see atatchment
Use your lecture notes as the basis for your Japanese Culture Analysis Essay
2/3 pages
Must have 4+ sources (3 or more from the STU online library), use 3rd person active voice, MLA format, 12 pt, double spaced, clear discussion/arguments, smooth transitions, sources cited within the essay, a works cited page (which does not count towards your written pages), and student must analyze various (more than 2) parts in order to complete your analysis and conclusion for your discussions/arguments.
Some reference links:
My topic would be about comfort woman
Link life as a comfort woman ( kim bok-dong story)
Maria Rosa Henson story
Narrating the Right to Sexual Well-being and the Global Management of Misery: Maria Rosa Henson’s Comfort Woman and Charlene Smith’s Proud of Me
Authors:
Smith, Sidonie
Source:
Literature and Medicine. 24(2):153-180
Publisher Information:
Johns Hopkins University Press,
2006
.
Publication Year:
2006
Description:
Within the human rights regime, violations are managed through a juridical model that divides people into victims (based on identity categories) and perpetrators, thereby focusing on individuals rather than on systems of inequalities. Rights campaigns depend upon victim stories to build a case, gain public attention, bring perpetrators to account, and raise money for rights activism. The recent turn to the right to “health,” however, foregrounds the importance of addressing the structural conditions of immiseration that produce injury and harm and negatively impact even those who have been formally granted civil and political rights. Focusing on two narratives published as part of campaigns organized to confront violence against women—Filipina Maria Rosa Henson’s Comfort Woman: A Filipina’s Story of Prostitution and Slavery under the Japanese Military (1999) and South African Charlene Smith’s Proud of Me: Speaking Out Against Sexual Violence and HIV (2001)—this essay explores the capacity of autobiographical narration to dislodge the “grammar” of victimization and expose the densities of structural violence.
8/24/2021 How Japan Took Control of Korea – HISTORY
https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea 1/4
Between 1910 and 1945, Japan worked to wipe out Korean culture,
language and history.
During the 2018 Olympic Winter Games, outraged South Koreans demanded an
apology from NBC after a commentator asserted that Korea’s transformation into a
global powerhouse was due to the “cultural, technological and economic example” of
Japan. For many South Koreans, analyst Joshua Cooper Ramo’s statement reopened
old wounds—ones carved by a generation of occupation of the country by Japan.
“Any reasonable person familiar with the history of Japanese imperialism, and the
atrocities it committed before and during WWII, would find such a statement deeply
hurtful and outrageous,” read the apology petition signed by tens of thousands of
South Koreans.
U P D A T E D :U P D A T E D : J U L 2 8 , 2 0 2 0J U L 2 8 , 2 0 2 0 ·· O R I G I N A L :O R I G I N A L : F E B 2 7 , 2 0 1 8F E B 2 7 , 2 0 1 8
How Japan Took Control of KoreaHow Japan Took Control of Korea
E R I N B L A K E M O R EE R I N B L A K E M O R E
https://www.history.com/news
https://www.history.com/author/erin-blakemore
https://www.history.com/
8/24/2021 How Japan Took Control of Korea – HISTORY
https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea 2/4
In 1910, Korea was annexed by the Empire of Japan after years of war, intimidation
and political machinations; the country would be considered a part of Japan until
1945. In order to establish control over its new protectorate, the Empire of Japan
waged an all-out war on Korean culture.
Schools and universities forbade speaking Korean and emphasized manual labor and
loyalty to the Emperor. Public places adopted Japanese, too, and an edict to make
films in Japanese soon followed. It also became a crime to teach history from non-
approved texts and authorities burned over 200,000 Korean historical documents,
essentially wiping out the historical memory of Korea.
During the occupation, Japan took over Korea’s labor and land. Nearly 100,000
Japanese families settled in Korea with land they had been given; they chopped down
trees by the millions and planted non-native species, transforming a familiar
landscape into something many Koreans didn’t recognize.
Nearly 725,000 Korean workers were made to work in Japan and its other colonies,
and as World War II loomed, Japan forced hundreds of thousands of Korean women
into life as“comfort women”—sexual slaves who served in military brothels.
Korea’s people weren’t the only thing that were plundered during Japan’s colonization
—its cultural symbols were considered fair game, too. One of the most powerful
symbols of Korean sovereignty and independence was its royal palace,
Gyeongbokgung, which was built in Seoul in 1395 by the mighty Joseon dynasty. Soon
after assuming power, the Japanese colonial government tore down over a third of
the complex’s historic buildings, and the remaining structures were turned intotourist
attractions for Japanese visitors.
As historian Heejung Kangnotes, the imperial government also attempted to preserve
treasures of Korean art history and culture—but then used them to uphold imperial
Japan’s image of itself as a civilizing and modern force. This view of Korea as
backwards and primitive compared to Japan made it into textbooks, museums and
even Koreans’ own perceptions of themselves.
Recommended for you
Nanking Massacre Korean War North Korea
https://books.google.com/books?id=E8IRdcnxg08C&lpg=PA13&dq=colonial%2520japan%2520burned%2520historical%2520documents%2520korea&pg=PA13#v=onepage&q=colonial%2520japan%2520burned%2520historical%2520documents%2520korea&f=false
https://books.google.com/books?id=LTPOw8kZRYsC&lpg=PA59&dq=japanese%2520occupation%2520korea%2520deforestation&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q=south%2520korea%2520has%2520experienced&f=false
https://books.google.com/books?id=JAoNCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PT60&dq=japanese%2520colonial%2520%2522planted%2520trees%2522&pg=PT60#v=onepage&q=japanese%2520colonial%2520%2522planted%2520trees%2522&f=false
http://www.history.com/news/comfort-women-japan-military-brothels-korea
https://books.google.com/books?id=2Pt1BAAAQBAJ&lpg=PT115&dq=Gyeongbokgung%25201915&pg=PT115#v=onepage&q=Gyeongbokgung%25201915&f=false
http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_7_May_2014/12
https://www.history.com/topics/japan/nanjing-massacre
https://www.history.com/topics/korea/korean-war
https://www.history.com/topics/korea/north-korea-history
https://www.history.com/topics/japan/nanjing-massacre
https://www.history.com/topics/korea/korean-war
https://www.history.com/topics/korea/north-korea-history
8/24/2021 How Japan Took Control of Korea – HISTORY
https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea 3/4
The occupation government also worked to assimilate Koreans with the help of
language, religion and education. Shinto shrines originally intended for Japanese
families became places offorced worship. The colonial government made Koreans
“worship the gods of imperial Japan, including dead emperors and the spirits of war
heroes who had helped them conquer Korea earlier in the century,” explains historian
Donald N. Clark.
This forced worship was viewed as an act of cultural genocide by many Koreans, but
for the colonists, it was seen as evidence that Koreans and Japanese were a single,
unified people. Though some families got around the Shinto edict by simply visiting
the shrines and not praying there, others grudgingly adopted the new religious
practices out of fear.
By the end of its occupation of Korea, Japan had even waged war on people’s family
names. At first, the colonial government made it illegal for people to adopt Japanese-
style names, ostensibly to prevent confusion in family registries. But in 1939, the
government made changing names an official policy. Under the law, Korean families
were “graciously allowed” to choose Japanese surnames.
At least84 percent of all Koreans took on the names, since people who lacked
Japanese names were not recognized by the colonial bureaucracy and were shut out
of everything from mail delivery to ration cards. “The whole point was for the
government to be able to say that the people had changed their names
‘voluntarily’,”writes historian Hildi Kang.
Though Japan occupied Korea for an entire generation, the Korean people didn’t
submit passively to Japanese rule. Throughout the occupation, protest movements
pushed for Korean independence. In 1919, the March First Movement proclaimed
Korean independence and more than 1,500 demonstrations broke out. The protests
were brutally suppressed by the Japanese, but not before the desire for
independence swept through Korea.
Later, underground groupslike the Party of Three Thousand, a group of students that
tried to undermine the Japanese military after being conscripted to fight in World War
II, were formed. Koreans also protested in their own quiet ways. Some refused to
speak Japanese or change their names; others came up with names that reflected
their family history or contained subtle resistance to the policy.
World War II devastated not just Japan, but the Korean Peninsula, and in 1945, the
United States and the USSR captured the peninsula and ended Japanese rule there.
Korea was divided into two occupation zones that were intended to be temporary.
However, a unified state was never given back to the newly independent Korean
people. Instead, the Korean War broke out between the Soviet and Chinese-backed
northern half of Korea and the United States and United Nations-backed south.
https://books.google.com/books?id=obYhbzN-dY0C&lpg=PA462&ots=9K_-As0Vd4&dq=korea%2520worship%2520occupied%2520japan%2520shinto%2520shrines&pg=PA462#v=onepage&q=worship%2520at&f=false
https://books.google.com/books?id=1VL_4bOmv4oC&lpg=PA49&dq=forced%2520worship%2520shinto%2520korea%2520occupied%2520japan&pg=PA49#v=onepage&q&f=false
http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/7.htm
https://books.google.com/books?id=sZkJAgAAQBAJ&lpg=PT117&dq=korea%25201939%2520name%2520change&pg=PT117#v=onepage&q=korea%25201939%2520name%2520change&f=false
https://apjjf.org/-Kiriyama-Keiichi/3151/article.html
http://www.history.com/news/north-south-korea-divided-reasons-facts
http://www.history.com/topics/korean-war
8/24/2021 How Japan Took Control of Korea – HISTORY
https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea 4/4
FACT CHECK: We strive for accuracy and fairness. But if you see something that doesn’t look right, click
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RELATED CONTENT
After the Korean War, South Korea transformed into a liberal democracy and tried to
purge itself of the remnants of Japanese rule. The country prosecuted a small number
of colonial collaborators immediately after World War II, and some of their land was
confiscated. Today, disputes continue about how and whether to prosecute those
who worked with the Japanese government during the occupation.
While South Korea still grapples with the fallout of Japan’s brutal occupation, it hasn’t
forgotten its resistance. Today, March 1—the day of the independence protest in 1919
—is a national holiday in South Korea, a reminder not just of the resilience of the
Korean people, but of the years of occupation they withstood.
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Reflections on postwar nationalism: Debates and challenges
in the Japanese academic critique of the “comfort
women” system
Yang Li
ABSTRACT
Since the 1990s the “comfort women” system has received much attention
in Japanese academic research, media, and society. This article first introdu-
ces the foundation built by historians such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki (吉見義明)
who have combed through historical data, and their debates with right-
wing nationalists on critical issues such as coercion in the “comfort wom-
en” system and “comfort women” becoming “sex slaves.” Then it summa-
rizes how gender studies scholars like Ueno Chizuko (上野千鹤子) use oral
histories and memory studies methods to explore the position of survivors
and analyze the foundation of empirical histories, rethinking and critiquing
the patriarchal legacies, gender oppression, and nationalistic mindset mani-
fested in the issue of “comfort women.” Finally the article will zoom in on
the discussion in Japan sparked by the Park Yu-ha (朴裕河) book Comfort
Women of the Empire (Korean: Cheguk �ui wianbu, Japanese: Teikoku no
ianfu, Chinese: Diguo de weianfu) to reveal how Japanese scholars used the
opportunity to further the focus on “comfort women’s” subjectivity and
the rich and varied nature of the original history and thus more deeply
rethink issues of imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism.
KEYWORDS
Postwar nationalism;
“comfort women”; gender
studies; Yoshimi Yoshiaki;
Ueno Chizuko; Park Yu-ha
Since the 1990s, the “comfort women” system has received much attention in Japanese academia,
media, and society. The term “comfort” in Japanese originally referred to a sense of peace and
ease. “Comfort stations” were supposed to be a harbor and oasis for the spirit, and thus “comfort
women” were supposed to be women who brought comfort and relief. This term is relatively mis-
leading and obscures the true condition and violent nature of the “comfort women” system.
Japanese academic studies of “comfort women” and related topics in recent years have the follow-
ing characteristics. First, their origins stemmed from external stimuli and simultaneously reflected
Japanese domestic interests and right-wing nationalism. In 1991, a lawsuit filed by Korean
“comfort woman” Kim Hak-sun (金 學 順 ) against the Japanese government shocked Japanese
society and attracted right-wing backlash. Japanese history scholars eventually responded with
studies corresponding to these developments. Second, scholars and officials developed opposing
views. Due to right-wing political influence, the Japanese government to this day has maintained
an equivocal and tight-lipped attitude on the “comfort women” system while right-wing national-
ists have provided the government some theoretical support. Overall, however, intellectual circles
have maintained more critical attitudes toward the government position and hope for further
reflection on Japan’s wartime responsibility. Third, the “comfort women” issue has sparked much
discussion and continuous debates in the fields of history, sociology, and literature. With rising
Yang Li is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures of Tsinghua University.
Translation � 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Chinese text “Fanxing zhanhou minzuzhuyi: Riben xuejie pipan
‘weianfu’ zhidu de zhenglun he tiaozhan” by Mengxi Li Seeley.
� 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY
2020, VOL. 53, NO. 1, 41–55
https://doi.org/10.1080/00094633.2019.1689758
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/00094633.2019.1689758&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2019-12-21
http://www.tandfonline.com
and falling momentum, there have been many overlapping and intersecting opinions as well as
divergences on important issues. The development and continuation of this phenomenon is
related to differences between right-wing and left-wing ideologies, and also reflects the different
methodologies and changing views in the scholarly world. Fourth, Japanese scholarly publications
in recent years, as well as changes in international academic trends, have developed a closer and
more complementary relationship.
To a certain extent, Japanese academic studies of “comfort women,” their history, and the
“comfort women” system have become a means by which recent scholars have criticized postwar
nationalist trends and challenged Japanese contemporary academic traditions. Especially in the
field of history, after the “linguistic turn” and the rise of gender and memory studies, the ques-
tion of whether Japanese scholars should focus on the level of “historical facts” or whether they
should place more emphasis on the dimensions of “narrative” and “memory” has sparked intense
debate and resulted in very different answers. This article focuses on these points to lay out
Japanese academic discussion of the “comfort women” issue. First it introduces how key issues
regarding the “comfort women” system have been explained and interpreted based on the histor-
ical foundation epitomized by Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s compilation of historical sources. Second, it
examines how sociologists like Ueno Chizuoko emphasize the perspective of the victims and
“comfort women” testimonies to further “comfort women” studies from the lens of sexual oppres-
sion and sexual violence. Finally, it focuses on the debates in Japan sparked by Park Yu-ha’s
Comfort Women of the Empire to reveal the interactions between Japan and Korea on “comfort
women” studies, and further analyze the differences between Japanese and Korean nationalism
embodied by the “comfort women” issue to point out the necessity of deeper rethinking of
the issue.
I. Japanese right-wing and left-wing scholarly debate and opposition on studies of
“comfort women” system
The term “comfort women” appeared in Japan before World War II, but attention to the
“comfort women” system began only in the 1970s. During this period a series of works such as
Maria’s Song of Praise (Maria no sanka) by former Japanese “comfort woman” Shirota Suzuko
(城田すず子),1 Military Comfort Women (J�ugun ianfu) by Senda Kak�o (千田夏光),2 and docu-
mentary film Okinawa Concerto: Testimony, Military Comfort Women (Okinawa no harumoni:
sh�ogen, j�ugunianfu) focusing on Okinawa-based former “comfort woman” Pe Pongi (裴奉奇) 3
allowed more people to know about the existence of the “comfort women” system.4 Senda Kak�o’s
book Military Comfort Women and the film of the same name released the following year were
especially influential in spreading the concept of “military comfort women” throughout Japanese
society. However, Senda’s Military Comfort Women did not depict the “comfort women” system
as a crime, nor “comfort women” as “victims.” In other words, during this period some people
knew about the existence of “comfort women” but most understood them only as “battlefield sex
workers.” “Comfort stations” were viewed as military brothels and “comfort women” as prosti-
tutes who serviced military troops. This did not attract scholarly attention.
The situation changed in the 1990s. After Korean “comfort woman” survivor Kim Hak-sun
first spoke up, women victims from many Asian countries gradually began adding their testimo-
nies, and a host of foreign inquiries made Japanese society and the government take note of the
“comfort women” issue. In response to the voices and accusations of “comfort women” from
Korea and other countries, Japanese government officials of various levels expressed apology to
different degrees and by different means.
At the same time, Japanese right-wing nationalists opposed Japan apologizing for these actions.
In the mid-1990s, former University of Tokyo professor Fujioka Nobukatsu (藤冈信胜) raised
the so-called “liberal view of history,” believing that postwar Japan’s history textbooks represented
42 YANG LI
a sort of “self-abusing historical view,” insisting that criticizing and blaming Japan’s shameful
past was not helpful to instilling patriotic sentiment in contemporary Japanese youth and also
did not reflect postwar Japan’s tremendous economic and social development. Literary critic
Nishio Kanji (西尾幹二) examined modern German and Japanese historical trajectories and
disagreed with the opinion that postwar Germany had “apologized” to victim countries while
Japanese had not been willing or had not. Nishio Kanji and Fujioka Nobukatsu later organized
the “New Textbook Editing Society” and edited and published a “new history textbook” which
tried to defend Japan’s past invasions and whitewash Japan’s World War II era crimes. In this
process, the “comfort women” system became one of their focus points. Right-wing historical
revisionists represented by the “Liberal View of History Studies Society” and the “New History
Textbook Editing Society” denied and misrepresented the coercion used in the “comfort wom-
en” system, portraying it as a purely commercial activity while requesting the “comfort women”
issue be removed from middle school history textbooks. Representative sayings of Nishio Kanji
and Fujioka Nobukatsu can be found in “The Facts” the “Historical Fact Committee” published
in the Washington Post. In it they argued that there were not enough historical sources to
prove “coercion” in the “comfort women” system; that the “comfort women” system was just
an official system of prostitution rather than a system of sexual slavery; and that many
“comfort women” were treated very well, even better than people of comparable income, etc.5
Right-wing historian Hata Ikuhiko (秦 郁 彦) published Comfort Women and the Sex on the
Battlefield (Ianfu to senj�o no sei) and other works which maintained that there was no govern-
ment or military direction in the forcible recruitment of “comfort women.”6 The scholars men-
tioned above represent the rise of postwar Japanese nationalism. They not only oppose the
Japanese government apologizing over the “comfort women” issue, but also oppose the left-
wing positions represented Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Suzuki Y�uko (鈴木裕子) as well as Japan’s
postwar academic traditions.
After Korean “comfort woman” Kim Hak-sun filed her lawsuit against the Japanese govern-
ment in 1991, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a professor of history at Chuo University at the time, began
a detailed empirical study of the “comfort women” system. Its result was the 1992 Military
Comfort Women Source Collection (J�ugun ianfu shiry�osh�u) and the 1995 monograph Military
Comfort Women (J�ugun ianfu).7 The latter has been continuously reprinted after its initial pub-
lication, selling more than eighty thousand copies, and has been very influential. In 2000 it
was translated into English and it is still a canonical work in the field today. The empirical
studies of people like Yoshimi Yoshiaki revealed evidence of how the Japanese military built
“comfort stations.” They gradually corrected and updated Japanese understanding of the
“comfort women” system, and even influenced Japanese government attitudes on this issue to a
limited degree. For example, the 1992 publication of Military Comfort Women Source Collection
provided evidence of direct and indirect Japanese military participation in building “comfort
stations.” In January 1993, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary K�ono Y�ohei (河野洋平) apologized
for the Japanese military’s role in building “comfort stations” and Japanese Prime Minister
Miyazawa Kiichi (宫 泽 喜 一 ), who was visiting Korea, also apologized at the Japanese and
Korean summit meeting. Yoshimi Yoshiaki and his colleagues also established the Japanese
War Responsibility Source Center in 1993, continuing to uncover relevant historical sources
and organizing academic conferences on the issue.
Because of their efforts, the “comfort women” issue and wartime sexual violence have become
formal topics of historical inquiry, and the “comfort women” system is no longer viewed as sim-
ply the military’s prostitution system, but rather beginning to be viewed as a “forced labor sys-
tem” (or “sexual slavery system”) wherein women were forced into sexual activities through
deception or human trafficking. At the same time, left-wing scholars like Yoshimi Yoshiaki have
also become targets of right-wing nationalists. To refute the intense attacks of the right wing and
the post-1997 policies resulting in most Japanese textbooks reducing or eliminating content on
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 43
“comfort women,” left-wing historians have used empirical studies to continuously excavate his-
torical evidence of “coercion” in the “comfort women” system and its nature as a system of sexual
slavery. The section below focuses on studies by historians such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki to further
introduce the key points of debate between the left and the right.8
II. Was there “coercion” in the “comfort women” recruitment process?
The first point of contention between the left and the right is whether force was used to recruit
“comfort women.” Right-wing discourse commonly denies the use of coercion in the process of
recruiting “comfort women” whereas left-wing historians such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki have discov-
ered and revealed many first-hand sources such as “comfort women” survivor testimonies, sol-
diers’ memories, and international archival records which serve as evidence of “coercion” in the
“comfort women” system. In Memories of a Japanese Military Comfort Woman (Aru Nihongun
“ianfu’ no kais�o), Fujime Yuki (藤目ゆき)9 uses interview records to show how most Filipina
women who became “comfort women” were kidnaped as they were walking and later imprisoned
and raped. Sexual Violence in a Yellow Earth Village (K�odo no mura no seib�oryoku) by Ishida
Yoneko (石田米子) and Uchida Tomoyuki (內田知行)10 uses interviews of “comfort women”
survivors and local residents to reveal the tragic history of how women in China’s Shanxi prov-
ince were forcefully abducted by Japanese soldiers, imprisoned, and raped11 In addition to this,
the records left by Japanese soldiers also prove the coercion used in the “comfort women” system.
For instance, the descriptions of “comfort stations” by military doctor Nagasawa Ken’ichi (長沢
健一)12 provides evidence that Japanese women were deceived into becoming “comfort women”
through human trafficking.13 Furthermore, foreign official archives also contain materials showing
how Japanese soldiers forcefully recruited “comfort women.” For example, the “Investigation
Report on Japanese Abuse” dated October 1, 1944 from American military archives documents
how the Japanese military used deception and human trafficking to forcefully recruit Korean
women to Burma.14
Scholars such as Yoshimi have not stopped with merely proving coercion in the “comfort
women” system through historical documents. They further argue that the essential problem in
the “comfort women” issue is not whether or not there was “coercive recruitment,” but that mak-
ing the “comfort women” issue centered around whether or not there was coercion in recruit-
ment is an intentional diversionary tactic of the right wing. In Military Comfort Women
published in 1995, Yoshimi Yoshiaki defined “military comfort women” as “women who provided
sexual services to soldiers under the management of the Japanese military, with limited freedom
under conditions depriving them of human rights.” He referred to their conditions as “military-
use sexual slavery.”15 He characterized the “comfort women” problem as a series of
“multidimensional human rights violations”: first, the military kept women imprisoned and sol-
diers gang-raped women through organized violence under conditions in which the women had
no choice, constituting a major human rights violation against the women. Second, there was
racial and ethnic discrimination. Third, there was economic and class discrimination. Fourth,
there were war crimes violating international law.16 This meant that, in Yoshimi’s opinion,
whether or not there was “coercion” in the recruitment of “comfort women” was not significant
to the essential nature of the “comfort women” issue. The core issue of the “comfort women” sys-
tem was that after using various methods such as deception, abduction, or human trafficking to
bring women into “comfort stations,” women were imprisoned and turned into sex slaves.17
Because of this, the issue that should be most concerning is how state organs designed and imple-
mented the “comfort women” system to imprison women in “comfort stations” and force them
to provide “sexual services” to soldiers.18
44 YANG LI
III. Was the “comfort women” system a “sexual slavery” system?
The second key point of contention is whether the “comfort women” system was a system of
“sexual slavery.” The right-wing commonly believes that the “comfort women” system was a
“commercial activity” no different from publicly licensed prostitution, and thus it was not a sys-
tem of “sexual slavery.” Left-wing intellectuals have raised counterarguments. Onozawa Akane
(小野沢あかね) has pointed out that the “comfort women” system was a system in which the
Japanese military directly or indirectly recruited women through methods such as deception,
human trafficking, and abduction to strip them of their personal liberty and imprison them in
“comfort stations” to commit sexual violence against them. Although some “comfort women,”
especially Japanese women, had once worked as licensed sex workers (or prostitutes),19 the over-
whelming majority of “comfort women” had no ties whatsoever to the licensed prostitution
industry. Furthermore, even if some women had worked as prostitutes before becoming “comfort
women,” it is not an excuse that justifies the “comfort women” system. No matter what kind of
work “comfort women” had pursued in the past, or through what methods they were recruited to
the “comfort stations,” once at the “comfort stations” they were forced to become targets of sex-
ual violence by the Japanese military. This, in and of itself, made them victims of criminal
action.20 In other words, the status of “comfort women” was not that of prostitutes. It is only on
this basis of understanding can the essential relationship between the “comfort women” system
and licensed prostitution system be discussed.
Following the passage of the Meiji constitution in 1889 and the establishment of the modern
emperor system, the 1898 Meiji civil code was adopted nine years later, which established the
basic foundation of the modern family system. The modern family system expanded the family
model of the Edo period samurai class to commoners, and solidified modern “patriarchy”
(“kafuch�osei” in Japanese) in law. In the family, wives had no property rights or economic inde-
pendence. Their primary responsibility was to help husbands’ families produce heirs and continue
the bloodline. Under the Meiji penal code on adultery, only wives were punished for having adul-
terous relationships with men outside marriage while there were no punishments for husbands
committing adultery with women besides their wives. Mutually compatible with this kind of fam-
ily system was the modern system of licensed prostitution. If sex between husband and wife was
sex for reproductive purposes, then the licensed prostitution system provided men sex for recre-
ative purposes.21 Suzuki Y�uko argues that the modern licensed prostitution system was funda-
mentally the result of updating and solidifying a less-organized Edo era system.22 Yoshimi
Yoshiaki states even more clearly that modern Japan’s licensed prostitution system set the founda-
tion for the “comfort women” system.23 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Japan not
only consolidated the licensed prostitution system domestically but also introduced it to its colo-
nies as it was spreading imperialism through East Asia.24 The internal logic propping up this sys-
tem was a “myth of masculinity” that men’s sexual desires and sexual impulses were
uncontrollable and must be released.25 Based on deep faith in this myth, the Japanese military
attempted to use the “comfort women” system to manage soldiers’ sexuality, which resulted in
deep and severe harm to Asia’s women.
What, then, are the differences between the Japanese military’s “comfort women” system and
Japan’s licensed prostitution system? The similarities and differences between licensed prostitution
and the Japanese military “comfort women” system are outlined in Table 1.26 As shown in the
table, the two were both essentially systems of “sexual slavery,” but also had some differences in
form. First, in both the licensed prostitution system and the “comfort women” system, women
were housed together under common management and had no freedom to choose where they
lived. Second, although women in the licensed prostitution system were prohibited from freely
leaving, due to the pressure of international criticism of taking away women’s freedom, after 1933
Japan’s Home Ministry proposed that women be given the freedom to leave. However, for women
in the “comfort women” system the freedom to leave was completely taken away.27 Furthermore,
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 45
to prove that the licensed prostitution system was not a “sex slave system,” the Japanese Home
Ministry drew up laws that allowed for closing business (resignation). The freedom to close busi-
ness referred to women’s rights within the licensed prostitution system to resign from the occupa-
tion of prostitute at any time according to their will. In practice, however, due to the enormous
debt burden carried by most prostitutes, actually exercising this right was virtually impossible. In
other words, the system was still essentially a “sex slave system.” From the beginning, however,
the “comfort women” system did not allow women the freedom to leave the occupation. Finally,
at least on the surface, the licensed prostitution system gave women the freedom to refuse sexual
partners, but due to the need to repay debt, women could not really refuse in practice. In the
“comfort women” system, however, there was virtually no freedom to refuse without military or
managerial punishment. As shown above, although the licensed prostitution system wore the
mask of a non-slave system under the framework of civil law, it actually deprived women of
many human rights and was, in practice, a slave system. Under the framework of military law,
however, the “comfort women” system was an undisguised sex slave system.28
In summary, it is because the Japanese government and right-wing discourse repeatedly denied
government participation in the “comfort women” system as well as its coercive aspects that his-
torians like Yoshimi work so hard to exhaust the textual sources to prove the facts of history. It
can be said that these scholars work in an environment where right-wing discourse runs rampant
and historical sources are scarce. Their efforts deserve to be noted and recognized. At the same
time, because these studies arise within a certain environment and context, with specific target
audiences in mind, they have certain fundamental limitations. These limitations can be seen in
how historians such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki challenge and refute the rise of Japanese postwar
nationalism, yet their work is nevertheless based on the traditions of Japanese modern historiog-
raphy, which are centered around finding and presenting government and military records for
research and publication. This manifests itself in a sort of “text-centric approach” that places the
emphasis of historical research on examining and evaluating textual sources, while undervaluing
or neglecting the historical experience of “comfort women” themselves.
IV. Ueno Chizuko’s criticism of empirical historiography and nationalism
While empirical historians such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki have severely criticized right-wing historical
revisionism, well-known Japanese sociologist Ueno Chizuko uses a “post-structuralist” view to
present completely new interpretations. Starting in 1996 Ueno has continuously published a series
of articles such as “Nationstate and Gender: On Turning Women into Citizens” (Kokumin kokka
to jend�a: josei no kokumin o meg�ute) and “The Politics of Memory: Citizen, Individual, Me”
(Kioku no seiji-gaku: kokumin, koji, watashi) Later she published the monograph Nationalism and
Gender (Nashonarizumu to jend�a) in 1998.29 In 1997, the Japanese War Responsibility Resource
Center hosted an academic conference on “nationalism and the comfort women issue.” In the
first panel discussion, Ueno Chizuko presented a paper on “Gender History and
Historiographical Methods” and Yoshimi Yoshiaki presented on “The ‘Comfort Women’ Issue in
Modern History” before opening up for discussion.” Yoshimi called Ueno’s theory “Ueno-style
feminist sociology” and said that she had many “misunderstandings” and “distortions” in her
view of the “comfort women” issue, particularly many “inappropriate critiques” of empirical
Table 1. Similarities and differences between licensed prostitution and the Japanese military “comfort women” system.
Freedom of residence Freedom to leave Freedom to resign Freedom to refuse
Licensed prostitution system None None before 1933,
gradually
allowed afterwards
Legally protected but
difficult in practice
Existent on the
surface, but difficult
in practice
“Comfort women” system None None None Basically impossible
46 YANG LI
historiography.30 Although there were many biases in Ueno’s critiques of certain historical details
noted by scholars like Yoshimi, it is undeniable that some of Ueno’s views certainly brought
more depth and diversity of interpretation to “comfort women” studies, giving it new life. The
fact is that before the testimonies of Korean “comfort women” appeared, feminists in Japan had
never considered the “comfort women” issue a topic needing research and consideration. It can
be said that it was because Korean women raised their voices, and that the voice of the “other”
appeared, that Japanese domestic feminism was pushed to begin reflecting on the oppressive rela-
tionship between nationalism, classism, and gender embedded in the “comfort women” issue.
Ueno supported developing new insights in “comfort women” research by approaching modern
Japanese historiographical tradition from a feminist and gender studies perspective.
First, Ueno criticized empirical historiography for the tendency to overemphasize textual sour-
ces at the expense of oral history sources. She believes the empirical historiography often gives
insufficient weight to people’s memories. For example, both historical revisionists and left-wing
historical empiricists hope to prove whether or not there was “coercive recruitment” in the
“comfort women” system through textual historical documents. To these historians, because it is
difficult to determine the veracity of “comfort women” survivors’ testimonies, the testimonies are
considered not very important and at best can only supplement textual historical sources. These
historians who do not take “comfort women” testimonies seriously essentially view themselves as
a “third party” with the privileged orthodox historical position of owning an objective narrative.31
On topics such as sexual violence, which are easily stigmatized, it is difficult to know the actual
facts. The experiences and experiential processes undergone by the perpetrators and victims are
entirely different. Especially in a cultural environment in which victims are often morally con-
demned, the victims and perpetrators of sexual violence have vastly unequal experiences. Once
victims are unable to talk about their own experiences, the culpability of the perpetrators are
never investigated, with compensation to the victims even more out of the question.32
Ueno believes that the actual essence of “comfort women” testimonies is a sort of resistance
against male-dominated mainstream discourses, and thus we should refuse to marginalize or
deprioritize these testimonies. When women tell their own histories, what they want to express is
“our history” rather than what is “a part of you”; this constitutes a challenge to official historical
narratives and mainstream power.33 This phenomenon of women being able to exercise their
own agency and give an account of their personal experiences stems from a change in the larger
environment, with the main opportunity being that the narrative model of the “comfort women”
issue changed from “military prostitution” to “sexual slavery system” and that the target of inves-
tigation and criticism shifted from victim to perpetrator. Historiographical understanding of
“comfort women” has also turned from its past focus on the “shame of the sacrificed” to the
“crimes of the perpetrators.” This shift let “comfort women” know that they are not survivors of
disgraceful sex but that they are blameless and should not feel guilt or shame for past experiences,
and that those in the wrong are the perpetrators, the Japanese government and military troops
that planned, organized, and implemented the “comfort women” system. This change in context
has given many “comfort women” survivors–who were marginalized, disadvantaged, oppressed,
and abandoned in the past–the linguistic space and verbal medium for expression, as well as gave
women the courage to remember and raise their voices.34
Ueno notes that empirical historians tend to emphasize whether “historical facts” are true or
false, while sociologists pay more attention to the construction of historical narratives, i.e., issues
like within what kind of networks historical narratives appear and the power relationships behind
them. Regarding the “comfort women” issue, no one understands the so-called historical truths;
what exists is simply the different “experiences” or “realities” in the minds of different witnesses.
It was only the brave voices of “comfort women” that allowed everyone to understand that the
history of “comfort women” was diverse and multidimensional. “Comfort women” not only
endured inhumane sexual slavery during the war, but were also silenced for decades after the
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 47
war. Even now, some historical revisionists are still trying to deny this criminal history. Thus
“comfort women” have not only been hurt during the wartime period, but have continuously
been hurt in the postwar period even to this day. Thus the “comfort women” issue is not only a
historical problem, but rather a real issue tightly connected to the present.
The second new interpretive angle Ueno Chizuko provided to the “comfort women” issue is
rethinking the influence of patriarchy in Japanese and East Asian society. The points below will
summarize Ueno’s views. First is an explanation for why the voices of “comfort women” survivors
did not appear in media or in the public consciousness for five decades after the war. The main
reason “comfort women” survivors were not able to express their voices for decades after the war
is because they were viewed as symbols of “national humiliation.” This had multiple layers of
meaning: first, regarding women themselves, in the Confucian moral worldview, female chastity
was more precious than women’s lives, so for women’s bodies and sexuality to be insulted was
already the greatest shame to the women themselves. Women who had been sexually harmed
were seen as polluted and degraded, and these women were differentiated from the women
viewed as pure and under the protection of patriarchy. Second, to Korean men, the inability to
protect the chastity of their ethnic compatriots brought them humiliation as well. Within the cul-
tural background of a patriarchal system that viewed female chastity as the property of men, this
part of history is a complete refutation of Korean masculinity and a major source of shame.
Thus, in terms of Korean culture under patriarchal influence, “comfort women” retelling of past
shame to the public was considered an “embarrassment” to Korean men35 and behavior which
damaged self-respect. These deeply held beliefs directly caused some Koreans to feel conflicted
about “comfort women” making their testimonies public.36 Ueno points out that these kinds of
pressure on the victims of sexual violence make them feel shame for harm they have received in
the past and that the actions (and beliefs) that silence them are of themselves an unforgiveable
form of sexual violence, with their result being a double-layered form of violence against
“comfort women.”37 Because of this, when “comfort women” began to stand up and denounce
the Japanese military for its crimes, it was a strong counterattack to the logic of the patriarchal
system and a clear self-awareness of having endured sexual assault. Because of this they could no
longer be viewed as the object of others, but rather subjects with ownership rights to their
own bodies.
In terms of “comfort women” studies, Ueno Chizuko not only pointed out that Japanese intel-
lectuals needed to rethink their modern historiographical traditions, but also that East Asian soci-
eties’ patriarchal legacies and even nationalist tendencies among Korean academic circles needed
to be reevaluated because of the relationship between the two. After Korean “comfort women”
stood up with their denunciations, Korean academics have shifted their understanding of the
topic from “national shame” to “national suffering” and “comfort women” have become
“daughters of the nation” who have suffered deeply in addition to being viewed as national her-
oes. Ueno notes that in the “comfort women” issue there is a second layer of patriarchal narrative
violence hidden in the background of this shift in mental framework and narrative model. The
“comfort woman” icon that has emerged from the main narrative and in popular imaginations is
that of a national hero who endured thousands of trials to resist occupation under Japan’s imperi-
alist colonialism.38 Moreover, the construction of the image of so-called “daughters of the nation”
occurs within a set discursive system. This set of terms emphasizes the purity of young Korean
women and the coercive aspects in the process of becoming “comfort women,” creating a sort of
“faultless victim” image: “Innocent, naive, and pure virgins were suddenly taken one day, sub-
jected to gang rape, and then forced to become comfort women. Although they tried to struggle
and escape numerous times, they were unsuccessful. These young women were forced to live
through inhuman torture.”39
Ueno argues that although this narrative model ties together the “comfort women” issue and
the pain of being colonized, and thoroughly mobilizes the Korean populace’s nationalistic,
48 YANG LI
anti-Japanese sentiment, this discourse which overemphasizes the purity and chastity of Korean
“comfort women” to some extent creates another layer of repression for “comfort women.”
Because “comfort women’s” experiences were not flat or unchanging, but rather varied, emo-
tional, and full of changes, not all women who became “comfort women” were so-called pure
maidens. There were some had been who sold by parents or relatives due to poverty, some who
had been lured by con-artists who had pretended to treat them well, and some who had experi-
ence as sex workers, etc. These experiences are difficult to summarize under one category or
framework. Thus Ueno emphasizes that simplistically highlighting the “purity” of sexual violence
victims makes “comfort women” narratives formulaic, unidimensional, and will only solidify a
simplistic and rigid image of “comfort women,” making anything that does not fit within this
narrative framework or those “insufficiently pure” experiences of “comfort women” unable to be
seen. This can be viewed as another form of repression of “comfort women’s” varied experiences
and diverse life paths. This kind of narrative model has also directly led to discrimination against
ethnically Japanese “comfort women.” Because more Japanese “comfort women” had originally
worked as prostitutes than “comfort women” of any other nationality, there is a divergence in the
formation of the image of victim between Japanese “comfort women” and “comfort women” of
other nationalities, downplaying the harm inflicted on and the sacrifice of Japanese “comfort
women,” and also further marginalizing women who work in the sex trade.
Media plays an important role in the development of this formulaic narrative, with a represen-
tative example featuring the original “testimony” of a “comfort woman” survivor recounting how
she had endured an abusive husband after being forced into a marriage by her parents, how in
the process of trying to escape she was deceived, and eventually became a “comfort woman.” In
the final media interview, however, the part about the tragedy of her initial married life was
edited out.40 This example raised by Ueno vividly shows how under media guidance, “comfort
women” stories are intentionally molded into a version that conforms to popular expectations
while the true life experiences of “comfort women” are covered or obscured. This process also
thoroughly shows the important role the “audience” plays in the memory process of “comfort
women.” Due to the appearance of an audience, “comfort women” gained the opportunity to
make their voices heard, but audiences often tend to select the content they want to hear, so
“comfort women” emphasized certain parts of their narratives according to audience demand and
reactions. Oral history cannot escape the two-way participation of narrator and listener, and it is
only in the interaction between the two that oral history is created. Thus researchers need to be
more aware of how “comfort women” experiences become formulized and fixed, and need to
respect the diversity in “comfort women” narratives.
The third point Ueno Chizuko critiques and reconsiders is the modern nation-state narrative
framework within the “comfort women” issue. In this reflection, Ueno not only examines Korean
nationalism but also Japanese citizens’ consciousness of a national identity. First, Ueno raises a
few Japanese examples: when a group of Japanese youth visited South Korea, there was an activity
in which they listened to the personal stories of men who were forcibly recruited into the military
during World War II and women who were forced to become “comfort women.” At the confer-
ence, an emotionally crying Japanese youth suddenly stood up after listening to the stories and
said, “I did not know about this part of history before. Please forgive us.”41 What surprised Ueno
about this report was that when this Japanese student heard about the grave crimes committed
by the Japanese government and military, they immediately inserted themselves into this part of
history, and very naturally united their individual identity with that of the state. Another example
is that of a Japanese middle school teacher who was discussing the “comfort women” issue with
students in class when there happened to be a Korean female student in the class; this teacher
asked each student to apologize to her for Japan’s past occupation and crimes. Undoubtedly this
teacher was a conscience-driven educator who felt a deep sense of self-awareness and remorse
over Japan’s role in the war. From another perspective, however, this story also vividly depicts
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 49
the ideology he had absorbed, which closely intertwined his personal identity with a sense of
national identity. Ueno argues that what we (modern Japanese and Korean people) should think
about and reflect on is how each of us exist within various social relationships and overlapping
identities of nationality, gender, occupation, ethnicity, and culture. How this synthesized “self” of
varied characteristics should understand itself and its relationships with others: this is a question
every person should consider. Although it is difficult to find a precise yet unified answer, what
we should be cautious of is how an originally rich and diverse individual can be “represented” by
a certain set identity, particularly a national identity. Because of this, Ueno Chizuko agrees with
Takahashi Tetsuya (高桥哲哉) on this point: “‘Historical subjects’ are overlapping and diverse
subjects; they are the intersection of multiple horizons. When Japanese people confront Japan’s
wartime responsibility, of course they cannot escape their sense of belonging to Japan as a polit-
ical community. At the same time, however, this does not equate to identifying with Japan as a
nation-state.”42 In other words, when a Japanese citizen reflects on responsibilities for the war,
one cannot avoid one’s own social identity as a Japanese person, but at the same time when con-
fronting the Japanese government and official attitude toward the war, one can think
independently.
Second, Ueno reflects on South Korean nationalism in official and mainstream narratives on
“comfort women.” Regarding “comfort women” narratives, South Korean official narratives often
superimpose the history of being colonized over the “comfort women” issue, overemphasizing the
national pain of being colonized by Japan rather than directly facing head-on the pain suffered by
“comfort women” themselves. Because of this, the sexual violence dimension of the “comfort women”
issue has long been obscured. Ueno emphasizes that she does not want to treat the “comfort women”
issue as simply either an issue of colonialism or an issue of sexual violence, nor is she criticizing
Korea’s nationalistic narratives of the “comfort women” issue. Rather, she wants to increase the atten-
tion given to the sexual violence in “comfort women” narratives and uncover through this the continu-
ally neglected issue of patriarchal gender oppression. Ueno argues that Korean scholars’ focus on
issues of ethnic discrimination and colonialism is closely connected to their identities. However, this
perspective also results in certain oversights, particularly the issue of Japanese “comfort women.” As a
Japanese scholar, Ueno tends to look beyond issues of ethnic oppression. As a feminist, instead, she is
more inclined to emphasize more issues of gender oppression. Ueno argues that in Japanese history,
feminism has never been able to surpass statism, and that the two have not been able to coexist.
However, feminism needs to surpass statism, and it should be able to surpass statism. This is also a dir-
ection a new generation of scholars should deeply explore and work toward.43
Overall, Ueno Chizuko and historians like Yoshimi Yoshiaki agree in recognizing the multiple
layers of gender oppression, ethnic oppression, and class oppression in the “comfort women”
issue, and hope to reexamine Japan’s wartime responsibilities through research. However, Ueno’s
starting point focuses more on “comfort women” themselves and victims, listening to their voices,
respecting their diverse experiences, and cautioning against statism and nationalism’s absorptive
effect on the “comfort women” issue. From the lens of gender, Ueno sheds light on previously
neglected issues of gender oppression and sexual violence, and has been an important part of
Japanese “comfort women” studies, also contributing a deeper and more diverse understanding to
sexual violence studies in East Asian and world discourse.
V. Discussion in Japan triggered by Korean scholar Park Yu-Ha’s Comfort Women of
the Empire
Stirring up a new round of heated discussion of the “comfort women” issue in the 2010s were
Korean scholar Park Yu-ha’s works Working for Reconciliation (Wakai no tame ni)44 and Comfort
Women of the Empire.45 The latter especially ignited considerable controversy. Summarized sim-
ply, Park Yu-ha put forward some opposing views on the “comfort women” mythology: first, that
50 YANG LI
not all “comfort women” were patriots who harbored intense feelings of resistance to Japanese
soldiers. Second was that the construction of “comfort women” as pure and innocent young
maidens neatly obscures the diverse and sometimes humiliating actual circumstances of “comfort
women.” Park Yu-ha not only uses the testimonies of “comfort women” but also various texts
including literature as evidence for how “comfort women” viewed themselves as comrades of
Japanese soldiers in a complex environment.
Claims in Comfort Women of the Empire of Korean “comfort women” having a “comradely
relationship” or a “cooperative relationship” with Japanese soldiers were strongly opposed by
some “comfort women” in South Korea, even resulting in a civil and criminal lawsuit.46 On
November 19, 2015, the Seoul Eastern Prosecutor’s Office initiated a lawsuit against Park Yu-ha
for defamation of character. On November 26 of the same year, 54 Japanese and American schol-
ars led by Ueno Chizuko issued a “Declaration of Opposition to the Lawsuit against Park Yu-ha.”
On March 28, 2016, supporters led by Ueno Chizuko and opponents led by Yoshimi Yoshiaki
met together to discuss Comfort Women of the Empire.47
In summary, Park Yu-ha’s work was repeatedly criticized for reasons including the following:
taking “comfort women” victims’ testimonies out of their original context and unidimensionally
interpreting and using them, mixing the contents of novels and testimonies, and misinterpreting
previous research. What has led to the fiercest criticism is Park’s emphasis on the agency shown
by “comfort women,” which led some scholars to view Park as trying to lessen the crimes of the
Japanese military and Japanese government. For example, Korean-Japanese “comfort women”
scholar Kim Puja (金富子) notes that Comfort Women of the Empire author Park Yu-ha compre-
hensively continues and adopts some of Ueno Chizuko’s theories as dedicated follower of Ueno’s
theories but also a rough practitioner. Park Yu-ha’s writing method takes the “pure victim” image
that Ueno criticizes and turns it on its head, constructing in her work Korean “comfort women”
who are “impure victims.” Kim Puja summarizes Park Yu-ha’s arguments into the points below: 1)
Korean “comfort women” were similar to “sex workers” in form, an existence with a form of
agency; 2) the narrative of Korean “comfort women” as teenagers is an image fabricated to meet
specific needs, and in actuality most were actually adults with similar feelings to Japanese
“comfort women” who had a sense of “patriotism”; 3) Korean “comfort women” also sometimes
cooperated with Japan and shared a sense of “comradely feeling” with soldiers. Kim Puja empha-
sizes that Park Yu-ha’s study rejects the research results of people like Yoshimi regarding
“comfort women” as “sex slaves” while playing up the aspects in which Koreans actively assisted
Japan, thus diminishing the responsibility of the Japanese military and government in the
“comfort women” issue.48 In addition, Yoshimi Yoshiaki also strongly criticized Comfort Women
of the Empire, with the most important reason being that when Park Yu-ha cited historical data,
she often distorted the original meaning of the source, sometimes even coming to the opposite
conclusion of the original historical document. A fairly classic example of this is how Park uncrit-
ically quotes Japanese military officers’ testimonies on “comfort women.” For example, Japanese
military officer Onoda Hir�o (小野田宽郎) testified that “comfort women” treated Japanese sol-
diers warmly and flatteringly, and seemed very happy. Thus, Onoda believed that these “comfort
women” were “serving the cause of the ‘country’ in their own special way.” Park Yu-ha cites this
section of testimony as evidence of “comfort women” agency almost uncritically. Yoshimi believes
that on this issue, Park Yu-ha internalized the views of Japanese soldiers as her own views, and
cannot represent the actual experiences and feelings of “comfort women.” Park Yu-ha’s study
does not fundamentally analyze the positions within the testimonies and is insufficient as a his-
torical study. The so-called diverse images of “comfort women” she presents are also unreliable.
Yet the results of this kind of research not only downplays the responsibility of the Japanese mili-
tary and government, but also hinders the defense of victims’ rights.
Some Japanese scholars led by Ueno Chizuko, however, have maintained a positive, protective
attitude toward Comfort Women of the Empire overall.49 Ueno believes that while Comfort
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 51
Women of the Empire received criticism from historians, this criticism fundamentally stemmed
from the standards of empirical history, which heavily emphasizes the proving of facts. However,
the academic attacks on Comfort Women of the Empire were not on the level of “facts” but rather
on the level of “narrative” and memory. Criticism of the work from merely the perspective of
“facts” is not very meaningful. One of the most important topics of Comfort Women of the
Empire is “post-colonialism.”50 It takes the framework of “wartime sexual violence” discourse and
the “comfort women” issue and considers it within the context of “colonial occupation,” high-
lighting how Korean “comfort women” were different from “comfort women” from other places
to reveal the structural violence of Japan’s expansion of colonial control in Korea.
Ueno points out that Comfort Women of the Empire does not diminish the wartime culpability
of the Japanese military or Japanese government as some scholars believe, but rather the opposite.
It not only does not exonerate the crimes of Japan’s perpetrators, but rather more deeply tackles
the crime of colonial occupation, and can be viewed as the work that is most capable of awaken-
ing Japanese to the painful “comfort women” issue to this day. Comfort Women of the Empire
records how Korean “comfort women” at the time were viewed as part of the Japanese military
and second-rate substitutes for Japanese women, with Japanese names, wearing kimono, and
speaking Japanese. This dual construction of both perpetrator and victim is very rare in the war-
time sexual violence found in other countries. Ueno believes that the biggest difference between
this book and “comfort women” studies to date is its explanation of how imperial Japan was able
to mobilize the “agency” and “cooperation” of its colonized subjects in the process of occupying
the colony, making it so that one cannot help but deeply reflect on the criminal severity of colo-
nial occupation. In postwar official memory, there are many narratives of the humiliation
endured by Korean “comfort women” and their tenacious resistance, while the dimension of
“cooperation and agency” has been completely killed off.
Another reason Ueno defends Comfort Women of the Empire is because she hopes to maintain
the independence of academic research. Ueno believes that although Park Yu-ha’s book has many
inappropriate uses of historical sources or that some of its topics are easily misunderstood or
debatable, a person should not be sued because some views in parts of their book are controver-
sial. The main reason Ueno took the lead in signing the “Declaration of Opposition to the
Lawsuit against Park Yu-ha” is because she opposes the insertion of state power into academic
research. She notes that taking the author of an academic work to criminal court not only brings
significant psychological harm to the author but also constitutes a violent suppression of different
academic voices.51
Yomota Inuhiko (四方田犬彦) points out that the exciting part of Park Yu-ha’s analysis is
where she shows how colonized Korean “comfort women” united their own identities with that
of the Japanese empire, which is a historical narrative that does not conform to existing official
memory (formulaic memory). But it is precisely this internalization of the Japanese empire as
part of one’s self-identity that shows the crimes of imperialist occupation that are most unforgiv-
able and in need of reexamination. Park Yu-ha does not place Japanese soldiers and Korean
“comfort women” in opposing positions, but rather views them both as sacrifices to imperial
coercion. This brings a new perspective to historical studies on “comfort women.” Park Yu-ha’s
pointing to imperialism as the core root of the “comfort women” issue differs from existing nar-
rative frameworks which place Japan and Korea in diametrically opposite positions, incessantly
emphasizing that Japanese are distorting the history of “comfort women,” and nationalistically
viewing Korea as the “spokesperson of “comfort women”.” Thus, in order to delve into how
South Korean official memory distorts or conceals truths about “comfort women,” one must place
the real experiences of “comfort women” in historical context for reexamination. Only through
this can one understand Park Yu-ha’s greater concern.52
Overall, to scholars who support the book Comfort Women of the Empire, its contribution stems
from its not viewing “comfort women” as completely passive victims, but rather obscuring the
52 YANG LI
boundaries between perpetrator and victim, amply examining the participation process of Korean
“comfort women” in the war as perpetrators, showing their complex accomplice relationship with
Japanese soldiers. Directly confronting Korean “comfort women’s” cooperation with Japan thoroughly
focuses on and evokes “comfort women’s” subjective agency. This kind of research angle does not
weaken the culpability of Japanese imperialism in the war, but rather respects the will to survive and
survival tactics of the weak and the oppressed “comfort women” in those extraordinary years. At the
same time it reflects on the violence of Japanese imperialism from multiple lenses.
Lastly, the author would like to summarize below this article’s main views regarding Japanese
academic studies on the “comfort women” system in recent years: the appearance of the “comfort
women” issue in postwar Japan led to a wave of right-wing nationalism. Japanese historians
exemplified by Yoshimi Yoshiaki criticized this tide of nationalism by finding and publishing
relevant government records to prove Japanese military and official participation and involvement
in the “comfort women” system. Because of the limitations of modern Japanese empirical histori-
ography, however, they are not able to completely overcome the research methodology of relying
on textual sources, and thus highlights and maintains the narrative framework of the nation-state.
In contrast, gender studies scholars represented by Ueno Chizuko synthesize the thinking of post-
modernism and post-structuralism, as well as the findings of contemporary memory and gender
studies, not only to challenge the traditions of modern Japanese historiography but also to deeply
reexamine nationalism in contemporary Japan and even all of East Asia. They emphasize that
human history was invariably complex and diverse, and that scholars need to show the original
richness and diversity of history while never forgetting to reexamine how history was described
in the past, why is was written that way, what it narrates, and so forth. Scholars need to pay
attention not only to textual historical sources, but also the minority “testimonies” not found in
texts. Scholars need to take note not only of official histories, but also the histories of weaker
groups that oppose and are oppressed by official histories. In summary, contemporary Japanese
academic debates over the “comfort women” issue challenge our traditional models of thinking.
From new perspectives, they reflect on imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism, thus furthering
thought on humanity’s future directions of development.
Notes
1. Shirota Suzuko, Maria no sanka (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisuto kyōdan shuppankyoku, 1971).
2. Senda Kak�o, J�ugun ianfu (Tokyo: Futabasha, 1973, book and supplement).
3. Chongsheng xiezouqu: Zhengyan, congjun weianfu, directed by Yamatani Tetsuo (山谷哲夫), 1979.
4. Nihongun “ianfu” mondai web saito seisaku iinkai, eds., “Ianfu,” ky�osei, seidorei (“Comfort women,”
coercion, sex slaves) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo, 2014), 51.
5. Ono Akane (小野あかね), “Senzen Nihon no k�osh�o seido to seidorei ninshiki” (Pre-war Japan’s licensed
prostitution system and understanding of sexual slavery), Nihongun “ianfu” mondai web saito seisaku
iinkai, eds., Seidorei towa nanika (Sex slaves and what are they) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo), 44.
6. Hata Ikuhiko (秦郁彦), “Seiji no omocha ni sarare rekishi ninshiki–‘Rokokyo,’ ‘Nankin,’ ‘731,’ ‘ianfu,’ no
kyojitsu o t�o” (Historical consciousness as the toys of politics: Examining the fact and fiction of “Marco
Polo Bridge,” “Nanjing,” “Unit 731,” “comfort women”), Shokun (Gentlemen) (September 1997); Hata
Ikuhiko, Ianfu to senj�o no sei (Tokyo: Shinch�o sensho, 1999); For related Chinese-language works, see Bu
Ping, “Weianfu wenti yu Riben de zhanzheng zeren renshi” (The comfort women issue and Japan’s
understanding of wartime culpability), Kangri zhengzheng yanjiu (War of resistance against Japan studies)
2 (2000).
7. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, J�ugun ianfu (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995); Yoshimi Yoshiaki, J�ugun ianfu shiry�osh�u
(Tokyo: �Otsuki shoten, 1992).
8. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, J�ugun ianfu, 2–5; also see Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the
Japanese Military during World War II, trans. Suzanne O’Brien (New York: Columbia University Press,
2000), translator’s introduction, 1–15.
9. Fujime Yuki, Aru Nihongun “ianfu” no kais�o: Firipin no gendaishi o ikite (Memories of a Japanese
military comfort woman: Surviving Philippines modern history) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995).
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 53
10. Ishida Yoneko and Uchida Tomoyuki, K�odo no mura no seib�oryoku: Dānyantachi no sensō wa owaranai
(Sexual violence in a yellow earth village: The aunties’ war is not over) (Tokyo: S�odosha, 2004).
11. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Nihongun “ianfu” seido towa nanika (Japanese military “comfort women” system and
what it was) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2010), 21.
12. Nagasawa Ken’ichi, Kank�o ianjo (Hankou comfort station) (Tokyo: Tosho shuppansha, 1983).
13. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Nihongun “ianfu” seido towa nanika, 24.
14. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, J�ugun ianfu shiry�osh�u, Document 99.
15. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, J�ugun ianfu, 11.
16. Ibid., 231–233.
17. Nihongun “ianfu” mondai web saito seisaku iinkai, eds., “Ianfu,” ky�osei, seidorei, 60.
18. For similar views, see: T�og�o Kazuhiko (東郷和彦), Rekishi ninshiki o toinaosu: Yasukuni, ianfu, ryodo
mondai (Reexamining historical understanding: Yasukuni, comfort women, territorial issues) (Tokyo:
Kadokawa shoten, 2013).
19. For related content, see the following study: Nishino Rumiko (西 野 瑠 美 子), ed., Nihonjin “ianfu”:
Aikokushin to jinshin baibai to (Japanese “comfort women”: Patriotism and human trafficking) (Tokyo:
Gendai shokan, 2015).
20. Nihongun “ianfu” mondai web saito seisaku iinkai, eds., Seidorei towa nanika, 45.
21. The introduction in this section relied on the following study: Suzuki Y�uko, “J�ugun ianfu” mondai to
seib�oryoku (“Military comfort women” issue and sexual violence) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1993), 13–17.
22. Ibid., 13.
23. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Kaishun suru teikoku: Nihongun “ianfu” mondai no kitei (Sex-buying empire: The basis
of the Japanese military “comfort women” issue) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2019).
24. For example, after Japan colonized Taiwan in 1895, it immediately introduced a system of licensed
prostitution. Suzuki Y�uko, “J�ugun ianfu” mondai to seib�oryoku, 17.
25. Japanese mass media from the Meiji to the Taisho era commonly featured references to “sexual instinct
theory,” emphasizing that releasing sexual desires was important to male physical and psychological health.
26. Nihongun “ianfu” mondai web saito seisaku iinkai, eds., “Ianfu,” ky�osei, seidorei, 30.
27. For example, prohibitions on “comfort women” freely leaving the comfort station are frequently found in
documents related to the regulation of comfort stations. Ibid., 31–32.
28. This section mainly relied on the following study: Ibid., 29–33.
29. Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jend�a, new edition, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2015).
30. For information on the debate between Ueno and Yoshimi, see the following study: Ueno Terumasa
(上野輝将), “‘Posutok�oz�oshuki’ to reikishigaku: ‘J�ugun ianfu’ mondai o meguru Ueno Chizuko, Yoshimi
Yoshiaki no rons�o o sozai ni” (“Post-structuralism” and the study of history: Materials on Ueno Chizuko
and Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s dispute concerning the “military comfort women” issue), Nihonshi kenky�u (Japanese
history studies) 509 (2005). Narita Ry�uichi (成田龍一), “Ueno Chizuko to reikishigaku no kankei ni tsuite,
ni, san no goto” (Two or three points regarding Ueno Chizuko and the study of history), Geidai shis�o
(Modern thought) 39 (2011): 17. Nihon no sens�o sekinin shiry�o sent�a, ed., Nashonarizumu to “ianfu”
mondai (Nationalism and the “comfort women” issue) (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 2003).
31. Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jend�a, 262.
32. Ueno Chizuko, Araragi Shinzo (蘭信三), Hirai Kazuko (平井和子), eds., Sens�o to seib�oryoku no hikakushi
e mukete (Towards a comparative history of war and sexual violence) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2018), 5.
33. Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jend�a, 263.
34. Ibid., 254.
35. Ibid., 104.
36. Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jend�a, 103–104; and Ueno Chizuko, Araragi Shinzo, Hirai Kazuko,
eds., Sens�o to seib�oryoku no hikakushi e mukete, 5.
37. Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jend�a, 104–105. For this discourse, Ueno referenced Ehara. Ehara
Yumiko (江原由美子), “J�ugun ianfu ni tsuite” (Regarding military comfort women), Shis�o no kagaku (The
science of thought) (December 1992): 40.
38. Ueno Chizuko, Araragi Shinzo, and Hirai Kazuko, eds., Sens�o to seib�oryoku no hikakushi e mukete, 5–6.
39. Ueno calls these “model victims”; see Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jend�a, 168.
40. Ueno Chizuko, “Kioku no seijigaku: Kokumin, kojin, watashi” (The politics of memory: Citizen,
individual, me), Inpakushon (Impaction), Inpakushon shuppankai, 103 (June 1997): 168–169.
41. Ibid., 171.
42. Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jend�a, 280.
43. Ibid., 290–291.
44. The Korean-language version of the book was published in 2005, and the Japanese-language version was
published in 2006. Paku Yu-ha (朴裕河), Wakai no tame ni: kyōkasho, ianfu, Yasukuni, Dokutō (Working
for reconciliation: Textbooks, comfort women, Yasukuni, Dokdo) (Tokyo: Heibonsha raiburarii, 2011).
54 YANG LI
45. The Korean-language version of this book was published in 2013, and the Japanese-language version was
published in 2014. Paku Yu-ha, Teikoku no ianfu: Shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai (Comfort
women of the empire: Colonial occupation and the fight over memory) (Tokyo: Asahi shinbun
shuppansha, 2014).
46. After the Korean-language version of Comfort Women of the Empire was published in 2013, in 2014 nine
“comfort women” filed a lawsuit with the Seoul local Prosecutor’s Office for defamation of character and
requested the Seoul East local court prohibit the book’s publication and also requested that the author
and publisher to pay for damages.
47. Information on the March 28 research conference can be found in PDF form on the following website
(with a five-year validity period): www.0328shuukai.net.
48. Kim Puja, “Uenoryu feminizumu shakaigaku no otoshiana: Ueno-Yoshimi rons�o to sonogo o furikaeru”
(The pitfalls of Ueno-style feminist sociology: Looking back at the Ueno-Yoshimi dispute and its legacy),
Sh�ogaku ronsan (Journal of commerce), Chuo University, 58, no. 5, 6 (March 2017).
49. Asano Toyomi (浅野豊美), Ogura Kiz�o (小倉記蔵), Nishi Masahiko (西成彦), eds., Taiwa no tame ni:
Teikoku no ianfu to iu toi o hiraku (Working for dialogue: Reviewing questions raised by Comfort
Women of the Empire) (Tokyo: Kurein, 2017).
50. Ueno Chizuko, “Teikoku no ianfu no posutokoroniarizumu” (The post-colonialism of Comfort Women of
the Empire), in Asano Toyomi, Ogura Kiz�o, Nishi Masahiko, eds., Taiwa no tame ni: Teikoku no ianfu to
iu toi o hiraku, 246.
51. Ibid., 255–257.
52. Yomota Inuhiko, “Yori ooki na fukanzu no moto ni Paku Yuha o bengo suru” (Defending Park Yu-ha
based on the larger birds-eye view) in Asano Toyomi, Ogura Kiz�o, Nishi Masahiko, eds., Taiwa no tame
ni: Teikoku no ianfu to iu toi o hiraku, 92–112.
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 55
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Japanese right-wing and left-wing scholarly debate and opposition on studies of “comfort women” system
Was there “coercion” in the “comfort women” recruitment process?
Was the “comfort women” system a “sexual slavery” system?
Ueno Chizuko’s criticism of empirical historiography and nationalism
Discussion in Japan triggered by Korean scholar Park Yu-Ha’s Comfort Women of the Empire
