The Rise of Uber and Regulating the Disruptive
Innovator
GEOFFREY DUDLEY, DAVID BANISTER AND TIM SCHWANEN
Abstract
The ride-hailing company Uber has achieved extremely rapid global expansion by means of
outmanoeuvring governments, regulators and competitors. The rise of the company has been
based on a deliberate strategy of acting as a market disruptive innovator through a user
friendly technology and making use of the ‘sharing economy’. These attributes are not
unique, but are distinctively augmented by a relentless expansionary ambition and an ability
to maintain the capacity to innovate. Uber has generated great political controversy, but the
challenge for governments and regulators is to embrace the benefits of the disruptive innova-
tor, while adopting an approach that takes into account the full range of impacts. For Uber,
the challenge is to maintain its expansionary style as a disruptive innovator, while also
redefining on its terms the political and public debate. The case study of London provides
important insights into the dynamics of these processes.
Keywords: Uber, taxi, technology, disruptive, innovator, London
The ‘Uberisation’ phenomenon
IN 2009, UBER was founded in San Francisco,
initially with the intention of challenging
what was generally considered to be the
city’s inefficient and inadequate taxi service.
Since then, its strategy of relentless and
audacious growth has enabled it rapidly to
spread its services worldwide, so that by
2017 it operates in more than seventy coun-
tries, with around $16 billion invested in the
company since its inception. The size of its
expansion is illustrated by the estimated val-
uation given it of $70 billion, making it the
world’s most valuable privately held tech-
nology company. The rise of the company
has wide implications that cover not only
transport, but also changing models of busi-
ness and employment, urban planning
issues, and patterns of mobility in the twenty
first century. A remarkable feature of the rise
of Uber, however, is how it has been based
on a deliberate strategy of acting as a market
‘disruptive innovator’.1 It therefore provides
a case study in how to exploit weaknesses
in competitors, and in regulatory systems
that have been compelled to behave not
only in a reactionary manner, but also with
frameworks that were never designed to
deal with the types of technological and
operational challenges presented by Uber.
The challenge for Uber is to maintain its
expansion as a disruptive innovator through
proactively redefining the political and
public debate.
The successful expansion of Uber has been
based on a deceptively simple use of modern
technology, in which the initial bookings, the
route to be taken, the calculation of fares
and, finally, payment, are all made by means
of a smart phone app. In operational terms,
this technological base is combined with the
economic concept of the ‘sharing economy,’
which aims to bring suppliers and con-
sumers together by making use of spare
capacity. In the case of Uber, this means
that, given that a motor vehicle is typically
idle for over ninety per cent of the time, the
driver of a private car can download the
Uber app and be put in touch with cus-
tomers who are using their own Uber smart
phone app. Technology, combined with the
‘sharing economy’, should mean a more effi-
cient matching of supply and demand than
for traditional taxi services. In addition, Uber
employs variable pricing that can be applied
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to deal with periods of peak demand, while
both driver and customer provide score rat-
ings for each other. The ability of Uber to
challenge and often undercut the incumbent
taxi operators has inevitably caused fierce
opposition to its services in many countries.
Particularly for regulatory purposes, Uber
seeks to differentiate itself from its rivals by
describing itself as a technology platform
rather than a taxi company, while it classifies
its drivers not as employees, but as ‘regis-
tered partners’.
It must be stressed, however, that the type
of service provided by Uber is far from
unique and, indeed, in San Francisco itself,
rival companies Lyft and Sidecar already
provided app based services similar to those
introduced by Uber in 2010. Lyft remains a
major competitor in the United States, while
Uber has faced major regional competition
from such companies as Grab in South-East
Asia, Gett in Israel, and Ola in India. In
China, competition has been particularly
fierce. Uber poured huge resources into this
market, but in 2016 was compelled to merge
with its chief rival, Didi Chuxing. Despite
the size of its operations, the losses incurred
in China and other countries have thrown
doubt on Uber’s long-term ability to make a
profit. Uber has been most successful in
large urban areas, but it is now building alli-
ances with the public sector, particularly in
the United States, so that it can expand into
suburban and smaller urban areas.
In many cities and countries, Uber has
adopted an invasive approach which has
sought to bypass regulatory regimes. This
has been particularly evident in Europe,
where Uber has fought fierce battles with
governments, regulators and established taxi
operators in France, Germany, Belgium, and
Italy, while in Hungary in 2016, Uber was
effectively declared illegal and thrown out of
the country by its regulators. The serious
political dilemma for governments and regu-
lators is that, while Uber provides an effi-
cient and relatively cheap service that is
popular with consumers, it can also threaten
the status and existence of established opera-
tors, and make regulatory regimes appear
ineffective. Similarly, by tapping into unused
capacity, Uber can act as an important cre-
ator of jobs. At the same time, its refusal to
treat drivers as employees can cause tensions
in terms of hours worked, the payment of
benefits, and wider social security.
The extent to which Uber has embedded
itself in public consciousness is indicated in
how the word ‘uberisation’ has come to be
applied to any sector that apparently adopts
the distinctive mix of modern technology
with the principles of the ‘sharing economy.’
For Uber itself, however, its expansion illus-
trates the complexities of how governments
and their regulatory regimes come to terms
with innovative operators that do not fit
standard templates and challenge established
perceptions of organisation, employment,
and patterns of life. Uber has now spread its
services to most UK cities, but London pro-
vides a notable case study: unlike in many
other European cities, from the outset its ser-
vices were officially licensed. This meant that
the regulator, Transport for London (TfL),
has sought to find an accommodation with
Uber, while at the same time facing fierce
opposition from the long established and ico-
nic black cab operators. Nevertheless, Uber
has retained the style of a disruptive market
innovator, and while this has created an
ambivalent relationship with the regulator, it
has allowed the company to continue its
growth in the city and to consolidate its
operational position.
Uber in London and success as a
disruptive innovator
Uber commenced operations in London in
2012—relatively early in its lifetime—and
unlike in many other European cities, its
standard UberX service was officially regis-
tered by TfL from the outset. (Uber also
runs a number of higher grade services.) In
2012, London staged the Olympic Games
and TfL feared that there might be insuffi-
cient transport capacity to meet the expected
demand. Uber, therefore, might have been
seen as a temporary expedient, but within
two years the company’s rapid growth in
the capital was causing great unrest on the
part of the established operators—particu-
larly in the case of the plying for hire black
cabs. Plying for hire vehicles are those that
can be hailed on the street by customers
and also picked up from cab ranks, while
private hire vehicles (the category that
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includes Uber) must be pre booked. Private
hire vehicles—often referred to as minicabs
—had been an established, if controversial,
part of the London transport system since
the 1960s and tended to create an adversar-
ial relationship with the plying for hire sys-
tem. What initially distinguished the Uber
service was the novelty of its app and its
ability to undercut the fares of its rivals by
employing the principles of the ‘sharing
economy’, where the drivers supplied their
own vehicles and had flexibility in terms of
the hours they worked. However, Uber
could not copyright its service model so
that, for example, over time, many of the
black cabs themselves have adopted their
own apps. (In 2016 Uber offered its own
app to the black cab drivers, but this offer
was refused.)
Uber, therefore, required something more
to ensure its success and continued growth,
and in this respect it has exploited its brand
as a perpetual innovator that is challenging
the status quo. It has skilfully outmanoeu-
vred both TfL and the established operators,
thereby firmly embedding its name and
image in the public consciousness. Conse-
quently, being a market disruptive innovator
provides the political opportunity to exploit
rules that were framed in another age, and
to bypass established forums by making
direct appeals for public support. For a
regulator such as TfL, there is a delicate
balance to be struck between wishing to
encourage innovation and services that
apparently have wide public support, with
sensitivity to the interests of established
operators, and to the provision of rules that
provide fair competition.
Significantly, the black cab drivers and
their representative body, the Licensed Taxi
Drivers Association (LTDA), have aimed
their protests chiefly at TfL rather than Uber
itself, on the grounds that it is the job of the
regulator to ensure that innovative services
remain within the bounds of what they
judge to be fair competition. The dispute
first flared into public view in June 2014,
when an estimated 5,000 black cabs blocked
the streets of central London for several
hours. The protest was specifically aimed at
TfL, which was deemed to be ‘afraid of
Uber’s money’, and London Mayor Boris
Johnson, whom the LTDA accused of being
too friendly and accommodating towards
Uber. In reply, TfL said that it had subjected
Uber to its largest ever compliance investiga-
tion, and found that its drivers held the
relevant licences and insurance. It was
notable that the London protest was co-ordi-
nated with similar demonstrations in Paris,
Madrid, Barcelona, Berlin, Milan, and Rome,
indicating the degree to which Uber had
already become a major disruptive force
across Europe. However, the difficulties for
TfL and the black cab operators, and Uber’s
flair for self-publicity, was evidenced by the
company’s claim that the protests had made
the public more aware of their distinctive
brand and style of operation. Furthermore,
while the demonstrations had been going
on, demand for their services had risen by
850 per cent.2
The demonstrations had no effect on the
growth of Uber, and by 2015, it was esti-
mated that the number of private hire vehi-
cles in London had increased by nearly a
fifth in the previous year to more than
78,000. Much of this rise was accounted for
by Uber, which had 14,000 drivers in the
capital, making it the largest provider of pri-
vate hire vehicles in the city.3 Further black
cab protests took place during 2015 and
2016, and in September 2015, the London
Mayor’s question time (where London
assembly members periodically hold the
Mayor to account) was disrupted when scuf-
fles broke out with black cab drivers protest-
ing about the legality of Uber. Mayor Boris
Johnson referred to the protestors as ‘Lud-
dites,’ but was clearly increasingly concerned
at the protests, and called on the government
to exercise its powers to restrict the number
of private hire vehicles on the streets of
London. For its part, the government was
aware of the rising popularity of Uber and
persistently refused to take any action. A
consistent advantage for Uber is that
having achieved a certain critical mass in
terms of cars and drivers on the streets,
restricting their growth becomes politically
sensitive as it may be seen to be frustrating
public demand.
Apart from its public popularity, a further
fundamental difficulty for both regulators
and established operators posed by a techno-
logical innovator such as Uber is the chal-
lenge it presents to long established working
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practices and regulatory frameworks. In the
case of the black cabs, a bedrock and rite of
passage to entry for drivers is ‘the Knowl-
edge,’ whereby candidates spend up to four
years learning their way around London’s
25,000 streets, and then must pass a final
examination. Critics claim that modern satel-
lite navigation systems, such as those
employed by the Uber app, make ‘the
Knowledge’ redundant. Defenders of the
established system claim that no satellite
navigation system can match the detailed
insights and expertise required for ‘the
Knowledge,’ but as a rite of passage it
clearly is an anachronism. Significantly, in
2015, one of the principal training schools,
the Knowledge Point College, announced its
imminent closure, blaming competition from
Uber and London’s high property prices. In
the event, the College was saved by financial
support from cab manufacturer the London
Taxi Company, but its threatened demise
indicated the fundamental challenges Uber
offers to the distinctive identity of the estab-
lished operators.
Similarly, in terms of regulation, the rise
of Uber indicated the vulnerability of
regimes framed in an age long before mod-
ern technological innovations. The London
taxi regulations, therefore, continued to rest
on foundations originally laid in the nine-
teenth century, and TfL discovered that it
was difficult to fit Uber technology to these
rules. In making their case about the illegal-
ity of Uber, the black cab drivers had
claimed that the company contravened sec-
tion eleven of the 1998 Private Hire Vehicles
(London) Act, which stipulates that no pri-
vate hire vehicle should be equipped with a
taximeter, and that the Uber app constituted
a taximeter. In terms of the Act, only a ply-
ing for hire cab is legally entitled to carry a
taximeter, which gives a running price for
the ride based on time and distance.
By 2015, TfL had clearly become politically
sensitive to the challenges facing the black
cabs, and so the regulator brought a high
court case against Uber and other similar
private hire operators, claiming that the app
constituted an illegal taximeter. However,
the High Court ruled that the app was legal
and could not be classed as a taximeter.
Uber was, therefore, able to use its position
as a technological disruptive innovator to its
great advantage, while at the same time giv-
ing the taxi regulatory regime an image of
being out of date and unable to cope with
modern technologies. Politically, this was a
major blow for both TfL and the black cab
operators, as it publicly demonstrated both
the rising strength of Uber, and the difficul-
ties in restricting its continued growth.
Having been frustrated in the legal arena,
TfL then attempted to clamp down on Uber
by introducing a series of proposals, includ-
ing a requirement that private hire vehicles
would have to wait five minutes after a
booking before picking up a customer. This
would have handicapped Uber in the use of
its app, while other proposals included pre-
venting operators from showing vehicles that
were available for immediate hire by means
of an app, and controls that threatened
Uber’s plans to introduce ride sharing ser-
vices for its cars. Perhaps in response to
Uber’s attacks on the credibility of ‘the
Knowledge,’ TfL also sought to make the
topographical test taken by private hire dri-
vers more difficult. TfL began a consultation
process, but Uber responded by launching
an intense lobbying campaign to win public
and political support for its services. Most
notably, this included a public petition that
eventually was signed by 200,000 people,
while a number of business organisations,
including the Institute of Directors, came out
in support of Uber. As TfL had expanded its
case against Uber to the High Court, so Uber
itself sought new arenas to counter these
challenges. By widening the debate to new
issues and arenas, each side battled to out-
flank the other politically.
Perhaps of most significance in terms of
political weight, however, was an interven-
tion by the chief executive of the UK regula-
tory body, the Competition and Markets
Authority. He warned that the TfL proposals
for private hire vehicles would artificially
restrict competition, and so stood to curb
developments that benefited the paying pas-
senger.4 For the first time, the disruptive
innovator Uber was winning public backing
from a prominent member of the regulatory
‘establishment’, and in a manner that por-
trayed TfL as reactionary and threatening to
curb an innovative and publicly popular
service. The political and public image of
Uber was, therefore, shifting from being an
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invasive threat to established services to
being an efficient innovator that was offering
a new and distinctive service.
In January 2016, TfL abandoned its plans
to tighten regulations on private hire vehi-
cles. This represented a major victory for
Uber, which had demonstrated that it could
outmanoeuvre politically both TfL and the
black cab operators. To add to this, TfL
remained frustrated at the government’s
refusal to cap the numbers of private hire
vehicles in central London. London Mayor
Boris Johnson claimed that the number of
private hire vehicles in the central London
congestion charging zone had increased by
more than 50 per cent in the previous two
years. He argued that this was causing seri-
ous congestion, and so defeating the object
of the congestion charge. Consequently, he
asked TfL to investigate the impact and fea-
sibility of removing the congestion charging
exemption for private hire vehicles.5 Once
more, however, this proposal confronted
Johnson and TfL with the accusation of plac-
ing unfair competitive burdens on operators
such as Uber. The public and official support
the company was winning had already
demonstrated its skill in resisting restrictions
on its operations.
The limits to disruptive
innovation in London
As 2016 progressed, however, Uber faced
fresh challenges to its operations from both
TfL and also its own employees in London—
and this time found it more difficult to
prevail. It could be said that Uber was
beginning to experience some of the penal-
ties of success in that, as its growth contin-
ued, official concern increased about what
would be the long-term impacts of the oper-
ations themselves, as well as on employment
patterns. Ironically, the very success of the
disruptive innovator strategy created politi-
cal and legal limits in the degree to which it
could be allowed to continue unchecked. In
operational terms, the rise of Uber is graphi-
cally illustrated in that by August 2016, there
were over 110,000 cars in London licensed to
operate as private hire vehicles. Of these,
around 30,000 were Uber vehicles. Mean-
while, the number of black cabs—at
around 22,500—remained about the same
as in 2011, the year before the introduction
of Uber.6
TfL was compelled to accept the success of
Uber and other private hire operators, but,
at the same time, there were now real fears
about the future identity and existence of the
black cabs, which were widely considered to
be an indispensable and iconic element of
London’s identity. These concerns made it
more difficult for Uber to define the direc-
tion of the political debate. In practical
terms, there was also the politically sensitive
issue of the employment prospects for the
black cab drivers. In May 2016, the Conser-
vative Boris Johnson was replaced as Lon-
don Mayor by the Labour party’s Sadiq
Khan, who wasted little time in producing a
Taxi and Private Hire Action Plan.7 This Plan
was broadly sympathetic to the black cabs,
and its recommendations included giving
the black cabs access to twenty more bus
lanes and quadrupling the number of offi-
cials enforcing private hire regulations. In
addition, restrictions on private hire vehicles
included the requirement that operators must
have a London-based, twenty-four hour call
centre. Such a requirement would be a hand-
icap to Uber with its app based operations.
Operators would also be required to have
permanent commercial insurance, while there
would be a written English test for all
drivers.
The black cab operators had fought
against Uber since the latter’s introduction in
2012, but with little success in stemming the
tide of its advance, so that in four years,
Uber had risen from nothing to having con-
siderably more vehicles on the road than the
black cabs. The new Mayor’s proposals,
however, gave them hope that some degree
of help was at hand. As with the 2015 pro-
posals, Uber made a public appeal for sup-
port and, in addition, took its case to the
High Court. On this occasion, the court
endorsed TfL’s case for the English language
tests, but found in Uber’s favour in the case
of permanent commercial insurance and
maintaining a call centre. At least in the case
of the English test, therefore, the needs of
the black cabs were given precedence. The
image of Uber was also affected around this
time by accusations concerning its alleged
failure to pay taxes in the UK. Nevertheless,
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there was no suggestion that the new mea-
sures would have a significant impact on the
continued advance of Uber and, signifi-
cantly, a 2016 Report by Nick Ferrari for the
centre-right think tank Policy Exchange, Sav-
ing the Black Cab,8 criticised the black cab
operators for attempting to conquer Uber by
means of seeking to protect their own inter-
ests. Instead, it advised the black cabs to
come to terms with the fact that the market
had changed and that they could only sur-
vive by competing more effectively in their
own right on price and convenience in the
new world. As the disruptive innovator,
Uber had set the operational and political
agenda, and the black cabs and TfL had
been compelled to respond.
For its part, Uber needed to develop and
promote its distinctive style and image as an
innovator, and this required being continu-
ally on the move as regards the range and
types of services it provided. In terms of
geographical scale, in 2016 it more than dou-
bled the scope of its operations in London.
Previously, it had been restricted to the city
centre, but had now expanded to more of
the outer areas, including Heathrow Airport.
In this case, Uber was hoping to attract more
commuters to its services, but it could also
be said that it was again keeping one step
ahead of the regulator in terms of threatened
restrictions on its operations in the central
congestion charging zone. One of the consis-
tent selling points of Uber has been that the
spread of its services could lead to a reduc-
tion in car ownership, although in relation to
congestion, this could be countered by the
greater number of private hire vehicles on
the road. To help counter this charge, Uber
introduced its ride sharing service UberPool
to London in 2015. This allowed the app
technology to match passengers going in the
same direction, so that by sharing a ride, a
significant saving could be made compared
with the established UberX service (although
UberPool could also be seen as a threat to
bus services). Uber also extended its range
by entering the food delivery market by
means of bike and scooter through UberEats.
Ironically, Uber’s greatest point of vulnera-
bility in London has occurred with the treat-
ment and status of its own drivers. The
fundamental ‘sharing economy’ element of
the Uber operation is that the drivers use
their own vehicles and download the Uber
app. As we noted earlier, Uber chooses to
treat its own drivers as ‘registered partners’
rather than company employees, but this has
led to persistent tensions with its drivers,
who seek to be official company employees
with the associated benefits. In addition,
Uber typically takes a twenty-five per cent
commission on each ride, and this has led to
complaints from drivers about their incomes
being squeezed, resulting in protests and
legal cases in several European countries and
United States cities. London has been no
exception to these trends and, in 2015, a pro-
test was held—supported by the GMB union
—concerning falling incomes for the drivers,
partly the result of Uber increasing its com-
mission rates and what were claimed to be
falling fares.
A 2016 survey suggested that more than
half of Uber’s London drivers made money
through other jobs, and that Uber was not
the biggest source of pay for one in five dri-
vers.9 This type of multiple employment has
become commonly known as the ‘gig econ-
omy’, with increasing numbers of people less
reliant on a single job and employer. Anxi-
eties about the conditions of employment
have become widespread, particularly in the
courier and urban freight sectors. Although
the ‘gig economy’ might open up new
employment opportunities, there is increas-
ing political concern about its consequences
in terms of pay and conditions.
Uber found itself at the forefront of this
debate in 2016, when two of its drivers—
again backed by the GMB union—took their
case to the Central London Employment Tri-
bunal, claiming that they should be treated
as employees of Uber and given associated
benefits such as sickness and holiday pay.
The Tribunal ruled in favour of the drivers
and in its judgment, stated that the notion
that Uber in London was a mosaic of 30,000
small businesses, linked by a common ‘plat-
form,’ was, to their minds, faintly ridiculous.
For its part, Uber decided to appeal against
the ruling, asserting that tens of thousands
of people in London drove with Uber pre-
cisely because they wanted to be self-
employed and their own boss. The Uber case
attracted widespread attention and signifi-
cantly, around this time, Prime Minister
Theresa May asked Matthew Taylor, the
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then policy chief of former Prime Minister
Tony Blair, to examine how to extend work-
ers’ rights in the ‘gig economy’ and so main-
tain flexibility, while also supporting security
and workforce rights. The business models
to be examined included Uber. The scale and
character of its operations now firmly occu-
pied the attention of people in the highest
places, but the employment tribunal judg-
ment was an indicator to Uber that there
could be limitations to its strategy and style.
Maintaining momentum as a
disruptive innovator?
Uber has rapidly achieved huge growth,
while generally retaining a status as a mar-
ket disruptive innovator. The technology it
has adopted has been innovative—although
not unique—but its success has been derived
from a global strategy, backed up by large
capital injections, that maintains a relentless
pursuit of market growth through overrid-
ing, or even bypassing, established interests
and regulatory systems. The guiding motto
of chief executive Travis Kalanick that ‘it is
easier to ask for forgiveness than permission’
has served it well, but as it becomes one of
the world’s corporate giants—with ambitions
to match—can it maintain its expansionary
momentum as a disruptive innovator?
In London, Uber was able to launch a
politically sophisticated campaign in win-
ning public and business support when it
was threatened with tighter regulation. Its
fares might be extensively subsidised, but
its success was based on an operation
undoubtedly popular with the public, and
with modern ‘techno-optimism’ at its heart.
Nevertheless, on a wider scale, the company
appears to have accepted that it needs politi-
cal allies if it is to continue its rate of
growth. Most notably, in 2016, Uber
appointed an eight person advisory board
that contained a former EU commissioner, a
former United States transport secretary, a
former campaign manager for former US
president Barack Obama, a former prime
minister of Peru, and a Saudi Arabian prin-
cess.10 However, in 2017 Uber’s image was
damaged by revelations concerning its secret
Greyball programme, whereby the company
would identify users who might be rivals or
enforcement officials, and show them a fake
version of its app whenever they tried to
order a car, thereby frustrating any official
action. In response, Uber announced that it
was reviewing the programme and banning
employees from using Greyball to target reg-
ulators. Around this time, Uber was also
subject to sexual harassment claims by a for-
mer employee, and a recorded altercation
between Travis Kalanick and an Uber driver
with regard to employment conditions. All
these revelations damaged Uber’s image as
an innovator, and cast it in a more reac-
tionary light.
At the same time, Uber’s ambitions show
no signs of slackening. Its long-term aims
are reflected in Kalanick’s stated mission for
Uber to ‘provide transportation as reliable as
running water, everywhere for everyone.’
The scale of these ambitions goes beyond the
transport sector and includes major impacts
on society as a whole. For example, in the
United States, Uber has established partner-
ships with a range of municipalities to offer
privately run services to replace former pub-
lic sector operations. These include such
statutory functions as transport for the dis-
abled. As part of these partnerships, local
authorities offer discounts to citizens who
use Uber.11 In taking on these partnerships,
companies such as Uber can blur the distinc-
tion between the public and private sectors,
while making themselves indispensable to
local authorities and communities.
Perhaps the most ambitious element in
Uber’s strategy, however, is its drive to
develop autonomous vehicles. In 2015, Uber
opened a driverless car research centre in
Pittsburgh in the United States and in
September 2016, launched a self-driving taxi
fleet in the city (although retaining a ‘driver’
for legal and safety purposes). In doing so,
Uber placed itself ahead of intense competi-
tion for developing driverless vehicles from
companies such as Alphabet (the parent of
Google), Tesla, Ford, and General Motors. In
association with developments such as
autonomous vehicles, Uber is also develop-
ing its own global mapping system.
In December 2016—and in spite of Alpha-
bet preparing to sue it on the grounds of
trade secret theft (linked to its autonomous
vehicle programme)—Uber introduced self-
driving taxis in its home city of San
498 G E O F F R E Y D U D L E Y E T A L .
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Francisco. On this occasion it reverted to its
disruptive innovator strategy by putting the
vehicles on the streets without the required
official permits. In this way, the company
did not need to disclose safety statistics. This
decision rebounded on the company when a
few days later the California highways regu-
lator ordered Uber to take its vehicles off the
road.12 In 2017, Uber reversed its decision,
and decided to apply for the permits.
Such setbacks are unlikely to deter Uber
from its long-term goals, with major implica-
tions for vehicle manufacture and patterns of
ownership, the identity and relationships
between the public and private sectors, and
the structure and character of the employ-
ment market. By exploiting its position as a
disruptive innovator, it has acted as a major
agent of change and, in doing so, placed
itself in a position of commensurate political
and public influence.
Acknowledgement
This article forms part of the research pro-
ject: ‘The Governance of Transitions in
Urban Mobility: The Case of Uber in Lon-
don’ funded by the Rees Jeffreys Road Fund.
Tim Schwanen’s contribution has been made
possible by a grant from the UK Research
Councils (EP/K011790/1) to the Centre on
Innovation and Energy Demand. We would
like to thank Jeremy Richardson and Antje
Witting for their valuable comments on ear-
lier drafts of this article.
Notes
1 C. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Bos-
ton, MA, Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
2 A. Topping, ‘Cabbies bring gridlock across
Europe in fight against “unregulated” taxi
app’, The Guardian, 12 June 2014, https://
www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/11/
cab-drivers-europe-protest-taxi-app-uber-london-
madrid (accessed 21 April 2017).
3 M. Ahmed, ‘Uber takes on Johnson over plans
to cap minicabs in London’, Financial Times, 21
May 2015, http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscut
tings/S/3/articleText/99657708#axzz4eu48M1Zu
(accessed 21 April 2017).
4 J. Kollewe and G. Topham, ‘Uber expansion
drive could see its value surpass General
Motors’, The Guardian, 5 December 2015, https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/04/
uber-app-valued-62-billion-general-motors (acces-
sed21April2017).
5 D. Hellier, ‘Transport for London halts plan to
clamp down on Uber’, The Guardian, 21 Jan-
uary 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/tec
hnology/2016/jan/20/uber-claims-victory-afte
r-tfl-drops-proposed-restrictions (accessed 21 April
2017).
6 C. Sullivan, ‘London Uber drivers face crack-
down in boost for black cabs’, Financial Times,
14 September 2016, http://presscuttings.ft.c
om/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/117047525#a
xzz4eu48M1Zu (accessed 21 April 2017).
7 Mayor of London, Taxi and Private Hire Action
Plan 2016, London, Transport for London,
2016.
8 N. Ferrari, Saving the Black Cab. Why Black Taxis
are Vital to London’s Economy and Identity, Lon-
don, Policy Exchange, Capital City Foundation,
2016.
9 J. Dean, ‘Many drivers are only moonlighting
with ride-hailing company’, The Times, 3 June
2016, p. 38.
10 J. Harris, ‘Why the driverless future could turn
into a nightmare’, The Guardian, 16 December
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commen
tisfree/2016/dec/16/trump-uber-driverless-fut
ure-jobs-go (accessed 21 April 2017).
11 E. Morozov, ‘Public transport by Uber, and
Airbnb social housing? Not a smart solution’,
The Observer, 11 September 2016, https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/se
p/10/only-public-sector-finds-smart-technology-
sexy (accessed 21 April 2017).
12 T. Bradshaw, ‘Uber forced to halt self-driving
car trial’, Financial Times, 23 December 2016,
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/
3/articleText/120615383#axzz4eu48M1Zu (ac-
cessed 21 April 2017).
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© The Authors 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 3
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/11/cab-drivers-europe-protest-taxi-app-uber-london-madrid
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/11/cab-drivers-europe-protest-taxi-app-uber-london-madrid
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/11/cab-drivers-europe-protest-taxi-app-uber-london-madrid
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/11/cab-drivers-europe-protest-taxi-app-uber-london-madrid
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/99657708#axzz4eu48M1Zu
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/99657708#axzz4eu48M1Zu
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/04/uber-app-valued-62-billion-general-motors
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/04/uber-app-valued-62-billion-general-motors
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/04/uber-app-valued-62-billion-general-motors
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/20/uber-claims-victory-after-tfl-drops-proposed-restrictions
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/20/uber-claims-victory-after-tfl-drops-proposed-restrictions
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/20/uber-claims-victory-after-tfl-drops-proposed-restrictions
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/117047525#axzz4eu48M1Zu
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/117047525#axzz4eu48M1Zu
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/117047525#axzz4eu48M1Zu
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/16/trump-uber-driverless-future-jobs-go
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/16/trump-uber-driverless-future-jobs-go
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/16/trump-uber-driverless-future-jobs-go
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/10/only-public-sector-finds-smart-technology-sexy
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/10/only-public-sector-finds-smart-technology-sexy
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/10/only-public-sector-finds-smart-technology-sexy
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/10/only-public-sector-finds-smart-technology-sexy
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/120615383#axzz4eu48M1Zu
http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/S/3/articleText/120615383#axzz4eu48M1Zu
Write a 2 page double-spaced paper (no need to follow any writing format such as MLA or APA) addressing the following questions:
· What is the industry structure of UBER?
· What are the competitive strategies of UBER?
· What are the pros and cons to a “sharing economy?”
· What issues/challenges can a market disruptive innovator like UBER face?
· How do the private hire vehicles (registered partners) of UBER relate to outsourcing within a company and what challenges may UBER face in the future for having this hiring structure?
· What implications on a personal and business scale could occur if America shifted towards a ‘gig economy?’
· Why do you think that disruptive innovators believe it is easier to ask for forgiveness than permission?
