ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION IN APA STYLE ONLY> USING ONLY THE SOURCE PROVIDED. 350 WORDS
How is the containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War similar to North Korea’s now?
Arms Control Association
A New Era for Nuclear Security
Author(s): Martin B. Malin and Nickolas Roth
Source: Arms Control Today, Vol. 46, No. 5 (JUNE 2016), pp. 8-15
Published by: Arms Control Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24878314
Accessed: 19-06-2019 13:39 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
Arms Control Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to Arms Control Today
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
By Martin B. Malin and Nickolas Roth
A New Era for Nuclear Security
The 2016 nuclear security summit was
a pivotal moment for the decades
long effort to secure nuclear material
around the globe. More than 50 national leaders
gathered in Washington for the last of four
biennial meetings that have led to significant
progress in strengthening measures to reduce
the risk of nuclear theft.
These summits have played a critical
role in nurturing that progress by
elevating the political salience of nuclear
security and providing a forum for world
leaders to announce new commitments,
share information, and hold one another
accountable for following through on
promised actions.
The international community is
now entering the post-summit era, in
which nuclear security will probably
receive less-regular high-level political
attention than it has in recent years.
Yet, there is still critical work to be
done to reduce the danger that nuclear
weapons or the materials needed to
make them could end up in the hands
of a terrorist organization such as the
Islamic State. Governments still do
not agree on what nuclear security
priorities are most pressing or how best
to sustain the momentum generated by
the summits. As the era of summitry
recedes, will states continue improving
measures to prevent nuclear theft and
sabotage, or will the summits turn out
to have been a high-water mark for
nuclear security efforts?
Progress at the 2016 Summit
Over the course of the summit process,
the participating states committed
themselves to dozens of cooperative
initiatives seeking to strengthen
aspects of nuclear security, reduced
vulnerabilities in their security systems,
and pledged to continue joint efforts
through multilateral groups and
international institutions. The 2016
summit, held March 31-April 1 in
Washington, marked progress on all of
these fronts.
Like the 2010 summit in Washington,
the 2012 summit in Seoul, and the
2014 summit in The Hague, this year’s
meeting produced a consensus-based
communique. At the three most recent
summits, smaller groups of participants
also produced a series of joint statements
and group commitments, or “gift
baskets.”1 At this year’s summit, all
but three states participated in at least
one of 18 gift baskets or nine joint
statements, which covered a range
of areas, including insider threats,
transport security, minimization of
the use of highly enriched uranium
(HEU), and cybersecurity.2 Among the
most important outcomes of the recent
summit was the establishment of a
Martin B. Malin is executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs. From 2000 to 2007, he was director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences. Nickolas Roth is a research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom. Parts of this article draw from the authors’ article
with Matthew Bunn and William H. Tobey in 2016 titled “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?”
By Martin B. Malin and Nickolas Roth
A New Era for Nuclear Security
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Research reactor fuel made from highly enriched uranium is prepared for removal from Vietnam on June 29, 2013.
contact group, which will meet annually
to discuss nuclear security.
Some of the major accomplishments
of the summit are listed below.
Strengthening the commitment to
nuclear security. China and India
joined 36 states that had signed on to
an important 2014 summit initiative
on strengthening nuclear security
implementation.3 Members of this
group committed to “meet the intent”
of International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) nuclear security principles
and recommendations, conduct self
assessments, host periodic peer reviews
of their nuclear security, and ensure
that “management and personnel with
accountability for nuclear security
are demonstrably competent,” along
with several other actions. This was
an important commitment for China
and India, demonstrating a measure
of transparency and reassurance on
nuclear security. Prior to the 2016
summit, neither country had been
open to participating in such initiatives
although both nuclear-armed states face
terrorist threats.4
The summit process also helped to
build support for a foundational and
legally binding international nuclear
security instrument. After more than
a decade, the 2005 amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) reached
the required number of ratifications to
enter into force in May. The amendment
outlines nuclear security principles
and requires states to establish rules
and regulations for physical protection.
It also requires a review conference
five years after entry into force and,
if members choose to have them,
additional review conferences at
intervals of at least five years.5 The
amended CPPNM, now officially known
as the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities, could be a helpful
tool for states to hold one another
accountable for maintaining physical
protection and strengthening norms.
Reducing nuclear security vulnerabilities.
In addition to announcing new
commitments, the summits were
occasions for states to report on steps
they had taken to remove or eliminate
HEU or plutonium, convert reactors,
improve physical protection, strengthen
regulation, and contribute support to
the IAEA or other international nuclear
security work.
At the recent summit, Japan and the
United States announced the completion
of a commitment they made in 2014
to remove more than 500 kilograms of
nuclear weapons-usable material from
Japan.6 Argentina announced it had
eliminated the last of its HEU, making
it the 18th state to clean out all of its
nuclear weapons-usable material since
the beginning of the summit process.
Indonesia declared it had eliminated all
of its fresh HEU and planned to get rid
of all its HEU in 2016.
China announced the opening of its
nuclear security center of excellence.
Since 2010, China has worked with
the United States to build the center
as a hub for training, bilateral and
multilateral best practice exchanges, and
technology demonstration.7 The center
will help China test and strengthen its
own nuclear security measures and will
Research reactor fuel made from highly enriched uranium is prepared for removal from Vietnam on June 29, 2013.
Sandor Tozser/IAEA
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
provide a venue for cooperation with
others in the region and beyond.
The White House reported that
20 states hosted or invited peer
review missions through the IAEA or
from other states. Many other states
announced that they had strengthened
nuclear security laws or regulations,
upgraded physical security, or updated
the list of threats against which their
nuclear facilities must be protected.
Continuing the dialogue. An important
new gift basket created a nuclear
security contact group that will
convene annually on the margins of
the IAEA General Conference. The
contact group will carry forward the
consultative element of the summit
process, providing a forum for senior
government officials to meet and
discuss current efforts, evaluate progress
on previously made commitments,
and identify future priorities. If states
buy into the idea of the contact group
and take action to strengthen it, the
group, whose membership is open to
states that did not participate in the
summits, could be an important vehicle
for sustaining international nuclear
security cooperation.
The summit also produced statements
on bilateral nuclear security discussions
between key countries. For example,
China and the United States agreed
to increase cooperation on nuclear
terrorism prevention and conduct an
annual dialogue on nuclear security.
In addition, summit participants
agreed to action plans for the IAEA, the
United Nations, Interpol, the Global
Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Destruction,
and the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The plans
outline the roles these organizations
will play in supporting ongoing nuclear
security discussions now that the
summits have ended.
Gaps and Missed Opportunities
In their communique, the participants
in the 2016 summit pledged to
“continuously strengthen nuclear
security at national, regional, and
global levels.”8 Striving for continuous
improvement is the right way to frame
the challenge of providing effective
and sustainable nuclear security.
Unfortunately, summit participants
missed important opportunities to give
added momentum to the effort. The
following issues continue to require
attention.
Still no global standard for nuclear
security. Although the amended
CPPNM establishes general security
principles, it lacks specific standards
or guidelines and applies only to
materials in civilian use. UN Security
Council Resolution 1540 requires states
to provide “appropriate effective”
protection for all materials, among other
relevant measures, but does not specify
what constitutes appropriate effective
protection.9 IAEA recommendations,
to which dozens of states have
now publicly subscribed, provide
somewhat more specificity, but their
implementation is voluntary. Although
the summit process certainly helped
produce a shared understanding of the
importance of nuclear security, it fell
short of producing a consensus on a
meaningful minimum global standard.
If a global standard was beyond
reach during the summits, a public
commitment to stringent nuclear
security measures among the states
possessing the biggest stocks of HEU
and plutonium would have been a
consequential step. Although China’s
and India’s endorsements of the
initiative on strengthening nuclear
security implementation was an
important development, Russia’s absence
from the summit and Russia’s and
Pakistan’s refusal to sign that statement
is a significant gap in the patchwork of
nuclear security commitments.
Furthermore, the summit outcomes
were not comprehensive. Although
the summit communiques explicitly
covered “all” nuclear material, most
of the concrete progress from the
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives for an April 1 plenary session of the
nuclear security summit in Washington. During the summit, China and India joined
an initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives for an April 1 plenary session of the
nuclear security summit in Washington. During the summit, China and India joined
an initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation.
Saul Loeb/Getty Images
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (left) talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) at the summit on April 1.
meetings focused on civilian materials,
largely ignoring the roughly four-fifths
of the world’s remaining HEU and
plutonium that is controlled by military
organizations.10
A mixed picture on implementation.
Nuclear facilities in many countries still
are not protected against the full range of
threats. States with large stocks of nuclear
weapons-usable material still contend
with corruption and extremism.11 On
the ground, security upgrades remain
urgently needed in many spots around
the world. One indication of the extent of
the inconsistent application of physical
protection measures is that, after all of
the high-level attention since the 2010
summit, at least six countries—Argentina,
Brazil, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain,
and Sweden—still do not have armed
guards at their nuclear facilities.12
The collapse of U.S.-Russian bilateral
cooperation is particularly alarming.
Without Russian and U.S. commitments
to rebuilding their bilateral nuclear
security relationship, it will be impossible
for the two states that possess roughly
80 percent of the world’s weapons-usable
nuclear material to reassure one another
that their nuclear security is sound.
Slippage of consolidation and
minimization goals. The Obama
administration put laudable effort into
cleaning out HEU and plutonium from
many countries and minimizing the
use of HEU elsewhere. Yet, political
obstacles will likely make substantial
additional progress more difficult
than in the past, in particular for
the hundreds of kilograms of HEU in
Belarus and South Africa. Conversion of
additional HEU-fueled research reactors
to use low-enriched uranium fuel,
particularly but not only in Russia, is
hampered by technical challenges and
political inattention. Moreover, summit
participants failed to reach agreement,
even in principle, on stopping or
reversing the buildup of separated
plutonium.13
Continuing culture of complacency in
some countries. The summits put the
notion of nuclear security culture on
the agenda for many countries where
it previously had been neglected.
Nevertheless, workers, managers,
policy officials, and even national
leaders in many places still dismiss
the threat of terrorist theft or sabotage
as remote or implausible.14 Many
organizations handling nuclear
weapons, HEU, or separated plutonium
do not have specific programs focused
on strengthening security culture.
The IAEA has still not published its
nuclear security culture self-assessment
guide.15 The summit process helped
spark interest in strengthening security
culture, but much more work is needed.
Need for more-robust channels for
dialogue. The political momentum
created by the summits will not
likely be re-created through other
organizations, although the contact
group, IAEA ministerial meetings, a
review conference for the amended
CPPNM, and other forums certainly will
provide important opportunities for
discussion, reporting on progress, and
further cooperation.
The recent summit’s action plans did
not significantly expand or strengthen
the global nuclear security architecture.
The IAEA has assumed greater
responsibility for convening high-level
discussions on nuclear security and has
intensified its nuclear security efforts
since the first summit. Yet, the agency
still deals only with civilian material
and has no authority to require states
o
o
2
H
JJ
O
O
□
$
11
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (left) talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) at the summit on April 1.
Alex Wong/Getty Images
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
to take any action on nuclear security.16
The nuclear security capacities of the
UN and Interpol are even less robust,
and the multilateral groupings, the
GICNT and Global Partnership, remain
unchanged by the action plans the
summit participants produced.
Finally, Russia’s absence from
the recent summit may bode ill for
out of reach for the present. Yet, a
group of states like-minded emanating
from within the contact group or a
special working group of the GICNT
could develop a set of principles and
guidelines that they pledge to apply
to all stocks of nuclear weapons, HEU,
and plutonium and invite other states
to join them. Such a commitment
that are needed. The United States
should expand nuclear security
cooperation with China, India, and
Pakistan, sharing additional information
on security arrangements without
revealing sensitive information that
would increase vulnerability to terrorist
attack. The United States also will need
to make a priority of discussions with a
In the interest of promoting cooperation,
the summits frequently focused on pluckJng
low-hanging fruit.
< □ O h _j
o
cr
h
z
o
o
(/)
12 !
the successful implementation of
the summit action plans. Moscow’s
leadership and cooperation in all of the
organizations referenced in the action
plans will be necessary for many key
nuclear security steps.
Progress in the Post-Summit Era
In the interest of promoting
cooperation, the summits frequently
focused on plucking low-hanging fruit,
while failing to advance more-difficult
discussions of threats and persistent
challenges. Governments must focus not
only on what is most feasible but also on
what is most urgently needed in light of
the evolving threats they face.17
Nuclear security efforts should have
a clear goal: ensuring that all nuclear
weapons and the materials that could be
used to make them, wherever they are in
the world, are effectively and sustainably
secured against the full range of threats
that terrorists and thieves might plausibly
pose.18 Building an international
consensus around such a goal will be
a major challenge for the next U.S.
president and for like-minded leaders.
The 2016 summit communique alludes
to the goal of continuous improvement.
Achieving that goal will require work on
several fronts. Here are some of the most
important areas of focus.19
Building up the commitment to stringent
nuclear security standards. A legally
binding set of international standards
for nuclear security is unfortunately
should include the provision of well
trained, well-equipped on-site guard
forces; comprehensive measures
to protect against insider threats;
control and accounting systems that
can detect and localize any theft of
weapons-usable nuclear material;
protections against cyberthreats that are
integrated with other nuclear security
measures; effective nuclear security
rules and regulations and independent
regulators capable of enforcing them;
regular and realistic testing of nuclear
security systems, including force-on
force exercises; a robust program for
enhancing security culture; and regular
assessments of the evolving threat of
theft or sabotage. Following the example
of the initial group of adherents, the
accumulation of international support
for more-comprehensive standards could
grow over time.
In the meantime, leading states that
are bound by the amended CPPNM
should push to universalize the treaty,
and the states that have joined the
initiative on strengthening nuclear
security implementation initiative
should encourage others to commit to
implement IAEA recommendations and
accept peer review.
Implementing effective and sustainable
security measures on the ground.
Commitments to stringent standards
are meaningful only if they translate
into real improvements. Bilateral
cooperation can help spur the actions
wide range of countries on enhancing
their own nuclear security, providing
resources when needed.
Despite tensions over Ukraine and
other issues, Russia and the United States
should agree to a package of cooperation
that includes nuclear energy initiatives,
which are of particular interest to
Russia, and nuclear security initiatives,
which are of particular interest to the
United States. Although it is unlikely
in the current political environment,
one mechanism for achieving this goal
would be to restart the U.S.-Russian
Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security
Working Group, which facilitated
dialogue from 2009 until it was
suspended in 2014 because of tensions
between the two countries. Cooperation
should no longer be based on a donor
recipient relationship but on an equal
partnership with ideas and resources
coming from both sides.20
Increasing efforts to reduce the number of
sites where nuclear weapons and weapons
usable materials are stored. Today there
are fewer locations where HEU and
plutonium can be stolen because of
removals motivated by the summit
process. The consolidation process
must continue. Stringent security
requirements can help to incentivize
the process of consolidation, as can
well-funded programs for conversion
of HEU-fueled reactors and removal
of material. Russia and the United
States, as the countries whose nuclear
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
A member of the security force at the Chinon nuclear plant patrols the plant site near Avoine, France, on January 6, 2012. Data
from a recent report indicate that at least six countries do not require their nuclear facilities to have armed guards.
stockpiles are dispersed in the largest
number of buildings and bunkers,
should each develop a national-level
plan for accomplishing their military
and civilian nuclear objectives with the
smallest practicable number of locations.
The United States and other interested
countries should ensure that plutonium
and HEU bulk processing facilities do
not spread to other countries or expand
in number or scale of operations and
that no more plutonium is separated
than is used, bringing global plutonium
stocks down over time.
Establishing a nuclear security culture
that does not tolerate complacency about
threats and vulnerabilities. Every country
with relevant materials and facilities
should have a program in place to assess
and strengthen security culture, and all
nuclear managers and security-relevant
staff should receive regular information,
appropriate to their role, on evolving
threats to nuclear security. At the same
time, interested countries should launch
initiatives to combat complacency,
including a shared database of security
incidents and lessons learned; detailed
reports and briefings on the nuclear
terrorism threat; discussions among
intelligence agencies, on which most
governments rely for information about
the threats to their country; and an
expanded program of nuclear theft and
terrorism exercises.
Building up channels for dialogue.
Countries must continue to share
information and devise plans to meet
current nuclear security challenges.
The IAEA ministerial-level meetings
on nuclear security will provide an
important forum. If parties to the
amended CPPNM elect to meet every
five years to review progress, this process
could create important opportunities
to place high-level pressure on states to
step up nuclear security commitments
and implementation.
A more comprehensive scope of
cooperation, including on military
materials, could take place in
multilateral forums. The GICNT, co
chaired by Russia and the United States
and still valued by both, consists of
more than 80 states committed to
the group’s statement of principles,
which includes improving measures
that reduce the risk of nuclear theft
such as accounting, control, and
protection of nuclear and radiological
materials. The group has not focused
on these preventive approaches so
far, but it should in the future.21
This summer represents the GICNT’s
10th anniversary, which would be an
excellent time to announce the creation
of a GICNT working group focused
specifically on strengthening security
for nuclear materials and facilities. The
GICNT could also be a useful forum for
Russia and the United States to expand
nuclear security cooperation.
The contact group created at the
nuclear security summit this year
holds promise for facilitating dialogue,
n
o
3J
O
r
O
□
5
13
A member of the security force at the Chinon nuclear plant patrols the plant site near Avoine, France, on January 6, 2012. Data
from a recent report indicate that at least six countries do not require their nuclear facilities to have armed guards.
Alain Jocard/AFP/Getty Images
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Khammar Mrabit, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Division of Nuclear Security, speaks on June 12, 2014,
at a meeting in Vienna on promoting entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material.
sharing information, and germinating
joint activities. Its openness to all
IAEA members has the advantage of
potentially attracting states beyond
the ring of past summit participants.
Its size and heterogeneity, however,
may limit the depth and effectiveness
of the discussions. The contact group
should select an executive committee of
member state representatives—perhaps
former summit hosts plus Russia, if
it chooses to join—to establish and
coordinate its agenda for discussion.
Finally, summit-level nuclear security
meetings could be continued on the side
of Group of 20 meetings, perhaps once
every four years. This would sustain
the kind of executive-level political
attention to nuclear security that
summits provided.
The nuclear security summits
periodically pressed participants to
commit themselves to new and stronger
measures for preventing nuclear
terrorism. They facilitated a process
of stocktaking and reporting on the
concrete actions participants had taken.
Moreover, they were a vehicle for forging
stronger international collaboration on
bolstering nuclear security around the
globe. States must continue to build on
the progress they made through the
summit process. If they do, the 2016
summit will mark the beginning, rather
than the end, of a new era of continuous
improvement in nuclear security.
ENDNOTES
1. For a comprehensive assessment of
progress in fulfilling commitments from the
summits prior to 2016, see Michelle Cann,
Kelsey Davenport, and Jenna Parker, “The
Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report on
Joint Statements,” Arms Control Association
and Partnership for Global Security, March
2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/
reports/2015/The-Nuclear-Security-Summit
Progress-Report-on-Joint-Statements.
2. The three countries that did not join
gift baskets were Gabon, Pakistan, and Saudi
Arabia. For a list of gift baskets and joint
statements from the 2016 summit, see “2016
Washington Summit,” Nuclear Security
Matters, n.d., http://nuclearsecuritymatters.
belfercenter.org/2016-washington-summit.
3. “Strengthening Nuclear Security
Implementation,” March 25, 2014,
http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/235508 . Thirty-five
countries signed the 2014 statement. Jordan
joined in late 2015.
4. See Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India
Khammar Mrabit, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Division of Nuclear Security, speaks on June 12, 2014,
at a meeting in Vienna on promoting entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material.
Dean Calma/(AEA
ENDNOTES
1. For a comprehensive assessment of
progress in fulfilling commitments from the
summits prior to 2016, see Michelle Cann,
Kelsey Davenport, and Jenna Parker, “The
Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report on
Joint Statements,” Arms Control Association
and Partnership for Global Security, March
2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/
reports/2015/The-Nuclear-Security-Summit
Progress-Report-on-Joint-Statements.
2. The three countries that did not join
gift baskets were Gabon, Pakistan, and Saudi
Arabia. For a list of gift baskets and joint
statements from the 2016 summit, see “2016
Washington Summit,” Nuclear Security
Matters, n.d., http://nuclearsecuritymatters.
belfercenter.org/2016-washington-summit.
3. “Strengthening Nuclear Security
Implementation,” March 25, 2014,
http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/235508 . Thirty-five
countries signed the 2014 statement. Jordan
joined in late 2015.
4. See Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
and the Nuclear Security Summit,” Nuclear
Security Matters, April 26, 2016, http://
nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.org/
blog/india-and-nuclear-security-summ; Hui
Zhang, “China Makes Significant Nuclear
Security Pledges at 2016 Summit,” Nuclear
Security Matters, April 8, 2016, http://
nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.org/blog/
china-makes-significant-nuclear-security
pledges-2016-summit.
5. For background on the amended
Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, see “Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,”
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
n.d., https://www.iaea.org/publications/
documents/conventions/convention-physical
protection-nuclear-material. For an argument
that the review conferences envisioned in
the amendment could help drive nuclear
security progress, see Jonathan Herbach and
Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, “More Work to Do: A
Pathway for Future Progress on Strengthening
Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today,
October 2015.
6. “Joint Statement by the Leaders of Japan
and the United States on Contributions to
Global Minimization of Nuclear Material,”
April 1, 2016, http://nuclearsecuritymatters.
belfercenter.org/files/nuclearmatters/files/
joint_statement_by_the_leaders_of_japan_
and_the_united_states_on_contrib .
7. Office of the Press Secretary, The White
House, “U.S.-China Joint Statement on
Nuclear Security Cooperation,” March 31,
2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
office/2016/03/31/us-china-joint-statement
nuclear-security-cooperation.
8. “Nuclear Security Summit 2016
Communique,” April 1, 2016, http://
nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.
org/files/nuclearmatters/files/nuclear_
security_summit_2016_communique.
pdf?m=1460469255.
9. See Matthew Bunn, “Appropriate
Effective Nuclear Security and Accounting—
What Is It?” (presentation, “Appropriate
Effective” Material Accounting and Physical
Protection—Joint Global Initiative/UNSCR
1540 Workshop,” Nashville, TN, July 18,
2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/bunn-1540-appropriate-effective50 .
10. For a discussion of security for military
materials, see Des Browne, Richard Lugar, and
Sam Nunn, “Bridging the Military Nuclear
Materials Gap,” Nuclear Threat Initiative
(NTI), 2015, http://www.nti.org/media/
pdfs/NTI_report_2015_e_version . The
2016 summit communique reaffirmed that
states had a fundamental responsibility “to
maintain at all times effective security of
all nuclear and other radioactive material,
including nuclear materials used in nuclear
weapons.” See “Nuclear Security Summit
2016 Communique.”
11. For a more complete discussion of the
threats some countries with nuclear material
face, see Matthew Bunn et al., “Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement
or Dangerous Decline?” Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School, March 2016, pp. 39-52,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web .
12. For country information on physical
protection, see the 2016 NTI Nuclear Security
Index for sabotage, http://ntiindex.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2016-NTI
Index-Data-2016.03.25.zip. Belgium has only
recently added armed guards to its nuclear
facilities. The Swedish regulator has ordered
that facilities post armed guards by February
2017. See Steven Mufson, “Brussels Attacks
Stoke Fears About Security of Belgian Nuclear
Facilities,” The Washington Post, March 25,
2016; “Swedish Regulator Orders Tighter
Security at Nuclear Plants,” Reuters, February
5, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/
sweden-nuclear-security-idUSL8N15K3SS.
13. The 2014 summit communique states,
“We encourage States to minimise their
stocks of [highly enriched uranium] and to
keep their stockpile of separated plutonium
to the minimum level, both as consistent
with national requirements.” “The Hague
Nuclear Security Summit Communique,”
March 25, 2014, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/237002 . In
2016, there was no mention of plutonium in
the communique.
14. Matthew Bunn and Eben Harrell
surveyed nuclear experts in states with
nuclear weapons-usable material and found
that some respondents did not find certain
threats credible, despite extensive evidence
to the contrary. See Matthew Bunn and Eben
Harrell, “Threat Perceptions and Drivers
of Change in Nuclear Security Around the
World: Results of a Survey,” Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School, March 2014,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
surveypaperfulltext .
15. IAEA, “Self-Assessment of Nuclear
Security Culture in Facilities and Activities
That Use Nuclear and/or Radioactive Material:
Draft Technical Guidance,” July 2, 2014, http://
www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/security
series-drafts/tech-guidance/nst026 .
16. See Trevor Findlay, “Beyond Nuclear
Summitry: The Role of the IAEA in Nuclear
Security Diplomacy After 2016,” Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School, March 2014,
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/
beyondnuclearsummitryfullpaper .
17. For a discussion of how the threat of
nuclear terrorism has evolved over time, see
Bunn et al., “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,”
pp. 14-26, 133-143.
18. Ibid., p. 96.
19. For the recommendations on which this
section draws, see Bunn et al., “Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism,” pp. 96-133.
20. For a more complete description of
the end of nuclear security cooperation,
see Nickolas Roth, “Russian Nuclear
Security Cooperation: Rebuilding Equality,
Mutual Benefit, and Respect,” Deep Cuts
Commission, June 2015, http://deepcuts.
org/files/pdf/Deep_Cuts_Issue_Brief4_US
Russian_Nuclear_Security_Cooperationl .
21. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (GICNT), “Fact Sheet,” n.d., http://
www.gicnt.org/content/downloads/sop/
GICNT_Fact_Sheet_June2015 . Although
the GICNT terms of reference state that its
activities do not involve “military nuclear
programs of the nuclear weapon states party
to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,” the group’s statement
of principles, which is the only document
GICNT members are required to endorse,
contains no such exclusion. See Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation,
U.S. Department of State, “Terms of Reference
for Implementation and Assessment,”
November 20, 2006, http://2001-2009.state.
gov/t/isn/rls/other/76421.htm; GICNT,
“Statement of Principles,” 2015, http://gicnt.
org/content/downloads/sop/Statement_of_
Principles .
o
O
z
H
3J
o
o
D
$
15
and the Nuclear Security Summit,” Nuclear
Security Matters, April 26, 2016, http://
nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.org/
blog/india-and-nuclear-security-summ; Hui
Zhang, “China Makes Significant Nuclear
Security Pledges at 2016 Summit,” Nuclear
Security Matters, April 8, 2016, http://
nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.org/blog/
china-makes-significant-nuclear-security
pledges-2016-summit.
5. For background on the amended
Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, see “Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,”
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
n.d., https://www.iaea.org/publications/
documents/conventions/convention-physical
protection-nuclear-material. For an argument
that the review conferences envisioned in
the amendment could help drive nuclear
security progress, see Jonathan Herbach and
Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, “More Work to Do: A
Pathway for Future Progress on Strengthening
Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today,
October 2015.
6. “Joint Statement by the Leaders of Japan
and the United States on Contributions to
Global Minimization of Nuclear Material,”
April 1, 2016, http://nuclearsecuritymatters.
belfercenter.org/files/nuclearmatters/files/
joint_statement_by_the_leaders_of_japan_
and_the_united_states_on_contrib .
7. Office of the Press Secretary, The White
House, “U.S.-China Joint Statement on
Nuclear Security Cooperation,” March 31,
2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
office/2016/03/31/us-china-joint-statement
nuclear-security-cooperation.
8. “Nuclear Security Summit 2016
Communiqué,” April 1, 2016, http://
nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.
org/files/nuclearmatters/files/nuclear_
security_summit_2016_communique.
pdf?m=1460469255.
9. See Matthew Bunn, “Appropriate
Effective Nuclear Security and Accounting—
What Is It?” (presentation, “Appropriate
Effective” Material Accounting and Physical
Protection—Joint Global Initiative/UNSCR
1540 Workshop,” Nashville, TN, July 18,
2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/bunn-1540-appropriate-ef fective50 .
10. For a discussion of security for military
materials, see Des Browne, Richard Lugar, and
Sam Nunn, “Bridging the Military Nuclear
Materials Gap,” Nuclear Threat Initiative
(NTI), 2015, http://www.nti.org/media/
pdfs/NTI_report_2015_e_version . The
2016 summit communiqué reaffirmed that
states had a fundamental responsibility “to
maintain at all times effective security of
all nuclear and other radioactive material,
including nuclear materials used in nuclear
weapons.” See “Nuclear Security Summit
2016 Communiqué.”
11. For a more complete discussion of the
threats some countries with nuclear material
face, see Matthew Bunn et al., “Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement
or Dangerous Decline?” Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School, March 2016, pp. 39-52,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web .
12. For country information on physical
protection, see the 2016 NTI Nuclear Security
Index for sabotage, http://ntiindex.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2016-NTI
Index-Data-2016.03.25.zip. Belgium has only
recently added armed guards to its nuclear
facilities. The Swedish regulator has ordered
that facilities post armed guards by February
2017. See Steven Mufson, “Brussels Attacks
Stoke Fears About Security of Belgian Nuclear
Facilities,” The Washington Post, March 25,
2016; “Swedish Regulator Orders Tighter
Security at Nuclear Plants,” Reuters, February
5, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/
sweden-nuclear-security-idUSL8N15K3SS.
13. The 2014 summit communiqué states,
“We encourage States to minimise their
stocks of [highly enriched uranium] and to
keep their stockpile of separated plutonium
to the minimum level, both as consistent
with national requirements.” “The Hague
Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué,”
March 25, 2014, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/237002 . In
2016, there was no mention of plutonium in
I the communiqué.
14. Matthew Bunn and Eben Harrell
surveyed nuclear experts in states with
nuclear weapons-usable material and found
that some respondents did not find certain
threats credible, despite extensive evidence
to the contrary. See Matthew Bunn and Eben
Harrell, “Threat Perceptions and Drivers
of Change in Nuclear Security Around the
World: Results of a Survey,” Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School, March 2014,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
surveypaperfulltext .
15. IAEA, “Self-Assessment of Nuclear
Security Culture in Facilities and Activities
That Use Nuclear and/or Radioactive Material:
Draft Technical Guidance,” July 2, 2014, http://
www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/security
series-drafts/tech-guidance/nst026 .
; 16. See Trevor Findlay, “Beyond Nuclear
Summitry: The Role of the IAEA in Nuclear
Security Diplomacy After 2016,” Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School, March 2014,
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/
beyondnuclearsummitryfullpaper .
17. For a discussion of how the threat of
nuclear terrorism has evolved over time, see
Bunn et al., “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,”
pp. 14-26, 133-143.
18. Ibid., p. 96.
19. For the recommendations on which this
section draws, see Bunn et al., “Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism,” pp. 96-133.
20. For a more complete description of
the end of nuclear security cooperation,
see Nickolas Roth, “Russian Nuclear
Security Cooperation: Rebuilding Equality,
Mutual Benefit, and Respect,” Deep Cuts
Commission, June 2015, http://deepcuts.
org/files/pdf/Deep_Cuts_Issue_Brief4_US
Russian_Nuclear_Security_Cooperationl .
21. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (GICNT), “Fact Sheet,” n.d., http://
www.gicnt.org/content/downloads/sop/
GICNT_Fact_Sheet_June2015 . Although
the GICNT terms of reference state that its
activities do not involve “military nuclear
programs of the nuclear weapon states party
to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,” the group’s statement
of principles, which is the only document
GICNT members are required to endorse,
contains no such exclusion. See Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation,
U.S. Department of State, “Terms of Reference
for Implementation and Assessment,”
November 20, 2006, http://2001-2009.state.
gov/t/isn/rls/other/76421.htm; GICNT,
“Statement of Principles,” 2015, http://gicnt.
org/content/downloads/sop/Statement_of_
Principles .
This content downloaded from 131.94.16.10 on Wed, 19 Jun 2019 13:39:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
p. 8
p. 9
p. 10
p. 11
p. 12
p. 13
p. 14
p. 15
Arms Control TODAY, Vol. 46, No. 5 (JUNE 2016) pp. 1-36
Front Matter
FOCUS: Obama’s India Nuclear Blind Spot [pp. 3-3]
InBRIEF [pp. 4-4]
News Briefs [pp. 5-6]
On the Calendar [pp. 6-6]
Reports of Note [pp. 7-7]
A New Era for Nuclear Security [pp. 8-15]
Just Leave It: NATO’s Nuclear Weapons Policy At the Warsaw Summit [pp. 16-21]
Conventional Arms Control In Europe: Decline, Disarray, And the Need for Reinvention [pp. 22-25]
InThe NEWS
THE WORLD
Momentum Builds for Nuclear Ban Treaty [pp. 26-28]
Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Initiative Turns 10 [pp. 28-30]
ASIA AND AUSTRALIA
North Korea Tests Land, Sea Missiles [pp. 31-32]
China Expands Missile Arsenal [pp. 32-33]
THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAS
Obama Addresses Hiroshima Experience [pp. 34-34]
EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Romania Missile Defense Site Activated [pp. 35-35]
GETTING TO KNOW: Greg Thielmann [pp. 36-36]
Back Matter
Dashboard
Unauthorized
Skip To Content
Dashboard
Account
Dashboard
Courses
Groups
Calendar
Inbox
History
Help
Close
