there is a general
correspondence between scientific and social thinking. For example, just as
preoperational children fail to consider two dimensions on conservation tasks,
they also fail to consider more than one perspective in their interactions with
others. Preoperational children are frequently egocentric, considering every-
thing from their own single viewpoint. This is apparent from young children’s
conversations (Piaget, 1923). A little girl might tell her friend, “I’m putting
this here,” oblivious to the fact that the place to which she is pointing is
blocked from her friend’s vision.
One of Piaget’s most widely quoted studies on egocentrism dealt with
the child’s perception of space. In this study (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948) the
child was taken for a walk around a model of three mountains so he or she
could see how the model looked from different angles. After the walk, the
child was seated on one side of the model, facing a doll that looked at the
model from the opposite side. The child was then asked to select from among
several photographs the picture that best showed what he or she saw and
the picture that showed what the doll saw. All the children could pick the
picture that represented their own view, but the youngest children (from
about 4 to 6 years) frequently chose the same picture to show the doll’s view.
Apparently, they did not understand that the doll’s perspective differed from
their own.
Egocentrism, then, refers to the inability to distinguish one’s own per-
spective from that of others. Egocentrism does not, however, necessarily imply
selfishness or conceit. This point can be clarified by an example. One day two
boys went shopping with their aunt for a birthday present for their mother.
The older boy, who was 7, picked out a piece of jewelry. The younger boy,
who was , selected a model car. The younger child’s behavior was not self-
ish or greedy; he carefully wrapped the present and gave it to his mother with
an expression that clearly showed that he expected her to love it. However, his
behavior was egocentric; he did not consider the fact that his mother’s inter-
ests were different from his own.
As long as children are egocentric, they tend simply to play alongside
one another. For example, two children in the sandbox will build their own
structures. As they overcome egocentrism, they learn to coordinate their actions
in joint endeavors. Each might dig a tunnel so that the tunnels eventually con-
nect. This requires considering each other’s perspective. Such cooperative play
occurs at the stage of concrete operations.
3 1�2
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or so—believed the rules were fixed and unchangeable. They said the rules
came from some prestigious authority, from the government, or from God.
The rules could not be changed, they asserted, because then it wouldn’t be
the real game.
After the age of 10 or so, the children were more relativistic. Rules were
seen simply as mutually agreed-upon ways of playing the game. Children
no longer considered the rules as fixed or absolute; they said the rules prob-
ably had changed over the years, as children invented new rules. And they
added that they too could change them, as long as everyone in the game
agreed (pp. 50–76).
These different conceptions of rules, Piaget said, reveal two basic moral
attitudes. The first, characteristic of the younger children, is moral heteronomy,
a blind obedience to rules imposed by adults. Children assume there is one
powerful law that they must always follow. The second morality—that of the
older children—is autonomy. This morality considers rules as human devices
produced by equals for the sake of cooperation (pp. 401–406).
Piaget believed that moral heteronomy is tied to egocentrism; children
view rules from a single perspective, seeing only what powerful adults
impose. As a form of egocentrism, moral heteronomy is overcome quite late,
at the age of 10 or so, compared to egocentric play, which is usually overcome
by age 7. Here, Piaget reminded us that heteronomy is a form of egocentric
thought and said that thought often lags behind action. Children may need to
engage in a good deal of genuinely cooperative play with peers, in which they
actually change rules to meet everyone’s satisfaction, before they can discuss
the relativity of rules on a conscious plane (pp. 94–95).
In their informal play, older children’s interest in the formulation of rules
can become quite keen. Piaget (1932, p. 50) described how a group of 10- and
11-year-olds, preparing for a snowball fight, spent considerable time debating
the rules for voting on a “president” for the game, dividing themselves into
teams, deciding the distances of the shots, and discussing the appropriate
sanctions for violations of the rules. According to one account of the episode,
the boys were called home before they got a chance to begin the actual snow-
ball fight, but all seemed content with their afternoon (Ginsburg & Opper,
1988, p. 98). What really interested them was the discussion of rules. Children
at this age are like little lawyers, discussing what is fair and right. In the
process, they develop their conceptions of justice.
Animism. Piaget described other ways in which young children’s
thinking differs from that of older children and adults. Like Werner, Piaget
observed that young children do not make the same distinctions between liv-
ing and nonliving things that adults do. As Werner said, they perceive every-
thing, including physical objects, physiognomically, as full of life and feeling.
A loud truck may seem angry and a single cloud lonely. Piaget called this
view of the physical world animistic.
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Egocentrism also may influence young children’s speech, as when they
engage in “collective monologues.” Two little girls may appear to be holding
a conversation while they play, but each girl is actually just talking about what
is on her own mind. One girl might talk about a toy house she is building
while the other talks about a trip she took, and no connection is ever made.
As children overcome egocentrism, they consider the reactions and view-
points of their listeners.
Much peer interaction, then, is initially egocentric. Nevertheless, Piaget
(1923, p. 101; 1932, p. 94) speculated, children overcome egocentrism as they
interact less exclusively with adults and more with other children. They dis-
cover that whereas grownups seem to understand whatever is on their minds,
their peers do not. Consequently, they learn to consider others’ viewpoints in
order to make themselves understood.
Furthermore, children are less impressed by the authority of other chil-
dren and feel freer to engage in conflicts with them. They argue with their
peers and sometimes reach compromises and cooperate with them. They begin
to coordinate alternative viewpoints and interests (Piaget, 1924, p. 205).
Whether children overcome egocentrism primarily through peer inter-
action or not, the most crucial point for Piaget’s theory is that children them-
selves play an active role in grasping the fact of alternative viewpoints. On
this point, I recall an instance in which our son Adam, then 5 years old,
seemed actually to make this discovery. He was riding alone in the car with
me when, after a few minutes of silence, he said, “You know, Dad, you’re not
remembering what I’m remembering.” I asked him what he meant, and he
replied, “Like I was remembering about my shoes, but you can’t see what
I’m remembering; you can’t be remembering what I’m remembering.” At
that moment he seemed actually to discover, by himself, that others’ per-
spectives differ from his own. He might not have completely surmounted
his egocentrism at that instant, but the point is that whatever step he took, he
took on his own.
Moral Judgment. Piaget investigated children’s social thought in
many areas, including morals. In his classic work, The Moral Judgment of the
Child (1932), he paid particular attention to how children understood the rules
of the game of marbles.
Piaget first observed how children actually played the game, and he
found that between the ages of 4 and 7 children typically played in an ego-
centric manner. If two boys were playing, each would play in his own way.
They had little sense of winning—one might exclaim, “I won and you won
too!” After the age of about 7 years, children tried to follow common rules
and win according to them (pp. 29–46).
Piaget next investigated children’s thinking about the rules. He was
particularly interested in whether children thought the rules could be
changed. Here, he found that children for several years—up to the age of 10
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Although Piaget and Werner were struck by a similar attitude in young
children, they studied it somewhat differently. Werner was concerned with
children’s direct perceptions of objects; Piaget was more interested in their
concepts and definitions of life.
At first, Piaget found that children equate life with any kind of activity.
For example, one boy was asked,
Is the sun alive?—Yes.—Why?—It gives light.—Is a candle alive?—Yes
because it gives light. It is alive when it is giving light, but it isn’t alive when
it is not giving light. . . . Is the play-bell alive?—Yes, it rings. (Piaget, 1926,
p. 196)
Such thinking is common between the ages of 4 and 6 years.
A bit later, between the ages of about 6 and 8, children restrict life to
things that move. For example,
Is a stone alive?—Yes.—Why?—It moves, . . . How does it move?—By
rolling.—Is the table alive?—No, it can’t move. . . . Is a bicycle alive?—
Yes.—Why?—It goes. (p. 196)
Only after 8 years or so do children restrict life to objects that move on their
own and, later, to plants and animals.
Piaget found roughly similar stages in thinking about the kinds of objects
that have feelings and consciousness. At first, children believe that an object
has feelings if it reacts in any way. For example, a stick feels fire because it
gets burnt. A bit later, children restrict feelings and consciousness to objects
that move, then to objects that move on their own, and finally to animals.
Thus children gradually abandon their animism and come to make the
distinctions characteristic of most adults. The fate of animism in Piaget’s the-
ory, we might note, differs from that of physiognomic perception in Werner’s.
For Werner, physiognomic perception, while less dominant in most adults
than in young children, nevertheless remains with us and contributes to our
artistic and poetic outlooks. For Piaget, animism is simply overcome.
Dreams. One of Piaget’s earliest studies examined children’s concep-
tions of dreams (1926, chap. 3). As with conceptions of life, young children’s
understanding of dreams seems to follow a specific stage sequence. Since
Piaget’s first study, others (especially the American psychologist Lawrence
Kohlberg, 1966a) have refined Piaget’s dream sequence.
At first, children seem to believe that dreams are real. For example,
when a 4-year-old girl was asked if the giant in her dream was really there,
she answered, “It was really there but it left when I woke up. I saw its foot-
print on the floor” (Kohlberg, 1966a, p. 6). Soon afterward, children discover
that dreams are not real, but they still view dreams quite differently from the
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way older children or adults view them. They think their dreams are visible
to others and that dreams come from the outside (from the night or the sky,
or through the window from the lights outside). They also think dreams
remain outside themselves while they are dreaming. It is as if they were
watching a movie, with the action taking place in their rooms in front of their
eyes. Gradually, stage by stage, children realize that dreams not only are
unreal but are also invisible, of internal origin, of internal location, and pos-
sess the other characteristics that adults assign to them. Children usually
complete their discoveries by the age of 6 or 7 years, at the beginning of con-
crete operations.
How do children learn about dreams? Our first assumption probably is
that they learn about them from adults. When children have nightmares,
parents reassure them, saying, “Don’t worry, it was only a dream. It wasn’t
real; it was only in your mind.” Piagetians, however, maintain that children
actually discover the various properties of dreams on their own. Kohlberg
(1966a), for example, argued that because children master the dream sequence
in an invariant six-stage sequence, it is unlikely that their thinking is the prod-
uct of adult teachings; adults do not take the trouble to teach children about
dreams in such a detailed, precise order. Instead, children arrive at different
conceptualizations on their own, in an order of increasing difficulty.
To gather additional information on the role of adult teaching, Kohlberg
(1966a) administered the dream interview to children in an aboriginal society
in which the adults believe dreams are real (the Atayal on Formosa). Despite
the adults’ beliefs, these children seem to progress through the stages in the
same order as American or Swiss children. That is, they first discover that
dreams are unreal, then that they are invisible, and so on. Finally, when they
reach the last stage, they feel the impact of the adult views and change their
minds, adopting the view that dreams are real after all. Still, they initially
progress through the dream sequence in opposition to any adult beliefs, so
adult views cannot be the sole determinants of their learnings.
Summary and Conclusion
Piaget argued that children’s thinking during the preoperational period is
very different from that of older children and adults. Preoperational thinking
is characterized by egocentrism, animism, moral heteronomy, a view of
dreams as external events, a lack of classification, a lack of conservation, as well
as other attributes we have not had the space to cover.
The list is a long one, and you might ask, “What do all these characteris-
tics have in common?” The question is central to Piaget’s theory, for it maintains
that each developmental stage has a basic unity. Unfortunately, Piaget did not
give as much attention to this question as we would like, but most often
(e.g., 1964a, pp. 41–60), he tried to link the various preoperational characteristics
to the concept of egocentrism.
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In speech, children are egocentric when they consider matters only from
their own perspective. Animism—the attribution of life to physical objects—
also stems from egocentrism; children assume that everything functions just
as they do. Similarly, Piaget tried to show that young children’s conceptions
of dreams are related to egocentrism. As long as children are egocentric, they
fail to realize the extent to which each person has private, subjective experi-
ences such as dreams. In the realm of morals, furthermore, egocentrism goes
hand in hand with moral heteronomy. Young children regard rules from only
one perspective, as absolutes handed down from above. They do not yet see
how rules are based on the mutual agreements of two or more actors attempt-
ing to coordinate their different objectives in a cooperative way.
There is also a link between egocentrism and children’s performances on
scientific tasks, such as the experiments on conservation. Just as the egocen-
tric child views things from a single perspective, the child who fails to conserve
focuses on only one aspect of the problem. For example, when water is poured
from one glass into a shorter, broader one, the child “centers” on a single strik-
ing dimension—the difference in height. The child cannot “decenter” and con-
sider two aspects of the situation at once.
Children at the level of concrete operations are able to consider two
aspects of a problem simultaneously. In their social interactions, they consider
not only what they are saying but also the needs of the listener. When they
perform conservation experiments, they consider not only the most visible
change but also a compensating change. The coordination of two perspectives
forms the basis of both their social and their scientific thinking (Piaget, 1947,
pp. 156–166).
PERIOD IV. FORMAL OPERATIONS
(11 YEARS TO ADULTHOOD)
At concrete operations, children can think systematically in terms of “mental
actions.” For example, when water is poured into a new glass, they can tell us
about the implications of reversing the process, without actually performing
the activity. However, there is a limit to such abilities. They can think logi-
cally and systematically only as long as they refer to tangible objects that can
be subjected to real activity (Piaget, 1964a, p. 62).
During formal operations, in contrast, thinking soars into the realm of
the purely abstract and hypothetical. The capacity for abstract reasoning can
be seen in responses to questions such as the following: If Joe is shorter than
Bob, and Joe is taller than Alex, who is the tallest? At the level of concrete
operations, children can handle this problem only if they actually place
people in order and compare their heights; beyond this, they simply guess. At
the level of formal operations, however, adolescents can order their thoughts
in their minds alone (p. 62).
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Piaget was most concerned with the capacity to reason with respect to
hypothetical possibilities. In one experiment (Inhelder & Piaget, 1955,
pp. 107–122), children were given four flasks containing colorless liquids, labeled
1, 2, 3, and 4. They also were given a small container of colorless liquid, labeled
g. Their task was to mix these liquids to make the color yellow.
At the level of preoperational intelligence, children typically made a
mess. They poured the liquids in and out of the bottles in a haphazard way.
At the level of concrete operations, children’s actions showed more
organization. A typical strategy was to pour g into each flask: g into 1, g into
2, g into 3, and g into 4. However, they then gave up. When questioned,
these children usually said there wasn’t anything more they could do. Thus
their actions revealed some organization, as we could have expected from
their systematic behavior on conservation tasks, on which they can think in
terms of two dimensions at once. But they entertained only a limited range
of possibilities.
At the level of formal operations, the adolescents worked systematically
in terms of all possibilities. Some started out by trying various combinations and
then realized they had better make sure that they would include all possible
combinations, so they wrote them down before acting any further.
When adolescents think about the various possibilities inherent in a situ-
ation beforehand and then systematically test them, they are working like true
scientists. For example, a teenage girl might test the effects of a new soil for
plants. At the level of formal operations, she does not just put new soil into one
pot and old soil into the other and watch the plants grow; she considers other
possibilities. Perhaps these two plants would have grown to different heights
anyway, because of individual differences, so she obtains several plants and
examines the average effects of the different soils. Perhaps the sunlight also has
an effect, so she makes sure that all the plants are exposed to the same sunlight.
Perhaps the amount of water is also important, so she controls for this variable
too. The essence of such reasoning is that one is systematically thinking about
hypotheses. One is not just entertaining a new possibility but is isolating one
hypothesis by controlling for the effects of other possible variables.
As with the other periods, Piaget introduced logico-mathematical mod-
els to describe formal operational thinking. These models are in some respects
similar to those that apply to earlier developmental levels, but they also go
beyond them. The models are very complex, and we will not attempt to cover
them here. It is important to note, however, that at the level of formal opera-
tions, thinking reaches its highest degree of equilibrium. This means, among
other things, that the various operations are more tightly interrelated and
apply to the widest possible field of application—the realm of hypothetical
possibilities.
Although Piaget limited most of his research on adolescents to mathe-
matical and scientific reasoning, he did speculate on the role of formal oper-
ations in the adolescent’s social life (Inhelder & Piaget, 1955, chap. 18). Unlike
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the concrete-operational child, who lives primarily in the here and now, ado-
lescents begin to think about more far-reaching problems—about their futures
and the nature of the society they will enter. In this process, their new cogni-
tive powers can lead to a striking idealism and utopianism. They can now
grasp abstract principles and ideals, such as liberty, justice, and love, and they
envision hypothetical societies very different from any that presently exist.
The adolescent becomes a dreamer, constructing theories about a better world.
Piaget believed that such idealistic and utopian thinking carries with it
a new kind of egocentrism. To fully appreciate this new egocentrism, we must
review how egocentrism appears whenever the child enters a new realm of
intellectual life. At first, infants are egocentric in the sense that they have no
conception of the world apart from their own actions. External objects have
no permanent existence of their own. Only at the end of the sensorimotor
period do children situate themselves in a world of permanent objects, of
which they are only one.
At the next level—that of preoperational thought—children enter a new,
vastly enlarged world—one that includes language, symbolic representation,
and communication with others. Children once again become egocentric and
have difficulty considering more than their own immediate perspective. Grad-
ually, they learn to consider alternative perspectives—as long as they are think-
ing about concrete objects immediately before them.
Finally, adolescents enter a broader world yet—the world of possibilities—
and egocentrism reappears. This time egocentrism is seen when adolescents
attribute unlimited power to their own thoughts. They dream of “a glorious
future or of transforming the world through Ideas” (p. 346), without attempt-
ing to test out their thoughts in reality. Young people overcome this final form
of egocenrism, in Piaget’s view, when they actually take up adult roles. They
then learn the limits and resistances to their own thoughts. They learn that a
theoretical construction or a utopian vision has value only in relation to how
it works out in reality.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
The Stage Concept
Many psychologists use the term stage loosely, as merely a convenient device
for summarizing their findings. This, however, is not the case with Piaget. As
Kohlberg (1968) stressed, the Piagetian stage concept implies several strong
positions on the nature of development.
First, in a rigorous stage theory, the stage sequence should be invariant.
People proceed through the stages at different rates, and some may not reach
the highest of Piaget’s stages; but to the extent that they move through them,
they proceed in order.
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Second, stages imply that growth is divided into qualitatively different
periods. If intellectual development were a continuous, quantitative process,
any division into separate stages would be arbitrary (Flavell, 1963, p. 19). For
example, if knowledge can be scored from 0 to 100, then any division into
stages at 40, 50, and 70 makes no more sense than any other series of cutoff
points. Piaget, however, believed that thinking at different times is organized
along qualitatively different lines. Thinking at concrete operations, for
instance, is qualitatively different from that at formal operations. (It is logical
insofar as it refers to concrete objects and activities, but it is not yet truly
abstract and hypothetical.) Consequently, there is a natural, valid distinction
between the two periods.
Third, stages refer to general characteristics. Kohlberg liked to discuss
this point by asking the following question: At the age of 4 years, a child
cannot copy a diamond. At the age of 5, the child can. Has the child reached
the diamond copying stage? Kohlberg explained that this proposal sounds
somewhat silly because diamond copying is too specific to be called a stage.
If we were to call each particular achievement a stage, we would have thou-
sands of stages. It is more appropriate to say that the child has reached a
new general stage of perceptual-motor coordination that permits him or her
to do many new things. Similarly, Piaget’s stages refer to general patterns of
thought, and if we know a child is in a particular stage, we should be able
to predict behavior across a wide variety of tasks. This is not completely
true, for children may be at somewhat different stages in different areas (e.g.,
in scientific versus social reasoning). Piaget called such irregularities
décalages. However, there should be a substantial unity in performances at
each general period.
Fourth, Piaget (Inhelder & Piaget, 1955) believed his own stages repre-
sent hierarchic integrations. That is, the lower stages do not disappear but
become integrated into, and in a sense dominated by, new broader frame-
works. For example, a teenage boy who begins using formal operations can
still use concrete operations—he can still reason systematically about con-
crete, visible events. However, he now realizes these events are only a part of
a wider range of theoretical possibilities, and he will prefer to approach dif-
ficult problems with this wider range in mind.3
Fifth, Piaget, like other rigorous stage theorists, claimed his stages unfold
in the same sequence in all cultures. This proposal frequently puzzles readers.
Don’t different cultures teach different beliefs, particularly with regard to
morals? In general the Piagetian answer is that the theory is not concerned
with specific beliefs but with underlying cognitive capacities. So young
3Piagetians imply that successive hierarchic integrations characterize development for
all the periods except for preoperational thought. The illogical features of this period do not
seem to be retained and integrated into any higher structures; they are simply overcome
(see Inhelder, 1971).
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children, regardless of their cultural beliefs on matters such as sex or fighting,
will base their views on what they think authority condones or punishes. It is
not until adolescence, when young people acquire formal operations, that
they will give abstract, theoretical treatises on moral matters, whatever their
specific beliefs.
In summary, then, Piaget advanced a rigorous stage theory, which
means he believed his stages (1) unfold in an invariant sequence, (2) describe
qualitatively different patterns, (3) refer to general properties of thought,
(4) represent hierarchic integrations, and (5) are culturally universal.
Movement from Stage to Stage
Piaget devoted a great deal of attention to the structures of his stages and far
less attention to the problem of movement through them. Nevertheless, he
had definite views on this topic.
He acknowledged (1964b) that biological maturation plays some role in
development. For example, children probably cannot attain concrete opera-
tions without some minimal maturation of the nervous system. However,
Piaget said that maturation alone cannot play the dominant role because rates
of development depend so much on where children live. Children who grow
up in impoverished rural areas frequently develop at slow rates, apparently
because they lack intellectual stimulation. The environment is also important.
However, it is easy to exaggerate the role of the environment, as learn-
ing theorists do. Generally speaking, learning theorists believe the child’s
mind is primarily a product of external reinforcements and teaching. Piaget-
ian concepts, they assume, must be taught by parents, teachers, and others.
However, it is not at all clear that this is the case.
In Piaget’s view, the environment is important, but only partly so. The
environment nourishes, stimulates, and challenges the child, but children
themselves build cognitive structures. As children seek out the environment,
they encounter events that capture their interest. They are particularly
intrigued by events that are moderately novel—events that do not quite cor-
respond to their past experience. Children then adjust their actions to learn
about these events, and in the process they build new ways for dealing with
the world. For example, I mentioned earlier how our son Tom, at the age of
12 months, was struck by the way water sprayed outward when he placed
his hand under it. He then adjusted his hand up and down to learn more
about it, and as he did so, he probably learned a little about the efficacy of
actively experimenting with different actions to see different results (stage 5
of sensorimotor development). In such behavior, it is not the environment
that structures the child’s mind, but the child who develops new schemes.
Experiences that promote cognitive development, in addition, are not only
interesting, but usually place the child in a state of conflict. For example, an
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infant might be unable to grasp an object because an obstacle is in the way. The
child needs to invent a new structure—a means-ends relationship—to obtain the
object. The child assimilates new objects by making accommodations that build
new cognitive structures.
The concept of conflict is involved in a formal model of developmental
change that Piaget called equilibration (1964b). We already have discussed the
essence of this model, without using its name, when we discussed how chil-
dren achieve conservation. For example, a little girl sees a ball of clay elongated
and initially thinks the amount has increased. After a while, however, she
considers the clay’s narrow width and thinks the clay has shrunk; she per-
ceives something that contradicts her initial view. When she thinks about both
the length and the width, she becomes confused. This conflict motivates the
child to realize that one change cancels out the other, leading to the discovery
of conservation. Piaget’s equilibration model tries to assign numerical prob-
abilities to the chances that the child will consider one dimension, then the
other, and finally both.
In philosophy, Piaget’s equilibration model would be called a dialecti-
cal theory. Dialectical theory holds that change occurs when our ideas meet
with counterevidence that motivates us to formulate new and better ideas.
Another source of new, conflicting information is the social environ-
ment. For example, preoperational children overcome egocentrism when they
interact with peers, with whom they get into arguments and conflicts. In such
interchanges, they learn that others have views different from their own, and
they also learn to coordinate different interests to behave in a cooperative
fashion. This ability to coordinate viewpoints also contributes to the growth
of scientific thinking, where the coordination of dimensions is also important
(Piaget, 1947, pp. 156–166).
Piaget, then, tried to indicate different ways in which interesting and
conflicting pieces of information lead children to develop new cognitive struc-
tures. It is important to emphasize that development is always a spontaneous
process. It is the children themselves who assimilate new information, resolve
contradictions, and construct new cognitive structures.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Piaget did not write extensively on education, but he did have some recom-
mendations. Essentially, his overall educational philosophy is similar to that
of Rousseau and Montessori. For Piaget, too, true learning is not something
handed down by the teacher, but something that comes from the child. It is
a process of spontaneous invention and discovery. This is clearly true of
infants, who make incredible intellectual progress simply by exploring and
manipulating the environment on their own, and it can be true of older chil-
dren as well. Accordingly, the teacher should not try to impose knowledge
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on the child but should find materials that will interest and challenge the
child and then permit the child to solve problems on her own (Piaget, 1969,
pp. 151–153, 160).
Like Rousseau and Montessori, Piaget also stressed the importance of
gearing instruction to the child’s particular level. He did not agree with
Montessori’s maturational view of stages, but the general principle still holds:
The educator must appreciate the extent to which children’s interests and
modes of learning are different at different times.
Say, for example, a boy is just entering the stage of concrete opera-
tions. He is beginning to think logically, but his thinking is still partly tied
to concrete objects and activities. Accordingly, lessons should give him
opportunities to deal actively with real things. If, for example, we wish to
teach him about fractions, we should not draw diagrams, give him lectures,
or engage him in verbal discussions. We should allow him to divide concrete
objects into parts (Flavell, 1963, p. 368). When we assume he will learn on
a verbal plane, we are being egocentric; we are assuming he learns just as
we do. The result will be a lesson that sails over his head and seems unnat-
ural to him.
It might appear that this principle—tailoring education to the child’s
own stage—is self-evident. Unfortunately, this is not always so. A case in point
was the wave of curricular reforms that the United States initiated in the late
1950s and 1960s in response to the Soviet Union’s launching of Sputnik. To try
to catch up with the Russians, educators introduced the “new math,” “new
science,” and other studies designed to teach children abstract, theoretical
reasoning at very young ages. Initially, this seemed to be a great idea, but the
new curriculum was not very successful. The reason, according to Kohlberg
and Gilligan (1971), was that it attempted to teach young children, largely at
the level of concrete operations and lower, ideas that assume capacities only
attained at formal operations. The curricular reforms began with an adult con-
ception of what children should learn and ignored children’s own cognitive
levels.
Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, we witnessed a similar
trend—a trend that continues today. U.S. leaders, worried that the country
was losing its technological leadership to the Japanese, began calling for a
new excellence in education. Parents, too, became anxious about their chil-
dren’s future and wanted to give them an early academic start. One result has
been more and more academic instruction at younger and younger ages—all
the way down to kindergarten and even earlier. David Elkind (1981, 1986), a
Piagetian, was one of the first to protest this trend. Five-year-olds, Elkind
pointed out, learn primarily through play and direct sensory contact with the
environment; formal instruction, including workbooks and worksheets, does
not coincide with the young child’s natural modes of learning. Early formal
instruction primarily teaches young children that learning is stressful and
unnatural.
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It is not always easy to find the educational experiences that are most nat-
ural for a given child. A knowledge of cognitive stages can help, but children
are sometimes at different stages in different areas (Piaget, 1969). What is
needed is sensitivity and flexibility on the teacher ’s part—a willingness to
look closely at the child’s actions, to learn from the child, and to be guided by
the child’s spontaneous interests (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 239). For active
learning always presupposes interest (Piaget, 1969, p. 152).
Like Rousseau and Montessori, then, Piaget believed learning should be
a process of active discovery and should be geared to the child’s stage. But
Piaget disagreed with Rousseau and Montessori on one point. Piaget saw
much greater educational value in social interactions. Children begin to think
logically—to coordinate two dimensions simultaneously—partly by learn-
ing to consider two or more perspectives in their dealings with others. So
interactions should be encouraged, and the most beneficial ones are those in
which children feel a basic equality, as they most often do with peers. As long
as children feel dominated by an authority who knows the “right” answer,
they will have difficulty appreciating differences in perspectives. In group dis-
cussions with other children, in contrast, they have a better opportunity to
deal with different viewpoints as stimulating challenges to their own think-
ing (pp. 173–180).
Kamii’s Constructivism
Several attempts have been made to bring Piaget’s ideas into the classroom,
particularly the preschool and the early grades (DeVries & Kohlberg, 1987,
chap. 3). Some educators have focused on Piaget’s tasks, attempting to teach
conservation, classification, and so on. Others have been more concerned with
the spirit of Piaget’s theory. An inspired proponent of this approach is Con-
stance Kamii.
Kamii begins with the Piagetian premise that real cognitive growth
occurs only when children construct their own knowledge. Children need
opportunities to figure things out on their own. They will not do this, Kamii
has found, if teachers use worksheets and tests. These practices make chil-
dren so worried about getting the “right answers,” the answers that the teacher
will mark as correct, that they don’t think problems out for themselves. Instead
of worksheets and tests, then, teachers need to provide experiences that chil-
dren will find so interesting and meaningful that they will work on them for
their own sake. Such problems, Kamii says, can be found throughout chil-
dren’s daily lives. For example, first-graders will enthusiastically work on
arithmetic problems as they come up during card games, keeping score dur-
ing outdoor games, voting on class decisions, and taking attendance. During
such activities, the teacher can ask questions that further stimulate the child’s
interest in arithmetic. If children are playing softball, the teacher might ask,
How many points do you need to reach 11? If a child brings pudding for the
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class, the teacher might ask, Are there just enough cups for all the children?
The teacher ’s questions set the children’s minds in motion, but the teacher
always leaves the problem solving to the children themselves. The teacher
should even respect the children’s “wrong answers.” For it is better for chil-
dren to come up with a wrong answer that is their own than to feel that they
must turn to an adult to know what is correct (Kamii, 1985, pp. 119–121,
161–165; Kamii & DeVries, 1977).
As children move into the second and third grades, Kamii adds many
dice, card, and board games that stimulate mathematical thinking. She also
presents children with standard problems in addition, subtraction, and so on,
but she always encourages the children to invent their own solutions. Kamii
vehemently opposes the conventional practice of teaching algorithms (e.g., a
teacher tells a child to add by adding the 8 and the 7, carrying the 1,
and so on). Algorithms, she points out, teach children to follow mechanical
procedures without the slightest understanding of why they are performing
them. Children in a constructivist class invent methods that make sense to
them (such as, “I’ll make this two 10s, with a 7 and an 8 left over.”). They cre-
ate methods for surprisingly difficult problems, and their methods are often
quite original (Kamii, 1994, 2004).
Kamii applies her approach to nearly every aspect of school life, includ-
ing “discipline problems.” If some children get into an argument during a
card game, the teacher should resist the impulse to step in and solve the prob-
lem for them. Instead, the teacher might ask, “Can you think of a way that
would be fair to everybody?” (Kamii, 1985, p. 48) In this way, the teacher
prompts the children themselves to work on a question of justice.
Piagetian teaching, Kamii (1973) says, often means giving children
more time to work on problems than schools usually do. Kamii tells, for
example, about lessons in specific gravity. Children in the elementary grades
are usually surprised to see that a pin sinks in water, whereas a block of
wood (which is larger) floats. And it usually takes children some time to
figure out why this is so. Teachers are therefore tempted to explain the
answer to their pupils, especially when the teacher wants to move on to a
new lesson. But Kamii urges the teacher to wait. It is far better, she says, for
the children to keep thinking and wondering about the matter than “to be
told the answer and to learn incidentally that the answer always comes from
the teacher ’s head” (p. 225).
Kamii (1985, 1994, 2004) has conducted evaluation research on her
method of teaching arithmetic in the early elementary grades. She has found
that on traditional standardized tests, her children do almost as well as those
taught by conventional methods. But her children demonstrate a far greater
understanding of the logic behind their work. They also are much more inde-
pendently minded. When a teacher tried to help one first-grade girl with a
hint, the girl said, “Wait, I have to think it in my own head” (Kamii, 1985,
p. 235). To Kamii, such responses are very important. Like Rousseau and
18 + 17
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Montessori, Kamii is less interested in the amount of knowledge children gain
than in their desire to think for themselves.
EVALUATION
Since about 1960 Piaget has stimulated a vast amount of research and the-
oretical discussion. We cannot summarize all of it here, but we can look at
some trends and issues. I will organize this section around some basic
questions.
Has Research Supported Piaget
on His Tasks?
As mentioned in the introduction, Piaget’s own research has been criticized
for its scientific shortcomings. For example, he based some conclusions only
on observations of his own three children—hardly a representative sample.
Consequently, when Piaget was rediscovered in the early 1960s, many people
wanted to see if they could replicate his findings.
Stage Sequences. On the whole, the replication research using
Piaget’s own tasks has supported his stage sequence. That is, children do
seem to move through the substages, stages, and periods in the order in which
Piaget initially found. His stages have held up particularly well for the sen-
sorimotor period and for scientific and mathematical reasoning with respect
to the later stages (E. Evans, 1975; Harris, 1983; Lovell, 1968; Neimark, 1975).
The results have been somewhat less clear cut for Piaget’s stages of social
thought, such as animism (Looft & Bartz, 1969), moral judgment (Kohlberg,
1964), and egocentrism (Damon, 1983, pp. 120–121), but in general younger
children do differ from older children as Piaget found. This replication
research, it should be noted, has typically used Piaget’s own tasks. A bit later
we will mention some studies that have questioned Piaget’s conclusions by
modifying his tasks.
Stage Generality. Although Piaget’s sequences have received sup-
port, his position that stages are general modes of thought has fared less well.
That is, researchers have found rather low correlations among tasks that
should tap the same general stages of thinking (Flavell, 1977, p. 248; Gelman
& Baillargeon, 1983, pp. 169–172). For example, a child who demonstrates
conservation of liquid might not exhibit the grasp of class inclusion that would
seem to go along with it. Piaget himself recognized that children will master
different tasks at different rates—he called such unevenness décalage—but he
implied more consistency than has been found.
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These largely negative findings have prompted many psychologists
(e.g., Bandura, 1986, pp. 484–485) to recommend abandoning Piaget’s stages
altogether. Children, many say, do not go through general periods when their
thinking reflects broad mental structures. Instead, they simply learn numer-
ous task-specific skills. Children learn arithmetic skills, reading skills,
communication skills, and so on, and there are no general mental structures
underlying them. Even psychologists who are sympathetic to Piaget, such as
John Flavell, have at times questioned the existence of general stages (Flavell,
1985, p. 295).
An abandonment of Piaget’s stages, however, would be premature. Con-
sider the child from 5 to 7 years of age. Sheldon White (1965, 1970) and others
(e.g., Kegan, 1985; Sameroff & Haith, 1996) have accumulated a wealth of evi-
dence that suggests children undergo important psychological changes dur-
ing this period. The changes involved in this 5- to 7-year shift go far beyond
responses to Piagetian tasks. They include behavior in a variety of learning
contexts. Prior to this shift, children are generally impulsive, distractible, and
full of fantasy. Afterward, they are more logical, rational, and reasonable.
Throughout the world, cultures have chosen this time to begin entrusting chil-
dren with important responsibilities, including care for the younger ones
(Weisner, 1996).
In many ways, the 5- to 7-year shift marks a loss of creativity. Before
the age of 7 or 8, children’s drawings are full of life and harmony; afterward,
their drawings become more geometric and precise. Before the age of 7, chil-
dren engage in elaborate make-believe play. Many children even create imag-
inary companions. By the age of 7 or so, this world of make-believe has
declined. As in the song Puff the Magic Dragon, the imaginary friend must go
away because the little boy is growing up and no longer believes in magic. He
is becoming logical and realistic (Crain, 2003).
Thus there is strong evidence for a broad stagelike transition occurring
at this time. And, as White (1965, 1996) observes, Piaget’s theory is one that
can help explain it. Children approach life in a more logical, rational way
because they are developing concrete operational thought.
There is still the problem, to be sure, of inconsistency across Piaget’s
tasks. Some researchers believe that higher levels of generality are to be
found at certain points within general periods (Siegler & Alibali, 2005,
p. 59; Uzgiris, 1964). I think it is more promising to pursue White’s (1996)
thought that the ultimate validity of the stage theory is to be found in daily
life, outside the tabletop universe of tests and tasks. As scholars study
Piaget’s stages and consider revisions, they might look for the features of his
stages that throw the most light on the child’s spontaneous activities and
thinking in everyday life. What features of concrete operations are related
to the decline in make-believe play? What cognitive processes develop when
a child questions Santa Claus and magic? What cognitive capacities enable
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a boy to look competently after his baby sister, rationing her juice for the
day and anticipating her unique needs? Piaget’s stage theory has the poten-
tial to help us understand such broad dimensions of life. It would be fool-
ish to dismiss his stages.
Do People Reach the Highest Stages?
A rather surprising finding is that most adults do not regularly demonstrate the
highest stages of formal operations on Piaget’s standard tasks. Most middle-
class adults employ formal operations only some of the time (Kuhn et al., 1977;
Neimark, 1975), and in many small village and tribal communities, many adults
barely use any formal operations at all (Berk, 2009, p. 256; Dasen, 1972). These
findings do not necessarily contradict Piaget. There is no theoretical reason
why all people must reach Piaget’s highest stages; thinking only moves forward
when it is sufficiently challenged and stimulated. Nevertheless, the findings are
puzzling.
Piaget (1972) attempted to account for these findings. It is likely, he said,
that most people attain some degree of formal operational thinking, but pri-
marily in areas of special interest or ability. An automobile mechanic may not
think in a formal, theoretical manner about philosophy or physics but does use
formal operations when trouble-shooting a car. An eager young law student
might not employ formal operations when faced with a problem in chemistry
but does so when discussing constitutional issues.
Similarly, Tulkin and Konner (1973) suggest that adults in small tribal
societies might fail to demonstrate formal operations on Piagetian tasks of
mathematical and scientific reasoning, but they employ them when working
on problems of vital importance to them. For example, when the indigenous
people of the Kalahari discuss animal tracking, they advance and weigh
hypotheses in ways “that tax the best inferential and analytic capacities of the
human mind” (p. 35).
Piaget conceded, then, that at the highest stages people will not demon-
strate a great deal of consistency across intellectual tasks—certainly not the same
degree of consistency that we expect at the earlier stages. Instead, people employ
the highest stages of thinking primarily in their areas of strongest interest.
Do Children Really Learn on Their Own?
Perhaps Piaget’s most controversial claim is that cognitive development is a
spontaneous process. Children, he said, develop cognitive structures on their
own, without direct teaching from adults. The most incontestable evidence
for spontaneous learning comes from Piaget’s observations on infants, who
make enormous intellectual progress simply by exploring the environment,
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before anyone takes the trouble to educate them. Once we begin teaching, in
fact, we often seem to stifle the child’s natural curiosity. In school, children
become disinterested, lazy, rebellious, and frightened of failure. The major
task of education, it would seem, would be to liberate the bold curiosity with
which children enter life.
When Piaget said children learn on their own, he did not mean they
learn in a vacuum. Other children can stimulate and challenge the child’s
thinking, and it would seem that adults can do the same. As we have seen,
Kamii asks children stimulating questions that start them thinking. But
Piaget did not believe it is productive to try to teach children right answers
or procedures. Instead, real learning comes from experiences that arouse
children’s curiosity and give them opportunities to work out their solutions
on their own.
But many psychologists, particularly American psychologists in the
learning-theory tradition, believe adult teaching is more important than Piaget
thought. To demonstrate this, they have devised a number of “training studies,”
most of which have tried to teach conservation to 4- and 5-year-olds.
A major finding is that conservation is surprisingly difficult to teach
(E. Evans, 1975; Halford & Andrews, 2006, p. 579; Liebert, Poulos, & Marmor,
1977, pp. 176–179). It is difficult, for example, to teach conservation by simply
explaining and reinforcing the right answers. And if one does succeed on one
task, the ability does not always generalize to new tasks. Further, the teach-
ing does not always cut very deep. People have told me how they had appar-
ently taught a child to conserve liquids; however, when they then offered the
child a choice between liquids he or she liked to drink (e.g., a soft drink), the
child insisted on taking the larger glass.
Nevertheless, conservation can be taught. In the first quite successful
experiment, Rochel Gelman (1969) taught children to conserve number and
length by reinforcing them for attending to the most relevant stimuli—for
example, the number of objects in a row rather than the row’s length. The
training worked, and, furthermore, 60% of the children showed an immedi-
ate new ability to conserve substance and liquid. Gelman’s training was labo-
rious (it lasted two days and consisted of 192 trials), but others have
successfully used similar methods in briefer training (Brainerd, 2003).
Still, we may wonder how accurately the training methods reflect the
ways in which children master conservation in their ordinary lives. We also
may wonder about the effects of the training methods on children’s feelings.
When children solve problems on their own, they gain confidence in their
abilities to make discoveries. When they undergo the training programs, in
which they are consistently told whether they are correct or what to think,
they can easily learn to mistrust their own powers of thought.
Piaget (1970) added some additional thoughts that are relevant here. We
frequently assume that spontaneous development is undesirable because it is
slow; direct teaching seems good because it can speed things up. But Piaget
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pointed out that when Howard Gruber examined the development of object
permanence in kittens, Gruber found that they progressed through the
sequences at a much faster rate than human infants do. Yet kittens, Piaget noted,
“do not progress any further and one may wonder whether the slower rate of
progress does not . . . make for greater progress ultimately” (1970, p. 111). Piaget
also observed that it took Darwin a remarkably long time to formulate his basic
ideas (in addition to the years he withheld it from publication because it was so
controversial), and Piaget speculated that slowness may sometimes be one of
the conditions of fruitful invention.
Did Piaget Underestimate
the Child’s Abilities?
In recent years, dozens of researchers (some of whom have conducted training
studies) have tried to show that Piaget underestimated children’s capacities—
that children are a lot smarter than he gave them credit for.
Sensorimotor Period Capacities. Some researchers have examined
deferred imitation, the imitation of events several hours or days after observing
them. I mentioned one of Piaget’s observations earlier. One day his daughter
Jacqueline watched in amazement when a little boy threw a temper tantrum
in his playpen. The boy screamed, pushed his playpen backward, and stomped
his foot several times. The next day, when Jacqueline was in her playpen, she
imitated the little boy precisely, even lightly stomping her foot. Deferred imi-
tation begins in Piaget’s sixth stage of sensorimotor development, at about
18 months of age. Piaget said it illustrates the new capacity for symbolic rep-
resentation; the child must have some way of representing the events inter-
nally and carrying the representation over time.
Questioning Piaget’s observations, Andrew Meltzoff (1988) found that
babies as young as 9 months imitate events after a 24-hour delay. In Meltzoff’s
experiments, babies saw an adult do things such as shake a small plastic egg
to make a rattle sound. Then, 24 hours later, when the babies were presented
with the egg, about half the babies imitated the adult’s actions.
Meltzoff’s study is widely cited as convincing evidence that infants have
the capacity for representation at a younger age than Piaget believed. But the
infants in Meltzoff’s study reproduced very simple actions that were proba-
bly familiar to them. The egg, for example, was really another rattle—to be
shaken. The infants didn’t seem to need to hold many images of new behav-
ior in their minds. Jacqueline, in contrast, behaved like an actor who memo-
rized a detailed action scene. Some of the actions, especially stomping a foot
several times, were probably entirely new to her. She carried an internal image
of the scene in her mind from one day to the next, and she referred to this
image to guide her performance.
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More recently, researchers have begun to examine the deferred imita-
tion of more complex events (more like those Jacqueline imitated). The find-
ings suggest that although infants as young as 6 months have some capacity
for deferred imitation, they must initially see an action performed many times,
and even then they don’t reproduce it very fully. Deferred imitation becomes
increasingly robust between about 13 and 24 months of age—about the time
Piaget saw it emerging (Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Bauer, 2006).
Other investigators have tried to show that infants have object perma-
nence at younger ages than Piaget observed. Piaget, you will recall, found that
babies don’t search for completely hidden objects until stage 4 of the sensori-
motor period, when they are 8 or 9 months old. If we cover a toy with a blan-
ket, the baby won’t continue to search for it. But Renée Baillargeon (1987)
speculated that the problem might be that the baby is required to physically
reach for hidden objects. If only looking were involved, the baby might
demonstrate object permanence earlier.
In Baillargeon’s best-known study (1987), babies saw a screen move
toward a block. When the screen got near the block, the screen impeded the
babies’ view of the block. The block was now hidden from their view. The
experiment was arranged so that two groups of babies now saw different
things. One group saw the screen appear to stop when it made contact with
the block. But a second group of babies saw the screen appear to go right
through the block—as if the block no longer existed! Baillargeon found that
babies as young as and months of age looked longer, as if surprised,
at the sight of the screen going through the hidden block. This longer “look-
ing time,” Baillargeon says, suggests that infants know that hidden objects
continue to exist at much earlier ages than Piaget indicated.
Reviewing this and similar experiments, several notable psychologists
(e.g., Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002; Mandler, 1998) conclude that Piaget under-
estimated infants’ knowledge about objects because his tests relied too heav-
ily on their immature motor systems. When infants need only look at
objects—not physically interact with them—they demonstrate knowledge
much earlier than Piaget thought possible.
But these critiques of Piaget tend to overlook the essence of his theory.
The criticisms often assume that an infant’s “motor system” is some trivial
matter and distracts us from what really counts—the infant’s knowledge. The
criticisms overlook Piaget’s powerful insight that motor action is the foun-
dation of logic and scientific thinking.
Consider the baby’s ability to find a completely hidden object. At the
time babies can do this, Piaget showed, they are constantly hiding and find-
ing objects in their everyday life. On one occasion, Piaget’s daughter Lucienne
hid her feet under a blanket, pulled the blanket off, put it on again, and so
on. A few days later, she endlessly repeated hiding a rattle under a rug and
retrieving it (Piaget, 1936b, p. 172). Piaget said these physical actions contain
the elements of the logical operation of reversal that the child will later carry
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Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
out on a more mental plane (as in the thought, “I lost five cards so I have to
get five new cards to get back to what I had”). For Piaget, all math and logic,
even at its most advanced levels, involves action—adding, subtracting, com-
bining, canceling, deducing, and so forth. At an advanced level, the indi-
vidual carries out these actions more quickly and briefly in her mind, but
they are actions nonetheless, and their precursors are found in sensorimotor
activity.
Although Piaget didn’t prove that logic and advanced reasoning grow
out of action, he has a particularly strong case with respect to the “active
experimenting” of stage 5. At this stage children begin to vary actions to see
the different outcomes. For instance, they drop objects from different heights
to see the different effects. Many years later, individuals carry out such exper-
iments on a purely mental plane, as when a medical scientist thinks to her-
self, “I wonder what would happen if I doubled or tripled the dose.” It seems
very likely that the scientist’s experimental approach had its beginnings in her
active physical experiments in infancy.
The experiments by Baillargeon and others are widely accepted as
demonstrating that infants are “more competent” than Piaget said, provid-
ing us with a “more positive” view of them (Flavell et al., 2002, pp. 75, 330).
Although most psychologists don’t intend their comments to be value judg-
ments, it’s easy to conclude that Piaget gave us a negative view of infants. But
what could be more inspiring than the sight of infants spontaneously engaged
in the intense explorations Piaget described? The baby engrossed in hiding
and retrieving objects, or trying out different actions to see the results, is quite
an investigator! Piaget suggested, moreover, that these sensorimotor inves-
tigations lead to advanced thought. If these investigations take some time,
why should we consider this to be negative? As Piaget said, the develop-
ment of logical and scientific thinking is a monumental enterprise.
The new experiments, to be sure, do indicate that infants have some
knowledge at younger ages than Piaget observed. These experiments, in which
babies merely sit and look at events, qualify Piaget to some extent. Perhaps
there is an innate component to babies’ early perceptual knowledge. But the
experimenters have only offered speculations on how any such knowledge
is related to advanced thought. They have hardly replaced Piaget’s richly doc-
umented account of the long journey from sensorimotor action to advanced
logical operations.
Preoperational Capacities. Many psychologists have tried to show
that Piaget also underestimated the intellectual capacities of the preopera-
tional child. They have looked for ways of altering or simplifying Piaget’s
tasks with respect to conservation, egocentrism, classification, and other top-
ics to show that 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds can actually think like older children
and adults. Such findings, they say, correct Piaget’s picture of the young child
as cognitively inept.
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In an early study, Borke (1975) suggests that young children are not as
egocentric as Piaget implied. Her research indicates that although 3- and
4-year-olds have difficulty on Piaget’s mountain task, they can perform less
egocentrically on simpler versions of the task. Other researchers have pro-
duced similar findings. It seems, for example, that even many 2-year-olds
know that the side of a cube they see is different from the side a person facing
them sees. (See Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983, and Siegler & Alibali, 2005,
pp. 60–61, for summaries of this research.)
In recent years, a popular topic is the child’s “theory of mind”—the
child’s theory of how people think—and many of the findings are relevant to
egocentrism. For example, a child is shown a box with pictures of candy on
it, guesses that candy is inside, but sees that the box actually contains crayons.
Then the child is asked to guess what another person, who hasn’t looked
inside the box, will believe. Three-year-olds often guess the other person will
think the box contains crayons. The 3-year-olds egocentrically assume others
will know what they now know. On such tasks, children generally overcome
this egocentrism by 4 or 5 years of age, which is sooner than Piaget indicated
(Flavell et al., 2002).
Investigators have also tried to demonstrate that young children can
think rationally on mathematical and scientific tasks. Gelman (1972), for ex-
ample, suggests that young children have some capacity to conserve number.
Piaget, you will recall, showed that when we shorten or lengthen a row of
objects, preoperational children believe the number is changed. They seem
more influenced by the perceptual configuration—the way the row looks—
than by logic or number. In Piaget’s studies, however, the rows often con-
tained as many as eight objects. Gelman, in contrast, presented 3- to 5-year-olds
with smaller sets of objects—two, three, or four objects—and found that chil-
dren ignored changes in length and continued to base their judgments on
number alone. They displayed conservation with these small sets.
Gelman’s findings, we might note, do not necessarily contradict Piaget.
It may be that changing such small rows produces very little perceptual
change, so we do not know if young children can ignore perceptual changes
in favor of logic or number. More broadly, Graeme Halford and Glenda
Andrews (2006) have questioned the extent to which several studies actu-
ally refute Piaget with respect to young children’s scientific and mathematical
reasoning. Rebuttals of Piaget seem stronger with respect to egocentrism.
Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among major psychologists that
Piaget gave an overly pessimistic and negative picture of children’s thinking
on scientific and mathematical tasks as well (see, for example, Berk, 2009,
p. 243–246; Flavell et al., 2002, p. 174; Miller, 2011, pp. 82–84; Siegler &
Alibali, 2005, p. 57).
In the following paragraphs I will reply to this criticism from a strongly
developmental perspective, as I imagine Rousseau might have done.
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First of all, we may note that Piaget’s critics seem to equate a positive and
optimistic view of childhood with early and rapid development. We might
ask, as Rousseau did, why it is pessimistic to observe that the development of
logical structures takes time. Piaget himself made this point with respect to
sensorimotor development, and it applies here as well.
Furthermore, Piaget’s critics judge young children’s thinking to be com-
petent insofar as it is as rational and logical as ours. But this may be an
inappropriate yardstick because young children’s thinking may be qualitatively
different from ours. The young child’s orientation, compared to that of the
older child and adult, seems more akin to that of an artist. In fact, two key
features of the preoperational period contribute to an artistic orientation. First,
on many tasks the preoperational child bases her judgments on her percep-
tions. Artists, too, place a premium on perception, as when they help us see
the beauty of a landscape or a bird in flight. Second, the preoperational child’s
animistic or physiognomic attitude is one that artists utililze. It helps them
capture the dynamic, emotional, expressive qualities of the world (such as the
sadness of the sky or the gentleness of a breeze).
Young children reveal their artistic orientation in many ways. They
love activities such as drawing, singing, and composing poems, and they
develop arresting works. For example, by the age of 6 or 7 years they con-
sistently produce drawings that are fresh, lively, and beautifully organized.
Many great artists have said they try to recapture the young child’s artistic
orientation. After this age their work becomes more geometric, wooden, and
lifeless. It seems that logical intelligence is taking over (Gardner, 1973, p. 21;
1980). Moreover, the young child’s rich fantasy life and theatrical playfulness
also correspond to a mental organization that is more akin to the arts than
to logic.
In response to Piaget’s critics, then, I would say that each stage has its
own distinctive quality, its own perfection. In early childhood, this perfection
is more artistic than logical. We don’t provide a positive view of the child by
showing that she isn’t quite so illogical after all, but by considering how pre-
operational thinking contributes to the child’s true strength, which is in the
artistic realm.
Unfortunately, Piaget worked himself into a corner where he couldn’t
make this response. Although he began his career with the goal of under-
standing the distinctive qualities of each stage, he was never open to the spe-
cial strength of the preoperational stage. He kept comparing it to the superior
logic of older children, and it never measured up. In his writings, the pre-
operational child “fails to grasp” basic notions, “continues to make the same
mistake,” and so on (Piaget & Szeminska, 1941, pp. 13, 142). If Piaget had
considered preoperational thought on its own terms, he might have seen its
affinity to that of the artist.
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Conclusion
We see, then, that there are many criticisms of Piaget’s theory. Other major the-
orists—Bandura, Vygotsky, and Chomsky—have had debates with Piaget. For
the present, it is worth noting that nearly everyone pits his or her ideas against
Piaget’s. This in itself is a testament to the stature of Piaget’s theory. And it is
a good bet that when all the dust clears, Piaget’s theory will still stand. For
whatever its weaknesses, it captures essential aspects of development.
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Kohlberg’s Stages
of Moral Development
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
An outstanding example of research in the Piagetian tradition is the
work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987). Kohlberg focused on moral
development and provided a stage theory of moral thinking that goes
well beyond Piaget’s initial formulations.
Kohlberg1 grew up in Bronxville, New York, and attended
Andover Academy in Massachusetts, an academically demanding pri-
vate high school. He did not go straight to college but instead went to
help the Israeli cause, serving as the second engineer on an old freighter
carrying European refugees through British blockades to Israel. After
this, in 1948, Kohlberg enrolled at the University of Chicago, where he
scored so high on admission tests that he only had to take a limited
number of courses to earn his bachelor ’s degree. This he did in one
year. He stayed on at Chicago for graduate work in psychology, at first
thinking he would become a clinical psychologist. But he soon became
interested in Piaget and began interviewing children and adolescents
on moral issues. The result was his doctoral dissertation (1958a), the
first rendition of his new stage theory. Kohlberg taught at the Univer-
sity of Chicago from 1962 to 1968 and at Harvard University from 1968
until his death in 1987.
Kohlberg was an informal, unassuming man. When he taught, he
frequently came to class dressed in a flannel shirt and baggy pants—
as if he had thought it was his day off. He usually began asking ques-
tions in an off-the-cuff manner. In the first days of the school year,
students didn’t always know what to make of him. But they soon saw
that they were in the presence of a true scholar, a man who had
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
1I would like to thank David F. Ricks for his help with this introductory section.
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
thought long and deeply about critical issues in philosophy and psychology,
and Kohlberg was inviting them to ponder these issues with him. In his lec-
tures and writings, he did much to help others appreciate the wisdom of the
“old psychologists,” writers such as Rousseau, John Dewey, and James Mark
Baldwin.
Unfortunately, Kohlberg suffered from a tropical disease and bouts of
depression that caused him intense pain during the last 20 years of his life.
At the age of 59, he ended his life by drowning.
PIAGET’S STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT
While he was in graduate school, Kohlberg became deeply impressed by
Piaget’s studies of moral judgment. Piaget, Kohlberg saw, was talking to chil-
dren about fundamental matters in moral philosophy and was drawing out
their real thinking. At the same time, Piaget’s work seemed incomplete.
Essentially, Piaget’s findings on moral judgment fit into a two-stage
theory. Children younger than 10 or 11 years think about moral dilemmas one
way; older children consider them differently. As we have seen, younger chil-
dren regard rules as fixed and absolute. They believe rules are handed down
by adults or by God and cannot be changed. The older child’s view is more
relativistic. She understands it is permissible to change rules if everyone
agrees. Rules are not sacred and absolute but are devices that humans use to
get along cooperatively.
At approximately the same time—age 10 or so—children’s moral think-
ing undergoes other shifts. Younger children base their moral judgments more
on consequences, whereas older children base their judgments on intentions.
When, for example, the young child hears about one boy who made a large
ink spot trying to help his dad and another boy who made only a small ink
spot when playing around, the young child thinks the first boy did worse.
The child primarily considers the amount of damage—the consequences—
whereas the older child is more likely to judge wrongness in terms of the
motives underlying the act (Piaget, 1932, p. 130).
There are many more details to Piaget’s work on moral judgment, but he
essentially found a series of changes that occur between the ages of 10 and 12,
just when the child begins to enter the general stage of formal operations.
Intellectual development, however, does not stop at this point. This is just the
beginning of formal operations, which continue to develop at least until age
16. Accordingly, one might expect thinking about moral issues to continue to
develop throughout adolescence. Kohlberg therefore interviewed both chil-
dren and adolescents about moral dilemmas, and he did find stages that go
well beyond Piaget’s. He uncovered six stages, only the first three of which
share many features with Piaget’s stages.
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
KOHLBERG’S METHOD
Kohlberg’s (1958a) core sample was comprised of 72 boys from both middle-
and lower-class families in Chicago. They were ages 10, 13, and 16. He later
added to his sample younger children, delinquents, and boys and girls from
other U.S. cities and from other countries (Kohlberg, 1963, 1970).
The basic interview consists of a series of dilemmas such as the following:
Heinz Steals the Drug
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There
was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of
radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The
drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times
what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and
charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband,
Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could
only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the
druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let
him pay later. But the druggist said: “No, I discovered the drug and I’m
going to make money from it.” So Heinz got desperate and broke into
the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have
done that? (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19)
Kohlberg was not really interested in whether the subject said “yes” or “no” to
this dilemma but in the reasoning behind the answer. The interviewer wants to
know why the subject thinks Heinz should or should not have stolen the drug.
The interview schedule then asks new questions that help us understand the
child’s reasoning. For example, children are asked if Heinz had a right to steal
the drug, if he was violating the druggist’s rights, and what sentence the judge
should give him once he was caught. Once again, the main concern is with the
reasoning behind the answers. The interview then goes on to give more dilem-
mas in order to get a good sampling of a subject’s moral thinking.
Once Kohlberg had classified the various responses into stages, he
wanted to know whether his classification was reliable. In particular, he wanted
to know if others would score the protocols in the same way. Other judges
independently scored a sample of responses, and he calculated the degree to
which all raters agreed. This procedure is called interrater reliability. Kohlberg
found these agreements to be high, as he did in his subsequent work, but
whenever investigators use Kohlberg’s interview, they should also check for
interrater reliability before scoring the entire sample.2
2For a discussion of other forms of reliability, see Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, and Lieberman,
1983.
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
KOHLBERG’S SIX STAGES
Level I. Preconventional Morality
Stage 1. Obedience and Punishment Orientation. Kohlberg’s stage
1 is similar to Piaget’s first stage of moral thought. The child assumes that
powerful authorities hand down a fixed set of rules that she must unques-
tioningly obey. To the Heinz dilemma, the child typically says that Heinz was
wrong to steal the drug because “it’s against the law” or “it’s bad to steal,” as
if this were all there were to it. When asked to elaborate, the child usually
responds in terms of the consequences involved, explaining that stealing is bad
“because you’ll get punished” (Kohlberg, 1958b).
Although the vast majority of children at stage 1 oppose Heinz’s theft,
it is still possible for a child to support the action and still employ stage 1 rea-
soning. A child might say, “Heinz can steal it because he asked first and it’s
not like he stole something big; he won’t get punished” (see Rest, 1973). Even
though the child agrees with Heinz’s action, the reasoning is still stage 1; the
concern is with what authorities permit and punish.
Kohlberg calls stage 1 thinking preconventional because children do not
yet speak as members of society. Instead, they see morality as something exter-
nal to themselves—something the big people say they must do (Colby,
Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1987a, p. 16).
Stage 2. Individualism and Exchange. At this stage children rec-
ognize there is not just one right view handed down by the authorities. Dif-
ferent individuals have different viewpoints. “Heinz,” they might point
out, “might think it’s right to take the drug, the druggist would not.” Since
everything is relative, each person is free to pursue his or her individual inter-
ests. One boy said that Heinz might steal the drug if he wanted his wife to
live, but that he doesn’t have to if he wants to marry someone younger and
better looking (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 24). Another boy said Heinz might steal
it because
maybe they had children and he might need someone at home to look
after them. But maybe he shouldn’t steal it because they might put him
in prison for more years than he could stand. (Colby, Kohlberg, &
Kauffman, 1987b, p. 208)
What is right for Heinz, then, is what meets his own self-interests.
You might have noticed that children at both stages 1 and 2 talk about
punishment. However, they perceive it differently. At stage 1, punishment is
tied up in the child’s mind with wrongness; punishment “proves” that dis-
obedience is wrong. At stage 2, in contrast, punishment is simply a risk that
one naturally wants to avoid.
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Although stage 2 respondents sometimes sound amoral, they do have
some sense of right action. There is a notion of fair exchange or fair deals. The
philosophy is one of returning favors— “If you scratch my back, I’ll scratch
yours.” To the Heinz story, subjects often say Heinz was right to steal the drug
because the druggist was unwilling to make a fair deal; he was “trying to rip
Heinz off.” Or they might say he should steal for his wife “because she might
return the favor some day” (Colby et al., 1987c, pp. 16–17).
Respondents at stage 2 are still said to reason at the preconventional
level because they speak as isolated individuals rather than as members of
society. They see individuals exchanging favors, but there is still no identifi-
cation with the values of the family or community.
Level II. Conventional Morality
Stage 3. Good Interpersonal Relationships. At this stage children—
who are by now usually entering their teens—see morality as more than
simple deals. They believe people should live up to the expectations of the
family and community and behave in “good” ways. Good behavior means
having good motives and interpersonal feelings such as love, empathy, trust,
and concern for others. Heinz, they typically argue, was right to steal the drug
because “he was a good man for wanting to save her” and “his intentions were
good, that of saving the life of someone he loves.” Even if Heinz doesn’t love
his wife, these subjects often say, he should steal the drug because “I don’t
think any husband should sit back and watch his wife die” (Kohlberg, 1958b;
Colby et al., 1987c, pp. 27–29).
If Heinz’s motives were good, the druggist’s were bad. The druggist,
stage 3 subjects emphasize, was “selfish,” “greedy,” and “only interested in
himself, not another life.” Sometimes the respondents become so angry
with the druggist that they say he ought to be put in jail (Colby et al., 1987c,
pp. 20–33). A typical stage 3 response is that of Don, age 13:
It was really the druggist’s fault, he was unfair, trying to overcharge and
letting someone die. Heinz loved his wife and wanted to save her. I think
anyone would. I don’t think they would put him in jail. The judge would
look at all sides, and see that the druggist was charging too much.
(Kohlberg, 1963, p. 25)
We see that Don defines the issue in terms of the actors’ character traits and
motives. He talks about the loving husband, the unfair druggist, and the
understanding judge. His answer deserves the label “conventional morality”
because it assumes that the attitude expressed would be shared by the entire
community—“anyone” would be right to do what Heinz did (p. 25).
As mentioned earlier, there are similarities between Kohlberg’s first
three stages and Piaget’s two stages. In both sequences there is a shift from
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
unquestioning obedience to a relativistic outlook and to a concern for good
motives. For Kohlberg, however, these shifts occur in three stages rather
than two.
Stage 4. Maintaining the Social Order. Stage 3 reasoning works best
in two-person relationships with family members or close friends, where one
can make a real effort to get to know the other ’s feelings and needs and try
to help. At stage 4, in contrast, the respondent becomes more broadly con-
cerned with society as a whole. Now the emphasis is on obeying laws, respect-
ing authority, and performing one’s duties so the social order is maintained.
In response to the Heinz story, many subjects say they understand that
Heinz’s motives were good, but they cannot condone the theft. What would
happen if we all started breaking the laws whenever we felt we had a good
reason? The result would be chaos; society couldn’t function. As one subject
explained,
I don’t want to sound like Spiro Agnew, law and order and wave the
flag, but if everybody did as he wanted to do, set up his own beliefs as
to right and wrong, then I think you would have chaos. The only thing
I think we have in civilization nowadays is some sort of legal structure
which people are sort of bound to follow. [Society needs] a centralizing
framework. (Colby et al., 1987c, p. 89)
Because stage 4 subjects make moral decisions from the perspective of soci-
ety as a whole, they think from a full-fledged member-of-society perspective
(Colby et al., 1987a, p. 17).
You will recall that stage 1 children also generally oppose stealing
because it breaks the law. Superficially, stage 1 and stage 4 subjects are giving
the same response, so we see here why Kohlberg insisted that we must probe
into the reasoning behind the overt response. Stage 1 children say, “It’s wrong
to steal” and “It’s against the law,” but they cannot elaborate any further,
except to say that stealing can get a person jailed. Stage 4 respondents, in con-
trast, have a conception of the function of laws for society as a whole—a
conception that far exceeds the grasp of the younger child.
Level III. Postconventional Morality
Stage 5. Social Contract and Individual Rights. At stage 4, people
want to keep society functioning. However, a smoothly functioning society is
not necessarily a good one. A totalitarian society might be well organized, but
it is hardly the moral ideal. At stage 5, people begin to ask, “What makes for
a good society?” They begin to think about society in a very theoretical way,
stepping back from their own society and considering the rights and values
a society ought to uphold. They then evaluate existing societies in terms of
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
these prior considerations. They are said to take a “prior-to-society” perspec-
tive (Colby et al., 1987a, p. 20).
Stage 5 respondents basically believe that a good society is best con-
ceived as a social contract into which people freely enter to work toward the
benefit of all. They recognize that different social groups within a society will
have different values, but they believe all rational people would agree on two
points. First, they would all want certain basic rights, such as liberty and life,
to be protected. Second, they would want some democratic procedures for
changing unfair laws and for improving society.
In response to the Heinz dilemma, stage 5 respondents make it clear that
they do not generally favor breaking laws; laws are social contracts that we
agree to uphold until we can change them by democratic means. Neverthe-
less, the wife’s right to live is a moral right that must be protected. Thus
stage 5 respondents sometimes defend Heinz’s theft in strong language:
It is the husband’s duty to save his wife. The fact that her life is in dan-
ger transcends every other standard you might use to judge his action.
Life is more important than property. (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 38)
This young man went on to say that “from a moral standpoint,” Heinz should
save the life of even a stranger, since, to be consistent, the value of a life means
any life. When asked if the judge should punish Heinz, he replied,
Usually the moral and legal standpoints coincide. Here they conflict.
The judge should weight the moral standpoint more heavily but pre-
serve the legal law in punishing Heinz lightly. (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 38)
Stage 5 subjects, then, talk about “morality” and “rights” that take some
priority over particular laws. Kohlberg insisted, however, that we do not judge
people to be at stage 5 merely from their verbal labels. We need to look at their
social perspective and mode of reasoning. At stage 4, too, subjects frequently
talk about the “right to life,” but for them this right is legitimized by the
authority of their social or religious group (e.g., by the Bible). Presumably, if
their group valued property over life, they would too. At stage 5, in contrast,
people are making more of an independent effort to think out what any soci-
ety ought to value. They often reason, for example, that property has little
meaning without life. They are trying to determine logically what a society
ought to be like (Colby et al., 1987c, pp. 53–55; Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 21–22).
Stage 6. Universal Principles. Stage 5 respondents are working
toward a conception of the good society. They suggest that we need to (1) pro-
tect certain individual rights and (2) settle disputes through democratic
processes. However, democratic processes alone do not always result in out-
comes that we intuitively sense are just. A majority, for example, may vote for
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
a law that hinders a minority. Thus Kohlberg believed there must be a higher
stage—stage 6—that defines the principles by which we achieve justice.
Kohlberg’s conception of justice followed that of the philosophers
Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, as well as great moral leaders such as
Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. According to these people,
the principles of justice require us to treat the claims of all parties in an impar-
tial manner, respecting the basic dignity of all people as individuals. The
principles of justice are therefore universal; they apply to all. We would not
vote for a law that aids some people but hurts others. The principles of jus-
tice require an equal respect for every person.
In actual practice, Kohlberg said, we can reach just decisions by looking
at a situation through one another’s eyes. In the Heinz dilemma, this would
mean that all parties—the druggist, Heinz, and his wife—take the roles of the
others. To do this in an impartial manner, people can assume a “veil of igno-
rance” (Rawls, 1971), acting as if they do not know which role they would
eventually occupy. If the druggist did this, even he would recognize that life
must take priority over property; for he wouldn’t want to risk finding himself
in the wife’s shoes with property valued over life. Thus they would all agree
the wife must be saved—this would be the fair solution. Such a solution, we
must note, requires not only impartiality but also the principle that everyone
is given full and equal respect. If the wife were considered of less value than
the others, a just solution could not be reached.
Until 1975 Kohlberg had been scoring some of his subjects at stage 6, but
he then stopped doing so. One reason was that he and other researchers had
found very few subjects who consistently reasoned at this stage. Also, Kohlberg
concluded that his interview dilemmas did not draw out differences between
stage 5 and stage 6 thinking. Theoretically, stage 6 has a clearer and broader con-
ception of universal principles (including justice as well as individual rights),
but the interview did not draw out this broader understanding. So he dropped
stage 6 from his manual, calling it a “theoretical stage” and scoring all post-
conventional responses at stage 5 (Colby et al., 1987a, pp. 35–40).
One issue that would distinguish stage 5 from stage 6 is civil disobe-
dience. Stage 5 thinkers would be hesitant to endorse civil disobedience
because of their commitment to the social contract and to changing laws
through democratic agreements. Only when an individual right is clearly
at stake does violating the law seem justified. At stage 6, in contrast, a com-
mitment to justice makes the rationale for civil disobedience stronger and
broader. Martin Luther King argued that laws are valid only insofar as they
are grounded in justice, and that a commitment to justice carries with it an
obligation to disobey unjust laws. King also recognized, of course, the gen-
eral need for laws and democratic processes (stages 4 and 5), and he was
therefore willing to accept the penalties for his actions. Nevertheless, he
believed that the higher principle of justice required civil disobedience
(Kohlberg, 1981, p. 43).
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Summary
At stage 1 children think of what is right as what authority says is right. Doing
the right thing is obeying authority and avoiding punishment. At stage 2 chil-
dren are no longer so impressed by any single authority; they see that there
are different sides to any issue. Since everything is relative, one is free to pur-
sue one’s own interests, although it is often useful to make deals and exchange
favors with others.
At stages 3 and 4 young people think as members of the conventional
society, with its values, norms, and expectations. At stage 3 they emphasize
being a good person, which basically means having helpful motives toward
people who are close to one. At stage 4 the concern shifts toward obeying laws
to maintain society as a whole.
At stages 5 and 6 people are less concerned with maintaining society for
its own sake, and more concerned with the principles and values that make
for a good society. At stage 5 they emphasize basic rights and the democratic
processes that give everyone a say, and at stage 6 they define the principles by
which agreements will be most just.
A Possible Seventh Stage
Those who have developed conception of justice often work to bring it about,
but they also encounter serious setbacks. They go through periods of doubt
and despair. Martin Luther King and activists in the civil rights movement of
the 1950s and 1960s experienced such periods. Any of us can go through them
as well. We might ask ourselves, Why should I act morally when no one else
seems to? Why act generously when the world is governed by self-interest?
Why should I bother to live when those whom I love the most are dying and
suffering and I can do nothing about it?
One answer to these kinds of questions has come from secular existen-
tialists such as Albert Camus (1948, 1955). Camus believed that even though
our efforts may be futile, we gain dignity by sticking with them. Although
the world offers nothing meaningful, we create meaning by working for what
we believe is right.
Kohlberg described an alternative. He observed that answers to despair
can come from a spiritual attitude he called stage 7.
Stage 7 isn’t a stage of moral reasoning, but rather a stage of spiritual
development growing out of personal experiences and reflection. It needn’t be
tied to organized religion. It doesn’t replace stage 6 efforts to rationally con-
sider what is fair or right, but it gives some people emotional support for
working for what is right. Essentially, it is a sense of being part of something
much larger than oneself—a sense of oneness with life, God, or Nature. Feel-
ing a part of a transcendent whole, one no longer feels futile or hopeless. One
even feels courage in the face of death (Kohlberg & Power, 1981).
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Martin Luther King expressed his personal view this way: “I am con-
vinced that the universe is under the control of a loving purpose, and that
in the struggle for righteousness man has cosmic companionship” (1963,
p. 153). No matter what King faced, this “cosmic companionship” kept him
going.
Kohlberg based his ideas about stage 7 on the lives of moral leaders
as well as James Fowler ’s research on the development of faith in children
and adults. On the basis of very limited data, Kohlberg speculated that
stage 7 follows stage 6 of moral reasoning. It comes after stage 6 as an
answer to the question of why one should act morally when it feels point-
less to do so. If it emerges this late, stage 7 is extremely rare (Kohlberg &
Power, 1981). One of Kohlberg’s former coworkers, John Gibbs (2003), sug-
gests that stage 7 thinking often occurs earlier and is even fairly common
in adolescence. In any event, I want to emphasize that Kohlberg didn’t con-
sider stage 7 part of his moral stage sequence. Rather, he thought of it as a
type of consciousness through which some individuals gain moral strength
(Kohlberg & Power, 1981).
THEORETICAL ISSUES
How Development Occurs
Kohlberg, it is important to remember, was a close follower of Piaget. Accord-
ingly, Kohlberg’s theoretical positions, including that on developmental
change, reflected those of his mentor.
Kohlberg (e.g., 1968; 1981, chap. 3) said his stages are not the product of
maturation—that is, the stage structures and sequences do not simply unfold
according to a genetic blueprint.
Neither, Kohlberg maintained, are his stages the product of socializa-
tion. That is, socializing agents (e.g., parents and teachers) do not directly
teach new forms of thinking. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine them system-
atically teaching each new stage structure in its particular place in the
sequence.
The stages emerge, instead, from our own thinking about moral prob-
lems. Social experiences do promote development, but they do so by stimu-
lating our mental processes. As we get into discussions and debates with
others, we find our views questioned and challenged and are therefore moti-
vated to come up with new, more comprehensive positions. The stages reflect
these broader viewpoints (Kohlberg et al., 1975).
We might imagine, for example, a young man and woman discussing a
new law. The man says that everyone should obey it, like it or not, because
laws are vital to social organization (stage 4). The woman notes, however, that
some well-organized societies, such as Nazi Germany, were not particularly
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
moral. The man therefore sees that some evidence contradicts his view. He
experiences some cognitive conflict and is motivated to think about the mat-
ter more fully, perhaps moving a bit toward stage 5.
Kohlberg also sometimes spoke of change occurring through role-taking
opportunities, opportunities to consider others’ viewpoints (e.g., Kohlberg,
1976). As children interact with others, they learn how viewpoints differ and
how to coordinate them in cooperative activities. As they discuss their prob-
lems and work out their differences, they develop their conceptions of what
is fair and just.
Whatever the interactions are specifically like, they work best, Kohlberg
said, when they are open and democratic. The less children feel pressured
simply to conform to authority, the freer they are to settle their own differ-
ences and formulate their own ideas.
The Stage Concept
Piaget, you will recall, proposed that true mental stages meet several criteria.
They (1) are qualitatively different ways of thinking, (2) are structured wholes,
(3) progress in an invariant sequence, (4) can be characterized as hierarchic
integrations, and (5) are cross-cultural universals. Kohlberg took these crite-
ria very seriously, trying to show how his stages meet them all. Let’s consider
these points one at a time.
1. Qualitative Differences. It seems fairly clear that Kohlberg’s stages
are qualitatively different from one another. For example, stage 1 responses,
which focus on obedience to authority, sound very different from stage 2
responses, which argue that each person is free to behave as he or she wishes.
The two stages do not seem to differ along any quantitative dimension; they
seem qualitatively different.
2. Structured Wholes. By structured wholes, Kohlberg meant the stages
are not just isolated responses but are general patterns of thought that consis-
tently show up across many different kinds of issues. One gets a sense this is
true by reading through his scoring manual; one finds the same kinds of think-
ing reappearing on diverse items. For example, one item asks, Why should a
promise be kept? As on the Heinz dilemma, children at stage 1 again speak in
terms of obedience to rules, whereas those at stage 2 focus on exchanging
favors that are in one’s self-interest (e.g., “You never know when you’re going
to need that person to do something for you”). Similarly, as children proceed
through the stages, they keep giving responses that are similar to those to the
Heinz dilemma (Colby et al., 1987c, pp. 802–854).
In addition, Kohlberg and his coworkers (Colby et al., 1983) have
obtained quantitative estimates of the extent to which subjects respond in
terms of one particular stage. Since some subjects might be in transition
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
between stages, one does not expect perfect consistency. Nevertheless,
Kohlberg found that subjects scored at their dominant stage across nine dilem-
mas about two thirds of the time. This seems to be a fair degree of consistency,
suggesting the stages may reflect general modes of thought.
3. Invariant Sequence. Kohlberg believed his stages unfold in an
invariant sequence. Children always go from stage 1 to stage 2 to stage 3 and
so forth. They do not skip stages or move through them in mixed-up orders.
Not all children necessarily reach the highest stages; they might lack intellec-
tual stimulation. But to the extent they do go through the stages, they pro-
ceed in order.
Most of Kohlberg’s evidence on his stage sequence came from cross-
sectional data. That is, he interviewed different children at various ages to see
if the younger ones were at lower stages than the older ones. Figure 1
70
30
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ts
20
10
0
70 10 13
Age
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Type 5
Type 6
16
FIGURE 1
Use of six types of moral judgments at four ages.
(From Kohlber, L. Use of six types of moral judgments at four
ages. Human Development, 6, p. 16. Copyright © 1963.
Reprinted by permission of S. Karger A.G..)
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
summarizes this data from his first studies. As you can see, stages 1 and 2 are
primarily found at the youngest age, whereas the higher stages become more
prevalent as age increases. The data support the stage sequence.
Cross-sectional findings, however, are inconclusive. In a cross-sectional
study, different children are interviewed at each age, so there is no guarantee
that any individual child actually moves through the stages in order. For ex-
ample, there is no guarantee that a boy who is coded at stage 3 at age 13 actu-
ally passed through stages 1 and 2 in order when he was younger. More
conclusive evidence must come from longitudinal studies, in which the same
children are followed over time.
The first two major longitudinal studies (Holstein, 1973; Kohlberg &
Kramer, 1969) began with samples of teenagers and then tested them at
3-year intervals. These studies produced ambiguous results. In both, most
subjects either remained at the same stage or moved up one stage, but there
were also some who might have skipped a stage. Furthermore, these studies
indicated that some subjects had regressed, and this finding also bothered
Kohlberg because he believed that movement through his stages should
always be forward.
Kohlberg’s response to these troublesome findings was to revise his scor-
ing method. He had already become uncomfortable with his first (1958b) scor-
ing manual, believing it relied too heavily on the content of subjects’ answers
rather than their underlying reasoning. So, in 1975, after these longitudinal
findings showed stage-skipping and regression, he decided to develop a more
precise scoring system. He and his coworkers created a manual that was more
stringent in assigning high scores; high-stage reasoning had to be more clearly
demonstrated. It was during this work that Kohlberg decided to drop stage 6
because so few people now fit into it. He and his colleagues then carried out
a new longitudinal analysis of his original sample with the new manual, and
this time they found no stage skipping and very little regression. Other lon-
gitudinal studies obtained similar results (Colby et al., 1983).
Kohlberg’s new, longitudinal study changed the earlier picture of moral
development in other ways. If we look again at Figure 1, which depicts the age
changes found in Kohlberg’s first studies, we see that stage 4 had become the
dominant stage by age 16. In the new scoring system, Kohlberg found that
stage 4 did not become dominant until the boys were in their 20s and 30s
(Figure 2). Stage 5, too, appears only in the mid-20s and never becomes very
prevalent.
4. Hierarchic Integration. When Kohlberg said his stages were hier-
archically integrated, he meant that people do not lose the insights gained at
earlier stages but integrate them into new, broader frameworks. For example,
people at stage 4 can still understand stage 3 arguments, but they now sub-
ordinate them to wider considerations. They understand that Heinz had good
motives for stealing, but they point out that if we all stole whenever we had
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
re
a
so
n
in
g
Age in years
3634323028262422201816141210
3632–3428–3024–2620–2216–1812–1410
Stage 2
Stage 4
Stage 3
Stage 5
Stage 1
FIGURE 2
Mean percentage of moral reasoning at each stage for each age group.
(From Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, A longitudinal study of moral judgment.
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Serial No. 200, 1983,
p. 46. Copyright © 1983. Reprinted by permission of Wiley-Blackwell.)
a good motive, the social structure would break down. Thus stage 4 subordi-
nates a concern for motives to a wider concern for the society as a whole.
The concept of hierarchic integration was very important for Kohlberg
because it enabled him to explain the direction of his stage sequence. Since he
was not a maturationist, he could not simply say the sequence is wired into
the genes. So he wanted to show how each new stage provides a broader
framework for dealing with moral issues. Stage 4, as mentioned, transcends
the limitations of stage 3 and becomes more broadly concerned with social
organization. Stage 5, in turn, sees the weakness of stage 4; a well-organized
society is not necessarily a moral one. Stage 5 therefore considers the rights and
orderly processes that make for a moral society. Each new stage retains the
insights of the prior stage, but it recasts them into a broader framework. In this
sense, each new stage is more cognitively adequate than the prior stage.
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
If Kohlberg was right about the hierarchic nature of his stages, we would
expect that people would still be able to understand earlier stages but con-
sider them inferior. In fact, when Rest presented adolescents with arguments
from different stages, this is what he found. They understood lower-stage rea-
soning, but they disliked it. What they preferred was the highest stage they
heard, whether they fully understood it or not. This finding suggests, per-
haps, that they had some intuitive sense of the greater adequacy of the higher
stages (Rest, 1973; Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969).
5. Cross-Cultural Universality. Kohlberg, like all stage theorists,
maintained that his stage sequence is universal; it is the same in all cultures.
At first glance, this proposal might be surprising. Don’t different cultures
socialize their children differently, teaching them very different moral
beliefs?
Kohlberg’s response was that different cultures do teach different beliefs,
but his stages refer not to specific beliefs but to underlying modes of reason-
ing (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971). For example, one culture might discourage
physical fighting, while another encourages it more. As a result, children will
have different beliefs about fighting, but they will still reason about it in the
same way at the same stage. At stage 1, for example, one child might say it is
wrong to fight when insulted “because you will get punished for it,” while
another says that “it is all right to fight; you won’t get punished.” The beliefs
differ, but both children reason about them in the same underlying way—in
terms of the physical consequences (punishment). They do so because this is
what they can cognitively grasp. Later on, the first child might argue that
fighting is bad “because if everyone fought all the time there would be anar-
chy,” while the second child argues that “people must defend their honor,
because if they don’t everyone will be insulting everyone, and the whole soci-
ety will break down.” Once again, the specific beliefs differ, reflecting differ-
ent cultural teachings, but the underlying reasoning is the same—in this case
it is stage 4, where people can consider something as abstract as the social
order. Children, regardless of their beliefs, will always move to stage 4 think-
ing some time after stage 1 thinking because it is cognitively so much more
sophisticated.
Kohlberg, then, proposed that his stage sequence is the same in all cul-
tures, for each stage is conceptually more advanced than the next. He and
other researchers have given his interview to children and adults in a variety
of cultures, including Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey, Israel, the Yucatan, Kenya, the
Bahamas, and India. Most of the studies have been cross-sectional, but a few
have been longitudinal. The studies have supported Kohlberg’s stage
sequence. To the extent that children in different cultures move through the
stages, they appear to move in order (Edwards, 1981; Gibbs et al., 2007).
At the same time, people in different cultures seem to move through the
sequence at different rates and to reach different end-points. In the United
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
States most urban, middle-class adults reach stage 4, with a small percentage
using some stage 5 reasoning. The picture is fairly similar in urban areas of
other countries. But in the isolated villages and tribal communities of many
countries, stage 4 is rarer and stage 5 is completely absent (Gibbs et al. 2007;
Edwards, 1981).
Kohlberg (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982) suggested that we can understand
these findings in terms of Piagetian theory. Cultural factors, in this theory, do
not directly shape the child’s moral thought, but they do stimulate thinking.
Social experiences can challenge children’s ideas, motivating them to come
up with new ones. In traditional villages, there may be little to challenge a
stage 3 morality; the norms of care and empathy work very well in govern-
ing the face-to-face interactions of the group. There is little to stimulate think-
ing beyond this stage.
When, in contrast, young people leave the village and go off to the
city, they witness the breakdown of interpersonal ties. They see that group
norms of care and empathy have little impact on the impersonal interactions
of city life, and they see the need for a formal legal structure to ensure moral
conduct. They also become aware of the need to coordinate a new variety
of formal roles, such as manager, foreman, and worker, to keep organiza-
tions functioning smoothly. In the city, then, it’s natural to think in terms of
stage 4 morality. Keniston (1971) also notes that if young people attend the
universities, they may take classes in which the teachers deliberately ques-
tion the unexamined assumptions of their childhoods and adolescences.
They are stimulated to think about moral matters in new, postconventional
ways.
Nevertheless, the results for traditional village societies are striking and
raise the possibility that Kohlberg’s stages fail to do justice to non-Western
philosophical thought. As an example, Kohlberg’s former co-author John
Snarey (Gibbs et al., 2007) refers to a 50-year-old man from India who said
that the Heinz dilemma illustrates the need to become conscious of the unity
of all life, including the lives of animals. This man’s thinking was difficult to
score according to Kohlberg’s manual, but it seemed advanced. Similar unity-
of-life thinking also is found in indigenous peoples around the world (Suzuki
& Knudston, 1992). It also appears in Kohlberg’s stage 7, but Kohlberg kept
stage 7 out of his official six-stage moral sequence. Perhaps a more compre-
hensive, culturally universal stage theory would include this unity-of-life ori-
entation and map out its development.
Moral Thought and Other Forms
of Cognition
Kohlberg also tried to relate his moral stages to other forms of cognition.
He first analyzed his stages in terms of their underlying cognitive structures
and then looked for parallels in purely logical and social thought. For this
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
purpose, he analyzed his own stages in terms of implicit role-taking capaci-
ties, capacities to consider others’ viewpoints (Kohlberg, 1976; see also Rest,
1983; Selman, 1976).
At stage 1, children hardly seem to recognize that viewpoints differ. They
assume there is only one right view—that of authorities. At stage 2, in contrast,
they recognize that people have different interests and viewpoints. They seem
to be overcoming egocentrism, and they see that perspectives are relative to
the individual. They also begin to consider how individuals might coordinate
their interests in terms of mutually beneficial deals.
At stage 3, people conceptualize role taking as a deeper, more empathic
process—one becomes concerned with the other’s feelings. Stage 4, in turn, has
a broader, society wide conception of how people coordinate their roles
through the legal system.
Stages 5 and 6, finally, take a more idealized look at how people might
coordinate their interests. Stage 5 emphasizes democratic processes, and stage
6 considers how all parties take one another’s perspectives according to the
principles of justice.
The moral stages, then, reflect expanded insights into how perspectives
differ and might be coordinated. As such, the moral stages might be related
to stages of logical and social thought that contain similar insights. So far, the
empirical evidence suggests that advances in moral thinking may rest on prior
achievements in these other realms (Colby et al., 1987a, pp. 12–15). For ex-
ample, children seem to advance to stage 2, overcoming their egocentrism in
the moral sphere, only after they have made equivalent progress in their
logical and social thought. If this pattern is correct, we can expect to find many
individuals who are logical and even socially insightful but still underdevel-
oped in their moral judgment.
Moral Thought and Moral Behavior
Kohlberg’s scale has to do with moral thinking, not moral action. In many
situations, we might have a clear idea about what is right, but we might not
act accordingly. We might put self-interest first; or we might feel our action
will be futile; or we might lack the courage of our moral convictions. Con-
sequently, we would not expect perfect correlations between moral judg-
ment and moral action. Still, Kohlberg thought there should be some
relationship.
As a general hypothesis, he proposed that moral behavior is more con-
sistent, predictable, and responsible at the higher stages (Kohlberg et al., 1975)
because the stages themselves increasingly employ more stable and general
standards. For example, stage 3 bases decisions on others’ approval, which
can vary, but stage 4 refers to set rules and laws. Thus we can expect that
moral behavior, too, will become more consistent as people move up the
sequence. Generally speaking, there is some research support for this
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
hypothesis (e.g., with respect to cheating), but the evidence is not clear cut
(Blasi, 1980; Brown & Herrnstein, 1975; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984).
In a socially relevant study, Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) examined the
moral reasoning of those who participated in the Berkeley Free Speech Move-
ment in 1964. They wondered if the protestors were motivated by postcon-
ventional democratic principles. The researchers did find that the protestors’
thinking was more often postconventional than that of a matched sample of
nonparticipants, but this finding was not replicated with some other protests,
perhaps because moral principles were not as clearly at stake (Keniston, 1971,
pp. 260–261).
Overall, then, research has indicated rather modest links between moral
thought and moral action (Berk, 2009, pp. 502–503). Kohlberg’s adherents are
unhappy with the results, believing there must be some stronger relationship
that has yet to be found (Walker & Pitts, 1998).
GILLIGAN ON THE FEMININE VOICE
In 1977 Carol Gilligan, one of Kohlberg’s associates and coauthors, published
an essay that criticized Kohlberg’s work as biased against girls and women.
Gilligan expanded this article into a book, In a Different Voice (1982), which
ignited a great deal of controversy and stimulated a considerable amount of
new thinking.
Gilligan pointed out that Kohlberg developed his stages exclusively from
interviews with boys, and she argued that the stages reflect a decidedly male
orientation. For males, advanced moral thought revolves around rules, rights,
and abstract principles. The ideal is formal justice, in which one tries to be
impartial in evaluating the competing claims of all parties. The individual
stands apart from the situation and tries to come up with a moral solution
that is fair in some theoretical sense. This conception of morality leaves out the
female voice on moral matters.
For women, Gilligan said, morality centers not on rights and rules but on
interpersonal relationships and the ethics of compassion and care. The ideal is
not impersonal justice but more affiliative and connected ways of living.
Women’s morality, in addition, is more contextualized; it is tied to real ongo-
ing relationships rather than abstract solutions to hypothetical dilemmas.
Gilligan said that because of these gender differences, men and women
frequently score at different stages on Kohlberg’s scale. Women more often
score at stage 3, with its focus on interpersonal relationships, whereas men
more commonly score at stages 4 and 5, which reflect more abstract concep-
tions of social organization. Thus women score lower than men. If, however,
Kohlberg’s scale were more sensitive to women’s distinctly interpersonal ori-
entation, it would show that women also continue to develop their thinking
beyond stage 3.
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Several research studies have examined the validity of Gilligan’s
charge that Kohlberg’s stages are biased. By and large, gender differences
on Kohlberg’s stages appear to be minimal. Girls often reach stage 3 a bit
earlier than boys do, but overall, females and males perform at the same lev-
els on Kohlberg’s sequence (Berk, 2009, p. 499). The results do not support
Gilligan’s charge that Kohlberg’s stage theory makes females appear
inferior.
At the same time, Gilligan has called attention to an ethic of care that
seems distinct from the abstract justice orientation that Kohlberg emphasized.
And females do seem more drawn to the care orientation. In an early (1983)
study, Nora Lyons asked men and women, “What does morality mean to
you?” The following gender differences were typical:
Male. “Morality is basically having a reason for a way of knowing what
is right, what one ought to do.”
Female. “Morality is a type of consciousness, I guess, a sensitivity . . . that
you can affect someone else’s life.” (p. 125)
The men’s responses were more abstract, whereas the women, employing an
ethic of care, more fequently saw themselves in relation to others.
Lyons reported substantial gender differences in the use of the two moral
orientations. Subsequent research has found more modest differences, and
both males and females usually use both justice and care orientations to at
least some extent (Pratt, Skoe, & Arnold, 2004). The two orientations are also
subject to cultural influences; some cultures, such as Japan, socialize both boys
and girls to adopt care orientations (Berk 2009, pp. 499–450). But all in all, it
does appear that there are two moral orientations, with females more gener-
ally represented by the care orientation.
Gilligan also sketched out the way women’s moral orientation develops.
Because she believes that women’s conceptions of care and affiliation are
embedded in real-life situations (not hypothetical ones), she interviewed
women facing a personal crisis—the decision to have an abortion. Through
these interviews, Gilligan described how women progressed from pre-
conventional to conventional to postconventional modes of thinking. At the
preconventional level, women talked about the issues in terms of what they
meant to themselves, in terms of their self-interests. At the conventional level,
they adopted the position of a caring, maternal person as defined by others
and society at large. At the postconventional level, they formed their own
insights based on their cumulative knowledge of human relationships
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 74).
Throughout women’s discussions, Gilligan says, we hear a concern for
what is “selfish” and what is “responsible.” At the first level there is an empha-
sis on the self, which at the conventional level shifts toward socially defined
responsibility toward others. At the postconventional level, women develop
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
insights into ways the self and others are actually interdependent. As a woman
called Claire put it,
By yourself, there is little sense to things. It is like the sound of one hand
clapping, the sound of one man or one woman, there is something lack-
ing. . . . You have to love someone else, because while you may not like
them, you are inseparable from them. In a way, it is like loving your
right hand. They are part of you. (1982, p. 160, emphasis in original)
Eva Skoe and her colleagues (Skoe & von der Lippe, 1998; Pratt et al.,
2004) have begun more systematic studies of developmental changes in the
care orientation. These investigators have created a standard interview (which
partly allows respondents to talk about real-life dilemmas of their own choos-
ing) and have developed a formal scoring system. Focusing on adolescents and
young adults, the researchers have basically found developmental changes
similar to those outlined by Gilligan. There is sometimes a slight tendency for
females to score higher than males. The researchers have not, however, come
across individuals who articulate human interrelatedness with the eloquence
of Claire in Gilligan’s study (quoted above). Perhaps such insightful responses
appear with more frequency in later adulthood.
It would be interesting to know if Claire and those who think like her
extend their view of interrelatedness beyond humans and include all life. If
so, they may have attained a wisdom associated with non-Western cultures,
and Gilligan’s care orientation may provide a developmental pathway toward
this wisdom.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Kohlberg wanted to see people advance to the highest possible stage of moral
thought. The best possible society would contain individuals who not only
understand the need for social order (stage 4) but can entertain visions of uni-
versal principles, such as justice and liberty (stage 6) (Kohlberg, 1970).
How, then, can we promote moral development? Turiel (1966) found
that when children listened to adults’ moral judgments, the resulting change
was slight. This is what Kohlberg might have expected, for he believed if chil-
dren are to reorganize their thinking, they must be more active.
Accordingly, Kohlberg encouraged another student, Moshe Blatt, to
lead discussion groups in which children had a chance to grapple actively
with moral issues (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). Blatt presented moral dilemmas
that engaged sixth-graders in a good deal of heated debate. He tried to leave
much of the discussions to the children themselves, stepping in only to sum-
marize, clarify, and sometimes present a view himself (p. 133). He encour-
aged arguments that were one stage above those of most of the class. In
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
general, he tried to implement one of Kohlberg’s main ideas on how children
move through the stages. They do so by encountering views that challenge
their thinking and stimulate them to formulate better arguments (Kohlberg
et al., 1975).
Blatt began a typical discussion by telling a story about a man named
Mr. Jones who had a seriously injured son and wanted to rush him to the
hospital. Mr. Jones had no car, so he approached a stranger, told him about
the situation, and asked to borrow his car. The stranger, however, refused, say-
ing he had an important appointment to keep. So Mr. Jones took the car by
force. Blatt then asked whether Mr. Jones should have done that.
In the discussion that followed, one child, Student B, felt Mr. Jones had
a good cause for taking the car and also believed the stranger could be charged
with murder if the son died. Student C pointed out that the stranger violated
no law. Student B still felt the stranger’s behavior was somehow wrong, even
though he now realized it was not legally wrong. So Student B was in a kind
of conflict. He had a sense of the wrongness of the stranger’s behavior, but he
could not articulate this sense in terms that would meet the objection. He was
challenged to think about the problem more deeply.
In the end, Blatt gave him the answer. The stranger’s behavior, Blatt said,
was not legally wrong, but morally wrong—wrong according to God’s law
(this was a Sunday School class). At this point, Blatt was an authority teach-
ing the “correct” view. In so doing, he might have robbed Student B of the
chance to formulate spontaneously his own position. Blatt would have done
better to ask a question or to simply clarify the student’s conflict (e.g., “So it’s
not legally wrong, but you still have a sense that it’s somehow wrong . . .”).
In any case, it seems clear that part of this discussion was valuable for this
student.
The Kohlberg-Blatt method of inducing cognitive conflict exemplifies
Piaget’s equilibration model. The child takes one view, becomes confused by
discrepant information, and then resolves the confusion by forming a more
advanced and comprehensive position. The method is also the dialectic
process of Socratic teaching. The students give a view, the teacher asks ques-
tions that get them to see the inadequacies of their views, and they are then
motivated to formulate better positions.
In Blatt’s first experiment, the students (sixth-graders) participated in
12 weekly discussion groups. Blatt found that over half the students moved
up one full stage after the 12 weeks. Blatt and others have tried to replicate
these findings, sometimes using other age groups and lengthier series of
classes. As often happens with replications, the results have not been quite so
successful; upward changes have been smaller—usually a third of a stage or
less. Still, it generally seems that Socratic classroom discussions held over sev-
eral months can produce changes that, although small, are significantly greater
than those found in control groups that do not receive these experiences
(Rest, 1983).
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
One of Blatt’s supplementary findings was that those students who
reported they were most “interested” in the discussions made the greatest
amount of change. This finding is in keeping with Piagetian theory. Children
develop not because they are shaped through external reinforcements but
because their curiosity is aroused. They become interested in information that
does not quite fit into their existing cognitive structures and are thereby moti-
vated to revise their thinking. Other investigators (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1985)
have examined actual dialogues to see if those who become most challenged
and involved in the tensions of moral debates are also those who move for-
ward. The evidence suggests this is the case.
Although Kohlberg was committed to the cognitive-conflict model of
change, he also developed another strategy—the just community approach.
Here, the focus is not on individuals but on groups. Kohlberg and some of
his colleagues (Power & Reimer, 1979) set up a special high school group of
about 180 students and encouraged them to function as a democracy and to
think of themselves as a community. Initially, little community feeling was
present. The group’s dominant orientation was stage 2; it treated problems
such as stealing as purely individual matters. If a boy had something stolen,
it was too bad for him. After a year, however, the group norms advanced to
stage 3; the students now considered stealing to be a community issue that
reflected on the degree of trust and care in the group. As a result, stealing and
other behavior problems sharply declined and the students began helping
one another in many ways. Similar projects have produced similar results
(Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989).
The just community approach has troubled some of Kohlberg’s follow-
ers. Although the students are encouraged to participate in a good deal of
democratic decision making, the adults in the program actively state their
own positions. When Kohlberg participated, he forcefully urged the students
to form a true community. Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh (1983) wondered if the
adults were not practicing indoctrination. After discussing the matter with
Kohlberg, they seemed reassured that Kohlberg hadn’t abandoned his belief
in students’ need to think for themselves (p. 251), but there are still grounds
for some uneasiness. In his last years, Kohlberg may have departed some-
what from his basic commitment to independent thinking.
Although the just community approach focuses on the moral orienta-
tions of groups, researchers have wondered if the programs produce changes
in individuals. Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg (1989) found that students who
participated in the programs for 2 or 3 years, compared to similar students in
ordinary high schools, showed greater advances in their moral judgment
scores, but their progress was still modest. Most advanced from stage 2 to
stage 3. The researchers advise those who primarily want to promote moral
development in individuals to concentrate on academic discussions of hypo-
thetical moral dilemmas. This intervention is easier than trying to change an
entire group.
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Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
EVALUATION
Kohlberg, a follower of Piaget, offered a new, more detailed stage sequence for
moral thinking. Piaget basically found two stages of moral thinking, the sec-
ond of which emerges in early adolescence; Kohlberg uncovered additional
stages that develop well into adolescence and adulthood. He suggested that
some people even reach a postconventional level of moral thinking where
they no longer accept their own society as given but think reflectively and
autonomously about what a good society should be.
The suggestion of a postconventional morality is unusual in the social
sciences. Perhaps it took a cognitive-developmentalist to suggest such a thing.
Whereas most social scientists have been impressed by the ways in which
societies mold and shape children’s thinking, cognitive-developmentalists are
more impressed by the capacities for independent thought. If children engage
in enough independent thinking, Kohlberg suggested, they will eventually
begin to formulate conceptions of rights, values, and principles by which they
evaluate existing social arrangements.
Kohlberg’s theory has provoked sharp criticism. We have reviewed Gilli-
gan’s view that it is male-oriented, as well as the cultural critique that
Kohlberg’s theory contains a Western bias. Both critiques point out that
Kohlberg worked in a Kantian tradition that emphasizes abstract rights and
principles of justice rather than interconnectedness, a sense of unity with oth-
ers or with all of life. I believe these critiques have merit.
All the same, we shouldn’t minimize the Kantian philosophical tradi-
tion in which Kohlberg worked. As Broughton (1983) argues, this morality of
justice has inspired battles against repressive state power that other ethical
orientations seem less equipped to handle. Gilligan’s ethic of care seems to nat-
urally focus on the interpersonal relationships of daily life, not the powerful
legal system that Martin Luther King challenged in the name of justice. Sim-
ilarly, as Albert Schweitzer (1929, pp. 302–304) observed, the Eastern con-
sciousness of the unity of life is more contemplative than action oriented. In
the pursuit of an abstract principle of justice, King acted.
Kohlberg gave us a picture of how children, through their own thinking,
might work their way toward such principled positions. Few, to be sure, will
grapple with moral issues so long and intently that they will come to think
about them in the manner of Kant, Socrates, Gandhi, and King. But Kohlberg’s
stages provide us with an inspiring vision of where moral development might
lead.
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Learning Theory:
Pavlov, Watson,
and Skinner
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Learning Theory:
Pavlov, Watson,
and Skinner
Theorists in the developmental tradition believe that key develop-
ments are governed by internal forces—by biological maturation or
by the individual’s own structuring of experience. In this chapter, we
will describe the work of some of the theorists in the opposing,
Lockean tradition—learning theorists who emphasize the processes
by which behavior is formed from the outside, by the external
environment.
PAVLOV AND CLASSICAL
CONDITIONING
Biographical Introduction
The father of modern learning theory is Ivan Petrovich Pavlov
(1849–1936). Pavlov was born in Ryazan, Russia, the son of a poor village
priest. Pavlov himself planned to become a priest until the age of 21, when
he decided he was more interested in a scientific career. For many years
he devoted his attention to physiological investigations, and in 1904 he
won the Nobel Prize for his work on the digestive system. It was just a
little before this time, when Pavlov was 50 years old, that he began his
famous work on conditioned reflexes. This new interest came about
through an accidental discovery about the nature of salivation in dogs.
Ordinarily dogs salivate when food touches their tongues; this is an innate
reflex. But Pavlov noticed that his dogs also salivated before the food was
in their mouths; they salivated when they saw the food coming, or even
when they heard approaching footsteps. What had happened was that the
reflex had become conditioned to new, formerly neutral stimuli.
For a while Pavlov could not decide whether to pursue the impli-
cations of his new discovery or to continue with his earlier research.
Finally, after a long struggle with himself, he began studying the
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
conditioning process. Still, Pavlov believed that he was working as a physi-
ologist, not a psychologist. In fact, Pavlov required that everyone in his labo-
ratory use only physiological terms. If his assistants were caught using
psychological language—referring, for example, to a dog’s feelings or
knowledge—they were fined (R. Watson, 1968, pp. 408–412).
Basic Concepts
The Classical Conditioning Paradigm. In a typical experiment
(Pavlov, 1928, p. 104), a dog was placed in a restraining harness in a dark room
and a light was turned on. After 30 seconds some food was placed in the dog’s
mouth, eliciting the salivation reflex. This procedure was repeated several
times—each time the presentation of food was paired with the light. After a
while the light, which initially had no relationship to salivation, elicited the
response by itself. The dog had been conditioned to respond to the light.
In Pavlov’s terms (1927, lectures 2 and 3), the presentation of food was
an unconditioned stimulus (US); Pavlov did not need to condition the animal to
salivate to the food. The light, in contrast, was a conditioned stimulus (CS); its
effect required conditioning.1 Salivation to the food was called an unconditioned
reflex (UR), and salivation to the light was called a conditioned reflex (CR). The
process itself is called classical conditioning.
You might have noticed in this experiment that the CS appeared before
the US; Pavlov turned on the light before he presented the food. One of the
questions he asked was whether this is the best order for establishing condi-
tioning. He and his students discovered that it is. It is very difficult to obtain
conditioning when the CS follows the US (1927, pp. 27–28). Other studies have
suggested that conditioning often occurs most rapidly when the CS is pre-
sented about one-half second prior to the US (see Schwartz, 1989, p. 83).
Pavlov discovered several other principles of conditioning, some of
which we will briefly describe.
Extinction. A conditioned stimulus, once established, does not con-
tinue to work forever. Pavlov found that even though he could make a light
a CS for salivation, if he flashed the light alone over several trials, it began to
lose its effect. Drops of saliva became fewer and fewer until there were none
at all. At this point, extinction had occurred (Pavlov, 1928, p. 297).
Pavlov also discovered that although a conditioned reflex appears to be
extinguished, it usually shows some spontaneous recovery. In one experiment
(Pavlov, 1927, p. 58), a dog was trained to salivate to the mere sight of food—
the CS. (Previously, the dog would salivate only when food was in its mouth.)
Next, the CS alone was presented at 3-minute intervals for six trials, and by
1Pavlov actually used the terms conditional and unconditional; they were translated
conditioned and unconditioned, the terms psychologists now generally use.
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
the sixth trial, the dog no longer salivated. The response appeared to have
been extinguished. But, after a 2-hour break in the experiment, the presenta-
tion of the CS alone once again produced a moderate amount of salivation.
Thus the response showed some spontaneous recovery. If one were to con-
tinue to extinguish the response, without periodically repairing the CS to the
US, the spontaneous recovery effect would also disappear.
Stimulus Generalization. Although a reflex has been conditioned to
only one stimulus, it is not just that particular stimulus that elicits it. The
response seems to generalize over a range of similar stimuli without any fur-
ther conditioning (Pavlov, 1928, p. 157). For example, a dog that has been con-
ditioned to salivate to a bell of a certain tone will also salivate to bells of
differing tones. The ability of the neighboring stimuli to produce the response
varies with the degree of similarity to the original CS. Pavlov believed that we
observe stimulus generalization because of an underlying physiological process
he called irradiation. The initial stimulus excites a certain part of the brain that
then irradiates, or spreads, over other regions of the cerebrum (p. 157).
Discrimination. Initial generalization gradually gives way to a process
of differentiation. If one continues to ring bells of different tones (without pre-
senting food), the dog begins to respond more selectively, restricting its
responses to the tones that most closely resemble the original CS. One can
also actively produce differentiation by pairing one tone with food while pre-
senting another tone without food. This would be called an experiment in
stimulus discrimination (Pavlov, 1927, pp. 118–130).
Higher-Order Conditioning. Pavlov showed, finally, that once he had
solidly conditioned a dog to a CS, he could then use the CS alone to establish
a connection to yet another neutral stimulus. In one experiment, Pavlov’s stu-
dent trained a dog to salivate to a bell and then paired the bell alone with a
black square. After a number of trials, the black square alone produced sali-
vation. This is called second-order conditioning. Pavlov found that in some cases
he could also establish third-order conditioning, but he could not go beyond
this point (p. 34).
Evaluation
In a sense, Pavlov’s basic idea was not new. In the 17th century, Locke had pro-
posed that knowledge is based on associations. Pavlov went beyond Locke,
however, and uncovered several principles of association through empirical
experiments. He took the theory of learning out of the realm of pure specu-
lation. Pavlov, as we shall see, did not discover everything there is to know
about conditioning; in particular, his brand of conditioning seems restricted
to a certain range of innate responses. Nevertheless, he was the first to put
learning theory on a firm scientific footing.
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
WATSON
Biographical Introduction
The man most responsible for making Pavlovian principles a part of the psy-
chological mainstream was John B. Watson (1878–1958). Watson was born on
a farm near Greenville, South Carolina. He said that in school “I was lazy,
somewhat insubordinate, and so far as I know, I never made above a passing
grade” (Watson, 1936, p. 271). Nevertheless, he went to college at Furman
University and graduate school at the University of Chicago, where he began
doing psychological research with animals. After earning his doctorate, he
took a position at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where he did his
most productive work.
In 1913 Watson made a great impact on psychology by issuing a mani-
festo, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.” In this article he argued that
the study of consciousness through introspection has no place in psychology
as a science. Psychology should abandon “the terms consciousness, mental
states, mind, content, introspectively verifiable, imagery and the like” (Wat-
son, 1913, p. 166). Instead, its goal should be “the prediction and control of
behavior” (p. 158). In particular, it should study only stimuli, responses, and
the formation of habits. In this way psychology could become a science like
the other natural sciences.
A year later he read the works of Pavlov and the Russians on condi-
tioned reflexes and made Pavlovian conditioning the cornerstone of his think-
ing. Then, in 1916, Watson began research on young children, becoming the
first major psychologist to apply principles of learning to the problems of
development.
In 1929 Watson’s academic career came to an abrupt end. His divorce
from his wife became so widely and sensationally publicized that Johns Hop-
kins fired him. Watson remarried (Rosalie Raynor, a coworker) and entered the
business world. In order to get a good sense of business, he worked for a while
as a coffee salesman and a clerk at Macy’s department store. He continued to
write, but now for magazines such as Cosmopolitan, Harper’s, and McCall’s, in
which he advanced his ideas on child development.
Basic Concepts
Environmentalism. Watson was a behaviorist; he said we should
study only overt behavior. He also was an environmentalist and made this
famous proposal:
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified
world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random
and train him to become any type of specialist I might select—doctor,
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
lawyer, artist, merchant, chief, and yes, even begger-man and thief,
regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and
race of his ancestors. (1924, p. 104)
In the next sentence Watson added that “I am going beyond my facts, and
I admit it, but so have the advocates of the contrary and they have been doing
it for many thousands of years” (p. 104).
Study of Emotions. One of Watson’s major interests was the condi-
tioning of emotions. He claimed that at birth there are only three unlearned
emotional reactions—fear, rage, and love. Actually, all we observe are three
different physical responses, but for the sake of simplicity we can call them
emotions.
Fear, Watson said (1924, pp. 152–154), is observed when infants suddenly
jump or start, breathe rapidly, clutch their hands, close their eyes, fall, and
cry. There are only two unconditioned stimuli that elicit fear. One is a sudden
noise; the other is loss of support (as when the baby’s head is dropped). Yet
older children are afraid of all kinds of things—strange people, rats, dogs, the
dark, and so on. Therefore it must be that the stimuli evoking most fear reac-
tions are learned. For example, a little boy is afraid of snakes because he was
frightened by a loud scream when he saw one. The snake became a condi-
tioned stimulus.
Rage is initially an unlearned response to the restriction of body move-
ment. If we grab a 2-year-old girl, preventing her from going where she
wants, she begins to scream and stiffens her body. She lies down stiff as a
rod in the middle of the street and yells until she becomes blue in the face
(p. 154). Although rage is initially a reaction to one situation—being forcibly
held—it later is expressed in a variety of situations; children become angry
when told to wash their faces, sit on the toilet, get undressed, take a bath,
and so on. Such commands elicit rage because they have been associated
with physical restraint in these situations. The child becomes angry when
told to get undressed because this order was initially associated with being
forcibly held.
Love is initially a response that is automatically elicited by the stroking
of the skin, tickling, gentle rocking, and patting. The baby responds by smil-
ing, laughing, gurgling and cooing, and other responses that we call affec-
tionate, good natured, and kindly. Although Watson had no use for Freud, he
noted that such responses “are especially easy to bring about by the stimula-
tion of what, for lack of a better term, we may call the erogenous zones, such
as the nipples, the lips, and the sex organs” (p. 155).
Infants initially do not love specific people, but they are conditioned to
do so. The mother’s face frequently appears along with patting, rocking, and
stroking, so it becomes a conditioned stimulus that alone elicits the good feel-
ings toward her. Later, other people associated with the mother in some way
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
also elicit the same responses. Thus tender or positive feelings toward others
are learned through second-order conditioning.
Actually, much of Watson’s writing on the emotions was speculation—
and vague speculation at that. He said the three basic emotions become
attached to a variety of stimuli and “we get marked additions to the responses
and other modifications of them” (p. 165), but he said little about how these
further developments occur. Where Watson did become specific was in his
experimental work. His major experiment was on the conditioning of fear in
an 11-month-old infant he called Albert B.
Conditioning Fear in Little Albert. Watson and Raynor (Watson, 1924,
pp. 159–164) wanted to see if they could condition Albert to fear a white rat.
At the beginning of the experiment Albert showed no such fear. Next, the
experimenter on four occasions presented the rat and simultaneously pounded
a bar behind Albert’s head, producing a startle response. On the fifth trial
Albert was shown the rat alone, and he puckered his face, whimpered, and
withdrew. He had been conditioned to fear the rat. For good measure, the
experimenter combined the rat and the pounding twice more, and on the next
trial, when the rat was again presented alone, Albert cried and tried to crawl
away as rapidly as he could.
A few days later, Watson and Raynor tested for stimulus generalization.
They found that although Albert played with many objects, he feared any-
thing furry. He cried or fretted whenever he saw a rabbit, dog, fur coat, cot-
ton wool, or a Santa Claus mask, even though he previously had not been
afraid of these things. Albert’s fear had generalized to all furry objects.
Practical Applications. One of Watson’s major practical innovations
was a method for deconditioning fears. He was not able to decondition Albert
of his new fears, because Albert was an orphan who was adopted and taken
out of town before this could be attempted. But Watson advised one of his
colleagues, Mary Cover Jones, on procedures for eliminating the fears of
another little boy, a 3-year-old called Peter.
Peter seemed active and healthy in every respect except for his fears. He
was scared of white rats, rabbits, fur coats, feathers, cotton wool, frogs, fish,
and mechanical toys. As Watson noted, “One might well think that Peter was
merely Albert B. grown up, but Peter was a different child whose fears were
‘home grown’” (1924, p. 173).
Jones tried a variety of methods, including having Peter watch other
children play with a rabbit. But the procedure that she and Watson highlighted
was the following. Peter was placed in his highchair and given a midafter-
noon snack. Then a caged white rabbit was displayed at a distance that did not
disturb him. The next day, the rabbit was brought increasingly closer, until
he showed a slight disturbance. That ended the day’s treatment. The same
thing was done day after day; the rabbit was brought closer and closer, with
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
the experimenter taking care never to disturb Peter very much. Finally, Peter
was able to eat with one hand while playing with the rabbit with the other. By
similar means, Jones eliminated most of Peter’s other fears as well.
Jones’s technique, although anticipated by Locke, was quite innovative
at the time. It is today known as a form of behavior modification called systematic
desensitization (see Wolpe, 1969). The subject is relaxed and gradually intro-
duced to the feared stimulus. The experimenter makes sure that the subject is
at no time made to feel too anxious. Gradually, then, the subject learns to asso-
ciate relaxed feelings, rather than fear, to the object or situation.
Watson did not confine his advice to therapeutic procedures for elimi-
nating fears. He also had much to say on child rearing, which he wanted to
turn into a scientific enterprise. Watson recommended, among other things,
that parents place babies on rigid schedules, and he insisted they refrain from
hugging, kissing, or caressing their babies. For when they do so, their chil-
dren soon associate the very sight of the parent with indulgent responses and
never learn to turn away from the parent and explore the world on their own
(Watson, 1928, p. 81). Watson’s advice was quite influential in the 1930s, but
it was too extreme to last. Under the influence of Spock, Bowlby, and others,
parents relaxed their schedules and became more affectionate with their chil-
dren. Nevertheless, Watson’s more general goal—that of placing child train-
ing on the firm foundation of scientific learning principles—remains a vital
part of child care in the United States.
Evaluation
Largely because of Watson’s efforts, the classical conditioning paradigm
became a cornerstone of psychological theory. It would seem that many of
our reactions to objects and people develop through this conditioning process
(see Liebert et al., 1977).
At the same time, we need to note that the model has certain limitations.
For one thing, researchers have found it much more difficult to condition
infants’ responses than Watson implied. This seems particularly true during
the first month of life (Lamb & Campos, 1982; Sameroff & Cavanaugh, 1979).
Perhaps classical conditioning becomes easier once infants have developed
what Piaget calls primary circular reactions. Once they can coordinate senso-
rimotor actions (e.g., look at what they hear), they might more readily learn
to make various associations.
There also seem to be limitations to the kinds of conditioned stimuli
humans will learn. When, for example, researchers attempted to classically
condition infants to fear objects such as curtains and wooden blocks instead
of rats, they had great difficulty. Perhaps humans are innately disposed to
fear certain stimuli. There may be biological constraints on the kinds of
stimuli we will associate with different responses (Harris & Liebert, 1984,
pp. 108–109; Seligman, 1972).
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
From a learning theory perspective, finally, classical conditioning seems
limited to certain kinds of responses. It seems to apply best to the conditioning
of reflexes and innate responses (which may include many emotional reactions).
It is questionable whether this kind of conditioning can also explain how we
learn such active and complex skills as talking, using tools, dancing, or playing
chess. When we master such skills, we are not limited to inborn reactions to
stimuli, but we engage in a great deal of free, trial-and-error behavior, finding
out what works best. Accordingly, learning theorists have developed other mod-
els of conditioning, the most influential of which is that of B. F. Skinner.
SKINNER AND OPERANT CONDITIONING
Biographical Introduction
B. F. Skinner (1905–1990) grew up in the small town of Susquehanna, Penn-
sylvania. As a boy, he liked school and enjoyed building things such as sleds,
rafts, and wagons. He also wrote stories and poetry. After graduating from
high school, he went to Hamilton College in New York. There, he felt some-
what out of place, but he graduated Phi Beta Kappa with a major in English
literature.
Skinner spent the next two years trying to become a writer, but he even-
tually decided that he could not succeed because “I had nothing important to
say” (1967, p. 395). Because he was interested in human and animal behavior,
he enrolled in the graduate psychology department at Harvard, where he
began doing research and formulating his ideas on learning. Skinner taught
at the University of Minnesota (1936–1945), Indiana University (1945–1947),
and Harvard University (1947 until his death in 1990).
Despite his successful career as a scientist, Skinner never completely
abandoned his earlier interests. For one thing, he continued to display his
boyhood enthusiasm for building things. When his first child was born, he
decided to make a new, improved crib. This crib, which is sometimes called
his “baby box,” is a pleasantly heated place that does away with the necessity
of excessive clothing and permits freer movement. It is not, as is sometimes
thought, an apparatus for training babies. It is simply a more comfortable crib.
Skinner ’s literary interests also reemerged. In 1948 he published a novel,
Walden Two, which describes a utopian community based on his principles of
conditioning.
The Operant Model
Like Watson, Skinner was a strict behaviorist. He believed psychology
should dispense with any references to intangible mental states (such as
goals, desires, or purposes); instead, it should confine itself to the study of
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
overt behavior. Like Watson, in addition, Skinner was an environmentalist;
although Skinner recognized that organisms enter the world with genetic
endowments, he was primarily concerned with how environments control
behavior.
In contrast to Watson, however, Skinner’s primary model of condition-
ing was not Pavlovian. The responses that Pavlov studied, Skinner said, are
best thought of as respondents. These are responses that are automatically
“elicited” by known stimuli. For example, the ingestion of food automatically
elicits salivation, and a loud noise automatically elicits a startle response. Most
respondents are probably simple reflexes.
A second class of behavior, which most interested Skinner, is called
operant. In operant behavior, the animal is not harnessed in, like Pavlov’s
dogs, but moves freely about and “operates” on the environment. For ex-
ample, in early experiments by Thorndike (1905), cats in a puzzle box would
sniff, claw, and jump about until they hit upon the response—pulling a
latch—that enabled them to get food. The successful response would then
be more likely to recur. In such cases, we cannot always identify any prior
stimulus that automatically elicits the responses. Rather, animals emit
responses, some of which become more likely in the future because they
have led to favorable consequences. Behavior, in Skinner ’s terms, is con-
trolled by the reinforcing stimuli that follow it (Skinner, 1938, pp. 20–21;
1953, pp. 65–66). The two models, respondent and operant, are diagrammed
in Figure 1.
To study operant conditioning, Skinner constructed an apparatus that
is commonly referred to as a “Skinner box.” This is a fairly small box in
which an animal is free to roam about (see Figure 2). At one end there is a
bar (lever) that, when pressed, automatically releases water or a pellet of
food. The animal, such as a rat, at first pokes around until she eventually
presses the bar, and then she gets the reward. As time goes on, she presses
the bar more frequently. The most important measure of learning, for Skin-
ner, is the rate of responding; when responses are reinforced, their rates of
CS
US
S1 R SR
?R
Respondent conditioning Operant conditioning
FIGURE 1
Respondent and operant conditioning. In respon-
dent (Pavlovian) conditioning, stimuli precede
responses and automatically elicit them. In oper-
ant conditioning, the initial stimuli are not always
known; the organism simply emits responses that
are controlled by reinforcing stimuli that
follow.
(SRs)
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
Lever
Water
Food tray
Screen Release
Light
FIGURE 2
A Skinner box. One side has been cut away to show the part
occupied by the animal.
(From Skinner, B. F., The Behavior of Organisms, p. 49.
Copyright 1938, renewed 1966. Reprinted by permission
of Prentice-Hall, Inc.)
occurrence increase. In Skinner ’s apparatus, the bar presses are automat-
ically registered on a graph, so the experimenter need not be present much
of the time. The data are presented as a learning curve, illustrated in
Figure 3.
Skinner believed that operant behavior, in comparison to respondent
behavior, plays a much greater role in human life. When we brush our teeth,
drive a car, or read a book, our behavior is not automatically elicited by a spe-
cific stimulus. The mere sight of a book, for instance, does not elicit reading
in the same way a bright light automatically elicits an eyeblink. We may or
may not read the book, depending on the consequences that have followed in
the past. If reading books has brought us rewards, such as high grades, we are
likely to engage in this behavior. Behavior is determined by its consequences
(Munn, Fernald, & Fernald, 1974, p. 208).
50
R
e
sp
o
n
se
s
15 30
Time in minutes
45
FIGURE 3
A typical learning curve.
(From Skinner, B. F. The Behavior
of Organisms, Copyright 1938.
Renewed 1966. Reprinted by
permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc.)
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
Principles of Conditioning
Reinforcement and Extinction. Skinnerians have performed numer-
ous experiments showing that human behavior, beginning in infancy, can be
controlled by reinforcing stimuli. For example, infants increase their rates of
sucking when sucking results in sweet, as opposed to nonsweet, liquid (Lipsitt,
1975). Similarly, infants’ rates of smiling and vocalization can be increased if
the behavior leads to rewards such as the experimenter’s smiles, caresses, and
attention (Brackbill, 1958; Rheingold, Gewirtz, & Ross, 1959).
In such experiments, one is dealing with different kinds of reinforcers.
Some reinforcers, such as food or the removal of pain, are primary reinforcers;
they have “natural” reinforcing properties. Other reinforcing stimuli, such as
an adult’s smiles, praise, or attention, are probably conditioned reinforcers; their
effectiveness stems from their frequent association with primary reinforcers
(Skinner, 1953, p. 78).
Operant behavior, like respondent behavior, is also subject to extinction
(p. 69). For example, because children do things “just to get attention” (p. 78),
one can extinguish undesirable behaviors, such as excessive crying or tem-
per tantrums, by consistently withdrawing one’s attention whenever they
occur (Etzel & Gewirtz, 1967; Williams, 1959).
Operant behavior that has apparently been extinguished may also show
spontaneous recovery. For example, a little boy whose temper tantrums had
been extinguished through the withdrawal of attention began having tantrums
once again when placed in a new situation (Williams, 1959). The behavior had
to be extinguished further.
Immediacy of Reinforcement. Skinner (1953, p. 101; 1959, p. 133)
found he could initially establish responses at the highest rates when he rein-
forced them promptly. A rat will begin pressing a bar at a high rate only if she
has promptly received a food pellet each time she has done so. As Bijou and
Baer (1961, p. 44) point out, this principle has importance for child rearing. If
a father shows pleasure immediately after his son brings him the newspaper,
the boy is likely to repeat the behavior the next evening. If, however, the father
is so engrossed in something else that he delays reinforcing his son’s behav-
ior for a few minutes, the boy’s behavior will not be strengthened. In fact,
what gets strengthened is the boy’s behavior at the moment of reinforcement.
If he is building blocks at that moment, it is block-building, not newspaper-
fetching, that gets reinforced.
Discriminative Stimuli. We have said that operant conditioning may
be described without any reference to initiating stimuli. This is true, but it
does not mean such stimuli are unimportant. Stimuli that precede responses
may gain considerable control over them.
For example, Skinner (1953, pp. 107–108) reinforced a pigeon each time
she stretched her neck. At this point Skinner had no knowledge of any initial
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
stimulus; he simply waited for the pigeon to emit the response and then rein-
forced it. Next, however, he reinforced the response only when a signal light
was on. After a few trials, the pigeon stretched her neck much more frequently
when the light was flashing than when it was off. The flashing light had
become a discriminative stimulus. The light controlled the behavior because it
set the occasion upon which the behavior was likely to be reinforced.
Skinner (pp. 108–109) listed numerous examples to show how everyday
behavior becomes attached to discriminative stimuli. In an orchard in which
red apples are sweet and all others are sour, redness becomes a stimulus that
sets the occasion upon which picking and eating will produce favorable out-
comes. Similarly, we learn that a smile is an occasion upon which approach-
ing another will meet with a positive response. When others frown, the same
approach meets with aversive consequences, such as rebuffs. Insofar as this
is true, the facial expressions of others become discriminative stimuli that con-
trol the likelihood that we will approach them.
Although discriminative stimuli do exert considerable control, it must be
emphasized that this control is not automatic, as in the case of respondent
conditioning. In Pavlov’s experiments, prior stimuli automatically elicit
responses; in operant conditioning, such stimuli only make responses more
likely.
Generalization. In operant conditioning, as in respondent condition-
ing, there is a process of stimulus generalization (Skinner, 1953, p. 132). Sup-
pose a little girl has been reinforced for saying “Da da” at the sight of her
father, but not when she is looking at her mother or siblings. The father has
become a discriminative stimulus. It is not unusual, however, to find the girl
saying “Da da” when she sees any man at all, such as strangers on the street.
The stimulus has generalized. Her parents must now teach her to make a finer
discrimination. They might say, “That’s right,” when she utters “Da da” in
the presence of her father, but not when she looks at any other man.
Similarly, we can observe response generalization. It has been shown, for
example, that when children are reinforced for using one part of speech, such
as plurals, they begin uttering new plurals—even though they haven’t
received reinforcement for those particular words. Reinforcement influences
not only particular responses but those of the same general class (Lovaas,
1977, pp. 112–113).
Shaping. Operant behavior is not acquired in all-or-nothing packages.
It is usually learned gradually, little by little. Even teaching a pigeon to peck
a spot on the wall, Skinner (1953, p. 92) showed, must be gradually shaped.
If we place a pigeon in a box and wait for her to peck the spot, we may have
to wait days or even weeks. Much of the time, the pigeon doesn’t even
approach the spot. So we must shape her behavior. First, we give the bird
food when she turns in the direction of the spot. This increases the frequency
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
of this behavior. Next, we withhold food until she makes a slight movement
in the right direction. We then keep reinforcing positions closer and closer to
the spot, until the bird is facing it. At this point we can reinforce head move-
ments, first giving food for any forward movement and finally reinforcing
the bird only when she actually pecks the spot. Through this procedure we
gradually shape the desired response. Shaping is also called the “method of
approximations,” because reinforcement is made contingent upon better and
better approximations of the desired response.
We probably teach many human skills in this bit-by-bit shaping process.
When we teach a boy to swing a baseball bat, we first say “Good” when he gets
his hands into the right grip. We then say “Right” when he lifts his bat in the
correct position over his shoulder. We then work on his stance, a level swing,
and so on—gradually shaping the complete behavior.
Behavior Chains. Although behavior may be shaped bit by bit, it also
develops into longer, integrated response chains. For example, batting in base-
ball involves picking up the bat, getting the right grip and stance, watching
for the right pitch, swinging, running the bases, and so on. Skinnerians attempt
to examine each step in terms of reinforcements and stimuli. Reaching for the
bat is reinforced by obtaining it, which also serves as a stimulus for the next
act, getting the right grip. Once the hands are placed on the bat, we get a cer-
tain “feel” that we recognize as the proper grip. This “feel” is a reinforcement,
and it also signals the next action, pulling the bat over the shoulder. A little
later, the sensation of the bat squarely striking the ball is a reinforcement for
the swing, and it also signals the next action, running the bases. When a boy
or girl has become a good hitter, the entire sequence is often performed in a
smooth, integrated fashion (Schwartz, 1989).
Schedules of Reinforcement. Skinner (1953, p. 99) observed that our
everyday behavior is rarely reinforced continuously, every time; instead, it is
reinforced intermittently. We do not find good snow every time we go skiing
or have fun every time we go to a party. Accordingly, Skinner studied the
effects of different schedules of intermittent reinforcement.
Intermittent reinforcement may be set up on a fixed-interval schedule,
such that the organism receives a reward for the first response after a speci-
fied period of time. For instance, a pigeon receives food after pecking a
disc, but must wait 3 minutes before her next peck is rewarded, then 3 more
minutes, and so on. The rate of responding on this schedule is generally low.
Higher rates are produced by fixed-ratio schedules, as when the pigeon gets
food after every fifth peck. On both schedules, however, there is a lull in
responding immediately after reinforcement. It is as if the organism knows it
has a long way to go before the next reinforcement (p. 103). Students often
experience this effect immediately after completing a long term paper—it is
difficult to get started on another assignment.
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
The lulls produced by fixed schedules can be avoided by varying rein-
forcement in unpredictable ways. On variable-interval schedules, reinforce-
ment is administered after an average length of time, but the intervals are
mixed up. With variable-ratio schedules, we vary the number of responses
needed to produce a reward. When put on these two schedules, organisms
consistently respond at high rates, especially on variable-ratio schedules. They
keep responding because a reward might come at any time.
One of Skinner ’s most important findings is that intermittently rein-
forced behavior, in comparison to that which is continuously reinforced, is
much more difficult to extinguish. This is why many of our children’s unde-
sirable behaviors are so difficult to stop. We might be able to resist a child’s
nagging or demanding behavior most of the time, but if we yield every once
in a while, the child will persist with it (Bijou & Baer, 1961, p. 62).
If we wish to begin teaching a desirable form of behavior, it is usually
best to begin with continuous reinforcement; this is the most efficient way to
get the behavior started. However, if we also wish to make the behavior last,
we might at some point switch to an intermittent schedule (Bijou & Baer,
1961, p. 62).
Negative Reinforcement and Punishment. So far we have been
focusing on positive reinforcement. Reinforcement means strengthening a
response (increasing its rate), and positive reinforcements strengthen
responses by adding positive consequences such as food, praise, or atten-
tion. Responses may also be strengthened through negative reinforcement, by
removing unpleasant or aversive stimuli. Basically, what is strengthened in
this way is the tendency to escape, as when a girl standing on a diving board
learns to escape the taunts of her peers by diving into the water (Skinner,
1953, pp. 73, 173).
When we punish, in contrast, we do not try to strengthen behavior but
to eliminate it. Punishment, Skinner said, is “the commonest technique of con-
trol in modern life. The pattern is familiar: If a man does not behave as you
wish, knock him down; if a child misbehaves, spank him; if the people of a
country misbehave, bomb them” (p. 182).
Punishment, however, does not always work. In an early experiment,
Skinner (1938) found that when he punished rats for bar pressing (by having
the bar swing back and smack them on the legs), he only temporarily sup-
pressed the response. In the long run, punishment did not eliminate the
response any faster than did extinction. Other studies (e.g., Estes, 1944) have
obtained similar results, and the findings conform to everyday experience.
Parents who hit their children get them to behave for a while, but the parents
find that the misconduct reappears later on.
Skinner also objected to punishment because it produces unwanted side
effects. A child who is scolded in school may soon appear inhibited and con-
flicted. The child seems torn between working and avoiding work because of
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
the feared consequences. The boy or girl may start and stop, become dis-
tracted, and behave in other awkward ways (Skinner, 1953, pp. 190–191).
Some researchers believe Skinner overstated the case against punish-
ment. In some instances punishment will in fact completely eliminate
responses. This is especially true when the punishment is extremely painful.
Also, punishment can be effective when it is promptly administered, and
when the organism can make alternative responses that are then rewarded
(Liebert et al., 1977, pp. 138–141). Nevertheless, the effects of punishment are
often puzzling and undesirable.
Skinner recommended that instead of punishing children, we try extinc-
tion. “If the child’s behavior is strong only because it has been reinforced by
‘getting a rise out of’ the parent, it will disappear when this consequence is no
longer forthcoming” (1953, p. 192). Skinnerians often suggest that we com-
bine extinction for undesirable behavior with positive reinforcement for desir-
able behavior. In one study, teachers simply ignored nursery school children
whenever they were aggressive and gave them praise and attention when-
ever they were peaceful or cooperative. The result was a quieter classroom
(P. Brown & Elliott, 1965).
Internal Events:
Thoughts, Feelings, and Drives
Thoughts. It is sometimes said that Skinner proposed an “empty
organism” theory. He examined only overt responses and ignored internal
states. This characterization is accurate but slightly oversimplified. Skinner
did not deny that an inner world exists. We do have inner sensations, such as
the pain from a toothache. We also can be said to think. Thinking is merely a
weaker or more covert form of behavior. For example, we may talk to our-
selves silently instead of out loud, or we may think out our moves silently in
a chess game. However, such private events have no place in scientific psy-
chology unless we can find ways of making them public and measuring them
(Skinner, 1974, pp. 16–17, and chap. 7).
Skinner was particularly distressed by our tendency to treat thoughts
as the causes of behavior. We say we went to the store because “we got an
idea to do so” or that a pigeon pecked a disc because she “anticipated” food.
However, we are in error when we speak in this way. We go to stores, and
pigeons peck discs, only because these actions have led to past reinforcements.
Any discussion of goals or expectations is superfluous. Worse, it diverts us
from the true explanation of behavior—the controlling effect of the environ-
ment (Skinner, 1969, pp. 240–241; 1974, pp. 68–71).
Feelings. Skinner acknowledged that we have emotions, just as we
have thoughts. However, feelings do not cause behavior any more than
thoughts do. We might say we are going to the movies because “we want
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
to” or because “we feel like it,” but such statements explain nothing. If we
go to the movies, it is because this behavior has been reinforced in the past
(Skinner, 1971, p. 10).
Emotional responses themselves can be explained according to learning-
theory principles. In our discussion of Watson, we saw how emotional reac-
tions might be learned through classical conditioning. Skinner believes an
operant analysis is also useful. Many emotions are the by-products of differ-
ent reinforcement contingencies. Confidence, for example, is a by-product of
frequent positive reinforcement. When we learn to hit a baseball sharply and
consistently, we develop a sense of confidence and mastery (Skinner, 1974,
p. 58). Conversely, we become depressed and lethargic when reinforcements
are no longer forthcoming. On certain fixed-ratio or fixed-interval schedules
we find it difficult to get going after receiving a reward because further
rewards will not be coming for some time (p. 59).
An operant analysis also helps us understand why various patterns of
emotional behavior persist. If a little girl persistently behaves in an aggressive
manner, it is important to know the consequences of this behavior. Do her
actions succeed in getting attention or other children’s toys? If so, her aggres-
siveness is likely to continue. Similarly, if displays of happiness, meekness,
sympathy, fearfulness, and other emotional responses persist, it is because
they have produced positive consequences (Bijou & Baer, 1961, pp. 73–74;
Skinner, 1969, pp. 129–130).
Skinner believed, then, that we can understand emotions if we look at
them as the products of environmental control. It is useless to consider emo-
tions as intrapsychic causes of behavior, as the Freudians do. For example,
a Freudian might talk about a man who fears sex because of anticipated
punishment from an internal agency, the superego. To Skinner, such dis-
cussions get us nowhere. If we wish to understand why a person avoids sex,
we must look at the past consequences of his sexual behavior (Skinner, 1974,
chap. 10).
Drives. Skinner ’s refusal to look for causes of behavior within the
organism led to certain difficulties. In particular, he had trouble with the con-
cept of drive. Drives, such as hunger or thirst, would seem to refer to internal
states that motivate behavior, and Skinner himself deprived his animals of
food and water in order to make reinforcements effective.
Skinner argued that we do not need to conceive of drives as inner states,
either mental or physiological. We simply specify the hours we deprive an
animal of food or water and examine the effect of this operation on response
rates (Skinner, 1953, p. 149).
Still, the drive concept has remained a thorn in the side of Skinneri-
ans, and they have therefore searched for ways of conceptualizing rein-
forcement without reference to this concept. One interesting proposal has
been made by Premack (1961), who suggests we think of reinforcement simply
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
as the momentary probability of a response. Behavior that has a high prob-
ability of occurrence at the moment can serve as a reinforcer for behavior
with a lower probability. If children are supposed to be eating their dinner
but are busy playing instead, playing can be used as a reinforcer for eating.
We simply say, “Eat some dinner and then play some more” (Homme &
Totsi, 1969). Conceptualized in this way, eating and drinking have no spe-
cial status as reinforcers. Eating and drinking, like any other actions, may or
may not be good reinforcers, depending on their probabilities of occurrence
at a particular time.
Species-Specific Behavior
Skinner argued, then, that we need not look inside the organism for the causes
of behavior. Behavior is controlled by the external environment. There do
seem to be, however, certain limitations to environmental control. As we
briefly mentioned in our evaluation of Watson, each species has a particular
genetic endowment that makes it easier to teach it some things rather than
other things. Operant research has found, for example, that it is hard to teach
a rat to let go of objects, and it is hard to shape vocal behavior in nonhuman
species (Skinner, 1969, p. 201). There are, as learning theorists increasingly
say, biological “constraints” on what a species can learn.
In practice, Skinnerians often deal with species-specific behavior as
the topography of a response. That is, the experimenter maps out a descrip-
tion of the behavior he or she can work with—for example, vocal behavior
in humans. The topography is merely a description and does not consti-
tute the most important part of the analysis, which is the way reinforce-
ments shape and maintain behavior. Nevertheless, the topography is
essential (pp. 199–209).
In a larger sense, Skinner argued, even species-specific behavior is a
product of environmental contingencies. For such behavior has become, in
the course of evolution, part of the species’ repertoire because it has helped that
species survive in a certain environment. Thus environments selectively rein-
force all behavior—not only that in an animal’s lifetime but also that in its
species’ evolutionary past (pp. 199–209).
Practical Applications
Behavior Modification with Children with Autism. Skinner’s research
readily lends itself to practical applications. We have seen how Skinnerians
might extinguish temper tantrums or get an unruly class to behave. The use
of operant techniques to correct behavior problems is a branch of behavior
modification. Operant techniques supplement the systematic desensitization
procedures first employed by Watson and Jones.
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An impressive example of operant therapy is Lovaas’s work with chil-
dren with autism. Autism was first described by Kanner in 1943. It is a severe
disorder in which children are extremely isolated. The children also engage in
repetitive behavior such as spinning objects or flapping their hands over and
over. Many are mute, and others are echolalic—they merely echo what one
says. Some engage in self-injurious behavior, such as hitting themselves
(Lovaas, 2003; Koegel & Koegel, 2006, p. 34).
Lovaas tries to gain control over the children’s behavior so he can change
it. He tries to eliminate socially inappropriate behavior and reinforce socially
appropriate behavior. If a child engages in echolalia, repetitive behavior, or
self-injurious behavior, Lovaas withdraws attention or punishes the child with
a loud “No!” or a slap on the thigh. If the child does something more appro-
priate, such as emitting correct speech, Lovaas gives the child a reward, per-
haps a bit of tasty cereal and the word “Good” (Lovaas, 1987).
Frequently, appropriate behavior must be gradually shaped, as when
the therapist teaches mute children to imitate words. At first, the therapist
reinforces any vocalization the child makes, even blowing air out of the mouth.
Once the child is regularly making sounds, the therapist says a word such as
“baby” and rewards any sound that comes within the next 5 seconds. After
that, rewards are made contingent on better and better approximations of
“baby” (or other target words) (Lovaas, 1969, 1977).
Initially, some children are so silent that the therapist must elicit sounds
by tickling them or pressing their lips together and then letting the air out.
These interventions are called manual prompts. Strictly speaking, these prompts
violate Skinner ’s operant paradigm; operant conditioning reinforces freely
emitted behavior—not behavior forced by the therapist’s actions. Prompts are
faded as soon as possible (Lovaas, 1977, pp. 36–37).
Lovaas’s therapy is intensive. In his first major project, begun in the 1960s,
Lovaas and his staff trained children seven hours a day, seven days a week, for
one year in a residential treatment setting at UCLA. Most of the children were 5
to 8 years old (Lovaas, 1973, 1977). Many made significant progress, but when
they were discharged to state hospitals, they lost all they had gained. In his next
major project, in the 1970s and 1980s, Lovaas avoided this discharge problem; he
worked with children in their homes and taught parents to help train the chil-
dren. He also worked with younger children—under the age of 4 years. The chil-
dren were trained at least 40 hours a week. After 2 to 3 years, nearly half entered
first grade as regular students—an achievement that would have once seemed
impossible (Lovaas, 1987). A 6-year follow-up study found that almost all of
these children still attended a regular school (McEachlin, Smith, & Lovaas, 1993).
Lovaas and his colleagues have described their treatment as applied behav-
ior analysis, or ABA, a term they apply to any therapy that uses principles of
learning in a measurable, scientific manner. Lovaas’s ABA methods are still the
most widely used, but there are new variations. Robert and Lynn Koegel and
their colleagues (2006) have developed a program that focuses less on teaching
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
discrete skills and more on broad areas such as motivation. The Koegels believe
that children often have difficulty with Lovaas’s tasks and sometimes lose their
enthusiasm for learning because reinforcement is infrequent. The Koegels there-
fore offer reinforcement more frequently—often just for the effort. (They call this
loose shaping.) They also let the child choose toys and activities. And instead of
giving cereal treats, they offer rewards that are important to the child in his or
her everyday environment. If a girl wants a shovel to dig in the sand, the thera-
pist asks her to say “Shovel,” and if she does, she receives the shovel. If she says,
“Swing,” she gets a push on the swing. The Koegels have reported success,
although their studies aren’t nearly as extensive as those by Lovaas.
Compared to Lovaas, the Koegels give children more opportunities to
take the lead. But the therapist still maintains control, as when the therapist
requires the child to name an object such as a shovel before receiving it. Fur-
thermore, if a child engages in highly repetitive behavior, the therapist actively
intervenes to turn the child’s attention to other activities. Sometimes the ther-
apist actually stands in front of the object, such as a fan, that stimulates repet-
itive behavior (Koegel & Koegel, 2006, p. 221).
Programmed Instruction. Skinner contributed to the education of
normal children through his invention of teaching machines and programmed
instruction (Skinner, 1968). The teaching machine was a simple apparatus that
permitted one to read a brief passage, answer questions, and then, by turning
a knob, see if one was correct. Actually, the machine itself was less important
than the programmed material it contained, and today the material is pre-
sented in simple booklet form or installed in a computer. To get an idea of
how programmed instruction works, read the following material2 and pre-
tend to fill in the blanks. As you do so, cover the answers on the left side with
a piece of paper, sliding it down just far enough to check your answers.
1. Programmed instruction involves several basic
principles of learning. One of these, called the
principle of small steps, is based on the premise that
small new information must be presented in _____ steps.
2. The learner gradually acquires more and more
small steps information, but always in _____ _____.
3. Because active readers generally acquire more
knowledge than passive readers, programmed
instruction also is based on the principle of active
participation. Writing key words as one is reading
active involves the principle of _____ participation.
2From Munn, N. L., Fernald, L. D., and Fernald, P. S., Introduction to Psychology, 3rd ed.,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974, pp. 249–250. By permission.
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
4. While reading a book, an uninterested learner may
slip into a passive state and discover that he can-
not recall what he has just “read.” In using pro-
grammed instruction the learner is prompted to
remain alert by writing the key words, thus uti-
active participation lizing the principle of _____ _____.
5. In these two techniques of programmed instruction,
small steps information is presented in _____ _____, and occa-
sionally key words are missing thus requiring the
active participation learner’s _____ _____ to complete the statements.
6. A third principle, immediate knowledge of results, is
illustrated when a professor returns quiz papers
to his students at the end of the class in which they
were written. These students receive almost imme-
knowledge diate _____of results.
7. If a student makes an incorrect response at any
point in programmed instruction, he discovers his
mistake because the correct answer may be seen
immediately after the frame, before the next one is
immediate considered. Thus, in programmed instruction, the
of results learner receives _____ knowledge _____ _____.
8. Notice that in programmed instruction, unlike
the evaluation of term papers, “immediate” does
not mean a week or even a day but rather a few
seconds. The reader of the program is continu-
immediate knowledge ously informed concerning his progress; he
of results receives _____ _____ _____ _____.
9. Let us review the three techniques of programmed
small steps instruction already considered. By means of
active participation _____ _____, the reader learns new material,
immediate knowledge which he acquires through _____ _____ followed
of results by _____ _____ _____ _____.
Programmed instruction embodies several Skinnerian principles. First,
it proceeds in small steps, because Skinner has found that the best way to
establish new behavior is to shape it bit by bit. Second, the learner is active,
because this is the natural condition of organisms. (Recall how Pavlov’s dogs,
in contrast, were harnessed in and simply reacted to stimuli.) Third, feedback
is immediate because Skinner found that learning is most rapid when
promptly reinforced. (Reinforcement here is the knowledge that one’s answer
is correct.)
A sample of programmed reading for children is found in Figure 4. In
programmed instruction, students work independently and at their own pace.
The instruction units are constructed so each student may begin at a level she
can easily master. One does not want the student making many errors at first,
for then she will lack positive reinforcement for learning. As with shaping, one
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
begins by reinforcing responses that are within the student’s behavioral reper-
toire and gradually building up from there.
On a technical level, programmed instruction has run into some diffi-
culties. For example, students sometimes rush through the programs with-
out fully mastering the material (Munson & Crosbie, 1998). But the
underlying principles are important and make efforts to solve the problems
worthwhile.
Surprisingly, the principles underlying programmed instruction over-
lap somewhat with Montessori’s. Both Skinner and Montessori wanted to
make learning an individualized, self-paced activity that begins at the stu-
dent’s own level and builds skills gradually. For both, the goal is not to tear
down, through criticism or punishment, but to make learning a consistently
positive experience.
But the two approaches also differ. For one thing, programmed
instruction involves material that young children read (see Figure 4),
whereas Montessori materials are largely physical. Even when learning to
read, Montessori children begin with sandpaper letters, metal insets, and so
on. Montessori thought young children find such physical activities more
natural.
More fundamentally, there is the difference in the extent to which the
child’s work is free from adult direction. Montessori allowed children to
choose their own tasks and work on them while the teacher steps into the
background. She wanted children to discover for themselves how some-
thing is out of place, how cylinders fit, how water is poured, and whatever
else is important to them. In programmed instruction, in contrast, adult
direction is pervasive. Although it might seem that children work
Mat
Man
Mat
I am a
man.
mat.
I am a ma .
I am a ma .
FIGURE 4
Programmed instruction for children.
(Adapted from Sullivan, M. W., Programmed
learning in reading. In A. D. Calvin, Ed.,
Programmed Instruction: Bold New Venture.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969,
p. 111. By permission of the publisher.)
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
independently on the booklets, in fact an adult (the program developer)
has structured each small response. The child follows the adult’s lead,
repeatedly checking with this social authority to see if she is right. Chil-
dren probably derive less sense that they are making their own discoveries
about the world.
Nevertheless, it is important not to overlook the similarities between
the two methods—especially the way both try to make learning a positive
experience. One can even imagine Skinner approving Montessori’s physical
tasks, albeit in his own terms. He would say they work not because they
allow for spontaneous discoveries, but because they allow children to make
responses that readily result in positive feedback from the physical
environment.
EVALUATION
Skinner considerably widened the scope of learning theory. After noting the
limitations of classical conditioning, he explored the nature of operant behav-
ior, where the organism acts freely and is controlled by the consequences of
its actions. In a brilliant series of studies, Skinner showed how such control is
exerted—by schedules of reinforcement, shaping, the influence of discrimi-
native stimuli, and other factors. Furthermore, Skinner amply demonstrated
the practical importance of his ideas.
In the process, Skinner stirred up controversies on many fronts. To some,
his work lends itself to authoritarian practices—for he suggests ways to con-
trol, manipulate, and program others’ behavior. Skinner’s (e.g., 1974, p. 244)
reply was that environments do, in fact, control behavior, and how we use
our knowledge of this fact is up to us. We can create environments that suit
humane purposes, or we can create ones that do not.
Developmentalists, too, often enter into heated, value-laden debates
with Skinnerians. Developmentalists cringe at talk of controlling and chang-
ing children’s behavior, when we should, instead, try to understand children
and give them opportunities to grow on their own. To many Skinnerians, such
sentiments are romantic and naive, for children chiefly develop through the
molding influence of the external environment.
In a more objective vein, there are essentially three ways in which
Skinner and writers in the developmental tradition disagree. First, devel-
opmental theorists often discuss internal events. Piaget described complex
mental structures, even though he did not expect to find direct evidence
for all of them in any individual case. Freudians discuss internal events,
such as unconscious fantasies, that we cannot directly observe at all. Skin-
ner believed such concepts divert us from scientific progress, which is made
when we confine ourselves to the measurement of overt responses and
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
environmental stimuli. But on this point, Skinner is now generally consid-
ered too extreme. Since the 1960s, there has been a dramatic new interest in
cognition, and even growing numbers of learning theorists have been con-
sidering internal, cognitive events, even if the events cannot be directly
measured.
Second, developmental theorists and Skinnerians disagree on the mean-
ing and importance of developmental stages—periods when children orga-
nize experience in very different ways. In Piaget’s theory, for example, a child’s
stage is a crucial variable; it is a predictor of the kind of experience the child
can learn from. A child at the sensorimotor level will not learn tasks that
involve language, nor will a child beginning to master concrete operations
learn much from lectures covering abstract theory.
Skinnerians doubt the validity of stages as general, distinct ways of
thinking or behaving; they believe the environment shapes behavior in a grad-
ual, continuous manner (Bijou, 1976, p. 2; Skinner, 1953, p. 91). Skinner did
acknowledge that one must note the child’s age in any experiment, just as one
must note an animal’s species and characteristic behavior (Skinner, 1969, p. 89).
Age contributes to the “topography” of behavior; it helps describe the behav-
ior that the experimenter sets about to shape or maintain. However, such infor-
mation is still merely descriptive; it is secondary to environmental variables
that control behavior. The question is whether the child’s developmental sta-
tus deserves this secondary role.
A third issue dividing Skinner and developmental theorists is the most
important of all. This issue concerns the source of behavioral change. Devel-
opmentalists contend that in crucial instances a child’s thoughts, feelings, and
actions develop spontaneously, from within. Behavior is not exclusively pat-
terned by the external environment. Gesell, for example, believed children
stand, walk, talk, and so on from inner maturational promptings. Piaget was
not a maturationist, but he also looked primarily to inner forces underlying
developmental change. In his view, children’s behavior is not structured by the
environment but by children themselves. Children, out of a spontaneous inter-
est in moderately novel events, construct increasingly complex and differen-
tiated structures for dealing with the world.
Consider, for example, a baby girl who drops a block, hears the sound,
and drops it again and again, making this new and interesting sound last.
In Skinner ’s theory, the sound is a reinforcer that controls her behavior. But
this reinforcer will soon lose its effectiveness, for she will soon become inter-
ested in more complex outcomes (Kohlberg, 1969a). She may, for instance,
begin listening for different sounds as she drops objects from different
heights. For Piaget, we cannot look to external reinforcements as the deter-
minants of behavior, for these often vary with the child’s developing inter-
ests. For him, the main variable is the child’s spontaneous curiosity about
increasingly complex events.
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Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
Developmental theorists, then, try to conceptualize ways in which chil-
dren grow and learn on their own, somewhat independent of others’ teach-
ings or external reinforcements. At the same time, no one can deny that
environments also reinforce and control behavior to a considerable extent, and
often in ways Skinner described. Skinner ’s theory and research, moreover,
have a clarity and elegant simplicity that others would do well to emulate. It
is clear that Skinner’s enormous contribution to scientific method and theory
will be a lasting one.
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Bandura’s Social
Learning Theory
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Bandura’s Social
Learning Theory
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
The pioneering learning theorists usually developed their concepts by
experimenting with animals in physical settings. They watched how
animals ran through mazes, solved puzzle boxes, and learned to press
levers in Skinner boxes. These situations were not social; there were
no other animals present. Skinnerians and others then showed how
the same principles apply to human learning in social contexts. Just as
rats learn to press levers to get food, people learn to interact with others
to obtain social rewards.
In the 1960s, however, Albert Bandura argued that our learning
in social situations goes beyond anything Skinner and most learning
theorists described. In social settings, Bandura said, we learn a great
deal through imitation, and imitation involves cognitive processes. We
acquire considerable information just by observing models, mentally
coding what we see.
In the 1970s Bandura refined his ideas on observational learn-
ing and demonstrated the powerful effects models have on our behav-
ior. Beginning in the 1980s he turned more attention to the ways our
efforts are influenced by our beliefs in our capacities—our self-efficacy
beliefs. Bandura’s lifetime of work occupies a central place in modern
psychology.
Bandura was born in 1925 in the tiny town of Mundare in the
province of Alberta, Canada. His parents had emigrated to Mundare
from Eastern Europe as teenagers and had converted a homestead into
a farm, which they struggled to maintain against storms and droughts.
As a boy Bandura pitched in when he could. Although his parents had
no schooling, they valued education and instilled this value in Bandura.
After attending a high school with only 20 students, Bandura enrolled
in the University of British Columbia, working afternoons in a wood-
work plant to help pay the cost (Bandura, 2006; Evans, 1989).
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
Bandura enrolled in his first psychology class almost by chance. He was
commuting to the college with a group of engineering and premed students
who took early morning classes, and Bandura had a gap in his schedule. So
he signed up for the psychology course and immediately became fascinated
by the topic. He majored in it; and after earning his bachelor ’s degree, he
entered the clinical psychology graduate program at the University of Iowa.
While he was there he became impressed by the work of Robert Sears and
other pioneers of social learning theory, and Bandura began thinking seri-
ously about the role of models in shaping our lives (Bandura, 2006; Evans,
1989; Zimmerman & Schunk, 2003).
Soon after graduate school, Bandura joined the faculty of Stanford Uni-
versity, where he has been ever since. In 1974 he was elected president of the
American Psychological Association. Bandura didn’t just serve as a titular
head; he actively organized the members to fight federal budget cuts to psy-
chological services. Over the years, Bandura has received numerous honors
and awards. Former students speak fondly of his wry humor and praise him
for the demanding but helpful mentorship he provided (Zimmerman &
Schunk, 2003).
BASIC CONCEPTS
Observational Learning
In Skinner’s theory, learning often appears to be a gradual process in which
organisms must act to learn. Organisms emit responses, which are gradually
shaped by their consequences. Bandura (1962), however, argues that in social
situations we often learn much more rapidly simply by observing the behav-
ior of others. When, for example, children learn new songs or play house just
like their parents, they often reproduce long sequences of new behavior imme-
diately. They appear to acquire large segments of new behavior all at once,
through observation alone.
The power of observational learning is well documented in the anthro-
pological literature (Bandura & Walters, 1963, chap. 2; Honigmann, 1967,
p. 180). In one Guatemalan subculture, girls learn to weave almost exclusively
by watching models. The teacher demonstrates the operations of the textile
machine while the girl simply observes. Then, when the girl feels ready, she
takes over, and she usually operates it skillfully on her very first try. She
demonstrates, in Bandura’s (1965a) term, no-trial learning; she acquires new
behavior all at once, entirely through observation. She does not need to
fumble through any tedious process of trial-and-error learning with differential
reinforcement for each small response.
When new behavior is acquired through observation alone, the learn-
ing appears to be cognitive. When the Guatemalan girl watches her teacher
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
and then imitates her perfectly without any practice, she must rely on some
inner representation of the behavior that guides her own performance.
Bandura, unlike Skinner, believes learning theory must include internal cog-
nitive variables.
Observation also teaches us the probable consequences of new behavior;
we notice what happens when others try it. Bandura calls this process vicarious
reinforcement. Vicarious reinforcement is also a cognitive process; we formu-
late expectations about the outcomes of our own behavior without any direct
action on our part.
We learn from models of many kinds—not only from live models but
also from symbolic models, such as those we see on television or read about in
books. Another form of symbolic modeling is verbal instruction, as when an
instructor describes for us the actions for driving a car. In this case the teacher’s
verbal descriptions, together with a demonstration, usually teach us most of
what we need to know. This is fortunate, for if we had to learn to drive exclu-
sively from the consequences of our own actions, few of us would survive
the process (Bandura, 1962, pp. 214, 241).
Let us now look more closely at the observational learning process,
which Bandura divides into four subprocesses.
The Four Components
of Observational Learning
1. Attentional Processes. First of all, we cannot imitate a model unless
we pay attention to the model. Models often attract our attention because they
are distinctive, or because they possess the trappings of success, prestige,
power, and other winsome qualities (Bandura, 1971, p. 17). Television is par-
ticularly successful at presenting models with engaging characteristics and
exerts a powerful influence on our lives (Bandura, 1977, p. 25). Attention is also
governed by the psychological characteristics of observers, such as their inter-
ests, but less is known about such variables (p. 25).
2. Retention Processes. Because we frequently imitate models some
time after we have observed them, we must have some way of remembering
their actions in symbolic form. Bandura (1965a; 1971, p. 17) thinks of sym-
bolic processes in terms of stimulus contiguity, associations among stimuli that
occur together. Suppose, for example, we watch a man use a new tool, a drill.
He shows us how to fasten the bit, plug it in, and so on. Later, the sight of the
drill alone arouses many associated images, and these guide our actions.
In the example, the stimuli are all visual. However, we usually remem-
ber events, Bandura (1971, p. 18) says, by associating them with verbal codes.
When we watch a motorist take a new route, we connect the route with
words (e.g., “Route 1, then Exit 12 . . .”). Later, when we try to drive the
route ourselves, the verbal codes help us follow it.
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Young children, under the age of 5 years or so, are not yet accustomed
to thinking in words and probably must rely quite heavily on visual images.
This limits their ability to imitate. We therefore can improve on their imitations
by directing them to use verbal codes—that is, by asking them to give verbal
descriptions of a model’s behavior while they are watching it (Bandura, 1971,
p. 19; Coates & Hartup, 1969).
On many memory tasks, young children display a striking disregard for
their own capacities and limitations. For example, Vygotsky (1931b, p. 71)
found that young children approach tasks, no matter how simple or difficult,
with the same unbridled enthusiasm. They act as if they can remember any-
thing. In contemporary terms, they lack metacognitive awareness; they do not
yet observe and assess their own cognitive skills. Between the ages of about
5 and 10 years, children gradually learn to evaluate their memory capacities
and learn when to use memory aids such as verbal rehearsals (repeating some-
thing to themselves over and over to remember it better). Bandura (1986,
p. 89) summarizes experimental evidence that suggests models can help chil-
dren learn to use verbal rehearsal and other techniques.
3. Motor Reproduction Processes. To reproduce behavior accurately,
the person must have the necessary motor skills. For example, a boy might
watch his father use a saw but find he cannot imitate very well because he
lacks the physical strength and agility. From observation alone, he picks up a
new pattern of responses (e.g., how to set up the wood and where to place the
saw) but no new physical abilities (e.g., cutting with power). The latter come
only with physical growth and practice (Bandura, 1977, p. 27).
4. Reinforcement and Motivational Processes. Bandura, like cogni-
tive learning theorists before him (Tolman, 1948), distinguishes between the
acquisition and the performance of new responses. We can observe a model, and
thereby acquire new knowledge, but we may or may not perform the responses.
A boy might hear his neighbor use some profane language, and thereby learn
some new words, but the boy might not reproduce them himself.
Performances are governed by reinforcement and motivational variables;
we will actually imitate another if we are likely to gain a reward. In part, it is
our past history of direct reinforcements that matters. If, in our example, the
boy has himself received respect and admiration for swearing, he is likely to
imitate his neighbor. If, however, he has been punished for swearing, he prob-
ably will hesitate to imitate his neighbor.
Performances also are influenced by vicarious reinforcements, the conse-
quences one sees accrue to the model. If the boy sees his neighbor admired for
swearing, the boy is likely to imitate him. If he sees the neighbor punished, he
is less likely to do so (Bandura, 1971, p. 46; 1977, pp. 117–124).
Performances, finally, are partly governed by self-reinforcements, the eval-
uations we make of our own behavior. We will discuss this process in a later
section.
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
Conclusion. To imitate a model successfully, then, we must (1) attend
to the model, (2) have some way of retaining what we have seen in symbolic
form, and (3) have the necessary motor skills to reproduce the behavior. If
these conditions are met, we probably know how to imitate the model. Still,
we might not do so. Our actual performances are governed by (4) reinforce-
ment contingencies, many of which are of a vicarious sort.
In reality, these four components are not totally separate. Reinforce-
ment processes, in particular, influence what we attend to. For example, we
often attend to powerful, competent, prestigious models because we have
found that imitating them, rather than inferior models, leads to more posi-
tive consequences.
SOCIALIZATION STUDIES
Bandura’s four-part model gives a fine-grained analysis of imitative learning.
On a broader level, one of Bandura’s primary, if sometimes implicit, concerns
has been the socialization process—the process by which societies induce their
members to behave in socially acceptable ways.
Socialization is an inclusive process that influences almost every kind of
behavior, even technical skills. Many American teenage boys, for example,
feel they will not fit into their social group unless they learn to drive a car.
Automobile driving, however, is not something required by all cultures, and
there are classes of social behavior that have broader relevance. All cultures
seem to try to teach their members when it is acceptable to express aggression.
It also is likely that all cultures try to teach people certain modes of coopera-
tion, sharing, and helping. Aggression and cooperative behavior, then, are
“targets” of socialization in all cultures (Hetherington & Parke, 1977, p. 231).
In the next few sections we sample social learning analyses of some of the
target behaviors in the socialization process.
Aggression
Bandura (1967; Bandura & Walters, 1963) believes that the socialization of
aggression, as well as other behavior, is partly a matter of operant condition-
ing. Parents and other socializing agents reward children when they express
aggression in socially appropriate ways (e.g., in games or in hunting) and
punish children when they express aggression in socially unacceptable ways
(e.g., hitting younger children). But socializing agents also teach children a
great deal by the kinds of models they present. Children observe aggressive
models, notice when they are reinforced, and imitate accordingly. Bandura
has examined this process in several experiments, one of which is now
considered a classic.
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
In this study (Bandura, 1965b), 4-year-olds individually watched a film
in which an adult male model engaged in some moderately novel aggressive
behavior. The model laid a Bobo doll1 on its side, sat on it, and punched it,
shouting such things as, “Pow, right in the nose,” and “Sockeroo . . . stay
down” (pp. 590–591). Each child was assigned to one of three conditions,
which meant that each child saw the same film but with different endings.
1. In the aggression-rewarded condition, the model was praised and given
treats at the end of the film. A second adult called him a “strong cham-
pion” and gave him chocolate bars, soft drinks, and the like (p. 591).
2. In the aggression-punished condition, the model was called a “big bully,”
swatted, and forced to cower away at the end of the film (p. 591).
3. In the third, no-consequences condition, the model received neither
rewards nor punishments for his aggressive behavior.
Immediately after the film, each child was escorted into a room with a Bobo
doll and other toys. The experimenters observed the child through a one-way
mirror to see how often he or she would imitate the aggressive model.
The results indicated that those who had seen the model punished exhib-
ited significantly fewer imitations than did those in the other two groups. Thus
vicarious punishment reduced the imitation of aggressive responses. There
was no difference between the aggression-rewarded and no-consequences
groups. This is often the finding with respect to behavior, such as aggression,
that is typically prohibited. The observation that “nothing bad happens this
time” prompts imitation just as readily as does vicarious reward (Bandura,
1969, p. 239).
The experiment also had a second, equally important phase. An exper-
imenter came back into the room and told each child that he or she would
get juice and a pretty sticker picture for each additional response he or she
could reproduce. This incentive completely eliminated the differences among
the three groups. Now all the children—including those who had seen the
model punished—imitated him to the same extent. Vicarious punishment
had only blocked the performance of new responses, not their acquisition. The
children in the aggression-punished condition had learned new responses,
but had not felt it wise to actually reproduce them until a new incentive was
introduced.
One of Bandura’s followers, Robert Liebert (Liebert et al., 1977, p. 145),
suggests this experiment has implications for aggression in television and
movies. Children are frequently exposed to actors who demonstrate clever
ways of committing homicides and other crimes. The widespread showing
of such films is justified by the fact that the criminals are usually caught in the
1A large inflated rubber doll.
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
end. But Bandura’s work suggests that children probably learn about crimi-
nal behavior nonetheless, and only inhibit such behavior until a time when
environmental contingencies clearly favor its occurrence.
In the above experiment, children performed newly acquired responses.
Models also can influence the performance of previously learned behavior of the
same general class. For example, a boy might watch a violent movie and then
act roughly toward his sister. He does not actually imitate the behavior he
saw in the film, but he feels freer to engage in previously learned behavior of
the same kind. In such cases, we say the behavior has been disinhibited. Mod-
els may also inhibit previously learned behavior, as when a girl sees a boy
punished in class and therefore decides to check her impulse to do something
else of a mischievous nature (Bandura & Walters, 1963, p. 72; Liebert et al.,
1977, pp. 146–147).
Gender Roles
During socialization, children are taught to behave in gender-appropriate
ways. Societies encourage boys to develop “masculine” traits and girls to
develop “feminine” traits.
It is possible, of course, that gender traits are also, in part, genetically
linked. Social learning theorists do not deny this possibility. But they believe
that more is to be gained from the study of socialization processes and the role
of imitation in particular (Bandura & Walters, 1963, pp. 26–29; Mischel, 1970).
In the learning of gender roles, the acquisition/performance distinction
is especially important (Mischel, 1970). Children frequently learn, through
observation, the behavior of both genders; however, they usually perform
only the behavior appropriate to their own gender because this is what they
have been reinforced to do. Margaret Mead (1964) told how Eskimo boys are
encouraged to practice hunting and building snow houses, whereas the girls
are not. So, ordinarily only the boys engage in these activities. But the girls
watch the boys, and in emergencies they can execute many of the skills. The
girls pick up the skills through observation alone (see Figure 1).
It is also possible, though, for children to become discouraged with respect
to opposite-gender activities. If they don’t get much opportunity to practice the
skills, and aren’t reinforced for them, they might stop paying as careful atten-
tion to them. Sex-typed social reinforcement, then, might have a negative effect
on observation itself (Grusec & Brinker, 1972; Maccoby & Wilson, 1957).
Prosocial Behavior
Since the 1970s there has been considerable interest in the nature and roots of
prosocial behavior—acts of sharing, helping, cooperation, and altruism. Social
learning theorists have taken the lead in this area, showing that prosocial
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
FIGURE 1
This young girl is imitating her father. After a while
she probably will find that she receives more rein-
forcement for imitating females. However, she still
may learn a good deal about “masculine” skills
from observation alone.
behavior can be readily influenced by exposure to the appropriate models. In
a typical study (Rushton, 1975), 7- to 11-year-old children watched an adult
model play a bowling game and donate some of his winnings to a “needy
children’s fund.” Immediately afterward, these children played the game
alone, and they themselves made many donations—far more than did a con-
trol group who had not seen the altruistic model. Furthermore, the children
who had observed the model still donated more 2 months later, even when
placed in a different room with a different experimenter. Evidently, even a
relatively brief exposure to a generous model exerts a fairly permanent effect
on children’s sharing.
Numerous other experiments have shown that models influence not
only children’s sharing but also their helpfulness toward others in distress,
their cooperativeness, and their concern for the feelings of others (Bryan, 1975;
Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, pp. 79–90). The experimental findings in this
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
area also seem supported by more naturalistic studies, in which parental
behavior is linked to their children’s altruism (DeHart et al., 2004, p. 353;
Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, pp. 86–90).
Practicing and Preaching. Socializing agents teach children not only
by behavioral example but also by preaching virtue and telling children how
to behave. Such verbal techniques have been most fully explored in research
on prosocial behavior, so a brief review might be in order.
First of all, preaching seems ineffective unless it is forceful. If an adult
simply says, “It is nice to share,” the child will be far more influenced by what
the adult actually does. If the adult shares, so will the child—regardless of
whether the adult preaches altruism or greed (Bryan & Walbek, 1970). When,
however, the preaching becomes stronger, taking the form of long emotional
sermons and commands, it can be effective (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977,
pp. 151–152).
Commands, however, are coercive and may backfire, as found in a study
by G. M. White (1972). In this experiment some children took turns bowling
with an adult who told them to share some of their winnings with needy chil-
dren. Other children were simply given the opportunity to follow an altruistic
example. The immediate result was that the children who were ordered to share
did so to a greater extent, even when playing alone. In a posttest, however, these
children’s sharing decreased sharply, and they displayed a greater incidence of
stealing, perhaps reflecting their resentment against the coercive technique.
Self-Regulation
As people become socialized, they depend less on external rewards and punish-
ments and increasingly regulate their own behavior. That is, they establish their
own internal standards and reward and punish themselves in accordance with
them. For example, a woman might criticize herself for a moral transgression
that no one else is even aware of. She punishes herself because her behavior
violated her own standards.
Bandura has been very interested in how people evaluate their own per-
formances as they strive for success and achievement. Some people set exceed-
ingly high achievement goals and reward themselves only when they meet
them. An artist, for example, might approve of his own work only after he
has corrected flaws that others would never detect. Others are satisfied with
less perfect work.
How are self-evaluative standards acquired? In part, Bandura believes,
they are the product of direct rewards and punishments. For example, parents
might give their daughter approval only when she earns very high grades, and
after a while she adopts this high standard as her own.
But Bandura’s focus, once again, has been on the influence of models.
In several experiments, Bandura and his colleagues (Bandura & Kupers,
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
1964; Bandura, 1986, pp. 341–342) have shown that children and adults adopt
the self-evaluative standards they observe in others. For example, if chil-
dren watch an adult model reward himself with self-praise and candy treats
only when he attains a high score in bowling, the children will adopt high
self-evaluative standards when it’s their turn to bowl. If, in contrast, the
children observe a model who displays low self-evaluative standards (and
gives himself treats even when he scores poorly), the children will use low
standards too.
In ordinary life, the situation is more complicated because children are
exposed to a variety of models (e.g., parents, TV characters, and peers), some
of whom exemplify high self-evaluative standards and some of whom do not.
Which models will children follow?
Bandura (1986, pp. 342–343) says that children tend to adopt the self-
evaluative standards of peers rather than adults because children can more
easily achieve the lower standards that peers set. But Bandura also points
out that we can do things to get children to adopt higher standards. For
example, we can encourage children to associate with high-achieving peers
(peers who meet high self-evaluative standards). We can also expose chil-
dren to models who are rewarded for adhering to high standards. We might
read children stories about scientists and athletes who settled for nothing
short of excellence and who eventually achieved great success and public
acclaim.
People who set high self-evaluative standards are generally hard work-
ers, and hard work produces real accomplishments. At the same time, high
goals are difficult to achieve, and people who set high goals are prone to dis-
appointment and depression. Such people, Bandura says, can avoid depres-
sion by focusing on subgoals. That is, instead of measuring their progress in
terms of distant aims, they should set realistically attainable goals for each
day and reward themselves when they achieve them (pp. 354, 359–360). Like
Locke, Watson, and Skinner before him, Bandura recommends a method of
small steps.
SELF-EFFICACY
When we regulate our own behavior, we engage in self-observation. We eval-
uate our ongoing performances in terms of our standards and goals. On other
occasions, we reflect on our general abilities, reaching conclusions such as,
“I’m good at algebra” and “I’m a poor swimmer.” Bandura calls such general
judgments self-efficacy appraisals (1986, chap. 9). In recent years, self-efficacy has
been a central focus of Bandura’s work.
Bandura believes that our self-efficacy appraisals exert powerful effects
on our levels of motivation. When we believe we are good at tasks, we work
on them vigorously and persist with them despite temporary setbacks. When
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we doubt our abilities, we work less energetically and are more likely to give
up when we encounter difficulties (p. 394).
The importance of perceived self-efficacy was demonstrated in an experi-
ment by Collins (1982, cited in Bandura, 1986, p. 391). Collins divided children
into two groups according to their level of ability in mathematics, and he also
asked the children about their own opinions of their abilities. Collins then gave
all the children some difficult problems. As we would expect, the children in
the high-ability group outperformed those in the low-ability group. But per-
ceived self-efficacy also had an effect. Within each ability group, the children
who believed they were good at math solved more problems, chose to work on
more of the problems they failed, and displayed a more positive attitude toward
mathematics.
It is possible, of course, to have too high an estimate of one’s abilities. This
is especially true when physical injury can result. If we overestimate our abil-
ity to ski down a steep slope, we could be seriously hurt. In general, however,
Bandura believes it’s good to overestimate our capacities and our belief we will
succeed. Life is strewn with difficulties—disappointments, setbacks, impedi-
ments, inequities. Optimistic self-efficacy is therefore beneficial: “Tenacious
strivers believe so strongly in themselves that they are able to exert extraordi-
nary effort and suffer countless reversals in pursuit of their vision” (Bandura,
1998, p. 57).
Sources of Self-Efficacy Appraisals
Bandura (1986, pp. 399–408) suggests that self-efficacy appraisals are based on
four sources of information.
1. The most influential source of knowledge is actual performance. If we
repeatedly succeed at tasks, our sense of efficacy increases. If we repeat-
edly fail, our sense of efficacy drops. Once we have developed a robust
sense of self-efficacy in an area, we are not too troubled by temporary set-
backs. We are likely to attribute failures to our lack of effort or to poor tac-
tics and to try again. And if we succeed, our sense of efficacy goes up even
higher.
2. Self-efficacy appraisals are also influenced by vicarious experiences. If
we see others succeed at a task, we infer that we can do it too. This is especially
true if we believe others have roughly the same abilities as we do.
3. Another variable is verbal persuasion—pep talks. When someone con-
vinces us we can perform a task, we usually do better on it. Pep talks cannot,
of course, enable us to accomplish tasks that are far too difficult. But outside
encouragement can help, largely because success usually depends more on the
effort we put into a task than on any inherent ability.
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4. Finally, we judge our abilities partly on the basis of physiological cues.
For example, we might interpret fatigue or tension as signs that a task is
becoming too difficult for us. At the same time, people often react differently
to the same bodily cues. One girl, warming up for the 400-meter race, may
interpret her anxiety as a sign that she is too tense to do well. Another girl
may interpret the same bodily cues as an indication that she is getting “fired
up,” that her “adrenaline is flowing,” and that she is ready to do her best.
Bandura (1994) has sketched out, in a very preliminary way, the devel-
opment of self-efficacy over the life span. Infants develop a sense of self-
efficacy as they explore the environment and get the sense that they can have
some control over it. As children grow, their social world widens. They look
to peers as models of self-efficacy and also as sources of social comparison.
Teenagers evaluate their efficacy in new areas, including dating. Young adults
must evaluate new capacities as workers and parents, and older people
reassess their abilities as they adjust to retirement and create a new lifestyle.
Throughout life, a resilient sense of self-efficacy keeps people moving for-
ward with energy and vitality. When self-efficacy is low, people are prone to
depression, resignation, and painful self-doubts.
ABSTRACT MODELING AND PIAGET’S STAGES
In the course of his writing, Bandura has expanded on the meaning of imi-
tation. Ordinarily, Bandura (1971) observes, psychologists think of model-
ing as a process of exact imitation. Exact imitation occurs, for example,
when a child tries to imitate a friend’s precise behavior, such as the friend’s
way of writing the letter L. But children also engage in abstract modeling;
they induce the general rules or principles underlying particular behav-
iors, and they then use these rules to generate entirely new behavior on
their own. For example, English-speaking children induce, from all the
language they hear, that the rule for forming the plural is to add the s sound,
and they then use the rule to generate countless new sentences. Similarly,
Bandura says, children induce the kinds of concepts that Piaget has discussed.
By observing a model, a child might induce a new moral rule or the principle
of conservation.
To some extent, Bandura views abstract modeling in a Piagetian vein.
Like Piaget, Bandura sees the child as an active agent; the child induces rules
and grasps concepts. But Bandura’s emphasis is much more on the way the
external environment—especially models—influences the kinds of concepts
children learn. Later we review some of the research by Bandura and his
colleagues on how models might influence children’s conceptual develop-
ment. But first, let us compare the theories of Piaget and Bandura a bit more
thoroughly.
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
Bandura and Piaget
Piaget, you will recall, thought that children learn much on their own, from
an intrinsic interest in the world. Children are especially curious about stim-
uli that are moderately novel, that do not quite fit into their existing cognitive
structures. When, for example, our son Tom was 11 months old, he could
grasp many things with his hands, so he was surprised to discover one day
that he couldn’t grasp water. He kept trying and failing, intently studying the
way the water responded to his actions. Tom was not motivated by adult
approval or any other external reinforcement. He was engrossed in the prob-
lem itself. And because he was so interested in the problem, he continued to
work on it, and over the next several months he invented some ways of hold-
ing water.
In Piaget’s view, then, children construct their own cognitive structures
as they work on intrinsically interesting problems. In the process, their think-
ing undergoes a series of broad transformations called stages. These stages,
in turn, indicate the kinds of new problems children will find most interest-
ing; for they continue to be most curious about events and activities that are
just beyond their current level. This principle of moderate discrepancy holds
for imitation too; children are spontaneously interested in models whose
behavior is slightly more complex than their own (Kohlberg, 1966b; 1969a,
p. 434; Kuhn, 1974). This is why we often see children tagging along after
somewhat older ones, trying to do the same things. Thus Piagetians do not
spend much time examining the modeling influences in a child’s life; they
study, instead, the child’s cognitive behavior at each stage, for the child’s stage
determines the kinds of models the child will seek out.
Bandura, in contrast, is much more of an environmentalist. It is appeal-
ing, he says, to imagine children making their own discoveries and creating
their own ideas. In reality, however, children’s minds are structured by the
environment, by the models and the social training practices the environment
provides (Bandura, 1977, p. 183; Bandura & Walters, 1963, p. 44).
In some major works (1977, 1986, 1997), Bandura has softened his envi-
ronmentalism somewhat. He talks about “reciprocal influences” among indi-
viduals, their behavior, and the environment. But Bandura is still much more
an environmentalist than Piaget, and Bandura continues to raise strong objec-
tions to Piagetian theory. Specifically, he disagrees with two basic Piagetian
tenets.
First, Bandura doubts that children learn much on their own, out of an
intrinsic interest in moderately novel events. He says that if children were
motivated to figure out everything that is slightly beyond their grasp, they
would be learning all the time. But this is not the case. If we want children
to learn, we must motivate them and assist them. We must teach them things,
administer rewards and punishments, and provide them with appropriate
models. After a while, to be sure, children do become self-motivated learn-
ers. But this does not mean they now learn for learning’s sake, because of
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their natural curiosity about the world. Rather, they learn to meet their inter-
nal achievement standards (for example, to master 90% of the material on a
test). These internal standards, moreover, are themselves the products of
social teaching and modeling influences (Bandura, 1986, pp. 340, 480–488;
1989, pp. 8–9, 34–35).
Bandura (1997, p. 219) acknowledges that intrinsic interest does exist.
But he says it occurs after we meet our achievement standards and develop
feelings of self-efficacy. For example, after we do well in biology courses, we
begin to enjoy the subject matter itself. But intrinsic interest is not primary.
Second, Bandura questions the validity of Piagetian stages. At first the
stages seem plausible because children do often master material in sequences.
But this is only because people usually solve easier problems before they solve
more difficult ones. There is nothing special about Piaget’s stage sequences,
and they are not as absolute as he claims.
Moreover, the stage concept implies that thinking becomes organized
and reorganized into broad unitary structures that underlie children’s think-
ing across a wide range of tasks. For example, the child at the stage of concrete
operations should apply the same logical operations to a wide variety of prob-
lems. But stages in this sense, Bandura argues, do not exist. Thinking actu-
ally consists of numerous discrete skills that vary from one cognitive domain
to the next. For example, reading, writing, and arithmetic all involve many of
their own particular skills and subskills. Piagetian stages, which lump chil-
dren’s thinking into broad categories, tell us little about the particular think-
ing skills in each area (Bandura, 1986, pp. 484–485).
Bandura argues, then, that Piaget’s view of development is false. Chil-
dren do not primarily learn on their own, nor does their thinking undergo
broad stage transformations.
Bandura’s opposition to Piaget is long standing, and Bandura and his
colleagues have conducted some classic studies that were designed to
demonstrate the superiority of their theory. In one, Bandura and McDonald
(1963) tried to show that modeling influences can alter Piaget’s stages of
moral reasoning.
Moral Reasoning. Piaget, you will recall, proposed a two-stage theory
of moral judgment, one aspect of which concerns consequences versus inten-
tions. That is, younger children tend to judge wrongdoing in terms of its con-
sequences, whereas older children base their judgments on the intentions
behind the act. For example, a young child is likely to say that a boy who
made a large ink spot trying to help his dad is naughtier than one who made
a small ink spot when playing around. The young child focuses on the con-
sequences—the amount of damage. The older child, in contrast, usually puts
more weight on the underlying motive.
Bandura gave 5- to 11-year-old children 12 such items and found the age
shift that Piaget and others (Kohlberg, 1969a) have documented. However,
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
Bandura emphasized, children of all ages evidenced at least some reasoning
of both kinds, suggesting the stages are not rigidly demarcated.
Following this pretest, Bandura tried to show that the children’s think-
ing could be altered by modeling influences. In a key part of the experiment,
children individually observed an adult model who was praised for giving
responses contrary to their own dominant mode. If, for example, a child had
typically judged wrongdoing in terms of intentions, the model always based
her judgment on the consequences. An experimenter presented the model
with a moral dilemma, praised her when she gave her answer, and gave the
child a turn on a new item. Taking turns in this way, the model and child each
responded to 12 new items (different from the pretest items).
This training procedure did have a strong effect. Prior to the training,
children gave one type of moral response only about 20% of the time; during
the treatment, this number increased to an average of about 50%.
The experiment also included an immediate posttest in which the chil-
dren responded once again to the pretest items. The results indicated that the
children persisted with their new mode of responding (about 38% to 53% of
the time).
The study, Bandura says, shows that “the so-called developmental stages
were readily altered by the provision of adult models” (Bandura & Walters,
1963, p. 209). There seems to be nothing fixed or invariant about them.
Cognitive developmentalists have viewed the study suspiciously. They
acknowledge that modeling can influence cognitive stages, but the influence
should be small. This is because stages represent broad, deeply rooted cogni-
tive structures. We cannot, in theory, effortlessly get a child to reason in any
way we wish. And when we do produce change, it should be primarily in the
direction of the stage sequence—one stage forward. Several experiments have,
in fact, found that these are the kinds of changes that do occur when
Kohlberg’s, rather than Piaget’s, stages are used (Gardner, 1982, p. 219). This,
Kohlberg (1969a) argued, is because his stages represent broader cognitive
structures than Piaget’s moral stages do, so his are harder to change. However,
as Bandura (1986, pp. 494–496) notes, the modeling influences in these stud-
ies were brief and weak.
We can see, then, that Bandura’s experiment has stirred up a good
deal of controversy. He has presented a serious challenge to cognitive stage
theory.
Conservation. Social learning theorists have also tried to show that
conservation can be altered through modeling. In some key experiments,
Rosenthal and Zimmerman (1972; Zimmerman & Rosenthal, 1974) reported
that 5- and 6-year-olds gained significant mastery of conservation on a battery
of tasks (including liquid, number, and weight) after they observed an adult
model demonstrate conservation reasoning. However, the investigators found
that 4-year-olds gained conservation skills only to a modest degree.
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Rosenthal and Zimmerman’s interpretation of the results indicates the
way researchers’ conclusions reflect their theoretical orientations. The
researchers concluded that the modeling produced rapid and substantial
change in conservation behavior. Conservation skills, they believe, are prob-
ably the product of socialization—of the teachings of adults in the child’s cul-
ture. Developmentalists would be more skeptical and would point to the
weaker results with children who were not ready to benefit from the model-
ing experience.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Bandura’s work should do a good deal to increase our awareness of the impor-
tance of models in child rearing and education. Although most parents and
teachers are already somewhat aware of the fact that they teach by example,
they probably have also overlooked just how influential modeling can be.
A case in point is physical punishment. Many parents try to prevent their
children from fighting by spanking them when they fight—only to find, it
seems, that their children fight all the more (Bandura & Walters, 1963, p. 129).
The likely explanation is that the parents, by spanking, are inadvertently pro-
viding a good demonstration of how to hurt others (Bandura, 1967). Similarly,
whenever we find that we are unable to rid a child of some distressing bit of
behavior, we might ask whether we have been inadvertently modeling the
behavior ourselves.
Modeling, according to Bandura, takes many forms. The familiar kind
is behavioral modeling; we exemplify an activity by performing it. Model-
ing may also be done verbally, as when we give instructions or issue com-
mands. Social learning researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of the
various kinds of modeling, and their findings should be of importance to
parents and educators. Of particular interest are studies such as G. M. White’s
(1972), which examined the effects of commanding children to share. At first,
the commands seemed to work, but their impact diminished over time, and
the commands also produced resentment and rebelliousness. In the long
run, we may do better simply to model generosity and helpfulness through
our own behavior. Then children can follow our example without feeling
forced to do so.
Social learning theorists have also shown that behavior is influenced not
only by personal or live models but also by those presented in the mass media.
Filmed models, in particular, seem to exert a powerful impact, and one major
implication is that television, which many children watch for hours on end,
is shaping young lives. Social learning theorists have been especially con-
cerned with the effects that televised violence has on children, and there is
substantial evidence that it can, in fact, increase children’s aggressiveness in
their daily lives (Anderson & Gentile, 2008; Kirsh, 2006).
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
The kinds of models presented in the mass media have been of concern
to leaders of historically disenfranchised groups. Civil rights leaders and fem-
inists have pointed out that television and motion pictures have traditionally
depicted people of color and women in stereotyped roles, and, by doing so,
have restricted people’s sense of what they might become in life. Accordingly,
activists have tried to get the media to present new kinds of models, such as
women and people of color as scientists and environmentalists rather than
housewives and criminals. The social learning research suggests that the
activists have adopted a good strategy for social change.
Because modeling can have a strong impact on behavior, it has signifi-
cant promise as a therapeutic device. You might recall that in Mary Cover
Jones’s (1924) famous experiment, modeling was part of the method used to
eliminate Peter’s fear of furry objects. Bandura and others have conducted a
number of studies that have more systematically shown how modeling can
help reduce fears. In one experiment (Bandura, Grusec, & Menlove, 1967), for
example, 4-year-olds who were afraid of dogs observed a child calmly play
with one, and then the children themselves became less fearful.
Bandura (1986) urges therapists to pay special attention to self-efficacy
appraisals when they diagnose and treat their clients. For example, Bandura
believes that whatever technique a therapist uses to treat a phobia—whether
it is modeling or some other technique—the treatment will work best if it
gives the client the sense that he or she has the ability to deal with the feared
stimulus. Similarly, techniques for dealing with pain, such as relaxation or
guided imagery, work best when they give clients the feeling they are capable
of influencing the amount of pain they feel (pp. 425–445).
Pediatricians have found self-efficacy theory valuable in the treatment
of children with asthma. Too often, doctors simply tell parents what to do at
home, and then the doctors complain that the parents do not adhere to the
plan. Doctors have obtained better results when they pay attention to the par-
ents’ feelings of self-efficacy. Because the parents often feel helpless with
respect to their children’s asthma, health-care workers model the ways the
parents can remove allergens from the home, give the parents positive feed-
back, and help them believe they can be effective (Hussain-Rizvi, Kunkov, &
Crain, 2009).
Bandura (1994) also has called attention to the social conditions that
undermine self-efficacy. He observes that standard school practices such as
ranking and competitive grading make many children feel inadequate. It
would be better if children worked more cooperatively and could judge their
work according to their own individual progress (rather than against that of
other pupils). Bandura adds that it is important for teachers to feel self-efficacy
as well. When they believe their work will have an effect, their confidence
serves as a model for their children.
More broadly, Bandura (1998) is worried about the impersonality of
our technological society, and the difficulty any individual has changing it.
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
Self-efficacy in the modern world, he speculates, must become collective
self-efficacy—people working together for change.
EVALUATION
Bandura’s work has changed over the years. Initially, he wanted to show how
the Skinnerian model, in which one must act to learn, is inadequate. Learning
also includes the observation of models, which is a cognitive process. In this
early work, Bandura focused clearly on the power of modeling influences,
and he and his colleagues devised a series of brilliant experiments to show just
how powerful models can be. In 1977 he wrote,
One can get people to behave altruistically, to volunteer their services,
to delay or to seek gratification, to show affection, to behave punitively,
to prefer certain foods or apparel, to converse on particular topics, to be
inquisitive or passive, and to engage in most any course of action by
having such conduct exemplified. (p. 88)
In more recent years, especially since the mid-1980s, Bandura’s theory has
become increasingly eclectic and wide ranging. In his recent self-efficacy the-
ory, Bandura considers modeling influences to be less powerful than suc-
cessful performances (in which the person achieves results through hard
work), and Bandura speculates about the broad social context in which self-
efficacy develops.
Still, the theme of modeling runs throughout his work, and modeling,
together with the general social environmental orientation, has presented a sig-
nificant challenge to the developmental position. It is therefore useful to more
fully consider the reaction of developmentalists to his work.
Developmentalists recognize that environments influence behavior, and
often in the ways that Bandura has specified. But developmentalists place a
high value on the kinds of growth that emerge from within the child—from
the child’s inner maturational promptings and spontaneous interests in the
world. Bandura has generally minimized the importance of such growth.
Among the developmentalists, it has been the Piagetians who have
become most embroiled in debates with Bandura. Piagetians believe that chil-
dren learn from a spontaneous interest in moderately novel events. Bandura
(1986, pp. 480–482) has dismissed this suggestion. Children, he says, really
learn in order to obtain reinforcements, such as praise, which they eventually
come to administer to themselves. But Bandura’s own research may contra-
dict his argument. In several experiments, models perform what he calls
“moderately novel” or “relatively unique” behaviors (Bandura, 1962, pp. 250,
252; 1965b, p. 116). Models sock Bobo dolls, march about, knock objects off
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Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
shelves, and engage in other zany physical antics. As Kohlberg (1969a, p. 435)
pointed out, these behaviors seem intuitively designed to capture the imagi-
nation of 4-year-olds, and in several experiments the children readily imi-
tated the behaviors even though there were no reinforcements available
(Bandura, 1965b; Bandura & Huston, 1961; Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963).
Quite possibly, the children reproduced such behaviors because they found
them intrinsically interesting. Reinforcement variables, to be sure, can increase
or alter imitation, but a spontaneous interest in moderate novelty might also
be at work.
Bandura (1986, pp. 480–482) argues that the principle of moderate nov-
elty does not fit with everyday observations. If people learned from their
intrinsic interest in moderately novel events, they would be learning all the
time; for they are constantly encountering slightly new information. But,
Bandura says, people in general are not eager learners. They usually restrict
their learning to one or two areas of life, such as their areas of occupational
expertise.
Piagetians (e.g., Kamii, 1980) and other developmentalists (e.g., Montes-
sori, 1936b) would agree that people often seem to be fairly apathetic when it
comes to learning. But this observation does not prove that humans have no
intrinsic interest in the world. Rather, the observation shows that the child’s
natural curiosity has been stifled.
Children, in the developmental view, begin life full of enthusiasm for
learning, and during the first few years they learn a tremendous amount on
their own, without adult instruction. Then adults get hold of them, sending
them to schools and taking charge of their learning. Adults provide them with
modeling influences and teach them what and how to think. Children feel the
pressure to please grownups and try to think in the ways the adults prescribe.
As a result, children stop pursuing their spontaneous interests and lose the
thrill that comes from making their own discoveries.
Bandura says that he, too, believes in self-motivated learning, but of a dif-
ferent kind. People, in Bandura’s view, do not learn out of a spontaneous inter-
est in the world, but to achieve their internal goals and standards. Children
internalize external standards and make their own positive self-evaluations
contingent on the achievement of these standards. For example, a college
student, studying for exams, might only be pleased with herself when she is
certain she has mastered enough material to earn straight A’s. Bandura (1997,
p. 219) says that people enjoy learning for its own sake after they start meet-
ing their internal standards and feeling good about their abilities.
I believe Bandura sheds light on the kind of learning that is dominant in
our society today. We do seem to constantly set standards and evaluate our
progress and abilities. But such extensive self-evaluation is confining and
debilitating. We become so wrapped up in ourselves that we lose touch with
the childlike delight in the world itself—in nature, other people, art, and the
world as we find it.
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Piagetians also believe Bandura overlooks the importance of cognitive
structures or stages. Bandura acknowledges that cognitive skills set limits on
what children can learn and imitate, but he does not believe these skills belong
to broad stage structures. Instead, he believes the cognition consists of a large
number of specific, isolated skills.
Bandura’s position has its supporters, but the issue is still very unsettled.
Piaget’s stages, despite certain problems, are important.
In fact, social learning research itself occasionally suggests that the child’s
general stage is at work. For example, Liebert and his colleagues (1969) found
that 14-year-olds, but not 8- or 6-year-olds, could imitate a new grammatical
rule. The oldest subjects were able to figure out the rule underlying the model’s
behavior because they had capacities for abstract thinking that the younger
children lacked. They had, it seems, formal operations.
It might be, then, that Bandura underestimates the importance of devel-
opmental variables. He certainly seems to overlook the extent to which chil-
dren learn on their own, from an intrinsic interest in the world. He might
also overlook the extent to which modeling is influenced by cognitive stages.
Nevertheless, Bandura has significantly broadened learning theory and con-
tributed enormously to our understanding of how environmental factors
shape behavior.
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Vygotsky’s
Social-Historical
Theory of Cognitive
Development
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
231

Vygotsky’s
Social-Historical
Theory of Cognitive
Development
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
This book focuses on theorists in the developmental tradition—scholars
who have seen developmental change primarily in terms of inner forces.
For example, Gesell emphasized inner maturational promptings and
Piaget saw children making their own discoveries. By way of contrast,
we have also examined the ideas of learning theorists, who have empha-
sized the role of the external environment.
Some of you may be dissatisfied with this theoretical division.
Why, you might ask, must we view development in either/or terms?
Can’t a theory assign major roles to both inner and outer forces?
The construction of such an integrative theory is a worthy goal,
but few people have made much progress in attaining it. Bandura, as
we saw, pronounces behavior to be multidetermined—to be influenced
by various internal and external variables—but he also discredits the
developmental perspective on how change comes from within. Later
we will discuss the ways Freud and Erikson weave inner and outer
forces into their psychoanalytic theories. In the realm of cognitive devel-
opment, the major theorist who discussed both developmental and
environmental forces was the Russian L. S. Vygotsky (1896–1934).
Vygotsky had read the early writings of Gesell, Werner, and
Piaget, and he recognized the importance of the kinds of intrinsic
development they were addressing. At the same time, Vygotsky was a
Marxist who believed that we can understand human beings only in the
context of the social-historical environment. So Vygotsky tried to cre-
ate a theory that allowed for the interplay between the two lines of
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
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Vygotsky’s Social-Historical Theory of Cognitive Development
development—the natural line that emerges from within and the social-historical
line that influences the child from without (Vygotsky, 1931a, p. 17).
Vygotsky was only partly successful. He had only sketched out an inte-
grative theory of development when, at the age of 38, his life was cut short by
tuberculosis. Nevertheless, many psychologists believe that if we eventually do
construct a solid integrative theory, it will build on the start Vygotsky gave us.
Lev Semenovich Vygotsky grew up in Gomel, a port city in western
Russia. His father was a banking executive, and his mother was a teacher,
although she spent most of her life raising her eight children. The family loved
interesting conversation, a trait that rubbed off on the young Vygotsky. As a
teenager, he was known among his friends as the “little professor” because he
was constantly leading them in discussions, mock trials, and debates. Vygot-
sky also loved to read history, literature, and poetry (Wertsch, 1985, pp. 3–4).
When he was 17, Vygotsky wanted to attend the University of Moscow,
but because he was Jewish he had to struggle with the state’s quota system;
the university’s enrollment was only 3% Jewish. Initially, Vygotsky seemed
assured of a spot because he was so bright. But before he completed his oral
examinations, the educational ministry shifted to a lottery system for Jewish
applicants. Vygotsky felt he had lost all hope, but then he won a position by
chance alone.
At the university, Vygotsky specialized in law, but he also took a wide
variety of courses in other fields, as well as courses at Shanyavskii People’s
University, where a number of professors had gone after being expelled from
the University of Moscow for anti-czarist leanings. Vygotsky graduated with
a law degree from the University of Moscow in 1917 and returned to his home
of Gomel (Wertsch, 1985, pp. 5–6).
Between 1917 (the year of the Communist Revolution) and 1924, Vygot-
sky taught literature in a secondary school and psychology at the local
teacher’s college, and he became interested in the education of the physically
disabled. He also worked on his doctoral dissertation on the psychology of art.
During this period he became ill with tuberculosis (Wertsch, 1985, pp. 7–8).
On January 6, 1924, Vygotsky traveled to Leningrad to deliver a lecture
on the psychology of consciousness. The clarity and brilliance of his speech—
by the unknown young man from the provinces—had an electrifying effect on
the young psychologists in the audience. One, A. R. Luria (1902–1977), rec-
ommended Vygotsky for a position at the Moscow Institute of Psychology,
which Vygotsky received. During his first year of work at the institute, he fin-
ished his dissertation and received his doctorate (p. 8).
In Moscow, Vygotsky soon became a commanding presence. When he
lectured, students stood outside the packed auditorium and listened through
open windows. When he traveled, students wrote poems in honor of his jour-
ney. Vygotsky inspired such enthusiasm not only because his ideas were excit-
ing but also because he led a group of young Marxists on a mission—to create
a psychology that would help build a new socialist society (p. 10).
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Perhaps sensing his life would be short, Vygotsky worked at a break-
neck pace. He read, lectured, and conducted research as rapidly as he could,
and he also traveled extensively to help clinics working with children and
adults with neurological disorders. Vygotsky’s daily schedule was often so
busy that he did his writing after 2 A.M., when he had a few quiet hours to him-
self. During the last 3 years of his life, his coughing spells became so severe
that he was sometimes left exhausted for days at a time. Nevertheless, he
worked until he died at the age of 38 (pp. 12–14).
A few of Vygotsky’s writings were published shortly after his death in
1934, but in 1936 the Soviet government banned his work—a ban that lasted
until 1956. The primary reason for the ban was that Vygotsky conducted some
research with intelligence tests, which the Communist Party condemned.
Actually, Vygotsky criticized the conventional use of intelligence tests and
employed them in new ways, but such subtleties were lost on the authorities.
Fortunately, Vygotsky’s colleagues and students kept his work alive, and today
his ideas are extremely popular among psychologists and educators
throughout the world (Cole & Scribner, 1978; Kozulin, 1986, pp. xxiv–xxv).
MARX’S VIEWS ON HUMAN NATURE
Because Vygotsky tried to create a psychology along Marxist lines, it will be
helpful to review briefly some of the ideas of Karl Marx (1818–1883) on human
nature before discussing Vygotsky in detail.
Marx’s comments on human nature were relatively brief, and they pri-
marily appeared in his early writings (Marx, 1844, 1845; Marx & Engels, 1846).
Marx recognized that humans have biological needs, but he emphasized the
human capacity for tool use and production. It is by inventing and using tools
that humans master their environments, satisfy their needs, and, ideally, ful-
fill their deepest creative potentials. Production, Marx also emphasized, is an
inherently social process. People join together to plant and harvest crops,
exchange goods, assemble machines, and so on.
Beyond these general comments, Marx had little to say about human
nature. Indeed, he argued that it is a mistake to describe human nature in the
abstract, apart from its social-historical context. Although humans are distin-
guished by their capacity for tool use and technological production, the con-
ditions under which they work and produce change throughout history. The
working conditions of the medieval artisan, for example, were quite different
from those of the 19th-century factory worker. To understand humans, then,
we need to understand history and the dynamics of historical change (Marx,
1845, pp. 107–109; Marx & Engels, 1846, pp. 118–121, 129).
History, in Marx’s view, is a dialectical process, a series of conflicts and
resolutions. New forces of production (e.g., new ways of manufacturing) come
into conflict with the existing social system, and a new social system is
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installed. For example, in 18th- and 19th-century Europe, the creation of new
factories gave a rising class of capitalists the opportunity to make vast sums
of money, but the ancient feudal system stood in their way. The result of this
conflict was the overthrow of the feudal system and the establishment of a
new system—the free enterprise system that allowed the capitalists to make
as much money as they liked (Marx, 1859; Marx & Engels, 1872, pp. 336–340;
Mills, 1962, pp. 82–83).
Marx believed that his own age—the second half of the 19th century—
was experiencing a new phase in the dialectic of history. Technological
progress was now being impeded by the free enterprise system. The resolu-
tion of this conflict would be a communist revolution in which the workers
would take over the industries and organize them for the benefit of all.
Marx, like so many other scholars, adopted the concept of dialectic from
Hegel. However, Marx used the concept in a very different way.
For Hegel, the dialectic of history occurs in the realm of consciousness
and ideas; one viewpoint comes into conflict with its opposite, leading to a
new synthesis. Marx, in contrast, believed that conflicts in ideas are superfi-
cial. The conflicts that really matter are social and economic. In fact, most
ideas and values merely justify particular social and economic interests. The
medieval lords praised loyalty and honor; the rising capitalists heralded lib-
erty and free competition; and both groups believed they were giving expres-
sion to the highest of all values. In reality, both groups were merely spouting
opinions that justified their own social and economic interests.
Marx, then, was highly critical of those scholars who analyzed the nature
of consciousness—people’s ideas, values, and outlooks—as if these had an
independent existence. What people think, Marx said, depends on their mate-
rial life—the ways in which they work, produce, and exchange goods—at a
certain point in historical development.
But it is not just the content of thinking that depends on historical devel-
opment. Our species’ cognitive capacities, too, have changed as a result of his-
torical change, especially technological development. This, at least, was the
position of Marx’s collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), who forcefully
argued that early technology—early tool use—gave rise to uniquely human
traits such as advanced intelligence and speech.
Engels on Tool Use and Human Evolution
According to Engels (1925, pp. 47–49, 238–246), our ancestors became capable
of tool use when they came down from the trees and began living on level
ground. This new mode of life enabled them to develop an upright posture,
which freed the hands for the production of stone implements. Once people
began making tools, their minds expanded. They discovered new properties
of natural objects, such as the properties of stone and wood that facilitate
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cutting. They also became aware, however dimly at first, of the scientific prin-
ciples underlying tool use, principles such as leverage, mass, and force.
Tool use also led to new modes of cooperation and communication. As
technologies advanced, people discovered the advantages of working together.
For example, they found that they could more effectively build a hut or a boat
by joining forces. But they now needed some way of communicating beyond
grunts and gestures. People needed to give one another instructions, such as
“Turn right,” and “Pull harder.” “Men in the making,” Engels said, “arrived
at the point where they had something to say to one another” (p. 232), and they
developed speech.
More generally, technology promoted a new orientation toward the envi-
ronment. With tools in hand, humans no longer had to accept the environ-
ment as they found it. They could change it. At a certain point, they stopped
picking fruit and vegetables wherever they found them; they began clearing
land and planting their own crops. This new orientation promoted planning
and foresight. Successful farming requires people to plan months and years
ahead. Such foresight, Engels observed, has not always been a capacity that
humans have exercised as well as they should. Nevertheless, once people saw
the power of tools and technology, they began transforming the environment
according to their own plans and designs.
VYGOTSKY’S THEORY
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TOOLS
Vygotsky was deeply impressed by Engels’s writing on tool use, and he
attempted to extend Engels’s insights. Just as people have developed tools to
master the environment, Vygotsky proposed, they also have created “psy-
chological tools” to master their own behavior. For example, early peoples
used notched sticks and knotted ropes to help them remember events, much
as a person might tie a string around his or her finger today. Later, as cultures
developed, they created other mental tools. Voyagers began using maps to
help them retrace prior routes and plan future expeditions. Vygotsky called
the various psychological tools that people use to aid their thinking and behav-
ior signs, and he argued that we cannot understand human thinking without
examining the signs that cultures provide (Vygotsky, 1930, pp. 39–40; 1931).
Undoubtedly, the single most important sign system is speech. Speech
serves many functions, but most fundamentally it frees our thought and atten-
tion from the immediate situation—from the stimuli impinging on us at the
moment. Because words can symbolize things and events that go beyond the
present situation, speech enables us to reflect on the past and plan for the future
(Luria, 1976, p. 10; Vygotsky, 1930, p. 26).
For example, I know a farming family whose vegetables were being
raided by deer. For a while the family members simply reacted to each immediate
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situation as it occurred. Whenever someone saw a deer eating the vegetables,
he or she chased it away. After a while, however, the family sat down and dis-
cussed long-term solutions. They talked about building a new fence, how high
it should be, and whether a ditch would be useful. One family member shared
an idea she heard from a neighbor a few months earlier. By using words to
symbolize things and events that were not immediately present—“a fence,”
“a ditch,” “the neighbor’s idea”—the family developed a plan. (They decided
to build a higher fence.)
When humans use signs, Vygotsky said, they engage in mediated behav-
ior. That is, they do not just respond to environmental stimuli; their behavior
is also influenced or “mediated” by their own signs. In the present example,
the family members did not just respond directly to the environmental stim-
uli (the deer); they also acted on the basis of a verbally formulated plan (“OK,
we’ve decided to build a 10-foot fence”) (Vygotsky, 1930a, pp. 19–40).
The acquisition of speech is of major importance to the growing child;
it enables the child to participate intelligently in the social life of his or her
group. But speech does more than this. It also facilitates the child’s own,
individual thinking. By the age of 3 or 4 years, Vygotsky noted, children
begin to carry out the kinds of dialogues they had had with others with
themselves alone. At first they do this aloud, and we can hear children at
play saying things such as, “I wonder where this wheel goes? Does it go
here?” After a while, at the age of 6 or 7 years, children begin to carry out
such dialogues more inwardly and silently. Vygotsky believed that our abil-
ity to talk to ourselves—to think with the help of words—contributes enor-
mously to our powers of thought.
Two other important sign systems are writing and numbering systems. The
invention of writing was a great human achievement; it enabled people to keep
permanent records of information. For most children, however, learning to
write (and read) is a real struggle because writing forces children to detach
themselves from physical, expressive speech, which comes so naturally to
them, and to use abstract symbols for words. Learning to write usually requires
a good deal of formal instruction (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 181; 1935, p. 105).
Numbering systems have also been of great importance in human evo-
lution. Vygotsky suggested that early peoples created numbering systems
because they found they were unable to quantify objects (such as vegetables
or cattle) by sight alone. They needed sets of symbols to help them count. For
example, the Papaus of New Guinea invented a method of counting that used
their fingers and many parts of their bodies to stand for objects. As societies
evolved, they developed other numbering systems, such as the abacus and
written notation. They also increasingly dealt with quantities in abstract and
theoretical ways, apart from particular objects. Algebra, for example, deals
with general quantitative categories without even specifying particular num-
bers. If then regardless of the particular values of a
and b. The mastery of algebra and other theoretical uses of number, like the
a = b – 10,a + 10 = b,
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mastery of reading and writing, usually require formal instruction (John-
Steiner & Souberman, 1978).
Vygotsky argued that cultural sign systems have a major impact on
cognitive development—an impact overlooked by developmentalists such
as Gesell and Piaget. Gesell and Piaget looked at development as if it comes
from the child alone, from the child’s inner maturational promptings or
spontaneous discoveries. Vygotsky acknowledged that such intrinsic devel-
opment, the “natural line” of development, is important. It may even dom-
inate cognitive development up to the age of 2 years or so (Vygotsky, 1930,
p. 24). But after this, the growth of the mind is increasingly influenced by the
“cultural line” of development, the sign systems the culture provides. In
fact, all our uniquely human powers of thought—those that distinguish us
from other species—would be impossible without speech and other sign
systems.
Vygotsky speculated, in addition, that the highest levels of thinking—
the levels of purely abstract or theoretical reasoning—require instruction in
writing, math, and other kinds of abstract concepts. Although children
might develop some concepts on their own, in their everyday experience,
they will not develop purely abstract modes of thought without instruc-
tion in abstract sign systems. And since this instruction is only widespread
in technologically advanced societies, we will find purely abstract thinking
prevalent only in these societies (Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 103, 206; 1935, p. 90;
Luria, 1976, pp. 8, 161).
In 1931 Vygotsky saw a unique opportunity to test this latter hypothesis—
that abstract thinking is a product of relatively advanced levels of social-
historical development. At this time, there were many remote areas of the
Soviet Union, including Central Asia, where peasants still lived a feudal exis-
tence. The peasants worked on small farms and were completely dependent
on wealthy landowners and feudal lords. Most were illiterate. The new Soviet
government, attempting to develop the entire nation into a modern socialist
state, instituted collective farming practices, in which peasants met in groups
to plan production, measure output, and so on. The government also gave
the peasants short courses in writing, reading, and the theoretical uses of num-
ber. Because, in 1931, the government was still phasing in the new programs,
Vygotsky saw the opportunity to compare the mental processes of those adults
who had begun to participate in the modern forms of social life with those who
were still living in the old ways.
Actually, Vygotsky himself was too ill to go to Central Asia to conduct
fieldwork, but he encouraged Luria and others to do so. In one aspect of the
study, the interviewers presented the subjects with syllogisms such as the
following:
In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white. Novaya is in
the Far North. What color are the bears there? (Luria, 1976, p. 108)
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The nonliterate subjects refused to deal with the question in a purely
theoretical way. They said things such as, “I don’t know what color the
bears there are, I never saw them” (p. 111). When the interviewer pressed
them, asking them to answer “on the basis of my words,” the peasants still
refused to speak beyond their personal experience. As one said, “Your
words can be answered only by someone who was there, and if a person
wasn’t there he can’t say anything on the basis of your words” (p. 109).
Those who had been participating in the new programs, in contrast, were
willing to deal with the syllogisms on a theoretical plane and they answered
them correctly (p. 116).
This study wasn’t perfect. Luria gave the impression that the nonliter-
ate subjects not only refused to think in syllogisms but also were incapable
of doing so. However on occasion a few subjects, when pressed sufficiently,
went against their deep-seated mental habits and answered the questions
correctly. They were capable of abstract thinking—they just preferred not to
engage in it.
But in general the study did support the Marxist contention that the
mind is a product of social-historical change. The study suggested that we
cannot meaningfully discuss the “principles of thinking” or “cognitive devel-
opment” in the abstract, as psychologists usually do. We need to examine the
culture into which the child is growing, and the sign systems the culture pro-
vides. For, as Vygotsky said, as these tools of thinking change, the mind takes
on a different character.
Not all Marxist psychologists, we should note, have enthusiastically
endorsed Vygotsky’s ideas. Several Marxists have argued that Vygotsky
stretched the metaphor of tools too far. Tools, they say, mean real tools—not
speech, writing, math, and other “psychological tools” (see Kozulin, 1986,
pp. xlviii–l).
But whatever his standing as a Marxist, Vygotsky pointed developmental
psychology in a promising new direction. Vygotsky recognized the role of
intrinsic forces, but he suggested that a complete understanding of cognitive
development requires the study of the psychological tools the culture hands
down to the child.
These two forces—intrinsic and cultural—generally seem to be opposed.
Perhaps it is for this reason that most scholars have emphasized one force or
the other, but not both. Vygotsky, in contrast, was schooled in dialectical the-
ory and was therefore primed to consider the ways in which opposing forces
interact and produce new transformations. The growing child, trying to make
sense of the world in her own way, encounters a culture that expects her to use
its particular psychological tools. These interactions are complex and diffi-
cult to study. Vygotsky himself only began to investigate them, and he gen-
erally focused on only one side of the dialectic—the impact of culture on the
child. In the following sections, we will look at Vygotsky’s insights into how
some of these psychological tools are acquired.
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MEMORY AIDS
Vygotsky suggested that some of humankind’s earliest psychological tools
were memory aids, and these tools are still very important to us today.
Vygotsky and his colleagues conducted various experiments to try to gain
insights into the ways in which children acquire them.
In one experiment, Vygotsky (1931a, pp. 70–71) instructed children and
adults to respond in different ways when they saw different colors. He told
them to lift a finger when they saw red, to press a button when they saw green,
and so on. Sometimes he made the task simple, sometimes he made it diffi-
cult, and at certain points he offered memory aids.
In such experiments, the youngest children, between the ages of 4 and
8 years, typically acted as if they could remember anything. Whether the task
was simple or difficult, they rushed into it as soon as they heard the instruc-
tions. When the experimenter offered them pictures and cards “to help you
remember,” they usually ignored the aids, or used them inappropriately.
Young children, Vygotsky concluded, “do not yet know their capacities and
limitations” or how to use external stimuli to help them remember things
(1931b, p. 71).
Older children, from about 9 to 12 years, typically used the pictures
Vygotsky offered, and these aids did improve their performance. Interestingly,
the addition of such aids did not always improve the memory of the adults.
But this was not because they had become like young children and no longer
used memory devices. Rather, it was because they now rehearsed instructions
and made mental notes to themselves inwardly, without the need for external
cues (Vygotsky, 1930, pp. 41–45).
By today’s standards, these experiments were very informal. But they
were pioneering investigations into an area that has become a major topic in
contemporary psychology. This is metacognition, the awareness people have of
their own thought processes. (People’s specific awareness of their own mem-
ory processes is sometimes called metamemory.) Like Vygotsky, contemporary
psychologists are trying to discover how children become aware of their think-
ing and how they learn to use psychological tools and strategies to improve
it (Flavell et al., 2002, pp. 163–167, 262–263).
SPEECH
The single-most important psychological tool is speech (Vygotsky, 1930, p. 24;
1934, p. 256). Speech frees our thought and attention from the immediate per-
ceptual field. This freedom sets us apart from other species.
To illustrate this difference, Vygotsky called attention to research by
Kohler (1925) on the problem solving of apes. Kohler found that if one places
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a banana within an ape’s visual field—but behind some bars so the ape can-
not grab it—the ape’s attention will be so riveted on the banana that it will
hardly consider anything else. The ape won’t consider using a stick lying
nearby, unless the stick also happens to lie directly in front of the bars. The
stick, that is, must also be part of the immediate visual field (Kohler, 1925,
pp. 37–38; Vygotsky, 1930, pp. 35–37).
Human thinking, in contrast, can range much more freely beyond the
immediate perceptual field, and it is speech that enables it to do so. Because
words frequently refer to absent objects, we can, in a situation like that of the
ape, ask ourselves, What object might reach that banana? Is there a stick or a
pole around here that will reach it? Thus, we use words to contemplate and
direct our search for objects not in our visual field.
Vygotsky suggested that the ability to engage in such internal dialogues
develops in three steps.
1. Initially, references to absent objects occur in the child’s interactions with
others. For example, a 2-year-old girl might ask her mother to help her
find something. Or the mother might say, “We’re going to the park now,
so get your pail and shovel,” directing the girl’s attention to objects she
had not been looking at.
2. Next, at the age of 3 years or so, the child begins to direct similar com-
ments to herself. While playing with her toys, she might say, “Where’s
my shovel? I need my shovel,” and begin looking for an object that had
not been within her immediate surroundings.
For a time, this self-guiding speech is said aloud; we frequently hear
children talking as they play or work on problems. Then, beginning at
about 6 years of age, children’s self-directed speech becomes increas-
ingly quiet, abbreviated, and less comprehensible to us.
3. Finally, by age 8 or so, we cannot hear this talk at all. But the child’s self-
directed speech has not disappeared; it has merely gone underground.
It has turned into inner speech, the silent dialogue that one has with one-
self (Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 29–40).
The general process, then, is one of internalizing social interactions. What
begins as an interpersonal process, occurring between the parent and the child,
becomes an intrapsychic process, occurring within the child. Vygotsky believed
that this general progression characterizes the development of all the “higher
mental processes,” all the forms of thought and attention that depend on cul-
tural signs. In fact, he stated that the progression is a general law:
Any function in the child’s cultural development appears on the stage
twice, on two planes, first on the social plane and then on the psycho-
logical. (1931a, pp. 44–45)
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This law, in the view of Vygotsky and his followers, was a cornerstone of
a Marxist psychology. A Marxist does not seek the origins of thinking within the
individual child, spontaneously sprouting from the child’s mind, but in exter-
nal social existence (Vygotsky, 1930, p. 45). “The child,” Vygotsky said, “learns
the social forms of behavior and applies them to himself” (1931a, p. 40).
Egocentric Speech
In the process of internalizing social speech, children go through a phase
(step 2) in which they spend considerable time talking to themselves aloud.
The first person to call attention to this kind of speech was Piaget (1923), who
called it egocentric speech. Piaget observed, for example, that if two 5-year-old
girls are playing in a sandbox, each might talk enthusiastically about topics
without considering the fact that the other couldn’t possibly know what she
was referring to. Piaget called this speech “egocentric” because he thought
it reflects the child’s general egocentrism; the child doesn’t adjust her speech
to the perspective of the listener because she egocentrically assumes the lis-
tener ’s perspective is the same as her own. Piaget estimated that between
the ages of 4 and 7 years about 45% of all speech is egocentric (1923, p. 51).
Vygotsky agreed that egocentric speech is very prevalent in this age
group, but he disagreed with Piaget about its theoretical meaning. In
Piaget’s view, egocentric speech is basically useless. It merely reflects a defi-
ciency in the child’s thinking. Vygotsky, in contrast, emphasized its positive
function; it helps the child solve problems. In one of Piaget’s studies (1923,
p. 14), Lev says to no one in particular, “I want to do that draw-
ing, there. . . . I want to draw something, I do. I shall need a big piece of
paper to do that.” In Vygotsky’s view, Lev’s self-directed talk helps Lev
plan and direct his activities (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 29).
Vygotsky also disagreed with Piaget about egocentric speech’s ultimate
fate. Piaget implied that as children overcome their egocentrism, egocentric
speech simply dies out. Vygotsky argued that it doesn’t just fade away, but it
goes underground and turns into inner speech, the kind of silent dialogue we
so often have with ourselves when we try to solve problems. Interpreting the
decline of egocentric speech as an indication it is dying, Vygotsky said, “is
like saying that the child stops counting when he ceases to use his fingers and
starts adding in his head” (1934, p. 230).
Vygotsky argued, then, that egocentric speech is highly useful and an
important way station on the road to inner speech. But even if we were to
agree with Vygotsky on these points, we would still have to agree with Piaget
that there is something puzzling about it. The child seems to be talking to
someone, yet doesn’t do so in any full way. For example, a child playing alone
with Tinkertoys while an adult is silently seated across the room says,
The wheels go here, the wheels go here. Oh, we need to start it all over
again. We need to close it up. See, it closes up. We’re starting it all over
6 1�2-year-old
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again. Do you know why we wanted to do that? Because I needed it to
go in a different way. (Kohlberg, Yaeger, & Hjertholm, 1968, p. 695)
The child seems to be talking to the listener (e.g., asking him, “Do you know
why . . . ?”), but the child doesn’t wait for the listener to respond.
According to Vygotsky, the child’s self-directed speech is puzzling because
it is not yet differentiated from social speech. The child is trying to use speech to
direct her own activities, but she still casts her speech in the form of social com-
munication. It takes a while for self-directed speech to “differentiate out” and take
on its own character. Only gradually does self-directed speech become quieter
and more abbreviated and turn into inner speech (Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 229–232).
Research Bearing on the Vygotsky–Piaget Issue. Vygotsky tried to
think of ways to test whether his view of egocentric speech was more correct
than that of Piaget. In his most prominent study, Vygotsky reasoned that if
egocentric speech serves a problem-solving function, it should increase when
tasks become more difficult. Because Piaget saw no positive function to ego-
centric speech, his theory makes no such prediction.
So Vygotsky did various things to make children’s tasks more difficult. “For
instance, when a child was getting ready to draw, he would suddenly find that
there was no paper, or no pencil of the color he needed. In other words, by obstruct-
ing his free activity, we made him face problems” (Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 29–30). In
these situations, the proportion of egocentric speech (the amount of egocentric
speech compared to all speech) nearly doubled among 5- to 7-year-olds (Luria,
1961, p. 33). The children tried to solve problems by talking to themselves. For
example, one child said, “Where’s the pencil? I need a blue pencil. Never mind, I’ll
draw with the red one and wet it with water; it will become dark and look like blue”
(Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 29–30). This study suggested, then, that egocentric speech
does serve a problem-solving function in young children, as Vygotsky suggested.
This study has been widely replicated, and the results have largely been
in agreement with Vygotsky’s. There is, however, one qualification. If tasks are
made much too difficult for children, they do not engage in self-guiding
speech. They just give up and don’t say anything. As Laura Berk says, tasks
must be “appropriately challenging” (2009, p. 265).
Other research has examined the contrasting positions of Piaget and
Vygotsky, and most of it supports Vygotsky. It suggests that egocentric or self-
directed speech serves a positive function and turns into inner speech, which
continues to guide behavior (Berk, 2009, p. 265; Kohlberg et al., 1968).
Nevertheless, it still seems possible that Piaget was partly correct. Even
if some egocentric speech serves the self-guiding function that Vygotsky
emphasized, it also seems that some egocentric speech might reflect the child’s
inability to consider the audience’s viewpoint. It may be that both Piaget and
Vygotsky were correct.1
1In their research reports, contemporary psychologists often refer to both egocentric and
vocalized self-directed speech as private speech.
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Self-Control
So far we have focused on the way children use self-guiding speech to help
them solve problems, as when they work on tasks such as drawing and build-
ing things with Tinkertoys. But verbal self-regulation also helps people gain
emotional self-control, in the sense of overcoming impulses and temptations.
In everyday conversations, we speak of this capacity as willpower.
According to Vygotsky, the basic question of willpower is: How is it pos-
sible for us to take action in situations in which forces pull us strongly against
it? How, for instance, do we stop watching TV and go study instead?
Vygotsky’s (1932) answer was that we use words to create artificial stim-
uli to direct our behavior. If we are watching TV, we might say to ourselves,
“OK, I’m going to watch it until 8 o’clock, then I’ll study.” We create a new, ver-
bal signal to control our behavior.
As usual, Vygotsky argued that we initially acquire such signals through
social interactions. When we were young, adults frequently used signals to
direct our behavior. They might have told us, “I want you to jump in the water
on the count of three” or “You can watch TV until the big hand on the clock
reaches the 12.” A little later, we began applying similar signals to ourselves,
at first aloud and then silently through inner speech.
As Berk observes, we can sometimes hear young children talking to
themselves as they try to gain self-control. A toddler who is tempted to touch
a light socket says to herself, “Don’t touch,” and pulls her hand back. A little
boy who starts to jump on a sofa says to himself, “No, can’t,” and climbs down
(Berk, 2001, pp. 89, 511). Several psychologists are interested in the process
by which children learn to delay gratification, as when they are told to wait
before eating a treat. Berk points out that this capacity emerges with the devel-
opment of language and that one can often overhear young children instruct-
ing themselves to wait (2001, p. 89).
Luria’s Research on the Verbal
Regulation of Behavior
An especially fine-grained analysis of the verbal self-regulation of behavior
was provided by Vygotsky’s colleague A. R. Luria.
Luria focused on the internalization of adult commands. He wanted to
see how the child comes to obey adult commands and then applies those
commands to herself. Vygotsky, we should note, did not imply that all self-
regulation is limited to the internalization of commands. Children internalize
all kinds of dialogue. But Luria focused on commands.
Luria found that a child’s ability to follow adult commands develops
rather slowly. Suppose a toy fish is lying on a table. If we tell a 14-month-old
child, “Bring me the fish,” the child will do so. But if we place a shiny toy cat
closer to the child and again say, “Bring me the fish,” the child will bring us
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the shiny cat. Our verbal instructions cannot overcome the power of an attrac-
tive stimulus (Luria, 1960, p. 360).
There are other difficulties as well. In one experiment, Luria gave a
2-year-old a rubber balloon and told him to press it, which the child did. But
Luria noted, “He does not stop his reaction, for he presses a second, a third,
and a fourth time” (p. 360). Luria gave the boy only one instruction, but the
boy’s action perseverated—it kept going.
What’s more, our commands, which can so easily set a child’s behavior
in motion, do not have nearly the same power to inhibit it. If an experimenter
tells a 2-year-old who is pressing a balloon, “That’s enough,” the command
usually has little effect. In fact, in many cases the command only intensifies the
child’s reaction; the child presses even more energetically (Luria, 1961, p. 53).
By the ages of 3 or , children can follow specific adult commands
fairly well (Luria, 1961, p. 70; Slobin, 1966, p. 131). But can they follow their
own verbal instructions?
In one experiment, Luria told children to say “Press” and press a balloon
when they saw one light and to say “Don’t press” and to refrain from press-
ing when they saw another light. But 3- and pressed at every
light. They said “Press” and pressed, and they said “Don’t press” and pressed.
Once again, words excite action, but they have a weak inhibiting effect (Luria,
1960, pp. 374–375; 1961, pp. 90–91).
Luria believed that a good part of the difficulty is that young children
respond to the excitatory function of speech rather than to its meaning. The
phrase “Don’t press” excites action simply because it is a signal, regardless of
its meaning.
A number of Luria’s experiments suggest that children can verbally reg-
ulate much of their own behavior by the age of 5 or 6 years. They can easily
handle the kinds of experiments previously described. In fact, an experimenter
need only give them instructions at the outset, and they will perform correctly
without saying anything to themselves aloud. But Luria believed they are still
giving themselves verbal instructions—only now they are doing so silently,
through inner speech. To support his interpretation, Luria reported that when
he made tasks more complicated or speeded them up, the 5- and 6-year-olds
spontaneously began giving themselves instructions aloud once again (Luria,
1961, p. 93).
Self-Regulation and Neurological Functioning. Luria emphasized
the social origins of self-regulation. First, children submit to the commands
of others; then they command themselves. At the same time, Luria recog-
nized that the child’s ability to regulate her behavior depends on the matu-
ration of the nervous system. In fact, Luria devoted a great portion of his
life studying the neurological mechanisms underlying self-regulation and
other mental functioning, and he is considered one of history’s great
neurologists.
3 1�2-year-olds
3 1�2
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Many of Luria’s insights came during his work with patients who suf-
fered brain injuries during the Second World War. Luria, like others, found that
the kinds of difficulties the patients experienced depended greatly on the spe-
cific location of their injuries. The ability to regulate one’s own behavior, Luria
found, is tied to the frontal lobes, particularly in the left hemisphere. Patients
who suffered frontal lobe injuries could still speak and perform simple habit-
ual tasks, such as greeting others and dressing themselves. But in new situa-
tions, they were unable to regulate their own behavior and, as a result, they
were slaves to environmental stimulation.
For example, one patient was supposed to take a train to Moscow, but
when he arrived at the station he stepped onto the first train he saw boarding
and traveled in the opposite direction. Apparently the call “All aboard” and
the sight of the others getting onto the train was more than he could resist. He
couldn’t tell himself, “This isn’t my train,” and use these words to regulate his
own behavior.
Patients with severe frontal lobe damage also have problems with per-
severation; once they begin an activity, they cannot easily stop it. Luria told
about a patient “who began occupational therapy after the war. He was
instructed to plane a piece of wood. He planed a board down completely and
continued to plane the work bench, being unable to stop” (Luria, 1982, p. 111).
In such cases, we must guess that the patients were unable to use speech
to control their behavior. We suppose that they could not effectively tell them-
selves “Stop” or “Hold it.” Some of Luria’s other research added more direct
support for this speculation. In one study, Luria asked patients to imitate him
and raise a finger or a fist whenever he did so. This they could do. But when
Luria reversed the instructions, they had difficulty. They could repeat his
instructions, but they couldn’t apply them to their behavior. A patient would
say, “Yours is a fist, so now I must raise my finger,” but he still imitated Luria
and raised his fist. He couldn’t use speech to regulate his actions (p. 112).
Inner Speech
Under ordinary circumstances, adults have developed the capacity to give
themselves verbal instructions inwardly and silently, through inner speech.
Inner speech, however, is very difficult to investigate. Vygotsky obtained some
clues from writers and poets, but he relied primarily on the study of egocen-
tric speech in children. That is, he assumed that the changes we see in ego-
centric speech just before it goes underground forecast what inner speech is
like (Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 226–227).
Inner speech, in comparison to social speech, seems more abbreviated.
It omits information that we already know and focuses on that which is new.
Sometimes we can observe the same phenomenon in social situations. Vygot-
sky asked us to imagine several people waiting for a particular bus. “No one
will say, on seeing the bus approach, ‘The bus for which we are waiting is
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coming.’” The speaker is likely to say merely, “Coming,” or some such expres-
sion. She limits her statement to the new information—the bus’s arrival (1934,
p. 236). When we talk silently to ourselves, we abbreviate our statements in a
similar way.
Another characteristic of inner speech is the dominance of sense over
meaning. The sense of the word is the feeling it arouses in us. For example,
the word lion can evoke feelings ranging from fear to tender sympathy,
depending on the context in which we are thinking about the animal. The
meaning is the more precise definition, like that found in a dictionary. A word’s
meaning is important for clear communication, but when we use words to
think about something just to ourselves, we are strongly affected by the emo-
tional sense of the words (Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 244–245).
To understand inner speech more fully, Vygotsky (1934, pp. 245–249)
said we need to examine its role within a microgenetic process. Microgenesis
is the relatively brief developmental process that occurs every time we form
a thought or a perception. The formation of a verbal statement, too, unfolds
microgenetically, and inner speech enters this process at a critical point.
The act of making a verbal statement begins with an emotion—a desire,
interest, or need. Next comes the dim stirring of a thought, which always
includes something of the original feeling. At this point, inner speech comes
into play. We engage in inner speech as we try to articulate our thoughts. This
process is fluid and dynamic, and both our thoughts and our words undergo
several transformations as we struggle to make a clear statement without los-
ing feeling behind our original thought (pp. 249–255).
Sometimes we cannot find words to express our thoughts at all. Vygot-
sky referred to a novel by Gelb Uspensky, in which “a poor peasant, who must
address an official with some life-important issue, cannot put his thoughts
into words” (p. 249). The poor man asks the Lord for help, but to no avail.
Even great poets, who are so good with words, experience this difficulty.
The poet Afanasey Fet wrote, “If only soul might speak without words!”
F. Tiutcheve felt that the process of translating thoughts into words so routinely
distorts the original thought that “a thought once uttered is a lie” (Vygotsky,
1934, pp. 251, 254). Vygotsky recognized this danger. Nevertheless, he argued
that we need words to develop our thoughts. A thought that fails to realize itself
in words remains unfulfilled. A “voiceless thought” as the poet Osip Mandel-
stam said, “returns to shadow’s chambers” (Vygtosky, 1934, p. 210).
PLAY
We have seen that speech frees the child from the immediate physical situa-
tion. Using words, the child can talk about objects and events beyond the here
and now. The young child also gains freedom from the concrete situation
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through play. In make-believe play, a piece of wood becomes a person, a stick
becomes a horse. The child creates an illusory world where objects take on
new meanings. Play is a big step in imaginative thinking.
But Vygotsky (1933) emphasized that the child’s play, although sponta-
neous and imaginative, is not completely free. In the child’s mind, there are
rules to be followed. When two young girls pretend it is night and they have
to go to sleep, they follow an implicit rule that they do not engage in any
imaginary activity whatsoever, such as digging in the dirt or riding bikes;
they only engage in bedtime activities. Vygotsky told about two girls, ages 5
and 7, who decided to play sisters. They followed an implicit rule that sisters
do things the same. They dressed alike and talked alike.
By adhering to the rules implicit in their play, children exhibit more self-
control than in the rest of their lives. They behave according to what they
think a role requires, not their immediate desires. If three children pretend to
be shopkeepers and customers, and let pieces of candy represent money, they
don’t eat the candy. They use the candy as a prop and stay in their roles.
Vygotsky said that because the child exhibits so much greater self con-
trol in play, it’s as if he were “a head taller than himself” (1933, p. 102). Yet
the child doesn’t experience the rules in play as a burden. On the contrary,
the child takes pleasure in adhering to them. Play, Vygotsky said, is the proto-
type for later taking pleasure in following one’s guiding idea or moral
principle (p. 99).
After the age of 7 or so, children begin playing games that have very
set rules. Vygotsky (1934, p. 104) observed that play isn’t as free and imag-
inative as it once was. But we should note that when Vygotsky wrote about
older children’s play, he was primarily thinking of structured, competitive
sports, not more informal children’s games, like snowball battles. In their
more informal games, children feel freer to create and revise rules, as Piaget
observed.
SCHOOLING
Vygotsky noted that children master language quite naturally (1935, p. 105),
and he made it sound as if early play springs spontaneously from the child her-
self. One might ask if speech and play are as much a part of the natural line
of development as the cultural line. Unfortunately, Vygotsky didn’t say much
on this question. But he made it clear that the acquisition of cultural sign sys-
tems such as math and writing don’t usually come naturally. These are taught
in schools, and most children have difficulty with these subjects. Vygotsky
was one of the first psychologists to devote considerable attention to the
impact of school instruction on the developing child. As was his custom, he
developed his ideas by comparing them to the ideas of others, particularly
those of Piaget.
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Vygotsky versus Piaget
Piaget drew a sharp distinction between development and teaching. Develop-
ment, he said, is a spontaneous process that comes from the child. It comes from
inner maturational growth and, more importantly, from the child’s own efforts
to make sense of the world. The child, in Piaget’s view, is a little intellectual
explorer, making her own discoveries and formulating her own positions.
Piaget did not mean that the child develops in isolation, apart from the
social world. Other people do have an impact on the child’s thinking. But they
do not help the child by trying to directly teach her things. Rather, they pro-
mote development by stimulating and challenging the child’s own thinking.
This often occurs, for example, when children get into discussions and debates
with friends. If a girl finds that a friend has pointed out a flaw in her argument,
she is stimulated to come up with a better argument, and her mind grows.
But the girl’s intellectual development is an independent process. For it is the
girl herself—not an outside person—who must construct the new argument.
As a proponent of independent thinking, Piaget was highly critical of the
teacher-directed instruction that occurs in most schools. Teachers try to take
charge of the child’s learning, acting as if they could somehow pour material
into the child’s head. They force the child into a passive position. Moreover,
teachers often present abstract concepts in math, science, and other areas that
are well beyond the child’s own grasp. Sometimes, to be sure, children appear
to have learned something, but they usually have acquired mere “verbalisms”;
they repeat back the teacher’s words without any genuine understanding of the
concepts behind them. If adults want children to genuinely grasp concepts, they
must give children opportunities to discover them on their own (Piaget, 1969).
In Vygotsky’s view, spontaneous development is important, but it is not
all-important, as Piaget believed. If children’s minds were simply the products
of their own discoveries and inventions, their minds wouldn’t advance very
far. In reality, children also benefit enormously from the knowledge and con-
ceptual tools handed down to them by their cultures. In modern societies, this
usually occurs in schools. Teachers do, as Piaget said, present material that is
too difficult for children to learn by themselves, but this is what good instruc-
tion should do. It should march ahead of development, pulling it along, help-
ing children master material that they cannot immediately grasp on their own.
Their initial understanding might be superficial, but the instruction is still
valuable, for it moves the children’s minds forward.
Scientific Concepts
Vygotsky saw particular value in the kinds of abstract concepts that are taught in
schools. He called them scientific concepts, and he included in this category con-
cepts in math and science (e.g., Archimedes’ law) as well as concepts in the social
sciences (e.g., class conflict). He contrasted these concepts with the spontaneous con-
cepts that children learn on their own. Because children develop most of their
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spontaneous concepts outside of school, in their everyday lives, Vygotsky also
referred to spontaneous concepts as everyday concepts (although there is no reason
why schools cannot also give children opportunities to make their own discov-
eries, as Montessori, Dewey, and Piagetians such as Kamii have shown).
In any case, Vygotsky argued that instruction in scientific concepts is
very helpful because it provides children with broader frameworks in which
to place their spontaneous concepts. For example, a 7-year-old boy might have
developed the spontaneous concept of grandmother, but his concept is pri-
marily based on his image of his own grandmother. If we ask him to define
the term, he might reply, “She has a soft lap.” Formal instruction, in which the
teacher diagrams abstract “family trees” (which include concepts such as
grandparents, parents, and children) can give the child a broader framework in
which to place his spontaneous concept and help him understand what a
grandmother really is (Vygotsky, 1930, p. 50).
Vygotsky argued that this kind of formal instruction brings conscious-
ness to the child’s thinking. So long as the child thinks of the concept
grandmother as a particular person, he is not really conscious of the concept.
His awareness is directed to the person, not the concept. Only when he sees
that grandmother is a category within a more general system of categories does
he become aware of the concept as such (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 171).
A similar process occurs when children learn to write. Before we are
introduced to writing, we have mastered a great deal of spoken language, but
our mastery is not at a very conscious level. Speaking is a bit like singing; it
is physically expressive and flows rather naturally. Writing, in contrast, uses
more formal and abstract systems of symbols and forces us to behave much
more consciously and deliberately. When we write, we are constantly making
conscious decisions with respect to the proper verb form, the point at which
a sentence should end, and so forth. Learning to write takes great effort, but
it helps us see how language is structured. Writing, Vygotsky said, “brings
awareness to speech” (p. 183).
Support for Vygotsky’s views has come from the research of Sylvia Scrib-
ner and Michael Cole (1981, pp. 151–156) on the effects of literacy among the
Vai people in Liberia. The investigators presented both literate and nonliterate
Vai adults with several sentences, some of which were ungrammatical. Both
groups were perfectly able to say which sentences were ungrammatical. But the
literate Vai were better able to explain why (for example, to explain that the sub-
ject and the verb of a sentence didn’t agree). Apparently, literacy training had
given them a greater conceptual awareness of their speech. In contemporary
terms, they had gained metacognitive knowledge of their own speech.
To get a better sense of what it feels like to learn on a newly conceptual
level, we might recall the experience of studying a foreign language in
school. The process probably felt awkward and self-conscious. But we might
also have felt we were becoming aware of our native language for the first
time because we were seeing it within a broader, abstract framework, as
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employing one set of rules where other options are possible (Vygotsky, 1934,
p. 196). As Goethe said, “He who knows no foreign language does not really
know his own” (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 160).
Vygotsky, then, saw much more value in scientific concepts than Piaget
did. In Vygotsky’s view, both scientific and spontaneous concepts have their
own specific virtues. Spontaneous concepts, such as the child’s own concepts
of grandmother and brother, are “saturated with experience” (p. 193); they are
full of rich personal sensations and imagery. Scientific concepts, such as
abstract family lineage systems, are comparatively dry. But scientific concepts
give children broader frameworks in which to view their own concepts.
Interactions Between Scientific and Spontaneous Concepts. In
school, the two kinds of concepts typically influence and benefit each other in
the following way. Scientific concepts, which the teacher hands down “from
above,” lead the way. They give cognitive development a new goal, pressing
children to think more abstractly than they ordinarily would.
For a while, however, children usually have difficulty understanding the
new concepts. That the children understand them at all must be credited to
their spontaneous concepts. When, for example, a typical Russian class of third-
graders listens to the teacher discuss the concept of class conflict, it is only because
the children have already developed spontaneous concepts of rich and poor
people that they have an inkling of what the teacher is talking about. As the
teacher presses on, the children are asked to think about the scientific concepts
further, and after a while they may develop some understanding of how their
spontaneous concepts fit into a more abstract scheme (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 194).
Instruction, then, propels the mind forward. Instruction, Vygotsky
emphasized, does not just add something new to the child’s development,
like adding clothes to the child’s body. Rather, it interacts with development,
awakening it, charting new paths for it. Vygotsky said that psychologists
should do all they can to learn about this interaction (1935, pp. 80, 91).
Vygotsky himself, however, found that this interaction is difficult to
study; the developmental processes stimulated by instruction are largely hid-
den from view. The one thing that is certain, Vygotsky found, is that devel-
opment does not follow instruction in any straightforward way. When he
plotted the two curves—one for the course of instruction, the other for the
child’s subsequent mental development—he found that the curves do not
coincide. For example, it often happens that three or four steps in instruction
produce no change in the child’s understanding of arithmetic, and then
with a fifth step, something clicks; the child has grasped a general prin-
ciple, and his developmental curve rises markedly. For this child, the
fifth operation was decisive, but this cannot be a general rule. The turn-
ing points at which a general principle becomes clear to the child can-
not be set in advance by the curriculum. (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 185)
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Thus the teacher cannot prescribe the manner in which the child learns.
The teacher might create a curriculum that progresses in a step-by-step man-
ner, but this doesn’t mean the child will develop according to the teacher’s
plan. Development has its own rhythms. Still, adult teaching is necessary.
Without it, the child’s mind wouldn’t advance very far (1934, p. 185).
The Zone of Proximal Development
Most teachers would probably agree with Vygotsky’s general viewpoint. They
would agree that it is their job to move the child’s mind forward, and to do
this they must directly teach children new concepts, not wait for them to make
their own discoveries. At the same time, teachers know they cannot teach any
concept to any child. They cannot, for example, effectively begin teaching
algebra to most first-graders. Teachers need ways of determining the kinds of
lessons children are ready for.
Most schools have made such decisions with the help of standardized
achievement and intelligence tests. A school might give a third-grade child
an achievement test, find that she is doing math at the third-grade level, and
assign her to a middle-level math group. Vygotsky argued, however, that the
conventional tests are inadequate. They only measure the child’s actual level
of development, telling us how far she has developed so far. They do not tell
us about the child’s ability to learn new material beyond her present level.
The reason for this shortcoming, Vygotsky said, is that conventional tests
only evaluate what the child can accomplish when working independently.
But before children can perform tasks alone, they can perform them in col-
laboration with others, receiving some guidance or support. To determine a
child’s potential for new learning, then, we need to see how well the child
can do when offered some assistance.
Vygotsky asked us to consider two boys who scored at the 8-year-old
level on a conventional intelligence test (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 187). They scored
at this level, that is, when working independently, as the test requires. Then,
however, the examiner presented some new problems, too difficult for the
boys to solve on their own, and offered each some slight assistance, such as a
leading question or the first step in a solution. With this help, one boy scored
at the 9-year-old level while the other boy scored at the 12-year-old level.
Clearly, the boys’ potential for new learning was not the same. Vygotsky called
the distance that children can perform beyond their current level the zone of
proximal development. More precisely, he defined the zone as
the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by
independent problem solving and the level of potential development as
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in col-
laboration with more capable peers. (1935, p. 86)
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Vygotsky hoped the zone of proximal development would give educators a
much better indication of each child’s true potential.
Actually, Vygotsky wrote just as enthusiastically about the concept’s use-
fulness to developmental psychology. He discussed the concept as if it pro-
vides a new, improved searchlight that illuminates not only those functions
that have already matured but also those that are in the process of maturing.
By focusing on the activities children can accomplish with assistance, the zone
reveals those abilities that are just beginning to develop, such as the ability to
walk in an infant who can do so only if she has a hand to hold. The zone of
proximal development casts light not so much on “the ripe as the ripening
functions”—those that the child can carry out only with assistance today but
will be able to perform alone tomorrow (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 188).
But how do we know Vygotsky was correct, that the zone of proximal
development does illuminate the stirrings of inner development? When a
slight amount of assistance quickly enables a child to succeed, we can be fairly
certain we are observing a spontaneously developing capacity. The rapid suc-
cess suggests that the adult aided a capacity that had already been emerging
from within.
But Vygotsky also suggested that adults occasionally provide a great deal
of assistance. He approvingly noted, for example, that a child could use an
abstract concept “because the teacher, working with the child, [had] explained,
supplied information, questioned, corrected, and made the pupil explain”
(1934, p. 191). In this case, the teacher appears to have treated the child like a
puppet, and it isn’t clear that the teacher has stimulated anything sponta-
neous within the child.
Perhaps the only way to know if the child’s spontaneous development
is activated is to watch the child. Is the child enthusiastic, curious, and actively
involved? Or does the child look off into space? In fact, some research (e.g.,
Rogoff, Malkin, & Gilbride, 1984) suggests that adults who teach effectively
within the zone of proximal development do continually look for signs of
spontaneous interest on the child’s part.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
Vygotsky wanted to help build a new society, and he deliberately set out to
construct a theory that addressed practical matters. As we have just seen, he
tried to show how school instruction can promote child development, and
he offered a new concept—the zone of proximal development—to assess
each child’s potential for new learning. If we want to know what a child is
ready to learn, Vygotsky said, we cannot look at what the child can do when
working alone; we must see how far ahead she can go when offered some
assistance.
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The zone of proximal development has captured the interest of a grow-
ing number of researchers. Some have evaluated the extent to which the zone
does in fact diagnose a child’s potential for new learning. The zone’s diag-
nostic value seems promising but in need of refinement; it does not yet pre-
dict end-of-the-year achievement better than IQ tests do (Berk, 2001, p. 205).
The zone of proximal development has stimulated much more interest
in the teaching process itself—how adults can help a child solve problems or
use strategies that are initially beyond the child’s independent abilities. Typ-
ically, psychologists and educators refer to this process as scaffolding (Wood,
1998). The adult (or more competent peer) at first provides a good deal of
assistance, but reduces it as the child gets the hang of the activity. The assis-
tance is like a temporary scaffold that comes down when construction is fin-
ished. For example, a parent might initially help a child pedal and steer a
bicycle, but then step aside as the child seems able to ride it on her own.
Brown and Palinscar (1989) showed how teachers might scaffold read-
ing skills using a method they call reciprocal teaching. Initially, the teacher
shows children how to summarize and clarify reading passages. Then the
children take turns “being the teacher,” leading small groups of classmates
in the use of the strategies. The teacher continues to guide the process but
gradually shifts much of the responsibility to the children. The method has
produced positive results (Berk, 2009, p. 269).
Elena Bodrova and Deborah Leong have developed a program called
Tools of the Mind to help preschool and kindergarten children learn self-
regulation skills such as planning activities, sticking to tasks, and ignoring
distractions. Bodrova and Leong began with Vygtosky’s observation that chil-
dren frequently demonstrate remarkable self-regulation in their make-believe
play. For example, the preschooler who has difficulty sitting still during
circle time can do so when she plays the role of a pupil in a make-believe
scene (Bodrova & Leong, 2007, p. 132). Using the Tools of the Mind program,
the teacher helps young children initiate and sustain make-believe play.
Teachers introduce children to play themes through videos, field trips,
and books. Teachers also ask children to create play plans. The children write
down their plans (to the best of their abilities) and draw pictures of them-
selves engaged in the activities. Children are encouraged to make their play
plans as specific as possible.
During the planning, the teachers suggest how the children “can try out
new roles, add new twists to the play scenario, or think of a way to substitute
for missing props” (Bodrova & Leong, 2001, p. 19). Initially, children often
believe props must be realistic-looking toys. Teachers wean children away
from this idea; they brainstorm with children about the different things a simple
object, such as wooden block, might represent. If children have difficulty sus-
taining their play, the teacher intervenes. She helps them plan and act out a
new scenario. If she intervenes a second time, she offers less assistance (as
scaffolding requires) (Bodrova & Leong, 2007, p. 151). In general, teachers do
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a considerable amount of coaching, which they gradually fade out (Tough,
2009, p. 35).
The Tools of the Mind program values both the quality of play—its rich-
ness and complexity—and the planning process itself. Planning helps chil-
dren gain cognitive control over their behavior.
Tools of the Mind also employs Vygotsky’s ideas with respect to academic
activities such as writing. For example, teachers ask children to use private or
self-directed speech while drawing letters. After observing a class, journalists
Bronson and Merryman report:
When the kids are learning the capital C, they all say in unison, “Start
at the top and go around” as they start to print. No one ever stops the
kids from saying it out loud, but after a few minutes, the Greek chorus
ends. In its place is a low murmur. A couple of minutes later, a few kids
are still saying it out loud—but most of the children are saying it in their
heads. (Bronson & Merryman, 2009, p. 167)
In kindergarten, children and teachers have mini-conferences to evalu-
ate the child’s activities during the past week and to plan for the next week
(Tough, 2009, p. 35). These conferences, too, are designed to help children gain
cognitive control over their behavior. Some research indicates that Tools of
the Mind does, in fact, increase children’s ability to regulate their behavior
(Diamond et al., 2007).
It is interesting to note that Vygotsky didn’t write about assisting chil-
dren’s play. He described play as if it’s a spontaneous development, coming
from children themselves. But Bodrova and Leong are justified in calling their
project “Vygotskian” (2001, p. 17) because Vygotsky generally emphasized
the way adults or more competent peers advance children’s skills.
Indeed, contemporary Vygotskians believe that adults and older
peers—not children themselves—initiate the first episodes of make-believe
play (Bodrova & Leong, 2007, p. 120; Berk, 2009, p. 268). If a toddler is hold-
ing a doll, an adult might say, “Tell your baby to chew her food,” helping
the child get into the mother role. Vygotskians (Berk, 2009, p. 268; Berk &
Winsler, 1995, p. 64) frequently cite two studies to demonstrate the need
for parental direction, but I don’t believe the studies’ results warrant this
conclusion.
In one study, Wendy Haight and Peggy Miller (1993) found that moth-
ers tried to get their 1-year-olds started on imaginary play. Then, when the
children were studied again at age 2, the children initiated 41% of their play
episodes. It might seem that the parents introduced the children to make-
believe play, which the children later initiated on their own. But what is over-
looked is that the parents’ efforts at age 1 had no discernable effect. The
children rarely played at that age. So the children who began make-believe
episodes a full year later (at age 2) might have acted spontaneously.
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In a second study, Miller and Catherine Garvey (1984) found that par-
ents provided props such as dolls for their 2-year-olds’ imaginary play. The
parents also allowed their children to borrow household objects such as pots
and pans for other props. But the children themselves usually began the play
episodes. Certainly, parents and older children can support and expand
youngsters’ imaginary play, but I don’t find evidence that their teaching or
guidance is necessary for its emergence.
In any case, it will be good to see further research on this question, which
highlights a basic disagreement between the Vygotskians and Piagetians. The
Vygotskians believe that development always has social origins. The Piage-
tians believe that development emerges from the child herself. You might
remember how Piaget’s daughter Jacqueline began make-believe play at about
the age of 2 years, as when she moved her finger on a table and said, “Horse
trotting.” From Piaget’s accounts, all her play at this age seemed to be her
own creation.
EVALUATION
Vygotsky’s work has generated great excitement because it suggests impor-
tant ways to expand traditional developmental theory. Vygotsky recognized
that intrinsic development, as studied by Gesell, Piaget, and others, is impor-
tant; children do grow and learn from their inner maturational promptings and
inventive spirit. But these forces alone, Vygotsky said, will not take children
very far. To develop their minds fully, children also need the intellectual tools
provided by their cultures—tools such as language, memory aids, numerical
systems, writing, and scientific concepts. A major task of developmental the-
ory is to understand how these tools are acquired.
But Vygotsky did more. He suggested we should study how intrinsic
developmental and cultural forces interact and produce new transformations.
It is the interaction between these conflicting forces that psychology must
eventually understand.
Vygotsky’s suggestion is more impressive than it might initially sound.
Many psychologists have called for eclectic approaches, saying we need to con-
sider a variety of intrinsic and environmental variables when we study devel-
opment. Such statements sound reasonable, but they overlook the legitimate
conflicts between theorists who emphasize one force or the other. Piagetians
believe the child grasps a concept on her own; environmentalists believe she
learns it from others; how can both be right? There is a logical contradiction.
Vygotsky, as a dialectical theorist, offered a new perspective. According
to dialectical theory, life is full of contradictions, and what we need to study
is what happens when opposing forces meet. We need to see what happens
when the growing child, trying to figure things out for herself, encounters
adults who try to teach her things. These interactions, Vygotsky observed, are
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complex and largely hidden from view. Indeed, Vygotsky frequently used the
metaphors of magnifying glasses, X-rays, and telescopes to convey the need
to get a better view of them (Cole & Scribner, 1978, p. 12; Vygotsky, 1933,
p. 102; 1935, p. 91). But although these interactions are difficult to study, they
are very important.
At the same time, Vygotsky’s work suffers from one-sidedness. As James
Wertsch (1985, pp. 40–49) points out, Vygotsky’s accounts about intrinsic or
natural development—that which comes from the children themselves—were
vague. Moreover, when it came to the interactions between these intrinsic
forces and cultural forces, Vygotsky’s own research focused largely on cul-
tural forces. For example, he studied the ways in which memory aids, writ-
ing, and scientific concepts transform the child’s mind, but he didn’t examine
the ways in which the child’s inner, spontaneous development might affect
cultural forces. He gave us a good picture of how children internalize their cul-
ture, but he told us little about how they might challenge or criticize their cul-
ture, as an idealistic adolescent might do.
It is easy to forgive any one-sidedness in Vygotsky’s own research.
A person can only do so much in his or her research career, and Vygotsky’s
career was cut tragically short. Others can study the interactions between
development and culture in fuller and more balanced ways.
The problem is that Vygotsky did not restrict himself to academic mat-
ters. He also tried to shape educational practices, and his educational ideas are
rapidly gaining popularity. In this realm, any one-sidedness becomes a more
urgent matter, and we need to take a close look at it. In the following com-
ments, I evaluate Vygotsky’s educational theory from a strongly develop-
mental perspective—that of writers such as Rousseau, Montessori, and Piaget.
Vygotsky, compared to these developmentalists, was enthusiastic about
school instruction. Instruction, he said, gives development a forward thrust.
It “does not preclude development, but charts new paths for it” (1934, p. 152).
On a day-to-day basis, the teacher moves the child forward by working
within the zone of proximal development. That is, the teacher does not just
give children tasks that they can solve by themselves, but more difficult
tasks—tasks they can solve only with some assistance. In this way, instruction
stimulates capacities that are still in an embryonic state and pushes develop-
ment forward.
At first glance, this kind of forward-looking instruction would seem
desirable. But many developmental scholars have been wary of attempts to
accelerate development. One danger is that we can push children forward
before we give them the chance to develop their potentials fully at their pres-
ent stage.
As an example, Vygotskians are attempting to promote goal-directed,
self-regulated thinking in 3- to 5-year-olds. Left on their own, children at this
age aren’t very focused or deliberate in their approach to tasks. They don’t
screen out irrelevant information, and they don’t monitor their progress.
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Because these self-regulation skills will be essential for future school success,
Vygotskian educators are trying to help children acquire them early on.
But this forward-looking instruction overlooks a potential strength of
early childhood—an open-minded receptivity to the world in all its richness
and variety. Young children love to wander about without any goal in mind,
taking delight in whatever they find. They become enthralled by their
discoveries—a shiny rock, a bird, a fish in a shallow brook. The world is full
of enchantment. Adult poets, artists, and naturalists try to recapture this
fresh openness and sense of wonder. Naturalist Cathy Johnson (1990) says
she tries to reduce the narrow, goal-directed approach that we associate
with cognitive maturity. Johnson says that if she wants to make serendipi-
tous discoveries, she needs to allow herself to wander about and be open
to whatever she encounters. Thus, the young child’s unfocused approach
to the world has its benefits. If we stress goal-directed behavior too early,
we curtail a valuable approach to life. (For more on the young child’s open-
ness to the world, see Crain, 2003, and Gopnik, 2009.)
Vygotsky’s educational philosophy contains a second danger. Instruc-
tion, Vygotsky said, propels the child forward because teachers and more
capable peers give the child assistance. With the help of others, children can
solve problems that are beyond them as individuals. Vygotsky was undoubt-
edly correct about this, but he overlooked the extent to which outside assis-
tance undermines the child’s independence. Developmentalists have
repeatedly warned that when we give children assistance and direction, we
encourage them to depend on others to know what and how to think, under-
mining their ability to think for themselves.
Vygotsky, to be sure, usually recommended that we provide children
only with slight amounts of assistance (such as a leading question or the first
step in a solution). In such cases, the threat to the child’s independence does
not seem to be too great. But on occasion, Vygotsky implied that we might
give the child a great deal of assistance. He implied this, for example, when
discussing his research on the concept of because.
Vygotsky found that 8-year-olds frequently use because correctly when
speaking on theoretical topics learned in school before they do so with respect
to their everyday concerns. For example, a girl might correctly say, “Planned
economy in the USSR is possible because there is no private property”
(Vygotsky, 1934, p. 191). The reason for the girl’s success, Vygotsky said, is
that “the teacher, working with the child, has explained, supplied information,
questioned, corrected, and made the pupil explain” (p. 191). So, when the girl
responds alone, she speaks correctly because the teacher’s help is “invisibly
present” (p. 191).
But to those who value independent thinking the girl’s correct response
is no cause for celebration. When the teacher’s assistance is this pervasive, it
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is difficult to imagine that the girl is in any way thinking for herself. She is
more like a toy puppet that is saying what it has been programmed to say.
Vygotsky (1935) had little patience with such objections. Many devel-
opmentalists, he said, are so worried about the harmful effects of instruction
that they constantly keep it at bay. They introduce instruction only when the
child is “ready” for it, which usually means waiting for a capacity to fully
mature before adding any relevant instruction. Instruction then becomes
superfluous, doing nothing to move the child forward.
Actually, developmental educators in the tradition of Montessori, Dewey,
and Piaget believe that children sometimes consolidate current capacities and
sometimes move forward. These educators believe that children themselves
tell us which tasks they need. They take a keen interest in such tasks and work
on them with great energy and concentration. For example, Montessori found
that children of 4 years or so become deeply engrossed in cutting vegetables
and other practical activities, probably because these activities help them
develop their perceptual-motor skills. The teacher’s job is to observe the child’s
interests and inclinations and to provide activities that engage the child in a
full way.
Teachers will, of course, be tempted to introduce materials that they
know the child will need in the future. But education is most effective when
it is geared to the child’s own interests and inclinations, not the teacher’s goals
for the future. And in no case should the teacher present tasks that are so far
ahead of the child that the child can solve them only with the teacher’s assis-
tance. The teacher should introduce activities that stimulate, challenge, and
engage the child, and then let the child solve them on his or her own.
Some of Vygotsky’s followers have narrowed the gap between Vygotsky
and the strong developmentalists. They point to instruction that pays close
attention to the child’s interest and enthusiasm as it leads the child through
tasks (Griffin & Cole, 1984; Rogoff, 1998). These investigators do not want to
squash the child’s creativity or participation in the learning process. In fact, in
one essay, Vygotsky (1935, pp. 116–119) himself argued that instruction should
arouse the child’s vital interests and correspond to the child’s natural way of
learning.
One Vygotskian, Barbara Rogoff (2003, chap. 8), suggests that part of the
problem is that Vygotsky focused on schools, where learning is predominantly
adult directed. In many non-Western communities, children more frequently
learn through participation in work-related activities and take more initiative
with respect to the tasks. For example, young Mayan children decide on their
own to make tortillas, with mothers giving them any assistance they need. In
many communities, children are expected to initially learn adult work through
observation, and “children take a leading role in managing their own atten-
tion, motivation, and involvement in learning, through their observation and
participation in ongoing mature activities” (Rogoff, 2003, p. 301).
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Rogoff, then, shares the developmentalists’ emphasis on children tak-
ing the initiative in their learning. But neither she nor other Vygotskians
endorse a really strong developmental position. They particularly object to
Piaget. As Bruner (1984, p. 96) has said, they oppose Piaget’s “image of human
development as a lone venture for the child,” in which the child must figure
everything out on her own. Instead, society has a responsibility to provide
the child with the intellectual tools it has developed, and this means provid-
ing her with instruction and assistance. If this assistance forces the child to
lean on others for intellectual support, so be it. Children simply cannot dis-
cover everything on their own. To develop their minds they need the help of
adults and more capable peers.
In the last analysis, then, Vygotsky and the developmentalists disagree
over the extent to which development can be entrusted to the child, to the
child’s own interests and efforts. And this disagreement is likely to continue
for a long time. But this may be a good thing. For disagreement can be part
of an ongoing dialectic, a series of challenges and responses that keep both
sides thinking and coming up with new ideas.
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Freud’s Psychoanalytic
Theory
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will begin discussing a group of theorists—the psy-
choanalysts—whose special province has been the inner world of feel-
ings, impulses, and fantasies. The principal founder of psychoanalytic
theory was Sigmund Freud (1856–1939).
To an extent, Freud’s thinking was similar to developmentalists
such as Gesell; Freud believed psychological change is governed by
inner forces, especially biological maturation. But Freud also thought
that maturation brings with it unruly sexual and aggressive energies,
which societies must harness. So, social forces also play a powerful role
in Freud’s theory.
Freud was born in Freiberg, Moravia (later part of Czechoslovakia).
He was the first child of a 20-year-old mother and a 40-year-old father,
although his father also had two grown sons from a previous marriage.
The father was a wool merchant who never became very successful in
business, and financial troubles forced the family to move twice when
Freud was young—first to Leipzig, and then, when Freud was 4, to
Vienna, where Freud lived until the last year of his life (Jones, 1961,
chap. 1).
As a boy, Freud was a brilliant student, and the family encouraged
his studies. His parents made sure he had an oil lamp to study by, while
the other family members had only candles (Schultz, 1975, p. 302).
Freud’s intellectual interests covered a wide variety of topics, and when
he was old enough to enter the university he had difficulty deciding on
an area of study. With some reluctance, he chose medicine, primarily
because it gave him an opportunity to do research. In medical school
Freud conducted important investigations of the spinal cord of the
Petromyzon, a type of fish (Jones, 1961, chaps. 3 and 4).
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Between the ages of 26 and 35, Freud restlessly searched for a field in
which he might make some important discovery. He continued to do research
in established areas of neurology, but he was more excited by other possibil-
ities. For a while, he thought he might find revolutionary uses for cocaine, a
drug to which he seemed temporarily addicted. Freud also visited Charcot’s
laboratory in Paris, where Charcot was investigating the mysteries of hyste-
ria. The study of this disorder became the starting point of Freud’s great con-
tributions (Jones, 1961, chaps. 5, 6, 10, and 11).
The term hysteria is applied to physical ailments as well as to losses of
memory for which there is no physiological explanation. A woman might
complain of a “glove anesthesia,” a loss of feeling in the hand up to the wrist,
even though physiologically there is no way she could lose sensation in pre-
cisely this part of the body.
Freud’s first work on hysteria followed the example of Josef Breuer,
who had treated a woman (“Anna O.”) by helping her uncover buried
thoughts and feelings through hypnosis. It seemed to Breuer and Freud (1895)
that hysteric patients had somehow blocked off, or repressed, wishes and emo-
tions from awareness. The blocked-off energy had then become converted
into physical symptoms. Therapy, then, consisted of uncovering and releas-
ing emotions that had been relegated to a separate part of the mind—the
unconscious.
Freud’s early work with hysteric patients can be illustrated by the case
of a woman he called Elizabeth von R. Elizabeth suffered from hysterical pains
in her thighs, pains that became worse after walks with her brother-in-law,
toward whom she “grew to feel a peculiar sympathy . . . which easily passed
with her for family tenderness” (Freud, 1910, p. 23). The sister (his wife) then
died, and Elizabeth was summoned to the funeral. As Elizabeth “stood by the
bedside of her dead sister, for one short moment there surged up in her mind
an idea, which might be framed in these words: ‘Now he is free and can marry
me’” (p. 23). This wish was totally unacceptable to her sense of morality, so she
immediately repressed it. She then fell ill with severe hysterical pains, and
when Freud came to treat her, she had completely forgotten the scene at her
sister ’s bedside. Many hours of psychoanalytic work were necessary to
uncover this and other memories, for Elizabeth had strong reasons for barring
them from consciousness. Eventually, she was able to gain awareness of her
feelings, and, to the extent she could accept them, they no longer needed to
be redirected into bodily symptoms.
In Freud’s work with Elizabeth and many other patients, he did not use
hypnosis, the technique Breuer had employed. Freud found that hypnosis,
among its other drawbacks, could only be used with some patients, and even
with those it often produced only temporary cures. In its place Freud devel-
oped the method of free association, in which the patient is instructed to let his
or her mind go and to report everything just as it occurs, making no effort to
order or censor the thoughts in any way.
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Freud found, however, that although free association eventually leads to
buried thoughts and feelings, it is by no means completely free. Patients
strongly resist the process. They block on certain topics, change the topic,
insist that their thoughts are too trivial or embarrassing to mention, and so on
(Freud, 1920, pp. 249–250). Freud named these interruptions resistance and
considered resistance new evidence for the power of repression in the mind
(Breuer & Freud, 1895, p. 314). That is, Freud saw new evidence for his the-
ory that the patient’s mind is at war with itself, that certain wishes are unac-
ceptable to the patient’s “ethical, aesthetic, or personal pretensions,” and that
the wishes therefore need to be repressed (Freud, 1910, p. 22).
As Freud built his theory, he speculated that not only hysterics and other
neurotic patients suffer from this kind of internal conflict. We all have thoughts
and desires we cannot admit to ourselves. In neurosis, repression and con-
flict become particularly intense and unmanageable, and symptoms result.
Nevertheless, conflict characterizes the human condition (Freud, 1900, p. 294;
1933, p. 121).
Breuer and Freud published a book together—Studies on Hysteria
(1895)—which became the first classic work in psychoanalytic theory. After-
ward, however, Breuer discontinued his work in the area. Breuer’s decision
was largely influenced by the direction the work was taking. Freud was
increasingly finding that the central emotions that hysterics blocked from
awareness were sexual ones—a finding that Breuer sensed was true but which
he also found personally distasteful and troubling. Moreover, the sexual the-
ory brought ridicule from the scientific community, and this hurt Breuer
deeply. Consequently, Breuer left it to Freud to investigate this new area by
himself.
As Freud pressed on with the work, he found that his patients’ buried
memories led farther back into their pasts—into their childhoods. Freud had
great trouble understanding what he was finding. His patients repeatedly
told stories about how their parents had committed the most immoral sexual
acts against them as children—stories that Freud finally concluded must
mainly be fantasies. For a while, it seemed his research had gone up in smoke.
It was not built on truth, but on fiction. But he then concluded that fantasies,
too, govern our lives. Our thoughts and feelings can be as important as actual
events (Freud, 1914a, p. 300; Gay, 1988, p. 95).
In 1897, the year in which Freud was puzzling over the truth of his
patients’ memories, he began a second line of investigation—a self-analysis.
Motivated by the disturbance he felt when his father died, he began examin-
ing his own dreams, memories, and childhood experiences. Through this
analysis, he gained independent confirmation of his theory of childhood sex-
uality and discovered what he considered his greatest insight: the Oedipus
complex in the child. That is, he discovered that he (and presumably all chil-
dren as well) develop an intense rivalry with the parent of the same sex for the
affection of the parent of the opposite sex. Freud first published this theory in
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the Interpretation of Dreams (1900). He called the interpretation of dreams “the
royal road to the unconscious” (p. 647).
Freud’s self-analysis was not an easy process. He had begun delving
into an area—the unconscious—out of which “God knows what kind of beast
will creep” (Jones, 1961, p. 213). At times, Freud was unable to think or write;
he experienced “an intellectual paralysis such as I have never imagined” (p. 213).
And, on top of this, what he was finding—evidence for childhood sexuality—
was unacceptable to most of the scientific community. Most of his colleagues
believed, with everyone else, that sexuality begins at puberty, not before.
Freud’s suggestion that innocent children experience sexual desires indicated
that he was little more than a perverted sex maniac. In the face of this reaction,
Freud felt “completely isolated” and said he often dreaded losing his way
and his confidence (Freud, 1914a, p. 302).
About 1901 (when Freud was 45 years old) he finally began to emerge
from his intellectual isolation. His work attracted various younger scientists
and writers, some of whom began meeting with him for weekly discussions.
These discussion groups gradually evolved into a formal psychoanalytic asso-
ciation. Among Freud’s early disciples were Alfred Adler and Carl Jung, who,
like several others, eventually broke with Freud and established their own
psychoanalytic theories.
Freud continued to develop and revise his theory until the end of his
life, the last 16 years of which he spent in pain from cancer of the jaw. In 1933
the Nazis burned his books in Berlin, and in 1938 he had to leave Vienna for
London, where he lived his last year and died at the age of 83.
THE STAGES OF PSYCHOSEXUAL
DEVELOPMENT
We have seen how Freud’s work led him to believe that sexual feelings must
be active in childhood. Freud’s concept of sex, however, was very broad. In
his view (1905), “sex” includes not just sexual intercourse but practically
anything that produces bodily pleasure. In childhood, in particular, sexual
feelings are very general and diffuse. Sexual feelings may be included in
activities such as sucking for pleasure, masturbation, the wish to show off
one’s body or to look at the bodies of others, anal excretion or retention,
body movements such as rocking, and even acts of cruelty, such as pinching
or biting (pp. 585–594).
Freud had two major reasons for considering such diverse activities as
sexual. First, children seem to derive pleasure from them. Babies enjoy suck-
ing even when they are not hungry; they suck their hands, fingers, and other
objects because it produces pleasurable sensations on the mucous membranes
of the mouth (p. 588). Second, Freud regarded many childhood activities as
sexual because they later reemerge in adult sexual activity. Most adults engage
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in sucking (i.e., kissing), looking, exhibitionism, or cuddling immediately
prior to and during sexual intercourse. Sometimes, in the cases of so-called per-
versions, adults reach orgasm through childhood sexual activities alone (with-
out sexual intercourse). A “Peeping Tom” may reach orgasm simply by looking
at the bodies of others. Neurotic adults, too, retain childhood sexual wishes,
but they feel so much guilt and shame that they repress them (Freud, 1920,
chaps. 20 and 21; 1905, pp. 577–579).
In Freud’s theory, the term for one’s general sexual energy is libido, and
any part of the body on which this energy becomes focused is called an
erogenous zone (Freud, 1905, pp. 585–594, 611). Almost any part of the body can
become an erogenous zone, but in childhood the three most important zones
are the mouth, the anus, and the genital area. These zones become the center
of the child’s sexual interests in a specific stage sequence. The child’s first inter-
ests center on the mouth (the oral stage), followed by the anus (the anal stage),
and finally the genital region (the phallic stage). Freud thought that this
sequence is governed by a maturational process—by innate, biological factors
(pp. 587, 621). At the same time, the child’s social experiences also play a deci-
sive developmental role. For example, a child who experiences a great deal of
frustration at the oral stage may develop a lasting preoccupation with things
having to do with the mouth. Let us now look at Freud’s stages in more detail.
The Oral Stage
The First Months. Freud said that “if the infant could express itself,
it would undoubtedly acknowledge that the act of sucking at its mother ’s
breast is far and away the most important thing in life” (Freud, 1920, p. 323).
Sucking is vital, of course, because it provides nourishment; the baby must
suck to stay alive. But, as mentioned, Freud thought that sucking also pro-
vides pleasure in its own right. This is why babies suck on their thumbs and
other objects even when they are not hungry. Freud called such pleasure-
sucking autoerotic; when babies suck their thumbs, they do not direct their
impulses toward others but find gratification through their own bodies
(Freud, 1905, p. 586).
Autoerotic activities are not confined to the oral stage. Later on, for
example, children stimulate their genitals for pleasure, and this too is auto-
erotic. However, Freud emphasized the autoerotic nature of the oral stage
because he wanted to stress the extent to which babies are wrapped up in
their own bodies. Like Piaget, Freud thought that during the first six months
or so the baby’s world is “objectless.” That is, the baby has no conception of
people or things existing in their own right. When nursing, for example,
young infants experience the comfort of the mother ’s hold, but they do not
recognize the existence of the mother as a separate person. Similarly, when
cold, wet, or hungry, babies feel mounting tension and even panic, but they
are unaware of any separate person who might relieve the pain. They simply
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long for a return of pleasurable feelings. Thus, although babies are completely
dependent on others, they are unaware of this fact because they do not yet
recognize other people’s separate existence.
Sometimes Freud described this initial objectless state as one of primary
narcissism (e.g., Freud, 1915a, p. 79). The term narcissism means self-love and
is taken from the Greek myth about a boy called Narcissus, who fell in love
with his reflection in a pond. As Edith Jacobson (1964, chap. 1) has observed,
this term is somewhat confusing because it implies that babies have a clear
conception of themselves to love, when they still cannot distinguish them-
selves from the rest of the world. Still, narcissism does convey the idea that at
first babies focus primarily inward, on their own bodies. The basic narcissis-
tic state, Freud (1916) said, is sleep, when infants feel warm and content and
have absolutely no interest in the outside world.
The Second Part of the Oral Stage. Beginning at about 6 months of
age, babies begin to develop a conception of another being, especially the
mother, as a separate, necessary person. They become anxious when she leaves
or when they encounter a stranger in her place (Freud, 1936a, p. 99).
At the same time, another important development is taking place: the
growth of teeth and the urge to bite. At this point, Karl Abraham (1924a)
pointed out, babies dimly form the idea that it is they, with their urge to bite
and devour, who can drive their mothers away. Life at this stage, then,
becomes increasingly complex and troubling. It is little wonder that we may
often unconsciously wish to return to the earlier oral stage, when things
seemed so much simpler and more gratifying.
An Illustration: Hansel and Gretel. Freud was aware of the difficulty
in reaching conclusions about the infant’s mental life. Babies cannot talk and
tell us about their feelings and fantasies. To some extent, we are forced to recon-
struct the infant’s psychic life from the analyses of adults who seem to revert
to early ways of thinking—namely, psychotics. But Freudians also suggest that
many myths and fairy tales reveal the child’s early fantasies and concerns.
Bruno Bettelheim (1976, pp. 159–166) wrote about the oral themes con-
tained in the story of Hansel and Gretel. Briefly, Hansel and Gretel are two chil-
dren who are sent into the forest by their parents, especially the mother,
because they are careless with food (milk) and there is no longer enough to
feed them. In the forest, they discover a gingerbread house, which they pro-
ceed to devour. Sensing that it may be dangerous to eat so much of the house,
Hansel and Gretel hear a voice that asks, “Who is nibbling at my house?” But
they ignore it, telling themselves, “It is only the wind” (The Brothers Grimm,
1972, p. 90). The woman who owns the house then appears, and she is at first
completely gratifying. She gives them all kinds of good things to eat and nice
beds in which to sleep. But the next day she turns out to be worse than their
mother. She is a witch who intends to eat them.
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In Bettelheim’s analysis, the themes are largely those of the second oral
stage. The story begins with the children experiencing the dreaded separa-
tion from their caretakers. There is some hint that the children’s own inner
urges are at the root of their troubles; they have been reckless with their
mother’s milk and they greedily devour the gingerbread house. The children’s
wish is to return to the first oral stage, which seemed so blissful. So they meet
the witch, who is temporarily “the original, all-giving mother, whom every
child hopes to find again later somewhere out in the world” (Bettelheim, 1976,
p. 161). However, this proves impossible. Because they are dimly aware of
their own oral destructiveness, they imagine that others will take an oral
revenge, which is what the witch attempts to do.
Bettelheim says that fairy tales facilitate growth by addressing children’s
deepest fears while, at the same time, showing them that their problems have
solutions. In this story, Hansel and Gretel finally quit acting solely on the basis
of their oral impulses and use more rational parts of the personality. They
employ reason to outwit the witch and kill her, and they return home as more
mature children.
Fixation and Regression. According to Freud, we all go through the
oral stage as well as every other stage of psychosexual development. However,
we also can develop a fixation at any stage, which means that no matter how
far we have advanced beyond it, we maintain a lasting preoccupation with the
pleasures and issues of the earlier stage. For example, if we are fixated at the
oral stage, we might find ourselves continually preoccupied with food; or we
find that we work most comfortably when we are sucking or biting on objects,
such as pencils; or we gain the most pleasure from oral sexual activities; or we
find ourselves addicted to smoking or drinking partly because of the oral
pleasure involved (Abraham, 1924b; Freud, 1905).
Freud (1920, p. 357) said that he was not certain about the causes of fix-
ation, but psychoanalysts generally believe that fixations are produced by either
excessive gratification or excessive frustration at the stage in question (Abra-
ham, 1924b, p. 357; Fenichel, 1945, p. 65). The baby who receives prolonged
and very satisfying nursing may continue to seek oral pleasures. Alternatively,
the baby who experiences sharp frustrations and deprivations at the oral stage
may act as if he or she is unwilling to give up oral satisfactions or as if there is
a persistent danger that oral needs will not be met. Such a person might, for
instance, become anxious when meals are not served on time and devour the
food as if it might disappear at any moment. In general, it seems that severe
frustrations, rather than excessive gratifications, produce the strongest fixa-
tions (White & Watt, 1973, pp. 136, 148, 189; Whiting & Child, 1953).
Sometimes people show few oral traits in their daily lives until they
experience some frustration, and then they regress to the oral fixation point. A
little boy who suddenly finds himself deprived of parental affections when his
baby sister is born might regress to oral behavior and once again take up
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thumb sucking—something he had previously given up. Or a teenage girl
may not be particularly concerned about oral matters until she loses a
boyfriend, and then she becomes depressed and finds comfort in eating.
The tendency to regress is determined by both the strength of the fixa-
tion in childhood and the magnitude of the current frustration (Freud, 1920,
chap. 22). If we have a strong oral fixation, a relatively small frustration in
our current life may be sufficient to cause an oral regression. Alternatively, a
major frustration might cause a regression to an earlier developmental stage
even if the fixation was not particularly strong.
The kinds of regressions we have been discussing might occur in any of
us—in relatively “normal” people. We all find life frustrating at times, and
now and then we regress to earlier, more infantile, ways of behaving. Such
regressions are not pathological, because they are only partial and temporary.
For example, the boy who resumes thumb sucking when his baby sister is
born usually does so only for a while; in any case, he does not become like an
infant in other respects.
Freud also believed, however, that the concepts of fixation and regression
can help clarify more serious emotional disorders. In certain forms of schizo-
phrenia, there is a very complete regression to the first developmental stage. The
schizophrenic often withdraws from interaction with others and entertains
grandiose ideas concerning his or her importance. A patient may think she is
God and her ideas affect the whole world. In such a case, the person has under-
gone a fairly complete regression to a state of primary narcissism, in which the
libido is invested solely in the self, and the boundaries between the self and the
rest of the world have once again become unstable (Freud, 1920, pp. 422–424).
According to Abraham (1924a), regression to the oral stage is also evident
in severe cases of depression. Such depressions frequently follow the loss of
a loved one, and a common symptom is the patient’s refusal to eat. Perhaps
patients are punishing themselves because they unconsciously feel it was their
own oral anger that destroyed the love object.
The Anal Stage
During the second and third years of the child’s life, the anal zone becomes
the focus of the child’s sexual interests. Children become increasingly aware
of the pleasurable sensations that bowel movements produce on the mucous
membranes of the anal region. As they gain maturational control over their
sphincter muscles, they sometimes learn to hold back their bowel movements
until the last moment, thereby increasing the pressure on the rectum and
heightening the pleasure of the final release (Freud, 1905, p. 589). Children
also frequently take an interest in the products of their labors and enjoy han-
dling and smearing their feces (Freud, 1913, pp. 88–91; Jones, 1918, p. 424).
It is at this stage that children are first asked to renounce their instinc-
tual pleasures in a fairly dramatic way. Few parents are willing to permit their
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children to smear and play with feces for very long. Most parents, as well-
socialized individuals, feel a certain repugnance over anal matters and soon
get children to feel the same way. As soon as their children are ready, if not
sooner, parents toilet-train them.
Some children initially fight back by deliberately soiling themselves
(Freud, 1905, p. 591). They also sometimes rebel by becoming wasteful, dis-
orderly, and messy—traits that sometimes persist into adulthood as aspects of
the “anal expulsive” character (J. F. Brown, 1940; Hall, 1954, p. 108).
Freud, however, was most interested in the opposite reaction to parental
demands. He observed that some people develop an excessive stake in clean-
liness, orderliness, and reliability (1908a). It seems as if they felt, as children,
that it was too risky to rebel against parental demands, and so they anxiously
conformed to parental rules. Instead of messing and smearing, they became
models of self-control, acquiring a disgust for anything dirty or smelly, and
developing a compulsive need to be clean and orderly. Such people, who are
sometimes labeled “anal compulsive” characters, also harbor resentment over
submitting to authority, but they do not dare express their anger openly.
Instead, they frequently develop a passive obstinacy; they insist on doing
things according to their own schedule—often while others are forced to wait.
They may also be frugal and stingy. It is as if they feel that although they were
forced to give up their feces when others demanded it, they will hold on to
other things, such as money, and nobody will take these things away.
Toilet training probably arouses sufficient anger and fear to produce
some measure of fixation in most children, especially in the United States,
where we tend to be strict about this matter (Munroe, 1955, p. 287). Conse-
quently, most people probably develop at least some tendency toward “anal
expulsiveness,” “anal compulsiveness,” or some combination of both. Some-
times these traits have little serious impact on one’s life but then emerge in a
more pronounced way when one is under stress. For example, writers may be
prone to compulsive behavior when they become anxious about their work.
A writer may be unable to finish a manuscript because of a compulsive need
to check and recheck it for mistakes. To a Freudian, such behavior probably
represents a regression to the anal stage, where the individual learned that
his or her natural actions met with unexpected disapproval. That is, the writer
might have learned that his or her first “productions” were considered dirty
and revolting when done spontaneously but prized if done properly. Thus, the
writer, anxious about the impact of the manuscript, tries to protect himself or
herself by seeing that everything is done precisely as it is supposed to be.
The Phallic or Oedipal Stage
Between the ages of about 3 and 6 years, the child enters the phallic or oedi-
pal stage. Freud understood this stage better in the case of the boy than in the
case of the girl, so we begin our discussion with the boy.
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The Boy’s Oedipal Crisis. The oedipal crisis begins when the boy
starts to take an interest in his penis. This organ, which is “so easily excitable
and changeable, and so rich in sensations,” fires his curiosity (Freud, 1923,
p. 246). He wants to compare his penis to those of other males and of animals,
and he tries to see the sexual organs of girls and women. He may also enjoy
exhibiting his penis and, more generally, imagines the role he might play as
an adult, sexual person. He initiates experiments and spins fantasies in which
he is an aggressive, heroic male, frequently directing his intentions toward
his primary love object, his mother. He may begin kissing Mommy aggres-
sively, or want to sleep with her at night, or imagine marrying her. He prob-
ably does not yet conceive of sexual intercourse per se, but he does wonder
what he might do with her.
The boy soon learns, however, that his most ambitious experiments and
plans are considered excessive and improper. He learns that he cannot, after
all, marry Mommy or engage in any sex play with her. He cannot even touch,
hug, or cuddle with Mommy as much as he would like, since he is now a “big
boy.” At the same time, he notices that Daddy seems to be able to do whatever
he wants: Daddy seems to kiss and hug Mommy at will, and he sleeps with
her all night long (doing with her whatever grownups do at night). So the
lines of the Oedipus complex are drawn: The boy sees the father as a rival for
the affections of the mother.
The little boy’s oedipal wishes are illustrated by Freud’s case of Little
Hans (Freud, 1909). When Hans was about 5 years old, he asked his mother
to touch his penis, and he wanted to cuddle with her at night. His father, how-
ever, objected. Soon after, Hans had the following dream:
In the night there was a big giraffe in the room and a crumpled one; and
the big one called out because I took the crumpled one away from it.
Then it stopped calling out; and then I sat down on top of the crumpled
one. (p. 179)
According to Freud, Hans’s dream probably represented his wish to take his
mother (the crumpled giraffe) from the father (the big giraffe).
The little boy, of course, cannot realistically hope to carry out his rivalrous
wishes; the father is too big. The youngster could still entertain rivalrous fan-
tasies, but these too become dangerous. For one thing, he not only feels jealous
of his father but he also loves and needs his father, so he is frightened by his
destructive wishes toward him. But more important, the boy begins to consider
the possibility of castration. In Freud’s day, parents often made outright threats
of castration when a boy masturbated. Today, parents may discourage mastur-
bation more delicately, but the boy does probably begin to worry about castra-
tion when he realizes his sister and other females are missing a penis. He then
concludes that they once had one, but it was cut off, and the same thing could
happen to him. The oedipal rivalry takes on a new, dangerous dimension, and
the boy must escape the whole situation (Freud, 1924, p. 271).
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Typically, the boy resolves the oedipal predicament through a series of
defensive maneuvers (Freud, 1923; 1924). He fends off his incestuous desires
for his mother through repression; that is, he buries any sexual feelings toward
her deep into his unconscious. He still loves his mother, of course, but he now
admits only to a socially acceptable, “sublimated” love—a pure, higher love.
The boy overcomes his rivalry with his father by repressing his hostile feelings
and by increasing his identification with him. Instead of trying to fight the
father, he now becomes more like him, and in this way vicariously enjoys the
feeling of being a big man. It is as if the boy were to say, “If you can’t beat
him, join him.”
To overcome the oedipal crisis, finally, the boy internalizes a superego.
That is, he adopts his parents’ moral prohibitions as his own, and in this way
FIGURE 1
Drawings by a 5-year-old boy and a 6-year-old girl suggest sexual interests of the
phallic stage.
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establishes a kind of internal police officer who guards against dangerous
impulses and desires. The superego is similar to what we ordinarily call the
conscience; it is an inner voice that reprimands us and makes us feel guilty for
bad thoughts and actions. Before the child internalizes a superego, he suffers
only from external criticism and punishment. Now, however, he can criticize
himself, and thus he possesses an inner fortification against forbidden impulses.
The foregoing review suggests the complexity of the Oedipus complex,
but it actually is far more complex than we have indicated. The boy’s rivalry
and love work both ways—he also rivals the mother for the affection of the
father (Freud, 1923, pp. 21–24). The situation is also complicated by the pres-
ence of siblings, who also become the objects of love and jealousy (Freud,
1920, p. 343), and by other factors, such as the loss of a parent. We cannot
begin to go into the limitless variations here, but the interested reader can
refer to Fenichel (1945, pp. 91–98).
Typical Outcomes. Typically, when the boy resolves the Oedipus
complex at the age of 6 years or so, his rivalrous and incestuous wishes are
temporarily driven underground. As we shall see, he enters the latency period,
during which he is relatively free of these worries. Nevertheless, oedipal feel-
ings continue to exist in the unconscious. They threaten to break into con-
sciousness once again at puberty and exert a strong influence on the life of
the adult. This influence has many variations, but it typically is felt in two
central areas: competition and love.
As the adult male enters into competition with other men, he carries
with him the dim knowledge of his first forays into this area. The first time
he dared to rival a man, his masculinity suffered a sharp setback. Conse-
quently, he may be apprehensive about rivaling men again. In the back of
his mind, he is still a little boy, wondering if he can really be a big man
(Fenichel, 1945, p. 391; Freud, 1914b).
The adult may also feel a sense of guilt over competitive urges. The first
time he rivaled a man, he wished to do away with his competitor. He repressed
these hostile wishes and established a superego to help fend them off, but he
still may dimly feel that the wish to become more successful than others is
somehow wrong (Freud, 1936b, p. 311).
Oedipal feelings also influence a man’s experiences in love. Freud (1905)
said that the man “seeks above all the memory-image of the mother” (p. 618).
However, this desire has its problems. In the early years, it became associated
with castration anxiety and guilt. Consequently, men are sometimes impo-
tent with women who evoke too much of the mother’s presence. They become
sexually inhibited with women who arouse the deep and tender feelings asso-
ciated with the mother, and they are most potent with women whom they
regard as mere outlets for their physical needs (Freud, 1912).
Freud thought that everyone undergoes an oedipal crisis, so all men
have some of these feelings to a certain degree. Severe problems usually stem
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from excessive fears experienced as a child. Still, oedipal problems are not as
serious as those that develop at earlier periods, when the personality is in a
more formative stage.
The Girl’s Oedipus Complex. Freud thought there was an Oedipus
complex for the little girl too, but he admitted that “here our material—for
some reason we do not understand—becomes far more shadowy and incom-
plete” (1924, p. 274). Freud’s views on this topic, in broad outline, were as fol-
lows. He noted (1933, pp. 122–127) that the girl, by the age of 5 years or so,
becomes disappointed in her mother. She feels deprived because her mother
no longer gives her the constant love and care that she required as a baby,
and, if new babies are born, she resents the attention they receive. Further-
more, she is increasingly irritated by the mother’s prohibitions, such as that
on masturbation. Finally, and most upsetting, the girl discovers that she does
not have a penis—a fact for which she blames the mother, “who sent her into
the world so insufficiently equipped” (Freud, 1925a, p. 193).
The little girl’s genital disappointment is illustrated by an anecdote
from Ruth Munroe (1955, pp. 217–218), a psychologist who said she was skep-
tical about Freud’s theory until one day when she observed her 4-year-old
daughter in a bathtub with her brother. The daughter suddenly exclaimed,
“My weewee (penis) is all gone,”—apparently comparing herself with her
brother for the first time. Munroe tried to reassure her, but nothing worked,
and for some weeks she objected violently even to being called a girl. Thus
this little girl felt what Freud called penis envy, the wish to have a penis and
to be like a boy (Freud, 1933, p. 126).
The little girl does, however, recover her feminine pride. This happens
when she begins to appreciate the attentions of her father. The father may
have not paid any special attention to his daughter when she was in diapers,
but now he may begin to admire her cuteness and growing femininity, call-
ing her his little princess and flirting with her in other ways. Thus inspired,
she begins to spin romantic fantasies involving herself and her father. At first
her thoughts include a vague wish for his penis, but this soon changes into a
wish to have a baby and give it to him as a present.
As with the little boy, the little girl discovers that she lacks sole rights to
her new love object. She realizes that she cannot, after all, marry Daddy, nor
can she cuddle, hug, or sleep with him as much as she would like. However,
the mother seems to be able to do these things, so she becomes the rival for
his affections. Freud said that this oedipal situation might be called the Electra
complex (1940, p. 99).
What most puzzled Freud about the girl’s Oedipus complex was the
motivation for its resolution. In the case of the little boy, the primary motiva-
tion seemed clear: The boy is frightened by the threat of castration. But the little
girl cannot fear castration, for she has no penis to lose. Why, then, does she
renounce her oedipal wishes at all? In one essay, Freud (1925a, p. 196) said
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that he simply did not know the answer, but his best guess was that the girl
resolves the oedipal crisis because she fears the loss of parental love (1933,
p. 87). So she does after all repress her incestuous desires, identify with her
mother, and institute a superego to check herself against forbidden impulses
and wishes.1 Still, lacking castration anxiety, her motivation to erect strong
defenses against oedipal feelings must be weaker, and, as a result, she must
develop a weaker superego. Freud knew that this last conclusion would anger
the feminists, but this was where his reasoning led and he argued that women
in fact are less rigid about moral issues (p. 129).
Like a boy, then, the little girl entertains and then abandons rivalrous
and incestuous fantasies. In some ways, the later consequences of the oedipal
experience would seem similar to those for the boy. For example, the girl too
may carry within her the dim knowledge that her first attempt at rivaling a
woman for a man’s love failed, and she may therefore doubt her future
prospects. At the same time, though, the girl’s oedipal experiences differed
from the boy’s, so the effects may differ as well. She had less need to resolve
the Oedipus crisis, so her oedipal desires may be more open and transparent
later in life (p. 129). Furthermore, just before she entered into the oedipal
rivalry, she experienced a deep disappointment over being female. This feel-
ing, Freud felt, may lead to a “masculinity complex,” in which the woman
may avoid intimate relationships with men, since these only remind her of
her inferior state, and, instead, try to outdo men by becoming very aggressive
and assertive (p. 126).
The Latency Stage
With the establishment of strong defenses against oedipal feelings, the child
enters the latency period, which lasts from about age 6 to 11 years. As the
name suggests, sexual and aggressive fantasies are now largely latent; they are
kept firmly down, in the unconscious. Freud thought that the repression of sex-
uality at this time is quite sweeping; it includes not only oedipal feelings and
memories, but oral and anal ones as well (Freud, 1905, pp. 580–585). Because
dangerous impulses and fantasies are now kept underground, the child is not
excessively bothered by them, and the latency period is one of relative calm.
The child is now free to redirect his or her energies into concrete, socially
acceptable pursuits, such as sports and games and intellectual activities.
Some of Freud’s followers have argued that sexual and aggressive fan-
tasies do not disappear at this time as completely as Freud implied (Blos,
1962, pp. 53–54). For example, an 8-year-old boy is still interested in girls’
bodies, and he typically discovers the real facts of life at about this age. Never-
theless, most Freudians agree that sexual concerns lose their frightening and
1As with the boy, the girl’s Oedipus complex is exceedingly complex. Rivalries develop
with both parents and with siblings as well.
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overwhelming character. In general, the latency-age child possesses a new
composure and self-control.
Puberty (The Genital Stage)
The stability of the latency period, however, does not last. As Erikson said,
“It is only a lull before the storm of puberty” (1959, p. 88). At puberty, which
begins at about age 11 for girls and age 13 for boys, sexual energy wells up in
full adult force and threatens to wreak havoc with the established defenses.
Once again, oedipal feelings threaten to break into consciousness, and now the
young person is big enough to carry them out in reality (Freud, 1920, p. 345).
Freud said that from puberty onward, the individual’s great task is “free-
ing himself from the parents” (p. 345). For the son, this means releasing his tie
to the mother and finding a woman of his own. The boy must also resolve his
rivalry with his father and free himself of his father’s domination of him. For
the daughter, the tasks are the same; she too must separate from the parents
and establish a life of her own. Freud noted, however, that independence
never comes easily (1905, p. 346). Over the years we have built up strong
dependencies on our parents, and it is painful to separate ourselves emo-
tionally from them. For most of us, the goal of genuine independence is never
completely attained.
Anna Freud on Adolescence
Although Freud sketched the general tasks of adolescence, he wrote little
about the distinctive stresses and behavior patterns of this stage of life. It was
his daughter, Anna Freud, who made many of the first contributions to the
psychoanalytic study of adolescence.
Anna Freud’s starting point was the same as that of her father: The
teenager experiences the dangerous resurgence of oedipal feelings. Typically,
the young person is most aware of a growing resentment against the parent
of the same sex. Incestuous feelings toward the other parent remain more
unconscious.
Anna Freud said that when adolescents first experience the welling up
of oedipal feelings, their first impulse is to take flight. The teenager feels tense
and anxious in the presence of the parents and feels safe only when apart
from them. Some adolescents actually run away from home at this time; many
others remain in the house “in the attitude of a boarder” (A. Freud, 1958,
p. 269). They shut themselves up in their rooms and feel comfortable only
when they are with their peers.
Sometimes adolescents try to escape their parents by developing a blan-
ket contempt for them. Instead of admitting any dependence and love, they
take an attitude that is exactly the opposite. It is as if they think they can
become free of parental involvement by thinking absolutely nothing of them.
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Here, again, teenagers may fancy themselves suddenly independent, but their
parents still dominate their lives, for they spend all their energy attacking and
deriding their parents (p. 270).
Adolescents sometimes attempt to defend themselves against feelings
and impulses altogether, irrespective of the individuals to whom their feelings
are attached. One strategy is asceticism. That is, the adolescent tries to fend off
all physical pleasure. Boys or girls might adhere to strict diets; deny them-
selves the pleasures of attractive clothes, dancing, or music, or anything else
fun or frivolous; or try to master their bodies through exhausting physical
exercise.
Another defense against impulses is intellectualization. The adolescent
attempts to transfer the problems of sex and aggression onto an abstract, intel-
lectual plane. He or she might construct elaborate theories on the nature of love
and the family, and on freedom and authority. While such theories may be
brilliant and original, they are also thinly disguised efforts to grapple with
oedipal issues on a purely intellectual level (A. Freud, 1936).
Anna Freud observed that adolescent turmoil and the desperate strate-
gies and defenses of this period are actually normal and to be expected. She
did not usually recommend psychotherapy; rather, she believed that the ado-
lescent should be given time and scope to work out his or her own solution.
However, parents may need guidance, for there “are few situations in life
which are more difficult to cope with than an adolescent son or daughter dur-
ing the attempt to liberate themselves” (A. Freud, 1958, p. 276).
THE AGENCIES OF THE MIND
We have now reviewed the stages of development. Freud’s theory contains
many other concepts, and we cannot review them all. However, an intro-
duction to Freud does require a look at one other cluster of concepts, those
pertaining to the agencies of the mind. Freud was continually revising his
ideas on this topic, but his best known concepts are those of the id, ego, and
superego.
The Id
The id is the part of the personality that Freud initially called “the uncon-
scious” (e.g., 1915b). It is the most primitive part of the personality, contain-
ing the basic biological reflexes and drives. Freud likened the id to a pit “full
of seething excitations,” all pressing for discharge (1933, p. 73). In terms of
motivation, the id is dominated by the pleasure principle; its goal is to maximize
pleasure and minimize pain. Pleasure, in Freud’s view, is primarily a matter
of reducing tension (1920, p. 365). During sexual intercourse, tension mounts
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and its final release is pleasurable. Similarly, we find that the release of hunger
or bladder tensions brings pleasurable relief. In general, the id tries to remove
all excitation and to return to a quiet state—namely, that of deep, peaceful
sleep.
At first, the baby is almost all id. Babies worry about little besides bod-
ily comfort, and they try to discharge all tensions as quickly as possible. How-
ever, even babies must experience frustration. For example, they sometimes
must wait to be fed. What the id does then is to hallucinate an image of the
desired object, and in this way it temporarily satisfies itself. We see such wish-
fulfilling fantasies at work when a starving person hallucinates an image of
food, or when a thirsty dreamer dreams that a glass of water is at hand and
therefore does not have to wake up and get one (Freud, 1900, pp. 158, 165).
Such fantasies are prime examples of what Freud called primary process
thinking (p. 535).
In the course of life, many impressions and impulses are repressed into
the id, where they exist side by side with the basic drives. In this “dark and
inaccessible” region of the mind, there is nothing that corresponds to logic or
a sense of time (Freud, 1933, pp. 73–74). Impressions and strivings “are vir-
tually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they had
just occurred” (p. 74). Images in the id, furthermore, are very fluid and easily
merge into one another. The id is oceanic, chaotic, and illogical. It is com-
pletely cut off from the external world. Our best knowledge of this mysteri-
ous region comes from the study of dreams.
The id, then, contains basic drives and reflexes, along with images and
sensations that have been repressed. So far we have focused on the id’s sex-
ual drives and those associated with the preservation of life, such as hunger
and thirst. The id also contains aggressive and destructive forces. Freud’s
views on aggression are complex and underwent drastic revisions, but in a
sense we can see how aggression follows the id’s basic principle of reducing
tension. In the id, any image associated with pain or tension should be
instantly destroyed. It does not matter to the id that one may be wishing for
the destruction of someone one needs and loves; contradictions such as these
have no importance in this illogical region of the mind. The id simply wants
a reduction in disturbing tensions immediately.
The Ego
If we were ruled by the id, we would not live for long. To survive, we cannot
act solely on the basis of hallucinations or simply follow our impulses. We
must learn to deal with reality. For example, a little boy soon learns that he can-
not just impulsively grab food from wherever he sees it. If he takes it from a
bigger boy, he is likely to get hit. He must learn to consider reality before act-
ing. The agency that delays the immediate impulse and considers reality is
called the ego.
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Freud said that whereas “the id stands for the untamed passions,” the
ego “stands for reason and good sense” (1933, p. 76). Because the ego con-
siders reality, it is said to follow the reality principle (Freud, 1911). The ego tries
to forestall action until it has had a chance to perceive reality accurately, to
consider what has happened in similar situations in the past, and to make
realistic plans for the future (Freud, 1940, p. 15). Such reasonable ways of
thinking are called secondary process thinking and include what we generally
think of as perceptual or cognitive processes. When we work on a math prob-
lem, plan a trip, or write an essay, we are making good use of ego functions.
At first, though, the ego’s functioning is largely bodily or motoric. For ex-
ample, when a child first learns to walk, she inhibits impulses toward ran-
dom movement, considers where she is headed to avoid collisions, and
otherwise exercises ego controls (p. 15).
The term ego is one that we hear a great deal in everyday language. Quite
often, we hear that someone has a “big ego,” meaning this person has an
inflated self-image. Although Freud himself (e.g., 1917) occasionally wrote
about the ego in just this way, many Freudians (e.g., Beres, 1971; Hartmann,
1956) contend that we should distinguish between the ego and the self-image.
Strictly speaking, they say, the ego refers only to a set of functions—judging
reality accurately, regulating impulses, and so on. The self-image, the picture
we have of ourselves, is different from the ego itself.
Freud emphasized that although the ego functions somewhat inde-
pendently from the id, it also borrows all its energy from the id. He likened
the ego’s relation to the id to that of a rider on a horse. “The horse supplies
the locomotive energy, while the rider has the privilege of deciding on the
goal and guiding the powerful animal’s movement. But only too often there
arises between the ego and the id the not precisely ideal situation of the rider
being obliged to guide the horse along the path by which it itself wants to go”
(1933, p. 77).
The Superego
The ego is sometimes called one of the “control systems” of the personality
(Redl & Wineman, 1951). The ego controls the blind passions of the id to pro-
tect the organism from injury. We mentioned how a little boy must learn to
inhibit the impulse to grab food until he can determine whether it is realisti-
cally safe to do so. But we also control our actions for other reasons. We might
also refrain from taking things from others because we believe such actions are
morally wrong. Our standards of right and wrong constitute the second con-
trol system of the personality—the superego.
We referred earlier to Freud’s view on the origin of the superego: It is a
product of the oedipal crisis. Children introject parental standards to check
themselves against the dangerous impulses and fantasies of this period. Freud
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did note, though, that the superego continues to develop after this period as
well. Children continue to identify with other people, such as teachers and
religious leaders, and to adopt their moral standards as their own (Freud,
1923, p. 27).
Freud wrote about the superego as if it contained two parts (pp. 24–25).
One part is sometimes called the conscience (Hall, 1954). It is the punitive, neg-
ative, and critical part of the superego that tells us what not to do and punishes
us with feelings of guilt when we violate its demands. The other part is called
the ego ideal, and this part consists of positive aspirations. For example, when
a child wants to be just like a famous basketball player, the athlete is the child’s
ego ideal. The ego ideal may also be more abstract. It may include our posi-
tive ideals, such as the wish to become more generous, courageous, or dedi-
cated to principles of justice and freedom.
Levels of Awareness of the Three Agencies
The id, ego, and superego function at differing levels of awareness, as Freud
tried to show by means of a diagram (1933, p. 78), reproduced here as
Figure 2.
The id, at the bottom of the drawing, is completely removed from the
region labeled pcpt.-cs, from consciousness and the perception of reality. The
id is entirely unconscious, which means that its workings can be made con-
scious only with a great deal of effort.
The ego extends into consciousness and reality; it is the part of the id
that develops in order to deal with the external world. The ego, you will note,
largely inhabits a region labeled preconscious. This term refers to functioning
that is below awareness but can be made conscious with relatively little effort.
S
U
P
E
R
-E
G
O
pcpt.-cs.
Preconscious
Unconscious
Re
pr
es
se
d
E
G
O
ID
FIGURE 2
Freud’s sketch of the personality structure.
(Reprinted from New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
analysis by Sigmund Freud. Translated by James
Strachey. Copyright © 1965, 1964 by James Strachey.
Used by permission of W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.)
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Freud’s Psychoanalytic Theory
The ego is also partly unconscious; for example, it represses forbidden
thoughts in a completely unconscious way.
The superego is drawn on top of the ego, illustrating its role of criticiz-
ing the ego from above. The superego, too, is partly unconscious; although
we are sometimes aware of our moral standards, they also frequently affect
us unconsciously. For example, we might suddenly become depressed with-
out any idea why, because our superego is punishing us for forbidden
thoughts.
The superego also works unconsciously during dreams. Dreams begin
as wishes from the id, but many wishes violate the superego’s standards, so
the superego demands that the wishes undergo distortion or disguise before
surfacing into consciousness (Freud, 1940, p. 51). In one of Freud’s examples,
a little boy was told it was wrong for him to eat very much because of his ill-
ness; so one night, when he was especially hungry, he dreamt that someone
else was enjoying a sumptuous meal (1900, pp. 301–302). Similarly, many sex-
ual and aggressive wishes must be disguised and distorted before surfacing.
Because the dream we remember upon waking has undergone disguise, we
cannot interpret it in any simple, straightforward way. In psychoanalysis, the
patient is asked to free-associate to the dream, to say whatever comes to mind
in connection with each aspect of it. In this way, the unconscious wishes of the
id may eventually come to light, and the patient’s ego can make some con-
scious assessment of them.
The Central Role of the Ego
In the last analysis, our ability to deal with life—our mental balance—rests
with our ego’s ability to meet the various pressures put upon it. More specif-
ically, the ego is the executive agency that must somehow serve three
“tyrannical masters”—the id, reality, and the superego (Freud, 1933, p. 78).
The ego must eventually meet the biological demands of the id, but in a
way that also respects external reality and does not violate the precepts of
the superego. The task is difficult because the ego is basically weak; as men-
tioned, it has no energy of its own, but borrows it from the id. Consequently,
the ego is quite prone to anxiety—to the fear it might not satisfy any one of
its three dictators. Anxiety arises when we feel helpless to satisfy a basic bio-
logical need in the id; when we anticipate moral punishment from the
superego; or when we face danger in the external world.
“Thus the ego, driven by the id, confined by the superego, repulsed by
reality, struggles to master its economic task of bringing harmony among the
forces and influences working in and upon it; and we can understand how it
is that so often we cannot suppress a cry: ‘Life is not easy!’” (p. 78)
In much of Freud’s writing, the ego seems to regard the id and the
superego as adversaries, as powerful combatants it must somehow appease
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and control. But Freud also recognized the vital necessity of the id and
superego, and some of Freud’s closest followers have elaborated on the
positive ways the ego utilizes these agencies. In an important contribution,
Kris (1952) described how the ego can utilize the fluid, sensuous, dreamlike
imagery of the id as a source of creative thinking. Artists, for example, may
temporarily abandon their tight ego controls and realistic thinking in order
to delve into the unconscious for its rich imagery and inspirational power.
Kris called this process “regression in the service of the ego,” and Kris’s
concept has become very important in Freudian theory. Werner also empha-
sized a similar process in his discussions of microgenesis. For both Werner
and the Freudians, then, primordial thinking is not just something to be
overcome but may continually serve as a rich resource for creative work.
The Ego’s Mechanisms of Defense
Although the ego is weak, it can ward off excessive anxiety by employing
mechanisms of defense. Freud (1926) thought the central defense mechanism
is repression, the rejection of thoughts, fantasies, or impulses from conscious
awareness. We saw earlier how children repress sexual and aggressive
impulses and fantasies as they resolve the Oedipus complex. We also briefly
noted repression in the case of one of Freud’s patients, Elizabeth von R. At
the bedside of her just-deceased sister, Elizabeth had a romantic thought about
her brother-in-law: “Now he is free and can marry me.” This wish totally vio-
lated her moral (superego) standards, and she immediately repressed it, for-
getting the thought and the entire scene as well.
For many years, Freud considered repression to be the only defense
mechanism. Eventually (1926) he came to include others, some of which I will
review below. In her classic work The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936),
Anna Freud observed that repression is the most powerful defense mecha-
nism and often used in combination with others. She also made it clear that
the ego employs all the defense mechanisms unconsciously (p. 52). So, when
a psychoanalytic patient tries to free-associate but tells the therapist that her
mind has suddenly gone blank, she isn’t necessarily concealing something on
purpose. It is likely that her ego is repressing a thought, and the repression
occurs unconsciously, below her level of awareness.
A second defense mechanism is displacement, the shifting of impulses or
feelings from one object onto another. By way of illustration, Anna Freud
(1936) described a young female patient who felt intense anger at her mother.
However, the girl unconsciously feared it would result in the loss of her
mother’s love. The girl therefore repressed her anger toward her mother and
displaced it onto other females. For many years there was always some other
woman she hated with a passion.
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Reaction-formation occurs when we turn our feelings into the opposite.
Freud (1908a) thought that anal compulsivity reflects an underlying reaction-
formation; the person wishes to be messy, but instead becomes a stickler for
neatness and cleanliness. Reaction-formation also is involved in the adoles-
cent’s blanket contempt for her parents. Instead of acknowledging any feel-
ings of love or tenderness toward her parents, she simply cannot stand them
(A. Freud, 1936).2
Projection occurs when we attribute our own impulses, feelings, and
characteristics onto others. A man might believe he is free of hostile wishes but
sees other people as full of hostility. He represses anger in himself and projects
it onto others. If Bettelheim (1967) was correct, projection is implicit in the
story of Hansel and Gretel. The children’s own oral greed and wishes to
devour are projected onto the wicked witch.
Most defense mechanisms deal with anxiety-producing impulses, fan-
tasies, and emotions that emerge from within, as when we repress a forbid-
den desire. Denial addresses the outside; it defends against reality by denying
the facts (A. Freud, 1936). Denial is often necessary in severe circumstances,
as when a child whose mother has died says, “My mommy is coming today.”
Elizabeth Kubler-Ross (1969) found that terminally ill patients usually go
through an initial stage of denying the evidence that they have the illness.
Anna Freud (1936) tentatively suggested that the defense mechanisms
are also tied to specific developmental stages. Repression is characteristic of
the oedipal stage, reaction-formation of the anal stage. Projection and denial
are primitive mechanisms that may be characteristic of the oral stage. But this
association between defenses and stages is somewhat sketchy.
Following Freud’s (1926) suggestion, many psychoanalysts have exam-
ined how different defenses are at work in different emotional disorders. For
example, they have found that displacement plays a major role in many pho-
bias, including school phobias. A young child who starts attending school
might develop an extraordinary fear of it, and the fear is especially intense
because the child displaces her anxiety over separation from her mother onto
the school (White & Watt, 1973).
While not necessarily denying the value of such analyses, several con-
temporary scholars seek to cast defense mechanisms in a more positive light.
They ask us to consider some defenses as healthy coping strategies. These
scholars are exploring an important area—constructive coping—but they
often overextend the concept of a defense mechanism. For example, Valliant
(2000) calls suppression a healthy defense mechanism. But suppression is a
fairly conscious effort to avoid interfering thoughts, whereas the classic
defense mechanisms operate unconsciously.
2In her discussion of adolescence, which we reviewed earlier, Anna Freud described sev-
eral ways young people try to ward off sexual and aggressive impulses welling up at this time.
Two of the strategies, asceticism and intellectualization, are technically considered mechanisms
of defense in standard psychoanalytic texts (e.g., Waelder, 1960).
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In traditional psychoanalytic theory, the healthiest defense mechanism
is sublimation. This is the process by which the ego redirects impulses into
socially acceptable pursuits. For example, people might channel their aggres-
sive energies into competitive sports. Or they might sublimate their sexual
interests into artistic activities, writing fiction or painting pictures on the topic
of romantic love.
The Ego’s Development
In the years after Freud’s death, many of his followers addressed the process
by which the ego develops. Freud wrote little on this subject. His main sug-
gestion (1911) was that the ego develops because the drives are frustrated.
As long as babies are gratified, they have no reason for dealing with reality.
But they do experience frustration. At first they try to reduce tensions
through hallucinations, but these do not work for long. So they must seek
need-gratifying objects in reality.
The difficulty with Freud’s proposal is that it implies the ego acts only
when the id activates it. Construed in this way, the ego is weak. It only serves
the id.
Hartmann’s Revision. One of Freud’s most influential followers,
Heinz Hartmann, suggested that Freud’s theory might permit a different pic-
ture of the ego—one that gives it more autonomy. Hartmann (1939, 1950)
noted that Freud wondered whether the ego might not have genetic roots of
its own. If so, ego functions such as motility (body movement), language, per-
ception, and cognition might develop according to their own maturational
timetable. Children, then, might begin to walk, talk, grasp objects, and so on,
from inner promptings that are biologically governed but are also independent
of the instinctual drives. Children have a maturational need to develop ego
functions when the id is at rest, when life is “conflict free.” Thus the ego might
develop independently from the id. Hartmann’s proposal is widely considered
a major breakthrough in the study of ego development.
Ego Development and Object Relations. Freudians have also stud-
ied the kind of environment most conducive to ego growth. When Freudians
talk about the environment, they usually are speaking not about the physical
world but the world of other people. They call interactions with others object
relations.
According to Hartmann (Hartmann, Kris, & Lowenstein, 1946), Benedek
(1938), and others, the optimal interpersonal environment at first is a con-
sistently gratifying one. When caretakers are consistently loving, babies
become interested in them and learn about the external world of people. Con-
sistent care seems especially important for the development of one essential
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ego function—the ability to postpone gratification. As Benedek says, when
the mother is consistent and loving, the baby gains confidence in her. The baby
does not grow unduly impatient the minute his or her needs are not met but
learns to wait. The baby knows care is forthcoming.
As psychoanalysis has developed, a number of people have moved
object relations to the forefront. Some analysts have given object relations pri-
ority over everything else—over the instinctual drives, libidinal zones, and ego
functions. What people really want, these writers say, is not to relieve instinc-
tual tensions or to engage in ego functions for their own sake, but to develop
mature interpersonal relationships (see Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, especially
chap. 6). The theories of Erikson and Mahler have moved psychoanalytic the-
ory in the direction of object relations while maintaining a commitment to
classical Freudian concepts.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
It is impossible to make any sharp distinctions between Freudian theory and
practice. Freud’s theory emerged from the clinical treatment of patients, and
his followers continue to use therapy as a main source of data. In this chap-
ter we have focused on Freud’s theory of normal growth and development,
rather than pathology and treatment, but we still have found it necessary to
mention topics in the latter areas (e.g., hysteria).
A description of Freud’s therapeutic work is well beyond our scope.
What we can say here is that a major goal of psychoanalysis is to recover
repressed or blocked-off experience. We saw how this was necessary in the
case of Elizabeth von R. Elizabeth had repressed sexual feelings toward her
brother-in-law, and these feelings, far from disappearing, became diverted
into painful bodily symptoms. The only solution, Freud thought, is for us to
become more conscious of our thoughts and feelings so that, instead of their
controlling us, we can gain a measure of control over them. As he put it,
“Where id was, there ego shall be” (1933, p. 80).
Therapy with children usually proceeds somewhat differently from that
with adults, for children are not given to verbal discussions and recollections.
Instead, they learn to express, accept, and master feelings and fantasies
through play.
It is important to note that Freud never believed that psychoanalysis
can completely cure our problems. Because we all live in society, which
demands some repression of our instinctual urges, we all suffer to some
extent. Further, Freud saw the therapist’s role as limited. A psychiatrist was
once asked by Freud if he was really able to cure. The psychiatrist replied,
“In no way, but one can, as a gardener does, remove some impediments to
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personal growth.” “Then,” Freud answered, “we will understand each
other” (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 461).
The practical implications of Freud’s ideas extend far beyond the treat-
ment of patients. His ideas have influenced practically every area of life,
including the practice of law, art, literature, religion, and education. The area
of most interest to us here is education. Freud’s thoughts on education were
not as radical as it is sometimes supposed. He believed societies will always
exact some instinctual renunciation, and he said it would be unfair to send chil-
dren into the world expecting they can do just as they please (1933, p. 149). On
the other hand, Freud thought discipline is usually excessive; it makes children
feel unnecessarily ashamed and guilty about their bodies and their natural
functions. Freud was particularly emphatic on the need for sex education. He
recommended that sex education be handled by the schools, where children
could learn about reproduction in their lessons on nature and animals. They
themselves would then draw the necessary conclusions with respect to
humans (Freud, 1907).
Freudian ideas have motivated some more adventurous experiments in
education. For example, at Summerhill, A. S. Neill (1960) gave children a great
deal of liberty of all kinds, including sexual freedom. However, such radical
innovations are rare, and Freud’s influence is more typically found in the gen-
eral attitude a teacher takes toward children. This attitude is particularly evi-
dent when a teacher refrains from automatically disciplining some unwanted
behavior and instead tries to understand the emotional reasons behind it (Rus-
sell, 1971). When a teacher takes a closer look at a child’s life, the teacher may
discover that the angry or sullen child is not really mad at the teacher but is
finding something at home, such as the neglect of a parent, deeply frustrating.
Or the teacher may discover that the seemingly lazy teenager is actually brood-
ing endlessly over sex or social failure (White & Watt, 1973, p. 34). The teacher
may not always be able to correct such problems, or even feel it is prudent to
discuss them with the student, for the student may need his or her privacy in
certain matters. Nevertheless, a measure of understanding can help. For the
teacher is then not so quick to criticize or punish but has a reason for being
patient and encouraging—attitudes that have helped many a child.
EVALUATION
Freud was one of the great thinkers of modern times. Before Freud, some
poets, artists, and philosophers may have known about the unconscious
and early sexual fantasies, but it was Freud’s remarkable work that made
us take these matters seriously. At the same time, Freud was more bitterly
attacked than any other psychological theorist before or since. Even today
many consider his ideas scandalous.
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It is not surprising, then, that Freud and his followers have sometimes
reacted dogmatically and defensively. At times they have behaved like mem-
bers of a religious sect, isolating themselves from other scientists and gath-
ering in their own groups to reaffirm the truth of their own beliefs. At other
times, Freudians have resorted to ad hominem arguments—arguments
directed not against others’ ideas, but against their personalities. In one
essay (1925b), Freud argued that his critics objected to his ideas because of
their own resistances and repressions.
In the midst of such emotionally charged debates, several criticisms of
psychoanalysis have been offered that have merit, and some Freudians have
tried to face them openly and to correct the weaknesses in the theory.
Some of the most important criticisms of Freud have come from anthro-
pologists who have argued that Freud’s theory is culture bound. In the 1920s,
Malinowski and others zeroed in on Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex,
pointing out that it is not nearly as universal as Freud imagined. Malinowski
noted that the family constellation on which this complex is based—the
nuclear triangle of mother, father, and child—is not found in all cultures.
Among the Trobriand Islanders, Malinowski found, the child’s chief disci-
plinarian was not the father but the maternal uncle. Further, the strongest
incest taboo was not between children and parents but between brothers and
sisters. In this situation, Malinowski pointed out, repressed fears and long-
ings were very different. “We might say that in the Oedipus complex there
is a repressed desire to kill the father and marry the mother, while in
the . . . Trobriands the wish is to marry the sister and to kill the maternal
uncle” (Malinowski, 1927, pp. 80–81). The oedipal situation is by no means
just as Freud described.
But Malinowski did not wish to dispense with Freud altogether. On the
contrary, he was indebted to Freud for the insight that repressed wishes
emerge in projections such as dreams, magic, and folklore. This insight pro-
vided him with an important theoretical tool. Malinowski’s argument was
that such projections vary with the cultural setting. Among the Trobriand
Islanders, he found no oedipal myths or dreams, but many that centered on
their own strongest temptations and taboos—especially brother-sister rela-
tions. For example, although they themselves never admitted to incestuous
wishes toward siblings, they told stories about how magic originated long
ago when a brother and sister did commit incest.
At the time of Malinowski’s writings, Freud and his followers resisted
anthropological modifications of psychoanalytic theory. However, later Freudi-
ans (e.g., Erikson, 1963; Kardiner, 1945) have tried to combine psychoanalytic
and anthropological insights.
Freud has also been sharply criticized for cultural bias on the topic of
women. Psychoanalytically oriented writers such as Clara Thompson (1950)
and modern feminists have charged that Freud’s views on women reflect
his own unexamined Victorian attitudes. Freud’s limitations, Thompson
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said, are most evident in his concept of penis envy. She agreed that girls
envy boys, but not for the reasons Freud thought. Freud assumed that penis
envy is based on a real biological inferiority—a view that fit well with his
society’s prejudice. Actually, she said, penis envy is much more of a cul-
tural problem; girls feel inferior to boys because girls lack the same privi-
leges in a male-dominated society. That is, they lack the opportunities for
adventure, independence, and success. Freud ignored women’s legitimate
desire for social equality.
Writers have also accused Freud of cultural bias in his discussions of
women’s sense of morality. Freud thought that girls, not fearing castration,
have less need to internalize a strong superego. As evidence he pointed to
women’s greater emotionality and flexibility in moral matters. Such observa-
tions, his critics contend, simply reflect his own cultural stereotypes.
Empirical evidence does suggest that Freud would have done well to
question his theory on superego formation. Most evidence suggests that
children do not acquire an initial sense of morality because they fear harm,
whether castration or some other physical punishment. The child who only
fears physical punishment simply tries to avoid getting caught (and per-
haps learns to hate the punisher). A sense of morality, instead, appears to
develop when the child experiences love and wishes to keep it. The child
who receives love tries to behave properly to gain parental approval (Brown,
1965, pp. 381–394; White & Watt, 1981, pp. 359–360.) So, if a girl is loved as
much as a boy, she should develop an equally strong conscience.
Several contemporary feminist psychoanalysts say that Freud’s theory
is too individualistic. Nancy Chodorow (1978) and Jessica Benjamin (1988)
argue that we cannot understand people as isolated individuals with their
drives and ego functions. We must focus on object relations—interactions with
others. In the view of both prominent feminists and object relations theorists,
humans don’t merely seek gratification of erotic needs; they seek relation-
ships (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, chap. 6).
Freud has also been criticized on scientific grounds. Although his theory
hinges on universal childhood developments, his evidence came primarily
from adults—from the memories and fantasies of adults in treatment. Freud
did not investigate his hypotheses in an unbiased way with representative
samples of normal children.
Some psychologists think Freud’s theory is of little scientific value
because it is so hopelessly opaque and complex. Sometimes, in fact, the the-
ory predicts equally probable but contradictory outcomes. For example, chil-
dren who experience frustration at the anal stage might develop habits of
orderliness, cleanliness, and obedience, or they might develop the opposite
characteristics, rebelliousness and messiness. How do we predict which set of
traits any given child will develop?
Finally, there is the unnerving experience of never seeming able to
disconfirm Freud’s hypotheses. If, for instance, we do a study that finds no
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relationship between weaning and later oral behavior, we can be sure some
Freudians will say we failed to understand Freud’s thoughts in sufficient
depth.
But despite the difficulties, an enormous amount of research on Freud’s
ideas has been done and will continue, and investigators will eventually sort
out the valid and invalid propositions. Researchers will continue to struggle
with Freud’s theory and to test it the best they can because they sense that
Freud was basically on the right track. As Hall, Lindzey, and Campbell (1998)
say, his theory has a fundamental appeal because it is both broad and deep:
Over and above all the other virtues of his theory stands this one: It
tries to envisage full-bodied individuals living partly in a world of real-
ity and partly in a world of make-believe, beset by conflicts and inner
contradictions, yet capable of rational thought and action, moved by
forces of which they have little knowledge and by aspirations which
are beyond their reach, by turn confused and clear-headed, frustrated
and satisfied, hopeful and despairing, selfish and altruistic; in short, a
complex human being. For many people, this picture of the individual
has an essential validity. (p. 77)
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Erikson and the Eight
Stages of Life
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
Among the advances in the psychoanalytic theory of development,
none has been more substantial than that made by Erik H. Erikson
(1902–1994). Erikson has given us a new, enlarged picture of the child’s
tasks at each of Freud’s stages. Beyond this, he has added three new
stages—those of the adult years—so the theory now encompasses the
entire life cycle.
Erikson was born to Danish parents in Frankfurt, Germany, the
child of an extramarital union he and his mother kept secret (“Erik
Erikson,” 1994). Erikson was raised by his mother alone until he was
3 years old, when she married again, this time to a local pediatrician,
Dr. Homburger. His mother and Dr. Homburger were Jewish, but
Erikson looked different—more like a tall, blond, blue-eyed Dane. He
was even nicknamed “the goy” (non-Jew) by the Jewish boys (Coles,
1970, p. 180).
Young Erikson was not a particularly good student. Although he
excelled in certain subjects—especially ancient history and art—he
disliked the formal school atmosphere. When he graduated from high
school, he felt lost and uncertain about his future place in life. Instead
of going to college, he wandered throughout Europe for a year, returned
home to study art for a while, and then set out on his travels once again.
He was going through what he would later call a moratorium, a period
during which young people take time out to try to find themselves.
Such behavior was acceptable for many German youth at the time. As
Erikson’s biographer, Robert Coles (1970), says, Erikson “was not seen
by his family or friends as odd or ‘sick,’ but as a wandering artist who
was trying to come to grips with himself” (p. 15).
Erikson finally began to find his calling when, at the age of 25,
he accepted an invitation to teach children in a new Viennese school
founded by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham. When Erikson
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Erikson and the Eight Stages of Life
wasn’t teaching, he studied child psychoanalysis with Anna Freud and oth-
ers, and he was himself analyzed by her.
At the age of 27, Erikson married Joan Serson and started a family. Their
life was disrupted in 1933 when the rise of Hitler forced them to leave Europe.
They settled in Boston, where Erikson became the city’s first child analyst.
But the urge to travel seemed firmly implanted in Erikson’s nature. After
3 years in Boston, he took a position at Yale University, and 2 years later he
made another trip—to the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, where he
lived with and learned about the Lakota (Sioux). Erikson then moved on to
San Francisco, where he resumed his clinical practice with children and par-
ticipated in a major longitudinal study of normal children at the University
of California. He also found time to travel up the California coast to study
another Indian tribe, the Yurok fishermen. We can see that Erikson was explor-
ing areas that Freud had left uncharted—the lives of normal children and of
children growing up in different cultural contexts.
In 1949, during the McCarthy era, Erikson came into conflict with his
employer, the University of California. The university demanded a loyalty
oath of all its employees, which Erikson refused to sign. When some of his
colleagues were dismissed, he resigned. Erikson took a new job at the Austin
Riggs Center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, where he worked until 1960. He
was then given a professorship at Harvard University, even though he had
never earned a formal college degree, and he taught at Harvard until his death.
Erikson’s most important work is Childhood and Society (1950; 2nd ed.
1963). In this book he maps out his eight stages of life and illustrates how
these stages are played out in different ways in different cultures. Two other
highly influential books are Young Man Luther (1958) and Gandhi’s Truth (1969),
which bridge psychoanalytic insights with historical material.
ERIKSON’S STAGE THEORY
General Purpose
Freud, you will recall, postulated a sequence of psychosexual stages that
center on body zones. As children mature, their sexual interest shifts from the
oral to the anal to the phallic zone; then, after a latency period, the focus is once
again on the genital region. Freud presented a completely new way of look-
ing at development.
At the same time, Freud’s stage theory is limited. In particular, its focus
on body zones is too specific. A rigorous stage theory describes general achieve-
ments or issues at different periods of life. For example, we do not call shoe
tying a stage because it is too specific. Similarly, the focus on zones also tends
to be specific, describing only parts of the body. Even though it is interesting
to note that some people become fixated on these zones—and, for example,
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find the mouth the main source of pleasure in life—there is more to person-
ality development than this.
Freud’s writings, of course, were not limited to descriptions of body
zones. He also discussed crucial interactions between children and significant
others. Erikson tried to do this more thoroughly. At each Freudian stage,
Erikson introduced concepts that gradually led to an understanding of the
most decisive, general encounter between the child and the social world.
1. The Oral Stage
Zones and Modes. Erikson first tried to give the Freudian stages
greater generality by pointing out that for each libidinal zone, we can also
speak of an ego mode. At the first stage, the primary zone is the mouth, but this
zone also possesses a mode of activity, incorporation, a passive yet eager taking
in (Erikson, 1963, p. 72). Further, incorporation extends beyond the mouth and
characterizes other senses as well. Babies not only take in through the mouth
but also through the eyes; when they see something interesting, they open their
eyes eagerly and widely and try to take the object in with all their might. Also,
they seem to take in good feelings through their tactile senses. And even a
basic reflex, the grasp reflex, seems to follow the incorporative mode; when
an object touches the baby’s palm, the fist automatically closes around it.
Incorporation describes a general mode through which the baby’s ego first
deals with the external world.
Freud’s second oral stage is marked by the eruption of teeth and aggres-
sive biting. According to Erikson, the mode of biting or grasping, like incor-
poration, is a general one that extends beyond the mouth. With maturation,
babies can actively reach out and grasp things with their hands. Similarly,
“the eyes, first part of a relatively passive system of accepting impressions as
they come along, have now learned to focus, to isolate, to ‘grasp’ objects from
a vaguer background, and to follow them” (p. 77). Finally, the organs of hear-
ing conform to the more active mode of grasping. Babies can now discern and
localize significant sounds and can move their heads and bodies so as to
actively take them in. Thus the mode of biting or grasping—of active taking—
is a general one that describes the central way in which the ego now deals
with the world.
The Most General Stage: Basic Trust versus Mistrust. The most
general stage at each period consists of a general encounter between the child’s
maturing ego and the social world. At the first stage, as babies try to take in
the things they need, they interact with caretakers, who follow their own cul-
ture’s ways of giving to them. What is most important in these interactions is
that babies come to find some consistency, predictability, and reliability in
their caretakers’ actions. When they sense that a parent is consistent and
dependable, they develop a sense of basic trust in the parent. They come to
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sense that when they are cold, wet, or hungry, they can count on others to
relieve their pain. Some parents come promptly while others minister on
schedules, but in either case babies learn the parent is dependable and there-
fore trustworthy. The alternative is a sense of mistrust, the feeling that the
parent is unpredictable and unreliable, and may not be there when needed
(Erikson, 1963, p. 247).
Babies must also learn to trust themselves. This problem becomes par-
ticularly acute when babies experience the rages of teething and hurt the nurs-
ing mother with their sharp bites and grasps. When babies learn to regulate
their urges—to suck without biting and to hold without hurting—they begin
to consider themselves “trustworthy enough so that the providers will not
need to be on guard lest they be nipped” (p. 248). For her part, the mother
needs to be careful not to withdraw too completely or to wean too suddenly.
If she does, the baby will feel that her care is not dependable after all, for it may
be suddenly taken away.
When babies have developed a sense of trust in their caretakers, they
show it in their behavior. Erikson said the first sign of trust in a mother comes
when the baby is willing “to let her out of sight without undue anxiety or
rage” (p. 247). The word undue is probably important here, for we saw in the
discussion of Bowlby that most babies experience some separation anxiety.
Nevertheless, if parents are dependable, babies can learn to tolerate their
absences. If caretakers are undependable, babies cannot afford to let them go
and panic when they begin to do so.
Trust is similar to what Benedek called confidence. It is a basic faith in
one’s providers. Erikson said he preferred the term trust because “there is more
naiveté and more mutuality in it” (p. 248). But trust results in the same attitude
that Benedek was concerned about—the calm patience that comes from the
certainty that one’s providers will be there when needed.
Trust, then, is the sense that others are reliable and predictable. At the
same time, however, Erikson implied that trust ultimately depends on some-
thing more. Ultimately, he said, trust depends on the parents’ own confidence,
on their sense they are doing things right. Parents “must be able to represent
to the child a deep, an almost somatic conviction that there is a meaning to
what they are doing” (p. 249). This sense of meaning, in turn, requires cul-
tural backing—the belief that the “way we do things is good for our children.”
At first glance, Erikson’s emphasis on the caretaker’s own confidence is
puzzling. What does the parent’s confidence have to do with the baby?
Erikson might have had in mind thoughts similar to those of the psychiatrist
H. S. Sullivan. Sullivan (1953) believed that in the first months of life the infant
has a special kind of physical empathy with the mother figure such that the
baby automatically feels the mother’s state of tension. If the mother feels anx-
ious, the baby feels anxious; if the mother feels calm, the baby feels calm. It is
important that parents feel reasonably confident and self-assured, so babies
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will not become too wary of interpersonal contact. Babies need to feel that it
is basically good and reassuring to be close to others.
Erikson (1959, p. 64) observed that it is not always easy for U.S. parents
to have an inner confidence in their child-rearing practices. Whereas parents
in simpler, more stable cultures follow practices that have been handed down
over the generations, the modern American parent has fewer traditions to fall
back on. Modern parents receive all kinds of advice on newer, “better” child-
rearing techniques, and the advice is by no means uniform.
In this situation, Erikson believed books such as Spock’s (1946) are help-
ful. Throughout his book, Spock encourages parents to trust themselves. He
tells parents that they know more than they think and they should follow
their impulses to respond to their babies’ needs. It is almost as if Spock had
read Erikson and understood the importance of parents possessing an inner
assurance.
Beyond reading Spock, Erikson said, parents can gain an inner security
from religion. Their own faith and inner assurance will be transmitted to the
child, helping the child feel the world is a trustworthy place. If parents are
without religion, they must find faith in some other area, perhaps in fellowship,
or the goals of their work, or in their social ideals (Erikson, 1959, pp. 64–65).
Erikson has sometimes given readers the impression that babies should
develop trust but not mistrust. But he did not mean this. He saw each stage
as a vital conflict or tension in which the “negative” pole is also necessary for
growth. In the present case, infants must experience both trust and mistrust.
If they only developed trust, they would become too gullible. “It is clear,”
Erikson said, “that the human infant must experience a goodly measure of
mistrust in order to learn to trust discerningly” (1976, p. 23).
At the same time, it is critical that infants emerge from this stage with a
favorable balance of trust over mistrust. If they do, they will have developed
the core ego strength of this period: hope. Hope is the expectation that despite
frustrations, rages, and disappointments, good things will happen in the
future. Hope enables the child to move forward into the world and take up
new challenges (Erikson, 1982, p. 60).
Conclusion. We see, then, that Erikson considerably broadened
Freud’s description of the oral stage. Erikson showed that it is not just the oral
zone that is important, but the corresponding ego modes of dealing with the
world. The infant incorporates and later grasps things in the world through
the various senses. The infant’s maturing ego, in turn, meets the social world—
in this case, the caretakers—in a general, decisive encounter. The critical issue
is that of trust versus mistrust. The baby needs to know that the caretakers are
predictable and to sense their inner assurance. If the baby can develop a favor-
able balance of trust over mistrust, the baby develops the core ego strength of
this period: hope. Hope enables the child to move forward and enthusiastically
confront the world despite current and past frustrations.
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Issues of trust, mistrust, and hope are, of course, with us throughout our
lives. Erikson recognized this. But he also claimed that the struggle between
trust and mistrust reaches its own particular crisis and is the dominating event
in the first year of life. And the way in which infants resolve this first crisis,
with or without a firm sense of hopefulness, determines the energy and vital-
ity they bring to subsequent stages.
2. The Anal Stage
Zones and Modes. In Freud’s second stage, which occurs during the
second and third years, the anal zone comes into prominence. With the mat-
uration of the nervous system, children gain voluntary control over their
sphincter muscles; they can now retain and eliminate as they wish. They often
hold on to their bowel movements to maximize the sensations of the final
release.
Erikson agreed with Freud that the basic modes of this stage are reten-
tion and elimination, of holding on and letting go. However, Erikson also
pointed out that these modes encompass more than the anal zone. For ex-
ample, children begin to use their hands to hold stubbornly on to objects and,
just as defiantly, to throw them away. Once they can sit up easily, they carefully
pile things up one moment, only to discard them the next. With people, too,
they sometimes hold on, snuggling up, and at other times insist on pushing
the adult away (Erikson, 1959, pp. 82, 86).
The General Stage: Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt. Amidst
these contradictory impulses—holding on one moment and expelling the
next—the child is primarily trying to exercise a choice. Two-year-olds want to
hold on when they want and to push aside when they do not. They are exer-
cising their will, their sense of autonomy (see Table 1).
TABLE 1 The Stages of Freud and Erikson
AGE FREUD’S STAGE ERIKSON’S GENERAL STAGE
Birth to 1 Oral Trust vs. Mistrust: Hope
1 to 3 Anal Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt: Will
3 to 6 Phallic (Oedipal) Initiative vs. Guilt: Purpose
6 to 11 Latency Industry vs. Inferiority:
Competence
Adolescence Genital Identity vs. Role Confusion: Fidelity
Young Adulthood Intimacy vs. Isolation: Love
Adulthood Generativity vs. Self-Absorption,
Stagnation: Care
Old Age Ego Integrity vs. Despair: Wisdom
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In other ways, too, maturation ushers in a sense of autonomy during
the second and third years. Children can now stand up on their own two feet,
and they begin to explore the world on their own. They also insist on feeding
themselves, even if this means exercising their right to make a mess. Their
language, too, reveals a new-found autonomy and sense of selfhood; they
repeatedly use the words me and mine. Most of all, they express their auton-
omy in a single word—no. Two-year-olds seem unable to say “Yes,” as if any
agreement means a complete forfeiture of their independence. Through the
strong and insistent “No,” children defy all external control.
As children seem so much more in control of themselves and reach peaks
of willfulness, societies, through parents, decide it is time to teach them the
right ways to behave. As Freud observed, parents do not permit their chil-
dren to enjoy their anality in any way they please; instead, they train them to
behave in the socially proper way. Parents quite often toilet-train children by
making them feel ashamed of messy and improper anal behavior. Children
may resist training for some time, but they eventually submit to it.
Erikson agreed that the “battles of the toilet bowl” are important. But
he also is suggesting that the battles of this time—between the child’s auton-
omy and the society’s regulations—take place in a number of arenas. For
example, when children insist on feeding themselves and making a mess,
parents try to regulate their behavior. Similarly, parents sooner or later decide
their 2-year-olds cannot say “No” to every single request. Two-year-olds, like
everyone else, must live in society and respect others’ wishes. Thus the con-
flict at this stage is a very general one.
Erikson defined the conflict as that of autonomy versus shame and
doubt. Autonomy comes from within; biological maturation fosters the abil-
ity to do things on one’s own—to control one’s own sphincter muscles, to
stand on one’s own feet, to use one’s hands, and so on. Shame and doubt, in
contrast, come from an awareness of social expectations and pressures. Shame
is the feeling that we do not look good in others’ eyes. For example, a little girl
who wets her pants becomes self-conscious, worried that others will see her
in this state. Doubt stems from the realization that one is not so powerful after
all, that others can control one and perform actions much better.
It is hoped that children can learn to adjust to social regulations without
losing too much of their initial sense of autonomy. Some parents try to assist
the child with this. They gently try to help the child learn social behavior with-
out crushing the child’s independence. Other parents are not so sensitive.
They may shame children excessively when they have a bowel accident; they
may try to break their children of any oppositional behavior; or they may
ridicule their children’s efforts to do things on their own. In such instances,
children can develop lasting feelings of shame and doubt that override their
impulses toward self-determination.
To the extent that children resolve this second crisis in a positive way,
with a favorable ratio of autonomy over shame and doubt, they develop the
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ego strength of rudimentary will. “Will,” Erikson said, is “the unbroken
determination to exercise free choice as well as self-restraint” (1964, p. 119).
Erikson includes self-restraint in his definition because he believes it is
important for children to learn to control their impulses and to renounce
what is not worth doing (or cannot be done). Still, it is the child—not exter-
nal powers—who is in charge.
3. The Phallic (Oedipal) Stage
Zone and Modes. During Freud’s third stage (between about 3 and 6
years of age), the child’s concern with the anal zone gives way to the primacy
of the genital zone. Children now focus their interest on their genitals and
become curious about the sex organs of others. They also begin to imagine
themselves in adult roles and even dare to rival one parent for the love of the
other. They enter the oedipal crisis.
Erikson called the primary mode at this stage intrusion. By this term, he
hoped to capture Freud’s sense of the child as now exceedingly daring, curi-
ous, and competitive. The term intrusion describes the activity of the boy’s
penis, but as a general mode it refers to much more. For both sexes, the mat-
uration of physical and mental abilities impels the child forward into a vari-
ety of intrusive activities. “These include the intrusion into other bodies by
physical attack; the intrusion into other people’s ears and minds by aggressive
talking; the intrusion into space by vigorous locomotion; the intrusion into
the unknown by consuming curiosity” (Erikson, 1963, p. 87).
The General Stage: Initiative versus Guilt. Initiative, like intru-
sion, connotes forward movement. The child with a sense of initiative makes
plans, sets goals, and perseveres in attaining them. I noted, for example,
some of the activities of our son Adam when he was 5 years old. In a single
day, he decided to see how high he could build his blocks, invented a game
that consisted of seeing who could jump the highest on his parents’ bed,
and led the family to a new movie containing a great deal of action and vio-
lence. His behavior had taken on a goal-directed, competitive, and imagi-
native quality.
The crisis comes when children realize their biggest plans and fondest
hopes are doomed for failure. These ambitions, of course, are the oedipal
ones—the wish to possess one parent and rival the other. The child finds
out that these wishes violate deep social taboos and are far more dangerous
than imagined. Consequently, the child internalizes social prohibitions—
a guilt-producing superego—to keep such dangerous impulses and fantasies
in check. The result is a new form of self-restriction. Forever after, the indi-
vidual’s naive exuberance and daring will be offset by self-observation,
self-control, and self-punishment (see Figure 1).
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Erikson and the Eight Stages of Life
FIGURE 1
A boy’s drawing expresses daring initiative and disaster. There is a resemblance
to the myth of Icarus, about a boy who went too far—too near the sun. This draw-
ing, by a 9-year-old, may also suggest the industry theme of the next stage: The
climbers on the left are engaged in skillful cooperation.
In Erikson’s view, the creation of a superego constitutes one of the great
tragedies in life. Although the superego is necessary for socialized behavior, it
stifles the bold initiative with which the child met life at the phallic stage. Still,
Erikson was not completely pessimistic. He observed that 3- to 6-year-old chil-
dren are, more than at any other time, ready to learn quickly and avidly, and
they are willing to find ways of channeling their ambition into socially useful
pursuits (1963, p. 258). Parents can help this process by easing their authority
somewhat and by permitting children to participate with them as equals on
interesting projects. In this way, parents can help children emerge from the cri-
sis of this stage with a strong sense of purpose, “the courage to envisage and pur-
sue valued goals,” unimpaired by guilt and inhibition (Erikson, 1964, p. 122).
4. The Latency Stage
In Freud’s theory, the resolution of the Oedipus complex brings about a latency
period, lasting from about age 6 to 11. During this period the sexual and
aggressive drives, which produced crises at earlier periods, are temporarily
dormant. There is no libidinal (sexual) zone for this stage.
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Of course, the child’s life at this time may not be entirely conflict free. For
example, the birth of a sibling may arouse intense jealousy. But as a rule, this
is a period of calm and stability. In terms of the instincts and drives, nothing
much is going on.
Erikson, however, showed that this is a most decisive stage for ego
growth. Children master important cognitive and social skills. The crisis is
industry versus inferiority. Children forget their past hopes and wishes, which
were often played out within the family, and eagerly apply themselves to
learning the useful skills and tools of the wider culture. In indigenous societies,
children learn to track, find food, and make utensils. In these cultures, learn-
ing is often informal, and much of it comes from older children. In modern
technological societies such as ours, children go to school, where they are
asked to master more cerebral skills—reading, writing, and arithmetic. In
either case, they are learning to do meaningful work and are developing the
ego strengths of “steady attention and persevering diligence” (Erikson, 1963,
p. 259). They also are learning to work and play with their peers.
The danger of this stage is an excessive feeling of inadequacy and infe-
riority (1963, p. 260). Most of us can probably remember the hurts of failure
in the classroom or on the playground. A particularly deep sense of inferior-
ity may have various roots. Sometimes children have difficulty at this stage
because they have not successfully resolved the conflicts at earlier stages. For
example, a girl may have developed more doubt than autonomy at the second
stage, so she is unsure of herself as she tries to master new tasks. At other
times, school and community attitudes may hinder the development of a sense
of industry. An African American boy may learn that the color of his skin
counts for more than his wish and will to learn. And all too often schools fail
to discover and encourage the individual’s special talents (p. 260).
Good teachers (who often are those who feel trusted and respected by
the community) can help children at this time. Erikson (1959, p. 87) said he had
repeatedly observed that in the lives of inspired and gifted people just one
teacher made a difference by encouraging the individual’s talent.
In any case, the successful resolution of this stage leads to the ego strength
Erikson called competence, the free exercise of intelligence and skill in the com-
pletion of tasks, unimpaired by excessive feelings of inferiority (1964, p. 124).
5. Puberty (The Genital Stage)
According to Sigmund and Anna Freud, adolescence is a turbulent stage
because of the dramatic physiological changes occurring at this time. Sexual
and aggressive drives, which were dormant during the latency stage, now
threaten to overwhelm the ego and its defenses. The genital zone, in particu-
lar, is infused with tremendous sexual energy, and the adolescent is once again
troubled by oedipal fantasies. The teenager may find it difficult simply to be
around his or her parents.
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Erikson agreed that the great increase in drive energy is disruptive at
adolescence, but he saw this as only part of the problem. Adolescents also
become disturbed and confused by new social conflicts and demands. The
adolescent’s primary task, Erikson believed, is establishing a new sense of ego
identity—a feeling for who one is and one’s place in the larger social order.
The crisis is one of identity versus role confusion.
The upsurge of instinctual drives certainly contributes to the adolescent’s
identity problems. Adolescents suddenly feel as if their impulses have a will
of their own, that they are no longer one with themselves. Also, the rapid phys-
ical growth at puberty creates a sense of identity confusion. Young people begin
to grow so quickly and to change in so many ways that they barely recognize
themselves. It is probably for this reason that teenagers spend so much time
looking in mirrors and pay so much attention to their appearance.
But identity problems are as much, if not more, a social matter. It is not
physical growth or sexual impulses per se that trouble young people, but it is
the thought that one might not look good to others or meet others’ expecta-
tions. And, even more than this, young people begin to worry about their
future place in the larger social world. Adolescents, with their rapidly expand-
ing mental powers, feel overwhelmed by the countless options and alterna-
tives before them.
Because adolescents are so uncertain about who they are, they anxiously
tend to identify with in-groups. They can “become remarkably clannish, intol-
erant, and cruel in their exclusion of others who are ‘different’” (Erikson, 1959,
p. 92). In their hurry to find some identity, they stereotype “themselves, their
ideals, and their enemies” (p. 92). They often put themselves and others to a
“loyalty test.” Some young people align themselves to political or religious ide-
ologies. In all this, we can detect young people’s search for values to which
they can be true.
To understand identity formation, it is important to recognize that it is
a lifelong process. In part, we form our identities through identifications.
Although we are not necessarily aware of it, we identify with those who appeal
to us and therefore become like them. Each person’s identity, then, is partly a
synthesis of various partial identifications (1959, pp. 112–113).
We also develop a sense of identity through our accomplishments.
The ability to stand up, walk, run, play ball, draw, read, and write all con-
tribute to a sense of ego identity. We come to see ourselves as “one who
can do these things.” Such accomplishments become part of a positive and
lasting sense of identity when they have importance for the culture (1959,
pp. 89–90).
Still, even though identity formation is a lifelong process, the problem
of identity reaches its crisis at adolescence. It is at this time that so many inner
changes are taking place, and so much in terms of future commitment is at
stake. During adolescence one’s earlier identity seems inadequate for all the
choices and decisions one must make.
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Erikson (1959, p. 123) asked us to consider, for example, a young college
girl from a conservative background. When she goes to college she meets
people of very different backgrounds, among whom she must choose her
friends. She also must decide what her attitude toward sex will be and what
occupational goals she is willing to compete for. At this point, her previous
identity and identifications offer little help. Each decision seems to affirm
some aspect of her past while repudiating others. If she decides to become
sexually active, she may violate her family’s spoken values, while identifying
with some of their hidden wishes. If she chooses to compete in a male-
dominated field such as politics or surgery, she ventures beyond certain fam-
ily values but aligns herself with others. As she makes decisions and
commitments, she reworks prior identifications and forms a new identity. Her
task is to forge for herself some “central perspective and direction, some work-
ing unity, out of the effective remnants of [her] childhood and the hopes of
[her] anticipated adulthood” (Erikson, 1958, p. 14).
Identity formation is a largely unconscious process. Still, young people
are often painfully aware of their inability to make lasting commitments.
They feel there is too much to decide too soon, and that every decision
reduces their future alternatives (Erikson, 1959, pp. 124–126). Because com-
mitment is so difficult, they sometimes enter a psychosocial moratorium, a kind
of “time out” period for finding oneself. Some young people, for example,
drop out of college to travel or experiment with various jobs before making
any final decisions. However, many young people have trouble achieving a
free moratorium state. Until they know who they are and what they will do
in life, they often experience a sense of isolation, a feeling that time is pass-
ing them by, an inability to find meaning in any kind of activity, and a feel-
ing that life is simply happening to them. As Biff puts it in Arthur Miller ’s
Death of a Salesman, “I just can’t take hold, Mom, I can’t take hold of some kind
of life” (Erikson, 1959, p. 91).
Nevertheless, the adolescent frequently postpones commitments any-
way, because of an inner need to avoid identity foreclosure, a premature accep-
tance of compartmentalized social roles. And although a protracted identity
search can be painful, it can also eventually lead to a higher form of personal
integration and to genuine social innovations. As we have seen, many of the
theorists in this book resisted the temptation to settle into conventional occu-
pational identities. Piaget, Freud, and Erikson, among others, spent some time
searching for their true callings. And their search, while not always pleasant
for them, eventually led to new ways of understanding and meaningful
changes in their professions.
The adolescent’s central task, then, is to find some way of life to which
he or she can make a permanent commitment. The struggles of this stage lead
to the new ego strength of fidelity, the ability to sustain one’s freely pledged
loyalties (Erikson, 1964, p. 125).
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6.Young Adulthood
Erikson is the first Freudian and one of the few developmental writers of any
persuasion to propose separate stages for the adult years. If, then, his
thoughts seem sketchy, we should remember that he was writing about an
uncharted area.
Erikson’s stages of adult development describe steps by which people
widen and deepen their capacities to love and care for others. The adolescent
is preeminently self-centered. Adolescents are concerned with who they are,
how they appear in the eyes of others, and what they will become. They do
become sexually attracted to others and even fall in love, but such attach-
ments most often are really efforts at self-definition. In their interactions,
young people try to find out who they are by endlessly talking about their
true feelings, their views of each other, and their plans, hopes, and expecta-
tions (Erikson, 1959, p. 95).
The adolescent, then, is too preoccupied with who he or she is to take
up the task of young adulthood—the attainment of intimacy. Real intimacy
is only possible once a reasonable sense of identity has been established
(1959, p. 95). Only one who is secure with one’s identity is able to lose one-
self in true mutuality with another. The young man, for example, who is
worried about his masculinity will not make the best lover. He will be too
self-conscious, too worried about how he is performing, to abandon himself
freely and tenderly with his sexual partner. To the extent that people fail to
attain genuine mutuality, they experience the opposite pole of this stage—
isolation.
Erikson observed that some young people marry before they have estab-
lished a good sense of identity. They hope they will be able to find them-
selves in their marriage. Such marriages, however, rarely work out. The
partners sooner or later begin to feel hemmed in by their obligations as mates
and parents. They soon complain that others are not giving them the oppor-
tunity to develop themselves. Erikson noted that a change in mate is rarely
the answer. What the individual needs is some “wisely guided insight” into
the fact that one cannot expect to live intimately with another until one has
become oneself (p. 95).
In his discussions of intimacy, Erikson, as a respectable Freudian, spoke
glowingly of the experience of orgasm: It is a supreme experience of mutual reg-
ulation that takes the edge off the inevitable bitterness and differences between
two people (1963, p. 265). He added, though, that the “Utopia of genitality” is by
no means a purely sexual matter. True intimacy means that two people are will-
ing to share and mutually regulate all important aspects of their lives (p. 266).
As with the other stages, no one develops only the positive pole of this
stage. No couple experiences total intimacy. Because people are different
(sexually and otherwise), there is inevitably a degree of antagonism between
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partners that leads to periodic isolation. Ideally, however, intimacy is
stronger than isolation. If so, young adults develop the ego strength of
mature love— the “mutuality of devotion forever subduing the antagonisms”
between them (Erikson, 1964, p. 129).
7. Adulthood
Once two people have established some measure of intimacy, their interests
begin to expand beyond just the two of them. They become concerned with
raising the next generation. In Erikson’s terms, they enter the stage of
generativity versus self-absorption and stagnation (Erikson, 1982, p. 67).
Generativity is a broad term that refers not only to the creation of children but
also to the production of things and ideas through work. But Erikson focused
primarily on the former—the generation of children.
The mere fact of having children, of course, does not guarantee genera-
tivity. Parents must do more than produce offspring; they must protect and
guide them. This means that parents must often sacrifice their own needs.
They must overcome temptations to self-indulgence, which lead to an unpro-
ductive stagnation. To the extent they can positively cope with this conflict,
they develop their ability to care for the next generation.
Some people, Erikson noted, develop generativity and care without hav-
ing children of their own. Nuns and priests, for example, forgo the right to
raise their own children, as do others who apply their special gifts to other
areas. Such persons can still teach and guide the next generation “by working
with other people’s children or helping to create a better world for them”
(Erikson in Evans, 1969, p. 51). Such adults must, to be sure, withstand a cer-
tain amount of frustration. This is especially true of women, whose bodies
are built for nurturing and nourishing offspring. But a sense of care and gen-
erativity is still possible.
On the other hand, there are many people who marry but lack genera-
tivity. In such cases, the couples often regress to a kind of “pseudointimacy”
or “begin to indulge themselves as if they were their one and only child”
(Erikson, 1959, p. 97). Erikson might have been thinking of couples who
endlessly analyze their relationship in terms of how much each person is get-
ting from the other. The individuals seem more concerned with their own
needs than those of their children.
There are several possible reasons for an inability to develop at this stage.
Sometimes the parent’s own childhood was so empty or frustrating that the
parent cannot see how it is possible to do more for his or her children. In other
cases, the difficulty seems more cultural. In the United States in particular,
our values emphasize independent achievement to such an extent that people
can become too exclusively involved in themselves and their successes and
neglect the responsibility of caring for others (Erikson, 1959, p. 97).
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8. Old Age
The psychological literature on old age, which is still sparse, typically views
this period as one of decline. The elderly, it is repeatedly pointed out, must
cope with a series of physical and social losses. They lose their physical
strength and health; they lose their jobs and much of their income through
retirement; and, as time goes by, they lose their spouses, relatives, and friends.
Equally damaging, they suffer the inevitable loss of status that accompanies
being old, inactive, and “useless” in America (see Gitelson, 1975; Havighurst,
1952, 1968). Some psychologists have tried to paint a more optimistic picture.
While acknowledging the many problems and losses, these psychologists say
that old age can be satisfying and can provide new experiences—“so long as
one actively engages the environment” (Cole & Cole, 1993, p. 671; see also
Newman & Newman, 2003, pp. 445, 470-472).
Erikson’s insights went in a very different direction. He wasn’t pri-
marily concerned with the older person’s activity, usefulness, or involvement
in external affairs. Instead, he focused on the inner struggle of this period—
a struggle that involves painful feelings but has potential for inner growth
and wisdom. He called this struggle ego integrity versus despair.
As older people face death, Erikson implied, they engage in what has
been called a life review (Butler, 1963). They look back on their lives and won-
der whether they were worthwhile. In this process, they confront the ultimate
despair—the feeling that life was not what it should have been, but now time
has run out and there is no chance to try alternative lifestyles. Frequently, dis-
gust hides despair. Many older people are disgusted by every little thing;
they have no patience for the struggles and failings of others. Such disgust,
Erikson said, really signifies their contempt for themselves (1959, p. 98).
As the older person faces despair, he or she is trying to find a sense of
ego integrity. Ego integrity, Erikson said, is difficult to define but includes the
sense that there is an order to one’s life and “the acceptance of one’s one and
only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of
no substitutions” (1963, p. 268). Integrity, it would seem, expresses the feeling
that, “Yes, I made mistakes, but given who I was at the time and the circum-
stances, the mistakes were inevitable. I accept them, along with the good
things in my life.” Integrity is a feeling that also extends beyond the self and
even transcends national and ideological boundaries. The older person, on
some level, has a feeling of companionship “with the ordering ways of distant
times and different pursuits, so expressed in the simple products and sayings
of such times and pursuits” (p. 268).
Erikson (1976) told us that the crisis of old age is most admirably illus-
trated by Ingmar Bergman’s film Wild Strawberries. The film, in Erikson’s words,
records an old Swedish doctor’s journey by car from his place of retire-
ment to the city of Lund. There, in the ancient cathedral, Dr. Isak Borg
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is to receive the highest honor of his profession, a Jubilee Doctorate mark-
ing fifty years of meritorious service. But this journey by car on marked
roads through familiar territory also becomes a symbolic pilgrimage
back into childhood and deep into his unknown self. (p. 1)
The film begins with Borg writing in his diary, in which he expresses a
self-satisfied view of what life has to offer. The film then plunges into a terri-
fying dream symbolizing his fear of death. Upon awakening, Borg decides to
travel to Lund by car instead of by airplane and to take along his daughter-
in-law, Marianne, who is in the midst of a marital crisis with which Borg has
so far refused to help. As soon as they are in the car, they begin to quarrel,
and Marianne tells him that “even though everyone depicts you as a great
humanitarian . . . you are an old egotist, Father” (Bergman, 1957, p. 32). Along
the journey, Borg engages in other encounters with Marianne and others, and
he is visited by vivid dreams and memories about the past. These dreams and
memories are extremely humiliating to him. He comes to realize that through-
out his life he has been an isolated onlooker, moralistically aloof, and in many
ways incapable of love. We see, then, that Borg’s initial sense of integrity was
superficial; as he imagines death and reviews his life, he confronts its many
failures.
In the end, however, Borg’s insights do not lead to a final despair but to
a new acceptance of the past. While he is receiving his Jubilee Doctorate, which
by now has become a rather trivial event, he begins to see “a remarkable causal-
ity” in the events of his life—an insight that sounds remarkably similar to
Erikson’s statement that ego integrity includes a sense of the inevitable order
of the past. Equally impressive, though, is a change in character. At the end of
the film, Borg expresses his love for Marianne and offers to help her and his son.
Through this film, we see why Erikson emphasized the importance of
both the positive and negative poles of his crises. Borg’s initial sense of
integrity was superficial and unconvincing. He acquired a more meaningful
sense of integrity only after confronting his life thoroughly and answering to
some existential despair (Erikson, 1976, p. 23).
Erikson and Bergman, then, are pointing to an inner struggle that we
are apt to miss when we look at older people. We are aware of their many
physical and social difficulties, and we may deplore the fact that older people
seem so “useless.” We may then try to correct our perceptions by finding
examples of older people who are more “useful,” energetic, and engaged in
external affairs. But we are still evaluating the elderly on the basis of external
behavior. We fail to consider the inner struggle. We fail to see that the quiet
older person may be grappling in some way with the most important of all
questions: Was my life, as I face death, a meaningful one? What makes a life
meaningful?
This inner struggle tends to make the older person something of a philoso-
pher, and out of the struggle grows the ego strength of wisdom. Wisdom may be
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expressed in many ways, but it always reflects a thoughtful, hopeful effort to
find the value and meaning of life in the face of death (Erikson, 1976, p. 23; 1982,
pp. 61–62).
THEORETICAL ISSUES
Why Erikson’s Theory Is a Stage Theory
Piaget and Kohlberg believed that cognitive stages should meet several cri-
teria. Erikson’s stages deal more with emotional development, but they basi-
cally meet the same criteria. That is, the stages (1) describe qualitatively
different behaviors, (2) refer to general issues, (3) unfold in an invariant
sequence, and (4) are culturally universal. Let us examine these points in
turn.
1. The Stages Refer to Qualitatively Different Behavior Patterns. If
development were just a matter of gradual quantitative change, any division
into stages would be arbitrary. Erikson’s stages, however, give us a good
sense of how behavior is qualitatively different at different points. Chil-
dren at the autonomy stage sound very different from those at the trust
stage; they are much more independent. Children at the initiative stage are
different again. Whereas children who are establishing a sense of auton-
omy defy authority and keep others out, children with a sense of initiative
are more daring and imaginative, running vigorously about, making big
plans, and initiating new activities. Behavior has a distinctive flavor at each
stage.
2. The Stages Describe General Issues. As I have emphasized, stages
refer to general characteristics or issues. Erikson went beyond Freud’s rela-
tively specific focus on body zones and attempted to delineate the general
issues at each period. At the oral stage, for example, he showed that it is not
just the stimulation of this zone that is important but the general mode of tak-
ing in and, more generally still, the development of a sense of trust in one’s
providers. Similarly, at each stage Erikson tried to isolate the most general
issue faced by the individual in the social world.
3. The Stages Unfold in an Invariant Sequence. All stage theories
imply an invariant sequence, and Erikson’s is no exception. He said that each
stage is present in some form throughout life, but each reaches its own crisis
at a specific time and in a specific order.
Erikson’s claim is based on the assumption that his sequence is partly the
product of biological maturation. As he put it, the child obeys “inner laws of
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development, namely those laws which in his prenatal period had formed
one organ after another and which now create a succession of potentialities for
significant interaction with those around him” (Erikson, 1963, p. 67). At the sec-
ond stage, for example, biological maturation ushers in a sense of autonomy.
Because of maturation, children can stand on their own two feet, control their
sphincter muscles, walk, use words such as me, mine, and no, and so on. At the
third stage, maturation prompts a new sexual interest, along with capacities
for imaginative play, curiosity, and vigorous locomotion.
At the same time, societies have evolved such that they invite and meet
this inner, maturational succession of potentialities. When, for example, the
child at the autonomy stage demonstrates a new degree of self-control, social-
izing agents consider the child ready for training. For example, they begin
toilet training. The result is the battle of wills, between child and society, which
creates the crisis of this period. Similarly, when children become recklessly
ambitious with respect to sexual matters, societies decide it is now time to
introduce their particular sexual prohibitions, creating the core conflict at the
third stage. Thus the succession of crises is produced by inner maturation on
the one hand and social forces on the other.
4. The Stages Are Cultural Universals. Erikson believed his stages
can be applied to all cultures. You might see how the stages would be uni-
versal to the extent they are maturationally governed, but you may still be
skeptical, for you know how widely cultures differ.
Erikson, too, was aware of the vast differences among cultures. In fact,
he wanted to show readers how cultures handle the stages differently accord-
ing to their different value systems. For example, the Lakota provide their
children with a long and indulgent period of nursing; one of their goals is
to get children to trust others and to become generous themselves (1963,
pp. 134–140). Our society, in contrast, discourages dependency. Compared to
other cultures, we wean our infants very early. We do not seem to want our
children to learn to depend on or trust others too much, but to become inde-
pendent. Independence and free mobility seem part of our cultural ethos,
from the pioneer days to the present time (chap. 8).
What Erikson did claim is that all cultures address themselves to the
same issues. All cultures try to provide their children with consistent care, reg-
ulate their extreme wish to do everything their own way, and instill incest
taboos. And, as children grow, all cultures ask them to learn the tools and
skills of their technology, to find a workable adult identity, to establish bonds
of intimacy, to care for the next generation, and to face death with integrity.
All cultures attempt to achieve these tasks because culture itself is a part of the
evolutionary process; in the course of evolution, those groups that failed in
these tasks had less chance of surviving. Unless, for example, cultures could
get their members to sacrifice some of their independence for the needs of
others (at the autonomy stage), to begin to learn the skills and tools of the
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society (at the industry stage), and to care for the next generation (at the gen-
erativity stage), they probably did not endure.1
The Question of Hierarchic Integration. Piagetians, you may recall,
define their stages in terms of a fifth point; they view them as hierarchic inte-
grations. This concept has been used somewhat differently by different writ-
ers, but in a stage theory it basically means earlier structures are reintegrated
into new, dominant structures. In Erikson’s theory, such a process does occur
at certain stages, such as adolescence. As young people achieve a new sense
of identity, they reorganize a good deal of their personality in the pursuit of
dominant goals or life plans. But the concept of hierarchic integration does
not apply to all the stages. For example, the issues at the stage of autonomy
versus shame and doubt are not reorganized or reintegrated into the next
stage, initiative versus guilt. The new stage simply raises new concerns, leav-
ing the earlier stage in the background, in much the same form as before. Thus
the concept of hierarchic integration does not seem to characterize develop-
ment at all of Erikson’s stages (see Kohlberg, 1969a, p. 353).
Must We Go Through All the Stages?
We sometimes hear that if we don’t achieve a good measure of success at one
of Erikson’s stages, we may be unable to go on to the next stage. This is
wrong. In Erikson’s theory, we must, if we live long enough, go through all
the stages. The reason has to do with the forces that move us from stage to
stage: biological maturation and social expectations. These forces push us
along according to a certain timetable, whether we have been successful at
earlier stages or not.
Consider, for example, a boy who has been unable to attain much of a
sense of industry. When he reaches puberty, he must grapple with the issues
of identity even though he is not really ready to do so. Because of biological
changes, he finds himself troubled by an upsurge of sexual feelings and by a
rapidly changing body. At the same time, social pressures force him to cope
with problems of dating and to start thinking about his future occupation. It
matters little to the larger society that he is still unsure about his own skills.
His society has its own timetable, and by the time he is 20 or so, he will feel
pressure to decide on a career. In the same way, he will find himself con-
fronting each new stage in the sequence.
Each of us, then, must go through all the stages, whether we have tra-
versed the earlier stages well or not. What is true is that success at earlier
stages affects the chances of success at later ones. Children who developed
a firm sense of trust in their caretakers can afford to leave them and
1Darwin had a similar view, as discussed in Chapter 3.
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independently explore the environment. In contrast, children who lack trust—
who are afraid to let caretakers out of sight—are less able to develop a sense
of autonomy. (Conceptualized slightly differently, it is the child who has
developed a favorable balance of trust over mistrust who ventures into the
world full of hope and anticipation, energetically testing new powers of inde-
pendent action.) In a similar way, a favorable outcome at each stage affects
the chances of a positive outcome at the subsequent stage. But whatever the
outcomes, maturational and social forces require the child to face the issues
at each new stage.
Comparison with Piaget
We have now reviewed the two most influential stage theories in the devel-
opmental literature: Piaget’s cognitive-developmental theory and Erikson’s
psychoanalytic theory. In many respects, the theories are different, as briefly
noted before. Broadly speaking, the most basic differences are these.
Erikson’s theory describes a variety of feelings we bring to tasks; Piaget’s
theory focuses on intellectual development. This development, for Piaget, is not
motivated by biological maturation and social forces, but by the child’s efforts
to solve cognitive problems. As children encounter problems they cannot
handle with their existing cognitive structures, they become challenged and curi-
ous and construct more elaborate structures. Since the driving force is the child’s
curiosity, there is no reason why the child must go through all the stages; if a
child is not curious about an area (e.g., mathematics), he or she may never reach
the highest stages in that area. Thus, where maturation and social pressures drive
us through all of Erikson’s stages, ready or not, we only go through Piaget’s
stages to the extent we are intellectually motivated to build new structures.
Such differences seem large. Nevertheless, both Erikson and Piaget gave
us stage theories, attempting to describe the most general qualitative shifts
in behavior. Moreover, they often seemed to be presenting different perspec-
tives on the same basic developments. Let us look at how this is so.
1. Trust. As Erikson (1964, pp. 116–117) observed, both Piaget and he
were concerned with the infant’s development of a secure image of external
objects. Erikson discussed the child’s growing reliance on the predictability
and dependability of people, whereas Piaget documented the developing
sense of permanent things. Thus both were concerned with the child’s grow-
ing faith in the stability of the world.2
2. Autonomy. As children develop a sense of trust in their caretakers,
they become increasingly independent. Secure in their knowledge that others
will be there when needed, they are free to explore the world on their own.
2For research exploring these parallels, see Bell, 1970; Flavell, 1977, p. 54; and Gouin-Décarie,
1965.
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Piaget pointed to a similar process. As children gain the conviction that
objects are permanent, they can act increasingly independently of them. For
example, when his daughter Jacqueline’s ball rolled under the sofa, she was
no longer bound to the spot where she last saw it. She now knew that the
object was permanent, even if hidden, and could therefore try out alternative
routes for finding it.
3. Initiative. At this stage, between about 3 and 6 years, Erikson and
the Freudians emphasize the child’s consuming curiosity, wealth of fantasy,
and daring imagination. As Erikson said, “Both language and locomotion per-
mit him to expand his imagination over so many things that he cannot avoid
frightening himself with what he has dreamed and thought up” (1959, p. 75).
Piaget’s view of the thinking at this period was remarkably similar. As
Flavell says,
The preoperational child is the child of wonder; his cognition appears to us
naive, impression-bound, and poorly organized. There is an essential law-
lessness about his world without, of course, this fact in any way entering
his awareness to inhibit the zest and flights of fancy with which he
approaches new situations. Anything is possible because nothing is subject
to lawful constraints. (1963, p. 211)
For Piaget, then, the fantasy and imagination of the phallic-age child owes
much to the fact that the child is in the preoperational period—a time in which
thoughts run free because they are not yet tied to the systematic logic the child
will develop at the next stage.
4. Industry. For Erikson and the Freudians, the fantasies and fears of
the oedipal child are temporarily buried during the latency stage, which lasts
from about age 6 to 11 years. Frightening wishes and fantasies are repressed,
and the child’s interests expand outward; the child intently tries to master the
realistic skills and tools of the culture. In general, this is a relatively calm
period; children seem more self-composed.
Piaget, too, would lead us to believe the 6- to 11-year-old is more stable,
realistic, and organized than the younger child. For Piaget, this change is not
the result of the repression of emotions and dangerous wishes; rather, it comes
about because, intellectually, the child has entered the stage of concrete oper-
ations. The child can now separate fact from fancy, can see different perspec-
tives on a problem, and can work logically and systematically on concrete
tasks. Intellectually, then, the child is in a stage of equilibrium with the world,
and this contributes to his or her overall stability and composure. Erikson
himself seemed to have concrete operations in mind when he described this
period: He said that at this time the child’s “exuberant imagination is tamed
and harnessed by the laws of impersonal things” (1963, p. 258).
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5. Identity. In Erikson’s view, the calm of the preceding period gives
way to the turbulence and uncertainty of adolescence. Adolescents are con-
fused by physical changes and pressures to make social commitments. They
wonder who they are and what their place in society will be.
Piaget had little to say about physical changes in adolescence, but his
insights into cognitive development help us understand why this can be an
identity-searching time. During the stage of concrete operations, the child’s
thought was pretty much tied to the here and now. But with the growth of
formal operations, the adolescent’s thought soars into the distant future and
into the realm of the purely hypothetical. Consequently, adolescents can now
entertain limitless possibilities about who they are and what they will become.
Formal operational capacities, then, may contribute to the self-questioning of
this period (see Inhelder & Piaget, 1955, chap. 18).
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Clinical Work: A Case Illustration
Clinical psychologists and other mental health workers have found Erikson’s
concepts very useful. We can get a sense of this from Erikson’s own work with
one of his cases, a 4-year-old boy he called Peter.
Peter suffered from a psychogenic megacolon, an enlarged colon that
resulted from Peter’s emotionally based habit of retaining his fecal matter for
up to a week at a time. Through conversations with Peter and his family,
Erikson learned that Peter developed this symptom shortly after his nurse,
an Asian girl, had been dismissed. Peter, it seems, had begun “attacking the
nurse in a rough-housing way, and the girl had seemed to accept and quietly
enjoy his decidedly ‘male’ approach” (Erikson, 1963, p. 56). In her culture,
such behavior was considered normal. However, Peter’s mother, living in our
culture, felt there was something wrong about Peter’s sudden maleness and
the way the nurse indulged it. So she got rid of the nurse. By way of expla-
nation, the nurse told Peter she was going to have a baby of her own, and that
she preferred to care for babies, not big boys like Peter. Soon afterward, Peter
developed the megacolon.
Erikson learned that Peter imagined that he himself was pregnant, a fan-
tasy through which he tried to keep the nurse by identifying with her. But,
more generally, we can see how Peter’s behavior regressed in terms of stages.
Initially, he had begun displaying the attacking, sexual behavior of the initia-
tive stage, but he found that it led to a tragic loss. So he regressed to an anal
mode. He was expressing, through his body, his central need: to hold on. When
Erikson found the right moment, he interpreted Peter’s wishes to him, and
Peter’s symptom was greatly alleviated.
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Sometimes students, when hearing of Peter’s behavior, suggest his symp-
tom was a means of “getting attention.” This interpretation is used frequently
by the behaviorists. We note, however, that Erikson’s approach was different.
He was concerned with the meaning of the symptom for Peter, with what
Peter was trying to express through it. Through his body, Peter was uncon-
sciously trying to say, “I need to hold on to what I’ve lost.” Erikson and other
psychoanalysts believe that instead of changing a child’s behavior through
external reinforcements such as attention, it is best to speak to the child’s fears
and to what the child may be unconsciously trying to say.
Thoughts on Child Rearing
Over the years, Erikson applied clinical insights to many problems, including
those in education, ethics, and politics. He also had a special interest in child
rearing.
As we briefly mentioned in our discussion of trust, Erikson was con-
cerned with the problem facing parents in our changing society. Modern par-
ents are often unable or unwilling simply to follow traditional child-rearing
precepts; they would like to bring up their children in more personal, toler-
ant ways, based on new information and education (Erikson, 1959, p. 99).
Unfortunately, modern child-rearing advice is often contradictory and fright-
ens the new parent with its accounts of how things can go wrong. Conse-
quently, the new parent is anxious and uncertain. This is a serious problem,
Erikson believed, for, as we have seen, it is important that the parent convey
to the child a basic security, a feeling the world is a calm and secure place.
Erikson suggested that parents can derive some inner security from reli-
gious faith. Beyond this, he suggested parents heed their fundamental “belief
in the species” (1963, p. 267). By this, Erikson meant something similar to
Gesell. Parents should recognize that it is not all up to them to form the child;
children largely grow according to an inner, maturational timetable. As
Erikson said, “It is important to realize that . . . the healthy child, if halfway
properly guided, merely obeys and on the whole can be trusted to obey inner
laws of development” (p. 67). So it is all right for parents to follow their incli-
nation to smile when their baby smiles, make room for their child to walk
when he or she tries to, and so on. They can feel secure that it is all right to fol-
low the baby’s own biological ground plan.
Erikson also hoped that parents can recognize the basic inequality
between child and adult. The human child, in contrast to the young of other
species, undergoes a much longer period of dependency and helplessness.
Parents, therefore, must be careful to resist the temptation to take out their
own frustrations on the weaker child. They must resist, for example, the
impulse to dominate the child because they themselves feel helpless with oth-
ers. Parents should also be careful to avoid trying to shape the child into the
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person they wanted to become, thereby ignoring the child’s own capacities and
inclinations. Erikson said, in conclusion, “If we will only learn to let live, the
plan for growth is all there” (1959, p. 100).
EVALUATION
Erikson certainly broadened psychoanalytic theory. He delineated the most
general issues at each of Freud’s stages and enlarged the stage sequence so it
now covers the entire life cycle. Erikson also gave us a new appreciation of
how social factors enter into the various stages. For example, he showed that
adolescents are struggling not just to master their impulses but to find an
identity in the larger social world.
Erikson, finally, gave Freudian theory new insights into the possibilities
for healthy development. He did this primarily by making wider use of the
concept of maturation than Freud did. In Freud’s view, maturation directs the
course of the instinctual drives, which must undergo a good measure of repres-
sion. For Erikson, maturation also promotes the growth of the ego modes and
the general ego qualities such as autonomy and initiative.3 Erikson, to be sure,
discussed the difficulties in attaining these qualities, but he did give us a bet-
ter picture of how ego growth is possible. By suggesting that healthy devel-
opment is tied to a maturational ground plan, Erikson moved Freudian theory
in the developmental direction of Rousseau, Gesell, and others.
Erikson’s theory has also met with various criticisms. Robert White
(1960) argued that Erikson tried too hard to link the various aspects of ego
development to Freud’s libidinal zones. Erikson said that for each zone, there
is a characteristic ego mode of interaction with the world. However, White
argued, these modes fail to capture many of the child’s activities. For example,
many of the young child’s efforts to achieve autonomy—such as the child’s
loud “no’s” and vigorous walking—seem unrelated to the anal modes of reten-
tion and elimination. White himself proposed we think of ego growth as a
general tendency toward competence—a tendency that includes locomotion,
exploration, and autonomous action without any necessary connection to
Freud’s zones.
In a different vein, we might fault Erikson for a degree of conceptual
vagueness. He wrote in a beautiful, flowing prose, but he left many concep-
tual matters unclear. For example, he provided new insights for the potential
for growth in old age, when people examine their lives and search for wisdom,
but he did not clearly indicate how this is part of the maturational process. It
may be that there is a biological tendency to review one’s life (Butler, 1963),
3Erikson’s suggestion that ego growth has maturational roots follows the lead of Hartmann.
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but Erikson was not explicit on this matter. Similarly, he failed to spell out
how maturation contributes to the other stages of adulthood.
Erikson was aware of his general vagueness. As he once said, “I came to
psychology from art, which may explain, if not justify, the fact that the reader
will find me painting contexts and backgrounds where he would rather have
me point to facts and concepts” (1963, p. 17).
Erikson’s conceptual vagueness may partly explain why empirical
research on his theory has been slow to emerge, although there have been
some solid efforts. Most notably, James Marcia (1966) has constructed measures
of different identity states, and these measures are related to other variables.
For example, young people with foreclosed identities—who have simply
accepted handed-down occupational goals and values without themselves
struggling with alternatives—seem to be most often found at the level of con-
ventional thought on Kohlberg’s scale. In contrast, those who have achieved
a sense of identity after a personal struggle are more often represented by
postconventional moral thinking (Podd, 1972; Kroger 2007, p. 105). Those who
have found their identity after a personal exploration also feel more inde-
pendent and in control of their lives (Berk, 2009, p. 467).
Researchers also have been examining the family contexts that best allow
young people to find their own identities (Kroger, 2007, p. 77). All such
research is encouraging. Erikson’s work is so rich and profound that it
deserves energetic scientific investigation.
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Mahler’s Separation/
Individuation Theory
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Individuation Theory
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
Erikson developed a grand, sweeping theory that gave Freudian
thought a much more social and cultural emphasis. Such broad theo-
ries are impressive, but it’s also possible to advance theory by focusing
on a more limited set of details. A striking example of this is Mahler’s
long and careful study of mother/infant interactions. She showed how
babies become separate people within a relationship, and in the process
Mahler cast light on universal dimensions of human life.
Margaret S. Mahler (1897–1985) was born in the small town of
Sopron, Hungary, a short distance from Vienna, Austria. In her memoirs,
she described her mother, a homemaker, as a beautiful, narcissistic, and
unhappy woman who didn’t want Mahler as a baby. As a result, Mahler
was grateful for the interest her father, a physician, took in her. “I became
very much my father’s daughter,” Mahler said. “It was to my father’s
world, the world of the intellect, of science, of medicine, that I turned”
(1988, pp. 4, 7).
When Mahler was 4 years old, her mother gave birth to another
girl, to whom her mother devoted more affection. Mahler was com-
pletely fascinated by this tender care and spent hours silently observ-
ing the mother/baby interactions. In fact, Mahler said, “I do not think
it an exaggeration to say that my own mother and sister represented the
first mother-child pair that I investigated” (p. 5).
Mahler described herself as a very insecure teenager and young
woman. But she also showed early academic promise, and at the age
of 16 became only the second girl from her town to seek higher edu-
cation, which was considered the province of males. She went to a
school in Budapest, where she became best friends with a girl whose
family was part of a group of pioneering psychoanalysts. They
treated Mahler as if she were part of the family, and after some inde-
cision, Mahler decided to pursue a career in medicine followed by
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psychoanalysis. (Her friend, Alice Balint, also became a distinguished
psychoanalyst.)
Mahler received her medical degree from the University of Jena in 1922.
During the next several years, she practiced pediatrics and child psychiatry
and completed psychoanalytic training. In 1936 she married Paul Mahler,
and in 1938 the couple came to the United States to escape the Nazis. They
settled in New York City, where Mahler ’s work on emotional disorders of
childhood resulted in several appointments, including a professorship at the
Albert Einstein College of Medicine. She also spent years commuting to
Philadelphia to teach at its Psychoanalytic Institute.
On a personal level, Mahler retained a considerable amount of insecurity
throughout her life, and she sometimes acted in demanding or mistrustful
ways. But many sensitive and creative people were committed to working with
her because they found her insights so valuable.
OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND METHODS
During the 1940s and 1950s, two striking advances were made in the concep-
tualization of childhood psychoses—the most severe emotional disorders. The
first advance was made by Leo Kanner (1943), who suggested that many
strange symptoms fit into a syndrome he called early infantile autism. This is a
disorder in which children are extremely isolated and aloof. They often avoid
eye contact or seem to look right through you. Children with autism also dis-
play other symptoms, including problems with language. Many are mute, and
those who do talk often engage in echolalia, the meaningless repetition of
sounds. If you ask the child, “What’s your name?” the child answers, “What’s
your name?” (Lovaas, 1973). If health workers are alert to the disorder, they can
often diagnosis it very early—before the second year of life.
A second diagnostic advance was made by Mahler. Beginning with a
footnote in a 1949 paper, Mahler conceptualized a disorder that usually
appears in the third or fourth year of life or a bit later. In these cases, the chil-
dren have formed a relationship with caretakers but are afraid to separate
themselves out of it. They cling to their mother, afraid to move out into the
world. Using the biological term symbiosis as a metaphor, Mahler called this
disorder symbiotic psychosis (see Mahler, 1968, pp. 72–75).
In Mahler’s view, these disturbances aren’t simply bizarre occurrences
but rather as deviations from normal development. As we can see in Table 1,
Mahler suggested that normal development begins with a normal autistic
phase; the baby is inwardly focused and wards off many stimuli. Next, the
baby progresses to a normal symbiotic phase; the baby now attends more fully
to outer sensations, but with the illusion of being at one with the mother. Then,
with the support of the mother, the baby becomes increasingly independent,
especially as she becomes a toddler.
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TABLE 1 Mahler’s Phases
AGE PHASE HIGHLIGHTS
Birth to 1 month Normal Autism Baby focuses on inner physiological
state
1 to 5 months Normal Symbiosis Baby responds more to outer stimuli
but is under the illusion that she and
mother are one
5 to 9 months Differentiation On mother’s lap, pulls back to study
her and world—has “hatched” look
9 to 12 months Early Practicing Uses mother as base to explore
12 to 15 months Practicing Explores world with bold exhilaration
15 to 24 months Rapprochement Realizes she needs mother after all—
but still seeks independence
24 to 30 months Beginnings of
Object Constancy
Creates an internal image of mother
and can function apart from her
In the case of autism, Mahler suggested, the child doesn’t get very far out
of the normal autistic phase. In the case of symbiotic psychosis, the child does
go through the symbiotic phase; however, she doesn’t derive bedrock feel-
ings of comfort and support from the relationship. As she becomes more inde-
pendent, she experiences some separations as so upsetting that she desperately
tries to regain the illusion of symbiotic union with the mother. Mahler sug-
gested that the symbiotic psychosis, appearing later than autism, is more
varied, and symbiotic psychotic children sometimes regress to an autistic state
(1968, pp. 14–22, 71–81).
A special aspect of Mahler’s work was her continuous effort to formu-
late and revise her ideas on the basis of research on ongoing mother/infant
relationships. She developed many of her thoughts on symbiotic psychosis
as a result of her work with Manuel Furer in a therapeutic nursery for mothers
and disturbed children. Mahler’s concept of normal development, which is our
focus in this chapter, also drew heavily on observations of mothers and their
infants in a nursery setting. Between 1959 and 1968, Mahler and her staff
observed and interacted with 38 normal mother/infant pairs in an indoor
play area. The space included an area for the mothers to sit, read, sip coffee,
and talk to one another—and from which they had a full view and free access
to their children at play. The babies typically entered the project when they
were between 2 and 5 months of age and left when they were 3 years old. The
observations (which included films, family interviews, and home visits) were
analyzed somewhat informally—largely through staff discussions—rather
than statistically. The observations also focused primarily on the phases
during which the child normally moves out of symbiosis and achieves inde-
pendence, rather than symbiosis itself. Mahler ’s thinking about the earlier
phases, normal autism and symbiosis, drew more heavily on her work with
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disturbed children and adults and the observations of other investigators
(Bergman, 1999, p. 6; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975, pp. 39, 233–271).
The observations of the normal babies and mothers were extremely
rich and were summarized in her 1975 book, The Psychological Birth of the
Human Infant (coauthored by Fred Pine and Anni Bergman). The book tells
the story of how the baby naturally emerges out of symbiosis and becomes
a separate individual. Let us now look at Mahler ’s full sequence of phases
in more detail.
PHASES OF NORMAL DEVELOPMENT
Mahler suggested that the phases of normal development overlap, and in
some ways the emotional qualities of each persist throughout the life cycle. But
the developmental achievement of each phase normally occurs at a certain
time in infancy and early childhood (Mahler et al., 1975, pp. 3, 48).
The Normal Autistic Phase
(birth to 1 month)
Mahler said the newborn (the baby up to the age of 1 month) “spends most
of his day in a half-sleeping, half-waking state”; he wakes primarily when
hunger or other tensions arouse him from within (p. 41). During this time,
the newborn infant is achieving a new physiological balance, and it’s the
baby’s inner physiological state—not the outside world—that holds the most
interest for him. In fact, the newborn seems protected from the outside by
what Freud called a stimulus barrier, a kind of shell that keeps out extremes in
stimuli. Mahler recognized there are also brief periods when the newborn is
quietly alert to his surroundings. But for the most part, the newborn acts as if
his inner sensations, not outer sensations, matter.
In recent years, a number of researchers, using advanced film tech-
nology, have suggested that infants are more responsive to their mothers
than is apparent to the naked eye. According to Mahler ’s coworker Anni
Bergman (1999), Mahler was aware of these findings and privately expressed
doubts about the autistic phase. But it still may mark something important
in development.
The Normal Symbiotic Phase (1 to 5 months)
At about 1 month of age, the baby starts taking more pleasure in stimuli from
the mother—from certain touches, smells, tones of voice, and ways of being
held. But the baby doesn’t know these sensations are separate from him. He
still lives in a twilight state in which he is still under the illusion that he and
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the mother are one. Mahler said that this undifferentiated state, which we can
only infer, is what she meant by “symbiosis” (1975, pp. 8, 44).
The first clear sign that the baby now takes pleasure in outer sensations—
which are mainly experiences of the mother—is the baby’s social smile. Some-
time during the second month, the baby starts staring at the mother’s face, and,
after doing so over a period of several days, the baby looks into her eyes and
bursts into the first social smile. The mother’s face isn’t the only one that elic-
its a gaze or smile, but she is likely to be the one who gazes and smiles back.
She also talks to the baby in the baby’s high-pitched voice and imitates the
baby’s coos. The deep mutual gaze seems to be the kind that is shared by peo-
ple in love. It is the kind that melts down boundaries. The mutual gazing,
together with the mutual smiles and the mother ’s imitations of the baby’s
sounds, all reinforce the baby’s illusion of oneness (L. Kaplan, 1978, p. 111;
Mahler et al., 1975, p. 45).
According to Mahler, the baby’s symbiotic state is marked by a sense of
omnipotence, a sense that the world is in perfect harmony with his wishes. The
mother fosters this illusion through her empathic sensitivity to the baby’s
cues. She senses that the baby is hungry and makes the nipple available; she
senses his need to rest and allows his body to mold into hers. As he melts into
her body, he apparently has a feeling that the world is in complete harmony
with his needs.
Anni Bergman adds that although we can’t know what the baby actu-
ally experiences, mothers often report that they feel a sense of union with
their babies. They say that they “lose their usual way of being in the world.
They have eloquently articulated something like a symbiotic state in them-
selves that parallels the state that has been postulated in the baby” (Bergman,
1999, p. 8).
Mahler recognized that mothers cannot be perfectly empathic; no
mother can read her baby’s every need. To an extent, babies themselves learn
to help her; they learn that certain cues, such as the mother ’s silences, mean
that they must let her know what they need. But there are times when all
babies must simply suffer cold, bad tastes, tension, hunger, loud noises, dust,
bright lights, and so on. Inevitably, then, babies not only mold comfortably
into their mothers’ bodies, but sometimes stiffen as they react to noxious
stimuli. And stiffening has its uses. It’s an early way of moving apart from
the mother—differentiating from her (L. Kaplan, 1978, pp. 100–104; Mahler
et al., 1975, p. 53).
On balance, though, the baby needs a responsive, comforting mother.
Mahler said that the baby doesn’t need a perfect mother, but, borrowing
phrases from D. W. Winnicott, the baby needs a “good enough” mother or an
“ordinarily devoted” mother. Mahler thought good mothering is a biologically
rooted necessity. The human infant, in comparison to other species, is more
helpless and dependent for a much longer time and needs a mother to ward
off intrusive stimuli and protect the baby’s well-being (1975, pp. 7, 45, 49).
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Nurturant mothering is also necessary for the baby’s psychological
development. Mahler said that the symbiotic phase is important for the initial
development of what Erikson called a sense of trust. The baby needs to feel
enough consistent comfort and relief of tensions to develop faith in the world
as a good place. Moreover, the sense of pleasurable symbiosis—of unity with
the mother—provides the growing baby with a sense of what Mahler called
a “safe anchor.” As the baby emerges from the symbiotic state and turns
increasingly outward, she doesn’t feel adrift and alone. The baby feels there
is a safe anchor of goodness and comfort (1975, pp. 45, 59, 110).
The Separation/Individuation Process
The Differentiation Subphase (5 to 9 months). The symbiotic state
sounds like it can be a period of blissful unity. Why, then, would a child want
to leave it? Mahler believed the baby is maturationally driven to develop inde-
pendent functioning and explore the wider world. Powerful inner forces
prompt the baby to scan the surroundings, to try to roll over, to sit up by one-
self, to reach out to grab things, and so on.
By 5 months, the baby has already been looking at the surroundings
outside the mother and knows the mother is different from others. The baby
now smiles at the mother and familiar people, but not others. But this
awareness has developed gradually and almost passively. At 5 months, the
baby’s investigations become more focused, prolonged, and active. Now,
even while nursing, babies spend considerable time looking at things
besides the mother. When they finish nursing, they turn away to look at
objects in the environment. At about 6 months of age, they pull their bod-
ies away from the mother to get a better look at her. (This pulling back is
in sharp contrast to the earlier molding.) As babies look at the mother, they
touch her face and body and grab things she is wearing, such as glasses or
a pin, to inspect them. They also start a “checking back” pattern, actively
comparing the mother to other people; first they look at the mother, then at
the other person, then back at the mother again. All in all, the baby is no
longer merged with the mother. The baby is more of an independent per-
son who is actively studying her mother and the outside world. Mahler
said the baby has hatched (pp. 53–56).
During this period, babies also inspect strangers tactilely and visually.
They usually do so in a very sober mood, which is different from the hap-
pier way in which they examine their mothers. Mahler, borrowing a term
from Sylvia Brody, called this behavior “customs inspection” (p. 56). At some
point, usually at about 7 months of age, many babies, but not all, exhibit
stranger anxiety. In some babies, stranger anxiety is very acute and they cry.
Mahler found this was most common in children whose symbiotic period
had been most strained. These babies hadn’t developed the beginnings of
basic trust and didn’t anticipate goodness in interpersonal relationships.
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The children who had enjoyed harmonious symbiotic phases typically showed
little fear of strangers, looking at them with wonderment and curiosity
(pp. 57–58).
Babies at this time also show separation anxiety. They become upset, for
example, when the mother leaves them alone. Mahler found that separation
anxiety at this time primarily takes the form of low-keyedness—a general
lowering of mood. The speculation is that the baby turns inward in an effort
to hold on to the image of the absent mother (Bergman, 1999, p. 13).
During this phase, then, the baby is moving out and away from the
mother, finding interesting things in the world and experiencing fears as well.
Mahler said that technically, two processes are underway. One is separation,
which is mainly increased physical distance from the mother. The other is
individuation, which includes the ego functions involved in exploring the
world perceptually, remembering where the mother and things are, and devel-
oping an image of one’s powers (Mahler et al., 1975, pp. 63–64).
Early Practicing (9 to 12 months). The practicing phase is ushered in
by the baby’s ability to crawl. As the baby moves about on all fours, and then
stands and coasts along while holding things, she becomes quite enthusiastic
about exploring the wider world. She often moves some distance away from
the mother, using her mother as a home base. As Ainsworth observed, the baby
explores new things in her environment, often becoming very absorbed in
them, then checks to make sure the mother is present (or even returning to her
for “refueling”) before venturing forth again.
During these explorations, the mother’s attitude is very important. Many
mothers—including those who had difficulty with the constant closeness and
intimacy of the earlier months—enjoy the baby’s new independence. They
sense that what the baby needs as the baby explores the world is just the
mother’s stable presence—her quiet availability. Other mothers become anx-
ious or ambivalent about the child’s explorations and have trouble serving as
a secure home base. They might try to interrupt the child’s activities or com-
municate their anxiety to the child. In such cases, the child’s enthusiasm for
moving out into the world is dampened.
The Practicing Subphase Proper (12 to 15 months). Mahler empha-
sized the power of the innate drive toward locomotion and exploration, and
babies’ pleasure in these activities becomes intense once they can walk. The
baby, who is now a real toddler, becomes exhilarated by her new ability to
move about and explore the world and takes pure delight in the discoveries
she makes. Everything she comes across, animate or inanimate, is a source of
wonder. The toddler acts as if the entire world was made for her investigations—
that when it comes to exploration, “the world is my oyster” (Mahler et al.,
1975, p. 71). Knocks and falls don’t bother her in the least, and she often seems
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impervious to the mother’s presence as well. The child does, to be sure, occa-
sionally look back to check on the mother’s presence, to make sure the mother
is still available. But the striking feature of this phase is the way the child
becomes so thrilled and absorbed in her explorations. This is a period when
the child “has a love affair with the world” (p. 74).
Mahler said this is a precious time when the child’s exuberance can over-
come emotional fragility. Only in cases when the mother is too intrusive or
unavailable is enthusiasm greatly diminished. Ordinarily, the child’s pleasure
in vigorous locomotion and exploration is immense.
Rapprochement (15 to 24 months). Mahler and her colleagues
observed that at 15 or 16 months, the toddlers in the nursery underwent a
major shift. Whereas they had been joyfully walking, running, jumping, and
playing without much regard to the mother, they now became very aware of
her. They began bringing her objects they had found in their explorations—
a piece of cookie, a toy, a bit of cellophane, a rock, a tricycle. They also began
monitoring her whereabouts and were no longer so impervious to knocks and
falls. Now they felt the pain and wanted the mother to come over and ease the
pain. In short, they became keenly aware of the mother and their need for her
(Bergman, 1999, pp. 18–20). It’s as if the toddler, who during the practicing
phase adventured into the world with a sense of omnipotence, suddenly
thinks, “Hey, where’s my mother? What am I doing out here all by myself;
I need her.”
Mahler believed the change is brought about by the kind of cognitive
development described by Piaget. During all their explorations of the outer
world, as well as their quiet play, the toddlers have been becoming increas-
ingly aware of how objects exist and function apart from themselves. It’s just
a matter of time before they think about their mother as a separate person
and all she does for them. Thus it dawns on the toddlers that the world is not
their oyster, that they are in fact “relatively helpless, small and separate indi-
vidual[s]” (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 78). In Erikson’s stage theory, the child begins
to experience doubt.
During the next several months, the child enters something of a crisis.
She is torn between conflicting aims. She wants to maintain and exert her
autonomy, but she also wants her mother. At one moment she emphatically
says, “No,” to every parental demand or request, asserting her refusal to sub-
mit to any authority. At the next moment, she clings to the mother or follows
her about, demanding the mother’s constant attention. She woos her mother
with gifts and objects such as books, knowing the mother believes in reading
to her. Many children enjoy a darting-away game in which the parent chases
and catches them. The game seems fun because the child feels suddenly
autonomous, running away, but also is reunited in the catching.
Sometimes the child is overcome by indecision. For example, in the
nursery, children would sometimes stand on the threshold of a new playroom,
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uncertain whether or not to enter it. Standing on the threshold seemed to
symbolize their conflict—whether to venture into a new room and leave the
mother, or to stay with her (p. 96).
This is a difficult time for the mother. The child’s behavior is often dis-
turbing and demanding, and the child herself doesn’t always seem to know
what she wants. Mahler again stressed the importance of the mother ’s quiet
patience and emotional availability (p. 79). If the mother can understand that
the child’s behavior is a natural development that will run its course—the
to-be-expected “terrible twos”—the mother can be patient. She can avoid
getting caught up in power struggles or withdrawing in retaliation. Then the
child will feel freer to work out things for herself, knowing that her own will
is respected.
Beginnings of Emotional Object Constancy (24 to 30 months). The
child in the rapprochement crisis seems to be in quite a predicament, and
we might wonder, “Just how will the child get over it? How can the child
resolve the conflicting needs for autonomy and the mother ’s care?” In good
part, the child does so by developing a positive internal image of the mother
that the child can evoke in her absence. Then, even though the child may
feel some longing for her, he can go on functioning independently without
her. This internal image is called emotional object constancy (Mahler et al.,
1975, p. 109).
Mahler said the attainment of object constancy has two prerequisites.
First, the child must have developed object permanence in Piaget’s sense. That
is, the child must know that objects (including people) exist even when they
are out of sight.
The second prerequisite is what Erikson called basic trust—the sense of
the mother as a reliable and predictable person who will be there for the child
(1975) when needed. The baby began developing this trust as early as the
symbiotic phase and developed it further in the differentiation, practicing,
and rapprochement phases (1975, p. 110).
Now, in the present phase, the child needs to internalize the image of a
good mother. The internalization process is complex, but the child carries it
out largely through make-believe play. In her play, the child lets objects rep-
resent parents, other people, and herself and consolidates an image of the
mother in her psychic structure. This is not always easy to do because the
child may be experiencing some strain with the mother. The child experiences
separations and frustrations (including toilet training and perhaps early oedi-
pal issues) and may be angry at the mother. It then becomes difficult for the
child to imagine the mother as a whole person who values the child despite
the tensions between them. But if positive experiences are sufficient, emo-
tional object constancyemerges. This development is open ended; it is subject
to change in the years that follow. But the development of object constancy in
this phase is crucial.
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PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
Although our focus is on Mahler’s theory of normal development, I would like
to note how much her work has helped mental health workers. In the early
1970s, when I began working in a partial hospitalization program, I remem-
ber how Mahler’s ideas cast light on puzzling psychiatric phenomena. One
man told me that when his mother died, he became confused and was taken
to a hospital where the intake worker asked him “an incomprehensible ques-
tion: She asked me to tell her something about myself. I didn’t have a clue as
to what she meant by ‘myself.’ I could tell her about my mother and me, but
I had never thought about myself as a separate person.” This man was describ-
ing a symbiotic attachment. Numerous stories like this one convinced me and
many others that significant insights into the mysterious roots of psychosis are
to be found in Mahler’s work.
Mahler’s work is most directly relevant to therapists treating disturbed
children. Prior to Mahler, it was almost taken as an axiom that therapists
should try to treat the child alone in a playroom. Mahler, instead, began work-
ing with infants and their mothers, trying to facilitate a more harmonious and
pleasurable symbiotic experience. For autistic children, her goal was to move
them forward into a symbiotic phase. For symbiotic psychotic children, too,
she wanted to foster a more complete and harmonious symbiosis. To many
people, this seems puzzling. Shouldn’t the goal be for these children to become
independent? But Mahler found that these children hadn’t experienced the
pleasurable union and trust that enabled them to move away from the mother.
Instead, with the maturation of motor and cognitive functions, they found
themselves separating before they felt emotionally ready. They felt prema-
turely alone and vulnerable, and new separation experiences (such as begin-
ning nursery school or the birth of a sibling) caused them to fall apart and to
cling desperately to their mothers. What they needed was not new encour-
agement to separate, but to build a sense of the mother as a secure anchor so
they could more confidently move out into the world.
When it comes to ordinary child rearing, Mahler repeatedly spoke about
the mother’s “emotional availability.” The normal period of symbiosis gives the
baby a feeling of being anchored in a place of comfort and safety, but as the baby
becomes a separate individual, she needs to be reassured of her mother’s con-
tinued availability. The most dramatic example is the way the crawling baby
uses her mother as a secure base from which to explore. The child ventures
out to investigate the world, checking back and sometimes actually returning
to her mother before venturing forth again. The mother’s calm, stable pres-
ence gives the child the courage to explore the world on her own.
There are numerous other ways that the baby uses the mother’s stable
presence to learn things on his or her own. If a mother is holding a 6-month-old
baby boy, the mother’s quiet, calm presence allows him to examine her with
his eyes and hands. He gets a chance to learn about her in his own way.
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This quality of the caretaker, this unobtrusive presence, is a quality we
find highlighted by other theorists. Ainsworth emphasized the baby’s use of
the mother as a secure base. Montessori, too, spoke on several occasions
about the ways the adult’s patient presence gives the child opportunities
for independent learning. Montessori mentioned, for example, how this can
occur when a parent takes a child for a walk. If a father is walking with his
2-year-old daughter in a park, he may adjust to the toddler ’s own rhythms,
stopping when the girl stops to examine things, standing patiently by while
she investigates a stick, rock, or puddle of water. As he stands by, he may
enjoy the delight she takes in examining the object. The father ’s presence is
necessary for the child’s security, but the father doesn’t have to teach the
child. All he needs to do is be quietly present and available, and the child can
learn on her own.
EVALUATION
Many contemporary psychoanalysts, including feminist psychoanalysts
(e.g., Benjamin, 1988), have criticized Freudians for focusing too exclusively
on the internal dynamics of the isolated individual. Mahler has moved
Freudian theory in an interpersonal direction.1 She has given us a vivid
account of how the baby achieves a sense of selfhood within an interpersonal
relationship. The baby hatches from a state of merger, becomes increasingly
independent, and then struggles with the realization of how dependent she
actually is. This back-and-forth process, in which the child deals with needs
for both relatedness and separateness, seems to capture universal tensions
and conflicts within all human life.
Mahler ’s theory also has met with some strong criticisms, two by the
highly respected psychoanalyst and infant researcher Daniel Stern (1985).
First, Stern criticizes Mahler for “pathologizing” infancy. That is, Mahler
began with an attempt to understand pathological states (autism and sym-
biosis) and looked for them in normal infancy. This approach, Stern says,
distorts our view of normal development. It would have been better if she
had studied normal infant and child development on its own terms. In my
view, this criticism has some merit, but it is hardly fatal. The ultimate test of
her theory is not its origins, but how well it captures the essence of the child’s
development.
Stern also argues that Mahler ’s early phases, especially the autistic
phase, are in error. The autistic phase, with its hypothesized stimulus barrier,
makes it sound as if the newborn primarily shuts herself off from the outer
1In psychoanalytic terms, Mahler is said to have contributed to object relations theory; see
Greenberg and Mitchell (1983).
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world. In fact, Stern points out, growing laboratory research and fine-grained
film analyses of mother/infant interactions show that the newborn has a
strong interest in external reality and an ability to make sense out of it.
This criticism is a serious one. It apparently stimulated Mahler, in her
last years, to consider modifying her concept of normal autism (Bergman,
1999, p. 5). But I believe any major change is still premature. For one thing,
capacities elicited in the laboratory don’t always reflect typical behavior in
normal life. The same is true of high-tech film analyses. Moreover, a con-
siderable amount of research tends to support the autistic concept—the view
that babies are more focused on inward stimuli than on the outer world.
Newborns sleep a great deal and defend themselves firmly against high-
intensity stimuli; and although they are interested in the world for brief
periods of time, they respond to a rather limited range of stimuli (Fogel,
2009, pp. 212–213).
It’s possible to raise other objections to Mahler ’s work—or point to
areas where we need more information. For one thing, Mahler often wrote
as if the mother is the only person in the infant’s life; we need to know more
about the baby’s interactions with fathers, children, and others. In addi-
tion, Mahler focused more on separation than the formation of new capac-
ities for love and mutuality, so more information is needed on this subject
as well.
As psychologists extend Mahler ’s work into new areas, they are espe-
cially interested in how Mahler ’s concepts might cast light on adolescence.
Jane Kroger (2007, p. 96) refers to adolescence as “the second separation-
individuation process.” It’s a time when young people often feel the need
to break away from parents and find their own identities, yet they are still
emotionally tied to their parents and, after a while, they may develop new
and more mature relationships with them. It will be interesting to see how
well Mahler ’s ideas provide a framework for understanding these
processes.
I would like to suggest another extension of Mahler—the possibility
that children develop a oneness not only with their mothers but also with
the natural world. As I mentioned in the chapter on Montessori, the child’s
experience of nature has received almost no attention in psychology. But in
her beautifully written book on Mahler (Oneness and Separateness, 1978),
Louise Kaplan briefly suggests that the child’s attachment to nature is impor-
tant. When the toddler enters the practicing phase, Kaplan says, the child
not only plants his feet “solidly on the earth,” but, running through open
spaces, “haughtily ignores his mother in the flesh, . . . having discovered a
more exciting mother in the world of visible space through which his body
glides.” He “molds his body to its invisible contours, imagining yet again
that he is one with the universe” (p. 169).
The few studies on children in natural settings provide evidence that
children do develop feelings of oneness with nature. In a rural New England
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Mahler’s Separation/Individuation Theory
town, Hart (1979) observed that children (between 3 and 12 years) liked to sit
or kneel beside brooks and ponds, staring quietly into the water in a day-
dreamlike state, seeming to feel a fluid connection between themselves and
the water—a oneness with the world. In Berkeley, California, where the com-
munity took up a half acre of asphalt and replaced it with a nature area of
ponds, wooded areas, and meadows, the children described a new sense of
connection and belonging. The nature area made them “feel at home,” like
being part of “one big happy family.” “Being alone doesn’t bother me now”
(Moore, 1989, pp. 201–203).
A study of adults’ autobiographies produced similar results. Chawla
(1990) found that those authors who said they benefited from childhood
experiences with nature most commonly referred to a lasting sense of root-
edness in the world. The African American minister Howard Thurman said
that he was a rather lonely boy who found comfort in the woods and the
ocean. Sometimes when he walked along the seashore at night and the ocean
was still,
I had the sense that all things, the sand, the sea, the stars, the night, and
I were one lung through which all of life breathed. Not only was I aware
of a vast rhythm enveloping all, but I was part of it and it was part of me.
(Chawla, 1990, p. 21)
Such early feelings with nature, Thurman said,
gave me a certain overriding immunity against much of the pain with
which I would have to deal in the years ahead when the ocean was only
a memory. The sense held: I felt rooted in life, in nature, in existence.
(Chawla, 1990, p. 21)
This sense of oneness and rootedness is also expressed in William
Wordsworth’s great ode (1807). Lamenting the loss of the exquisite attune-
ment to nature we had as children, Wordsworth said that we can nevertheless
take heart:
Though nothing can bring back the hour
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower;
We will grieve not, rather find
Strength in what remains behind;
In the primal sympathy
Which having been must ever be.
This “primal sympathy,” this feeling of “rootedness,” is what Mahler thought
the mother provides in the early months of life and continues to reinforce,
through her availability, as the child becomes separate. Thurman and
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Mahler’s Separation/Individuation Theory
Wordsworth are suggesting that the growing child also can find a sense of
belonging in nature. Today, of course, we so thoroughly enclose children in an
artificial world of computers, TVs, videos, and synthetic materials that they
may never develop any such feelings at all. This is a problem we must address,
for the early feelings of oneness with nature, like oneness with the mother,
may fortify the growing child against feeling too alone in the world.
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A Case Study
in Psychoanalytic
Treatment: Bettelheim
on Autism
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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A Case Study
in Psychoanalytic
Treatment: Bettelheim
on Autism
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I will give a description of psychoanalytic treatment.
Such treatments vary of course, and I will not attempt to review the
variations here. I have selected Bettelheim’s work with children diag-
nosed with autism because it provides an unusually rich account of
child therapy that is within the Rousseauist developmental tradition.
In some respects Bettelheim’s work is more classic than contem-
porary. Today, the most popular therapy for children with autism is
Lovaas’s adaptation of B. F. Skinner’s principles (summarized on pages
196–198 of this book). Even the institution that Bettelheim directed until
1973, the Orthogenic School in Chicago, has since added a mix of new
techniques to his core principles. But I believe Bettelheim’s treatment
exemplifies a philosophical approach that will always guide many
thoughtful therapists.
Bruno Bettelheim (1903–1990) grew up and became interested in
psychoanalysis in Vienna, Austria. In 1932 Bettelheim and his wife took
into their home and began caring for a girl who later would have been
diagnosed as suffering from autism (Kanner, 1943)—a mysterious con-
dition in which children are totally unresponsive to people. But in 1938
Hitler’s invasion of Austria disrupted this home treatment, along with
everything else (Goleman, 1990). From 1938 to 1939 Bettelheim was a
prisoner in the concentration camps of Dachau and Buchenwald. He
wrote detailed accounts of this experience (e.g., 1960) and drew on it
in all of his work. After his release, Bettelheim came to the United States
and, in 1944, took over the direction of the Orthogenic School in
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
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A Case Study in Psychoanalytic Treatment
Chicago with the hope that if it was possible to build prison camps powerful
enough to destroy human personalities, perhaps it was also possible to create
environments that can foster their rebirth (Bettelheim, 1967, p. 8). In this spe-
cial school and home for children, Bettelheim and his staff treated a wide vari-
ety of emotional disorders, but Bettelheim always had a special interest in
children with autism and he wrote movingly about his school’s treatment of
them in The Empty Fortress (1967). Bettelheim retired as director of the school
in 1973, but he continued to write on many topics, including fairy tales (Bet-
telheim, 1976) and reading instruction (Bettelheim & Zelan, 1981). He died at
the age of 86, taking his own life.
Bettelheim was a complex man. In his writings, he emphasized the need
for a warm, accepting environment in which even the most disturbed chil-
dren would feel free to develop according to their inner promptings. This is
the philosophy that his staff at the Orthogenic School followed. Yet Bettel-
heim himself was an autocratic man who sometimes insulted his students
and staff. And soon after he died, former patients from the school wrote that
he sometimes lost his temper and hit them and humiliated them (e.g., Jatich,
1990). Richard Pollak (1997) published a best-selling book that was scathing
in its criticism of Bettelheim. Bettelheim has his defenders (e.g., Bernstein,
1990), but there was definitely a contradiction between his philosophy and
his behavior.
Still, we do not study Bettelheim because of his personal attributes. We
study him because of his ideas and insights.
THE AUTISTIC SYNDROME
For decades, autism was considered to be very rare. But the diagnosis of
autism rose dramatically over the past two decades (Parritz & Troy, 2011).
It isn’t clear if the trend is due to greater awareness of the disorder or if the
rising incidence is real. In any case, autism is the earliest of the severe per-
sonality disturbances, usually showing up by the second year of life. Children
with autism tend to be physically healthy, but they are isolated and aloof,
rebuffing human interaction. They seem to look through people. Often they
do not speak, and when they do speak, they engage in echolalia, simply echo-
ing what others say. They also show a variety of other disturbances, such as
highly repetitive behavior (e.g., endlessly spinning objects ). In a minority of
cases, they engage in self-destructive behavior, such as hitting their heads,
especially when they are physically moved (Koegel & Koegel, 2006, p. 34;
Lovaas, 1973, 2003, pp. 3–7).
The cause of autism is still unknown. Because the onset is so early, most
mental health workers believe it is a product of some inborn defect, perhaps a
brain dysfunction. Bettelheim believed it is the outcome of early interactions
with the social environment, with parents or caretakers. Specifically, he
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proposed that autistic children fail to develop a sense of autonomy, a sense
they can have an effect on the environment.
In normal development, Bettelheim said, babies begin developing auton-
omy early on. When they nurse, they get the sense that it’s their actions—
their search for the nipple and their vigorous sucking—that produces the
desired result. Or when they cry and people respond, they get the sense that
their signals make a difference. But in the case of autism, the babies develop
the sense that their actions are more likely to result in indifference, anxiety, or
retaliation. As a result, the children begin to give up autonomous action. But
more than this, Bettelheim speculated, the children sense, rightly or wrongly,
that they are unwanted, that their caretakers would rather they didn’t exist,
and that any action might be the last straw that results in their destruction.
In this respect, children with autism may feel something like the prisoners
in concentration camps, for whom any action risked death. Thus the children
with autism give up assertiveness. Through a monumental act of will, they
decide to do nothing and to be nothing, or to limit their actions to the small
world they can control (for example, endlessly spinning a saucer, oblivious to
the happenings in the rest of the room).
Bettelheim was often accused of blaming autism on parents. He said this
was not his intention. Although he attributed the disorder to parent/infant
interactions, he believed innate temperamental differences between parent
and child also might play a large role. For example, a fast, hyperactive boy
might be out of tune with a slower mother, and the boy will have difficulty
finding appropriate feedback from her (Bettelheim, 1967, p. 29).
THERAPY
For a long time, autism was considered essentially untreatable. Then Bettelheim
(1967) and a few others (especially Lovaas, 1969) reported some success. In the
Orthogenic School, the treatment for all children is on a residential basis; the
children live in the school full time. When Bettelheim was its director, the school
generally housed 45 to 50 children, but it never attempted to treat more than 6
or 8 children with autism at a time (Bettelheim, 1967, p. 90; 1974, p. 5). The treat-
ment for these children usually lasted at least 5 years. Bettelheim’s therapeutic
principles emerge from his detailed descriptions of three case studies (1967).
Love and Care
A crucial part of the school’s environment, in Bettelheim’s day and today, is the
provision of a tremendous amount of love, care, and protection—a nurturance
that probably counteracts any feelings by the children with autism that others
wish their destruction. The school’s counselors are extremely devoted to the
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children, and after a while this loving care seems to register with them. For
example, Joey, a 9-year-old boy who had given up on people and had made
himself into a machine, seemed to like being bathed,
though for a long time this too was a mechanical procedure. In the tub
he rocked hard, back and forth, with the regularity of an engine and
without emotion, flooding the bathroom. If he stopped rocking, he did
that too, like a machine. . . . Only once, after months of being carried
to bed from his bath, did we catch a slight puzzled pleasure on his face
and he said, in a very low voice, “They even carry you to your bed
here.” This was the first time we heard him use a personal pronoun.
(Bettelheim, 1967, p. 255)
Autonomy
Apart from this care, though, there is a sense in which Bettelheim believed
the staff cannot do things for children with autism—for the most important
thing that the children must develop is autonomy, and if autonomy is to be
genuine, the children must gain it on their own. All the staff can do is cre-
ate the right conditions of love and respect for the children and then hope
the children will begin to trust them sufficiently to take the first steps on
their own.
The way in which love and care set the stage for autonomous action is
illustrated by an incident with Laurie, a girl who came to the school at the
age of 7 years. Although Laurie was pretty and well dressed, she was com-
pletely inert and withdrawn. She had not uttered a word in more than 4 years.
She also ate and drank very little and for months had kept her mouth slightly
open, which parched her lips. Laurie’s counselor tried to
wet her lips and also to oil them, to make her more comfortable. Her
counselor rubbed her lips softly, and then gently put a finger in her mouth
and on her tongue. . . . At first Laurie barely reacted, but later she seemed
to like it, and for an instant she touched the finger with her tongue, may
even have licked it for a moment. (Bettelheim, 1967, p. 100)
Thus the counselor’s loving care seemed to inspire Laurie to take a small, but
spontaneous, initial action on her own.
Usually the children’s first efforts at self-assertion occurred around the
issue of elimination, which is what happened, for example, in the case of
Marcia. When Marcia came to the school at the age of years, she was
completely unresponsive to people or objects, and she spoke only in single
words that had some personal meaning to her alone. A central problem in her
life was her constipation; she had stopped moving her bowels on her own
after her mother had begun training her at age 2. Since then, her parents had
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A Case Study in Psychoanalytic Treatment
given her repeated enemas, an experience which, her doll play later revealed,
represented for her the feeling of being completely overpowered by huge
adults. The staff’s attitude toward her constipation illustrates the importance
they put on the concept of autonomy. Bettelheim wrote,
From the moment Marcia came we were convinced that if we were to
force her to do anything, to give anything up, we could never help her
out of her isolation. Nothing seemed more important than her acquir-
ing the feeling that she was at least in charge of her own body. So from
the beginning we assured her that we would not force her to move her
bowels, that at the school she would never be given enemas, or any lax-
atives, and that in regard to elimination she could do as she wished.
(1967, p. 70)
She did not have to defecate in the toilet, “but could do it wherever and when-
ever it was easiest for her” (1967, p. 172). Soon Marcia began to soil, and the
first place she defecated with any regularity was in the bathtub, the place
where she seemed to feel the most relaxed and comfortable. After defecating
in the tub, she frequently played with her stools. “After about a year and again
in her own good time—though we occasionally made tentative suggestions—
she began to eliminate in the toilet” (1967, p. 172).
The children’s progress continued when they made initial attempts to
relate to others. After a year at the school, Marcia invited her counselor Inge
to play a chasing game, exclaiming, “Chase!” However, Inge always had to
maintain a certain distance, and Marcia never chased Inge in turn. Bettelheim
speculated that through this game, in which Marcia was never caught, she
was trying to master her feelings of being overpowered by adults. That is,
she may have been trying to establish “through thousands of repetitions of the
game that never again would anyone get hold of her and overpower the now
barely emerging ‘me’” (1967, p. 179). Thus Bettelheim interpreted Marcia’s
initial attempts to relate to others in terms of her need to establish autonomy.
The counselors respected her wishes and always played the game on her own
terms. Their attitude, in turn, seemed to win Marcia’s trust to the point where
she then tried new ways of relating to them.
The three cases suggest, finally, that progress in relating gave the children
the courage to begin a new phase: Through symbolic play, they attempted to
reexperience and master conflicts at the earliest developmental stage, the oral
stage. For Marcia, it took some time before she could engage in purely oral
play. For days, she repeatedly forced water in and out of a baby doll’s mouth
and rectum in exactly the same manner. Apparently, she first had to free her-
self of the death grip that enemas had on her total experience before she could
work on feeding as a separate function (1967, p. 208). Finally, she separated the
two activities by performing them in different rooms. When, however, her
play did take on distinctively oral themes, she revealed that orality was fraught
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A Case Study in Psychoanalytic Treatment
with its own grave dangers, as when, for example, she viciously beat a toy
dog for daring to drink some milk (p. 224). Marcia seemed to believe oral
intake was bad and could bring about the severest retaliation. Gradually,
though, she was able to experiment with pleasurable ways of drinking in doll
play and even to enjoy drinking itself.
The course of therapy, it should be noted, was not something Bettelheim
determined beforehand. The children took the lead in acting and exploring
their problems, and the staff supported them the best it could. This was often
difficult. Marcia’s water play, for example, flooded the floors and required
enormous work mopping up. But the staff members usually tolerated such
behavior, for the children were trying to master their experience (pp. 204, 217).
Marcia eventually made a partial recovery. After 5 years in the school,
she was talking to others and seemed capable of the full range of emotional
expression. Her intellectual abilities, however, lagged behind; she was only
reading at the fourth-grade level. Perhaps she had entered the school at too
late an age ( years) to permit a full recovery. Still, when she returned
home, after 7 years in the school, she was able to take care of herself and per-
form useful tasks. More importantly, she was no longer the frozen child she
once had been.
Attitude toward Symptoms
One of the most radical aspects of Bettelheim’s philosophy was his attitude
toward symptoms. For most mental health workers, symptoms (e.g., self-
stimulation and peculiar gestures) are to be directly eliminated, or, at best,
tolerated. Bettelheim, however, pointed out that the symptoms are what the
children have spontaneously developed to gain some relief from, and even
some mastery over, their tensions. They represent the child’s greatest spon-
taneous achievement to date. Accordingly, they deserve our respect. If,
instead, we disparage the symptoms—if, for example, we encourage the child
to drop them—we cannot convey our respect for the child, either (Bettelheim,
1967, p. 169).
The staff’s attitude toward symptoms is illustrated by its approach to
Marcia’s behavior in the dining room. When Marcia first came to the school,
she ate only candy, and in the dining room she plugged her ears with her fore-
fingers and her nose with her little fingers, apparently to protect herself from
something dangerous in the situation. This habit made it impossible for her
to eat with her hands. The staff thought about telling her it was OK to unplug
her ears and nose, but they realized this communication would fall woefully
short; for if it were OK for her to unplug them she would do it herself. Simi-
larly, they did not feel that an offer to feed her themselves would convince
her they understood her plight; if she could trust anyone to feed her, she would
not need to plug herself up.
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Our solution was to offer to plug the ears for her; then she could have
some fingers free to eat with. Hearing our offer, Marcia promptly
plugged her nose with her forefingers and with her other fingers brought
food to her mouth by bending as close to the plate as she could—a per-
formance that astonished both the other children and all adults present.
(1967, pp. 169–170)
Many professionals would consider the staff’s approach completely wrong;
what they did was reinforce the psychotic behavior. However, they were try-
ing to show a respect for the child’s own devices for handling frightening
feelings.
Sometimes the autistic symptoms included self-destructive behavior;
the children tried to hurt and damage themselves. In these cases, the staff did
step in; they had to protect the children (e.g., 1967, p. 268). However, other
symptoms were respected as far as possible, for they were the children’s
autonomous constructions.
Phenomenology
Bettelheim’s work has a phenomenological orientation. As a philosophy, phe-
nomenology is exceedingly complex, but in psychology it generally means
suspending our preconception that others think in some customary way and
trying to enter into the other’s unique world from the inside. It means putting
oneself in the other’s shoes (Ellenberger, 1958).
The school’s phenomenological approach is illustrated by the attitude
toward Marcia’s plugging of her ears and nose. Although the staff members
knew it was OK for Marcia to unplug herself, they guessed this was not
Marcia’s experience. Thus they tried to see the world in terms of Marcia’s
unique inner experience and to act accordingly.
Bettelheim said that children with autism will never leave their defen-
sive positions as long as adults are simply interested in getting them to see the
world as they (adults) see it.
This is exactly what the psychotic child cannot do. Instead, our
task . . . is to create for him a world that is totally different from the one
he abandoned in despair, and moreover a world he can enter right now,
as he is. This means, above all, that he must feel we are with him in his
private world and not that he is once more repeating the experience
that “everyone wants me to come out of my world and enter his.”
(1967, p. 10)
The phenomenological task is especially difficult in the case of children
with autism for two reasons. First, because we have become fairly well
adjusted to the external world, we have difficulty understanding the horror
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with which the autistic child regards it. Second, these children in many ways
have never transcended the experiential modalities of the infant—modalities
that are largely preverbal and foreign to us as adults.
Summary
In Bettelheim’s view, then, therapy should include (1) a great deal of love and
care for the children with autism, which (2) enables them to trust others to
the point where they will dare to take steps toward autonomous action.
Bettelheim also believed (3) that the children will make progress only if they
are given full respect as human beings, including respect for their symptoms
as their greatest efforts to date to relieve their suffering. Finally (4), they will
move out of the autistic position only if the staff somehow communicates to
them that it does not simply want them to enter its own world, but that it is
trying to understand the children’s own unique experience.
EVALUATION
Bettelheim tried to evaluate the school’s success with 40 of the children with
autism that the school treated up to 1967 (Bettelheim, 1967, pp. 414–416). He
believed the school had good success with four fifths of these children. That
is, about this number were able to make a decent adjustment to society, includ-
ing meaningful relationships with others. Of these, about half, for all intents
and purposes, were cured; although they sometimes showed some personal-
ity quirks, they were doing well in their studies or were earning a living on
their own. It is difficult to evaluate such statistics, however, because there are
no reports on the reliability of these judgments. We do not know, that is, if
neutral observers would have agreed with Bettelheim’s assessments. Never-
theless, Bettelheim’s case reports and films indicate that the children did make
substantial progress, so we can have some confidence in his impressions.
Bettelheim’s success is, for our purposes, important because his school
took a decidedly developmental approach. Unlike most mental health insti-
tutions, the school did not actively try to change the children’s behavior. The
staff was, in a sense, more passive. It assumed that if it established the right
conditions of love and care, the children would begin to take the steps toward
health on their own. The staff allowed the children to take the lead. Bettel-
heim’s school, working in the developmental tradition, had faith that even in
these very disturbed children there were inner forces toward growth and
autonomy that would emerge in the right environment.
Rousseau, Gesell, and other developmentalists distinguish between
autonomous growth and socialization. If we actively try to change children’s
behavior, we usually become socializers. We adopt socially appropriate
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behavior as our goal and try to teach children accordingly. The behaviorist
Lovaas (1973, 1987), for example, tries to reinforce socially appropriate behav-
ior, such as language, while eliminating socially inappropriate behavior, such
as peculiar psychotic gestures. Bettelheim, in contrast, put such a high pre-
mium on autonomous development that he frequently tolerated socially
“deviant” acts. We saw how he respected many psychotic symptoms, for
they are the child’s autonomous creations. We also saw how the staff per-
mitted Marcia to move her bowels in the bathtub and to flood the floors. It did
so because she was taking steps on her own and exploring her problems.
Bettelheim said that “too often children’s progress is viewed not in terms of
a move toward autonomy but of the convenience of a society that cares less
about autonomy than conformity, and of parents who prefer not to clean their
children’s underclothes, no matter what” (1967, p. 294). The real question,
he says, is “when, and for what gains, we ought to strip away social adjust-
ment for the sake of personal development” (p. 293).
I have implied that Bettelheim’s approach differs not only from the
behaviorists’ but from that of most mental health workers. At the same time,
a number of child psychoanalysts would substantially agree with his
approach. Most child analysts, of course, work with less disturbed children
and therefore do not need to become active caretakers. Nevertheless, they
often share Bettelheim’s developmentalist orientation. That is, they do not
try to get children to behave in the “correct” ways, but they try to create a
climate of acceptance and understanding that will enable children to take
the initiative in exploring their problems.
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Schachtel on Childhood
Experiences
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
Freud, Erikson, Mahler, and Bettelheim share the developmentalist
concern for how growth might occur from inner forces, from the organ-
ism itself. They also share the developmentalist view that thought and
behavior are qualitatively different at different stages. A writer who
provided special insights into the unique qualities of early experiences
was Ernest Schachtel.
Ernest Schachtel (1903–1975) was born and grew up in Berlin. His
father wanted him to become a lawyer, which he did, even though he
was more interested in philosophy, sociology, and literature. Schachtel
practiced law for 8 years until 1933, when the Nazis had him jailed and
then sent to a concentration camp. After his release he worked on fam-
ily research in England and Switzerland and then in 1935 came to
New York, where he received psychoanalytic training. Schachtel worked
as a psychoanalyst the rest of his life, with a special interest in Rorschach
(inkblot) testing. However, Schachtel was always something of a
maverick among psychoanalysts, a man with his own ideas on devel-
opment (Wilner, 1975).
BASIC CONCEPTS
Schachtel was most specifically interested in the problem of infantile
amnesia, our inability to remember most of the personal events of our
first 5 or 6 years of life. We can, to be sure, remember words and
common objects. What’s missing is our autobiographical memory, our
memories for our personal experiences (Schachtel, 1959, p. 286). This
curious memory gap was first noted by Freud, who pointed out that as
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
infants we had many intense experiences—loves, fears, angers, jealousies—
and yet our recall for them is very fragmentary. Freud’s explanation was that
this amnesia is the product of repression. Early sexual and aggressive feel-
ings became linked to shame, disgust, and loathing, and therefore were
repressed into the unconscious (Freud, 1905, pp. 581–583).
Schachtel believed Freud was partly right, but he pointed out two prob-
lems with the repression hypothesis. First, childhood amnesia is quite
pervasive; we forget not only the sexual and hostile feelings that we might
have had cause to repress, but almost all the rest of our personal experiences
as well. Second, even psychoanalytic patients, who sometimes can get
beneath the repression barrier, are still unable to remember much of their first
few years. So childhood amnesia must have an additional source (Schachtel,
1959, p. 285).
Schachtel suggested that childhood amnesia primarily has to do with
perceptual modes of experience. Most adult experience and memory is based on
verbal categories. We look at a painting and say to ourselves, “That is a picture
by Picasso,” and this is how we remember what we have seen (see Slobin, 1979,
pp. 155–156). Childhood experience, in contrast, is largely preverbal. It is, as
Rousseau said, more directly based on the senses. As a result, it cannot be
tagged, labeled—and later recalled—through verbal codes, and it is therefore
lost to us as we grow up.
Schachtel divided childhood experience into two stages: infancy and
early childhood. Let us look at the modes of perception during these two
stages and compare them with the orientations of the adult.
Infancy (birth to 1 year)
In infancy we rely on certain senses in particular. One vital sense is taste.
Babies, who take many things into their mouths, have more taste buds than
adults do and probably can make rather fine discriminations through this
modality (Schachtel, 1959, pp. 138, 300). Babies also experience objects and
people by their smells. Since babies are often held, they probably have
greater exposure to others’ odors than adults do, and they frequently rec-
ognize an object such as a blanket or a shirt by its odor (p. 138). Infants,
Schachtel said, know what the mother tastes and smells like long before
they know what she looks like. They probably can tell when she is tense or
calm through these senses (p. 299). Babies are also very sensitive to touch
and react, for example, to the state of the mother as revealed by her relaxed
or tense hold. Babies, finally, react sensitively to temperature through the
thermal sense (p. 92).
Schachtel called these senses autocentric—the sensations are felt in the
body. When we taste or smell food, our sensations are felt in the mouth or in
the nostrils. Similarly, the experiences of hot and cold, and of being held and
touched, are felt in or on the body. The autocentric senses are distinguished
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Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
from the predominantly allocentric senses—hearing and especially sight. When
we use these sensory modalities, our attention is directed to the outside.
When we look at a tree, we usually focus outward, on the object itself (1959,
pp. 81–84, 96–115).
The autocentric senses are intimately bound up with feelings of pleasure
and unpleasure, of comfort and discomfort. Good food, for example, produces
a feeling of pleasure; rancid food produces disgust. The allocentric senses, in
contrast, are usually more neutral. We experience no keen pleasure or disgust,
for instance, in looking at a tree. The baby’s predominantly autocentric expe-
rience, then, is tied to the pleasure principle, as Freud said.
Adult memory categories—which are predominantly verbal—are poorly
suited for the recall of autocentric experience. We have a fair number of words
for describing what we see but very few for describing what we smell, taste,
or feel. “A wine,” for example, “is said to be dry, sweet, robust, fine, full, and
so on, but none of these words enables one to imagine the flavor and bouquet
of the wine” (1959, pp. 298–299). Poets can sometimes create vivid images of
visual scenes, but they are unable to do so with respect to smells and tastes.
The world of the infant, then, which is so much a world of smells, tastes, and
bodily sensations, is not subject to verbal codes and recall.
Schachtel called special attention to the sense of smell. Western cultures
practically outlaw discriminations based on this sense. If, upon being intro-
duced to a man, I were to go up and sniff him, I would be considered
extremely uncouth (although it is perfectly acceptable to inspect him visually
at a distance). In English, to say “He smells” is synonymous with saying “He
smells bad.” We do, of course, use perfumes and are aware of some fra-
grances, but on the whole our discriminations based on this sense are very
limited.
Schachtel said the taboo on smell is probably related to the fact that odor
is the primary quality of fecal matter. Babies seem to enjoy the smell of their
feces, but socializing agents teach them otherwise. The result is that children
repress specific anal experiences. But it is more than this. Children quit mak-
ing fine discriminations based on this sense altogether. Consequently, their
early experiences are lost, for they do not fit into the accepted categories of
experience (Schachtel, 1959, pp. 298–300).
Early Childhood (1 to 5 years)
During infancy we do not generally welcome changes in internal or external
stimulation. Sudden changes—such as sharp hunger pains, shivering cold, or
the loss of bodily support—can be quite threatening. The infant would like to
remain embedded in a warm, peaceful, protective environment, much like
the womb (Schachtel, 1959, pp. 26, 44–68).
At about 1 year of age, however, the child’s basic orientation undergoes
a change. Children become relatively less concerned about their security; under
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maturational urging, they take a much more active and persistent interest in
new things. To some extent they still rely on the autocentric senses, as when
they put objects into their mouths. But they now increasingly utilize the pure
allocentric senses—hearing and especially sight. They examine and explore
new objects by looking at them.
The young child’s attitude is one of openness to the world. The child
has the capacity to take everything in, no matter how small or insignificant
to us, in a fresh, naive, and spellbound manner. A little girl, coming across
an insect, will stop and examine it intently. To her, the insect is full of new
and fascinating possibilities. She perceives each new object with a sense of
wonder and awe.
This openness contrasts markedly with the predominant attitude of
adults. Most adults simply label objects—for example, “That is an ant”—and
then go on to something else. Adults use the same allocentric senses—sight
and hearing—but not in a fully allocentric way, not with an openness to things
themselves. As adults, our greatest need is not to explore the world in all its
richness but to reassure ourselves that everything is familiar, as accustomed
and expected.
It is not easy to understand why adults are in such a hurry to name,
label, and classify things, but the answer probably has to do with the process
of socialization. As children grow up, they find that grownups and peers
have standard, conventional ways of describing the world, and the pressure
is great to adopt them. The older child and the adult become afraid of
looking at things in any way that might be different from others. There is
always the threat of feeling odd, ignorant, or alone. Just as infants need the
security of caretakers, adults need the security of belonging and conform-
ing to their cultural group. Consequently, they come to see what others see,
to feel what everyone feels, and to refer to all experiences with the same
clichés (Schachtel, 1959, pp. 204–206, 176–177). They then think they know
all the answers, but they really only know their way around the conven-
tional pattern, in which everything is familiar and nothing a cause for
wonder (p. 292).
What the adult becomes capable of remembering, then, is that which fits
into conventional categories. For example, when we take a trip, we see all the
sights we are supposed to see, so we can be sure to remember exactly what
everybody else remembers, too. We can tell our friends that we saw the Grand
Canyon, that we stopped at six IHOP restaurants, and that the desert looked
beautiful at sunset (just like in the postcards). We cannot, however, give any
real idea of what the country was like. The trip has become a mere collection
of clichés (p. 288).
Similarly, our journey through life is remembered in terms of conven-
tional signposts. A man can tell us about his birthdays, his wedding day, his
jobs, the number of children he had and their positions in life, and the recog-
nitions he received. But he will be unable to tell us about the truly special
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Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
qualities of his wife, of his job, or of his children, for to do so would mean
opening himself to experiences that transcend the conventional categories of
perception (p. 299).
Among adults, Schachtel said, it is primarily the sensitive poet and
artist who have retained the young child’s capacity to view the world
freshly, vividly, and openly. Only they still experience things with the young
child’s sense of wonder at watching an insect walk; at the way a ball
squeezes, bounces, and responds to the hand; or at the way water feels and
looks as it is poured. For most of us, unfortunately, “the age of discovery,
early childhood, is buried deep under the age of routine familiarity, adult-
hood” (p. 294).
In summary, then, neither the autocentric experiences of the infant nor
the allocentric experiences of the young child fit into the adult’s way of cate-
gorizing and remembering events. The infant’s world of tastes, smells, and
touch, as well as the young child’s fresh and open experience of things in all
their fullness, are foreign to the adult and not subject to recall.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Most of Schachtel’s thoughts on child rearing and education concerned the
child as he or she begins actively to explore the world. Schachtel wanted us
to preserve and encourage the young child’s bold curiosity. Unfortunately,
we usually stifle it.
For example, when babies begin to handle and examine everything they
see, parents often become overly anxious. Parents, as Montessori observed, are
afraid their children are acting too rough, that they might break things or hurt
themselves. Actually, it is usually simple enough to childproof a house—to
remove all breakable and dangerous objects—and then permit the child to
explore. Nevertheless, parents often become anxious at this point, and the result
is that children learn it’s dangerous to become too curious about the world
(Schachtel, 1959, p. 154).
Adults may also discourage children’s curiosity by the way they name,
label, and explain things to children. For example, when a child becomes
curious about something, the adult often simply tells the child the object’s
name, implying there is nothing more to know about it (p. 187). If a little girl
shouts, “Da!” and points excitedly at a dog, the father says, “Yes, that’s a
dog,” and then urges her to continue on with their walk. He teaches her that
the conventional category—the word—“explains” the object. Instead, he
might say, “Yes, that’s a dog!” and stop and observe it with her. In this way,
he respects and encourages her active interest in the world.
Schachtel, on the whole, told us more about how parents, teachers, and
peers stifle the child’s curiosity than how we might protect and encourage it.
Like Rousseau, he implied that the most important thing is to avoid negative
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Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
influences. If we can lessen our tendency to close off their world, children
themselves will take an open, active interest in it, from their own spontaneous
tendencies.
EVALUATION
Freud thought that the great tragedy of life is that in order for us to live in
society, we repress so much of ourselves. Freud had in mind the repression
of instinctual drives. Erikson elaborated on this theme, suggesting that pos-
itive potentials for autonomy, initiative, and other strengths usually become
somewhat curtailed in the course of socialization. Schachtel’s contribution
is an enlarged conception of just how much we do lose. It is not just that we
repress our drives, or even that ego strengths such as autonomy are restricted,
but that we lose touch with entire modes of experience. The baby who is in
direct contact with objects through the senses of smell, taste, and touch and
the child who is openly curious about the world grow into well-socialized
adults who view the world through very narrow, verbal, conventional
schemes.
Schachtel called special attention to infantile amnesia, the adult’s inabil-
ity to remember personal events before the age of 5 or 6 years. The primary
reason for this memory gap, Schachtel said, is that adults rely on conventional
verbal categories that cannot capture the rich nonverbal experiences of the
early years.
Schachtel didn’t cite empirical research demonstrating the existence of
infantile amnesia. At the time he wrote, little such-research existed. But since
the 1980s, many psychologists have examined the topic.
Investigators have consistently found that adults in Western societies
rarely remember any personal experiences before the age of 3 years. The aver-
age age of the earliest memory is . In addition, adults recall significantly
fewer experiences before the age of 5 than one would expect simply because
of the passage of time (Pillemer & White, 1989; Pillemer, Picariello, & Pruett,
1994). Hayne and MacDonald (2003) recorded early memories among the
Maori, the indigenous people of New Zealand, who place a great value on
telling stories about the past. The average age of the Maori adults’ first mem-
ories was slightly earlier—just under 3 years, compared to in the West. All
in all, the evidence indicates that infantile amnesia certainly exists, although
the ages for completely forgotten experiences are generally earlier than
Schachtel suggested.
As psychologists discuss explanations of infantile amnesia, they typically
mention Schachtel in a rather cursory manner. However, the most common
explanation is in agreement with Schachtel’s ideas. Briefly put, the expla-
nation is this. Very young children—under the age of 2 years—are capable
of remembering things. They can imitate events after time delays. But young
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Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
children are best at reproducing events nonverbally, through their physical
actions. Even at the age of 4 years, their verbal recall lags behind (Simcock
& Hayne, 2003). It appears, then, that in order to preserve memories, chil-
dren must learn to put their experiences into linguistic forms, especially the
forms their various cultures value. Then children can readily share their
memories with others, thereby strengthening the memories in their minds
and rendering the memories more accessible to them as adults (Flavell et al.,
2002; Nelson, 2003; Wang, 2004).
Many psychologists also believe that parents help children put expe-
riences into words by providing what Vygotskians call scaffolding. That is,
the parents at first provide a good deal of assistance, helping their children
describe what happened. This assistance serves as a kind of scaffold until
the child can engage in verbal recall on her own (Flavell et al., 2002;
Nelson, 2003).
This, then, is a prevalent interpretation of childhood amnesia, and it
accords fairly well with Schachtel’s views. He, too, believed that societies
teach children to put their experiences into verbal categories, which is why
their early, nonverbal experiences are not preserved. (Schachtel didn’t write
about the method of scaffolding, but I’m sure he would have agreed that this
is a way parents teach children to use verbal categories.)
But while there is broad agreement on what occurs, there is sharp dis-
agreement on the benefits of the process.To my knowledge, every contem-
porary psychologist who has written on the child’s increasing reliance on
verbal recall has viewed it in a purely positive light. Schachtel did not. Let
us look at an example from the research of Reese and Fivush (1993), in
which a mother helps her 3-year-old son, Michael, remember a visit to the
aquarium.
Parent: Did we see any big fishes? What kind of big fishes?
Child: Big, big, big.
Parent: And what’s their names?
Child: I don’t know.
Parent: You remember the names of the fishes. What we called them.
Michael’s favorite kind of fish. Big mean ugly fish.
Child: Yeah.
Parent: What kind is it?
Child: Um, ba.
Parent: A ssshark?
Child: Yeah.
Parent: Remember the sharks?
Child: Yeah.
Parent: Do you? What else did we see in the big tank at the aquarium?
Child: I don’t know.
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Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
Parent: Remember when we first came in . . . the aquarium? And we
looked down and there were a whole bunch of birdies in the
water? Remember the names of the birdies?
Child: Ducks!
Parent: Nooo! They weren’t ducks. They had on little suits. Penguins.
Remember, what did the penguins do?
Child: I don’t know.
Parent: You don’t remember?
Child: No.
Parent: Remember them jumping off the rocks and swimming in the
water?
Child: Yeah.
Parent: Real fast. You were watching them jump in the water, hm.
Child: Yeah. (p. 606)
Flavell, Miller, and Miller have reprinted this dialogue in their influen-
tial book Cognitive Development (2002, pp. 241–242) to illustrate how scaffold-
ing promotes recall. But from Schachtel’s perspective, the mother also is
teaching Michael that his own experience matters less than labels. For
example, when Michael gives his enthusiastic impression of the sharks—“Big,
big, big”—she replies, “And what’s their names?” Also, because Michael
doesn’t himself come up with the name “shark,” the mother even doubts he
remembers them:
Parent: Remember the sharks?
Child: Yeah.
Parent: Do you? . . .
If Schachtel was correct, the mother’s emphasis on words and labels is shared
by Western society as a whole—but at a great cost. The sensual, nonverbal
realm of experience is drowned out. Schachtel said that conventional verbal
labels protect us from the “precarious and lonely struggle with the unknown”
(1959, p. 192). He urged us to dare to transcend linguistic categories and
encounter the world in all its mystery. This is the world in which young
children reside.
Although Schachtel wrote less than the other theorists in this book, his
work is especially important in another way. He demonstrated the value of the
phenomenological approach to childhood. He provided glimpses of how the
infant’s world might appear from the inside, to the infant herself, and how her
experience might differ from ours because different senses are dominant. The
phenomenological approach deserves wider application in developmental
psychology.
At the same time, Schachtel’s work suffered from oversimplification.
In particular, he gave a somewhat one-sided picture of language. Although
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Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
conventional words and labels restrict experience, language also can be
creative.
Still, Schachtel did much to keep us mindful of the value of the radical
Rousseau-like way of thinking. He pointed out how very different the child’s
world is from ours and how much human potential for fresh, creative expe-
rience may be lost in the process of becoming a well-adjusted member of the
conventional social order.
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Chomsky’s Theory of
Language Development1
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
In 1949 Montessori tried to get us to see that the child’s mastery of
language is an amazing achievement. It was not the learning of words
that impressed her, but the acquisition of grammar or syntax—a sys-
tem of rules for creating and understanding correct sentences. Gram-
matical rules are so complex and so deeply buried within spoken
language that adults are hardly aware of them, yet children somehow
unconsciously master most of them by the age of 6 years. Develop-
mental psychology must understand how this happens.
Psychologists might have agreed with Montessori, but for a long
time they were handicapped by their own ignorance of grammatical
rules and structures. They were largely limited to counting children’s
nouns and verbs. Then, in 1957, Chomsky published Syntactic Struc-
tures, in which he described some of the operations we use to form and
transform sentences. Researchers then had an idea of the kinds of oper-
ations to look for in children’s speech, and the whole new field of devel-
opmental psycholinguistics emerged.
Noam Chomsky was born in 1928 in Philadelphia. Growing up, he
learned a little about linguistics from his father, a respected Hebrew
scholar. Chomsky attended a progressive school run by Temple Uni-
versity, which he describes (2003) as a wonderful place that promoted
creative activities. Because the school eschewed grades and competi-
tion, Chomsky didn’t even know he was a good student until high
school. At the age of 16 he entered the University of Pennsylvania, full
of anticipation, but found himself so bored that he was ready to drop out
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
1This chapter was written in collaboration with Stephen Crain.
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
351

Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
after two years. Fortunately, the linguist Zellig Harris invited Chomsky to take
his graduate course and to explore other fields. Chomsky earned both his B.A.
and Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, although he spent several grad-
uate school years in a special program at Harvard University that permitted
him to work on whatever he wanted. Chomsky’s new theory, a combination
of mathematics and linguistics, was so different from anything that had been
done before that the universities had no place for him within their traditional
departments. His only job offer came from the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT), where he has been since 1955 (Chomsky, 1977, p. 80).
Chomsky is not only a linguist; he is also an expert on foreign affairs. He
was one of the first intellectuals to speak out against the U.S. war in Vietnam,
and he opposed American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Many of his academic colleagues disagree with his radical politics, but they
almost unanimously recognize his accomplishments as a linguist. He has been
awarded numerous honorary doctorate degrees and is widely considered one
of the great minds of our time.
BASIC CONCEPTS
The Importance of Rules
Prior to Chomsky, most people probably believed what Roger Brown called
the “storage bin” theory of language learning. Children imitate others and
acquire a large number of sentences they store in their heads. They then
reach in for the appropriate sentence when the occasion arises (Brown &
Herrnstein, 1975, p. 444).
Chomsky has shown this view is incorrect. We do not simply learn a set
number of sentences, for we routinely create new ones. As I write this book,
I use the same words over and over, but I create a novel sentence practically
every time. We all do the same thing when we speak or write. We can do this
because we have internal rules that enable us to decide which sentences are
grammatical and convey our intended meanings. If we could use only sen-
tences that we had already heard and memorized, our language would be
severely limited. Because we have a system of rules—a grammar—we can
invent and understand sentences we have never heard before (Chomsky,
1959, p. 56).
The Child’s Remarkable Grasp of Rules
Chomsky has focused on the rules for making transformations, as when we
transform a statement into a question. For example, we might turn the sen-
tence “The dog bit the lady” into the question “Did the dog bite the lady?”
Chomsky has shown that the rules for making transformations can be quite
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
complex, and he therefore considers it remarkable that they are routinely
mastered by children.
Chomsky himself has observed children only informally. However, we
can illustrate the child’s linguistic capacities with some findings by Roger
Brown (1973), whom Chomsky inspired. Brown unobtrusively tape-recorded
a few children’s spontaneous speech over a number of years and found,
among other things, how they begin making a transformation called tag
questions. Here are some tag questions produced by a boy called Adam (see
Figure 1) one day when he was years old.
Ursula’s my sister, isn’t she?
I made a mistake, didn’t I?
Diandros and me are working, aren’t we?
He can’t beat me, can he?
He doesn’t know what to do, does he?
The “tags” are the little questions on the end (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975,
p. 471).
The first thing we might notice is the creative nature of Adam’s speech.
These do not seem to be sentences he has heard, but sentences he is making
up. He can create new sentences that are grammatical because he is following
rules.
Yet the rules are complex. First of all, to create the tags, Adam must
reverse the negative or affirmative statement in the first part of the sentence.
When Adam says, “I made a mistake,” an affirmative statement, the tag must
be negative, “Didn’t I?” When he begins with a negative statement, such as
“He can’t beat me,” the tag must be positive, “Can he?” Adam does this cor-
rectly every time.
Also, Adam must locate the subject of the sentence and then convert it
into the correct pronoun in the tag question. In the sentence, “Diandros and
me are working, aren’t we?,” Adam correctly sees that the subject is the noun
phrase “Diandros and me,” and he converts it into “we.”
In addition, Adam implicitly recognizes there are specific times when
one must move the auxiliary verb to the front in the question. Note, however,
that in the sentence “I made a mistake, didn’t I?,” the auxiliary “did” is not
4 1�2
FIGURE 1
Adam.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher from A First
Language: The Early Stages by Roger Brown. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1973 by the
President and Fellows of Harvard College.
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
present in the statement. So Adam creates it, following an abstract rule no one
was even aware of until Chomsky (1957) discovered it.
Thus Adam is simultaneously employing several operations, and these
are only some of them. It is truly remarkable that he can produce correct tag
questions at age , yet he is not unusual in this respect (Brown & Herrnstein,
1975, p. 471).
An interesting aspect of Adam’s verbal record is the frequency distrib-
ution of these sentences over time. Adam produced no tag questions at all
until he was and then he suddenly burst out with them. In one hour he
created 32 such questions, whereas the average adult frequency is 3 to 6. His
behavior is reminiscent of Piaget’s circular reactions and Montessori’s repe-
titions. Children seem to have an inner need to solidify new capacities through
repeated exercise.
In any case, the development of tag questions illustrates Chomsky’s
point: Children master complex linguistic rules and procedures in a very short
time. They seem to master most of the intricacies of grammars by the age of
6 or so, and the rest by puberty. This is not to say they become consciously
aware of grammatical rules; even Chomsky is still trying to make them explicit.
But they gain a working knowledge of them on an intuitive level. They rapidly
learn the rules of their own language—and, if need be, those of a second lan-
guage as well. It is a common observation, Chomsky says, that a young child
of immigrant parents may learn a second language in the streets, from other
children, with amazing rapidity, and the child will speak the new language as
fluently as the other children (1959, p. 42).
Chomsky acknowledges that everyone’s speech, including that of adults,
contains errors, slips, false starts, and interrupted fragments. These mistakes
are caused by such factors as carelessness, fatigue, and memory lapses. These
deficits in performance, however, are far outweighed by an underlying
competence, which is best revealed by an ability to distinguish between poorly
formed and well-formed sentences (Chomsky, 1962, p. 531).
The Innateness Hypothesis
Chomsky says the linguistic accomplishments of the ordinary child are too
great to be explained in terms of any kind of input from the environment.
Children hear only a limited body of speech, much of which is poorly formed,
yet they rapidly and uniformly develop an intricate system of rules for creat-
ing an unlimited number of sentences. Their knowledge extends far beyond
their experience. One can only conclude, Chomsky says, that children do not
build grammars primarily from the evidence they hear, but according to an
inner design—a genetic program (Chomsky, 1972, p. 171; 1980, pp. 232–234).
But there is a problem. Languages vary considerably from culture to cul-
ture, and the language a child learns depends on the culture in which he or
she is raised. How, then, can an innate language-learning process be at work?
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
Chomsky’s proposal (1986, pp. 145–150) is this: When children master a
grammar, they are guided by an innate knowledge of Universal Grammar; they
automatically know the general form any language must take. But Universal
Grammar (UG) has holes in it; it leaves certain parameters open. For example,
one principle of UG is that all sentences must contain a subject, but some lan-
guages allow speakers to routinely leave the subject implicit; the speakers do
not have to voice it. In Italian one can simply say “Went” where in English one
must say “She went” (Hyams, 1986). So children need information from the
environment to set this parameter, to determine which rule their particular
language follows.2
Usually, Chomsky (1986, pp. 146–152) speculates, setting parameters is
a simple matter, like setting a switch or Furthermore, the number of
switches that a child must set might be fairly small. If so, grammar acquisition
can be quick and efficient.
It is not yet clear that this parameter-setting model actually describes
the way children learn their particular grammars. Chomsky himself is con-
stantly thinking of new models. But Chomsky is committed to the general
theory of Universal Grammar. Regardless of how children pick up the
details of their particular grammars, they must have an innate knowledge
of the general form that all languages must take. As they put words
together, they must intuitively know certain combinations are possible and
others are not. If children lacked this knowledge, if they had to learn gram-
mar primarily from experience, they could never master such a complex
system in so short a time.
The child’s capacity to learn languages, Chomsky also postulates, is
species-specific (found only in humans) and a highly specialized faculty
within the human mind. That is, it is quite unlike the faculty for learning
science, music, and so on. It has its own genetic design (Chomsky, 1980,
chap. 6; 1983, p. 37).
Innate Constraints
What, precisely, are the genetically determined aspects of language? We are a
long way from knowing for sure. We cannot have an innate knowledge of
many of the rules for creating tag questions, for these are not universal.
On a universal level, Chomsky believes we are probably disposed to
construct languages out of certain building blocks, such as nouns and verbs.
Primarily, however, Chomsky argues that our minds possess built-in
constraints that limit the rules we will even consider. As children learn
languages, these constraints tell them, in effect, “Don’t waste your time
– .+
2The idea of UG with gaps filled in by experience reminds one of the imprintinglike
process by which some species of birds learn songs. However, Chomsky has not suggested this
analogy.
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considering such-and-such rules; these are wrong.” Such constraints free the
child of the predicament of the scientific linguist, who must entertain and rule
out all conceivable grammatical systems and rules. Children already know
that grammars must be of a certain type (Chomsky, 1972, p. 113).
A major innate constraint is that all transformational rules must be
structure dependent. To get an idea of what this means, let us consider trans-
forming the following sentences into yes/no questions.
(1) The man is tall.—Is the man tall?
The book is on the table.—Is the book on the table?
I can go.—Can I go?
What is the rule for forming these questions? Chomsky says that a neu-
tral scientist, looking at these questions for the first time, would doubtlessly
infer that the rule is to read from left to right until we come across the first
verbal element (is, can, etc.) and then to move it to the front of the sentence.
We can call this Hypothesis 1, and it works almost every time with sentences
of this type. It is a simple, straightforward rule, one we would use if we were
programming a computer. But look what happens when we apply it to the
following sentence:
(2) The man who is tall is in the room.—Is the man who tall is in the
room?
The sentence is ungrammatical. Hypothesis 1 is therefore wrong, and our
scientist would be surprised.
When we correctly transform sentences, we first analyze them into
abstract phrases (e.g., the noun phrase and the verb phrase). The phrases are
called abstract because nothing marks off their boundaries; our sense of them
is intuitive. Then we locate the first verbal element (is, can, etc.) after the first
noun phrase, and it is this verbal element that we move to the front of the sen-
tence. Thus (to use a diagram suggested by Aitchison, 1976),
(1)
(2)
The man
The book
I
The man who is tall
is I tall
is I on the table
can I go
is I in the room
In this way, then, we correctly transform Sentence 2, creating the sen-
tence, “Is the man who is tall in the room?” In Chomsky’s terms, we follow a
structure-dependent rule; we do not operate on strings of single words, but
we analyze the structure of the phrases before making transformations. And
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we always keep the first noun phrase (in this case, “the man who is tall”)
intact (Chomsky, 1975, pp. 30–32).
Chomsky claims that the ordinary child, unlike our imaginary scientist,
will never even consider Hypothesis 1. This is because structure dependence
is an innate mode of organizing experience, not something derived from evi-
dence. In fact, Chomsky says, people may go through a considerable part of
their lives without hearing any evidence that would enable them to choose
between Hypothesis 1 and structure dependence, and yet the very first time
they must transform a sentence like Sentence 2 they will unhesitatingly use the
structure-dependent rule (1975, p. 32).
Several scholars (e.g., Pullum & Scholz, 2002; Tomasello, 2003, p. 288)
have challenged Chomksy’s claim. Unlike Chomsky, these scholars speculate
that children might hear numerous adult questions that resemble “Is the man
who is tall in the room?” For example, a teacher might ask children, “Is the boy
who was crying still here?” Adult questions of this kind could inform chil-
dren about the structure that the questions must take.
However researchers have found that questions of this kind are extremely
rare in the data bases of speech that children hear from adults (S. Crain &
Thornton, 2006). It’s possible that some children never hear this kind of ques-
tion before the age of 5 years. Yet a study by Stephen Crain and Mineharu
Nakayama (1987) suggests that 3- to 5-year olds consistently know that ques-
tions of this kind must be structure dependent.
In this study, 30 children questioned a doll about various matters, such
as whether “the boy who is watching Mickey Mouse is happy.” The children
sometimes had difficulty framing their questions to the doll—their questions
were sometimes awkwardly expressed—but the children always adhered to
the principle of structure dependence. They always kept the noun phrase (“the
boy who is watching Mickey Mouse”) intact. The children seemed to know
intuitively that structure dependence must be respected.3 When, moreover,
we consider the fact that all languages, so far as we know, employ only structure-
dependent rules, it begins to appear that structure dependence is indeed an
innate property of the human mind.
Structure dependence, then, is submitted as an innate constraint that
restricts the kinds of transformational rules children must learn. Children
growing up in different cultures will learn somewhat different transforma-
tional rules, but they will automatically know that all the rules must be struc-
ture dependent. The great task of linguistics, Chomsky believes, is to discover
what principles, such as structure dependence, set limits on the kinds of rules
we automatically follow. Such principles will tell us much about how the
mind works.
3Ambridge, Rowland, and Pine (2008) challenged these results, reporting that 3- to
7-year-olds in their own study violated structure dependence 5 percent of the time. But their
study might have contributed to the errors by tiring the children; and, in any case, a 5 percent
error rate is small.
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Surface and Deep Structure
To help understand how we transform sentences, Chomsky introduced the
concepts of deep and surface structure. The deep structure is the basic struc-
ture on which we perform various operations to create new sentences.
Consider the following sentences:
(3) Susan ate the apple.
(4) The apple was eaten by Susan.
(5) Susan did not eat the apple.
(6) What did Susan eat?
(7) Susan ate the apple, didn’t she?
Of these sentences, Sentence 3 is the most straightforward. It is a simple, active,
declarative sentence and follows a subject-verb-object word order. In English,
Sentence 3 contains the basic form of the abstract deep structure. Using Sentence
3, one could perform certain operations to generate all the other sentences. One
could not take any other sentence—say Sentence 4—and derive a clear set of
operations for creating the others (Chomsky, 1957, pp. 45, 91; 1965, pp. 138–141).
When Chomsky introduced the term deep structure, he created a good deal
of confusion. The word deep conjures up images of an underlying universal
grammar. But deep structure is not universal, largely because languages differ
with respect to the word order they treat as basic. Some languages, such as Eng-
lish, treat the subject-verb-object (SVO) word order as basic and use it for per-
forming transformations. Other languages use other word orders. For example,
Japanese uses SOV. To avoid confusion, Chomsky has tried replacing deep and
surface structure with different terms. He has even considered abandoning the
concepts altogether. But many linguists consider the concepts very useful.
NOTES ON THE GROWTH OF GRAMMAR
As indicated, Chomsky has not himself studied children, and his views on
development are rather vague and inconsistent. In general, he suggests we
begin with the assumption that development is “instantaneous,” that chil-
dren instantly develop the grammatical structures of the adult. But this is just
an initial working assumption—a way to get research started. For Chomsky
also realizes that grammatical capacities, like any biological system, do
mature and may even undergo qualitatively different stages (Chomsky, 1972,
pp. 88–90; 1975, pp. 119–123).
In any case, Chomsky’s work has inspired many researchers—
psycholinguists—to study children’s language development in great detail.
The following notes summarize some of the main findings.4
4This summary follows a phase sequence suggested by Cairns and Cairns, 1976, pp. 193–197.
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
Early Language
Right at birth, babies are tuned in to language. Careful film analyses suggest
that they make very slight body movements in response to speech, and their
movements vary with the boundaries of sounds and words (Condon & Sander,
1974). Newborns are also very sensitive to the rhythms and pitches of speech
(Fogel, 2009, p. 242).
At about 1 month of age, babies begin gurgling and cooing, and by
6 months or so they are usually making babbling sounds such as “ba ba ba”
and “da da da” (Sachs, 1976). They like to play with such sounds, and their
babbling often has a musical quality, too (Crain, 2003, p. 92).
One-Word Utterances
At about 1 year, babies begin producing single words. Some researchers
believe they are trying to use single words to express entire sentences. For
example, “cookie” might mean “I want a cookie” or “There is a cookie,”
depending on the context. There is a danger, however, of reading too much
into the baby’s speech (Sachs, 1976).
Two-Word Utterances
Beginning at about years, children put two words together, and their lan-
guage takes on a definite structure. Researchers have disagreed widely, how-
ever, about how best to characterize this structure. Table 1 lists some typical
two-word utterances, as characterized by some psycholinguists.
In the table, notice how, in utterances 6 through 8, children are separat-
ing out agents, actions, and objects. Some people (e.g., McNeill, 1966) have
proposed that children possess an underlying knowledge of subject-verb-object
1 1�2
TABLE 1 Some Typical Two-Word Utterances
TYPE EXAMPLE
1. Naming that doggie
2. Repetition more jump
3. Negation allgone ball, no wet
4. Possession my truck
5. Attribution big boy
6. Agent-action Johnny hit
7. Action-object hit ball
8. Agent-object Mommy bread (meaning,“Mommy is cutting the
bread”)
Adapted from Brown and Herrnstein (1975, p. 478) and Slobin (1979, pp. 86–87).
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
relationships. This, however, is not certain. When children employ agents, they
are not necessarily using subjects. An agent is a limited semantic (word-
meaning) category; it refers to something that takes action. A subject is a
broader syntactic category that refers to parts of sentences that may or may
not be taking action (e.g., there is no action in “He is tall”). Thus researchers
who infer adult syntax in children’s speech may once again be reading too
much into it (Gardner, 1982, pp. 168–170).
Developing Grammar
Between 2 and 3 years of age, children typically begin putting three and
more words together, saying things such as “I making coffee.” Occasionally
they say things like “Eve is girl” (Brown, 1973, p. 314), now apparently using
subjects and verbs that go beyond agents and actions (Eve isn’t doing any-
thing). English-speaking children usually follow the subject-verb-object word
order, which is integral to deep structure in our language (Brown, Cazden, &
Bellugi-Klima, 1969, p. 42).
As soon as children begin putting three or more words together, they indi-
cate a sense of structure dependence—that noun phrases are whole units. They
reveal this, for example, by their pauses, as when a child says, “Put . . . the red
hat . . . on,” rather than “Put the . . . red hat . . . on.” The child knows the phrase
“the red hat” functions as a unit that is not to be broken up (Brown & Bellugi,
1964, p. 150). Later, when children begin making transformations, they will
respect the integrity of these units.
During this phase children also begin making use of word endings, and
when they do, they overregularize, saying things like “I runned,” “It goed,”
and “She doed it.” A similar process occurs with respect to plurals; children
routinely say things such as “foots,” “mans,” and “mouses” (Ervin, 1964;
Slobin, 1972).
Interestingly, children do not begin with overregularizations, but first
use correct irregular forms. For example, a child says “went” before saying
“goed.” But after a month or so children begin to overregularize word end-
ings and continue to do so well into the elementary school years (Siegler &
Alibali, 2005, p. 212).
What children seem to be doing, most psycholinguists believe, is for-
mulating rules. They discover that the rule for forming the past tense is to
add the -ed sound, which they then apply to all cases, assuming the lan-
guage is more consistent than it actually is. Similarly, they induce that the
rule for creating plurals is to add the -s sound, which they then apply across
the board.
As mentioned earlier, psycholinguists sometimes seem to be looking
for adult syntax in children’s speech. Developmentalists in the Rousseauist
tradition, in contrast, would be interested in the ways children’s speech might
be qualitatively different from that of adults. Overregularizations do give
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children’s speech a unique flavor. However, children are actually overregu-
larizing adult rules. Consequently, we would like to know if children
sometimes also formulate their own rules.
This possibility struck Klima and Bellugi (1966) when examining chil-
dren’s negatives. Initially children act as if their rule is: Put the negative in
front of the whole sentence (or after it). For example, they say, “No play that,”
“No want stand head,” and “Car go no.”
A bit later children seem to form a new rule: Put the negative after the
first noun phrase and before everything else. They say things like “He no bite
you” and “I no want envelope.”
At different stages, then, children structure negatives in their own ways.
As Klima and Bellugi (1966) say, “It has seemed to us that the language of
children has its own systematicity, and that the sentences of children are not
just an imperfect copy of those of an adult” (p. 191).
Transformations
Between about 3 and 6 years, children’s grammar rapidly becomes quite
complex; most notably, children begin making transformations. Bellugi-
Klima (1968) has studied how children form Where, What, and Why ques-
tions, which are transformations of their deep-structure representations.
For example, “Where can I put it?” is essentially a transformation of “I can
put it where.”
Children do not master the transformational operations all at once, and
they seem to go through stages somewhat like those with respect to nega-
tives. For example, they go through a period where they say things like,
“Where I can put it?” and “What he wants?” They move the why or what to
the front of the sentence, but leave the rest of the sentence alone (retaining the
subject-verb-object word order). Even when they are asked to imitate, they
commonly stick to their own way of speaking. For example,
Adult: “Adam, say what I say: Where can I put them?”
Adam: “Where I can put them?” (Slobin, 1979, p. 96)
Near Adult Grammar
Although children master most aspects of grammar by the age of 5 or 6 years,
they still need time to master some sentence constructions. For example,
English-speaking children have difficulty understanding a sentence such
as, “The doll is easy to see.” They think the doll is the one who sees, appar-
ently because of their penchant for subject-verb-object word order. Ages 5 to
10 may be important for the acquisition of the subtlest and most complex
grammatical skills (C. Chomsky, 1969).
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
Universals
As indicated, many psycholinguists believe there may be universals in the
developmental process. So far the evidence is strongest for the earliest phases.
Children everywhere probably proceed from babbling to one-word to two-word
utterances. Early babbling and two-word structures, in particular, appear
to be highly similar throughout the world (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975,
pp. 477–479; DeHart et al., 2004, p. 239).
The search for syntactic universals after the two-word phase becomes
very difficult, and the search has really just begun. Some evidence suggests
that children everywhere may initially handle negatives in the same man-
ner, and they may overregularize some parts of speech (Slobin, 1973, 1985).
By the time children are mastering transformations, they are clearly using
rules that differ somewhat from language to language. Still, there may be
universal constraints, such as structure dependence, which limit the rules
they will form.
CHOMSKY AND LEARNING THEORY
Chomsky suggests that language is something structured by children them-
selves. Hearing only a fragmentary body of speech, they nevertheless discover
its rules, guided by an innate sense of what the rules must be like. Learning the-
orists, in contrast, believe we must look to the social environment for the source
of linguistic patterning. Language, in their view, is shaped primarily by others
through operant conditioning or through modeling influences.
Operant Conditioning
The Skinnerian view of early language learning is sometimes called the
“babble-luck” theory. Babies babble away until, by luck, they hit on a sound
that resembles a word, and it is reinforced. For example, they say “da da” in
the presence of Daddy, and the parents show their approval. Gradually, par-
ents make their approval contingent upon increasingly accurate and complex
utterances.
Skinner (1957) and his followers (e.g., Lovaas, 1977) have recognized
that such meticulous shaping of each utterance would be too slow a process
to account for the rapid development of language. Accordingly, they have
pointed out that when children are taught specific linguistic behaviors, they
may rapidly generalize their learning to new situations. For example, a child
who has been taught to pluralize a word may automatically pluralize new
words without any further training. Because children generalize, they readily
produce entirely new expressions—behavior that Chomsky considers so
important.
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The principle of generalization would seem to explain overregulariza-
tions (e.g., “mans”). However, the picture is complicated because, as you may
recall, children initially emit correct irregular forms (e.g., “men”), which are
presumably reinforced. Clearer demonstrations of operant principles have
come from laboratory research, most of which has been done with children
with developmental delay or disturbed children who are behind in their
speech. Such children have been taught plurals, prepositions, and other rela-
tively simple grammatical elements, which they have rapidly generalized to
new situations (Lovaas, 1977, pp. 110–116). However, it has not yet been shown
that operant techniques can produce anything like complex grammatical trans-
formations.
Furthermore, research by Brown and Hanlon (1970) suggests that typi-
cally developing children would have great difficulty learning language on the
basis of parental conditioning, because parents are such poor language teach-
ers. These investigators found that parents correct surprisingly few ungram-
matical utterances. Instead, they concentrate on the truthfulness of their
children’s remarks. For example, when one girl, Sarah, said, “Her curl my
hair,” her mother said, “That’s right,” because that was what she was doing.
The mother ignored Sarah’s grammatical error. When, however, Sarah said,
“There’s the animal farmhouse,” a grammatically impeccable sentence, her
mother corrected her, because it was a lighthouse (p. 202). Thus it is unlikely
that Sarah learned grammar as a consequence of her parents’ effective use of
approval and disapproval.
Perhaps it is not parental approval, but some other form of feedback
that constitutes effective reinforcement. Perhaps children learn to use increas-
ingly correct grammar because parents can comprehend and respond accu-
rately to it. However, Brown and Hanlon also failed to find that well-formed
utterances met with any better understanding than poorly formed utterances.
Brown and Hanlon’s data were based on only three children, but these three
seemed to learn correct grammar despite the poorest kind of direct reinforce-
ment from their parents.
Bandura and Modeling
Bandura emphasizes the influence of models. He recognizes that modeling
does not always work through a process of exact imitation, for children pro-
duce novel utterances that they have never heard. For example, children’s
overregularizations (e.g., “mans”) cannot be exact imitations, for adults do
not talk this way.5 However, Bandura contends that modeling is still at
5It is conceivable that overregularizations are exact imitations of the speech of other chil-
dren, but it is unlikely. Overregularizations occur in all children, including 2-year-old firstborns
whose primary linguistic models are their parents (Slobin, 1979, p. 94).
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
work; the process is one of “abstract modeling.” Children imitate the rules
they hear (e.g., add the s sound to form the plural), which they imitate too
well (Bandura, 1977, p. 175).
Some laboratory research supports Bandura’s position. For example,
Whitehurst, Ironsmith, and Goldman (1974) showed that the careful model-
ing of passive sentences produced passives in children’s speech. The children
did not just copy the model’s exact words, but they picked up the general
structure of passive sentences and created new sentences of this type.
Chomsky has not commented directly on Bandura’s proposal, but we
can imagine what his response would be. In the real world, models may some-
times exemplify rules with sufficient clarity for children to infer them on this
basis. By and large, however, models present children with a limited body of
speech that is frequently degenerate. Much adult speech is full of errors, slips,
false starts, and so on. Thus, although children do pick up rules from the
speech they hear, they can do so only because they are guided by an innate
sense of what the rules are. Instead of focusing on the behavior of models,
then, we should study the processing mechanisms of the child.
A good deal of research has challenged Chomsky’s view of the quality
of speech children hear (Snow, 1979; DeHart et al., 2004, pp. 258–259).
Although speech between adults may be full of errors, adults commonly talk
to children in a very simple, clear, and grammatical fashion. Such speech is
called child-directed speech or motherese and is illustrated by the following early
record of it (Brown & Bellugi, 1964, p. 135):
Adam: See truck, Mommy. See truck.
Mother: Did you see the truck?
Adam: No I see truck.
Mother: No, you didn’t see it? There goes one.
Adam: There go one.
Mother: Yes, there goes one.
The mother’s speech is short, and it is perfectly grammatical. It is simple
enough for Adam to imitate, which he does at one point, saying, “There go
one.” The mother follows with an expanded imitation—“Yes, there goes one.”
That is, she imitates Adam’s sentence and expands a bit on it. Perhaps
expanded imitations gradually lead the child toward new grammatical forms.
The discovery of motherese, then, suggests that models may be far more
effective than Chomsky implies. If adults model speech in simple, clear, and
correct forms, children can learn it from them.
However, we cannot yet draw any firm conclusions about the impact of
modeling influences. For one thing, we do not yet know how important moth-
erese is. Current evidence suggests that motherese can speed up some lan-
guage acquisition a bit, but children can certainly learn language without it.
The adults in some cultures, such as the Kulali in New Guinea, do not believe
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in using simplified speech, yet their children learn language at roughly the
same rate as U.S. children (DeHart et al., 2004, pp. 258–259; Tomasello, 2003,
pp. 108–109).
Furthermore, even if simplified speech can accelerate language learn-
ing slightly, it still may be uninformative on key points. It probably doesn’t
provide children with the information they would need to know that all rules
must be structure dependent by the age they know this. This knowledge, as
Chomsky says, may be innate, a part of the mind’s natural way of organizing
linguistic experience.
There is, finally, another kind of evidence that must caution us against
placing too much emphasis on the role of modeling influences. Children some-
times create grammatical structures that are quite unlike those of adults. For
example, we noted earlier how children initially put the “no” at the begin-
ning or the end of the rest of the sentence—something that adults never exem-
plify. Adam does this in the preceding excerpt, saying, “No I see truck.” We
also saw earlier that when Adam began making transformations, he said
things like “Where I can put them?” (retaining SVO word order). Adults don’t
talk this way, but children do. For some time, Chomsky and his coworkers
(e.g., Lightfoot, 1982, p. 184) minimized the significance of children’s unique
structures, emphasizing instead the early acquisition of adult grammar. But
they have more recently begun to appreciate children’s unique structures,
which suggest that children do not just imitate adult rules but organize speech
in their own ways (see Lightfoot, 1999, p. 72).
Pidgins and Creoles
So far we have discussed the views of Chomsky and others on the acquisition
of English and traditional languages. The linguist Derek Bickerton (1984, 1999),
whose position is close to Chomsky’s, believes we can also learn a great deal
from the study of pidgins and creoles.
Sometimes adults from diverse linguistic backgrounds have been sud-
denly thrown together, as happened on slave plantations. To communicate, the
workers developed pidgins—choppy strings of words that lack most of the
qualities of true grammar. For example, pidgins lack rules for making trans-
formations. In conversations, the speakers often become confused.
A creole comes about when a population turns a native pidgin into a full,
elegant grammar. But, according to Bickerton, it’s not the adults who perform
this feat. It’s the children.
Bickerton (1984, 1999) has presented evidence on how children created
a creole in Hawaii at the turn of the 20th century. By that time, slave planta-
tions no longer existed, but adults from various countries came to Hawaii to
harvest the crops for a booming sugar industry. There, the adults created a
typically choppy pidgin. Their children heard the pidgin and turned it into an
elegant creole in a single generation.
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Bickerton points out that creoles are highly similar throughout the world.
It’s therefore reasonable to hypothesize, he says, that children create creoles
on the basis of a universal blueprint—a universal grammar. Thus linguists
who want to know what universal grammar looks like can get a good idea
from the study of creoles.
Bickerton further asserts that children everywhere speak in something
like creole grammar before they adjust to the languages they hear from adults
(such as English or Spanish). For example, when English-speaking children say
things such as “He no bite you,” they are uttering sentences that are gram-
matical in creoles and reveal a universal blueprint.
If Bickerton is right, modeling cannot explain the development of creole
grammars. The pidgins with which children must work are too degenerate
to serve as models. The Hawaiian children, Bickerton says, didn’t draw on
other adult grammars (e.g., Spanish or Korean), either.
But how can children create a full creole on the basis of a universal
grammar alone? In Chomsky’s theory, Universal Grammar would be insuf-
ficient; children need some input from the adult languages to discover key
facts, such as the language’s basic word order and the transformational rules.
In Hawaii and elsewhere, the children couldn’t obtain this information from
the pidgin. In such situations, Bickerton (1999) proposes, the universal gram-
mar frequently provides the children with default solutions. The universal
grammar says, in effect, “If you don’t hear what transformations are like, use
option A.”
Bickerton worked with historical records that are far from perfect and his
claims are controversial (Tomasello, 2003, p. 287). To many, his account is sim-
ply too amazing to believe. How can children, on the basis of an impover-
ished pidgin, create a full grammar? But such a feat need not come as a
complete surprise. Chomsky pointed out that young immigrant children
acquire a second language with amazing rapidity, off the streets and play-
grounds, while older children and adults struggle with the task. Normal lan-
guage development, too, points to a special power in children, as we saw in
our discussion of tag questions. Children’s ability to create a creole confirms
this power.
Teaching Language to Chimpanzees
Chomsky (1980, p. 239) has claimed that syntax is a uniquely human capac-
ity. However, many researchers have tried to teach animals, especially chim-
panzees, to speak. Chimpanzees do not have human vocal chords, so, beginning
in the 1960s, many researchers attempted to teach them sign language. When-
ever the chimp gave the correct sign, the experimenter gave the animal a
reward such as a toy or piece of fruit. Initially, the results seemed promising.
The chimps not only learned individual words, but spontaneously put them
together to make statements such as “Gimme tickle” and “More eat” (Gardner
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Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
& Gardner, 1969, p. 671; Terrace, Petito, Sanders, & Bever, 1979, p. 894). The
researchers were enthusiastic.
However in 1979 Herb Terrace and his coauthors made a strong case
that chimpanzees couldn’t advance farther than the two-word stage. When the
chimps put more than two words together, they merely repeated themselves.
Terrace’s critique had a devastating effect on research in this field. It suggested
that chimps cannot learn human language after all. But not everyone aban-
doned the effort.
The most eye-opening recent work is that of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh.
Savage-Rumbaugh explored new methods with a different kind of
chimpanzee—the bonobo. Bonobos, who were only recognized as a separate
species in 1929, are smaller than the common chimpanzee and they seem more
humanlike. Their walk is more upright and they have a high degree of empa-
thy with us (Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, & Taylor, 1998, pp. 4, 8).
Savage-Rumbaugh’s star pupil is a bonobo named Kanzi. Kanzi came to
Savage-Rumbaugh’s research lab in Georgia in 1980 with his mother, Matata,
when Kanzi was 6 months old. The staff’s initial focus was on Matata, whom
they tried to teach symbols on a keyboard that lit up when a symbol was
pressed. The keyboard had symbols for bananas, juice, and other objects of
interest to Matata. During her training sessions, Kanzi frequently played on
Matata’s lap, climbed on her shoulders, and performed gymnastics on her
head. Matata tolerated Kanzi’s antics and was still able to concentrate on her
learning tasks, but she didn’t have much success (Rumbaugh & Washburn,
2003, p. 129; Savage-Rumbuagh et al., 1998, pp. 3, 15–18).
Then one day, when Kanzi was years old, the center from which
Matata came decided to temporarily take her back for breeding. On the first
day of her absence, Kanzi astonished everyone by his extensive use of sym-
bols. He produced 120 different utterances using 12 different symbols. He had
been watching Matata all along and suddenly demonstrated what he had
learned.
Savage-Rumbaugh was so impressed that she decided to abandon
direct instruction with Kanzi. She asked Kanzi’s teachers to simply talk
about the things in which he expressed an interest, especially on walks in
the forest that is part of the research center. The teachers also carried a small
keyboard so they could present its symbols as they spoke, and they let Kanzi
talk back on the keyboard if he wished. But other than trying to present a
language-rich environment, they simply let Kanzi pick up language on his
own. Savage-Rumbaugh believes this is how ordinary human children learn
language (Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003, p. 131; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin,
1994, p. 177).
Kanzi’s initial use of symbols supports Bandura’s theory of observational
learning. Kanzi learned a lot by simply observing his mother. He didn’t
perform language until his mother ’s temporary absence, but he had
acquired it (illustrating Bandura’s acquisition/performance distinction).
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At the same time, Kanzi didn’t just imitate what he saw and heard. When he
began putting together two-word utterances, he sometimes departed from
standard English and created his own word-order rules (Savage-Rumbaugh
et al., 1998, p. 64).
But what’s striking about Kanzi’s language isn’t what he produces,
but what he comprehends. In production, Kanzi basically seems to use two-
word combinations; his ability to comprehend what others say is much
greater. At the age of 8 years, he showed by his actions that he understood
spoken requests such as, “Put the raisins in the shoe” as well as more com-
plicated sentences such as, “Show me the ball that’s on TV” (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1998, p. 68-71).
Kanzi even understood Savage-Rumbaugh when she said, “Kanzi, if
you give Austin [another chimp] your monster mask, I’ll let you have some
of Austin’s cereal.” Kanzi promptly got his monster mask, gave it to Austin,
and then pointed to the cereal (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994, p. 170).
Savage-Rumbaugh estimates that at age 9 Kanzi’s comprehension was
equivalent to that of a year old human child (1998, pp.67–69). Since human
children’s comprehension also outpaces their production, this is a significant
achievement. When I showed my wife Ellen a YouTube video of Savage-
Rumbaugh talking to Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh, 2007) Ellen exclaimed,
“Wow! He understands English!”
Savage-Rumbaugh acknowledges that Kanzi’s linguistic achievements
do not match those of humans, but she insists that it’s sufficient to refute
Chomsky’s claim that the capacity for syntax is unique to our species. A
bonobo can learn some of it—enough to say that there is a continuity, not a
sharp difference, between bonobo and human (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin,
1994, pp. 156, 163).
We might note, finally, that discussions of syntax in chimpanzees use
human syntax as the standard. Perhaps there will come a day when researchers
look into the possibility that nonhuman species have their own forms of
syntax—forms that may be more sophisticated than we had ever imagined.
CHOMSKY AND PIAGET
Chomsky has primarily pitted his theory against environmentalism, but he
also has discussed differences between his theory and that of Piaget. In fact,
he met with Piaget in 1975 for a series of debates (Piatelli-Palmarini, 1979).
Piaget and Chomsky, to be sure, have much in common. Both argue that
children are not molded by the external environment, but spontaneously
create mental structures. But Chomsky is much more nativistic than Piaget.
Chomsky believes that children will, when receiving rather minimal input,
automatically create grammatical forms according to the genetic design.
Piaget, in contrast, placed much less emphasis on genetically controlled
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development. In his view, cognitive structures emerge simply from the child’s
own efforts to deal with and make sense of the world.
Another difference concerns the specificity or the autonomy of language
development. For Chomsky, language is a highly specialized mental faculty
that develops fairly independently from other forms of cognition. Piaget and
his followers, in contrast, have viewed language as more closely related to
general cognitive development.
In support of his position Piaget (1983) noted that children begin using
language as symbols (to represent absent things and events) at about 2 years
of age, when they also begin using physical actions as symbols. In fact, the
child starts using physical symbols a bit earlier. For instance, Jacqueline play-
fully used a piece of cloth to represent a pillow before she added words to
her make-believe play. Thus, linguist symbols are part of the same general
symbolizing process that has its origins in physical activity.
Piagetians (e.g., Sinclair, 1971) have speculated that there are other ways
that syntax rests on cognitive achievements, but we can only take the Piaget-
ian view so far. Piaget argued that between the ages of about 2 and 6 years (the
preoperational period), thinking is basically illogical and unsystematic. Yet
this is the time when language acquisition is so rapid and impressive. The
development of language, especially syntax, seems to have its own special
time of astonishing progress. Still, it seems unlikely that research will show
that language development is as completely divorced from other cognitive
activities as Chomsky suggests.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Chomsky says that children learn an intricate grammatical system almost
entirely on their own. All they need is to hear a language spoken, and they will
master it. Thus Chomsky proposes no special instructional programs. But this
does not mean his work has no practical value. It can help change our atti-
tudes and deepen our appreciation of the child’s mind. The teacher who
considers the child’s linguistic accomplishments will realize how ridiculous
it is to focus on the child’s shortcomings. Whatever the child may lack, it is
trivial in comparison to the complex grammatical system he or she has mas-
tered. The teacher, upon meeting each new elementary school child, will think,
“This child has developed a remarkable grasp of linguistic structures. This
mind deserves my greatest respect.” One can only wonder about the effect
such an attitude would have.
Despite Chomsky’s work, many psychologists cannot accept the possi-
bility that children really learn language on their own. Instead, they believe
it is up to us to teach children a proper grammar. For example, Bandura (1977,
p. 175) implies we should correct children’s overregularizations (e.g., “We
digged the hole”). Chomsky’s work suggests otherwise. What children are
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doing is searching for underlying rules, a search that will eventually lead to
the mastery of an intricate grammar. It is wrong to interfere with this process.
By correcting children’s mistakes, we only confuse them and undermine their
confidence. Their mistakes will correct themselves in time.
Nevertheless, many psychologists and educators continue to explore
ways of facilitating and accelerating children’s speech (Berk, 2009, p. 388).
Some of these efforts include the use of expanded imitations—something
many parents naturally do. For example, we noted how one of Roger Brown’s
subjects, Adam, said, “There go one,” and his mother responded, “Yes, there
goes one.” Children then sometimes imitate their parents’ expansions. Many
parents seem naturally to talk to children in this way, and children may enjoy
such conversations. But it is not at all clear that expanded imitations can help
the acquisition of syntax in any major way (Berk, 2009, p. 388; Cole & Cole,
2001, p. 326; Dale, 1976).
Others are interested in increasing children’s vocabulary, and in this case
the results are clearer. Hart and Risley (2003) have found that when parents talk
a great deal to their babies and toddlers, the parents can boost their children’s
vocabularies at age 3 years. These gains, in turn, are associated with elevated IQ
and reading scores in elementary school. On the basis of these findings, many
authorities, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, encourage parents
to talk to their young children as much as possible (Camp, 2002).
However, this “chatty parent” movement is worrisome. As Schachtel
emphasized, young children are eager to explore their world nonverbally,
through their senses. I have often seen a young child intently absorbed in
examining an object—a leaf, a wooden toy, a puddle of water—only to have
the parent interrupt the investigation by getting the child to name it. Schachtel
noted that poets and artists try to recapture the young child’s fresh, nonver-
bal impressions. We should give children the chance to experience them.
Vocabulary enthusiasts point out that increasing the word power of low-
income children can raise their academic achievement. This is a worthy goal.
But it’s also important to keep vocabulary in perspective. Although the
average child spontaneously learns many new words a day, the child’s vocab-
ulary growth is minor in comparison to her mastery of a sophisticated and
abstract syntax. The ordinary child, whether from a low- or a high-income
neighborhood, is really a linguistic genius. Indeed, many children in low-
income neighborhoods are recent immigrants who master not one language
but two. So while it might be good to increase a child’s vocabulary, it would
be very wrong to treat the child as if she has some deficit. When it comes to
language, every child deserves our admiration.
Some educators have felt it is important to teach children with African
American dialects the standard English form. These educators have com-
monly assumed African American dialects are inferior to standard English,
which they are not (Labov, 1970). The likely outcome is that the African
American child is made to feel deficient.
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In most schools, teachers describe the parts of speech, writing the famil-
iar tree diagrams on the blackboard. Chomsky’s work suggests that children
already have an implicit grasp of almost everything the teacher is explaining
by the age of 6 years. Tree diagrams, to be sure, can make children more
conscious of their language, a point Vygotsky emphasized. Since tree diagrams
are abstract, they probably benefit children primarily after the age of 11 or 12,
when the capacity for abstract thinking begins. Before this age, tree diagrams
just baffle the child.
In general, the lesson to be gained from Chomsky’s work is this: Since
children independently master an intricate system of grammatical rules, we
should respect their independent efforts. It is presumptuous of us to try to
structure the child’s learning, and our attempts to do so are likely to lead only
to their loss of faith in their own intuitions. Although it is good to talk to chil-
dren in ways they find enjoyable, it is not necessary to do anything that under-
mines their nonverbal explorations or deprecates their immense linguistic
accomplishments.
EVALUATION
It is remarkable that Chomsky, who is more of a linguist or even a philosopher
than a psychologist, has inspired so much psychological research. This
research is a testament to the importance of his ideas.
We have focused on the descriptive studies of children’s emerging gram-
mar. Chomsky’s nativistic theory also has stimulated other lines of investi-
gation. Some researchers have been exploring the possibility that there is a
neurologically based sensitive period for language learning. Once the brain has
completed a certain degree of maturation—perhaps at the onset of puberty—
it may be difficult for children to acquire language with anything like the ease
with which they do so before this time. This may be why children seem bet-
ter able to learn some aspects of a second language more readily when they
are young. Similarly, children who are hearing impaired may more readily
learn sign language at a young age. There is some evidence that a sensitive
period for rapid language acquisition ends even prior to puberty, perhaps at
the age of 7 years. There is much to be learned about the sensitive period
hypothesis, but we can see how Chomsky’s strongly biological theory has
inspired new research (Johnson & Newport, 1989; Newport, 1990; Pinker, 1994;
Siegler & Alibalil, 2005, pp. 212–214).
The criticisms we might make of Chomsky are primarily from a devel-
opmental perspective. First, Chomsky promoted a kind of revival of prefor-
mationism. His comments on the “instantaneous” emergence of mature
grammar made it sound as if children are miniature adults as far as their
language is concerned. More recently, Chomsky’s followers have been more
sensitive to the ways that children’s speech, like their thought, might
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sometimes possess a quality of its own, but they still seem determined to
find adult structures in children’s language (see Lightfoot, 1999, p. 72;
S. Crain & Thornton, 2006).
The second developmental criticism is one Werner might make. Chomsky
contends that grammar can be studied separately from other psychological
processes. He even suggests this is the scientific way to proceed, since biolo-
gists study organs such as the heart and the lungs apart from one another
(Chomsky, 1983, p. 35). However, biologists recognize that organs and systems
differentiate out of more primitive and global configurations, and this may be
true of language as well. Early language, for example, may be difficult to clas-
sify either in terms of syntactic or action categories because these two systems
are still undifferentiated (see Hass, 1975). Indeed, at the outset, it’s not always
easy to separate the baby’s speech from her singing. So while we may disagree
with Piagetians over the extent to which language rests on prior cognitive
achievements, we still need to consider the ways in which language is initially
bound up with various actions, feelings, and perceptions.
These criticisms notwithstanding, we can only marvel at the excitement
and energy Chomsky has generated. Earlier, a few writers, such as Montessori,
indicated that language development merits special study because children are
mastering so many complex rules so soon, but it was not until Chomsky began
to specify the nature of these rules that the research really got underway.
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of Adulthood
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson Pren-
tice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Jung’s Theory
of Adulthood
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION
We have noted that few theorists have concerned themselves with
development during the adult years. Erikson was one notable excep-
tion. Another was C. G. Jung (1875–1961), whose psychoanalytic theory
dealt primarily with the issues of adulthood and aging.
Jung was born in Kesswil, a village in northeastern Switzerland.
His childhood was mostly unhappy. He experienced the tensions of
his parents’ marital difficulties and was usually quite lonely. School
bored him and even precipitated fainting spells when he was 12 years
old (Jung, 1961, p. 30). Because his father was a pastor, Jung went to
church, but he disliked it and got into bitter religious arguments with
his father. Jung’s primary enjoyments during childhood and adoles-
cence were exploring nature and reading books of his own choosing—
drama, poetry, history, and philosophy.
Despite his problems, Jung did well in high school and went on
to earn a medical degree. He then began practicing psychiatry in
Zurich, where he quickly developed a lasting interest in psychotic dis-
orders. Jung’s work—including his invention of the word-association
test—suggested the importance of Freud’s ideas. His colleagues warned
him that any alignment with Freud would jeopardize his career, but
he went ahead and indicated the importance of Freud anyway (Jung,
1961, p. 148). Freud, of course, appreciated Jung’s support, and when
the two men met they found they had much in common. For some
time, Freud treated Jung like a son and chosen disciple. Jung, however,
disagreed with aspects of Freud’s theory, particularly with the attempt
to reduce all unconscious events to sexual drives. Jung believed the
unconscious contains many kinds of strivings, including religious and
spiritual ones. In 1912 Jung decided to develop his own ideas, and in
1913 the two men severed ties.
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Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
After parting with Freud, Jung lost his footing. He began having
uncanny, deeply symbolic dreams and experienced frightening visions dur-
ing his waking hours. In one vision he saw the Alps grow and then saw
mighty yellow waves drown thousands of people and turn into a sea of
blood. Since World War I broke out the next year, he believed his vision car-
ried a message that related to events far beyond himself (Jung, 1961,
pp. 175–176).
Jung realized he was on the brink of psychosis, but he nevertheless
decided to submit to the unconscious—to whatever was welling up and call-
ing him from within. It was his only chance of understanding what was hap-
pening to him. Thus he embarked on a terrifying inner journey in which he
frequently felt himself descending into lower and lower depths. At each
region, he saw archaic symbols and images, and he communicated with
demons, ghosts, and strange figures from the distant historical past. During
this period, his family and professional practice served as bases of support in
the outer world. Otherwise, he was certain, the images welling up from within
would have driven him completely out of his mind (1961, p. 189).
Gradually, after about 4 years, he began to find the goal of his inner
quest. This happened when he increasingly found himself drawing geo-
metrical figures, symbols composed of circles and squares that he would
later call mandalas (see Figure 1). The drawings represented some basic unity
or wholeness, a path to the center of his being. Jung said that during his
psychotic state
I had to let myself be carried along by the current, without knowing
where it would lead me. When I began drawing mandalas, however,
I saw that everything, all the paths I had been following, all the steps
I had taken, were leading back to a single point—namely to the mid-
point. It became increasingly clear to me that the mandala is the center.
(1961, p. 196)
Thus Jung began to understand his break as a necessary inner journey
that led to a new personal integration. Support for this, however, came some
8 years later, when he dreamed of a curiously Chinese-looking mandala,
and the next year he received a book in Chinese philosophy that discussed
the mandala as the expression of the unity of life. Jung then believed that his
own experience partook of an unconscious universal quest for psychic
wholeness.
Jung made the exploration of the unconscious and its symbols the center
of his research for the rest of his life. He continually explored his own dreams
and fantasies and those of his patients. He also extensively studied the myths
and art of numerous cultures, finding in these productions the expression of
universal, unconscious yearnings and tensions.
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FIGURE 1
A Tibetan mandala.
(Source: Jung, C.G., Collected Works of C. G. Jung. © 1977
Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton
University Press.)
Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
376

PERSONALITY STRUCTURE
Although Jung was most concerned with the nature of the unconscious, he
developed a theory of personality that encompasses various systems of per-
sonality functioning. We will first describe Jung’s ideas on personality struc-
ture, and then discuss his views on how the personality develops.
The Ego. The ego is roughly equivalent to consciousness. It includes
our awareness of the external world as well as our consciousness of ourselves
(Jung, 1933, p. 98; Whitmont & Kaufmann, 1973, p. 93).
The Persona. The persona is the ego’s mask, the image we present to
the outer world. Our personas vary with our roles. People present one image
to business associates, another to their children. Some people develop their
personas to the exclusion of deeper parts of the personality. At some point
they, or others, sense there is little of substance beneath the superficial front
(Jung, 1961, p. 385). It also is true, however, that we need this part of the
personality to deal effectively with others. It is often necessary, for example,
to convey an image of confidence and decisiveness if we want others to listen
to us (Jacobi, 1965, p. 37). To the extent the personality is balanced, the persona
will be developed, but not to the exclusion of other parts.
The Shadow. The shadow consists of those traits and feelings we can-
not admit to ourselves. It is the opposite of our ego or self-image; it is the
Mr. Hyde of Dr. Jekyll. In dreams, the shadow is projected onto people of
the same gender, as when we dream about evil and sadistic people who are
the same gender as ourselves. In our daily lives, our shadow often shows
when we are in awkward situations and, for example, suddenly blurt out a
hostile remark that “doesn’t sound like me at all.” We also see the projections
of our shadows when we complain about “the one thing I cannot stand in
people,” for such vehemence suggests that we are really defending against
an awareness of this quality in ourselves (Von Franz, 1964, p. 174).
In most cases the shadow is largely negative, for it is the opposite of
our positive self-image. However, to the extent that our conscious self-image
contains negative elements, the unconscious shadow will be positive (Jung,
1961, p. 387). A young woman who considers herself unattractive may dream
about a beautiful lady. She considers this lady somebody else, but it may
really represent her own beauty wishing to emerge. Whether the shadow is
positive or negative, it is important to get in touch with it. Insight into the
nature of one’s shadow is the first step toward self-awareness and the inte-
gration of the personality (Jung, 1933, p. 33).
The Anima and Animus. Chinese Taoists speak of the yin and the
yang, the feminine and the masculine sides of our personalities. According
to Jung, the feminine principle includes capacities for nurturance, feeling, and
Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
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Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
art, and a oneness with nature. The masculine principle includes logical think-
ing, heroic assertion, and the conquest of nature (Jung, 1961, pp. 379–380;
Whitmont & Kaufmann, 1973, p. 94). We are all biologically bisexual, and we
all identify with people of both genders, so we all possess both masculine and
feminine traits. However, there are also genetic gender differences, which
socialization pressures exaggerate, forcing women to overdevelop their fem-
inine side and men to overemphasize their masculine nature. The result is
that the “other side” is repressed and weak. Men tend to become one-sidedly
independent, aggressive, and intellectual; they neglect capacities for nurtur-
ance and relatedness to others. Women develop their nurturant and feel-
ing sides but neglect their capacities for self-assertion and logical thought.
Nevertheless, the neglected aspects do not disappear but remain active and
call out to us from the unconscious. In men, the feminine side emerges in
dreams and fantasies as “the woman within,” the anima. In women, the “man
within” is called the animus (Jung, 1961, p. 380).
The Personal Unconscious. Jung thought that the unconscious con-
sists of two layers. The first is the personal unconscious, which contains all the
tendencies and feelings we have repressed during our lifetime (p. 389). Much
of the shadow is in the personal unconscious. It might include, for example,
a man’s tender feelings toward his father that, as a child, he needed to repress.
The anima and animus are also partly, but not completely, found in this uncon-
scious region. A woman may have repressed her experiences of her father as
seductive—experiences that then contribute to her animus and reside in her
personal unconscious.
The Collective Unconscious. Each individual’s personal unconscious
is unique, for each person has repressed different thoughts and feelings dur-
ing his or her lifetime. However, Jung also believed there exists, at the deep-
est layer of the psyche, a collective unconscious that is inherited and shared
by all humankind. The collective unconscious is made up of innate energy
forces and organizing tendencies called archetypes (see Figure 2). We can never
know the archetypes directly, but we can learn about them through arche-
typal images found in the myths, art, dreams, and fantasies of peoples
throughout the world. Through these images, people try to express their deep-
est inner yearnings and unconscious tendencies. They include the image of the
Earth Mother, the wise old woman, the wise old man, animals, rebirth, death,
the trickster, the witch, and God.
The archetypes also influence the nature and growth of the other parts
of the personality. For example, a woman’s animus results not only from her
experiences with her father and other men but also from unconscious male
aggressive energies that may appear in dreams as wild beasts.
Different cultures express archetypal themes in somewhat different ways,
but humans everywhere have always been fascinated and impressed by them.
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Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
Archetypes
Shadow
Ego
Persona
Collective
Unconscious
Self
Personal
Unconscious
Consciousness
Outer World
Anima
(in men)
Animus
(in women)
FIGURE 2
The psyche in Jung’s theory.
Jung said,
The concept of the archetype . . . is derived from the repeated observa-
tion that, for instance, the myths and fairytales of world literature con-
tain definite motifs which crop up everywhere. We meet these same
motifs in the fantasies, dreams, deliria, and delusions of individuals
living today. . . . They have their origin in the archetype, which in itself
is an irrepresentable unconscious, pre-existent form that seems to be
part of the inherited structure of the psyche and can therefore manifest
itself spontaneously anywhere, at any time. (1961, p. 380)
Although Jung said archetypes are essentially unknowable, he also likened
them to instincts in animals—for example, a bird’s innate schema of the parent
(Jung, 1964, p. 58). Perhaps archetypes can also be likened to the innate per-
ceptual tendencies Gestalt psychologists talk about (Arnheim, 1954; R. Watson,
1968, chap. 19). For example, we may have an inner sense of what constitutes
a harmonious form. Mandalas probably strike us as beautiful because they
correspond to our senses of proportion, balance, and good organization.
The Self. The most important archetype is that of the Self, our uncon-
scious striving for centeredness, wholeness, and meaning (Jung, 1961, p. 386).
The Self is an inner urge to balance and reconcile the opposing aspects of our
personalities. It is represented throughout the world in drawings of man-
dalas, figures in which all sides are perfectly balanced around a center point.
The Self is also expressed by our search for God, the symbol of wholeness and
ultimate meaning (p. 382).
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Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
Introversion and Extroversion. Although the Self is the ultimate goal
in life, no one ever fully attains it. We all develop in one-sided ways. Most of
us, for example, develop our consciousness and neglect our unconscious lives.
Women neglect their masculine side, and men neglect their feminine side.
Jung developed other concepts to describe opposite tendencies, of which
we develop one to the exclusion of the other. One such polarity is introversion-
extroversion. The extrovert confidently engages in direct action; the introvert
hesitates and reflects on what may happen. At a party, an extroverted young
woman immediately walks over to others and strikes up a conversation with
them. The introverted woman hesitates; she is caught up in her inner state, her
fears, hopes, and feelings. The extrovert moves outward, toward the world;
the introvert is more secure in his or her inner world and takes more pleasure
in activities such as reading and art. We all have both tendencies but are
predisposed toward one, leaving the other underdeveloped and unconscious
(Jung, 1945).
THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT
The First Half of Life
The personality develops along different lines during the first and second
halves of the life cycle. The first period, until the age of 35 or 40, is a time
of outward expansion. Maturational forces direct the growth of the ego and
the unfolding of capacities for dealing with the external world. Young people
learn to get along with others and try to win as many of society’s rewards
as possible. They establish careers and families, and they do what they can
to advance up the social ladder of success. To do so, women usually expe-
rience social pressure to develop their feminine traits, and men their mas-
culine traits.
During this phase, Jung thought, a certain degree of one-sidedness is
necessary; young people need to dedicate themselves to the mastery of the
outer world. It is not especially advantageous for young people to be too
preoccupied with their self-doubts, fantasies, and inner natures (Jung, 1933,
p. 109); their task is to meet the demands of the external environment con-
fidently and assertively. As we can imagine, extroverts, rather than introverts,
have an easier time of it during this period (Jacobi, 1965, p. 42).
The Midlife Crisis
At about age 40 the psyche begins to undergo a transformation. The individ-
ual feels that the goals and ambitions that once seemed so eternal have lost
their meaning. Quite often the person feels depressed, stagnant, and incom-
plete, as if something crucial is missing. Jung observed that this happens even
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among people who have achieved a good measure of social success, for “the
achievements which society rewards are won at the cost of a diminution of
personality. Many—far too many—aspects of life which should have been
experienced lie in the lumber-room among dusty memories” (1933, p. 104).
The psyche itself provides the way out of this crisis. It urges the person
to turn inward and examine the meaning of his or her life. This turning inward
is prompted by the unconscious, the region in which all the repressed and
unlived aspects of the self have grown and now clamor to be heard. The
unconscious calls out for recognition in order to bring about psychic balance
and harmony (1933, pp. 17–18, 62–63).
The unconscious speaks to us primarily through dreams. For example,
early in his analysis, a man who was depressed and felt that his life was mean-
ingless had the following dream:
I am standing totally perplexed, in the midst of a Casbah-like city with
serpentine and winding small streets, not knowing where to turn. Sud-
denly I see a young, mysterious woman whom I had never seen before,
pointing with her hand the direction out. It had a very awesome quality
to it. (Whitmont & Kaufmann, 1973, p. 95)
The dream’s message is that the man must pay attention to his anima (the
mysterious young woman) for the direction out of his impasse. For it is this
side of himself that he has so far failed to appreciate and develop.
As adults examine their lives and listen to unconscious messages, they
sooner or later encounter images of the Self, the symbols of wholeness and
centeredness. For example, a middle-aged man, a highly successful execu-
tive who had been increasingly experiencing tension and a suicidal depres-
sion, had a dream in which a water devil attacked him and maneuvered him
to the edge of an abyss. The creature then rescued him and gave him a drill,
which the dreamer was supposed to use to dig to the center of the earth. In
Jungian terms, the dream’s key figure, the water devil, is initially evil, for it
represents elements in the unconscious that the conscious ego has considered
inadmissible—destructive urges. Yet the devil turns into a helper, indicating
that the man must confront the negative aspects of himself if he is ever to
become whole and find his true center (Whitmont, 1969, pp. 224–225).
As the dream continued, the man found himself in a secret chamber
where a meeting was in progress around a square table. Presiding were a
splendid knight and a Lord Mayor. However, the dreamer was led to the table
by a delinquent boy and a dirty, tramplike man who looked like a friar. They
sat at the table and gave him some repulsive food, which he ate anyway. He
then pushed his drill into the ground, and flowers grew around the drill, and
the drill was transformed into a blossoming tree.
According to a Jungian analysis, the splendid knight and the Mayor rep-
resent the heroic and authoritative aspects of the personality that the man had
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consciously realized as a business administrator. The delinquent and the ragged
friar stand for the neglected, devalued aspects of the self—elements he has so
far repressed. In particular, this man had regarded his religious inclinations as
soft and escapist, as tendencies that would undermine his manhood. But it is
the monk and the delinquent—repressed shadow figures—who lead him to
the square table, the symbol of psychic unity. There he eats repulsive food—
for no one likes looking into the repressed parts of the personality—but in so
doing he sees that new growth (the blossoming tree) will emerge (Whitmont,
1969, pp. 224–227).
You will notice that the Jungian approach to dreams differs from that
of the Freudians. Freud considered dreams to be the end products of dis-
tortion and disguise. Jung, in contrast, believed that dreams express uncon-
scious meanings fairly directly (Jung, 1933, p. 13). In the dream just cited,
the delinquent and the monk are interpreted, quite literally, as symbols for
the delinquent and religious aspects of the personality. Further, the uncon-
scious, the source of dreams, is not just a seething pit of base impulses and
desires, as it was for Freud. Rather, the unconscious, as a part of nature, can
be a creative force, directing us out of our current stalemates, as the above
dreams illustrate. Dreams tell us which aspects of the personality we have
neglected and must get in touch with (Jung, 1933, pp. 62–63). This does not
mean we should actually live out our evil tendencies. But it does mean we
should learn about them, so we can control them, rather than the other way
around (Whitmont, 1969, pp. 227–230).
The road toward health and growth—toward the unattainable goal of the
Self—is called individuation (Jung, 1933, p. 26). Individuation involves not only
achieving a measure of psychic balance but also separating ourselves from
our ordinary conformity to the goals and values of the mass culture. It means
finding one’s individual way. Each person’s true nature partakes of universal
archetypes, but it is also based on unique experiences and potentials that must
be discovered (Jung, 1961, p. 383; Jacobi, 1965, pp. 83–87).
The middle of life, then, is marked by a transformation in the psyche. We
are prompted to begin turning our energy away from the mastery of the exter-
nal world and to begin focusing on our inner selves. We feel inner urgings to
listen to the unconscious to learn about the potentials we have so far left unre-
alized. We begin to raise questions about the meaning of our lives, which,
after all, are now half over.
Although the focus from middle age onward becomes increasingly
inward, the middle-aged adult still has the energy and resources for making
changes in his or her external situation. In middle age, adults quite often take
up long-neglected projects and interests and even make seemingly incom-
prehensible career changes. Men and women, Jung observed (1933, p. 108),
begin giving expression to their opposite sexual sides. Men become less
aggressively ambitious and become more concerned with interpersonal rela-
tionships. As an older colleague once told me, “As you get older you find that
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Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
achievement counts for less and friendship counts for far more.” Women, in
contrast, become more aggressive and independent. If, for example, a man
loses interest in the family business, the wife may willingly take it over. The
woman, like the man, is becoming increasingly inner directed as she ages, but
her enthusiasm for aggressive pursuits may temporarily counterbalance or
stall this general inner orientation.
The changes of life in middle age can create marital problems. A wife
might tire of her husband’s intellectual condescension, for she will no longer
restrain her own thinking side. The husband may feel oppressed by his wife’s
tendency to treat him emotionally like a child. He no longer simply wants to
be calmed and pampered for his moodiness, but he wants to explore the realm
of feelings and relationships in a more mature manner. Changes such as these
can disturb the marital equilibrium (Jung, 1931).
Although growth during the second half of life creates tensions and dif-
ficulties, the greatest failures come when adults cling to the goals and values
of the first half of life (Jung, 1933, p. 109). Middle-aged people may try des-
perately to maintain the attractiveness of their youth or may talk incessantly
about their past athletic glories. In such cases, adults miss out on further devel-
opment, which can emerge only when they risk a confrontation with the
neglected parts of themselves.
Old Age
Jung said that “with increasing age, contemplation, and reflection, the inner
images naturally play an ever greater part in man’s life. . . . In old age one
begins to let memories unroll before the mind’s eye” (1961, p. 320). The old
person tries to understand the nature of life in the face of death (p. 309).
Jung believed we cannot face death in a healthy way unless we have
some image of the hereafter. If “I live in a house which I know will fall about
my head within the next two weeks, all my vital functions will be impaired
by this thought; but if on the contrary I feel myself to be safe, I can dwell
there in a normal and comfortable way” (Jung, 1933, p. 112). When Jung rec-
ommended that the aged entertain thoughts of an afterlife, he did not feel
that he was simply prescribing some artificial tranquilizer. He believed that
the unconscious itself has an archetype of eternity that wells up from within
as death nears.
Jung could not say, of course, whether our archetypal image of the here-
after is valid, but he believed it is a vital part of psychic functioning, and he
therefore tried to get some picture of it. He based his picture on his own last
dreams and those of others near death. The archetypal image of eternity, in
Jung’s view, is not of some hedonistic paradise. Instead, he pictured the souls
of the dead to be like a spellbound audience listening to a lecture, seeking
information from the newly deceased on the meaning of life. Apparently they
know only what they knew at the moment of death—“hence their endeavor
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Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
to penetrate into life in order to share in the knowledge of men. I frequently
have the feeling that they are standing directly behind us, waiting to hear
what answer we will give them, and what answer to destiny” (Jung, 1961,
p. 308). They continue to strive to attain in death that share of awareness they
failed to win in life.
In Jung’s view, then, life after death is a continuation of life itself. The
dead, like the aged, continue to struggle with the questions of existence; they
wonder what it is that makes a life whole and gives it meaning—they search,
in Erikson’s term, for integrity.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
As with the Freudians, Jung’s theory is inseparable from its practical applica-
tions. Much of Jung’s theory came out of his work with patients who helped him
understand the nature of the unconscious and the kinds of experiences that
were necessary to integrate their lives. Jungian psychoanalysis is most applic-
able to adults and older people. In fact, over two thirds of Jung’s own clients
were in the second half of their lives (Whitmont & Kaufmann, 1973, p. 110).
Jung’s ideas would also seem of value even to those who never find
their way to the analyst’s office. Most adults, at one time or another, proba-
bly experience the special problems that come with growing older. Some
knowledge of the kinds of changes that typically occur may help them get
their bearings. For this reason, adults seem to derive benefits from a book
such as Passages (Sheehy, 1976), which discusses the expectable crises of
adulthood. Since this book popularizes ideas of Levinson (1977, 1978), and
Levinson, in turn, owes much to Jung, we ultimately may find the deepest
rewards from Jung himself.
Jung’s relevance for psychology and psychiatry extends beyond his spe-
cial insights into adult development. Because he considered religious questions
vital and meaningful in their own right, ministers, priests, and others, who
themselves must often work with emotionally distressed people, have found
that Jung provides a valuable bridge between the religious and psychiatric
professions.
Jung’s writings, furthermore, anticipated bold thinking on the nature of
psychotic disorders, especially the thinking of R. D. Laing (1967). Laing argued
that it is wrong to view psychotic experiences as simply abnormal and bizarre.
This attitude characterizes technological cultures that refuse to admit the valid-
ity of the inner world and, instead, make outer adjustment the sole objective.
Laing contended that the psychotic experience, for all its pain, can be a
meaningful inner voyage and a healing process. In this voyage, the therapist
can serve as a guide, helping the patient understand his or her inner symbols.
Jung’s view was somewhat similar, and a knowledge of Jung would seem
essential for anyone who wishes to understand psychosis.
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EVALUATION
Jung occupies an unusual place in contemporary psychology. For many
psychologists his ideas are too mystical. He not only posited a collective
unconscious but he also believed in ESP and related phenomena (e.g., Jung,
1961, p. 190). Sometimes, in addition, he seemed unnecessarily determined
to keep his concepts shrouded in mystery. For example, he said that the arche-
types are unknowable, yet he compared them to instincts in animals—a topic
certainly open to scientific investigation.
Jung also annoys scholars by his use of categories. In particular, feminists—
even Jungian feminists—note that Jung sometimes wrote about his feminine
and masculine categories as if they were essential truths. It would have been
better if he had handled the concepts more tentatively, recognizing that they
are just ways of describing tendencies. Indeed, Susan Rowland (2002, p. 41)
points out that a more tentative approach to gender concepts would corre-
spond to the fluid androgyny of many archetypal images.
Despite these problems, psychologists in general, and developmentalists
in particular, increasingly recognize the importance of Jung’s ideas. Devel-
opmentalists, as we have seen, have long been concerned with how we seem
to lose so much of ourselves and our potentials as we become socialized, as
we become adjusted to the external world. Jung agreed this happens, but he
saw new opportunities for individual growth in the adult years.
Moreover, some very significant empirical research lends support to
Jung’s ideas. In a major study of adult men, Daniel Levinson (1977, 1978)
interpreted his findings in a Jungian context. Levinson found that the vast
majority of his subjects underwent a crisis at about age 40 or 45, during
which they began to experience “internal voices that have been silent or
muted for years and now clamor to be heard” (1977, p. 108). Levinson con-
cluded that the life structure of the 30s necessarily gives high priority to cer-
tain aspects of the self, those oriented toward social adjustment and
achievement. But in the 40s, “the neglected parts of the self urgently seek
expression and stimulate a man to reappraise his life” (p. 108). In a follow-
up study, Levinson (1996) reported that for women, too, middle age is a
period in which the individual becomes dissatisfied with outer roles and
wants to make new connections to the inner self.
The studies of Bernice Neugarten and her colleagues at the University
of Chicago also lend support to Jung’s insights. Neugarten reports that for both
genders, the 40s and 50s mark a “movement of energy away from an outer-
world to an inner-world orientation” (1964, p. 201). Introspection, contempla-
tion, and self-evaluation increasingly become characteristic forms of mental
life (Neugarten, 1968, p. 140). Furthermore, men “become more receptive to
their own affiliative, nurturant, and sensual promptings; while women seem
to become more responsive toward, and less guilty about, their own aggressive,
egocentric impulses” (Neugarten, 1964, p. 199). Some cross-cultural research
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Jung’s Theory of Adulthood
suggests these shifts may become even more common and pronounced in old
age (Gutman, 1987). Thus the work of Neugarten and her associates, like that
of Levinson, supports some of the personality changes Jung outlined.
These shifts, it is important to note, seem to occur consistently before
external situations demand them (Havighurst, Neugarten, & Tobin, 1968,
p. 167). Adults seem to turn inward before they might be forced to do so by
external losses, such as retirement, reduced income, or the loss of a spouse.
There seems to be an intrinsic developmental process at work. Adults may
have an inherent need to take stock, to resist the pressures of conventional
roles, and to concern themselves with the neglected and unrealized aspects
of the personality.
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Humanistic Psychology
and Developmental
Theory
In this chapter, we will discuss the emergence of humanistic psychology
and indicate the extent to which developmental theorists have shared the
humanists’ concerns.
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology and the Humanistic Revolt
For centuries, psychology was a topic within philosophy. The term
psychology derives from the Greek word psyche, which means soul or
life principle. But many Western philosophers, especially since the 16th
century, were actually more interested in what we would today call the
mind. They discussed how people perceive objects, form memories,
associate ideas, and make judgments (Gregory, 1987; Munn et al., 1974).
Psychology began to separate from philosophy in the later part of
the 19th century, when Wilhelm Wundt tried to make psychology a
scientific discipline. Wundt and his colleagues deeply admired the
accomplishments of physics, chemistry, and the other natural sciences.
They felt that if psychology could only follow in the example of these
sciences, it also could accomplish great things. Psychology, too, should
strive for the objective, quantitative measurement of isolated variables
and the formulation of abstract laws. Wundt tried to analyze con-
sciousness into its basic elements, just like physicists and chemists had
done with respect to matter, and he inspired numerous researchers to
adopt his approach.
After a few decades, however, the investigations of consciousness
seemed to lose their promise. By the end of the 1920s, the scientific
banner had been taken over by another group, the behaviorists.
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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The behaviorists argued we should confine ourselves to the measure-
ment of overt behavior and the way it is controlled by the observable stimuli
in the external environment. Mental processes, they said, cannot be directly
observed and therefore have no place in scientific psychology; to study them
just opens psychology back up to souls and all kinds of mysticism (Heidbreder,
1933, p. 235). What’s more, the behaviorists pointed out, the study of overt
behavior and environmental control has enormous practical value. As we have
seen, the behaviorists have introduced a variety of techniques—a “technology
of behavior” (Skinner, 1971, p. 3)—to improve learning and to alleviate fears,
temper tantrums, and other problems. Skinner even wrote a novel, Walden Two
(1948), which described the way one could create a total environment to pro-
duce greater human happiness.
Early on, however, some psychologists had misgivings about the
behavioristic brand of science. During the first half of the 20th century,
Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and others argued that
behaviorism, whatever its merits, was producing a very one-sided picture
of human nature. Humans, they argued, do not consist of only overt
responses, nor are they completely controlled by the external environment.
People also grow, think, feel, dream, create, and do many other things that
make up the human experience. The behaviorists and others, in their emu-
lation of the physical sciences, were ignoring most aspects of life that make
humans unique and give them dignity. These humanists were not at all
opposed to scientific investigation, but they argued that psychology should
address itself to the full range of human experience, not just the aspects that
are most readily measurable and under environmental control. For some
time, these writers were calling out in the wilderness; their views were far
removed from the mainstream in U.S. psychology. But in the 1950s their
writings began to attract increasing attention, and a humanistic movement
in psychology was born (Misiak & Sexton, 1973, pp. 108–109).
Modern humanistic psychology, then, developed primarily in reaction
to behavioristically oriented approaches. Humanistic psychology’s relation-
ship to the second main branch of psychology, psychoanalysis, has been more
ambivalent. Many humanists have appreciated the psychoanalytic attempt to
explore the inner world at its deepest levels. However, humanists have also
felt the psychoanalysts have been too pessimistic about human capacities for
growth and free choice. Whereas the behaviorists have seen people as exclu-
sively controlled by the external environment, psychoanalysts have viewed
people as dominated by irrational forces in the unconscious. Perhaps, human-
ists have suggested, psychoanalytic theory has been too colored by the study
of patients with crippling emotional disorders. Humanists have proposed that
people, to a much greater extent than has been realized, are free and creative
beings, capable of growth and self-actualization (Maslow, 1962, pp. 189–197).
The humanistic psychology movement that started gaining momentum
in the 1950s, then, was a reaction against two mainstream forces: behaviorism
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Humanistic Psychology and Developmental Theory
and psychoanalysis. Because of this, one of the movement’s leaders, Abraham
Maslow, dubbed humanistic psychology “The Third Force” (1962, p. ix). Since
the 1970s, however, the psychological mainstream has increasingly moved in
a new direction, turning its attention to cognitive processes.
The cognitive revolution was largely inspired by advances in com-
puter technology. Psychologists, like people everywhere, were enormously
impressed by the achievements of high-speed computers, and they quickly
saw similarities between computers and human thinking. Both computers
and humans, psychologists noted, encode, store, and retrieve information,
and psychologists began thinking of the mind itself as an “information-
processing device.” Behaviorists, too, have increasingly included cognitive
variables in their theories, and computer-inspired models of human intel-
ligence have captured the interest of scholars in a wide variety of academic
disciplines. Philosophers, mathematicians, linguists, computer scientists,
and neurologists have all joined the cognitive psychologists, working under
the banner of “cognitive science.” Some scholars, to be sure, have stuck
more closely to computer models than others, but the general upshot has
been a great emphasis on the kinds of thinking that computers facilitate—
thinking that is rational and task oriented. Many of today’s top scholars
assume that we think best when we clearly define the task, select strate-
gies for solving it, avoid distractions, and self-consciously monitor our
progress each step of the way (see, for example, Palinscar & Brown, 1989;
Siegler & Alibali, 2005; Wood, 1998).
But to humanistic psychologists, the new cognitive models are nearly
as one-sided as the old behaviorism. Cognitive models describe thinking as a
highly rational and cerebral affair. They leave little room for the emotional
aspects of thinking—for empathy, wonder, imagination, and inspiration. The
new models also leave out the kinds of experience that phenomenologists
highlight—the immediate experience of the world just at it reveals itself to
us, before we put it into mental categories (including the categories that allow
it to be processed as data by a computational machine).
To recap, psychology means the study of the soul, but most 19th-century
scientific psychologists were more interested in the workings of the mind.
Then, in the early 20th century, behaviorism became the dominant force and
discouraged the study of the mind. This sequence of events prompted the
joke, “First psychology lost its soul. Then it lost its mind” (Munn et al.,
1974, p. 187).
But since the 1970s, psychology has returned its full attention to the study
of cognitive processes; it has clearly regained its mind. Now the challenge for
humanistic psychology is to somehow stimulate mainstream psychology to
regain its soul, in the sense of paying attention to inner feelings, creative
promptings, and a sense of the wonder of life.
To get a fuller understanding of humanistic psychology, let’s look briefly
at the life and work of the man who is considered its father, Abraham Maslow.
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Maslow
Biographical Introduction. Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) was born
in Brooklyn, New York, the son of poor Russian immigrant parents. He was
a shy, unhappy boy. Although he liked high school, he had trouble adjusting
to college. He attended the City College of New York, Cornell University, and
finally the University of Wisconsin, where he earned his B.A. and stayed on
for graduate work in psychology. Maslow began his career squarely within the
scientific mainstream. He received rigorous experimental training under
E. L. Thorndike and Harry Harlow and wrote a standard textbook on abnor-
mal psychology (Wilson, 1972, pp. 115–134). In fact, Maslow said that early in
his career he was sold on behaviorism (Goble, 1970, p. 11) and in a sense he
never repudiated it; he always realized that people are subject to condition-
ing from the external environment. What increasingly annoyed him was
behaviorism’s one-sidedness; people also have an inner life and potentials
for growth, creativity, and free choice.
Maslow taught at Brooklyn College from 1937 to 1951 and at Brandeis
University from 1951 to 1969. During his career, he also saw clients as a clin-
ical psychologist and even spent a summer doing anthropological fieldwork
among the Blackfoot Indians in Alberta, Canada (Goble, 1970, p. 12).
Maslow’s colleagues have described him as full of curiosity and wonder,
chuckling warmly over new ideas (Manuel, 1972). As his work developed,
it became increasingly broad and inclusive. He wanted psychology to go
beyond rational science and incorporate various ways of knowing, includ-
ing those of Eastern philosophies. Thus, although Maslow died in 1970,
before the cognitive revolution really got under way, he spelled out alter-
natives to the rational, task-oriented model of thinking that dominates
cognitive theory.
Maslow’s Ideas. Maslow’s first step in the direction of a humanistic
psychology was the formulation of a new theory of motivation (1943). Accord-
ing to this theory, there are six kinds of needs: physiological needs, safety
needs, belongingness needs, love needs, self-esteem needs, and, at the high-
est level, self-actualization needs. These needs are arranged in a hierarchical
order such that the fulfillment of lower needs propels the organism on to the
next highest level. For example, a man who has a strong physiological need,
such as hunger, will be motivated by little else, but when this need is fulfilled,
he will move on to the next level, that of safety needs, and when these are
satisfied, he will move on to the third level, and so on.
In his major works, Maslow was most interested in the highest need—
the need for self-actualization. Self-actualization, a concept borrowed from
Goldstein (1939), refers to the actualization of one’s potentials, capacities, and
talents. To study it, Maslow examined the lives and experiences of the most
healthy, creative people he could find. His sample included contemporaries
and acquaintances, such as the anthropologist Ruth Benedict, as well as public
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Humanistic Psychology and Developmental Theory
and historical figures, such as Thomas Jefferson and Eleanor Roosevelt
(Maslow, 1954, pp. 202–203).
Maslow’s key finding was that the self-actualizers, compared to most
people, have maintained a certain independence from their society. Most
people are so strongly motivated by needs such as belongingness, love, and
respect that they are afraid to entertain any thought that others might dis-
approve of. They try to fit into their society and do whatever brings pres-
tige within it. Self-actualizers, in contrast, are less conforming. They seem
less molded and flattened by the social environment and are more sponta-
neous, free, and natural. Although they rarely behave in unconventional
ways, they typically regard conventions with a good-natured shrug of the
shoulders. Instead, they are primarily motivated by their own inner growth,
the development of their potentials, and their personal mission in life
(Maslow, 1954, pp. 223–228).
Because self-actualizers have attained a certain independence from their
culture, they are not confined to conventional, abstract, or stereotyped modes
of perception. When, for example, most people go to a museum, they read
the name of the artist below the painting and then judge the work according
to the conventional estimate. Self-actualizers, in contrast, perceive things more
freshly, naively, and as they really are. They can look at any painting—or any
tree, bird, or baby—as if seeing it for the first time; they can find miraculous
beauty where others see nothing but the common object (Maslow, 1966, p. 88).
In fact, they seem to have retained the creative, open approach that is char-
acteristic of the young child. Like the child, their attitude is frequently
“absorbed, spellbound, popeyed, enchanted” (p. 100). Unfortunately, most
children lose this approach to life as they become socialized.
When such perception is intense, it can be called a “peak experience.”
The individual becomes overcome with awe and wonder at the object—a for-
est, a lover, a baby—and becomes so absorbed and poured into the experience
that she loses all self-consciousness. She may even feel a mystical sense of com-
munion with a transcendent beauty and perfection. In any case, there is no
effort to name or categorize the object, or use it for any purpose. There is pure
delight in what is (Maslow, 1966, chap. 6; 1971, pp. 333–334).1
In many ways, self-actualizers seem like good phenomenologists.
Whether or not their perceptions reach the level of peak experiences, they can
suspend or go beyond conventional ways of ordering experience. They savor
the concrete, raw experience (Maslow, 1966, p. 87). Maslow also likened the
self-actualizers’ approach to a “Taoistic letting be,” to a receptive, open appre-
ciation of objects without interfering with them or attempting to control them
(Maslow, 1962, p. 86).
1Peak experiences are not restricted to the perception of beauty but may occur during other
activities, such as athletics, dance, or the act of love. During peak experiences, people lose them-
selves in the moment and everything seems to flow naturally (Maslow, 1968, chaps. 6 and 7).
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Humanistic Psychology and Developmental Theory
Maslow believed psychologists and other scientists could learn much
from self-actualizers’ phenomenological and Taoistic approaches. It’s widely
assumed that science must proceed in an intellectual, goal-directed manner.
As scientists, we must clearly define the purpose of our study and then collect
data that help solve the problem or test the hypothesis. In the process, we
filter out all the rich experiences of people and things that are outside the
purpose of our study. Maslow suggested that before we get caught up in
our purposes, hypotheses, and generalizations, we open ourselves to the
world on a sensory, prerational, experiential level. We should try to experi-
ence the world more freshly and receptively, surrendering ourselves to what
moves us and enchants us, like a child does. We will then come up with
insights that can later inform our rational, goal-directed work (Maslow, 1966;
1968, p. 184).
Maslow reworked his ideas over the years and was not always system-
atic in the process. But by and large, his overall position was as follows:
1. Humans possess an essential biological, inner nature, which includes
all the basic needs and the impulses toward growth and self-actualization
(1968, p. 190; 1971, p. 25).
2. This inner core is partly specieswide and partly idiosyncratic, for we
all have special bents, temperaments, and abilities (1968, p. 191).
3. Our inner core is a positive force that presses toward the realization
of full humanness, just as an acorn may be said to press toward becoming an
oak tree. It is important to recognize it is our inner nature, not the environment,
that plays the guiding role. The environment is like sun, food, and water; it
nourishes growth, but it is not the seed. Social and educational practices
should be evaluated not in terms of how efficiently they control the child or
get the child to adjust, but according to how well they support and nourish
inner growth potentials (1968, pp. 160–161, 211–212).
4. Our inner nature is not strong, like instincts in animals. Rather, it is
subtle, delicate, and in many ways weak. It is easily “drowned out by learn-
ing, by cultural expectations, by fear, by disapproval, etc.” (1968, p. 191).
5. The suppression of our inner nature usually takes place during child-
hood. At the start, babies have an inner wisdom with respect to most matters,
including food intake, amount of sleep, readiness for toilet training, and the
urges to stand up and to walk. Babies will also avidly explore the environ-
ment, focusing on the particular things in which they take delight. Their own
feelings and inner promptings guide them toward healthy growth. However,
socializing agents frequently lack respect for children’s choices. Instead, they
try to direct children, to teach them things. They criticize them, correct their
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errors, and try to get them to give the “right” answers. Consequently, children
quit trusting themselves and their senses and begin to rely on the opinions of
others (1968, pp. 49–55, 150, 198–199).
6. Even though our inner core, with its urge toward self-actualization,
is weak, it rarely disappears altogether—even in adulthood. It persists under-
ground, in the unconscious, and speaks to us as an inner voice waiting to be
heard. Inner signals can lead even the neurotic adult back to buried capacities
and unfulfilled potentials. Our inner core is a pressure we call the “will to
health,” and it is this urge on which all successful psychotherapy is based
(1968, pp. 192–193).
7. There are a few people—“self-actualizers”—who have remained
deeply responsive to their inner natures and urges toward growth. These
people are less molded and flattened by cultural pressures and have preserved
the capacity to look at the world in a spontaneous, fresh, childlike manner
(1968, pp. 207–208).
DEVELOPMENTALISTS AS HUMANISTS
If Maslow’s ideas sound familiar, they are. Maslow and the modern human-
istic psychologists have, without making much note of it, drawn heavily on
the developmental tradition that began with Rousseau. Since Rousseau, many
developmental theorists have been preoccupied with the same basic problem
as Maslow: Children, as they become socialized, quit relying on their own
experience and judgments; they become too dependent on conventions and
the opinions of others. Thus developmentalists, like the humanists, have been
searching for an inner force that will guide the individual toward a healthier,
more independent development.
Intrinsic Growth Forces
Where Maslow speaks of a biological core that directs healthy growth, devel-
opmentalists refer to maturation. Maturation is an internal mechanism that
prompts children to seek out certain experiences at certain times. Under
maturational urging, children regulate their cycles of sleep and eating; learn
to sit up, walk, and run; develop an urgent need for autonomy; master lan-
guage; explore the widening environment; and so on. According to Gesell and
others, children, following their own inner schedule and timing, are eminently
wise regarding what they need and can do. So, instead of trying to make
children conform to our own set schedules and directions, we can let them
guide us and make their own choices—as Maslow proposed.
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Nevertheless, as Maslow observed, it is often difficult for us to trust chil-
dren and the growth process. We seem to have particular difficulty believing
children can really learn on their own, without our direction and supervision.
But developmentalists have tried to show they can. Montessori, in particular,
tried to show that if we will open-mindedly observe children’s spontaneous
interests, they will direct us to the tasks on which they will work indepen-
dently and with the greatest concentration and sense of fulfillment. They will
become absorbed in such tasks because the tasks meet inner needs to perfect
certain capacities at certain points in development. So we are not forced to
take charge of children’s learning, to choose tasks for them, to motivate them
by our praise, or to criticize their mistakes—practices that force them to turn
to external authorities for guidance and evaluation. Instead, we can trust their
maturationally based urges to perfect their own capacities in their own ways.
Maslow might have pointed to Montessori as an educator who was thor-
oughly humanistic in her faith in children’s intrinsic creative powers.
Not all developmentalists, of course, are as nativistic as Gesell or Montes-
sori. As we have seen, Piaget, Kohlberg, and the cognitive-developmentalists
doubt that biological maturation directly governs the stages of cognitive devel-
opment. But these theorists also look to children’s independent activities,
rather than to external teachings, as the source of developmental change.
Children, in their view, are intrinsically curious about the world and reach
out for new experiences that lead them to reorganize their cognitive struc-
tures. In this sense, the cognitive-developmentalists also share the humanists’
faith in intrinsic capacities for self-directed learning.
Interestingly, Maslow’s thoughts on adulthood were also foreshadowed
by earlier developmental theorists—especially by Jung. Maslow pointed out
how the well-socialized adult, whose inner potentials for self-actualization
lie dormant, will still hear inner voices calling for attention. Jung used nearly
identical language to describe the crisis of middle life. Prior to middle age,
the individual typically concentrates on adjusting to the external, social world,
trying to do things that bring social success and prestige and developing those
parts of the personality that are suited for this goal. In middle life, however,
social success loses its importance, and inner voices from the unconscious
direct one to attend to the previously neglected and unrealized parts of the self.
The individual increasingly turns inward and considers the discovery and
rounding out of the personality more important than social conformity.
Thus developmental theorists, like the modern humanistic psycholo-
gists, have tried to uncover intrinsic growth factors that stand apart from
pressures toward social conformity. At the same time, however, some devel-
opmental theorists have been more pessimistic than the humanists about the
chances for any substantial improvement based on intrinsic forces. In partic-
ular, the Freudians have felt that because maturation brings with it unruly
sexual and aggressive impulses, a good measure of social repression will
always be necessary. Erikson viewed maturational growth somewhat more
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positively than Freud, calling attention to the maturation of autonomy, ini-
tiative, industry, and so on, but he too felt that the other sides of these qualities—
shame, doubt, guilt, inferiority, and so on—are inevitable. No child, for
example, can become completely autonomous, for societies will always need
to regulate the child to some extent. Still, Erikson hoped we can raise children
so they can gain as much autonomy, initiative, and as many other virtues as
possible.
Furthermore, Freudian therapy relies heavily on inner growth forces.
Recall how Freud once asked a psychiatrist if he could really cure. When the
psychiatrist responded that he could not—that he could only remove some
impediments to growth as a gardener removes some stones or weeds—Freud
said they would then understand each other. The psychoanalyst’s reliance on
intrinsic growth processes is quite evident in Bettelheim’s school. Bettelheim
did not try to make disturbed children behave in normal ways, but he tried
to provide certain conditions—love, acceptance, empathy—that will enable
children to feel it is safe to take steps toward growth on their own. The physi-
cian treats patients in essentially the same way. The doctor does not actually
heal a cut but only cleans and stitches the wound. The rest is up to nature.
Any cure, in psychotherapy or in medicine, partly relies on forces toward
health that are out of the doctor’s control. The doctor puts his or her faith in
innate forces toward health.
Thus developmental theorists, like the humanists, have tried to discover
the nature of intrinsic growth forces and to devise educational and therapeutic
methods based on them. And, to a considerable extent, developmental writers
had been working on these tasks long before the modern humanistic move-
ment in psychology even began.
Romanticism
Theories that extol the virtues of nature and biological forces, as opposed to
society, are often called Romantic. In this sense, Maslow, as well as Rousseau
and the maturationists, are strongly Romantic. Rousseau, in fact, is often cred-
ited with the origin of Romantic thought.
Another aspect of Romanticism is a fondness for the past. This attraction
is quite evident in Maslow; he looked upon infancy and childhood as times
when we were more closely in touch with our natural urges and possessed a
more spontaneous and creative outlook. As children, he said, we perceived the
world more freshly, directly, and imaginatively than we typically do as well-
socialized adults. Maslow recognized the value of mature, adult thought, but
he also saw the need to learn to regress temporarily to more childlike modes
of experience.
Rousseau, too, “romanticized the past.” He suggested that we were hap-
pier and more independent as savages, and he saw childhood as a potentially
happy and innocent time in which we live in close harmony with nature.
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In modern developmental theory, perhaps the most thoroughgoing Romantic
was Schachtel, who contrasted the richly sensuous experiences of infancy and
the open curiosity of childhood with the stereotyped, conventional thought of
most adults.
Neither Rousseau nor Schachtel, however, clearly specified ways in
which we, as adults, might recapture childlike modes of experience. For such
a conceptualization, we are particularly indebted to Werner. Werner sug-
gested that we continually engage in a process called microgenesis, beginning
each new thought or perception at primitive levels before moving on to more
advanced forms of cognition. Thus the primitive modes of experience are
continually available to us. Ordinarily, Werner observed, we do not engage
in primitive imagery in a very full way, but we do so when we are most cre-
ative, when we truly begin anew. At these moments our impressions become
particularly rich and sensuous; for primitive images are fused with emotion,
sensation, and imaginative qualities. Creative thinking, of course, does not
stop with such images; it goes on to articulate and structure them. Never-
theless, Werner emphasized, creativity begins with a responsiveness to early
forms of experience—a view shared by the psychoanalysts who speak of
“regressions in the service of the ego.”
Not all writers in the developmental tradition, we should note, have
been Romantic. The cognitive-developmentalists, in particular, have gener-
ally been unimpressed by the distinctive virtues of childlike thinking. Piaget
observed that we continue to use early sensorimotor schemes and cognitive
operations, but he saw nothing special in the imaginative, fanciful thinking of
the preoperational child, and he never suggested that creative people regress
to it. Similarly, Kohlberg never seemed impressed by the concept of regression.
In his view, stages of moral reasoning simply reflected increasing levels of
cognitive adequacy, so there was no point to regressing to earlier stages.
Not all developmentalists, then, have placed a special premium on child-
like modes of thought. Most, to be sure, have argued that childhood thinking
has unique qualities, but not all have been so enamored with these qualities
that they have urged us to recapture them. Still, a Romantic attraction to child-
hood is one theme that runs through a good deal of humanistic psychology
and developmental theory.
Phenomenology
Another central component of modern humanistic psychology is a phenom-
enological orientation. This orientation or method includes what may be called
a “phenomenological suspension.” One tries to suspend one’s theoretical pre-
conceptions and customary categories and tries to see people and things as
openly and freshly as possible—to see them as they really are. This approach,
as we have seen, was the starting point of Rousseau’s developmental philos-
ophy. Rousseau argued that children have their own ways of seeing, thinking,
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and feeling, and that we know nothing about these; we therefore must refrain
from investing children with our own thoughts and take the time to simply
observe them, listen to them, and let them reveal their unique characteristics
to us. Later, Piaget and Montessori emphasized the same point. The etholo-
gists, too, may be said to employ a phenomenological suspension. Before an
ethologist forms any hypothesis or builds any theory, he or she first simply
tries to learn about and describe as much about a particular species as pos-
sible. To do this, ethologists believe, we must observe animals in their natural
habitats, not in the laboratory.
In psychology, phenomenology usually implies a second step. Phe-
nomenological psychologists usually suspend preconceptions in order to enter
into the inner world of the other. They try to open themselves to the other’s
direct experience, to see things through the other’s eyes.
Developmental theorists have been less consistent in taking this sec-
ond step. Those who have worked the hardest to learn about children’s
inner worlds are Schachtel and the psychoanalysts. Schachtel tried to gain
insight into the infant’s unique modes of perception, and the psychoanalyst
Bettelheim, for example, constantly asked himself, “How does the world look
and feel to this child?” Other writers, however, have been less interested in
perceiving the world through the child’s eyes. Gesell wanted us to be open to
children’s own needs and interests, but he primarily observed their external
motor behavior. Werner gave us insights into how the world might look to
the child—how, for instance, it might appear full of life and feeling—but he
mostly discussed the child’s mental life from the outside, analyzing it in terms
of concepts such as differentiation and integration. Similarly, Piaget provided
valuable insights into the young child’s unique experiences—how objects
change with momentary perceptions, how dreams seem real, how morals
seem imposed by authorities, and so forth—but Piaget, too, primarily exam-
ined the young child’s thought from the outside, analyzing it in terms of log-
ical structures. The ethologists also primarily look at behavior from an external
point of view.
A knowledge of how the world looks to children (and adults) at differ-
ent stages will not be easy to come by. Young children are not sufficiently ver-
bal to tell us how the world appears to them, and infants cannot tell us
anything at all. One approach may be the study of spontaneous interests. For
example, Montessori showed how young children attend to minute details
and are concerned about anything out of place. These observations give us
two clues concerning the young child’s perceptual world. Young children also
seem to perceive life where we do not, and they may be particularly inter-
ested in objects, such as cars, balls, or balloons, which, with a little imagina-
tion, take on human qualities. It would seem important to record every aspect
of the environment that children find uniquely interesting. To structure such
studies, we might follow the lead of Martha Muchow, who observed how
children of different ages responded to typical settings in their everyday envi-
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Humanistic Psychology and Developmental Theory
ronments, including a landing dock and a department store. By noting the
things that children find particularly interesting, as well as those that they
ignore, we can begin to form a picture of how the world appears to the child
at different phases of life.
Universals
Those of you who have already learned something about developmental psy-
chology will notice this book neglects or skims over certain topics. We have
barely mentioned, for example, differences among children or adults on IQ
tests. Other topics that have received only minor coverage include cultural
differences in personality development and gender differences. The various
differences among people, which are partly the product of environmental fac-
tors, are tremendously important.
However, the differences among people have not been the primary
concern of writers in the developmental tradition. Instead, they have
searched for growth forces and sequences common to all people. This search,
as Chomsky suggests (1975, pp. 130–133), probably reflects, as much as any-
thing, an ethical orientation. Developmentalists, like humanists, are trying
to show how, at the deepest levels, we are all the same. Writers in the devel-
opmental tradition are especially reluctant to investigate ways in which one
person is better than another. The writers’ focus, instead, is on our common
humanity (Maslow, 1962, p. 185). They want to show that, at bottom, we all
have the same yearnings, hopes, and fears, as well as the same creative urges
toward health and personal integration. Hopefully, an appreciation of the
strivings that we all share can help in the building of a universal human
community.
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■ ■ ■ ■ ■
From Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications, Sixth Edition. William
Crain. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson
Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
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Index
Index
Page references followed by “f” indicate illustrated
figures or photographs; followed by “t” indicates a
table.
A
Abilities, 13, 31-32, 34, 73, 140, 152-153, 188, 213,
219-221, 228, 253-254, 296, 337
Abnormal, 33, 384, 390, 401, 403, 407, 409, 412, 419
Abnormal behavior, 403, 412
Abnormal psychology, 390, 409
abortion, 177
Abstract modeling, 221, 364
Abstract reasoning, 140
Abstract thinking, 111, 229, 238-239
Abuse, 62, 84, 402
Academic achievement, 370
Accessibility, 55
Accommodation, 123-124
Achievement, 31, 90, 143, 201, 218, 223, 237, 252,
254, 302, 319, 351, 368, 385, 404
IQ and, 370
understanding, 351, 404
Achievement tests, 90
Acquisition, 73-76, 90, 213, 215-216, 237, 248, 351,
361, 364-365, 367, 369-371, 407, 417
of grammar, 351, 361, 417
of language, 73-75, 351, 355, 361, 364-365, 367,
369-371, 403-404, 417
Action systems, 130
Actions, 6, 25-26, 42, 48, 96-98, 113, 123, 126-130,
135, 140-142, 144, 147, 153-155, 198-201,
205-206, 212, 246, 269, 272, 278, 291, 295,
359-360, 368-369, 372
Activities of daily living, 79
Actual developmental level, 252
Actualization needs, 390
Adaptation, 40, 332, 401-402, 408
Adaptive value, 42, 69
Adjustment, 339-340, 384-385, 414
Adolescence, 13-15, 17, 63, 86, 96, 144, 160, 168,
181, 275, 282, 294, 298-299, 307, 327, 406,
409, 414-415
and moral development, 402
attachment in, 63
autonomy, 294, 298, 307, 402
formal operations, 144, 160, 310, 414
identity, 294, 299, 307, 310, 415
identity formation, 299
mental health, 310
moral development, 160, 168, 181, 402, 409, 417
personality development in, 417
physical changes in, 310
puberty, 14, 275, 298-299, 307
Adolescents, 58, 88-89, 96, 121, 140-142, 159-160,
173, 178, 275-276, 299, 301, 310, 410
Adult development, 301, 384
Adulthood, 109, 122, 140, 178, 181, 269, 294,
300-302, 313, 345, 373-386, 393-394,
412-413
cognitive development, 394, 412
crises of, 384
generativity, 294, 302
midlife, 380
stage theory, 122
Adults, 1-3, 7-10, 14-15, 18, 32, 58-59, 63, 69, 72-73,
75-77, 80, 87, 89-91, 97-103, 105, 107,
111-112, 114-115, 121-123, 136-139,
151-152, 155, 160, 173-174, 178, 180, 219,
234, 238, 244, 246, 253-256, 260, 264-266,
284, 287, 319, 336, 338-339, 344-347, 351,
357, 363-366, 371, 381-384
Affect, 44, 77, 105, 177, 257, 268, 280, 409
Affectional bonds, 402
affiliation, 177
Afghanistan, 352
Africa, 60, 63
African, 105, 298, 328, 370
Age, 1-3, 8, 11-12, 14, 16-18, 22-28, 31-33, 49-50,
53-57, 59, 63-67, 71-74, 77, 81, 87-88, 90,
110, 120-121, 124, 127, 136-137, 139,
143-144, 150, 153-154, 156-157, 160, 163,
170-172, 201, 206, 223, 233-235, 237-238,
255-257, 264, 272-275, 289-290, 296-297,
318-319, 333, 345-347, 351, 359-361,
368-371, 382-383, 385-386, 408, 411, 414
and friendship, 383
and health, 303
and personality, 28, 404, 408, 419
concepts of, 419
of mother, 316, 318
schizophrenia and, 417
Age and aging, 408, 414
personality and, 408
Age norms, 28, 32, 124
Age-related changes, 417
Aggression, 214-215, 276-277, 400-401, 403, 412
family, and, 276
in children, 403
television and, 215
Aggressiveness, 199
Aging, 374, 408, 414
and memory, 414
study of, 408
AIDS, 166, 213, 240, 256-257
Ainsworth, Mary, 59
Algebra, 219, 237, 252
Algorithms, 148
Allport, Gordon, 388
Altruism, 38, 216, 218
American Academy of Pediatrics, 370
American Psychological Association, 211
members, 211
Americans, 103
Amnesia, 341-342, 346-347
childhood, 341-342, 346-347
infantile, 341, 346
infantile amnesia, 341, 346
spontaneous, 346
Anal stage, 265, 268-269, 282, 287, 294
Analytic psychology, 409
Androgyny, 385
Anger, 14, 62, 104, 268-269, 281-282
Anima, 377-379, 381
Animals, 8, 37-40, 45-46, 48-49, 56, 67-70, 73, 86, 98,
106, 116-117, 138, 187, 192, 199, 210, 285,
378-379, 385, 397, 416
and language, 416
imprinting in, 49, 56
intelligence of, 416
research on, 45, 187
Animism, 137-140, 149
Animus, 377-379
Anxiety, 8, 49, 54, 57, 221, 272, 274, 280-282, 292,
321-322
stranger anxiety, 321
Applied behavior analysis, 201
Apprenticeships, 2
Archetype, 379, 383
Archetypes, 378-379, 382, 385
Arguments, 132, 145, 171, 173, 178-179, 286, 374,
415
Arithmetic, 81, 147-148, 150, 223, 251, 298, 410
Art, 125, 228, 233, 285, 289, 378, 380, 400, 411
stages of, 289, 313
Asia, 238
Assessment, 280, 400, 415
history of, 400, 415
Assimilation, 123-124
Attachment, 18, 44, 47-61, 63-64, 66-68, 325, 327,
400, 402-403, 405, 407-409, 412-413,
418-419
differences in, 400, 419
establishment of, 412
fathers, 63-64, 327
first, 18, 44, 47, 49-51, 55-57, 60, 63, 68, 403
growth of, 400, 402, 409
separation anxiety, 54, 57
Strange Situation, 60-61, 63-64, 68
theory of, 48, 59, 325, 403, 405, 407-409, 413, 418
with fathers, 327
Attachment behaviors, 48
Attachment relationships, 405
Attachment theory, 59, 68, 407, 412-413
in infancy, 413
Attention, 1, 4, 7, 30, 39, 42, 64-66, 72-73, 90, 103,
109, 112-114, 116, 121, 127-128, 136, 139,
144, 177, 184, 194, 197-199, 201-202, 236,
240-242, 259, 273, 298-299, 311, 323,
394-395
Attentional processes, 212
Attitude, 3, 30, 76, 87, 103, 138, 157, 163, 167, 220,
275, 285, 292, 322, 336-338, 369
Attitudes, 63, 90, 137, 285-286, 298, 410
behavior and, 285
Attraction, 395-396
romantic attraction, 396
Attractiveness, 383
Attribution, 140, 359
Attunement, 328
Audience, 233, 243, 383
authority, 4, 11-12, 17, 85, 136-137, 144, 147,
164-165, 167, 169, 179, 205, 276
influence of, 205
obedience to, 137, 164, 169
Autism, 200-201, 317-318, 326-327, 331-335,
338-339, 402, 410, 412
Autobiographical memory, 341, 408, 414, 418
Autonomy, 31, 137, 283, 294-295, 298, 305-308, 312,
323-324, 334-336, 346, 393, 395, 402
development of, 283, 298, 305, 308, 369, 402
emotional, 305, 323-324
Autonomy versus shame and doubt, 294-295, 307
Avoidant infants, 61, 67
Awareness, 64, 97, 225, 240, 250, 262-263, 279, 281,
295, 333, 384
B
Babbling, 51, 53, 75, 114, 359, 362
Baby, 22, 24, 26, 29-30, 49-55, 57, 60-61, 65-66, 68,
106, 114-115, 123, 125, 128, 151, 154-155,
191, 201, 206, 255, 267-268, 273, 277,
291-293, 316-322, 324-327, 343, 372,
412-413
Baby talk, 106, 114
Bahamas, 173
Baillargeon, R., 401, 407
Balance, 27-28, 31, 66, 110, 280, 293, 319-320, 379,
381-382
Bandura, A., 401
Bantu, 101
Basic emotions, 189
Basic orientation, 343
Basic trust versus mistrust, 291
Beginnings of thought, 127
Behavior, 6-9, 18, 22, 25-26, 30-33, 35, 38-42, 44, 46,
48-49, 51-52, 54-68, 78-79, 85, 96, 100,
112-113, 120-121, 127-128, 135, 141,
143-144, 150, 153, 163, 179-180, 190-203,
205-207, 210-219, 221-222, 225-227, 229,
236-237, 242-246, 255, 258, 267, 269,
295-297, 304-305, 308, 310-311, 327, 333,
337-340, 364, 397, 400-403, 407-419
infant, 22, 26, 30, 32, 48-49, 51, 54, 63-64, 292,
327, 339, 397, 400-403, 407-408,
416-419
moral, 38, 144, 163, 175, 179-180, 218, 221,
401-403, 407-411, 414-418
prosocial, 216, 218
self-regulation of, 244
sexual, 44, 68, 199, 267, 275, 285, 297, 310
421

shaping of, 362
strength of, 258, 296, 304
Behavior analysis, 201
Behavior modification, 190, 200, 412
Behavior therapy, 419
Behavioral treatment, 412
Behaviorism, 388-390, 417-418
Behaviorists, 311, 340, 387-389
Beliefs, 5, 11, 18, 139, 143-144, 164, 173, 210, 286
in God, 5
Belongingness needs, 390
Best friends, 316
Bias, 181, 286-287
Biological evolution, 29
Biological factors, 265
Biological model, 115
Biology, 39-40, 223, 403, 411, 417
Birdsong, 401
Birth, 3-4, 11-14, 23, 25, 27, 45, 48, 50, 64, 68, 74,
124, 298, 316, 318-319, 359
process of, 27, 402
Blank slate, 5
Blood, 37
Body, 1, 6, 12-15, 17, 29, 41, 75, 116, 251, 262,
264-265, 283, 290-291, 307, 310-311,
320-321, 327, 354, 362, 364
Body movement, 13, 188, 283
Body proportions, 1
Bonding, 412
Bowlby, John, 47, 60
Boys, 86, 135-137, 161, 171, 176-177, 214, 216, 252,
275-276, 287, 289
Brain, 23, 25-26, 113, 186, 246, 411
adolescent, 411
autism and, 333, 402
behavior and, 26, 246
development, 23, 25-26, 246, 371, 402, 411
frontal lobes, 246
hand-eye coordination, 25-26
hemispheres of, 26
regions of, 186
schizophrenic, 113
self, 25-26, 333, 402, 411
Brain development, 411
Breast-feeding, 52
Brown, Roger, 352-353, 370
C
Cancer, 161, 264
Capital punishment, 411
Care orientation, 177-178
Career, 47, 56, 65, 72, 122, 157, 187, 191, 257, 307,
382
Careers, 380
Caregivers, 67
Case studies, 334, 419
Castration, 270, 272-274, 287
Castration anxiety, 272, 274
Categories, 101, 116, 126, 130, 223, 237, 250,
342-348, 372, 385, 389, 396
Causality, 128, 304
Cell, The, 24
Cells, 23-24
Central nervous system, 23, 93, 96, 412
Cerebrum, 186
Challenge, 146, 152, 174, 179, 227, 257, 259, 389
Change, 3-4, 8, 12, 14, 17, 39, 54, 72-73, 93, 108-111,
115, 122, 129, 132-133, 137, 139-140, 145,
156, 160, 165, 168-169, 180, 206, 234-236,
239, 251, 263, 301, 304-305, 323-324
discontinuous, 108-109, 111
Child care, 64-65, 190, 401-402, 412, 414, 417
quality of, 65
Child development, 12, 22, 172, 187, 253, 400-405,
407, 409-411, 413-415, 417-419
future of, 400
theories of, 401, 413-414
Child development research, 400, 403, 410
Child rearing, 22, 29, 32, 66, 112, 190, 225, 311, 325,
345, 414
Child-directed speech, 364
Childhood, 13-16, 22, 33, 55, 58, 63, 91-92, 96, 98,
109, 157, 258, 263-265, 268, 287, 300, 302,
304, 317, 319, 341-349, 395-396, 404-405,
407, 409, 413-415, 417-418, 420
Childhood amnesia, 342, 347
Child-rearing, 293, 311
Children, 1-3, 5-19, 22-24, 28-34, 38, 40, 46-49,
55-70, 71-92, 95-97, 99-103, 105-114, 117,
121-124, 126-130, 132-153, 155-157,
159-164, 167-171, 173-175, 178-181,
187-190, 194-195, 197-207, 211, 213-229,
237-238, 240-246, 248-260, 263-269,
278-279, 281-287, 289-292, 294-298, 302,
305-309, 311, 321-323, 325, 327-329,
332-340, 343-348, 377, 391-398, 400-406,
408-410, 412-418, 420
as miniature adults, 2
body proportions and, 1
development in, 95, 171, 180, 232, 256, 283, 358,
365, 371, 402, 417-418
media violence, 400, 410
temperament, 28-29, 67-68, 418
Chimpanzees, 46, 49, 67, 366-368
China, 63
Chinese, 375, 377, 418
Chomsky, 90, 158, 351-372, 398, 403-404, 415
Chomsky, Noam, 351, 415
Chromosomes, 24
Church of England, 4
Circular reaction, 125
Circular reactions, 125-126, 190, 354
Civil disobedience, 166
Claims, 122, 131, 166, 176, 223, 357, 366, 407
two, 122, 223
Class inclusion, 149
Classical conditioning, 184-185, 190-191, 199, 205
extinction, 185
Classification, 64, 134-135, 139, 147, 155, 161
Classroom, 80, 89, 91, 147, 198, 402, 410
Clinical psychologists, 310
Clinics, 234
close relationships, 62
Closure, 94
Coaching, 255
Cocaine, 262
Coding, 210
Cognition, 98-99, 114, 174, 206, 229, 283, 369, 396,
402, 412, 416, 418-419
and aging, 408
and creativity, 98
and education, 408
animal, 206, 412
infant cognition, 408
need for, 174
reasoning and, 408
Cognitive development, 121, 144, 151, 231-260, 310,
323, 348, 369, 405, 412
conservation, 407
culture, 238-239, 257, 310, 407
early childhood, 258, 405, 407
infancy, 412
intelligence, 121, 234-235, 252, 407
memory, 240, 256-257, 407
of infants, 121
Piaget, 121, 144, 151, 232, 238, 242-243, 248-249,
251, 256-257, 259-260, 310, 323, 369,
405, 412
Piaget and, 121, 243, 369
problem solving, 240, 252
Vygotsky, 231-260, 407
zone of proximal development, 252-254, 257
Cognitive domain, 223
Cognitive growth, 147
Cognitive learning, 213
Cognitive maps, 418
Cognitive mode, 108
Cognitive processes, 99, 150, 210, 278, 389
Cognitive psychology, 409, 415
Cognitive revolution, 389-390
Cognitive stages, 147, 224, 229, 305, 410
Cognitive theory, 390, 401
Cognitive view, 403
Cognitive-developmental approach, 410
Cognitive-developmental theory, 120-158, 308
Collective self, 227
College, 95, 120, 159, 187, 191, 228, 289-290, 300,
390, 405, 410-411, 413, 416
Color, 105, 141, 226, 238-239, 298
Colors, 32, 73, 87, 98, 104-105, 240
Commitment, 166, 180, 284, 299-300
and loving, 284
Communication, 117, 142, 150, 236, 243, 247, 337
of animals, 117
Communist Party, 234, 413
Community, 88, 163, 180, 191, 263-264, 298, 328,
398, 411
Comparative psychology, 94, 105, 406, 419
comparison, 17, 33, 76, 92, 134, 193, 197, 308,
369-370, 405
Comparisons, 109
Competence, 115, 294, 298, 312, 354, 400, 419
Competition, 39, 272, 351
Computers, 66, 329, 389
Concept, 23, 49, 97, 99, 106, 109, 114, 130, 139, 142,
145, 169, 250-253, 256, 258, 264, 281-282,
307, 327, 336, 396
Conception, 2-3, 95, 98, 108, 128, 142, 146, 164-167,
175-176, 265-266, 414-415
Concepts, 1, 14, 49, 95, 113, 116, 123, 128, 134, 138,
144, 205, 209-211, 221, 238, 249-252,
256-257, 310, 313, 351-352, 397, 407, 410
artificial, 116, 121
concrete, 14, 134, 144, 310
formal, 95, 113, 144, 238, 250, 289, 310
formation of, 187, 327, 419
learning, 1, 14, 123, 144, 185, 205, 209-211, 221,
249-250, 252, 351-352, 407, 419
Conclusion, 36, 139, 158, 214, 255, 274, 293, 312
Concrete operational thought, 150
Concrete operations, 122, 129, 132-133, 135,
139-141, 143-144, 146, 150, 206, 223,
309-310
condescension, 383
Conditioned reflexes, 184, 187, 414
Conditioning, 46, 184-192, 194-195, 199, 201, 205,
214, 390, 416
classical, 184-185, 190-191, 199, 205
higher-order, 186
operant, 191-192, 194-195, 199, 201, 205, 214,
416
vicarious, 214
Conflict, 133, 144-145, 165, 169, 179-180, 234-235,
249, 251, 263, 283, 290, 293, 298, 302, 306,
402
Conflict resolution, 402
Conflicts, 120, 136, 145, 234-235, 256, 288, 298-299,
326, 336
theory, 120, 136, 145, 234-235, 256, 288, 326
toddler, 326
Conformity, 12, 19, 340, 394
Conscience, 272, 279, 287
Consciousness, 64, 138, 168, 177, 181, 187, 233,
262, 272, 275, 279-280, 379-380, 387
control of, 168, 187
psychology of, 233
Consensus, 156
Conservation, 130-135, 139-141, 145, 147, 149, 152,
155-156, 221, 224-225, 407, 416, 418-419
of liquids, 132-133
tasks, 130, 135, 140-141, 147, 149, 152, 155-156,
224
Consistency, 63, 149, 151, 170, 291
Constancy, 318, 324
Constraint, 356-357, 400
Constraints, 190, 200, 309, 355-356, 362, 414
Construction, 76, 123, 125, 142, 232, 408, 414-415,
419
Constructivism, 147
Contact, 11, 26, 48-49, 54, 62, 77, 85-86, 154, 293,
317, 410
Context, 35, 107, 113, 227, 232, 234, 247, 359, 385,
414
thought and, 411
Contiguity, 212
Contingencies of reinforcement, 417
Contingency, 409
acquisition and, 409
Contingency management, 409
Continuity, 38, 68, 110
Control, 6, 23, 30, 32, 34, 66, 84-85, 96, 179, 187,
194-195, 197, 199-202, 205-207, 217, 221,
246, 248, 255, 268-269, 284, 294-296, 388,
391-392, 405
perceived, 395
Control groups, 179
Conventional morality, 163
Conventional morality stage, 163
Conventions, 15, 18, 29, 106, 391, 393
Cooing, 51, 53, 114, 188, 359
cooperation, 137, 214, 216, 297, 403
Cooperative learning, 403
Cooperative play, 135, 137
Coping, 282
Coping strategies, 282
Cornell University, 390, 415
Correlations, 149, 175
422

couples, 302
courtship, 41
Crawling, 26, 49, 325
Creative thinking, 38, 114, 281, 396
Creativity, 69, 86-87, 90-91, 98, 150, 259, 390, 396
curiosity and, 390
tests, 90, 150
Crimes, 215
Crisis, 58, 72, 177, 270-272, 274, 278, 294-299,
303-306, 323-324, 380-381, 385, 394, 413
Critical period, 42, 44-45, 409
Critical periods, 73, 90
Cross-cultural research, 385
Crowding, 114
Cues, 29, 33, 63, 66, 240, 320
Cultural beliefs, 144
Cultural bias, 286-287
Cultural differences, 398
Cultural evolution, 413
Cultural factors, 174
Cultural influences, 177
Cultural stereotypes, 287
Cultural universality, 63, 173
Cultural universals, 169, 306
Culture, 29-31, 46, 106, 108, 116, 173, 225, 238-239,
257, 286, 291, 298-299, 306, 309-310, 354,
382, 391, 411
and research, 31, 413
child development, 407, 409, 411, 413
child development and, 407, 411
context, 411
death and, 411
differences, 306
levels of, 238
self and, 407, 409
Cumulative record, 417
Cytoplasm, 24
Czechoslovakia, 261
D
Darwin, Charles, 35, 404
Data, 48, 168, 170-171, 193, 284, 357, 363, 389, 392,
407, 419
Dating, 221, 307
Death, 11, 59, 159, 161, 167, 234, 283, 290, 300,
303-306, 336, 383-384, 411
confronting, 304
fear of, 304
Death and dying, 411
Decenter, 140
Decision making, 115, 180
Decisions, 147, 164, 166, 175, 250, 252, 299-300
individual, 164, 166, 175
Deep structure, 358, 360
Defense, 58, 276, 281-283, 406
Deferred imitation, 127, 153-154, 401
Deficiency, 242
Delusions, 379
Denial, 282
Dependability, 308
Dependence, 25, 275, 357, 360, 362, 400, 404
Depression, 160, 219, 221, 268, 381
environment and, 221
Deprivation, 45, 47, 56-57, 64
human, 47, 56
Depth, 288, 404
Descriptive studies, 371
Desensitization, 190, 200
systematic, 190, 200
Development, 1-2, 5-6, 10, 12-15, 18, 21-26, 28,
30-31, 35, 37, 39, 45-46, 63, 65-66, 69,
71-73, 90-91, 93-99, 105, 108-111, 115,
119-123, 125, 142-145, 151-153, 155,
157-158, 159-181, 223, 231-260, 264,
266-267, 276, 283-284, 305-308, 310-312,
317-319, 323-326, 351-372, 393-394, 398,
399-419
adult, 1-2, 10, 13-15, 18, 31, 46, 73, 99, 109-110,
123, 142, 152-153, 157, 244-245,
252-255, 258-259, 264, 289, 301, 311,
357-358, 360-361, 364-366, 372, 374,
404-405, 413-414, 417, 419
biological, 18, 22, 31, 115, 123, 144, 234, 261, 276,
305-308, 311-312, 317, 358, 371,
393-394, 417
brain, 23, 25-26, 246, 371, 402, 411
motor behavior, 25
of brain, 411
of moral thinking, 159, 181
psychosexual, 264, 267, 290, 419
Developmental change, 115, 122, 145, 168, 206, 232,
394
Developmental delay, 71-72, 363
Developmental psychology, 12, 109, 115, 239, 348,
351, 401, 404-405, 407-408, 410-413,
415-418, 420
adulthood, 109, 412-413
explained, 253
infancy and childhood, 418
Developmental stages, 206, 224, 282, 418
Developmental view, 228, 414
Developmentalists, 19, 71, 109, 181, 205-206,
224-225, 227-228, 238, 257-260, 339, 360,
385, 393-394, 398
Deviations, 317
Dewey, John, 160
Diagnosis, 71, 113, 317, 407
clinical, 113
Dialects, 45, 370
Differential reinforcement, 211
Digestive system, 184
Direct experience, 17, 397
Discipline, 6-7, 9, 85, 148, 285, 387
Discrimination, 15, 87, 186, 195
of stimulus, 195
Discriminative stimuli, 194-195, 205
Disease, 101, 160, 403
Disequilibrium, 28
disgust, 269, 303, 342-343
Disorders, 234, 268, 282, 317, 374, 384, 414
diagnosis of, 333
psychological, 400, 414
Disoriented infants, 62
Distress, 41, 48-49, 51, 60, 217
Distribution, 354
disturbances of, 47, 410
Division of labor, 14
Divorce, 59, 187
Dominance, 26, 58, 247
Dream, 79, 138-139, 142, 270, 280, 304, 377,
381-382, 388
Dreaming, 139
Dreams, 97, 116, 121, 138-140, 263-264, 277, 280,
286, 304, 377-379, 381-383, 397, 405-406
analysis of, 406
interpretation of, 264, 406
nature of, 377, 383
psychoanalytic theory of, 405
Drive, 42, 48, 59, 69, 80, 193, 199, 212, 214, 308
sex, 199
Drives, 198-199, 283-284, 287, 297-299, 312, 346,
374
Drugs, 97
Dualism, 403
E
Early childhood, 157, 258, 319, 342-343, 402, 405,
407, 417, 420
education, 345, 402, 405
Early childhood education, 402, 405
Early development, 409
Eating, 123, 195, 200, 237, 244, 268
regulation of, 244
Echo, 117, 201
Echolalia, 201, 317
Eclectic approaches, 256
Education, 1, 3-7, 10, 12, 15, 18, 71-72, 76-77, 87-89,
91, 95, 112-114, 145-146, 152, 178, 225,
259, 285, 311, 345, 369, 410-411, 415-416
exercise, 6, 15, 89
health, 6
Ego, 276-281, 283-284, 287, 291, 293-294, 296,
298-300, 302-304, 312, 346, 377, 379-381,
396, 402, 408-409, 413, 415
psychoanalysis and, 406
repression of, 284, 346
Ego ideal, 279
Ego identity, 299, 413, 415
Ego integrity, 294, 303-304
Ego integrity versus despair, 303
Ego psychology, 408
Egocentric speech, 242-243, 246
Egocentric thought, 137
Egocentrism, 3, 135-137, 139-140, 142, 145, 149,
155-156, 175, 242
Eidetic imagery, 101
Elderly, 303-304, 407
Elderly people, 407
Electra complex, 273
Elkind, David, 146
Emergencies, 216
Emitted behavior, 201
Emotion, 38, 75, 99, 101-103, 247, 396
Emotional availability, 324-325
Emotional development, 305
Emotional self, 244
Emotions, 38-39, 47, 54, 67, 100, 102, 116, 188-189,
198-199, 262-263, 282, 309
Empathy, 98, 163, 174, 292, 367, 389, 395
Empirical evidence, 5, 34, 175, 287
reliance on, 5
Empiricism, 5
Employees, 290
Enculturation, 31
Environment, 5-6, 10, 14, 23-24, 31, 40, 46, 60-61, 73,
75, 77-79, 88, 96, 102-103, 112, 116,
144-146, 151, 184, 198, 205-206, 221-222,
283, 303, 321-322, 339, 354-355, 367-368,
380, 390-393
self-efficacy and, 221
Environmental contingencies, 200, 216
Environmental factors, 23, 25, 229, 398
Equality, 147, 287
Equilibration, 145, 179
Erasmus, 35
Erikson, E., 405
Erikson, Erik, 289, 405
theory of development, 289
Erogenous zones, 188
Eroticism, 400, 406
Error, 31, 80, 84, 127, 198, 211, 326, 357, 363
Errors, 80, 203, 354, 357, 364
ESP, 385
Esteem needs, 390
Ethic of care, 177, 181
Ethics, 176, 311
Ethologists, 18, 39-42, 45-46, 63, 98, 397
Ethology, 35, 39-40, 46, 48, 408
Ethos, 306
Europe, 3, 46, 63, 210, 235, 289-290
Evaluation, 9, 18, 31, 33, 39, 46, 67, 89, 115, 148-149,
186, 190, 203, 227-228, 256, 285, 312, 346
of self, 89
Evidence, 2-3, 5, 24, 33-34, 36, 45, 47, 65, 67-69, 73,
112, 150-151, 153, 169-171, 175-176, 180,
205, 225, 256, 263-264, 287, 346, 357, 362,
364-365, 371
Evolution, 14, 29, 35-37, 40, 42, 49, 59, 61, 66, 90,
200, 235, 237, 400, 412-413, 415
cultural evolution, 413
human evolution, 61, 235, 237
natural selection, 36
Exceptions, 13
Exercise, 6, 14-15, 17, 32, 78, 82-84, 89, 276, 298,
354
Exhibitionism, 265
Expectations, 29, 33, 63, 84, 163, 198, 212, 295, 299,
307, 392
influence, 63, 212
Experience, 5, 13, 16-18, 42, 44, 46, 49, 51, 71, 73,
89-90, 96-97, 99-100, 102-105, 113-114,
116, 144, 184, 196-197, 204-206, 238-239,
247-248, 250-251, 267, 283-284, 287,
300-301, 323, 325, 336-339, 342-343,
345-346, 370, 391-393, 395-397
Experiment, 41-42, 96, 126, 130-131, 133-134, 141,
152, 154, 179, 185-186, 189, 197, 206, 218,
220, 224, 226
control, 96, 179, 197, 206
Experimental psychology, 415
Experiments, 40, 46, 133, 140, 153-155, 186, 192,
194-195, 217-218, 224, 227-228, 285
Expert, 352
Expertise, 228
Exposure, 90, 217, 342
External control, 295
External forces, 18
Extinction, 185, 194, 197-198, 403, 405, 419
spontaneous recovery, 185, 194
Extroversion, 26, 380
extroverts, 380
Exuberance, 110, 296, 323
Eye, 9, 23, 25-27, 69, 83, 319, 367, 383, 405
movements of, 83
F
Faces, 50-51, 62, 104-105, 188, 303
423

Facial expressions, 195
Failure, 152, 285, 296, 298
Families, 3, 57, 65, 380, 408
Family, 35, 37, 47, 63, 88, 97, 120, 163-164, 236-237,
250-251, 261-262, 276, 286, 296, 298, 300,
310, 313, 318, 328, 383, 413, 415
blended, 37
nuclear, 286
systems, 237, 250-251
Family constellation, 286
Family values, 300
Farming, 1, 3, 14, 16, 88-89, 236, 238
Father, 1, 4-5, 11-12, 39-40, 53, 55, 105, 120,
194-195, 213, 217, 233, 270-273, 275, 286,
304, 326, 378
Fathers, 63-64, 327
Fear, 8, 33, 45-46, 54, 56-58, 64, 66, 91, 188-190,
226, 247, 269, 282, 287, 304, 392, 409
Fear of strangers, 54, 57, 322
Feedback, 203, 205, 226, 334, 363
Feelings, 6, 12, 14, 59, 61, 63-64, 68, 77, 86, 89,
96-99, 103-107, 113, 115, 138, 163-164,
175, 185, 188-190, 206, 217, 223, 226,
261-264, 271-272, 274-276, 281-282, 298,
301, 307-308, 318, 327-329, 338, 342-343,
372, 383
Females, 41-42, 177-178, 217, 270, 281
Feminine traits, 378, 380
Fetus, 96
Fiber, 49
Fidelity, 294, 300
Field of vision, 51, 128
Fish, 14, 37, 41, 258, 261
Fixation, 267-269
Fixations, 267
Fixed-interval schedules, 199
Fixed-ratio schedules, 196
Flattery, 7, 17
Flexibility, 45, 64, 147, 287
Flooding, 335
Fluid, 96, 116, 247, 281, 328, 385
Foreclosure, 300
Forgetting, 281
repression, 281
Form perception, 99
Formal operational thinking, 141, 151
Formal operations, 122, 140-141, 143-144, 146, 151,
160, 229, 310, 411, 414
Fossils, 36
Framing, 357
Free association, 262-263
Free speech, 176
Frequency, 178, 195, 354
Frequency distribution, 354
Freud, S., 403, 406-407
Freud, Sigmund, 261, 279, 406, 409
theory of dreams, 406
Freudian theory, 281, 284, 326
Friendliness, 63
Friends, 58-59, 65, 72, 164, 233, 249, 289, 300, 303,
344
Friendship, 383
seeking, 383
Frontal lobe, 246
Frontal lobes, 246
Fulfillment, 390, 394
Funeral, 262
future, 4, 9, 13, 17-18, 59, 68, 90, 130, 142, 146, 192,
236, 258-259, 274, 278, 289, 293, 299-300,
307, 310, 400
G
Gandhi, Mohandas, 166
Gardner, Howard, 110
Gender, 176-177, 216, 377-378, 385, 398, 403, 408
aggression, 403
development and, 398
differences, 176-177, 378, 398
Gender differences, 176-177, 378, 398
Gender differences in, 177
Gender roles, 216
Generalization, 186, 189, 195
Generalizations, 392
Generativity, 294, 302, 307
Generativity versus self-absorption, 302
Genes, 23-25, 36, 39, 172
Genetic factors, 412
developmental, 412
Genital stage, 275, 298
Germany, 168, 289
Gesell, Arnold, 1, 22
Gestalt principles, 94
Gestalt psychologists, 93, 379
Gestalt psychology, 93-94
Gesture, 50
Gilligan, Carol, 176
Girls, 136, 161, 176-177, 216, 242, 270, 274-276, 287
Glove anesthesia, 262
Goals, 31, 55, 80, 87, 89, 96, 116, 191, 198, 218-219,
228, 259, 293, 296-297, 300, 306-307, 313,
380
and values, 313, 382-383
Grammar, 13, 74-75, 106, 351-352, 355, 358,
360-361, 365-366, 369-372, 417
acquisition of, 74, 351, 361, 365, 370, 403, 417
Grandparents, 65, 250
Grasp reflex, 51, 53, 291
Grasping, 24-25, 74, 122-124, 136, 291
reflex, 123-124, 291
Grief, 44
Group, 24, 39, 47, 98, 128, 137, 147, 154, 165, 172,
174, 180, 211, 217, 220, 261, 316
experimental, 217
Groups, 39, 45, 48, 154, 165, 178-180, 220, 226, 238,
250, 254, 264, 286
decision making, 180
performance of, 215
Growth, 3, 10-11, 13, 19, 22-23, 25-26, 28-31, 88, 129,
143, 145, 147, 213, 238, 266-267, 283-285,
303, 310, 312, 339, 341, 370, 378, 388,
390-395, 398, 402, 414
Guided imagery, 226
Guilt, 265, 272, 279, 294, 296-297, 395
H
Habitats, 397
Hair, 53, 100, 363
Hallucinations, 277, 283
Hallucinogenic drugs, 97
Hallucinogens, 105
Hand-eye coordination, 25-26, 83
Happiness, 7, 54, 199, 388
children and, 7
Harlow, Harry, 390
Hartmann, Heinz, 283
Havighurst, R., 408
Health, 6, 16, 47, 51, 56, 64-65, 115, 226, 303, 317,
325, 337, 339-340, 382, 395, 398
lifestyles, 303
mental, 47, 115, 310, 325, 333, 337, 339-340
Health care, 65
Hearing, 38, 105, 291, 311, 338, 343-344, 357, 362,
371, 413
aid, 38
impaired, 371
loss, 343, 371
Heart, 23, 328, 372, 402, 411
Heinz dilemma, 162, 165-166, 169, 174
Helpfulness, 217, 225
Hemispheres, 26
Heteronomy, 137, 139-140
High school, 77, 93, 120, 180, 191, 390, 416
Higher education, 316
Higher-order conditioning, 186
History, 11, 17, 37, 58, 69, 71, 92, 100, 213, 233-235,
245, 374, 400-401, 406-407, 414-418
of psychology, 233, 407, 415, 417-418
reinforcement, 213, 401, 417
Holistic approach, 407
homicides, 215
Homunculus, 2-3
Honesty, 107
Hospitalization, 325
Hospitals, 47, 65, 201
Hostility, 282
Hue, 101
Human development, 14, 39, 46, 65, 260, 406-407,
410-412, 414-416, 418
Human evolution, 61, 235, 237
Human thinking, 236, 241, 389
Human traits, 235
Humanistic psychology, 387-398, 404
Humor, 211
Hunger, 69, 199, 319-320, 343, 390
Hyperactivity, 113
Hypnosis, 262
Hypotheses, 69, 141, 151, 287, 392
Hypothesis, 90, 141, 175-176, 238, 342, 354, 356-357,
371, 392, 397
forming, 356
Hysteria, 262-263, 284, 403
I
Idealism, 142
Identical twins, 24
Identification, 163, 271, 401, 412
Identifications, 299-300
Identity, 132-134, 294, 299-301, 306-307, 310,
312-313, 405, 411, 413, 415
foreclosure, 300
formation, 299-300
Identity confusion, 299
Identity foreclosure, 300
Identity formation, 299-300
Identity status, 413, 415
Identity versus role confusion, 299
ideology, 410, 413
Illness, 280, 282
Illusion, 317-320
Imagery, 100-101, 187, 226, 251, 396
eidetic, 101
Images, 33, 43, 92, 97-98, 122, 129, 153, 212-213,
277, 343, 358, 378, 396
Imagination, 87-88, 228, 309, 389, 397
Imitation, 6, 32, 127, 153-154, 210, 215-216, 221-222,
228, 401, 405, 408, 413, 415, 419
deferred, 127, 153-154, 401, 413, 419
Imitation of models, 127
Imprint, 44-45, 48
Imprinting, 42, 44-46, 49, 56-57, 75, 401, 408
Incest, 286, 306
Incidence, 218, 333
Incidental learning, 401
Independent thinking, 19, 180-181, 258
India, 173-174
Individual differences, 23, 141, 400, 417, 419
Individualism, 162
Industry versus inferiority, 298
Infancy, 13, 27, 29, 60, 63, 96, 155, 194, 319,
342-343, 395-396, 400, 406, 411-413, 418
behavior in, 96, 411, 413
Infancy and early childhood, 319, 342
Infant intelligence, 22
Infantile amnesia, 341, 346
Infants, 13-14, 28, 50, 54, 60-62, 64-67, 73, 96, 115,
123-126, 128, 130, 142, 145, 151, 153-155,
187-188, 221, 306, 318-319, 325, 342, 403
imprinting, 401
nervous system, 28, 96, 294
perception, 342, 397, 403
Infants and toddlers, 66
Information, 22, 42, 47, 80, 88, 123, 139, 145,
179-180, 202-203, 206, 220, 228, 237,
246-247, 253, 257-258, 365-366, 383, 389
sources of, 220
In-groups, 299
Inheritance, 36
Initiative versus guilt, 296, 307
Injuries, 113, 246
Innate behavior, 40
Insight, 73, 154, 286, 301, 304, 377, 397, 405
Instinct, 41-42, 46, 49, 412, 415, 417
Integration, 28, 95, 171-172, 300, 307, 377, 397-398
Integrity versus despair, 303
Intellectual abilities, 337
Intellectual development, 66, 90, 120, 125, 143, 249,
407
Intelligence, 22, 38, 91, 121-122, 124, 141, 157,
234-235, 252, 298, 389, 407, 414-416
creative, 38, 91, 389
linguistic, 415
tests, 22, 121, 234, 252
theories, 38, 389, 414
thinking and, 121
Intelligence testing, 121
Intelligence tests, 234, 252
Interactionism, 410
Intermittent reinforcement, 196
Internal conflict, 263
Internalization, 244, 324
Interpersonal relations, 47, 417
Interpersonal theory, 417
Interpretation of dreams, 264, 406
Interrater reliability, 161
Interval schedules, 197, 199
Interventions, 113, 201, 352
Interviewing children, 159
424

Interviews, 64, 176-177, 318
Intimacy, 294, 301-302, 306, 322
goals, 306
Intimate relationships, 274
Intonation, 107
Intrinsic motivation, 10
Introspection, 187, 385
Ion, 109
Iowa, 211
IQ, 103, 254, 370, 398
IQ tests, 254, 398
Iraq, 352
Isolation, 24, 99, 249, 294, 300-302
intimacy vs., 294
J
Japan, 63, 177
Japanese, 146, 358
Jefferson, Thomas, 391
Job, 1, 3, 76, 85, 120, 252, 259, 345, 416
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 409
Judgment, 11, 16, 87, 136, 149, 160, 172, 180,
223-224, 402, 404-405, 407, 409-411,
414-416
self-efficacy, 223
Judgments, 100, 115, 155-157, 160, 170, 178, 219,
223, 339, 387, 393, 401, 411, 416
Justice orientation, 177
K
Kagan, Jerome, 67
Kant, Immanuel, 93, 166
Kanzi, 367-368, 416
Knowledge, 3, 5, 9, 13, 17, 22, 30, 42, 55, 76, 143,
145, 147, 149, 154-155, 177, 185-186, 194,
202-203, 205, 249-250, 274, 288, 308, 347,
354-355, 365, 397
aspects of, 76, 355
Koffka, Kurt, 94
Kohlberg, L., 402, 404-405, 410-411, 414-416
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 138, 159, 415
Kohler, Wolfgang, 94
L
Labor, 14
Laboratory research, 327, 363-364
Language, 4, 13, 22, 30, 41, 73-75, 81, 84, 88, 90,
101, 105-108, 113-114, 116-117, 129-130,
142, 185, 213, 250-251, 256, 283, 309,
348-349, 351-372, 393-394, 402-405,
407-409, 411-412, 414-418
emergence of, 371, 402, 414, 418
grammar, 13, 74-75, 106, 351-352, 355, 358,
360-361, 365-366, 369-372, 417
instinct, 41, 412, 415, 417
nonhuman, 368
overregularizations, 360, 363, 369
poverty, 411, 415
private speech, 411
propositions, 412
rules of, 354
scientific, 130, 250-251, 256, 356, 372, 408
semantics, 404
sensitive periods, 73, 75
sign language, 366, 371, 407
symbols in, 129
syntax, 351, 360, 366, 368-370, 403-404, 417
syntax in, 360, 368, 370, 403
universal grammar, 355, 358, 366
vocabulary, 127, 370
Language acquisition, 75, 90, 364, 369, 371, 402, 404,
409
Language and thought, 404, 414-415
Language development, 352-372, 404, 417
early childhood, 417
Language instinct, 415
Language learning, 352, 362, 365, 371, 409, 414
Latency period, 272, 274-275, 290, 297
Later adulthood, 178
Law, 137, 151, 162, 164-166, 168, 179, 233, 241-242,
262, 284-285, 304, 341, 405
Leaders, 146, 166, 168, 226, 279, 389
Leadership, 63, 146
Learned behavior, 216
Learning, 1, 3, 5-6, 9, 13-14, 17, 31-32, 74-76, 80-81,
90, 123, 126, 144-147, 150-152, 183-207,
209-229, 232, 237, 249-250, 252-255,
259-260, 298, 326, 351-352, 354-355,
362-363, 365, 371, 392, 401-404, 407-409,
412, 414-419
active, 13, 74, 123, 147, 189, 191, 202-203
by modeling, 224
by observing, 210-211, 221
cognitive learning, 213
cognitive maps, 418
during early childhood, 417
from models, 212
incidental, 401
observational, 210-212, 367, 404, 412
observational learning, 210-212, 367, 404, 412
prepared, 75, 84
self-regulated, 29, 414
social-learning theory, 401
through imitation, 6, 210, 401
trial-and-error, 191, 211
Learning curve, 193
Learning theory, 1, 5, 9, 183-207, 209-229, 362, 401
Levinson, Daniel, 385
Liebert, Robert, 215
Life span, 98, 221
Life structure, 385
Lifestyle, 221
Lifestyles, 303
Light, 9, 32, 48, 67, 105, 138, 150, 185, 193, 244-245,
253, 282, 316, 347
visible, 327
Linguistic structures, 369
Linguistics, 351-352, 357, 404
Links, 176
Listening, 34, 91-92, 93, 206, 383
Locke, John, 1, 4, 411, 414-416
Locomotion, 56, 109, 296, 306, 309, 312, 322-323
Logic, 116, 130, 133, 148, 154-157, 277, 309, 404, 411
of formal operations, 411
Logical concepts, 134
Logical intelligence, 157
Logical operation, 154
Logical thinking, 64, 130, 378, 409, 417
Logical thought, 378
Longitudinal studies, 171
Longitudinal study, 171-172, 290, 404
Lorenz, Konrad, 39
Loss, 62, 85, 150, 188, 262, 268, 272, 274, 281, 310,
343, 402
Love, 8, 47, 49-51, 64, 66, 68, 72, 85-86, 90, 110, 114,
135, 142, 157, 163, 167, 188, 258, 270-276,
281-283, 287, 301-302, 304, 334-335, 402,
410
empty, 302, 402
Love needs, 390
Luther, Martin, 166-168, 181
M
Magazines, 187
Males, 38-39, 42, 176-178, 270, 316
Management, 409
Mandala, 375-376
Mandalas, 375, 379
Marcia, James, 313
Marriage, 261, 301, 409
Marx, Karl, 234
Masculine traits, 380
Maslow, Abraham, 388-390, 407, 413
Mass media, 225-226
Masturbation, 264, 270, 273
Mathematics, 16-17, 220, 308, 352
Mating, 40
Matrix, 106, 419
Matrix, The, 419
Maturational theory, 21-34
Mean, 64, 67, 97, 102, 152, 166, 172, 177, 194, 203,
239, 252, 320, 347
Meanings, 74, 248, 352, 382
Measurement, 97, 109, 205, 387-388, 404
Media, 225-226, 400, 410
Media violence, 400, 410
Medicine, 4, 35, 40, 114, 316-317, 395, 411
Meltzoff, Andrew, 153
memories, 64, 262-263, 274, 287, 304, 341, 346-347,
381, 383, 415
autobiographical, 341
Memory, 84, 99, 101, 109, 213, 240, 256-257, 262,
272, 341-343, 346, 354, 401, 407-408,
413-414, 417-418
conceptual, 101, 109
explicit, 354
field, 240, 262
knowledge, 213, 272, 354
photographic, 101
photographic memory, 101
recall, 342-343, 346
rehearsal, 213
rehearsal and, 213
Memory aids, 213, 240, 256-257
Memory capacity, 109
men, 176-177, 236, 272, 274, 363, 374, 378-380, 382,
384-385, 403, 418
Mendel, Gregor, 39
Mental disorders, 400
common, 400
Mental events, 63
Mental functioning, 245, 406
Mental health, 47, 310, 325, 333, 337, 339-340
Mental retardation, 71, 113, 412
Mental states, 103, 187, 191
Metacognition, 240
Metacognitive knowledge, 250
Metamemory, 240
Metaphor, 26, 239, 317
Methods, 71-72, 77, 87-88, 148, 152, 201, 205, 317,
367, 395
Mickey Mouse, 357
Middle school, 404
movement, 404
Midlife crisis, 380
Military, 352
Mistrust, 152, 291-294, 308
trust versus, 291, 293
Modalities, 10, 98, 105, 339, 343
Model, 8, 14, 51, 55, 63, 68, 115-116, 127-128, 145,
179-180, 190-192, 212-215, 217, 219, 221,
224-227, 355, 390, 401
Modeling, 9, 212, 221-229, 362-366, 401, 416, 419
Monkeys, 37, 67-68
Montessori education, 85, 89, 91, 411
Montessori, Maria, 1, 411, 414
Montessori method, 81, 413
Montessori preschools, 89
Montessori schools, 76, 89-90
Mood, 321-322
Moral behavior, 175
Moral development, 159-181, 402-403, 407, 409-411,
417
Kohlberg and, 169, 180
models, 403, 417
Moral dilemma, 224
Moral dilemmas, 160, 178, 180
Moral emotions, 38
Moral reasoning, 167-168, 172, 176, 223, 396
stages of, 167-168, 172, 176, 223, 396
Moral standards, 279-280
Morality, 38, 121, 137, 162-165, 174, 176-177, 181,
262, 287, 407, 412, 415-416, 418
conventional, 163, 177
justice orientation, 177
postconventional, 164, 174, 176-177, 181
preconventional, 162-163, 177
violations of, 137
Morality of justice, 181
Mothers, 48, 50, 60-65, 255, 259, 266, 318-322, 325,
327
age of, 63, 65, 319
Motion, 75, 148, 226, 245
Motivation, 10, 202, 219, 259, 273-274, 276, 390, 401,
413, 419
and goals, 219
developmental approach to, 419
rewards and, 10
Motives, 160, 163-164, 167, 171-172
Motor development, 2, 24
Motor skills, 81, 213-214, 259
fine, 81, 214
Movement, 11, 13, 72, 93, 125, 144, 167, 176, 188,
196, 283, 296, 370, 388-389
Movies, 198-199, 215
Muscle, 81, 127
Music, 11, 87, 93, 105, 276, 355
Mutations, 37
Mutual gaze, 320
Mutuality, 292, 301-302, 327
N
Narcissism, 266, 268
Native Americans, 103
Natural selection, 36, 39
Naturalistic observations, 60
425

Nazi Germany, 168
Negative reinforcement, 197
Neglect, 76, 115, 285, 302, 380
Nerves, 37
Nervous system, 23, 25, 28, 93, 96, 144, 245, 294,
412
spinal cord, 23
Newborn, 32, 51, 319, 326-327, 400, 411, 420
crying, 51
Newborns, 1-2, 32, 327, 359
Newton, Isaac, 36
NICHD, 65
No-consequences condition, 215
Noise, 8, 51, 54, 188, 192
Norms, 22, 28, 32, 124, 167, 174, 180
O
Obedience, 85, 137, 162, 164, 169, 287
Obedience to authority, 169
Object constancy, 318, 324
Object permanence, 128-129, 153-154, 324, 401
Observation, 22, 40, 77, 85-87, 90, 211-213, 215-217,
219, 227-228, 254, 259, 296, 354, 419-420
direct, 77, 212-213
Observational learning, 210-212, 367, 404, 412
attention, 210, 212
OCEAN, 67, 328
Odors, 32, 50, 98, 342
Oedipal stage, 269, 282
Oedipus complex, 263, 270, 272-274, 281, 286, 297,
406
Old age, 294, 303, 312, 383, 386
On Death and Dying, 411
only children, 217
Operant conditioning, 191-192, 194-195, 201, 214,
362, 416
discriminative stimulus, 195
primary reinforcers, 194
reinforcement, 194-195, 214
reinforcers, 194
Skinner box, 192
stimulus generalization, 195
Oral fixation, 267-268
Organization, 25-26, 47, 56, 64, 96, 123-125, 141,
157, 168, 172, 176, 379, 400
Orgasm, 265, 301
Orientation, 73, 94-95, 98-99, 113-114, 157, 162, 174,
176-178, 180, 227, 236, 338, 340, 383, 385,
398
Overregularizations, 360, 363, 369
Overregularizing, 361
Overtones, 100
P
Pain, 7-8, 13-14, 49, 51, 160, 194, 198, 226, 264-265,
276-277, 292, 323, 328
sense of, 226, 277, 292, 323, 328
somatic, 292
Palmar grasp, 26
Panic, 265, 292
Parenting, 412
Parents, 3, 6-8, 17-18, 29-31, 33-34, 41, 44-45, 47-49,
58-59, 63-68, 72, 76-77, 89, 114, 139, 144,
146, 168, 190, 195, 197, 210-211, 214, 250,
255-256, 261, 268-271, 274-276, 292-293,
295-298, 311, 333-335, 345, 354, 362-363
as models, 221
single, 30, 41, 295-296, 335
Passion, 281
Pavlovian conditioning, 187
Peak experience, 391
Peak experiences, 391
Peer, 136, 254, 402
groups, 254
peers, 90, 136-137, 145, 147, 197, 219, 221, 252, 255,
258, 260, 298, 344-345
Penis envy, 273, 287
Percept, 109
Perception, 94, 98-99, 101-104, 107-109, 117, 135,
138, 157, 279, 283, 345, 396-397, 408, 416,
419
of inequality, 416
Period of concrete operations, 135
Periods of development, 122
Person, 5, 8, 13-15, 22, 35, 49, 51, 53-54, 56-59, 62,
88, 98, 101, 128, 140, 156, 162, 166-167,
169, 177, 242, 248-250, 257, 265-268,
277-278, 302-304, 312, 321, 323-325, 327,
380-383
described, 22, 59, 128, 167, 177, 266, 282
Persona, 377, 379
Personal unconscious, 378-379
Personality, 25-26, 28, 62, 73, 96, 267, 273, 276,
278-279, 307, 339, 380-382, 386, 398,
400-401, 404, 408-409, 413-414, 416-419
Erikson and, 291, 307
healthy, 333, 404
psychoanalysis, 279, 408, 418
psychosexual stages, 419
social cognitive theory, 401
studies of, 417
traits, 267, 377-378, 380, 409
traits in, 267
types, 62
Personality development, 96, 291, 398, 400-401, 404,
417
Perspective, 30, 39, 48, 67, 109, 113, 137, 140, 142,
156, 164-165, 191, 232, 242, 256-257, 348,
370-371, 405-406, 418
Perspectives, 69, 136, 140, 142, 147, 175, 308-309,
408-409, 411-412, 414
Persuasion, 220, 301
source of, 220
Phallic (Oedipal) stage, 296
Phallic stage, 265, 271, 297
Phenomenological approach, 338
Phi, 191, 405
Philosophy of science, 404
Phobia, 226, 406
Phobias, 282, 417
social, 417
Photographic memory, 101
Phrases, 320, 360
Physical growth, 213, 299
Physical health, 6
Physiological needs, 390
Physiology, 40
Piaget, J., 409, 414-415
Piaget, Jean, 1, 120, 405, 415
Piagetian theory, 174, 180, 222
Pincer grasp, 26
Plague, 13, 403
Play, 6, 11, 15, 23, 29, 32-33, 38, 60, 68-70, 75, 91-92,
110, 114, 133-138, 146, 150, 189, 247-248,
254-256, 261, 269-270, 284, 298-299,
336-337, 369
fighting, 144
Pleasure principle, 276, 343
politeness, 7
Popularity, 59, 257
Population, 37, 365
Positive psychology, 418
Postconventional level, 177, 181
Postconventional morality, 164, 181
Postnatal development, 23
Poverty, 411, 415
Power, 6, 9, 87, 114, 125, 142, 167-168, 180-181,
211-213, 227, 245, 263, 281, 322, 324, 366,
370, 403-404, 411
Practice, 6, 8, 24, 65, 77, 81, 83, 92, 148, 200,
212-213, 284-285, 290, 375, 417, 419
Precocious, 17, 32
Preconscious, 279
Preconventional level, 163, 177
Preconventional morality, 162
Preconventional morality stage, 162
Prefixes, 75
Prejudice, 287
envy, 287
Premise, 147, 202
Prenatal development, 23
Prenatal period, 306
Preoperational period, 129, 133, 139, 157, 369
Preoperational stage, 133, 157
Preoperational thinking, 139, 157
early childhood, 157
Preoperational thought, 122, 129, 142-143, 157
Preschool years, 403
Pressure, 19, 42, 46, 80, 228, 344, 393
sound, 393
Primacy, 296
Primary circular reactions, 125, 190
Primary process thinking, 277
Primary reinforcers, 194
Princeton University, 376, 409
Private speech, 243
Problem solving, 69, 148, 240, 252
Problems, 14, 16, 19, 29, 57, 65, 81, 98, 113, 142-143,
146-148, 151-152, 168-169, 180, 187, 200,
220, 222-223, 241-244, 254, 258, 267,
272-273, 303, 307-308, 317, 340, 342,
383-385
Processing, 364
Programmed instruction, 202-204, 414
Projection, 282
Prosocial behavior, 216, 218
in emergencies, 216
Prototype, 248
Proximity, 18, 48-49, 51, 54-55, 58, 61, 64, 67
Psychiatrists, 47
Psychiatry, 317, 374, 384, 403, 405, 411, 417
Psychoanalysis, 279-280, 284, 286, 290, 317, 384,
388-389, 406-408, 418
resistance, 406
unconscious, 279-280, 384, 388, 406
Psychoanalyst, 317, 326, 341, 395, 397
Psychoanalytic theories, 232, 264
Psychoanalytic theory, 261-288, 289, 308, 312, 374,
405, 408
Oedipus complex in, 263
Psycholinguistics, 351, 400, 403-404, 410, 412, 417
Psycholinguists, 358-360, 362
Psychological Bulletin, 402, 411, 413
Psychological research, 187, 371, 418
Psychologists, 22, 31, 40, 46, 89, 93-95, 121-122,
142, 150, 152, 154-156, 185, 221, 239-240,
243-244, 248, 251, 256, 287, 303, 310,
346-347, 351, 369-370, 379, 388-389,
392-394, 418
developmental, 31, 72, 89, 94-95, 121-122, 130,
142, 150, 152, 154-156, 239, 251, 256,
351, 392-394, 404, 418
school, 22, 31, 40, 89, 93-95, 152, 233, 248, 251,
351, 369-370
Psychology, 1, 5, 11-12, 19, 59, 76, 93-95, 99, 105,
109, 115-116, 120, 159-160, 191, 198, 202,
210-211, 233-234, 239-240, 242, 253, 256,
338, 384-385, 387-398, 401, 403-420
applied, 415
as a science, 187
clinical, 115, 159, 211, 390, 405, 411-412, 417
experimental, 105, 390, 401, 403, 405, 407, 412,
415, 418-419
feminist, 416
field of, 351
humanistic, 19, 387-398, 404, 413
intuitive, 115
present-day, 417
psychological research, 187, 418
research in, 109, 120, 159, 404, 409, 413, 418-419
scientific method, 5
traditional, 76, 256
Psychosis, 33, 317-318, 325, 375, 384, 412
Psychosocial moratorium, 300
Psychotherapies, 419
Psychotherapy, 276, 393, 395, 419
behavior therapy, 419
Puberty, 14, 264, 272, 275, 298-299, 307, 371
beginning of, 14
Public schools, 410
Pudding, 147
Punisher, 287
Punishment, 7, 9-10, 162, 167, 173, 197-199, 204,
225, 272, 280, 287, 296, 411
vicarious punishment, 215
Puzzle box, 192
Q
Qualitative change, 109, 111
Qualitative changes, 109
Quantitative change, 305
R
Race, 89, 188, 221
Ratio schedules, 196-197
Rational thought, 38, 288
Reading, 3, 7, 9, 11, 17, 71-72, 84, 90, 113-114, 123,
150, 202-204, 223, 238, 254, 298, 359-360,
374, 414
writing and, 84, 90, 114
Reality, 59, 86-87, 91, 142, 214, 222, 235, 249, 275,
277-280, 282-283, 288, 327, 402, 407
Reasoning, 17-18, 130, 140-141, 143, 146, 149, 151,
155-156, 161-162, 164-165, 167-168,
171-174, 176, 223-224, 238, 274, 396, 405,
426

414-415
ability, 18, 151
abstract, 140, 143, 146, 173, 176, 238
analytic, 151
good, 161, 164-165, 167, 171-172, 224, 396
Recapitulation, 100
Recasts, 172
Received support, 149
Reciprocal teaching, 254
Recognition, 29, 91, 125
process, 29, 91, 125
Recovery, 185-186, 194, 337
Reflex, 27, 32, 42, 51-53, 123-124, 184-186, 291
Reflexes, 42, 51-52, 123-124, 184, 187, 191-192,
276-277, 414
adaptive, 42
Moro, 51-52
primitive, 276
startle, 192
Regression, 108, 171, 267-269, 281, 396
Rehearsal, 213, 419
Reinforcement, 32, 194-199, 202-203, 205, 211-214,
216-217, 222, 228, 363, 401, 403, 405, 408,
417
contingencies of, 417
continuous, 197
extinction, 194, 197-198, 401, 403, 405
immediacy of, 194
intermittent, 196-197
internal, 198-199, 205, 212, 228, 403
pattern of, 213
principle of, 202-203, 222, 228, 363
punishment, 197-199, 405
shaping, 195-196, 202-203, 205, 211
sliding, 202
vicarious reinforcement, 212
Reinforcement contingencies, 199, 214, 401
Reinforcers, 194, 200
Relationships, 14, 47, 57, 62, 66, 163-164, 176-177,
284, 287, 318, 321, 339, 360, 382-383, 416
close, 62, 66, 164
therapeutic, 284, 318
Relaxation, 226
Reliability, 161, 269
interrater, 161
Remembering, 8, 136, 212, 344-346
Reminiscence, 403
Replication, 149
Replications, 179
Representations, 361, 404
Representative samples, 287
Repression, 263, 271, 274, 281-282, 284, 309, 342,
346, 394, 413
and ego, 284
Research, 31-33, 40, 42, 45, 47, 57, 59-60, 62-63,
65-66, 69, 88-89, 91, 95, 97, 99, 109,
112-114, 120-122, 148-149, 156, 159, 168,
172, 175-177, 184, 191, 200, 207, 234,
243-244, 246, 250, 255-258, 261-263, 288,
346-347, 369, 371-372, 400-401, 403-404,
413, 417-419
cross-cultural, 385, 404, 418-419
in child development, 172, 400, 404, 409, 411, 413,
419
longitudinal, 172, 404, 409
psychotherapy, 419
sex, 263, 406, 410, 413
techniques for, 226
with animals, 187
Research in developmental psychology, 109
Research psychologist, 95
Residential treatment, 201
Resistance, 46, 62, 67, 133, 263, 406
Respondent conditioning, 192, 195
Response, 12, 42, 44-45, 51, 56-57, 146, 157,
163-165, 171, 173, 185-186, 188-189, 192,
195-197, 199-200, 203, 205, 211, 215, 224,
359, 364, 403, 414-415
conditioned, 185-186, 188-189, 414
Response generalization, 195
Responsiveness, 33, 42, 49, 53, 55, 61, 63, 396, 402
Retention, 212, 294, 312
Retirement, 221, 303, 386
activity, 303
Reversibility, 128, 132
Reward, 7, 80, 196-197, 199, 201, 213-215, 218-219,
366
Rewards, 6-7, 9-10, 80, 85, 193-194, 199, 201-202,
210, 215, 222, 380-381, 384
Ridicule, 263, 295
Rogoff, Barbara, 259
Role taking, 175
Roles, 142, 166, 174-175, 226, 232, 300, 377,
385-386, 408
sex-role development, 408
Role-taking, 169, 175, 405
Romantic attraction, 396
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 391
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1, 10, 404
S
Sadness, 103, 157
Safety, 49, 67, 88, 325, 390
Safety needs, 390
Sample, 122, 149, 161, 171, 176, 203, 214
standardized, 122
Samples, 61-63, 171, 287
Sampling, 161
Schedules of reinforcement, 196, 205
Schema, 44, 124, 379
Schizophrenia, 113, 268, 417
School, 3-4, 22, 31, 40, 76-78, 80, 82-83, 85-90,
93-95, 97, 111, 114, 148, 152, 159-160,
179-180, 191, 197-198, 210-211, 226, 233,
250-253, 257-258, 261, 332-339, 369-370,
390, 403-404, 410, 413
achievement, 31, 90, 201, 252, 337, 351, 404
higher education, 316
middle school, 404
Schooling, 210, 248
Schools, 3, 17, 31, 47, 68, 76-77, 89-90, 148, 180,
228, 248-250, 259, 285, 298, 371, 405, 410,
413-414
Science, 4, 14, 16, 29, 97, 109, 116, 120, 146, 249,
388-390, 392, 400-401, 404-405, 411,
413-417, 419-420
Scientific American, 408
Scientific method, 5, 207
Scientific psychology, 198, 388
Sears, Robert, 211
Second language learning, 409
Second Step, 397
Secondary circular reactions, 125
Secondary education, 87
Secondary process thinking, 278
Second-order conditioning, 186, 189
Secular, 167
Secure attachment, 63
Selective imitation, 419
Self, 6-7, 11, 14, 25-26, 28-29, 33, 61-63, 88-89, 96,
102, 124, 146, 167, 175, 177-178, 201, 204,
210, 213, 218-223, 226-228, 241-245, 248,
250, 254-255, 257-258, 263-264, 275,
294-296, 301-304, 309-310, 333, 338,
377-382, 388-394, 407-412, 414
Self, the, 381
Self-actualization needs, 390
Self-actualizers, 391-393
Self-control, 6, 244, 269, 275, 296, 306
Self-efficacy, 210, 219-221, 223, 226-227, 401
Self-esteem, 89, 390
Self-evaluations, 228
self-image, 278, 377
Semantics, 404
Sensation, 107, 196, 262, 396
Sensations, 96-98, 114-115, 198, 251, 264, 268, 270,
277, 294, 317, 319-320, 342-343
Senses, 13-17, 71, 88, 104-105, 291, 293, 320,
342-344, 348, 370, 379, 419
cold, 13, 320, 342-343
Sensitive period, 45, 56-57, 73-76, 83-84, 90, 371
Sensitive periods, 73, 75-76, 78-79, 83, 87
Sensitivity, 30, 63, 73, 75, 86, 117, 177, 320
Sensorimotor intelligence, 122, 124
Sensorimotor period, 129-130, 142, 149, 153-154
Sensorimotor stages, 128
Sentences, 30, 75, 221, 250, 351-356, 358-361, 364,
366, 368
meaning, 221, 359
Separation, 54, 56-58, 60-61, 91, 267, 282, 292,
315-329
Set, 5-6, 8, 16, 33, 75, 79-80, 89, 116, 120-121, 148,
162, 164, 175, 180, 195-196, 218-219,
228-229, 245, 248, 251, 253, 287, 289, 316,
357-358, 393
Sex, 11, 14, 144, 188, 199, 216, 263-264, 270,
275-276, 285, 300, 412-413
Sex differences, 410, 412
in perspective, 412
Sexual activity, 264
Sexual behavior, 44, 199, 310
Sexual intercourse, 264-265, 270, 276
Sexuality, 263-264, 274, 406
Shadow, 40, 247, 377-379, 382
Shaping, 195-196, 202-203, 205, 211, 225, 362
Shivering, 343
Siblings, 195, 272, 274, 286
Side effects, 197
Sight, 7-8, 41, 44, 49-51, 54, 57, 73, 76, 85, 154-155,
190, 193, 195, 212, 246, 343-344
Significant others, 291
Similarity, 107, 186
Simple reflexes, 192
Situation, 36, 54, 60-65, 68-69, 102, 127, 129,
140-141, 166, 176, 179, 188, 194, 236-237,
247, 272-273, 286, 293, 337
physical environment, 102
situations, 11, 40, 55, 127, 175, 177, 210-211,
243-244, 246, 278, 362-363, 377, 386
Size, 1, 3
Skepticism, 38
Skin, 101, 188, 298
Slaves, 15, 18, 246
Sleep, 28-30, 50, 129, 248, 266, 270, 273, 277,
392-393
Smell, 105, 342-343, 346
loss of, 343
what we smell, 343
Smoking, 267
Social, 1, 3-4, 10-15, 17-19, 24, 29, 31, 44-45, 49-52,
56-57, 59, 63, 66, 80, 88, 91, 116, 135-136,
145, 149, 164-166, 172-176, 178, 181,
209-229, 231-260, 265, 291, 295-296,
298-300, 303-308, 310, 316, 320, 362,
380-381, 385, 391-392, 394, 400-401,
412-413, 416-419
Social adjustment, 340, 385
Social approval, 15
Social behavior, 44, 214, 295
social change, 226
Social comparison, 221
Social contract, 12, 164-166, 416
Social conventions, 18
Social development, 91
Social interaction, 51
Social learning theorists, 216, 224-225
Social psychology, 401, 403, 408, 412-413, 416,
418-419
Social relationships, 14
Social situations, 210-211, 246
Social smile, 50-51, 320
Social smiles, 50
Social speech, 242-243, 246
Social support, 413
Socialization, 10, 214, 216, 225, 339, 344, 401, 410,
413
in the West, 346
narrow, 346
Social-learning theory, 401
self-efficacy, 401
Society for Research in Child Development, 172, 400,
404, 409, 413, 419
Socrates, 181
Songbirds, 45
Sound, 32, 44, 48, 51, 57, 81, 83-84, 105, 107, 153,
163-164, 178, 201, 206, 248, 256, 371, 377,
393
sensation of, 107
Sounds, 30, 32, 53, 75, 83, 98, 104-106, 113-114,
116-117, 126, 143, 206, 291, 304, 320-321,
359
Source, 22, 130, 145, 206, 281, 291, 322, 376, 382
Speech, 2, 13, 74-75, 106-107, 117, 136, 140, 201,
233, 235-248, 250, 351, 353-354, 357,
359-365, 370-372, 402-404, 410-412
child-directed, 364
inner, 107, 238, 241-247, 354
Spin, 273
Spinal cord, 23, 261
Spock, Benjamin, 23
Spontaneous recovery, 185-186, 194
Stability, 28, 30, 275, 308-309, 400
Stage theories, 305, 308
Stages of moral reasoning, 223, 396
Stamina, 77
Statistics, 339
Status, 3, 100, 200, 206, 303, 415
427

Stereotypes, 287
Stickleback fish, 41
Stimuli, 41-42, 56, 101-102, 152, 184, 186-192,
194-197, 203, 205-206, 212, 222, 236-237,
240, 317-320, 327
discriminative, 194-195, 205
Stimulus, 41-42, 50-51, 185-186, 188-190, 192-193,
195-196, 212, 226, 245, 319, 326, 415
conditioned stimulus, 185, 188
conditioned stimulus (CS), 185
generalization, 186, 189, 195
neutral, 186
unconditioned stimulus (US), 185
Stimulus discrimination, 186
Storage, 352
Stranger anxiety, 321
Stress, 115, 258, 265, 269
response, 258
Strokes, 51, 96
students, 60, 88-89, 95, 114, 159, 179-180, 196, 201,
210-211, 233-234, 311
Studying, 35, 50, 99, 111, 120, 222, 228, 245
Sublimation, 283
Subskills, 81, 223
Sucking reflex, 123-124
Suffixes, 75
Sullivan, H. S., 417
Surface structure, 358
Surgery, 300
Surprise, 106, 366
Survey, 413
Survival, 18, 36, 39, 42, 51, 61, 116
Sweets, 7
Syllogisms, 238-239
Symbolic modeling, 212
Symbolic play, 336, 413
Symbols, 106-107, 114, 116-117, 122, 129-130, 237,
250, 367, 369, 375, 381-382, 384, 409
Symptoms, 262-263, 284, 317, 337-340, 406
Synchrony, 411
Synesthesia, 104-105, 413
Syntax, 351, 360, 366, 368-370, 403-404, 417
and semantics, 404
Systematicity, 361
T
Tag question, 353
Taste, 105, 342-343, 346
buds, 342
Teaching machine, 202
Teens, 3, 163
Television, 92, 212, 215, 225-226, 404
Temperament, 28-29, 67-68, 418
dimensions, 418
Tertiary circular reactions, 126
Test scores, 89
Tests, 22, 90, 121, 147-148, 150, 154, 159, 234, 252,
254, 398, 413
group, 147, 154, 252
of creativity, 150
personality, 398, 413
Theories, 1-19, 21, 35-70, 109, 114, 123, 142, 221,
231-232, 264, 276, 308, 389, 395, 399-401,
406, 408, 413-414
ecological, 414
Theories of child development, 401
Theory, 1, 5, 9, 13, 18, 21-34, 35-36, 48, 59, 68-69,
72-73, 93-117, 119-158, 174, 177, 180-181,
209-229, 231-260, 261-288, 305, 307-308,
312-313, 315-329, 351-372, 387-398, 401,
403-413, 415-418
constructivist, 148, 405
stage, 13, 18, 30, 122-129, 132-133, 135, 138-139,
142-144, 146-147, 149-151, 153-155,
157, 159-160, 174, 177, 180-181, 206,
222-224, 229, 241, 257, 265-269,
273-275, 282, 290, 297, 307-308,
410-411
Therapist, 113, 201-202, 226, 284, 384
Therapists, 226, 325, 332
Therapy, 112, 201, 246, 262, 284, 334, 337, 339, 419
family, 262
modeling, 419
Thinking, 3, 5-6, 9-10, 13, 16-17, 19, 30, 38, 64, 90,
97-100, 109-112, 114, 121-123, 129-130,
132, 135-143, 145-152, 154-157, 159-162,
166, 168-169, 173-181, 187, 198, 206,
222-224, 229, 235-242, 257-260, 261, 266,
275, 277-278, 313, 349, 389-390, 409-411
concepts, 121, 123, 138, 159, 238, 249-250, 257,
313, 410
dreams as, 139, 378
thinking about, 16, 74, 98, 136, 138, 141-142, 160,
168, 247, 307
Thompson, Clara, 286
Thought, 3-4, 6, 8, 15, 18-19, 32, 34, 38, 51, 89, 91,
93, 97-100, 108-109, 111-113, 116, 127, 129,
134, 142-144, 149-150, 152, 154-155, 157,
159-162, 168-170, 174-176, 178, 181,
191-192, 204, 236-238, 261-262, 265,
272-274, 281-282, 284-285, 287-288, 313,
316, 337, 395-397, 401, 410-411
concepts, 93, 113, 116, 134, 144, 238, 310, 313,
397, 407, 410
critical, 160, 247
judgments, 100, 155, 157, 160, 170, 178, 401, 411
Threats, 17, 80, 85
Threshold, 323-324
Time, 5, 8-9, 11-15, 17-18, 29-34, 37-39, 41-44, 46-48,
50-51, 54, 56, 61-67, 72-73, 75-80, 84, 91,
95, 97-98, 107, 120, 125-130, 137, 142, 148,
150-151, 153-155, 157, 169-171, 190,
192-197, 207, 212, 215-216, 219, 221-222,
241-242, 247, 257, 265-267, 270, 272-277,
285-286, 289-290, 292-293, 295, 297-300,
305-307, 309-310, 327, 334-336, 346,
351-357, 368-371, 384, 407, 414, 416
Time out, 289, 300
Tinbergen, Niko, 40
Tonic neck reflex, 27
Touch, 8, 13, 16, 74-75, 83-84, 106, 116, 228, 270,
321, 342, 345-346, 377, 395
Training, 9, 24, 47, 95, 152-153, 190-191, 222, 224,
250, 295, 306, 324, 335, 341, 362, 367, 392,
416-417, 419
Traits, 36, 39, 216, 267, 269, 287, 377-378, 409
Trance, 62
Transformation, 353, 361, 380, 382, 412
Transition, 133, 150, 169, 411, 414, 419
Treatment, 113, 189, 201, 224, 226, 284-285, 287,
331-340, 409, 412
residential, 201, 334
Trial-and-error learning, 211
Trust versus mistrust, 291, 293
Truthfulness, 363
Turning points, 251
Twins, 24, 407
identical twins, 24
Two-word stage, 367
U
Unconditioned reflex, 185
unconditioned stimulus, 185
Unconscious, 75, 205, 262, 264, 271-272, 274-276,
279-281, 285, 300, 374-375, 377-385,
393-394, 409
collective, 378-379, 385
collective unconscious, 378-379, 385
personal unconscious, 378-379
United Kingdom, 57
United States, 46, 60, 63, 94-95, 121, 146, 190, 269,
302, 332
independence, 63
Universal grammar, 355, 358, 366
Universals, 169, 306, 362
Unlearned response, 188
V
Validity, 150, 177, 206, 223, 288, 384
of research, 288
Variable, 55, 141, 197, 206, 220
Variable-interval schedules, 197
Variable-ratio schedules, 197
Variables, 63, 109, 141, 206, 212-213, 228-229, 232,
256, 313, 387, 389
Variations, 36, 201, 272
Vegetables, 81, 83, 236-237, 259
Verbal codes, 212-213, 342-343
Verbs, 351, 355, 360
Vicarious punishment, 215
Vicarious reinforcement, 212
Victims, 69
Violence, 225, 296, 400, 410
and media violence, 410
youth, 410
Vision, 12, 25, 51, 90, 128-129, 142, 181, 375
eye, 25
eye movements, 25
eyes, 25, 51
Visual field, 241
Visual perception, 400
Vocabulary growth, 370
Voice, 50-51, 107, 176, 266, 272, 319-320, 335, 393,
407
W
Walden Two, 191, 388, 417
Walking reflex, 32
Weight, 6, 105, 133-134, 165
Well-being, 320
Wertheimer, Max, 94
Widowhood, 59
Withdrawal, 194
Womb, 343
Women, 11, 71-72, 176-177, 226, 270, 272, 274,
286-287, 378-380, 382-383, 385, 403, 407,
417
moral reasoning of, 176
Words, 9, 30, 74-75, 84, 97-98, 100-101, 106-108,
113, 117, 129-130, 195, 201-203, 236-237,
241, 243-247, 249, 262, 295, 303, 306, 335,
341, 343, 347-349, 351-352, 359-360, 362,
364-367, 369-370
Work, 3, 5-7, 10, 14, 23-25, 28, 31-32, 36-37, 39-40,
46-47, 59, 65-66, 72, 78-80, 82, 84-86,
88-92, 93, 110, 112-113, 121-122, 125,
147-148, 152, 157, 159-161, 167, 169, 171,
174, 181, 187, 196-197, 200-201, 203-205,
218-220, 225-229, 256-257, 259, 262-264,
276-278, 281-285, 301-302, 309-310,
324-325, 336-338, 354, 366-367, 369, 371,
389-392, 404
willingness to, 147
working conditions, 234
Workplace, 2, 91
World, 3, 12-15, 17-19, 27, 29, 33, 40, 42, 45, 55-56,
63-67, 72, 86, 88, 90, 96-97, 101-104,
106-107, 110-112, 116-117, 121-123, 128,
137, 142, 144, 150, 157, 187, 205-206,
221-223, 227-229, 234, 248-249, 258, 261,
265-268, 277, 279-280, 283, 285, 302,
308-309, 316-323, 338-339, 343-346, 362,
384-385, 388-389, 392-395, 397-398, 419
World Health Organization, 47, 56, 64
World War I, 375
Worry, 66, 71, 139, 270, 277, 299
Written language, 81, 117
X
X-rays, 257
Y
Young adulthood, 294, 301
Young adults, 178, 221, 302, 408
wisdom, 178
Young people, 88-89, 96, 142, 144, 167, 174, 282,
289, 299-301, 307, 313, 327, 380
YouTube, 368
Z
Zone of proximal development, 252-254, 257, 403,
408, 416
428

Table of Contents
1. Early Theories: Performationism, Locke, and Rousseau
2. Gesell’s Maturational Theory
3. Ethological Theories: Darwin, Lorenz and Tinbergen, and Bowlby and Ainsworth
4. Montessori’s Educational Philosophy
5. Werner’s Organismic and Comparative Theory
6. Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory
7. Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
8. Learning Theory: Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
9. Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
10. Vygotsky’s Social-Historical Theory of Cognitive Development
11. Freud’s Psychoanalytic Theory
12. Erikson and the Eight Stages of Life
13. Mahler’s Separation/Individuation Theory
14. A Case Study in Psychoanalytic Treatment: Bettleheim on Autism
15. Schachtel on Childhood Experiences
16. Chomsky’s Theory of Language Development
17. Jung’s Theory on Adulthood
18. Humanistic Psychology and Developmental Theory
References
Index