Answer the following questions. Your answer will be graded based on organization, clarity and inclusion of appropriate examples to support your answer. Each answer should be at least 3 pages (950 words). (Times New Roman/Font 12/ Double Space.
Contents v
Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand? 57
Political/Conflict Theories 58
Economic Theories 60
Cultural Theories 61
Diffusion Theories 62
Great Britain, the United Kingdom,
or Neither? State and Nation in England and Scotland 65
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Mexico 56
France 59
United Kingdom 62
Nigeria 63
C H A P T E R 4
Political Economy 70
Concepts 72
Inequality 73
Employment and Inflation 75
Types 76
Markets and States in Modern Economies 76
Markets and Economic Performance 77
States and Economic Performance 79
Economic Functions of Modern States 82
States and Economic Management 82
Investments in Human Capital: Education and Health 83
Infrastructure and Other Public Goods 85
Welfare State Functions 85
Causes and Effects: W hy Do Welfare States Emerge? 86
Cultural Changes 87
Industrial Capitalism 87
Mobilization and Political Action 89
International Learning Effects 92
Welfare States in the Nordic
Countries: What Can We Learn and How? 93
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
United States 72
United Kingdom 77
Japan 84
Germany 87
C H A P T E R 5
Development 96
Concepts 98
Types 98
Poverty 98
Social Outcomes and Human Development 99
Gender Relations and Racial and Ethnic Identities 100
Satisfaction and Happiness 101
Cultural Development 102
Sustainability 103
Causes and Effects: Why Does Development
Happen? 103
Institutions:The Market-State Debate, Revisited 104
Institutions: Beyond the Market-State Debate 106
Culture and Development 107
Civil Society, Social Capital, and Trust 107
Religion 109
Value Systems 109
Systems and Structures: Domestic and International 110
Domestic Economic Structures and Class Interests 111
International Economic Structures and Class Interests 111
Geography 112
Explaining the Development
of North and South Korea 114
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
India 99
Nigeria 101
China 105
Brazil 112
C H A P T E R 6
Democracy and Dem ocratization 119
Concepts 121
Democracy and Democratic Regimes 121
Procedural (Minimal) Definitions of Democracy 122
Substantive Definitions of Democracy 123
Regime Change and Democratization 124
Types 125
Types of Democracy 125
Representative Democracy 126
Direct Democracy 128
Types of Democratization 129
Democratic Transitions 129
Democratic Consolidation 129
Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 131
Modernization 132
Culture and Democracy 134
The International System 135
Domestic Institutions 136
Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals and Groups 137
Combining Arguments and Theories: Multiple Causes 139
l l ! l l ! i m i M U M I i m is American Democracy
a Model? 141
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Brazil 130
■
Contents
China 131
India 133
United States 140
C H A P T E R 7
A uthoritarian Regimes and Democratic
Breakdown 145
Concepts 147
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Regimes 147
Transitions to Authoritarian Regimes 148
Types 148
Types of Authoritarianism 148
Totalitarian Regimes 148
Theocracies 149
Personalistic Dictatorships 149
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes 151
Hybrid and Semi-authoritarian Regimes 151
Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to Authoritarianism 152
Authoritarian Persistence 153
Democratic Breakdown 155
Transition to Hybrid or Semi-authoritarian Regime 157
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes
to Emerge and Persist? 158
Historical Institutionalist Theories 159
Poverty and Inequality 160
State Weakness and Failure 162
Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian Persistence 163
Barriers to Collective Action 164
Special Causal Circumstances Surrounding Hybrid
and Semi-Authoritarian Regimes 166
Why Did Zimbabwe Become
and Remain Authoritarian? 167
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Iran 150
Russia 153
Mexico 154
Germany 157
France 157
p a r t ill: Institutions of Government
C H A P T E R 8
Constitutions and Constitutional Design 171
Concepts 174
Constitutions 174
Constitutional Design 175
Types 176
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions 177
Separation of Powers: Judicial Review and Parliamentary
Sovereignty 178
Federalism and Unitarism 180
Federalism 180
Unitarism 182
Authoritarian and Democratic Constitutions 183
Causes and Effects: W hat Are the Effects of Federal
Constitutions? 184
Are Federal Constitutions Good for Social Stability? 185
Are Federal Constitutions Good for Democratic Rights? 187
Are Federal Constitutions Good for the Economy? 188
Judicial Review and Democracy 190
What Explains the Similarities
Between the Brazilian and South African
Constitutions? 193
H B a iiB B iflm i
United Kingdom 181
Iran 185
Nigeria 187
India 189
United States 192
C H A P T E R 9
Legislatures and Legislative Elections 198
Concepts 200
What Legislatures Are 200
What Legislatures Do 201
Types 202
Unicameral and Bicameral Legislatures 202
Electoral Systems 205
District Systems 205
Proportional Representation (PR) 208
Mixed or Hybrid 209
Executive-Legislative Relations 211
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns
of Representation? 213
Patterns of Representation 213
Electoral Systems and Representation 215
Legislative Decision Making and Representation 218
Executive-Legislative Relations and Representation 220
Representation in New Zealand
and Beyond 222
ES3Q2SE31
United Kingdom 206
Brazil 209
Japan 210
Germany 212
United States 217
Brief Contents
p a r t i : Comparative Political Analysis
1 The Comparative Approach: An Introduction 1
2 Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 23
p a r t II: The State, Development,
Democracy, and Authoritarianism
3 The State 46
4 Political Economy 70
5 Development 96
6 Democracy and Democratization 119
7 Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic
Breakdown 145
p a r t ill: Institutions of Government
8 Constitutions and Constitutional Design 171
9 Legislatures and Legislative Elections 198
10 Executives 226
11 Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest
Groups 252
p a r t IV: Politics, Society, and Culture
12 Revolutions and Contention 277
13 Nationalism and National Identity 304
14 Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 325
15 Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics 348
p a r t V : The Comparative-International
Nexus
16 Comparative Politics and International
Relations 372
p a r t v i : Country Profiles and Cases
Brazil 399
China 412
I I France 427
P B B Germany 441
^ 2 lndia 455
] Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran) 468
| ♦ | Japan 482
a Mexico 496
n Nigeria 510
j j j j Russia (Russian Federation) 525
I H H United Kingdom 539
■ United States 553
Contents
Insights, xiii
Preface xv
Maps of the World xxvi
p a r t i : Comparative Political Analysis
C H A P T E R 1
The Comparative Approach: A n Introduction 1
Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative
Politics 2
Major Questions in Comparative Politics 4
Empirical Arguments Versus Normative Arguments 6
Solving Intellectual Puzzles: A Contemporary Analogy 7
Concepts 9
Features of Good Concepts 9
Conceptualization 10
Operationalizing: From Concepts to Measures 11
Empirical Evidence 12
Facts and Evidence 12
Cases and Case Studies 13
The Comparative Method 14
Variables and Comparison 14
Most-Similar-Systems Design 15
Most-Different-Systems Design 18
Comparative Checking 18
Within-Case Comparison 20
Is the Study of Politics a Science? The Limits of the
Comparative Method 20
C H A P T E R 2
Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 23
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 24
Theories 25
Flypotheses 25
How Theories Emerge and Are Used 27
Types of Evidence 29
L h
Hypothesis Testing 31
Correlation 31
Causation 33
Critiques: Using Theory and Evidence 39
Empirical Critiques: Using Deviant Cases 39
Theoretical Critiques: Improving Theories and Hypotheses 39
The Challenges of Measurement: Biases,
Errors, and Validity 41
EU SM B B S* Qualities of Good Analysis
and Argumentation 42
Step 1: Asking Good Questions: Why? 43
Step 2: Hypothesis Testing: Generating Good Hypotheses
and Testing Them Fairly 43
Step 3: Balancing Argumentation: Evidence, Originality,
and Meaningfulness 43
p a r t ii: The State, Development,
Democracy, and Authoritarianism
C H A P T E R 3
The State 46
Concepts 48
The Modern State 48
State Capacity 49
Failed States 50
The State-Society Relationship 50
Types 52
Cha racteristics of Modern States 52
Bureaucracy 52
Impersonality 53
Sovereignty 54
Traditional Functions of States 55
Defense 55
Policing 55
Taxation 56
Order, Administration, and “Legibility” 57
■NSgggf
C H A P TE R 10
Executives 226
Concepts 228
Types 229
Executive Structures: Presidential and Parliamentary 230
Formal Powers 232
Partisan Powers 235
Coalitions 235
Informal Powers 240
Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive
Stability? 240
Stable and Unstable Regimes: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,
and Democracy 241
Stable and Unstable Executives: Styles of Presidential Rule 243
Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns of Parliamentary
Rule 246
U i lllim i l M M H H m Beyond the American
and British Models 247
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
France 231
United States 231
Russia 234
China 236
Nigeria 241
C H A P T E R 11
Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest
Groups 252
Concepts 255
Political Parties 255
Party Systems 255
Interest Groups 256
Types 257
Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All Parties 258
Party Systems: Dominant-Party, Two-Party, and Multiparty
Systems 259
Interest Groups: Pluralism and Corporatism 264
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge,
and What Effects Do They Have? 267
Party Systems and Representation 267
What Factors Shape Party Systems? 267
How Do Party Systems Shape Political Outcomes? 269
Interest Groups and Representation 272
Party Systems in Sub-Saharan
Africa 275
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
China 260
Japan 261
Contents vii
Germany 262
Russia 265
Mexico 267
p a r t i v : Politics, Society, and Culture
C H A P T E R 12
Revolutions and Contention 277
Concepts 279
What Is “Contention”? 279
Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary Contention 279
Types 280
Social Movements 280
Revolutions 284
Insurgencies and Civil Wars 287
Terrorism 287
“Everyday Resistance” 289
Thinking About Contention: Summary 290
Causes and Effects: W hy Do Revolutions Happen? 291
Relative Deprivation 291
Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunities 292
Rational Choice 294
Culture or “Framing” Explanations 296
Q ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Q ^ ^ T h e “Arab Spring” of 2011 298
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Brazil 282
France 285
Russia 292
China 293
Iran 297
C H A P T E R 13
Nationalism and National Identity 304
Concepts 306
Identity 306
Nationalism and the Nation 306
Types 307
Primordialist Approaches 307
Perennialist Approaches 308
Modernist Approaches 308
Types of Nationalism 311
Causes and Effects: W hat Causes Ethno-National
Conflict? 313
Primordial Bonds 316
Cultural Boundaries 317
viii Contents
Material Interests 318
Rational Calculation 318
Social Psychology 320
Ending Ethnic and National
Violence 321
United Kingdom 308
Mexico 309
Japan 310
Germany 312
Nigeria 316
C H A P T E R 14
Race, Ethnicity, and G ender 325
Concepts 327
Race and Ethnicity 327
Gender 328
Sexual Orientation 329
Types 329
Disentangling Race and Ethnicity 329
Discrimination Based on Race and Ethnicity 332
Gender Discrimination 333
Empowerment of Women and Minority Groups 334
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence
the Political Representation of Women
and Minority Groups? 337
Social Movement Mobilization 337
Political Parties Based on Gender or Ethnicity 339
Institutions for Promoting Women’s and Minority Group
Representation 341
WOmmwMEfr Indicators of Gender
Empowerment 344
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Iran 334
Japan 335
Brazil 336
Mexico 340
India 341
C H A P T E R 15
Ideology and Religion in M odern
Politics 348
Concepts 350
Modernity and Modernization 350
Ideology 351
Religion 351
Secularization, Religion, and Modern Politics 352
Religious Conflict 353
Types 354
Modern Ideologies 354
Liberalism 354
Fascism 355
Socialism 356
Modern Forms of Religion in Politics 357
Lay and Religious States 358
Denominationalism 359
Causes and Effects: W hy Do Religion and Ideology
Remain Prevalent in Modern Politics? 360
Why (and How) Does Modernization Alter Religion’s Role
in Politics? 360
Modernization Theory and Secularization 361
The ‘Religious Economies”Approach 362
Institutional Theories 363
Why Didn’t Ideology (and History) End? 364
JBBBSMMESk Two Lefts in Latin America? 367
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
United Kingdom 355
Russia 357
France 359
Iran 360
Nigeria 361
p a r t V : The Comparative-International
Nexus
C H A P T E R 16
Comparative Politics and International
Relations 372
Concepts 375
Issues 376
Globalization and Trade 376
International Institutions and Integration 380
Immigration 382
Environment and Sustainability 384
Transnational Networks 387
Nuclear Threats and Terrorism 388
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes
in International Relations? 390
Realism 390
Liberalism 393
Constructivism 394
Marxism 395
Contents ix
The EU and Levels of Analysis 395
C A S E S IN C O N T EX T
United States 381
France 383
Japan 387
Iran 389
India 389
• Qom
I R A N
Esfahan »
• Dezful
® Y a z d
p a r t vi: Country Profiles and Cases
m Brazil 399
399
Introduction 399
Historical Development 401
Regime and Political Institutions 404
Political Culture 405
Political Economy 406
407
Does the Global Economy Help or Hurt Developing Nations?
(Chapter 5) 407
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil (Chapter 6) 408
Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline in Brazil’s Legislature
(Chapter 9) 409
Brazil’s Landless Movement (Chapter 12) 410
Gender and Political Representation in Brazil: Where Has
Progress Come From? (Chapter 14) 410
HI C hina 412
412
Introduction 412
Historical Development 414
Regime and Political Institutions 417
Political Culture 418
Political Economy 419
420
How Did China Become an Economic Power? (Chapter 5) 420
Is China Destined for Democracy? (Chapter 6) 421
Who Governs China? (Chapter 10) 423
The Chinese Party System (Chapter 11) 424
The Chinese Revolution (Chapter 12) 425
1 1 France 427
427
Introduction 427
C A S E S T U D IE S
C A S E S T U D IE S
Historical Development 429
Regime and Political Institutions 431
Political Culture 432
Political Economy 433
434
The State in France (Chapter 3) 434
Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France
(Chapter 7) 435
Electing the French President: What Do Runoffs Do? (Chapter 10) 436
The French Revolution (Chapter 12) 437
Religion and Secularism in France (Chapter 15) 438
Globalization and Culture in France (Chapter 16) 439
G erm any 441
2 ^ 441
Introduction 441
Historical Development 443
Regime and Political Institutions 446
Political Culture 447
Political Economy 448
u s m a m i 449
The German State: Unification and Welfare (Chapter 4) 449
Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany (Chapter 7) 450
Institutional Design: Germany’s Bundestag and Bundesrat
(Chapter 9) 451
Consensus-Based Politics in Germany (Chapter 11) 452
Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? (Chapter 13) 453
India 455
455
Introduction 455
Historical Development 457
Regime and Political Institutions 460
Political Culture 461
Political Economy 462
463
What Explain India’s Recent Growth? (Chapter 5) 463
Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn from
a Deviant Case? (Chapter 6) 464
Federalism and Differences in Development in India (Chapter 8) 464
Ethnicity and Political Parties in India (Chapter 14) 465
India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics, Identity,
and Security (Chapter 16) 466
C 2 Iran (Islamic Republic o f Iran) 468
2 ^ 468
Introduction 468
Historical Development 470
Regime and Political Institutions 473
C A S E S T U D IE S
C A S E S T U D IE S
X Contents
Political Culture 474
Political Economy 474
B E E uE H E I 475
Democratic Features of Authoritarian Systems? The Case of
Iran (Chapter 7) 475
Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran (Chapter 8) 476
Iran’s Islamic Revolution and “Green Revolution”? (Chapter 12) 478
Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Politics (Chapter 14) 479
Religion and Politics in Iran (Chapter 15) 479
Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chapter 16) 480
Japan 482
^ 482
Introduction 482
Historical Development 484
Regime and Political Institutions 487
Political Culture 488
Political Economy 488
C A S E S T U D IE S 490
State-Led Development in Japan (Chapter 4) 490
The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet
(Chapter 9) 491
How Did Japan’s Dominant Party Win for So Long?
(Chapter 11) 491
Importing National Identity in Japan? (Chapter 13) 493
Gender Empowerment in Japan? (Chapter 14) 493
Resource Management in Japan (Chapter 16) 494
I I Mexico 496
496
Introduction 496
Historical Development 498
Regime and Political Institutions 501
Political Culture 502
Political Economy 503
E S 2 2 S 3 504
The Mexican State and Rule of Law (Chapter 3) 504
Mexico’s “Perfect Dictatorship” and Its End (Chapter 7) 505
The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico (Chapter 11) 506
Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity
in Mexico (Chapter 13) 507
Why Aren’t There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico?
(Chapter 14) 508
I I Nigeria 510
510
Introduction 510
Historical Development 512
Regime and Political Institutions
Political Culture 515
Political Economy 516
515
C A S E S T U D IE S 517
What Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed?
The Case of Nigeria (Chapter 3) 517
Why Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse?
The Nigerian Case (Chapter 5) 518
Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding Together
or Tearing Apart? (Chapter 8) 519
The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations
(Chapter 10) 521
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism and Ethno-
National Conflict in a Post-Colonial Society (Chapter 13) 522
Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria: Disentangling
Ethnicity and Religion? (Chapter 15) 523
Russia (Russian Federation) 525
525
Introduction 525
Historical Development 527
Regime and Political Institutions 531
Political Culture 532
Political Economy 532
m m 533
Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia
(Chapter 7) 533
Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers
(Chapter 10) 534
Personalism and the Party System in Russia (Chapter 11) 535
The Russian Revolution (Chapter 12) 536
Communist Ideology in Practice— Russia and the Soviet Union
(Chapter 15) 537
IH H U nited Kingdom 539
539
Introduction 539
Historical Development 541
Regime and Political Institutions 544
Political Culture 545
Political Economy 545
I4M 4-W H.IIH 546
The State in the United Kingdom (Chapter 3) 546
Political Economy of Britain (Chapter 4) 547
No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality in the
United Kingdom (Chapter 8) 548
The Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom and the
Westminster Model (Chapter 9) 549
National Identity in the United Kingdom (Chapter 13) 550
Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom (Chapter 15) 552
Contents
United States 553
553
Introduction 553
Historical Development 555
Regime and Political Institutions 558
Political Culture 559
Political Economy 560
I 2 2 J2 I3I3 561
Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich? Will They in
the Future? (Chapter 4) 561
Is American Democracy in Trouble?
(Chapter 6) 562
Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem?
(Chapter 8) 563
The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or Functioning by
Design? (Chapter 9) 564
“The Most Powerful Person in the World”? Checks on American
Presidents (Chapter 10) 566
The United States and the World: A Love-Hate Relationship?
(Chapter 16) 567
Notes 569
Glossary 581
References and Further Reading 591
Credits 617
Index 618
r
Insights
C H A P TER 3
C H A P TER 4
C H A P T E R S
C H A P TER 6
C H A P TER 7
C H A PTER 8
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States 60
Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework
for Interpreting Recorded Human History 61
Philip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modem Europe 62
Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors 64
John Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez, World Society and the
Nation-State 65
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 79
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation 80
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 89
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 90
Gasta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 91
Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery 107
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development 108
Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 109
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System 113
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 114
Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics and Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy ’ 132
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 135
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 137
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule 139
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human
Development Sequence 140
Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in theMaking
of the Modem World 161
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 162
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations 164
Timur Kuran, Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989 165
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 166
William Riker, Federalism:Origin, Operation, Significance 186
Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model 186
Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism 189
Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Economic Management in
Multi-Tiered Systems 190
Ran Hirschl, Toward Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 193
Insights
CH A P TE R 9
C H A P TER 10
CH A P TER 11
CH A P TER 12
CH A P TER 13
C H A P TER 14
C H A P TER 15
C H A P TE R 16
Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America 213
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 214
Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House 219
Morris Fiorina, Divided Government 221
Michael Mezey, Comparative Legislatures 222
Juan Linz, The Perils ofPresidentialism and The Virtues of Parliamentarism 242
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart.duan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical
Appraisal 243
Guillermo O’Donnell, DelegativeDemocracy 244
Kenneth Roberts, Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: the Peruvian
Case 245
Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy 247
Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 266
Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties] 268
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis 269
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 271
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups and The Rise
and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 273
Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks 289
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, and Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel 292
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 294
Marc Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma 296
John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions 298
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 309
Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity 310
David Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence 319
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 320
Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture 338
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity 338
Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America 340
Mala Htun, Is Gender Like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups 342
Mona Lena Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide 344
Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 358
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 361
Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty 362
Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey 364
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 365
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 366
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. Multiple Modernities 366
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 386
Moises Naim, The Five Wars of Globalization 388
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics 392
Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 393
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 394
The field of comparative politics is changing, not only in how it’s studied but in how it’s taught. We set out to write this textbook because we saw the need
for a new approach—one that is truly comparative, that goes beyond a litany of
facts or abstract ideas. In the process, we had to rethink what a book for this
course should look like. We started with a central aim: to get students to think
like comparativists. Toward that end, we have integrated theories and methods
with a range of country case applications to address the big questions in com
parative politics today.
Many undergraduates take a course in comparative politics because they are
broadly interested in world affairs. They want to understand issues such as democ
racy and democratization, economic and social development, transnational social
movements, and the relationship between world religions and conflict around the
globe, just as we did as students (and still do!). This book focuses squarely on these
big issues and offers a framework for understanding through comparison.
Our job is to teach students how to think critically, how to analyze the world
around them. We want our students to do more than just memorize facts and theo
ries. Ultimately, we want them to learn how to do comparative politics. This course
is successful if students can use the comparative method to seek out their own an
swers. We are successful as educators if we give them the analytical skills to do so.
What’s New in This Edition?
We have thoroughly updated this edition of Comparative Politics to reflect feed
back we received from numerous readers, instructors, and students, not to men
tion our own experiences of teaching with the book. We are truly grateful to
those who have shared their perspectives with us.
Whereas the first edition covered the state, political economy, and develop
ment across two chapters, the second edition expands this coverage into three:
• Chapter 3 now focuses on describing and defining the state, emphasizing
its organizational form, its order-generating characteristics, and its linkages
to both domestic and international conflict. This chapter retains a focus
on explaining the rise of modern states in the “Thinking Comparatively”
section and includes an expanded discussion of civil society and society-
state relations.
• Chapter 4 is now devoted entirely to political economy, including
considerable discussion of welfare states and efforts to explain variation
in their form and extent.
• Chapter 5 picks up the thread from the political economy discussion and
focuses on development issues.
In addition to these changes in several key chapters, we have made the follow
ing revisions throughout the book:
• Streamlined the chapter on nationalism and national identity, and in the
process highlighted its focus on intergroup conflict.
• Substantially revised several of the “Thinking Comparatively” features that
close the chapters, showing how comparativists work with models as a
crucial step in their method.
• Emphasized the case studies that readers found most useful, while elimi
nating some that were less so.
• Updated the entire set of country materials and the broader text.
An Integrative Approach
One of the distinctive features of this book is the way we have integrated theories,
methods, and cases. Rather than focusing on either country information or themes
Democracy’s Success in India:
What Can We Learn from a Deviant Case?
India is a major anomaly for modernization theories of develop
ment. In essence, the relationship between its political and eco
nomic development has been the inverse of what modernization
theory would predict. India is the world’s second largest society
and its largest democracy— consider, therefore, the share that
Indian citizens hold in the world’s broader democratic popula
tion. This anomaly has potentially serious implications and
makes the puzzle of Indian democratization all the more
intriguing.
For more on the case of democratization in India, see the
case study in Part VI, p. 464. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. What, if anything, does Indian anti-colonial resistance
have to do with the country’s democratization?
2. What, if anything, does Indian
about the importance of
and institutional design?
3. Can you think of a way to
the face of the case of India?
suggest
leadership,
theory in
Indian voters, 2012. India is the world’s largest democracy.
Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn
from a Deviant Case? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 133
How does modernization theory account
for low-income democracies such as
India? As discussed in chapter 6, modern
ization theory predicts that economic de
velopment will lead to democratization
and democratic consolidation. Indeed,
this relationship generally holds. More
often than not, increasing economic de
velopment increases the probability that
any given society will have democratic
decide that this anomaly disproves or re
futes modernization theory, and turn to
some other theory of democratization.
For example, we could turn to institu
tional theories of democratization as an
alternative. Perhaps something about the
parliamentary form of government rather
than presidential government contrib
uted to India’s rather successful democ
racy (as is discussed in chapter 10); one
economic development fa c ilita te s democ
ratization and democratic consolidation?
Why would this be different? Because the
theory would now say that it is u n lik e ly t h a t
India could successfully democratize with
out first achieving a higher level of eco
nomic development, but not that it is
im p o s s ib le . A more flexible theory of mod
ernization might be compatible with in
cluding insights from other theories. For
of comparative politics, we have combined these approaches while emphasizing
application and analysis. By providing students with the tools to begin doing their
own analyses, we hope to show them how exciting this kind of work can be. These
tools include theories (presented in an accessible way), the basics of the comparative
method, and manageable case materials for practice, all in the context of the big
questions.
We thus take an integrative approach to the relationship between big themes
and country case studies. This text is a hybrid containing sixteen thematic
chapters plus linked materials for twelve countries of significant interest to
comparativists. The country materials following the thematic chapters include
both basic country information and a series of case studies dealing with spe
cific thematic issues.
We link the country cases to the thematic chapters via short “call out” boxes—
” C a s e s in C o n t e x t ” — at relevant points in the chapters. For example, a “Case in
Context” box in a discussion of theory in chapter 6, “Democracy and Democra
tization,” points students to a full c a s e s t u d y on democratization in India, in
cluded at the back of the text.
Another “Case in Context” box in chapter 6 invites students to consider whether
democratization in China is inevitable. Other boxes in that chapter focus on issues
of democracy and democratization in Brazil and the United States.
Using these short “linking” boxes has enabled us to integrate a complete set of
case materials without interrupting the narrative flow of the chapters. The kind
of reading we suggest with the structure of this text is similar to following hy
perlinks in online text—something students do easily. This flexible design fea
ture also caters to the diversity of teaching styles in today’s political science.
Instructors can choose to have students follow these links to case studies as they
go, using all or just some of them, or they can choose to teach thematic chapters
and country materials separately.
The text integrates theories, methods, and cases in other ways as well. ” I n s ig h t s ”
boxes make connections by briefly summarizing important scholarly works repre
sentative of the major schools of thought.
INSIGH TS
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity
bvlM>c,h<$0feld • '
Greenfeld argues that nationalism is fundamentally c u lt u r a l and needs to be understood as an imaginative response to
social conditions. To understand nationalism's emergence and
growth, we must understand why the idea spread that humanity
is divided into distinct "peoples" who are "sovereign" and "equal."
For Greenfeld, the key preconditions for the development of na
tional identity are problems in s t r a tific a tio n system s through
which societies hierarchically divide themselves, such as the class
structure. Elite s ta tu s -in c o n s is te n c y — a condition present when
the stratification system breaks down and elites are no longer
sure of their status— leads some groups to seek to transform
identity, and national identity often seems to such groups to
serve their interests well. Greenfeld hypothesis
against a number of cases (includingî ^ ^ K . F rance, Russia,
Germany, and Japan), finding pronounced status-inconsistency
in each case in the key groups that are most central in redefining
their societies as nations. At the same time, Greenfeld acknowl
edges the importance of institutions like the state prior to na
tional identity's emergence in helping to shape the type that
develops in any given case. Scholars working with this theory
also note that political institutions play an important role in
spreading and preserving national identity.
Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992.
W h y Did Z i m b a b w e B e c o m e a n d R e m a in
A u t h o ri ta r ia n ?
Au th o rita ria n regim es com e in m any varieties, a n d th e y com e from m any d ifferent origins. W e have em phasized th a t th e re is no single th in g called “authoritarianism” th a t one theory can explain. Rather, authoritarian regimes have
distin ct features an d exhibit m any different types o f transitions (and nontransi
tions). Scholars have developed a n um ber o f explanatory m odels to account for
these. Some o f th e m ain general factors in m ost cases, though, include (1) histori
cal relationships betw een contending groups, (2) th e stren g th and form o f exist
in g institutions, (3) a country’s level o f econom ic developm ent, (4) p o litic al-cu ltu ral
tra d itio n s a n d te n d en cie s, a n d (5) th e strateg ic situ a tio n s a n d choices o f key
actors. O f course, as w e have seen in o th e r ch a p te rs , it is n o t en o u g h to merely
lis t such c o n trib u tin g factors; w e m u s t figure o u t ho w su ch factors in te ra c t
an d w h ich are m ost im p o rtan t. W h a t do you th in k ? A n d how could we te st your
ideas empirically?
A s we noted at the outset o f the chapter, m odern-day Zim babw e is an authori
tarian regime th a t is characterized by many o f the features w e have discussed. I t is a
“personalist” regime, the population o f which is subject to many o f the vagaries o f au
thoritarianism. It is characterized by repression, a lack o f secure political rights, seem
ingly arbitrary rule, and so on. N o t everyw here in A frica is like this, and Zim babw e
itse lf has n o t always been like th is, so o u r research question m ig h t be “W h y is
Z im babw e authoritarian? W h y did it becom e so, and w hy has it rem ained so?”
W e should expect theories o f au th orita rian rule to be able to account for an
au th orita rian regim e like R o b ert M u g ab e’s Z im babw e. L o o king at th e various
causal theories o f au thoritarianism w e can consider how each m ig h t propose an
explanation for th e em ergence a n d /o r persistence o f th e regim e. I n th e section on
TfTTT
i W i
KEY M E T H O D O L O G IC A L T O O L
Evidence and
Empirical Critiques
One reason that many theories con
tinue to endure in different areas of
comparative politics is that most of
the major theories have some empiri
cal support. This makes it challenging
to determine which theory is the
most accurate. In reality, most theo
ries will not be accurate under all
circumstances, but rather each will
explain some outcomapiiacter than
others. So how do yo i|
making "laundry lists'!
tier) and saying, "Every
In preparing to make thee
arguments, it is of course ifl
for any particular question 1
how the empirical evidenc®
with the theoretical predicw
the specific hypotheses y o p
offer. One very useful tool J
evidence that allows you jb critique a
particular argument.
In aiming to build arguments.
Each chapter after the introduction closes with a " T h i n k i n g C o m p a r a t i v e l y "
feature, which focuses on a case or set of cases to illustrate how students can
apply the theories discussed in the chapter.
In these features we highlight important methodological tools or strategies,
such as the use of deviant cases and the most-similar-systems (MSS) design. We
then model for students how to use these analytical tools in practice.
Organization
The sixteen thematic chapters of this book are divided into five parts:
• Part I (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on basic methods in comparative politics,
covering conceptualization, hypothesis testing, the formation of theories,
and the use of evidence. The goal in these first two chapters is not to focus
on the details of methodology, which can be taught in more specialized
courses, but on the overarching logic of comparative inquiry.
• Part II (chapters 3 through 7) focuses on the state (chapter 3), political
economy (chapter 4), development (chapter 5), democracy and democrati
zation (chapter 6), and the various forms of authoritarian regimes (chapter 7).
• Part III (chapters 8 through 11) focuses on the analysis of political institu
tions, giving students the tools to analyze institutional design in constitutional
structures and judiciaries (chapter 8), legislatures and elections (chapter 9),
executives (chapter 10), and political parties and interest groups (chapter 11).
• Part IV (chapters 12 through 15) focuses on issues that link comparative
politics to political sociology, such as the study of revolution and other forms
of contention (chapter 12), national identities and nationalism (chapter 13),
race, gender, and ethnicity (chapter 14), and religion and ideology (chapter 15).
'
Preface xix
Part V consists of a single chapter, 16, which links comparative politics to
international relations, emphasizing how global politics has produced new
sets of problems that both comparativists and international relations scholars
must analyze. As such, the book points to another kind of integration,
pushing students to see connections between comparative politics and other
courses in political science.
After chapter 2, the thematic chapters follow a common format. They are di
vided into three main sections:
• Concepts: covers basic definitions and develops a working vocabulary.
• Types: discusses useful typologies, such as the major types of dramatic social
change that interest political scientists.
• Causes and Effects: walks students through the major theories that aim to
explain causes and effects, ending with the “Thinking Comparatively” feature
to model analysis.
The final part of the book, Part VI, comprises country " p r o f i l e s " and in-
depth " c a s e s t u d i e s . " We selected twelve countries after surveying more
Preface
than 150 instructors of comparative politics to see which they considered most
crucial for inclusion. The cases are Brazil, China, France, Germany, India,
Iran, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. This selection offers broad coverage of every major world region, dem
ocratic and authoritarian polities, every major religious tradition, highly vary
ing levels of economic and social development, and quite different institutional
designs.
For each country, we first provide a “profile”: an introduction with a table of
key features, a map, and pie charts of demographics; a timeline and historical
overview; and brief descriptions of political institutions, political culture, and
political economy.
Following each profile is a set of case studies (five or six for each country)
that we reference in the thematic chapters as described earlier (via the " C a s e in
C o n t e x t " boxes).
The case sets end with research prompts to help students get started as
comparativists.
Flexibility in Instruction:
Ways of Using This Text
T he chapters are arranged in a logical order yet w ritten in such a way that
instructors might easily rearrange them to custom-fit a course. Some in
structors, for example, may wish to pair chapter 3 (on the state) with chapter
13 (on nationalism and national identity). Others might wish to assign
chapter 15 (on religion and ideology) alongside chapters 6 and 7 (on demo
cratic and authoritarian regimes). We have w ritten the book w ith the flexi
bility to facilitate such pairings. Indeed, while we strongly suggest beginning
w ith chapters 1 and 2, students will be able to follow the text even without
reading them first.
Similarly, the book’s structure supports a range of options for using the coun
try materials. Some instructors may wish to teach selected country materials at
or near the beginning of a course. Some may wish to make reference to country
materials as the course proceeds, assigning students to read them as they are
clearly and visibly “called out” in the text. One approach could require all stu
dents in a course to familiarize themselves with only a subset of the countries
detailed here, rather than all twelve. Another might require each student to
select three or four countries, following rules or categories of countries as laid
out by the instructor.
The book also works with or without supplemental materials chosen by the
instructor. The “Insights” boxes throughout the text provide indications of excel
lent options for further readings. Many other choice readings are noted in the
“References and Further Reading” section at the back of the text, organized by
chapter. A companion book of classic and contemporary readings is available
(see Packaging Options, p. xxii). In short, instructors can use this text alone or
link it seamlessly to other readings.
Summary of Features
We have built a number of useful features into the text, some of which we have
already mentioned:
• " C a s e in C o n t e x t " boxes tie in to the narrative of the main chapters,
pointing students to full case studies in the book’s final part.
• " i n s i g h t s " boxes illustrate causal theories by describing the work of key
authors in the field, making this work accessible to introductory students.
• "T h in k in g C o m p a r a t i v e l y " sections at the end of every chapter (after
chapter 1) model the application of theories and the testing of hypotheses.
Each “Thinking Comparatively” section includes a " K e y M e t h o d o l o g i c a l
To o ls " feature, which introduces key skills and strategies for doing compar
ative political analysis and reinforces lessons learned in the first two chapters.
• "T h in k in g It T h r o u g h " questions close every chapter. These help students
test their ability to apply comparative politics theories to cases.
• Every section of case studies offers a series of "R e s e a r c h P r o m p t s " that
can be used to develop comparative projects and papers, applying what
students have learned as they start to do comparative analysis.
• Every chapter ends with a " C h a p t e r S u m m a r y , " enabling students and
instructors to review the main points at a glance.
• At the back of the text, we include " R e f e r e n c e s a n d Fu r th er R e a d i n g " by
chapter that students can use to dig deeper into the issues raised or as they
begin their own research.
• A runni ng g l o s s a r y in the margin of the text highlights the meaning of
key terms as they appear and serves as a quick study reference.
Supplements
Oxford University Press offers instructors and students a comprehensive ancil
lary package for qualified adopters of Comparative Politics: Integrating Theories,
Methods, and Cases.
Ancillary Resource Center
The Ancillary Resource Center (ARC) at www.oup-arc.com is a convenient,
instructor-focused single destination for resources to accompany this book.
Accessed online through individual user accounts, the ARC provides instructors
with up-to-date ancillaries while guaranteeing the security of grade-significant
resources. In addition, it allows OUP to keep instructors informed when new
content becomes available.
The ARC for Comparative Politics contains a variety of materials to aid in
teaching:
• Instructor’s Resource Manual with Test Item File—The Instructor’s
Resource Manual includes chapter objectives, detailed chapter outlines,
lecture suggestions and activities, discussion questions, video resources,
http://www.oup-arc.com
and Web resources. The Test Item File includes more than eight hundred
test questions selected and approved by the authors, including multiple-
choice, short-answer, and essay questions.
• Computerized Test Bank—Using the test authoring and management tool
Diploma, the computerized test bank that accompanies this text is designed
for both novice and advanced users. Diploma enables instructors to create
and edit questions, create randomized quizzes and tests with an easy-to-use
drag-and-drop tool, publish quizzes and tests to online courses, and print
quizzes and tests for paper-based assessments.
• PowerPoint-Based Slides—Each chapter’s slide set includes a succinct
chapter outline and incorporates relevant chapter graphics.
• CN N Videos—Offering recent clips on timely topics, this collection
includes fifteen films tied to the chapter topics. Each clip is approximately
5-10 minutes, providing a great way to launch your lectures.
Course Cartridges
For qualified adopters, OUP will supply the teaching resources in a course car
tridges designed to work with your preferred Online Learning Platform. Please
contact your Oxford University Press sales representative at (800) 280-0280.
E-Book
This text is also available as a CourseSmart eBook (978-0-19-027102-2) at www
.coursesmart.com. CourseSmart’s eTextbooks can be read on any browser-enabled
computer or mobile device and come with the ability to transfer individual chapters
or the entire book offline. Furthermore, CourseSmart was the first to introduce free
eTextbook apps for the Android and Apple devices for an even better reading
experience.
Companion Website
Comparative Politics is also accompanied by an extensive companion website at
www.oup.com/us/dickovick. This open-access website includes a number of
learning tools to help students study and review key concepts presented in the
text. For each chapter, you will find learning objectives, key-concept summaries,
quizzes, essay questions, web activities, and web links.
Packaging Options
Adopters of Comparative Politics: Integrating Theories, Methods, and Cases can pack
age A N Y Oxford University Press book with the text for a 20% savings off the
total package price. See our many trade and scholarly offerings at www.oup.com,
then contact your OUP sales representative at (800) 280-0280 to request a pack
age ISBN. In addition, the following items can be packaged with the text for free:
• Oxford Pocket World Atlas, Sixth Edition—This full-color atlas is a
handy reference for political science students. Please use package ISBN
978-0-19-046231-4.
xxii Preface
http://www.oup.com/us/dickovick
http://www.oup.com
• Very Short Introduction Series—-These very brief texts offer succinct intro
ductions to a variety of topics. Titles include Nationalism, Citizenship, Global
Economic History, Fascism, and Democracy, to name just a few.
• The Student Research and Writing Guide fo r Political Science—This brief
guide provides students with the information and tools necessary to conduct
research and write a research paper. The guide explains how to get started
writing a research paper, describes the parts of a research paper, and presents
the citation formats found in academic writing. Please use package ISBN
978-0-19-046160-7 to order.
Acknowledgments
We are very grateful to a number of individuals who have been helpful to us as
we worked on this project. At Washington and Lee University, we thank our
respective provosts, deans, and department chairs who have supported our
work. This includes June Aprille, Bob Strong, Daniel Wubah, Larry Peppers,
Rob Straughan, Hank Dobin, Suzanne Keen, M ark Rush, Lucas Morel, David
Novack, and Krzysztof Jasiewicz. We are very grateful to the many friends and
colleagues, both at Washington and Lee and elsewhere, who read and com
mented on chapters or country profiles, including Francoise Fregnac-Clave,
Rachel Beatty Riedl, Tim Lubin, Dan Kramer, Christian Jennings, Robin
Leblanc, Ay§e Zarakol, Rich Bidlack, David Bello, Ken W hite, and Alessandra
Del Conte Dickovick. We also thank Hardin Marion for his excellent close
reading of the first edition and the comments he generously shared with us. We
have many other colleagues and friends who have given us intellectual and
moral support for which we are grateful. Numerous students have been extraor
dinarily helpful as well. We are particularly grateful to Miranda Galvin and Ali
Greenberg. Other students to whom we wish to express our appreciation in
clude, but are not limited to, Samara Francisco, Morten Wendelbo, Maya Reimi
Wendelbo, Linnea Bond, Natasha Lerner, Amy Dawson, Justine Griffin-
Churchill, David Razum, John Twomey, Grant Russell, Lauren Howard, and
Kate LeMasters. We are also thankful to students in numerous iterations of
Politics 105 (Global Politics), many of whom offered insightful questions on a
“prototype” of this text (in early years) and on the first edition (more recently),
as well as students who read the book in Eastwood’s International Comparative
Sociology course. We owe thanks to Washington and Lee for support for the
work of some of the students mentioned previously through the Summer Re
search Scholar Program, and our own work through the Lenfest Sabbatical
Grant, and the Glenn Grant, Lenfest Grant, and Hess Scholars programs for
summer research.
Our families have been characteristically supportive and gracious throughout
the several years that we worked on this project. Their collective patience has
been extraordinary. We owe eternal gratitude to our spouses, Maria Emilia Nava
and Alessandra Del Conte Dickovick. We are also grateful to (and for) our won
derful children: Gabriela Eastwood, Carolina Dickovick, Gabriela Dickovick,
Samuel Eastwood, and Alexander Eastwood. We owe much gratitude to our
parents and extended families as well, of course.
xxiv Preface
Diane Bulpett
Northeastern University
Ivy Hamerly
Baylor University
Katherine H. Keyser
Drew University
Eric Langenbacher
Georgetown University
We are grateful as well to the fine editorial staff at Oxford University Press.
We particularly appreciate the excellent ideas and efforts of Jennifer Carpenter,
Lauren Mine, and Thom Holmes. All of them improved this text substantially
with their insights and hard work over several years. We have also benefited from
the work of Jane Lee, Barbara Mathieu, David Bradley, Maegan Sherlock, and
Brianna Provenzano, among others.
We owe gratitude as well to those who developed our passion for (and under
standing of) comparative politics. W ith the standard caveat that any errors of
fact or interpretation in this text are solely our own, we want to thank first our
earliest teachers of comparative politics. Above, all, we wish to thank Kent Eaton
and Liah Greenfeld. We also owe great thanks to Jeffrey Herbst, Deborah
Yashar, Chuck Lindholm, Scott Palmer, John Stone, and Evan Lieberman, as
well as Nancy Bermeo, Atul Kohli, Lynn White, and Claudio Veliz, among
others.
Finally, we thank the external evaluators of this edition, who gave generously
of their time and expertise:
Cheryl Van Den Handel
Northeastern State University
Adryan Wallace
University of Hartford.
Jeffrey Lewis
Cleveland State University
Vanja Petricevic
Florida Gulf Coast University
Laura Roselle
Elon University
Hootan Shambayati
Florida Gulf Coast University
We also thank the many reviewers of the first edition, whose insights helped
shape the book:
Dauda Abubakar
Ohio University
Despina Alexiadou
University of Pittsburgh
Michelle Allendoerfer
George Washington University
Jason Ross Arnold
Virginia Commonwealth
University
Andrew Appleton
Washington State University
Tanya Bagashka
University of Houston
Karolyn Benger
Georgia Institute o f Technology
Anna Brigevich
The University o f North Carolina
at Chapel Hill
Joel R. Carbonell
Kent State University at Stark
Ryan Carlin
Georgia State University
Luis F. Clemente
Ohio University
Howard Cody
University of Maine
Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz
Michigan State University
William Crowther
The University o f North Carolina
at Greensboro
Ian Down
University o f Tennessee—Knoxville
Glen Duerr
Cedarville University
M atthew Fails
Oakland University
Ronald A. Francisco
University of Kansas
Preface
Nathan W. Freeman
University o f Georgia
Joseph J. Foy
University of Wisconsin-Parkside
John D. Granger
University of Central Florida
Ivy Hamerly
Baylor University
Keisha Haywood
Ramapo College of New Jersey
Tobias Hofmann
National University of Singapore
Jennifer Horan
The University of North Carolina
at Wilmington
John Hulsey
James Madison University
Eunsookjung
Fairfield University
Peggy Kahn
University of Michigan—Flint
Stephen Juan King
Georgetown University
Natalie A. Kistner
James Madison University
Lada V. Kochtcheeva
North Carolina State University
Galiya Lahav
Stonybrook University
Ricardo Rene Laremont
Binghamton University
Jeffrey Lewis
Cleveland State University
Rahsaan Maxwell
University of Massachusetts
Amherst
Mary M. McCarthy
Drake University
Gregory J. Moore
Eckerd College
Katarina Moyon
Winthrop University
Anna Ohanyan
Stonehill College
Sanghamitra Padhy
Davidson College
Juris Pupcenoks
Washington College
Dietmar Schirmer
University of Florida
James Seroka
Auburn University
Oxana Shevel
Tufts University
Tracy H. Slagter
University o f Wisconsin Oshkosh
Marcus Stadelmann
University o f Texas at Tyler
Jeffrey K. Staton
Emory University
Emmanuel Teitelbaum
George Washington University
Anca Turcu
University of Central Florida
Rollin F. Tusalem
Arkansas State University
Meredith Weiss
University at Albany-SUNY
Aubrey Westfall
Virginia Wesleyan College
Jennifer J. W hite
University of Georgia
Fiona Yap
University of Kansas
Gamze Cavdar Yasar
Colorado State University
Jiangnan Zhu
University ofNevada-Reno
The field of comparative politics is always changing, and a book of this sort
covers a huge array of research areas. As such, we anticipate a need to update this
text in the future. We are very eager for suggestions, corrections, and other com
ments that instructors or students might make. We have established an e-mail
address specifically for these inquiries, and all comments will go to and be read
by the authors. The address is c o m p a r a t i v e . p o l i t i c s @ o u p . c o m . So if you have
any suggestions for future issues, or find any errors or omissions, please let us
know. We hope you enjoy the book.
mailto:comparative.politics@oup.com
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CHAPTER 1
The Comparative
Approach:
An Introduction
• Germany's Angela Merkel and Russia's Vladimir Putin converse at the World Cup in Brazil, July 2014.
op quiz. Fill in the blank in the following sentence:
I n _____________________, Columbus sailed the ocean blue.
IN THIS C H A P T E R
A skin g Why: Research Questions
in Com parative Politics 2
Major Questions in Comparative Politics 4
Empirical Arguments Versus Normative
Arguments 6
Solving Intellectual Puzzles:
A Contemporary Analogy 7
Concepts 9
Features of Good Concepts 9
Conceptualization 10
Operationalizing: From Concepts
to Measures 11
Em pirical Evidence 12
Facts and Evidence 12
Cases and Case Studies 13
The Com parative Method 14
Variables and Comparison 14
Most-Similar-Systems Design 15
Most-Different-Systems Design 18
Comparative Checking 18
Within-Case Comparison 20
Is the Study of Politics a Science? The Limits
of the Com parative Method 20
A large proportion of American students who have completed elementary
school will be able to answer correctly: fourteen hundred ninety-two.
This recollection from childhood illustrates the ways we first begin to learn
about societies and their histories. We learn important events and the dates,
names, and places associated with them. We learn simple facts: that Columbus
set sail in 1492 and discovered the New World. For many of our
formative years, this is what we think learning means in our
courses on social studies, history, world affairs, or current events.
Scholarship is not defined, however, by knowledge of
facts alone, and the learning we do as adults must be differ
ent: It must be based on more than just description and recall.
The task now, at the collegiate level, is to develop analytical
skills. In this book, we examine the similarities and differ
ences in politics within and between countries around the
world, using comparisons and contrasts as our central tools.
We cover more than just facts about the politics of China, or
India, or France. W e analyze politics comparatively.
Asking Why: Research Questions
in Comparative Politics
To illustrate the type of learning this book promotes, we turn to
another mnemonic device from primary school:
List the “Five W ’s” used to ask questions.
You may easily recall the answer (or be able to reconstruct it):
Who, What, Where, When, and Why. (And to this list we
often add “How”.)
Now ask yourself about the relative merits of these “Five W ’s.” W hich of these
questions are the most profound and lead us to learn the most? Are we likely to
gain a deep understanding of the social and political world from questions of the
general form “W ho did this?” or “Where did this happen?” or “W hen did this
happen?” For the most part, these relatively simple questions lead us to answers
Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative Politics 3
based on simple facts, such as prominent historical figures (Who), or places
(Where), or dates (When). Consider how most of the “Five W ’s” are answered in
the sentence In fourteen hundred ninety-two, Columbus sailed the ocean blue. W ho
is the subject? Columbus. Where did this event occur? The ocean blue. W hen did
it happen? 1492. W hat did the subject do (or how did the event happen)? He
sailed. W ithin one easily remembered rhyme, we have answers to a host of basic
questions. And, of course, the same is true for more contemporary politics. For
instance, saying, “In 2012, Franpois Hollande was elected president of France”
also provides answers to who, where, what, and when questions.
Even if we don’t know certain facts, we can often find them easily in modern
life, and we do not need rhymes, other mnemonics, or even reference books. Online
search engines (e.g., Google) provide virtually free access to basic facts (though
they can also provide access to inaccurate information). Smart phones, laptops, and
other devices make basic information accessible almost anywhere. Try typing some
basic questions using the “Five W ’s” into a search engine. W ho is the president of
Brazil? Where (or what) is the capital of Estonia? W hen did Tanzania become a
free and independent nation? For these questions, the correct and complete answer
is available almost instantly. Some knowledge of basic facts is obviously important,
but this is not the type of question that interests us in this text. We will not focus
simply on descriptions of who did what and when, nor on where things happened.
Now try searching for “Why did Columbus sail the ocean blue?” or “Why did
Tanzania gain independence from its colonizer?” or “Why was Fran5ois Hollande
elected president of France?” Your search will probably lead to an essay full of
reasoning and argumentation, as well as facts. O f course, the essay may or may not
be reliable, and more comprehensive searching—using scholarly articles and book
chapters—could provide you with other essays that offer contrary perspectives. These
why questions lend themselves to richer discussions and debates than who/what/
when/where questions. We cannot answer many why questions in one or two sen
tences. Answering why correctly requires more research, more reasoning, and more
debate than the preliminary factual questions about who did what, where, and when.
We can debate the correct answer to why questions. You may think you have a
simple answer to why Columbus set sail: He was an explorer by nature, intellectu
ally curious and seeking adventure. But a classmate may offer an equally compel
ling answer: The exploration westward across the Atlantic was promoted and
financed by the Spanish crown (King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella), who were
forced by geopolitical rivalries and strategic concerns to extend and expand their
territories. W ho is correct? In your answer, you focus on Columbus himself, while
your classmate makes reference to impersonal factors (such as geopolitical strategy)
that push individuals toward certain actions. Both of you include facts in defending
your answers, such as the relevant actors (who), the period in which this took place
(when), and the country from which Columbus set sail (where). But the debate is
not easily resolved, even with these basic facts. We can respectfully disagree on the
primary cause of why something happened. We construct arguments by supplying
evidence in a logical form in support of positions or claims, and the relative merit
of our arguments depends on who has the better supporting evidence.
Generally, we do not debate at great length about when an explorer set sail,
who he was, or where he left from and where he went.1 We either know these facts
argument The placement of
evidence in logical form in support
of a position or claim.
4 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
comparative politics The
subfield of political science that
aims to analyze multiple cases
using the comparative method.
or don’t. Anyone who has watched Jeopardy! or played trivia games will notice
that such games almost never ask why something happened. The answers would
surely be too long and almost certainly too debatable. Basic factual knowledge
may earn you points on a game board, but it alone cannot be the route to a deeper
understanding of the social and political world.
Questions that begin with that little word— why— are often answered not
with a simple fact; rather, the answers begin with another deceptively powerful
word: because. Note that the root of the word because is cause. Why questions give
rise to answers that talk about the causes of events, and they turn basic facts
(who, what, where, when, and how) into evidence supporting a claim about cause
and effect.2 This is the core pursuit of comparative politics: We seek to develop
strong claims about cause and effect, testing various hypotheses (that is, possible
answers to our questions) using factual evidence, and developing larger theories
about why the world operates the way it does. Through most of this book, we will
provide some basic information necessary to speak the language of comparative
scholars, but our emphasis is on asking and trying to answer why questions.
We do not ignore factual information when we ask questions. Indeed, some
knowledge of a particular case usually makes us interested in a topic and moti
vates the questions we want to ask. We find some set of facts that does not fit
with our intuition, and we pursue it further. We are intrigued by facts that pre
sent us with puzzles. The number of such puzzles is virtually infinite, but certain
major questions take center stage in comparative politics. Many are easy to ask
but challenging to answer. As we note later, some may be phrased as how ques
tions, but the logic behind them is the same: We seek to understand causes and
effects to comprehend the world around us.
Few political phenomena are monocausal', or caused by just one thing. Often
many factors combine to produce an outcome. Explaining something does not
amount to simply naming one or another of these factors. Rather, we try to ex
plain by identifying not just the necessary conditions to produce an effect, but
those that are sufficient to produce it. For example, the fact that a given commu
nity is divided into different groups might be a necessary factor of civil war. But
since most such divided countries are not engaged in civil war most of the time,
the condition of being divided is clearly not sufficient to produce this effect by
itself, and thus probably cannot be said to be the main cause of war.3
Major Q uestions in Com parative Politics
Comparative politics focuses on certain key questions that researchers have de
bated for years. Some important questions that we examine in this book are listed
in Table 1.1. All of these are about causes and effects and can be answered, at
least partly, by comparing and contrasting the politics of different countries.
Some such questions, like the last two in the table, may also imply research on
relations between countries as well as politics within countries.
The questions in the table are very general, and we would likely begin research
by asking a more specific version of such questions about one or two countries.
Rather than “W hy do countries go to war?” we might ask, “W hy did France opt
not to support the Iraq War in 2003?” This question is more specific but also open-
ended enough to have many possible answers. In scientific terms, this question can
t a b l e i.i Prom inent Q uestions in Com parative Politics
Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative Politics
Why are some countries democratic and others not?
Why are some countries rich and others not?
Why do countries have different institutions and forms of government?
Why do countries have different policies in a variety of areas?
Why do some social revolutions succeed and endure while others fail?
Why do some countries develop strong senses of statehood and nationhood and others not?
Why do countries go to war or establish peace?
Why are some societies subjected to terrorism and others not?
have several competing hypotheses we can test out using evidence, as we discuss
later in this chapter and in the next. Possible answers may be based on France’s
strategic interests and calculations, its position in global affairs, French attitudes
or culture with respect to war, and/or other possibilities.
Contrast this question with a more leading one, such as “How did French
defeat in World War II lead to France’s decision not to support the Iraq War?” In
this version, the questioner presumes he/she knows the answer to why France
decided not to support the war. The researcher is entering the research expecting
to confirm one particular answer.
Given our own human biases, this researcher may well choose evidence selec
tively, neglecting that which does not fit his/her assumptions and preconceptions.
It is highly unlikely that someone asking this leading question will answer with
“France’s defeat in World War II had no effect.” This type of question can there
fore lead to a biased argument.
Forming questions with why is a good rule of thumb, but good questions may
also begin with other words, such as how. The questions in Table 1.2 also lead to
debates about cause and effect. The first question asks about “consequences,”
which is just another way of asking about the effects of certain causes (in this
case, the causes would be institutions). The question is also open-ended; that is,
no hunch or expected answer is built into it, so the researcher can remain open to
what the evidence reveals. The second question is just a bit more specific, identi
fying a certain consequence and a certain institution, but it is also open-ended.
As we get more specific, we must take care not to commit the error of building
the answer into the question, or assume that what we are researching is the only
answer. In this case, we would not want to assume that a presidential versus a
parliamentary system of government is the main factor that shapes education
policy.4 The next question asks “under what conditions” democracies form, which
is just another way of asking about the causes of democracy, if we compare and
contrast where and when and how it happens. So too does the final question ask
about cause and effect, as shown by the verb affect. These are all valid research
questions, even if they don’t begin with why.
open-ended question A ques
tion that, in principle, is open to
numerous possible answers.
6 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
empirical Drawn from observa
tions of the world.
Students in Paris, France, protest the Iraq War in 200S. Why did France opt not to support the
Iraq War?
t a b l e 1.2 A dditional Research Q uestions A bout
Cause and Effect
What are the consequences of different kinds of institutions for policy?
What are the consequences of presidential versus parliamentary systems of government for
education policy?
Under what conditions will democracies emerge and consolidate?
How do major social revolutions affect subsequent political developments in their respective
countries?
Some questions that begin with why may be poor questions, or at least they may
be ill suited to cause-and-effect research. Contrast the following two questions,
where the how question is a more open-ended and better question than the why.
• Why did the United States foolishly invade Iraq in 2003 for no good reason?
• How did the decision to initiate military action against Iraq come about?
It is perfectly legitimate to ask “why the United States invaded Iraq” as an
open-ended social science question, but the tone of the why question here sug
gests that it is focused more on the issue of right and wrong than on cause and
effect. The key is keeping our minds open to the possibility that any of several
hypotheses may have the power to explain what we want to explain.
Em pirical A rgum en ts Versus Norm ative Argum ents
The issue of right and wrong relates to the issue of causal or empirical arguments
versus normative arguments. In this text, we mainly address empirical arguments:
Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative Politics 7
arguments that link cause and effect, uncovering answers to why the political
world operates as it does. Normative arguments, by contrast, emphasize the way
things should be. 1116 following pair of questions highlights the distinction:
• W hy are some countries democratic and others authoritarian? (causal/
empirical)
• Why is democracy preferable to authoritarianism? (normative)
Comparativists answer questions like the first more often than the second,
though we care about the answers to both types of questions. We are not primar
ily concerned in this book with resolving normative arguments about what is
right and wrong. This is not because comparativists are indifferent to moral con
cerns. To the contrary, most social scientists hold strong convictions, indeed
probably stronger normative views about politics than the average citizen, given
their choice of career. Comparativists would overwhelmingly express a prefer
ence for democracy over authoritarianism if asked, though some might note the
limitations of democracy and/or argue that authoritarian rule has sometimes led
to economic growth. Yet, as comparativists, we do not usually spend our intellec
tual energy coming up with new arguments for why democracy is morally super
ior to authoritarianism. Rather, we spend this energy trying to solve the puzzle
of why democracy and authoritarianism arise in the first place.
So the point of analyzing politics comparatively is not to come up with good
arguments in favor of democracy, or grearer wealth, or peace. Rather, our job is to
find what causes these things, and we can assume that a commitment to uncover
ing the causes comes from some interest in the outcome. Comparativists are like
doctors diagnosing social problems: Instead of explaining why it is better to be
healthy, we focus on explaining how we can be healthy as a political society. Com
parative political scientists often have an ethical or moral passion that drives re
search, as we may wish to make government and society more effective, efficient,
equitable, just, responsive, and accountable. Yet our principal role in that process
is to describe what is and explain why, rather than proclaim what ought to be.
So lving Intellectual Puzzles: A C ontem porary A n a lo gy
Social science is a process of problem solving. By way of analogy, we can glimpse
the sort of intellectual puzzles we solve through the mirror of pop culture.
Among the most successful TV shows in the world today (apart from reality
shows) are those in which researchers, academics, and scientists are presented
with a puzzle that they must solve, usually within a short period. Medical dramas,
legal dramas, and crime dramas all fit this mold. The researchers may be doctors
trying to diagnose a potentially fatal disease, detectives trying to solve a murder
using forensic evidence, or attorneys trying to prosecute a case against a pre
sumed perpetrator. Examples are legion: NCIS, The Mentalist, Sherlock (or the
Sherlock Holmes adaptation Elementary), and the long-running CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation, among others.
W hat these shows have in common is the basic approach to puzzle solving
used by the experts. The protagonist will typically be presented with a puzzle
early in the episode and will then begin gathering evidence and formulating
hypotheses. Usually, some of these hypotheses will be inconsistent with the
normative Concerned with speci
fying which sort of practice or
institution is morally or ethically
justified.
Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
evidence, or new evidence will emerge that contradicts a hypothesis. In such
shows, this development is deliberate, of course, in order to build suspense and
mislead the viewer. We may find, for example, that the person we were supposed
to think was the killer had an alibi and was somewhere else on the night of the
murder. By the latter part of the show, the protagonist usually comes across some
piece of evidence that pulls the case together and gives it a logical interpretation.
The episode typically concludes when a hypothesis is confirmed, sometimes sig
nified by a criminal’s confession or maybe by a medical treatment that succeeds.
Social scientists operate in a similar fashion to these puzzle-solving profes
sionals, but comparativists face some additional constraints. (If we really want to
solve our puzzles, we have to be even more clever than the people on TV.) The
most obvious constraint is the lack of laboratories in comparative politics.5
Whereas physicians, forensicologists, and prosecutors often have recourse to
physical evidence such as blood samples or DNA or cell phone records, social
scientists rely on social facts and evidence of a more qualitative and historical
nature. The evidence used by social scientists is often subject to interpretation.
For example, one political scientist may deem Mexico a democratic success story
since 2000, because an opposition party won a presidential election, and multiple
parties now compete successfully for power. Another may argue that Mexico is
not a democratic success story, because the country still suffers from high levels
of social and economic inequality and from unequal political participation.6
Many academics and other professionals rely on evidence and logic and reason
to make persuasive arguments, even in the absence of absolute proof. Returning
to our pop culture analogy, the detective Sherlock Holmes often rules out many
options by process of elimination, gathers evidence that is consistent with a cer
tain interpretation of the facts, and builds a hypothesis. Sometimes, Sherlock
will have a particular hypothesis that is shown to be wrong by some new bit of
evidence. In those instances, he must generate a new hypothesis to solve the case.
Typically, at the end of a detective story, proof comes with a confession that re
veals the full story. In courtroom dramas, to use another example, there may not
be “prooF’ that someone committed a crime, but the jury may be convinced
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that the accused is guilty. Again, in some instances,
there may eventually be a confession by the perpetrator that does lead to “proof,”
once the hypothesis is backed by substantial evidence and the perpetrator is in
formed of the strength of the prosecution’s case. Medical dramas are similar in
that the doctors must diagnose complicated cases using the evidence available to
them. The solution usually takes the form of a treatment that cures or saves the
patient. In all of these cases, the common theme is the need to solve a puzzle
using a combination of evidence, logical reasoning, and educated guesses.
Unfortunately for social scientists, the world never confesses its secrets like
some TV criminal, and we cannot typically administer some pharmaceutical in
controlled fashion to cure a body politic. The best social scientists can do is work
with a standard that requires scholars to make the strongest and most persuasive
case possible by using and interpreting the available evidence. Many social scien
tists who use statistical methods—including sociologists, political scientists, and
most economists—even formalize standards for what is a persuasive finding.
Some use 95 percent certainty as a crucial benchmark in testing and trying to
Concepts 9
confirm hypotheses (however arbitrary that 95 percent threshold may be, and
even this threshold only relates to their confidence that they can reject the “null
hypothesis” that the factor in question has absolutely no eifect). Good scholarship
seeks evidence, tests hypotheses, makes arguments, and contributes to theoretical
debates. We address theories and hypotheses in greater detail in chapter 2. First,
however, we turn to the ideas of concepts, variables, and causal relationships.
Concepts
Social science works with concepts, abstract ideas that we usually attempt to
define as we ask and answer our questions. Examples of concepts are numerous
and include freedom, democracy (as well as liberal democracy, electoral democ
racy, delegative democracy, and many other subtypes), justice, nationalism, con
stitutionalism, federalism, identity, gender relations, special interests, and social
movements, among many others. Working with concepts helps us think about
the social world, which is too complex to analyze without them. We must be very
careful in defining them, because bad concepts make for bad analysis.
Most concepts are categories. In some areas, such as physical and natural sci
ence, certain categories are relatively clear.7 The elements of the periodic table are
an example. Concepts like “helium” and “oxygen” describe things in the real
world that have certain numbers of electrons and protons. Yet there are few such
clear-cut categories in social and political life. Concepts like “democracy” and
“revolution” do not define phenomena the same way that “hydrogen” refers to an
atom composed of a single proton and a single electron. Social and political con
cepts like democracy and revolution shade into each other by degree. Definitions
do not capture exact boundaries between social and political phenomena in the
real world, but we use them so that we can get a handle on that world. Reasonable
concepts and categories help us make sense of all the events that take place.
Features of Good Concepts
W hat makes a concept worthwhile? Good concepts have several features, including
clarity, coherence, consistency, and usefulness. The concept of “democratization”
when used correctly is an example of a concept that is worthwhile on all these counts.
First, concepts must be clear and coherent.8 Maybe you begin a research proj
ect because you are troubled by differences in levels of democratization across
different countries. At the beginning, you have a common-sense understanding
of democratization. To do good comparative work, however, you must make the
meaning of the term explicit and clear. W hat do you mean by democratization?
W hat is it you are studying? You cannot say “democratization consists of all the
positive things that happen when a society changes.” This is neither clear nor co
herent. A clearer and more coherent statement would be “democratization is the
process by which civil liberties and political rights are extended to all adult citi
zens in a nation.” We begin with common-sense concerns about specific prob
lems, but we need to define our key concepts precisely.
Second, concepts must be logically consistent, both internally and from one
to another. For example, one cannot conceptualize democratization in terms of
“expansion of liberty and equality” without addressing the likelihood that increasing
concept An idea comparativists
use to think about the processes
we study.
10 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
conceptualization The deliberate
process through which we create
and select social-scientific
concepts.
Sartori's ladder of abstraction
The idea that we can organize
concepts on the basis of their
specificity or generality.
liberty will likely lead to some degree of inequality. The issue here is whether our
concept of democratization is internally consistent. Likewise, one cannot concep
tualize democracy as being about a “set of institutional arrangements,” such as
elections, while viewing democratization as being about a “sort of political cul
ture or set of values and norms.” This is an issue of logical consistency between the
concepts of democracy and democratization, which we presume are related, but
which seem to point in different directions here.
Third, concepts should be useful. They must be specific enough that they
allow you to draw distinctions in analyzing examples. The concept of democrati
zation can be useful because we can meaningfully distinguish between countries
that have democratized and those that have not. Our use of concepts is prag
matic, because we identify concepts based on how they help us answer research
questions.9 For comparative analysis, concepts must allow us to identify varia
tions between places, which the concept of democratization does: It allows us to
differentiate and examine the variations between places that have undergone the
process and those that have not. To be useful, concepts must also allow us to
measure variables, which we examine further later.
Conceptualization
Using concepts may be creative, because social scientists need to develop their
own in many cases. The process of making up and defining concepts is called
conceptualization. It is often necessary to come up with new ideas and defini
tions, though we must be self-conscious and thoughtful in how we conceptual
ize. In comparative politics, a good practice is to look to how scholars have
already conceptualized major ideas in books (including textbooks) and articles.
We should not coin a new phrase just for the sake of it, and we do not want to end
up with a thousand different definitions of a concept like “democracy” when
there are already several good and accepted definitions available. Too much cre
ation of concepts could generate confusion and make discussion more difficult.
Nonetheless, no concept is perfect, and you may need to conceptualize in novel
ways on your own, depending on your specific projects.10 Doing so can be part
of an intellectual contribution, so long as your concepts are clear, consistent, and
useful.11
Some concepts are very general, while others are very specific. To take “na
tionalism” and “national identity” as an example, we might see the concept of
collective identity (an individual’s sense of belonging to a group) as being quite
general, though sometimes we ask questions that don’t require more specific
concepts.12 Greater specificity comes with adding more attributes to the con
cept, maybe by specifying that we are interested in those collective identities
that are political. More specific still, one can divide political identities into more
specific subtypes, for example, political identities that say that everybody in
your country is like you and that they are all equal. Some questions require more
general concepts, and others more specific concepts. This issue is sometimes
referred to as “Sartori’s ladder of abstraction.”13 The ladder ranges from gen
eral concepts at the top to very specific concepts at the bottom, and the rung one
stands on depends on the specific questions being asked and the cases being
examined.
Concepts 11
The Concept of Freedom
I n societies such as the United States, freedom is seen as a core
lvalue. Virtually everyone is a supporter and defender of freedom,
and popular images present the American nation as the "land of
the free." Yet what it means to be free is not so clear, and the term
has multiple, distinct, and perhaps even contradictory meanings.14
Some view freedom in "negative" terms: One is free to the extent
that nobody impinges on his or her ability to act in accordance with
his or her will. Others view freedom in "positive" terms: One is free
to the extent that one can engage in particular sorts of acts or
ways of life. Others may view freedom in mystical terms, suggesting
that one is free to the extent that one experiences transcendence
through service to others, through participation in collective action,
or through spiritual contemplation. There are also Marxist-inspired
interpretations of freedom holding that one is free to the extent
that one is not alienated from others, from one's work, and from a
sense of purpose or meaning. (And, last but not least, Janis Joplin
sang that "Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose")
All of these understandings take freedom to be a quality of
an individual. Yet many also speak of the collective freedoms of
groups. For instance, many societies, in seeking independence
from colonial powers, produce authoritarian regimes that do not
promote individual freedoms. Often, the members of these soci
eties nevertheless celebrate them as distinctively free. Note that
all of these meanings of the term (and we could list many more)
resonate with millions of people in the world today.15
Libyan women celebrate liberation from Qaddafi's rule.
Tripoli, September 2011.
O perationalizing: From C oncepts to Measures
Once we have a clear notion of a concept, we need to be able to measure it; that
is, we need to operationalize our concept. To operationalize a concept is to make operationalization The process
it workable, mainly by making it measurable. W hen a concept is operational— through which we make a concept
or we have an operational definition—we can begin to explain what we are study- measurable,
ing. We can start to explain cause and effect only when we have clarified what we
are talking about and can measure it.
There may be many ways to operationalize a certain concept, as shown by
the example of democratization in Table 1.3. All of these may be valid ways to
t a b l e 1 . 3 Possible Operational Definitions
of D em ocratization
A case of democratization occurs when...
• a country holds a free and fair multiparty election
• two turnovers of government at the ballot box have occurred, in which the ruling party loses
an election and peacefully steps down from power
• free and fair elections are held, and a constitutional law is in place guaranteeing the rights of
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion to all citizens
• there is no verifiable suppression of political participation and expression
• more than two-thirds of citizens in a survey express values that reject authoritarian rule
12 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
evidence A set of facts or obser
vations used to support a proposi
tion or hypothesis.
operationalize democratization, so long as the operational definition matches up
with the concept. I f we conceptualize democratization in terms of elections, we
should measure it in terms of elections (not, for example, by values people hold).
As we begin to measure our concepts, we move more toward the “real,” or empir
ical, world we observe.
Empirical Evidence
Questions demand answers. Social scientists do not ask questions just to ask them,
but to attempt to answer them. So how do social scientists answer their questions?
In short, they couple empirical evidence with theory. In comparative politics, em
pirical means those observations we can make from looking at the real world rather
than using abstract theories or speculation. We look at how theory and evidence
interact in chapter 2. For the moment, we only highlight the forms of evidence
most often used in comparative politics, since this is necessary for understanding
the method. A key is the distinction between facts and evidence.
Facts and Evidence
Facts—understood here as simple statements about what is or is not the case—
are abundant, but evidence is more precious. As noted previously, online sources
such as Wikipedia and Google provide almost costless access to a massive set of
facts (though a lot of information found online is inaccurate or incorrect). Evidence
consists of facts used in support of a proposition or hypothesis. Notice something
built into these definitions: evidence is indeed based on facts. So a point of view
or an opinion, whether your own or someone else’s, is not evidence. The fact that
someone else believes something does not mean there is evidence for it, even
if that opinion has been published by a prominent scholar or public figure. Evi
dence should be available for the reader to gather as well, and not be simply based
on hearsay, though research sometimes requires anonymity of sources. Wherever
possible, research should be replicable by someone else.
To use a simple example of varying qualities of evidence, say we ask two stu
dents to make a simple claim about whether Saudi Arabia is a democracy and to
back this claim with evidence. In the two examples in Table 1.4, the difference
t a b l e 1.4 Exam ples of Strong and W eak Use of Evidence
Student 1 Student 2
Claim: Saudi Arabia is not democratic. Claim: Saudi Arabia is not democratic.
Evidence: Saudi Arabia has not held free and Evidence: Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country
fair elections for its national government. whose economy is based on exporting oil. It is
Women do not have the same political and a long-time ally of the United States and is led
social rights as men. by King Salman and a large royal family.
Claim: strong Claim: strong
Facts: correct Facts: correct
Evidence: strong Evidence: weak
Empirical Evidence 13
between the two students is not the correctness of the claim, which is the same.
Nor is it the facts, which are true on both sides. Rather, the difference is in how
well evidence is used to back the claim. Successful comparativists are known not
for the correctness of their assertions but for the ways they empirically support
their claims.
Strong evidence has several characteristics. Most obviously, it must be rele
vant to the issue at hand. I f you are arguing about Saudi Arabia’s democracy, the
fact that the country is Muslim, or an oil exporter, is not an indicator of democ
racy. We may debate whether these factors help came democracy or a lack of
democracy, but they are not measures of democracy itself the way free and fair
elections and civil rights are.
The evidence should also be at the same level o f analysis as the claim you are
making—that is, at the individual, organizational, or societal level, for example.
We can ask good research questions at many levels of analysis: individuals, groups
within a country, whole countries and societies, regions of the world, and the
world as a whole. But we need to be careful that our evidence reflects our level of
analysis. Countries are made up of individuals, but individuals are not countries,
and there are important differences between individuals, groups, and societies at
large. So if you are seeking evidence about gender attitudes in Saudi Arabia, it is
insufficient to note what a certain small group of men in the capital city thinks,
unless you can show that these men happen to be representative of the country at
large. The same is true the other way around: I f you are talking about an individ
ual or a small group, you cannot assume you know everything about them just
because of what country they come from; this is essentially stereotyping. Ana
lysts risk committing logical fallacies if they do not pay attention to levels of
analysis.
Cases and Case Studies
Cases are the basic units of analysis in comparative politics. In many instances,
our cases are countries, usually for a certain period. We may seek, for example,
to explain North Korea’s lack of democracy versus the (imperfect) progress of
democracy in South Korea; the cases here are the two countries we are com
paring, and perhaps our time frame will be the period after the Korean W ar of
the 1950s.
A case is not always a country, however. To start with, we could consider other
geographical units: We may be interested in the social history of the state of
California or Texas, or in comparing the two. Or we may be interested in the
state of Gujarat in India, or in the city of Caracas, Venezuela. We may be inter
ested in contrasting the European Union with the African Union, or the “major
ity Catholic nations of southern Europe” with the “majority Protestant nations of
northern Europe.” In this instance, the case for study would still be a geographic
area but not a nation-state.
Cases can also take other forms. They may be political groups, organizations,
specific institutions, historical processes, eras, or even discrete events. The civil
rights movement in the United States may be a case of a social movement. To
do a comparison, one might examine the “civil rights movement of the 1960s”
in juxtaposition to the “women’s suffrage movement of the early 1900s.” Or one
level of analysis The level (e.g.,
individual, organizational, societal)
at which observations are made, or
at which causa! processes operate.
case In comparative analysis, a -
unit or example of a phenomenon
to be studied.
14 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
variable An element or factor that
is likely to change, or effect (or result or consequence)
independent variable -> dependent variable
explanatory variable -> outcome
X variable Y variable
The Comparative Method 15
The city of Nogales straddles the border between Mexico (left) and the United States, divided
by a three-mile fence completed in 2011. Why do these neighboring countries have such striking
differences?
If we compare or contrast two or more cases in order to make a causal argu
ment, we will be looking for similarities and differences (also called variations)
between the cases. Using just two countries for the moment (to keep it simple),
we may look to explain why two countries have different outcomes, or we may
look at variations in outcomes between two countries. We may ask why one
country is wealthy but a neighboring country is poor. Or, conversely, we may ask
why two very different countries had very similar outcomes, such as becoming
democracies around the same time.
To address such questions, we can use two simple tools as points of departure:
most-similar-systems analyses and most-different-systems analyses.17 These ap
proaches use comparison for the same fundamental purpose: ruling out plausible
explanations for certain phenomena. That is, quite similar or quite different cases
are used as comparative checks to see what arguments cannot account for a cer
tain outcome. Ruling out these other arguments allows the researcher to narrow
down the research process, by focusing on the possible causes that remain, and
testing evidence supporting these causes.
M ost-Similar-Systems Design
The most-similar-systems (MSS) design is predicated on the logic that two
cases (such as two countries) that are similar in a variety of ways would be ex
pected to have very similar political outcomes. Thus, if two cases have variations
in outcomes, we would look for the variations that can explain why the countries
are dissimilar.
While Table 1.5 may make the analysis appear formal, people actually do this
type of analysis informally all the time. Consider discussions you have with
variation Difference between
cases in any given study of compa
rative politics.
most-similar-systems (MSS)
A research design in which we
compare cases that are similar with
respect to a number of factors but
with distinct outcomes.
Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
t a b l e 1 . 5 M ost-Similar-Systems Design
REGIME TYPES IN AFRICA
Variable Case 1:Togo Case 2: Ghana
Similarities
Climate Hot Hot
Income Low Low
Ethnic Demography Heterogeneous Heterogeneous
Largest Religion Christian Christian
Other Religions Islam, Traditional Islam, Traditional
Outcome
Regime Type Authoritarian Democratic
Cause
Hypothesis: Colonizer France United Kingdom
others about things seemingly as simple as why we like certain movies. Virtually
all feature films released in cinemas are of similar length, are filmed for large
screens, use professional directors and producers, have a plot with a protagonist
(often a big star), use carefully chosen music as a soundtrack, and elicit emotion
from the audience (or at least are intended to). Yet we all have preferences for
some films over others. Amid these significant similarities among all films, we
can identify—through comparison—the certain factors that lead each of us to
appreciate or dislike a film.
I f we can demystify the process of comparison by realizing that we use it sub
consciously all the time, it is just a half-step to how this might be done in practice
when analyzing political questions. Consider the presentation in Table 1.5 of two
African countries, neither of which you are assumed to know a great deal about.
We are wondering why one country (Ghana) is a democracy and another
(Togo) is not. The table notes several similarities between the two countries,
making the variation in outcomes a true puzzle. If we were to hypothesize a
cause, we might argue that the colonial legacies of the countries mattered: Togo
was colonized by France (and previously Germany) and Ghana by Britain. As
we look for the cause of variations in outcomes, we can essentially cross out the
many variables on which the countries are similar, as they are unlikely to cause
differences. For instance, the hot climate of Togo cannot explain why it is more
authoritarian than Ghana, because Ghana is hot as well. Eliminating these simi
larities as potential causes leaves us looking for other possible causes where the
countries vary.
So “colonizer” might fit the bill, as Table 1.5 suggests. Does this mean we
have proven that colonizer is the answer? Not at all. We would need to do several
The Comparative Method 17
People wait to vote in Accra, Ghana, in 2004, Despite many similarities with its neighbor Togo, Ghana is a democracy, while Togo
is not. Why?
things to make this case, as we shall see going forward. First, we would consider
alternative hypotheses. Instead of colonizer, we might just as easily have said that
the economic performance of each country was the key factor that shaped regime
type, or that the nature of the military command was the key cause, or that the
ideology of the founding fathers of each country mattered most. Only by exam
ining and weighing these various causes could we gain real insight into why one
country is democratic and the other is not. Thus, our second caveat is that we
would need to find plausible evidence and have a strong argument linking the
cause to the outcome. We would want to explore the ways in which colonization
affected politics in these African countries. We would assess the evidence to
determine whether it had an impact, and we would make sure there is a plausible
story that allows us to connect the dots between the cause and the effect.
One potential source of initial confusion is that MSS designs place a premium
on identifying the differences between cases, not the similarities. You might
think of it this way: I f two cases are most similar, what is remarkable about com
paring them? W hat is remarkable is where most similar cases differ. Differences
in outcomes between similar cases are noteworthy, and differences in possible
causes are what will help us explain them. We invert this logic when using the
other tool that serves as a basic point of departure in comparative politics: most-
different-systems designs.
18 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
most-different-systems (MDS)
A research design in which we
compare cases that differ with
respect to multiple factors but in
which the outcome is the same.
comparative checking The pro
cess of testing the conclusions
from a set of comparisons against
additional cases or evidence.
M ost-Different-Systems Design
The most-different-systems (M DS) design uses a logic that mirrors that of the
MSS. In this approach, the researcher identifies two cases that are different in
nearly all aspects yet are similar on a particular outcome. This puzzle leads the
researcher to develop hypotheses to explain the peculiar similarity. See Table 1.6,
which presents an example of two major revolutions in world history, which hap
pened in very different geographical and historical contexts.
Just as MSS designs place a priority on identifying differences between cases,
MDS designs place a premium on identifying the similarities that can give us
analytical leverage. Again, the name is revealing: In an MDS design, what vari
ables are noteworthy and telling? Those that are not different. If France in 1789 and
China in 1949 are so different, what accounts for both having major social revolu
tions? In the interest of cultivating your habit of building comparisons, we leave it
to you to insert your own hypotheses. Might both countries have had populations
facing extreme deprivation at these times? Or perhaps in both countries new
actors emerged at these moments in history to lead a revolution? We will not
answer these questions here, but since several major variables differ between these
“most different” cases, we may surmise that similarity in revolution will be attrib
utable to one of the relatively scarce number of other similarities we can find.
Com parative C h e ckin g
W hile the MSS and M DS designs are the foundation for initial comparisons,
they do not complete our analysis. Analysts must constantly remain aware that
one pair of cases does not “prove” a hypothesis to be true everywhere, any more
than one case study can prove a hypothesis. Rather, we must constantly engage
in comparative checking, or examining the conditions under which certain
t a b l e 1 . 6 M ost-Different-System s Design
M A JO R SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS
Variables Case 1: France (1780s) Case 2: China (1940s)
Differences
Continent Europe Asia
Population (approx.) < 30 million > 500 million
Century Eighteenth Twentieth
Regime Monarchy Nationalist Party
Outcome(s)
Social Revolution Yes Yes
Cause
[Insert Your Hypothesis Here] ??? ???
The Comparative Method 19
arguments hold. This checking typically involves mixing MSS and M DS designs
to test our hypotheses further and to give us a sense of how generalizable they
are, or how applicable to a wide number of cases.
Return briefly to Table 1.5, the MSS table using Togo and Ghana as exam
ples. That MSS analysis provided us with a glimpse of the possibility that colo
nizer or colonial legacy may affect regime type. From that table, we might think
we have found that being colonized by France leads to authoritarian rule, while
the good fortune of being colonized by Britain leads to democracy. However,
even just a bit of comparative checking beyond these two cases will reveal that
the story is not so simple, as Table 1.7 shows.
This table illustrates that a simplistic explanation of African regime types
based on colonizer is insufficient. Benin, which neighbors Togo, was colonized
by the French and is now democratic, in counterpoint to our simplistic view from
the MSS table (Table 1.5). The fact that a single case does not correspond to this
theory’s prediction does not “prove” that colonizer is irrelevant to regime type,
any more than our first MSS “proved” that colonizer is relevant to regime type.
Rather, it shows that a more sophisticated examination of the causes of democ
racy is needed. How might we proceed?
In looking for other possible causes, we have many strategies to pursue. We
can look to a larger number of cases to see if other hypothesized arguments might
still hold. We should also dig in to our original cases once again, to see if there are
any variations or hypotheses that we may have overlooked. We can also revisit the
scholarly literature— a strategy under-utilized by many beginning comparativists—
digging in to see how scholars explain the outcome that interests us. We may find
new hypotheses, or refine the hypothesis we have already worked with. In this case,
perhaps we would find from the literature that colonialism has impacts on regimes,
t a b l e 1 . 7 Com parative Ch e ckin g
Variable Case 1:Togo Case 2: Ghana Case 3: Benin
Similarities
Climate Hot Hot Hot
Income Low Low Low
Ethnic Demography Heterogeneous Heterogeneous Heterogeneous
Largest Religion Christian Christian Christian
Other Religions Islam, Traditional Islam, Traditional Islam, Traditional
Outcome
Regime Type Authoritarian Democratic Democratic
Cause
generalizability The quality
that a given theory, hypothesis,
or finding has of being applicable
to a wide number of cases.
Colonizer France UK France
20 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
within-case comparison The
comparative analysis of variation
that takes place over time or in
distinct parts of a single case.
but that it takes shape over time differently in different cases; maybe colonialism
is something that matters but needs to be understood in a more sophisticated
fashion, and not as simply either “French” or “British.” Finally, we could use a
strategy that links to the issue of how politics happens over time, called within-
case comparison.
W ithin-Case Com parison
Within-case comparison means looking more carefully within one’s own case(s)
to examine the variations there. For instance, to use the Togo/Ghana example,
we might find that there are certain pieces or moments within the Togo case
where there was some democracy. Maybe people in certain cities or regions of
the country gained more rights, while people in other cities or regions were left
without.18 Or maybe Togo democratized (somewhat) at certain moments, such
as the early 1990s, only to backslide to an authoritarian regime. Looking at dif
ferent moments in time or in space may allow us to dig deeper into a case to better
understand our evidence.
To use another example, consider why hopefulness about the future may have
been relatively high in the United States in the 1990s but is lower today. Many
variables are similar across these two periods: The basic governmental structure
of the country and certainly the geography of the country are quite stable, for
instance. In other words, a country at an earlier period (call it Time 1) is “most
similar” to the same country at Time 2. Yet some things do change over time,
and those variables are good candidates to explain changing outcomes. The
economy may change, for instance, or the composition of the workforce, or
international events, or the political mood. Many other examples can also illus
trate the virtues of comparing periods within a country. The takeaway point is
that comparison does not end with simple charts listing attributes of different
countries, but instead is a way to delve systematically into the evidence case stud
ies provide.
Is the Study of Politics a Science?
The Limits of the Comparative Method
We speak of political science even though in comparative politics, we rarely find a
“proof ” of the kind found in geometry, for example. Some scholars view the
common methods for the study of politics to be inherently scientific in nature.
Some even think the study of politics is (and should be) a science that aims to
uncover general laws about political and social life. Others think it is a science
but one that shows probable relationships between variables, rather than showing
general laws.19 Others outside the discipline (including some natural and phys
ical scientists) may view the study of politics in a more skeptical fashion, arguing
that the term science is more aspirational in nature: For them, politics is not yet a
science, though it may aim to be. Still others may argue that politics is not a sci
ence, and should not be. It may be more interpretive and may relate more to the
humanities than to other sciences.
Is the Study of Politics a Science? The Limits of the Comparative Method
To be sure, for many questions, social scientists cannot use one of the major
tools that drives knowledge in the natural and physical sciences: the controlled
experiment. We cannot subject individual countries to precise conditions to
examine the effects the way we can in a chemistry lab, although many social
scientists do look for so-called “natural experiments,” in which real-world events
mimic laboratory conditions in key ways.20 In general, truly definitive proof is
hard to come by in the social sciences. The sorts of comparative designs we have
discussed in this chapter comprise one way to make up for our inability to do
experiments everywhere. W hen we observe countries that are quite similar in the
MSS design, we are approximating the controlled experiment of the laboratory:
We hold many variables constant, and vary one or two key variables to see if we
can measure their impact.
Given the complexity of the world and the many factors that affect political
life, hypotheses that are confirmed “beyond a reasonable doubt” are generally the
best we can aim for. Physicists have described the “law of gravity,” but social
scientists do not typically uncover fully analogous “laws” that appear to hold
everywhere. We instead rely on theories that give more or less powerful explana
tions about how the world operates. The strongest theories persist over long
periods, even if they do not explain each and every possible case or circumstance.
We elaborate on this point in the next chapter.
In this book, we take the approach that comparative politics can aspire to sci
entific inference, even if it has certain limitations.21 Some argue that mathemat
ical approaches focusing on many cases are the gold standard in political science,
because with large numbers of cases, researchers are liberated from the idiosyn
crasies and complexities of individual cases. In one version, political science
could replace “proper names” with variables.22 We do not, however, presume that
we must follow the models of quantitative research designs (which we will dis
cuss further in chapter 2). There are many ways in which detailed studies of
smaller numbers of cases can show us things obscured from view in quantitative
studies of many cases. Qualitative analyses—such as deep historical probing of
individual cases and detailed descriptions of social contexts— can be as scientific
as white-coated lab work. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative methods com
plement each other, a point that seems to be increasingly recognized in political
science.
Comparative work may contribute to knowledge in many ways. These include
conceptualization, refining the basic ideas and terms we use, and categorizing
cases. Other contributions come from theoretical critiques, which can highlight
inconsistencies of certain explanations, allowing researchers to develop a better
theory. And, of course, many good critiques will also be empirical, pointing out
cases that do not fit with favored explanations. Each of these forms of contribu
tion is consistent with the scientific method, even if it does not always involve
direct testing of hypotheses. In the next chapter, we explore how these aspects of
the comparative approach help us build theories in comparative politics.
22 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction
C h a p te r S u m m a ry
Asking Why: Research Questions
in Comparative Politics
For scholars of comparative politics, the key questions are
about why something happens, or about cause and effect,
even though we are often also interested in normative
questions about right and wrong.
• Research in comparative politics addresses questions on
such major issues as economic development, political re
gimes and institutions, and a range of social outcomes.
Concepts
• Concepts are the ideas we use to categorize the world and
enable us to measure and compare observations.
• Good concepts are clear, coherent, consistent, and useful.
Social scientists often must do their own conceptualization,
or develop their own concepts, and must operationalize
their concepts to enable measurement.
Empirical Evidence
Comparative politics relies heavily on facts and evidence to
support arguments about cause and effect.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. Imagine you are going to do a project that tries to explain why
democracy has been relatively successful in the United States.
What sort of conceptual work would you need to do before you
could complete this study?
2. If you were to conceptualize democracy as a political system in
which (1) certain individual rights are respected, (2) elections
are periodically held, and (3) political transitions are peaceful,
what would you have to do to operationalize this concept for
the purposes of a comparative study?
3. What are the five most interesting why questions about com
parative politics that you can think of? What are the main con
cepts they imply?
• One of the main empirical approaches is the use of case
studies and comparisons between cases.
The Comparative Method
Variables are features that vary from one case to another
and enable comparison between cases.
• Two approaches to comparison involve the most-similar-
systems design and the most-different-systems design,
both of which examine variations and similarities between
cases to assist in testing hypotheses.
Good comparative study requires more than just brief
examination of similar and different variables: it often
involves further examination through steps such as com
parative checking and within-case comparison.
Is the Study of Politics a Science?
The Limits of the Comparative Method
• While the study of politics aspires to scientific conclusions,
it is rarely able to prove its conclusions with absolute
certainty.
4. Take one of the questions you have formulated in response
to question 3. Now think of how you could construct a most-
different-systems (MDS) design to compare cases and answer
your question.
5. Take one of the questions you have formulated in response
to question 3. Now think of how you could construct a most-
similar-systems (MSS) design to compare cases and answer your
question.
amm
W .
CHAPTER 2 f
Theories,
Hypotheses,
and Evidence
• A medical worker undergoes Ebola response training during the outbreak that began in 2014.
27
IN THIS C H A P T E R
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses,
and Evidence 24
Theories 25
Hypotheses 25
How Theories Emerge and Are Used
Types of Evidence 29
H ypothesis Testing 31
Correlation 31
Causation 33
Critiques: Using Theory and Evidence
Empirical Critiques: Confirming Cases
and Deviant Cases 39
Theoretical Critiques: Improving Theories
and Hypotheses 39
The Challenges o f Measurement: Biases,
Errors, and Validity 41
THINKI NG C O M P A R A T IV E L Y
I n 2014, a deadly outbreak of the Ebola virus hit several countries in W est
I Africa. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were especially hard hit. Medical
professionals from around the world came to the region in an attempt to con
tain the outbreak. Some villagers, however, did not welcome them, and in
fact at least one youth group mobilized to fight off the doctors because they
noticed something: soon after the doctors arrived, people in a village began
to die. As The New York Times reported, some villagers reached a simple con
clusion: the doctors bring death, and the way to stop Ebola
was to stop the doctors.1
This kind of faulty logic almost certainly proved deadly
to some. Examples like this show how important it is to have
good theories that can help us understand— not misunder
stand— how the world works. Such an example also shows
how im portant it is to interpret evidence correctly. In this
story, it is the case that the disease was claiming lives despite
the doctors’ best efforts, not that the doctors were doing the
killing. Villagers were confusing correlation— observing fac
tors that accompany each other—with causation, or an argu
ment that one thing causes another.
In this chapter, we discuss how theories work. We dis
cuss how to form hypotheses, or educated guesses about what
will happen under certain circumstances, and how to avoid
certain pitfalls in testing those hypotheses. A ll this will pre
pare you better for examining the issues of comparative poli
tics that make up the rest of the book.
39
Qualities of Good Analysis and
Argum entation 42
Step 1: Asking Good Questions: Why? 43
Step 2: Hypothesis Testing: Generating
Good Hypotheses and Testing Them
Fairly 43
Step 3: Balancing Argumentation: Evidence,
Originality, and Meaningfulness 43
24
Introduction to Theories,
Hypotheses, and Evidence
Social scientists look for convincing answers to important ques
tions about why things happen: W hy are some countries demo
cratic and others not, or why do revolutions occur, or why do some countries have
two main political parties while others have many parties in their legislatures? The
first step in comparative politics is asking good research questions about the causes
and effects of political events. Chapter 1 gave us an approach—the comparative
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 25
method—to begin to answer those questions by comparing and contrasting cases,
most often different countries or specific events in different countries. We may
examine the political party systems of Germany and France, or the communist
revolutions in Russia and China, for instance. To do so, we juxtapose the facts of
the different cases to make an argument about the similarities and differences
between them.
In this chapter, we talk about the tools we need to answer questions, with a focus
on two elements that help us to formulate possible answers: theories and hypoth
eses. We discuss what theories and hypotheses are, and how they differ from one
another. We then discuss how evidence is used to test hypotheses and theories.
Theories
Theories are general explanations of empirical phenomena, or explanations
about how the world operates. A theory aims to explain more than just one or
two cases or examples, and it is typically backed by a considerable number of sup
porting facts as empirical evidence. An explanation or framework in the social
sciences will rarely earn the right to be called a theory if we cannot find consider
able support for its arguments in the real world.
This may not be the only way you hear the word theory used. There is also a more
casual everyday usage to describe a hunch or idea. For instance, imagine a friend
who says, “The Chicago Cubs are going to win the World Series this year, that’s my
theory.” From a social scientific point of view, this is a prediction, not a theory. It
may be a good or a bad prediction (probably the latter, knowing the Cubs), but it is
speculative at best, a hopeful guess. Without some logical argumentation and
backing in facts, it is not really a theory based on reason and evidence. If, on the
other hand, the friend offers a detailed explanation that shows how the team with
the strongest pitching routinely wins the World Series, and proceeds to detail how
Chicago’s pitching is stronger than that of other teams (it’s probably not), then the
friend is approaching a general theory about the relationship between two vari
ables: pitching and championships. In this theory, pitching is the cause and win
ning the championship is the consequence, also called the effect or the outcome.
In political science, there are two different types of theory, typically referred
to as normative theory and empirical (also known as positive) theory. Normative
theory deals with questions of values and moral beliefs. An example might be the
question “W hat is the best kind of political system we could construct?” This is a
matter of morals and ethics. Empirical theory, by contrast, deals with empirical
questions. An example is “W hich factors are most likely to produce a preferred
political system?” This is about the factors and variables that cause things to
happen. In this book, we are mostly focused on empirical theories: we discuss
theory as a general explanation of why things happen.
Hypotheses
Hypotheses are specific proposed explanations for why an outcome occurs. To
answer research questions, we may generate or formulate hypotheses that we
think can explain a set of facts upon further research. Hypotheses are not expla
nations already backed by lots of evidence. Instead, they are possible answers to
a question, which we plan to test out by applying them to data, looking at specific
theory A general set of explana
tory claims about some specifiable
empirical range.
hypothesis A specific prediction,
derived from a theory, that can be
tested against empirical evidence.
26 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
deductive reasoning The process
of moving from general claims or
theories to specific observations or
predictions about a phenomenon
or set of cases.
deviant case (outlier) A case that
does not fit the pattern predicted
by a given theory.
Inductive reasoning The process
of moving from specific observa
tions to general claims.
cases to see if there is evidence to support the idea. Informally, you can think of
them as hunches. If the hypothesis receives that support from the evidence, it
may become a thesis in an argument.2
Developing hypotheses requires us to make imaginative leaps from unanswered
questions to possible explanations. Hypotheses can be generated from existing
theories in a deductive fashion: starting with general ideas and then testing
whether they work on specific examples. For example, say we are asking about why
an anti-colonial revolution happened in a certain African country in the 1950s. We
may begin our research with a major theory that holds that social revolutions (such
as the French Revolution, Russian Revolution, or Iranian Revolution) are caused by
the social upheavals produced by modernization. We seek to apply this theory to
the African country we are studying. Using the theory as our general model, we
might hypothesize that the anti-colonial revolution in the African country was pro
duced by a history of modernization. Another way to think of this sort of approach
is to consider it an effort to test an observable implication of the starting theory.3
Not all hypotheses are deduced from general theories, of course. Some can
also come from looking at a case that deviates from a particular theory. We can
learn a great deal from so-called deviant cases, or “outliers,” that do not do as
we might expect. For instance, in many international comparisons the United
States is a deviant case. It has both higher income inequality and greater differ
ences in life expectancy between racial groups (to name just two variables) than
one might expect based on its level of economic development. By focusing on
some characteristics that make the United States different from other cases, we
might sometimes understand general relationships better. For example, perhaps
it is not a country’s overall level of economic development that predicts the life
expectancy of its people, but individual life chances. By this thinking, U.S.
income inequality may help us to account for the fact that high development does
not lead to high life expectancy for all U.S. groups.
We often formulate a hypothesis with some initial knowledge of the topic at
hand, but we do not want to ask questions to which we presume we already know
the answer. We do not normally aim to create a hypothesis from empirical data in
an inductive way—moving from specific observations to general claims. That is,
we don’t do the research, find the answer, then go back and propose our hypoth
esis (although sometimes our analysis does suggest new hypotheses, and inductive
approaches to theory generation do exist). Instead, we approach our hypothesis
with an open mind toward what answers we may find. Our hypotheses may be
supported or rejected by the research we do, so there is always the possibility that
they are wrong. In fact, most hypotheses are wrong, and rarely if ever can we fully
confirm or disprove a hypothesis with limited research.4 The goal is not to pick the
correct hypothesis at the outset, but rather to learn something from the study we
undertake. In fact, many social scientists believe that our knowledge advances
more from refuting hypotheses than from defending or supporting them.
Hypotheses and theories inform one another. Theories help guide us in for
mulating hypotheses, and confirming hypotheses may either support or under
mine theories. In general, hypotheses are more tentative and speculative than
theories. A specific hypothesis is generated for each research question and is put
on the line to be tested in each case. W hile the evidence from testing a specific
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 27
hypothesis may support or oppose a particular theory, it usually is insufficient to
reject or confirm a theory by itself. Generating a theory is a more elaborate, long
term process than generating and testing a single hypothesis.
After testing hypotheses for a specific study, scholars will typically offer a
thesis, a claim to argue on the basis of evidence from research. One can think of
a thesis statement that usually appears near the beginning of a well-written
scholarly paper. In comparative politics, a thesis is an argument supported by the
research evidence that comes from testing a hypothesis. W hile a thesis has evi
dence supporting it, that does not mean it is a full theory. Before achieving the
status and prestige of being called a theory, an idea requires ample evidence to
support it, typically based on research by many scholars. For the most part, stu
dents of comparative politics test hypotheses, make specific claims in the form of
theses, and are expected to use evidence to argue in support of their theses,
taking account of existing theories. We are informed by theory and can contrib
ute to debates by theorizing, but we rarely craft or destroy entire theories alone.
How Theories Em erge and Are Used
Theories emerge and are used all the time to explain the world around us. Let us
take a prominent theory from beyond comparative politics that has long featured
prominently in social and political debate: the theory of evolution. First, we offer
a very abridged version of the theory, followed by one specific hypothesis derived
from the theory.
Theory (abridged): The origin and development of species are based on a
process of natural selection, in which organisms with a genetic advantage
in a given natural environment thrive and propagate their genes, whereas
organisms at a genetic disadvantage will fall out of the gene pool over the
long term.
Hypothesis (example): The theory of evolution accounts for humans’
walking on two legs. Human ancestors first began to walk on two legs in
African savannahs where grasses grew tall; those walking on two legs had
an advantage over similar four-legged mammals because they could better
see and more easily flee predators.
In testing this hypothesis—that humans first walked upright in order to flee
predators— a scholar will examine whether the evidence is consistent with such
an explanation. The evidence uncovered may include fossils and archaeological
evidence. As part of his or her work, the scholar may note that other prominent
arguments are inconsistent with one or more substantial pieces of evidence,
thereby making this hypothesis relatively more capable of explaining the ob
served facts.
O f course, even if the scholar finds that the evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis, a single study will not be the end of the story. Counter-arguments
will emerge. Indeed, the existence and progress of the social sciences depends
precisely on the common efforts of the scholarly community to question existing
explanations and to provide alternative ones. In our example, some scholars who
accept the evolutionary perspective may argue that humans first walked upright
in order to conserve energy while foraging for food. Scholars who reject the
thesis A statement for which one
argues on the basis of evidence.
28 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
theory may also contribute arguments to the debate,
and even non-scientists may do so, as long as their
arguments are tested empirically. We can pursue the
scientific endeavor by further testing related hypoth
eses to see how the theory changes as a result.
We narrow in on good explanations by finding
increasing evidence that certain hypotheses are con
sistent with the evidence while others are inconsistent
with the evidence. We can rarely, if ever, confirm a
hypothesis or prove it fully true; rather, we can find
that a hypothesis is increasingly viable as we find more
and more evidence to support it. Ideally, much like a
courtroom lawyer that has the evidence on his or her
side, we will make our case “beyond a reasonable
doubt” as we defend our claim.
Theories have facts and evidence supporting them,
but these are not proof that a theory is valid and cor
rect in all circumstances. Often, a wrong theory will hold sway for a long period
of time until it is supplanted by a stronger theory. For example, the earth was
long believed to be situated at the center of the universe, and this appeared con
sistent with many facts, such as the sun and moon rising and falling beyond the
horizon each day. However, this theory eventually came into conflict with obser
vations that suggested that the earth revolved around the sun. Both theories
persisted for a time until it became clear that the heliocentric (sun-centered)
theory best explained the structure of our solar system. Thus, competing theories
may coexist, and there may simultaneously be facts and evidence that support a
theory and other facts and evidence that contradict the theory. Theories may ul
timately fail and be rejected, but ideally theories only “die” when replaced by new
ones that better explain existing evidence.5
Theories in political science explain tendencies and help us understand many
cases, but there are almost always exceptions to the rules. Nothing in political
science works in all cases the way the laws of physics work everywhere on earth.
For example, as you will read in chapter 6, there are several competing theories
to explain why countries become democracies. There is considerable evidence
that wealthier countries are likelier to be democratic than poor countries, but this
does not mean every rich country will be a democracy and every low-income
country will be under authoritarian rule. Rather, the theory of the link between
wealth and democracy posits a tendency, much as eating healthy foods and not
smoking will tend to increase one’s life expectancy. Not everyone who eats well
and avoids smoking will live to old age, and not everyone who smokes and eats
junk food will die young. Cause-and-effect relationships in the social sciences are
general patterns, not absolute laws. As a result, building theory is an intensive
process over an extended period of formulating and testing hypotheses, gather
ing and examining evidence, and understanding and synthesizing debates. Theo
ries are imperfect but can be improved over time.
Since theories compete with one another as the best explanations of social
phenomena, it may be natural to think of scientists competing with one another
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 29
to come up with the best theory. This is true in part, but the social sciences are
also a collective endeavor. In this sense, when a theory is rejected, it represents an
advance of our understanding. Even critiques of one scientist’s effort by another
scientist are part of the process of testing and contesting the best explanations.
Types of Evidence
For most students being introduced to comparative politics, the dominant form
of evidence will be qualitative, meaning it comes from accounts of historical or
contemporary events. For instance, if I wish to test the hypothesis that the
French Revolution of 1789 was caused by the emergence of a self-conscious
middle class {bourgeoisie), then I may look to accounts of that class and its atti
tudes and involvements in political life in the years leading up to 1789 in France,
perhaps comparing it to other countries where a revolution did not take place. In
this case, my data are not numbers and figures inserted into a spreadsheet, but
rather the detailed accounts of historical record. I may test my hypothesis using
the facts of who did what, when and where they did it, and how. Qualitative evi
dence may come from many sources, such as written works like constitutions and
laws, historical or journalistic accounts or reports, and interviews or surveys
of people.
Social scientists use quantitative data such as statistics and figures to comple
ment qualitative data as they aim to make inferences, or conclusions based on
evidence, about cause and effect. Examples include measures of average incomes
or average life expectancies across countries. Such quantitative comparisons may
be undertaken using national statistics from government agencies, numerical
data from surveys, or data collected by researcher observations. Various data
sources may be used to compare and contrast outcomes in different countries. At
a more advanced level, such descriptive statistics can be used to formulate and
begin to test hypotheses about the causes and effects of differences between
countries. Other quantitative research in comparative politics focuses on the
construction of formal mathematical models of the strategic behavior of indi
viduals and groups in political situations. Quantitative data differ from qualita
tive data in their presentation, but both types are used to generate and test
hypotheses. W hile the details of statistical methodologies and formal mathe
matical modeling are beyond the scope of this book, we work from the premise
that both qualitative and quantitative work may be used to categorize and explain
differences across cases, but also they can be used to test hypotheses about the
causes of those differences.6
In comparative politics, you will use historical accounts and data more often
than you will make predictions about the future. This is because we have real evi
dence only for things that have happened, and not for what might happen. O f
course, the past may give us expectations about the future, which is why we hear
that those who fail to learn about the past are doomed to repeat it. But in terms
of concrete evidence, we cannot know what has yet to happen. For this reason, we
work with existing cases to develop hypotheses and theories. For instance, we
may hypothesize that China, which is not currently a democratic country, will
move toward democracy as it grows wealthier. This hypothesis may come from
observations about what has happened in other countries as they have grown
qualitative A form of analysis that
aims to discern relationships be
tween events or phenomena as
described in narrative form, such as
an account of a historical process.
quantitative Quantitative analysis
aims for the mathematical discern
ment of relationships between
variables, typically involving a large
number of cases or observations.
inference The process through
which we aim to test observable
implications (often about cause
and effect) of any given theory; also
refers to conclusions reached
through this process.
30 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate
The increasingly sophisticated use of statistics in social science has generated considerable debate about the best methods
and types of data for research. Qualitative (non-mathematical)
research often closely treats a few cases. Such approaches, as
mentioned in chapter 1, are often called small-N studies, with N
meaning the number of cases. Quantitative approaches often
handle many cases, using mathematical techniques to measure
the degree of association between a set of variables that cut
across each case. Scholars who prefer quantitative work maintain
that qualitative studies of one, two, or three cases are susceptible
to reaching conclusions that only work for those selected cases
and not a larger number of cases (some people call this the
small-N problem). According to this perspective, qualitative argu
ments may not “travel well.” On the other hand, scholars who
advocate strongly for qualitative work may argue that quantita
tive research is unpersuasive because it neglects the context and
detail needed to make arguments meaningful. From this per
spective, quantitative arguments that travel too far miss the real
causes in a case as they unfold over time. Despite this debate,
qualitative and quantitative research are increasingly interdepen
dent in contemporary social science, and they complement each
other in important ways. The perspective of this text is that ex
treme views of one or another sort are ill-advised. In general,
quantitative work has the potential to make strong empirical
claims about large numbers of cases and general associations
between variables, and some would argue that qualitative work
has the ability to reveal causal mechanisms or processes at the
case-specific level. It has been argued that a common logic un
derpins any good social science work.7 While this position is con
troversial, much of political science relies on formulating research
questions and then using available data to test hypotheses
about answers to these those questions.8
wealthier. Well-regarded theories may strongly suggest that China will democ
ratize, and we may hypothesize and argue that it will do so, but to test the hy
pothesis we will have to await future events. Evidence comes only from events
that have happened.
Spring Festival travel rush in Shenzhen City, China, 2012. Will China move toward democracy
as its middle class grows larger? We address this question in the discussion of democratization
in chapter 6.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis Testing
The core of comparative politics is testing hypotheses about cause and effect be
tween two or more variables. We defined variables in chapter 1 as some measure
that can vary from one observation to the next. Examples range from a country’s
average income or average life expectancy, to whether a revolution occurred in a
given country, to the most prominent religion in a particular state, to the religion
of a particular person.
In social science, cause-and-effect arguments are based on examining differ
ent variables, and how those variables relate to one another and may depend on
one another. I f country A is wealthy and country B is poor, what does country A
have that country B does not that makes it so?9 An explanation will hinge upon
identifying what variable might cause A to have become rich and B to remain
poor. Our goal will be to identify what other variables go alongside wealth that
are lacking in countries that are poor, in order to examine whether those vari
ables made the difference. Our first key distinction here is between correlation
and causation.
Correlation
Correlation measures the association between two variables. W hen two vari
ables correlate, they are related to one another (or, to separate the words, they
“co-relate”). To use a simple example, the temperature in many places will cor
relate with the month of the year: when it is February in the Northern Hemi
sphere, the temperature will be relatively cold, whereas in July the temperature
will be relatively hot. This does not mean it is impossible to have a hot day in
February or a cold day in July, just that there is an association in general. There is
thus a correlation between the variable “month of the year” and the variable
“temperature.”
If two variables have a positive correlation, they tend to increase together.
One increases as the other increases. An obvious example is the income of a
person and the amount the person spends on luxury goods. People with low in
comes cannot afford to spend money on luxury goods, while the wealthy may
spend a large amount on luxury goods. These two variables are positively corre
lated. A negative correlation is just the opposite, and means that as one variable
tends to increase, the other tends to decrease. An example might be the number
of cigarettes one smokes per day and one’s life expectancy.
Just as we can find a positive correlation between wealth and democracy, we
can conversely find a negative correlation between another pair of variables: pov
erty and democracy. Consider the number of people in a country living on an
income below $2 per day (call this variable the absolute poverty rate) and the level
of democracy. In this case, the rich countries have relatively low levels of poverty
and high levels of democracy, while many countries in Africa have high levels of
poverty and low levels of democracy. W hen we look at the nearly two hundred or
so countries in the world today, these correlations are apparent, even though it
should be noted that there are some countries that are rich but not democratic,
and some that are low-income yet are democratic.
correlation A relationship
between two variables in which
they tend to move in either the
same direction (positive
correlation) or in opposite
directions (negative correlation).
Correlation: Wealth and Democracy
Wealth and democracy of nations appear to be positively correlated. This correlation can be easily observed on a
world map that shows which countries are wealthy and which
are poor, set alongside a map that shows which countries are de
mocracies and which are not. Europe, the United States, Australia,
Canada, Japan, and several other countries are highly democra
tized and are quite wealthy. Many countries in Africa, on the
other hand, have low incomes and low levels of democracy.
Where “incomes” are high, “democracy” is high, and where “in
comes” are low, “democracy” is likely to be low.
IR ELAN D G EO R G IA
isrC’
JA P A N
CHIN A
| NORTH KO REA
SOUTH KOREA
i/IBODIA
G U IN E A — _
BISSAU
SIER R A
LEONE
It o g o
BR A Z IL BURUNDI
NIGER
DEM %
REP I
C O N G O ’
AU S T R A LIA
ZIM B A B W E
The Global D istru b u tio n o f W ealth
A c o u n try ‘s G D P p e r ca p ita as p e rc e n ta g e
o f w o rld average ($10,500), 2009:
I O v e r 400% -j H i 2 5 -5 0 % ■>
f F irs t T ie r < x x x ?■ T h ird T ier
| 2 0 0 -4 0 0 % J mSm 1 -2 5 % J
1 1 | 1 0 0-20 0%
5 0 -1 0 0 %
D em ocracy in th e W orld 2015
| Free
H P a rtly Free
I N o t Free
32
Hypothesis Testing 33
Causation
Causation exists when one variable causes another. This helps us answer the fun- causation The property that
damental questions raised in chapter 1, such as “W hy are some countries democ- obtains when one thing can be
racies?” Recall that why questions are often best answered with because answers, shown to cause another.
As the word because implies, answering why involves explaining causes. W ithout
causal arguments and theories, correlations are just patterns in search of an ex
planation. W hen we have causation, we usually have correlation, but the opposite
is not true. Failing to distinguish between correlation and causation can lead to
a variety of problems, as we will show.
Does the correlation between wealth and democracy prove that getting rich
causes democracy to happen? Not necessarily. It may be that this correlation
points in the direction of a causal argument, such as wealth —> democracy. Or
maybe the other way around: democracy —» wealth. On the other hand, it may be
that the correlation exists, but there is no causal reason for it. It may be simply
due to chance that rich countries happen to be democracies. Or there may be
other factors that result in both wealth and democracy.
As it turns out, one of the central theories of comparative politics suggests
that countries that grow wealthy are likely to become democratic for specific
reasons we detail in chapter 6. The causal argument, beginning with the positive
correlation between wealth and democracy, finds that historically, countries have
developed a middle class as they have grown wealthier. This middle class, rather
than the elite, ends up being a central force that pushes for more rights for all citi
zens. In poor countries without a middle class, democracy is unlikely to succeed,
but growing middle classes in countries that are growing rich have helped bring
democracy with them. W hile the correlation here does have a causal explanation,
notice that the correlation needed an argument and logic to bring the story to
gether and to make the fact of the correlation into evidence that supports an
argument.
We cannot assume that all correlations between two variables (call them X
and Y) mean that X leads to Y. We will use various examples to illustrate possible
relationships between variables. The first of those was the causal argument that
X leads to Y (Figure 2.1).10
Causation: Legislative Elections and the Number of Political Parties
in Legislatures
W hile almost no arguments in social science get “proven,” the argument linking district-based electoral systems and
political systems with few parties has substantial support. In
countries like the United States, electing a single representative
from each Congressional district means that small parties like the
Green Party, Reform Party, and Libertarian Party end up with vir
tually no members of Congress, even in years when they have
5 percent or more support from voters nationwide. This is clearly
because (note the use of because) such parties get a small per
centage in many districts, which may result in winning no seats if
Republicans and Democrats get higher percentages; by contrast,
if the whole country voted in one big district, and Congressional
seats were distributed in proportion with the vote received,
these small parties would win more seats. In this sense, the struc
ture of the elections is at least one of the causes of the two-party
system.
Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
Figure 2.1 Causal Relationship Between Correlated Variables (X and Y)
But there are many other possibilities. Figure 2.2 shows some possible rela
tionships between variable X and variable Y that are not the simple causal rela
tionship where X —> Y. I f we assumed X -» Y in each of these cases, we could run
into a number of analytical problems.
We discuss each of these problems in order.
( 1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Figure 2.2 Possible Problems with Causal Arguments About Correlated Variables (X and Y)
(1) Definitional problem s and falsifiability problem
X Y
The first problem is one that is rarely noted, because it apparently involves
arguments that are “too correct.” In reality, one common problem is confusing
cause-and-effect between two variables with two variables that are the same by
definition. If X is measuring the same thing as Y, they will correlate perfectly.
But this is not because X —» Y, but rather because X = Y.11 A common problem
for comparativists is defining two variables that are so nearly the same that the
causal argument is meaningless, or tautological. This definitional problem relates
Hypothesis Testing 35
to the problem of falsifiability, which is the idea that for an explanation to be
meaningful, it must be contestable. To argue that something is true means some
thing only if there is a chance it could at least possibly be incorrect and could be
proved wrong. For instance, say we are asked why a baseball team won a game,
and our “analysis” is that the winning team “just scored more runs” than the
losing team, or “just got it done.” This argument is correct, in the narrow sense
that it is not inaccurate, but it is also meaningless, precisely because it can never
be otherwise: scoring more runs over the course of a game and winning the game
are one and the same, by definition. By contrast, if we say that none of the world’s
democratic countries will ever again succumb to dictatorship, then that argu
ment is falsifiable because a contrary example is possible.
falsifiability The testability of
a theory or hypothesis. A good
hypothesis could be logically
demonstrated to be false by
evidence.
(2) Reverse causality problem
The reverse causality problem is rather simpler to understand. Our story at the
beginning of the chapter held that villagers noted that contagious epidemics
brought doctors into villages and people in the villages began to die, and they
concluded that doctors were causing the illness, rather than the illness bringing
the doctors to the village. In this case, two variables are correlated, but the causal
argument linking the two may be the opposite of what we anticipate. Instead of
Definitions and Falsifiability: Dictators and Dictatorships
*r, %. *
\
I n trying to explain why countries become dictatorships, we may often be drawn to the actions of certain key individuals. Say we
argue that North Korea is a dictatorship because North Korean
people have no practical rights under Kim Jong-un.The cause is
Kim Jong-un’s rule and the consequence is dictatorship, as de
fined by a lack of political rights for citizens. We may then note
that Kim Jong-un, like his father, Kim Jong-il, is a dictator who
does not allow free and fair elections, tramples civil liberties, and
rules with an iron fist.12 But if we say that these aspects of Kim
Jong-il’s rule are the causes of North Korea becoming a dictator
ship, we are defining cause and effect the same way. We are char
acterizing the rule of Kim Jong-il as a dictatorship more than we
are giving a real cause for why dictatorial rule in North Korea
came about. Arguing that individuals like Kim Jong-il cause dic
tatorships may work as long as we are careful in our causal argu
ment and separate it from our definition, but in this case our
cause and our effect are the same.
Kim Jong-un, General Ri Yong Ho, and Kim Jong-il of North
Korea in 2010. When Kim Jong-il died in 2011, his son Kim
Jong-un took over the dictatorship. Why has this authoritarian
regime persisted despite international isolation and poor
economic performance?
36 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
Reverse Causality: Cancer Rates and Longevity
For much of the twentieth century, cancer rates were higher in countries with long life spans than they were in countries
where the average life span was shorter. Given this correlation be
tween the variables, one (wrong) conclusion might be that cancer
causes people to live longer. This would, of course, have the
causal relationship backward. Cancers are diseases that affect the
old more often than the young, so where people live longer they
are likelier to suffer from cancer. Because many people in coun
tries with short life spans (such as some African countries, unfortu
nately) do not live to old ages, cancer is infrequent. Understanding
“which way the causal arrow goes” is crucial: In this case the arrow
goes longevity -» cancer, rather than cancer -> longevity.
X leading to Y, perhaps Y leads to X. Getting the “causal arrow” pointed in the
right direction is essential, and reversing causality has the potential to lead to
disastrous consequences.
(3) Endogeneity problem
The endogeneity problem is about circularity: It happens when two variables
exhibit mutual or reciprocal effects. You may know of a simple expression such as
“the chicken and the egg” problem, though endogeneity arises any time variables
mutually affect one another. If X and Y correlate and seem to go together, we
may be left trying to figure out whether X caused Y to happen or Y caused X to
happen. Reasonable people may disagree about which direction the causal arrow
goes.13 Endogeneity problems are common in the real world. W hen we talk of
vicious circles (of, say, poverty and dictatorship) or virtuous circles (of, say, eco
nomic growth and human development), we are describing a situation in which
many important variables are endogenous. Indeed, endogeneity as such is not a
problem but a feature of many social and political phenomena. It becomes a prob
lem when we mistakenly claim one variable causes another when the two vari
ables are, in fact, endogenously linked. Even so, social scientists don’t want
simply to identify multiple variables as endogenous, but to understand more
Endogeneity: Education and Health
f ‘ hildren’s health and children’s education seem to correlate
*— .positively: When one improves, so does the other. So, do im
provements in education lead to better health, or do improve
ments in health lead to better education? Both are plausible.
Healthier students will be more likely to have good attendance at
school and will be better able to thrive in their work there,
making improved health a cause of improved educational out
comes. Conversely, better education may lead to more knowl
edge about healthy practices, including nutrition and sanitation.
So education may make for less frequent visits to the doctor. In
this case, the two variables are endogenous.
endogeneity The name given to
any circumstance in which two
variables exhibit mutual or recipro
cal effects.
Hypothesis Testing 37
precisely the ways endogenously linked variables interact over time. One of the
leading strategies for resolving this dilemma in qualitative research is closely
tracing the historical sequence. Where we have good information about when
and where things happened, who did them, or how events unfolded, we may be
able to determine whether X -> Y or Y —> X. I f we can identify clearly whether
the chicken came before the egg (or vice-versa), we may be able to address this
problem. This is not, however, always possible, as the box on education and
health shows.
In addition, there are statistical strategies for dealing with this problem that
we cannot explore here, but you could learn about them by taking a more ad
vanced social science methods course.
(4) Intervening variable problem
z
Y
Intervening variables are another potential problem, though they are not
always problematic. The situation here is that X leads to Y, but indirectly: The
effect of X on Y is mediated through another variable, Z. This is not always a
problem. An example is eating fatty foods and having a higher risk of heart
disease. Eating lots of fatty foods leads to an accumulation of cholesterol in the
arteries, which leads to higher risk of heart disease. Even though there are in
tervening steps between the actual eating and the risk of heart disease, we can
still say eating fatty foods causes higher risk of heart disease. As long as we can
specify the argument and its steps, we do not have an intervening variable
problem. The potential problem arises when we miss an intervening variable
and this leads us to a wrong interpretation. The following example illustrates
this problem.
Intervening Variables: Communism and Democratization
In 1989, many of the countries of central-eastern Europe became democracies as they left the communist bloc dominated by the
former Soviet Union. An amateur analyst might be tempted to
conclude that communism therefore caused democracy. The
communist regimes must have encouraged the citizenry to
demand their rights, and then they agreed to hold elections to
fulfill those rights.This is nonsense. In reality, the democratization
of the region came about as a reaction and response to years of
communist rule, generated by civil society and civic groups, and
directed at the authoritarian regimes. Communism cannot
meaningfully be said to have caused the democratization. Rather,
intervening variables, such as citizens’ long pent-up frustrations,
combined with some particular trigger events, brought on the
fall of communism. An interpretation of the democratic wave of
1989 as a consequence of communism would have the argument
quite wrong if it lacked the key intervening variables.
(5) Omitted variable problem
38 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
We frequently miss or omit variables that should be in our analysis. We ob
serve an empirical relationship between X and Y, and assume this means that one
creates the other, when in fact both are attributable to a third factor, sometimes
also called a confounding or “lurking” variable, because though it is there in the
background we might not see it. If X and Y are positively correlated, it may not
be that X —> Y or Y —> X at all. Instead, some factor Z may lead to both X and Y,
thus giving rise to the correlation between them. That is, Z —> X and Z —» Y.
(6) Spurious correlation problem
Finally, there are many variables out there in the world, and some are bound
to correlate with one another even in the absence of any causal relationship.
Many problems that seem to be of this sort will actually be omitted variable
problems upon further investigation, but there are examples of correlations
where simply no meaningful causal relationship exists. Lucky superstitions are
examples where two variables seem to correlate, but there is no plausible rela
tionship between them. Perhaps your college’s sports team always seems to win
when you put your lucky hat on for the game. This correlation may continue for
some time, but there is no reasonable scientific explanation linking your hat-
wearing tendencies to victory, and no reason to expect that you putting on your
hat will lead your team to win the next game. Though the variables “hat wear
ing” and “victory” may correlate, there is no causation. (Sorry. You can take off
your hat now.)
Omitted Variables: Ice Cream Sales and Murders
There is a peculiar correlation between ice cream and murder rates, often cited in methodology textbooks.14 Let’s say a
study gives convincing evidence of a positive correlation be
tween increases in ice cream sales and increases in murder rates.
What’s more, the analyst plausibly claims to have a causal argu
ment. What could such a causal argument be? Does eating ice
cream lead people to murder? Unlikely. Murdering someone
gives a craving for ice cream? Probably not. The answer is a miss
ing variable: the temperature outside. This omitted variable af
fects both ice cream sales and murder rates, both of which
increase in the summertime. Failing to account for omitted vari
ables can lead to dangerously flawed causal arguments.
Critiques’. Using Theories and Evidence 39
Spurious Correlation: Stock Markets and Butter Production in Bangladesh
A ccording to an accomplished statistician now at the University of California, Berkeley, the variable most highly corre
lated with the performance of American stock markets for several
decades was not U.S. corporate profits, or rates of inflation or
unemployment in the United States, but rather butter produc
tion in Bangladesh.15 If this is true, surely it is so by coincidence. It
is highly improbable that some factor happens to affect only
American stock prices and butter production in Bangladesh but
not any of the other variables that might also be expected to link
the two (such as the overall performance of the global econ
omy). With the seemingly boundless number of variables we
might observe in the world, some are bound to correlate even
when there is no real relationship between them.
Critiques: Using Theories and Evidence
Evidence can be used to support an argument, but it can also help us counter an
argument, and this too is a meaningful contribution to advancing our under
standing and knowledge. It is clear that we often want to use evidence to support
our own arguments. Less obviously, however, evidence can be used to enhance a
theory or an argument by providing a helpful critique of the conventional
wisdom. Accordingly, empirical critiques have a prominent place in comparative
politics, as do the theoretical critiques they enable.
Empirical Critiques: Using Deviant Cases
In testing hypotheses, we often hope to find evidence that supports a particular
theory. Specifically, we want to find cases that confirm or reaffirm our theory or
support our hypothesis. But many interesting advances come from empirical evi
dence that does not fit a theory well. Deviant cases—those that do not fit a
theory or are exceptions or outliers— are very important in advancing social sci
ence theory. These cases help us test out why a theory doesn’t work, and under
stand what improvements need to be made to our knowledge. They allow us to
make an empirical critique of a theory because they do not support it. Much
like getting a bad result on a certain test can encourage us to do better where we
fell short, so too a deviant case forces us to think about how to improve our
arguments.
Theoretical Critiques: Im proving Theories
and Hypotheses
Theoretical critiques are new ideas that improve upon the logic or reasoning of
existing theories. Theory and empirical evidence constantly interact, and where
deviant cases help provide an empirical critique, these can help us improve our
theories. They often provide the impetus for improvement of the theory.
Empirical critiques allow us to advance social science by pointing out anomalies,
inconsistencies, and deviations from a theory. Theoretical advances can also
come from critiques of the theory itself, through reexaminations of the logic,
assumptions, or arguments underpinning it. The following box gives an example
of how a theoretical critique emerged from empirical evidence that didn’t fit
a theory.
empirical critique An effort to
point to important evidence that
does not support a conventional
version of any given theory.
theoretical critique An effort
to show that a given theory has
logical limitations.
40 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
Empirical Critique: Ghana and Modernization Theory (see chapter 6)
Ghana is a low-income West African country that defies expectations by having a robust democracy. This presents an
intriguing challenge to the theory of modernization, which we
present further in chapter 6. Modernization theory holds that
democracy can be expected as a consequence of economic de
velopment, industrialization, education, and urbanization, all of
which contribute to the emergence of a middle class.16 While
Ghana is advancing on some of these criteria, the country clearly
is poor with a limited industrial base, low levels of education, and
only some recent urbanization. Yet it is a rather successful de
mocracy with free and fair elections and protections for citizens’
rights and liberties. Ghana thus becomes a very interesting case
to examine, precisely because it facilitates an empirical critique
of a prominent theory about democratization.
O f course, theories can also receive theoretical critiques from other scholars
who are not looking to refine and better them, but rather to offer an entirely dif
ferent theoretical perspective. This is certainly the case with the dependency
theory example, which has been challenged in many ways. For the comparative
analyst’s purposes, theoretical critiques can be favorable amendments to a theory,
or they can oppose a theory entirely.
Critiques help us craft better arguments and theories. First, they can improve
scope conditions The conditions our understanding of scope conditions, or the conditions under which an argu-
or range of cases for which an ment works. Identifying and examining cases that do not fit an argument is a
argument works. good potential avenue for further research. Second, critiques based on empirical
evidence can help improve our concepts and lead to clearer understanding of
what exactly we are studying. For instance, the tiny, oil-rich country of Equato
rial Guinea has grown rapidly to become one of the wealthiest countries in
Africa, but much of its wealth goes just to the dictator’s family. Studying this
empirical example might give us more insight into what exactly a country’s
“economic development” means. By identifying weaknesses in arguments and
offering alternative explanations, critiques give us better understandings of why
things happen.
Theoretical Critique: Dependency Theory in Latin America (see chapter 5)
From the 1940s to the 1960s, many leading scholars of Latin America argued that the continent suffered from economic
dependency relative to the world’s industrial powers. This “de
pendency theory” suggested that poor Latin American countries
essentially lost money, resources, and power to the wealthy and
powerful countries of the world. The image was of exploitation
of the poor countries on the world’s periphery by the rich “core”
countries. However, empirical evidence after World War II chal
lenged this theory, as countries such as Brazil managed to grow,
develop, and industrialize with some success. As a result, depen
dency theory received a theoretical critique from other scholars.
including Peter Evans and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo
Faletto. (Cardoso, incidentally, later became president of Brazil in
the 1990s.) This next generation of dependency theorists charac
terized the relationship between Latin America and the core
countries as one of “dependent development,” in which the con
tinent could develop and grow, but still in a subordinate position
that furthered its dependence on capital from the wealthy coun
tries. This theoretical critique came from the recognition that the
original dependency theory had a failing: It could not explain or
account for growth or progress in Latin America.
The Challenges of Measurement: Biases, Errors, and Validity 41
The Challenges of Measurement:
Biases, Errors, and Validity
The challenges of garnering and wielding evidence are multifaceted. Beyond de
termining how to gather evidence and which pieces to use, we must pay attention
to measures and indicators (elements or features suggesting underlying factors).
Without careful and thoughtful measurement, we may accidentally introduce
biases and errors into an analysis. Bias is a preference for one idea or perspective
over another, especially a preference that may result in unbalanced use of evi
dence or in analytical error.
Bias aside, it is possible to simply make measurement errors, such as by
typing the wrong number in a spreadsheet. This kind of error happens more often
than you might expect and sometimes in consequential ways. As a well-known
example, a spreadsheet data error in work by Harvard economists Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff produced erroneous results in highly influential
research about government debt and economic growth (note that this error was
discovered by a graduate student!).17 Less obvious might be how a measurement
cannot fully reflect what it is trying to measure. Most college students have taken
standardized tests such as the SAT or ACT, which attempt to measure overall
competence in math and language. Scores for most students will fluctuate from
one test to the next depending on the specific questions. Whatever their merits,
the tests thus have a degree of measurement error in conveying competence.
A second measurement problem is measurement bias. One example of bias
comes from respondents in a survey who are untruthful, whether consciously or
subconsciously.18 Another would be if the questions we ask people are interpreted
differently by different groups of respondents. Perhaps the most serious form of
bias for beginning researchers is seeking to confirm one’s favored hypothesis. This
can include a tendency to believe things are a certain way that we want to see them.
Imagine that a gung-ho capitalist student wants to show that countries with free
markets have performed better economically than countries that have more active
government involvement in the economy. The eager student knows that the United
States performed better than the U.S.S.R. in economic growth rates in the 1980s
and uses these cases to “prove” the hypothesis that less government involvement in
the economy is better for the economy. Subconsciously, the student may have
chosen those cases because he knew what he would find, and that it would support
his preference. But looking at the same question in other cases (say, Scandinavia or
Canada vs. African countries) might show very different results. The point is not
that the student is wrong—in fact, he may be correct—but that the student’s pre
conceptions biased the research. We must ask research questions and test hypoth
eses fairly, by ensuring the answer is not predetermined.
Even when researchers are careful not to bias their measures, we must con
sider the problem of measurement validity—that is, whether a given measure
effectively captures or represents what is being researched. Indicators that are
valid accurately reflect our concept. Informally, validity means measuring what
we claim we are measuring. In some cases, this is straightforward, and our mea
sures may be perfectly valid. To measure the “total number of political parties
represented in a legislature,” we may simply find a record of every member of the
indicator An element or feature
that indicates the presence of an
underlying factor.
bias A preference for one idea or
perspective over another, espe
cially a preference that may result
in unbalanced use of evidence or
in analytical error.
measurement error Either an
episodic error, such as improperly
recording data, or a systematic
error, meaning that a measurement
does not fully reflect what it is
designed to measure.
measurement bias A measure is
biased if it will not produce compa
rable results for all observations.
measurement validity Whether a
given measure effectively captures
or represents what we are
researching.
42 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
Measurement Validity Problems: Nationalism in Latin America
Complex concepts like those in comparative politics have real potential for problems of validity, and this is especially true
of cultural phenomena that are less subject to precise mea
surement. For example, Miguel Angel Centeno aimed to mea
sure levels of nationalism in several nineteenth-century Latin
American societies.19 For obvious reasons, nineteenth-century
Latin Americans cannot be surveyed (and there are limitations to
what surveys can reveal about identities in any case). Therefore,
Centeno needed to select indicators of national sentiment.
Among others, he chose the presence (or relative lack) of na
tional monuments. Is the presence of national monuments a
valid indicator of “nationalism” or “national sentiment”? To say
yes, we must suppose there is a relationship between national
sentiment and the construction of national monuments. Is this
assumption correct? If not, does this mean that we should disre
gard such imperfect indicators? There is often a tension between
measurement validity and our desire to have measures that are
objective and precise. The construction of monuments is rela
tively easy to measure, but it may not fully capture national senti
ment; on the other hand, measuring national sentiment by more
extensive accounts (say, from diaries and newspapers of the
time) may give us greater validity, but the measure may be fuzz
ier than the measure using monuments. We often must use ne
cessarily imperfect indicators, but we must remember their
limitations, and search for the best available measures.
legislature, note which party each member is from, then count the number of
distinct parties to which legislators belong. On the other hand, consider the
challenge of trying to measure overall health outcomes of a given country. Is life
expectancy the right measure for this? Or infant mortality rates (the percent of
infants that die before the age of two, e.g.)? Or rates of asthma, malaria, or HIV/
AIDS? In truth, each of these is a valid measure of something specific, but none
precisely measures “overall health.”
Several guidelines can help here. We should strive for valid measurement to
the greatest extent possible, but sometimes, when dealing with certain questions
and sets of data, we will have to work with imperfect indicators of the concepts
that interest us. We should explicitly state our reservations about our measures
when we present our work. This allows others to make their own judgments. In
addition, we should be mindful of how our measured variables relate to our con
cepts and questions. In your own research, you should ask yourself the following
two questions. First, can this actually be measured? Second, does this measure
actually correspond to the concept we are trying to study?
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY Qualities of Good Analysis and Argumentation
Comparative politics tests hypotheses and builds theories by using evidence and identifying causal relationships. Careful use of theory and evidence
allows a researcher to give a hypothesis a good test. The results of that test and
that research will lead to a thesis that can be well substantiated and compelling.
Good argumentation will avoid, or at least address, the problems of causal infer
ence and measurement shown in this chapter. We conclude the chapter with
some guidance for high-quality analysis in comparative politics.
Qualities of Good Analysis and Argumentation 43
Good arguments are generally good answers to good questions. It is nearly im
possible to have a good answer to a bad question. For this reason, we begin with
asking good questions. Good questions have a number of characteristics, among
them the following. First, good questions can be answered with evidence. The
question of why human beings form political societies is not a bad question for
political philosophers, but it is not an especially good question for comparative
politics, because it is virtually impossible to answer using empirical evidence.
Second, good questions are interesting. Questions can be interesting in several
ways. They may produce knowledge that is relevant to making policies and laws,
for example. But especially important is that they somehow contribute to existing
theories. Related to this, they should elicit curiosity, both from a potential audi
ence and from you, the analyst. Third, good questions can be answered, at least
in a preliminary but meaningful fashion, given the time and resources at your
disposal. Finally, good questions ask for causal explanations. They do not just ask
for descriptive accounts of processes, but they push us to explain why some phe
nomenon or phenomena has (or have) come to pass.
Step 1: Asking Good Questions: Why?
Step 2: Hypothesis Testing: Generating Good Hypotheses and Testing Them Fairly
The second set of issues for beginning comparative political analysis is formulat
ing an appropriate hypothesis and testing it with as little bias as possible. A hy
pothesis should be based upon clearly defined variables and concepts. To explain
why country X became a democracy, for example, we need a good definition for
democracy and how we know country X is a democracy. A good hypothesis will
typically be rooted in some existing theory from comparative politics. For ex
ample, can modernization theory (see chapters 5 and 6) offer a hypothesis for
why country X democratized? Good hypothesis testing often involves reading
theories and arguments about cases other than the one we are interested in. Gen
erating a hypothesis about democratization in country X may require us to read
theories and arguments not just about country X itself, but also about other coun
tries. Good hypothesis testing will not mean the researcher goes looking to prove
her/his own pet argument, picking and choosing evidence to make the point.
Once a hypothesis is formulated, it should receive a fair test from the researcher,
who can and should use the available evidence to weigh the proposed argument
and how well it works or does not.
Step 3: Balancing Argumentation: Evidence, Originality, and Meaningfulness
A final key to good comparative analysis is making meaningful claims and avoid
ing trivial arguments. If you are developing your own argument, you should offer
your own distinct hypothesis and then your own original claim based upon your
research. Self-evident and obvious arguments contribute much less to social sci
ence than arguments that are memorable. Ideally, you would like those hearing
your argument to think it is one “only this person would make in this way,” while
also thinking you have defended your argument well. Another way to put this is
to see that your argument produces new knowledge rather than reproducing old
knowledge. You do not want to replicate, copy, or transcribe others’ ideas; you
want to generate and defend your own.
44 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
Originality matters, but it must be balanced with a respect for existing know
ledge. Originality does not mean developing ridiculous and goofy arguments or
ignoring previous research. Serious evaluation of existing evidence is as important
in formulating one’s argument as it is in testing the hypothesis. Good comparative
analysis means more argumentation than pure description and more attention to
evidence than pure opinion. It is neither an opinion piece nor a book report about
a country. It represents a middle ground in which you have an argument where
original claims and interpretations are backed with evidence. Basing your argu
ment on significant reading and research will be the likeliest route to success.
There is no substitute for this research work. Indeed, original research is original
precisely because it contributes in helpful ways to an existing research tradition.
One challenge from extensive research is that there will frequently be multiple
variables that can be shown to have some impact on a particular outcome. For
instance, a country’s economic growth may be shown to depend upon the follow
ing: geographic location, relationship to the dominant powers in the world econ
omy, policies, leadership, culture, institutions, histories of colonialism, chance
and luck, and many other variables. It is important, however, to do more than
make a “laundry list” and simply say “all of these matter.” The challenge is to pri
oritize the variables that have the most significant and substantive impact on the
outcome. In the jargon, we call this being parsimonious, selecting the most im
portant variables and giving them pride of place in the argument.
Doing all of this will enable a researcher to engage with the larger scholarly
literature and the central debates in comparative politics. The strongest works of
comparative politics—the major books and articles in the field— are the product
of years of research work and refined thinking, but the basic process can be emu
lated by those new to the field. The best student work comes from analyses that
draw on diverse sources, including theoretical sources, to weigh the validity of
different claims, show competent understanding of relevant literature, build on
relevant concepts and theories, and highlight the individual’s unique synthesis
and contribution. This asks a great deal, and it requires practice, but our guidance
boils down to the suggestions in Table 2.1.
Comparative research requires considerable thought and planning, but it is also
best learned by doing. This comes from reading in the field to see how scholars
analyze politics, and by conducting one’s own research for papers, presentations,
t a b l e 2.1 G uidelines for Com parative Research
Guideline Step 1: A sk Good Questions Step 2: Test H ypotheses Step 3: Write Your Argum ent
Do the basics Ask open-ended why questions
about cause and effect.
Define concepts and
variables clearly.
Read and use the scholarly
literature on your topic.
Be original and informed Ask questions you do not know
the answer to before starting
your research.
Use theories from scholarly
books and articles to help
form hypotheses.
Aim for meaningful, original
claims, and avoid laundry lists of
factors that just “matter.”
T H IN K IN G 1
CO M P A R A TIV ELY J j
Consider the evidence Ask questions for which Be aware of your biases Use evidence and not opinion
evidence is available to test a and work from the to make your claims,
hypothesis. evidence, not assumptions.
Chapter Review 45
r T H IN K IN G
^CO M PA R A TIV ELY
exams, or other outputs. The remainder of the book will help provide you with this
practice. In the next chapters, we turn to the major themes of comparative politics
and use these to work on the process of formulating and generating questions,
hypotheses, arguments, and theories. We provide some of the requisite knowledge
of these topics, and examples of quality research, while pushing you to analyze
comparative politics on your own.
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses,
and Evidence
Social scientists use theories, hypotheses, and evidence to
build arguments about how the world operates. Theories are
general explanations of how empirical phenomena operate
across a range of cases. They are typically backed by some
evidence. Hypotheses are potential explanations of cause
and effect for specific cases. They are designed to be tested
using evidence and are often derived from theories.
Hypothesis Testing
• The central practice in comparative politics is testing hy
potheses about causal questions using empirical evidence.
This involves measuring variables and seeing how variables
correlate across cases.
• Variables that correlate with one another may have a causal
relationship, but not necessarily.
• There are several fallacies and logical traps to avoid when
making causal arguments about correlated variables, to
include reverse causation, omitted variables, intervening
variables, and spurious correlation.
Critiques: Using Theory and Evidence
Political science can advance by developing critiques of
existing theories and arguments. Critiques can be empiri
cal, based on demonstrating cases that do not fit a theory,
or can be more purely theoretical by using reason and logic
to show problems with a theory.
The Challenge of Measurement:
Errors, Biases, and Validity
Measurement is a leading challenge facing comparative
political scientists. Comparativists aim to avoid measure
ment errors and biases, and seek to ensure that measures
are valid, or measure what they claim to measure.
Th in kin g Com paratively
Good practices in comparative politics include asking
causal “Why” questions, developing unbiased hypothesis
tests, and making arguments that are original yet informed
by an understanding of existing theories and findings.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. Considering the examples of problems with causal arguments
in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, come up with your own examples of
omitted-variable problems in the real world.
2. Considering the theory of modernization, which holds (among
other things) that wealth is likely to lead to democracy, what
sorts of countries would you seek out if you wanted to test the
theory on deviant cases? Think of some examples, or do some
preliminary research online that will help you identify some.
3. What are some examples of measurement problems that you
could foresee if you were to conduct a study of how a country’s
culture affects its wealth?
4. What beliefs do you have about politics that you think are rooted
in a theory? For example, do you have beliefs about how politi
cians tend to behave, the media’s role in politics, or the likelihood
that student activists can “change the world”? If so, consider what
you think the theory is, and contemplate it in light of this chapter.
What are the achievements and shortcomings of the theory?
5. Ask yourself what puzzles you about politics or social life in a
certain country (perhaps including the United States). Now try
to develop a hypothesis for a possible answer that would ex
plain the puzzle. How could you develop a research plan that
would allow you to gather evidence and test your hypothesis?
• Egyptian police and soldiers outside a voting center in 2011. The m ilitary and police shape the development and functioning of the state in critical ways.
I n the years just after World W ar II, many observers thought of the W estern
European state system as fairly settled. It was in this region that the idea of
modern states had first developed. The consolidation of states’ power was
high, even in cases like Germany and Italy, which unified only in the late
nineteenth century. A nd despite the 1945 split of Germany into East and
West, followed by its reunification several decades later, the European states
on the whole seemed likely to persist into the distant future.
But at least two recent developments have called into ques
tion the stability of the W estern European system of nation
states. The first is the movement over the second h a lf of the
twentieth century toward European integration, beginning
with the European common market and culminating in the
creation of the European Union (EU). Some have wondered
whether a European “super-state” might form, and others have
made arguments for and against this possibility.1 The second
development is the notable presence of secessionist and sub
state nationalist movements in the region, perhaps most nota
bly in Catalonia (an area on the Mediterranean coast of Spain)
and Scotland (which is part of the United Kingdom). In the
fall of 2014 Scotland held a referendum on becoming indepen
dent from the United Kingdom. The referendum failed, but
some of its supporters are undaunted. Similarly, many in Cata
lonia are hopeful of forming an independent state in the future.
Could such developments gather steam? I f Catalonia or Scot
land successfully forms a new state, will others in the region
follow in its wake? To answer such questions, we must under
stand the processes through which states have been formed
and, before that, the characteristic features of modern states.
It is impossible to understand modern politics without un
derstanding the state. It is states that are authoritarian or dem
ocratic, and it is states that exhibit the institutional features
such as executives and legislatures that we discuss later in this book. It is
states that groups with national identities and other political identities aim to
influence and control, and that social movements and revolutions aim to
transform. States are key factors in economic development, and they shape the
experiences of citizens, residents, and still other individuals. Finally, states
IN THI S C H A P T E R
Concepts 48
The Modern State 48
State Capacity 49
Failed States 50
The State-Society Relationship 50
Types 52
Characteristics of Modern States 52
Traditional Functions of States 55
Causes and Effects: Why Did States
Em erge and Expand? 57
Political/Conflict Theories 58
Economic Theories 60
Cultural Theories 61
Diffusion Theories 62
T HI NKI NG C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
Great Britain, the United Kingdom , or
Neither? State and Nation in England
and Scotland 65
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Mexico
Nigeria
France • United Kingdom
48 Chapter 3: The State
state The most important form of
political organization in modern
politics, which, in its ideal form, is
characterized by centralized con
trol of the use of force, bureaucratic
organization, and the provision of
a number of public goods.
are the central characters in the story of international politics: Even in this
rapidly globalizing world in which non-state and transnational actors are in
creasingly important, the state remains perhaps the most important and pow
erful force.
But what is the state? W here do states come from, and what does this tell
us about their character and likely future? W h at do states do? How do they
differ from one another, and why are some strong and others weak or even
failed states? These are the questions we begin to answer in this chapter and
those that follow.
• * •
Concepts
Analysts of comparative politics do not always agree completely on the defini
tions of words such as state or development or democracy. Often, though, there is a
sort of lowest common denominator, an agreed-on general idea about what a
concept covers. W ith respect to the state— and here we focus on the modern state
that evolved over the last several centuries2~this lowest common denominator is
the classic definition posited almost a century ago by Max Weber: The state is the
central political institution that exerts a “monopoly on the legitimate use of phys
ical force within a given territory.”3 Note that by “legitimate” Weber means rec
ognized by members of the society in question as generally justified. Political
scientists do not themselves decide what is or is not “legitimate.”
W hat does Weber’s definition mean? Definitions work, in part, by telling us
what something is not. W hat is a state not? Well, it is clear from this definition
that a political arena with many distinct actors using legitimate force would not
be a state. Consider a scenario of anarchy, for example, the famous “war of all
against all.” I f a society has no central authority that can use force, then perhaps
anyone can. In such a society, individuals need to either acquire the ability to use
force themselves or make an arrangement with someone who can. I f they do not,
they remain vulnerable to the threat that someone else could harm them, and
without some higher authority, they have no one to turn to. Yet the diversity of
political societies is not limited to the extremes of anarchic systems and modern
states. Indeed, there are many intermediary types.
The M odem State
We begin by comparing the modern state to another sort of political society that
was not anarchic, but in which a nonstate order was present: European feudalism
in the medieval era.4 In the feudal political order, hierarchical ties linked peasants,
at the bottom, to kings, who at least nominally sat at the top (in tenuous balance
with the church), with a nobility mediating between them. In the feudal order,
however, kings were understood to be the greatest among nobles, and their rule
over the population of their kingdoms was mostly indirect. There was little stan
dardized taxation, there were few standing armies, and the king’s administration
Concepts 49
did not provide meaningful public services. Peasants in such a system were un
likely to find recourse against local nobles by petitioning the king.5 Achieving
such recourse was not impossible in principle, but the organizational capacity of
the system typically made it unfeasible. Most people traveled very little, and the
authority to which they were subjected was local, and often arbitrary. Law was
present, but rule o f law, referring to a political system in which the law is consis
tently applied equally to all, was not. No single, centralized authority could claim
to control the legitimate use of force.6 Indeed, it was considered legitimate for a
variety of actors to exert force, and not just because such authority had been del
egated to them.7 The king’s authority was rivaled by both the authority of the
church and the nobility.
Now think about the state you live in (and by this, of course, we mean your
country). Imagine an incident of violence taking place within this state. Is that
violence considered legitimate or illegitimate? This will depend on who is doing
it and why. I f it is your neighbor, and he or she holds no official position, chances
are the violence is illegitimate. W hat about a police officer subduing a violent
suspect? W hat is critical here is that all of the use of force considered legitimate
in a society ultimately traces its legitimacy back to the state. In other words, in a
society with a state, violence is tremendously concentrated in the military and
law enforcement agencies.8 This means that in well-functioning states, interper
sonal violence is likely lower than in other systems: States with high capacity
limit and control interpersonal violence, to the extent that citizens of well-
functioning states are often able to ignore what little interpersonal violence is
present. This does not mean, though, that states with high levels of capacity are
nonviolent. Rather, they represent the greatest concentration of the capacity to
exert force that the world has ever known.9
So far we have used a fairly minimal definition of the state. It is worth noting
that there are other important features of modern states, which we discuss fur
ther later in the chapter, including their bureaucratic type of organization, their
impersonality, and above all the fact that they claim sovereignty. Moreover,
states aim to do many things, and as time passes these actions of the state get in
corporated into our idea of what a state is.
State C apacity
State capacity is the measurement of a state’s ability to accomplish its goals.10 In
general, today we would say that a state has high capacity when (1) it has established
a monopoly on the use of force; (2) it has a properly functioning bureaucracy,
with relatively low levels of corruption and irregularity, accomplishing tasks such
as coordinating defense, maintaining infrastructure, and managing projects in
education and public health; and (3) rule of law is maintained, producing a pre
dictable and manageable environment for citizens as they go about their business.
To do this it must successfully generate revenue, usually by taxing its population,
a task more difficult than you might imagine.11
As we will see later, the goals that states have taken on have increased over
time.12 Because the list of states’ necessary activities is a moving target, so is the
definition of “state capacity”: A state that would have been considered to have
high capacity in the late seventeenth century, such as the English or French state
rule of law A system that imposes
regularized rules in a polity, with
key criteria including equal rights,
the regular enforcement of laws,
and the relative independence of
the judiciary.
modern state A concept used to
distinguish states in the modern
world from earlier forms of political
centralization; it includes features
such as extensive bureaucracy,
centralization of violence, and
impersonality.
state capacity The ability of the
state to achieve its objectives,
especially the abilities to control
violence, effectively tax the popula
tion, and maintain well-functioning
institutions and the rule of law.
50 Chapter 3: The State
failed state A state that cannot
or does not perform its expected
functions.
of that time, would today be considered weak or to have low capacity. For ex
ample, seventeenth-century France—unquestionably a strong state with high
capacity in its historical context—did not provide (or aim to provide) public edu
cation, but today this is considered a key function of states. A state that fails at
doing so is now considered to have lower capacity than a state that succeeds.
Another way to think about this would be to see states as moving along a con
tinuum of stateness.13 In other words, rather than thinking of state or non-state as
a dichotomous (“yes” or “no”) variable, we could think of stateness as a quality of
a given political order: State capacity, from this point of view, is the degree to
which a political order has achieved stateness.
Failed States
As with many other concepts, scholars do not always agree about how to precisely
define and measure failed states, but, put simply, states fail when their capacity
declines to a certain point. So a failed state is one that cannot or does not do what
states are conventionally supposed to do. Perhaps the clearest example in recent
years has been Somalia, where the state as such is just one actor among many. Rival
groups, essentially large gangs, control their own territory and battle over it at the
margins. Public service provision is minimal where it exists at all. We will examine
failed states at greater length in the next chapter on political economy.
The S ta te -S o cie ty Relationship
We have said that the state is fundamental to understanding modern politics. At
the same time, it is important to remember that the state is part of society. It does
not exist outside or above the society but is one among many organizations. “So
ciety” can be thought of as the set of webs of ties that connect people to each
other. In other words, it can be thought of as a space created by lots of different
overlapping social networks. So society is composed of webs of friendships, pro
fessional linkages, voluntary groups and religious organizations, media ties, and
many other structured systems of relationships. In these patterns of overlapping
networks, power is distributed. In modern societies, formally organized power is,
as we have seen, concentrated in the state. But in most modern societies, despite
the state’s concentration of formal power, there is a great deal of political activity
that is not controlled by state actors. We need to be able to take this activity into
account.
W hen political scientists speak of the state-society relationship, they imply
that the modern state is partially autonomous and is situated in relationships
with other actors, and that these relationships are important to study. Why? Be
cause sets of relationships with other actors affect the state’s goals and constrain
its policy options and, thus, its actions. These relationships also have implica
tions for those other actors, and especially for participants in “civil society,”
which we discuss further later in the chapter. W hen we say that the state is par
tially autonomous we mean that it is not subject to the total control of other
organizations. Instead, it tends to serve as a base to control those other organiza
tions. For example, before the creation of modern states in Europe, the political
institutions that preceded them (confusingly, also often called “states”) existed
in dynamic tension with the Catholic Church. In essence, these organizations
Concepts 51
shared sovereignty in complicated and even contradictory ways. Modern states,
though, tend to be more autonomous from religious organizations, as we explore
more fully in chapter 15.
So the state is part of society more broadly, but in many modern societies it
assumes a kind of directing role, coordinating key forms of collective action
within it. In well-institutionalized states, non-state actors do not declare wars,
for example, or otherwise usurp the state’s roles and functions. And when crises
emerge, populations often turn to states, demanding that they address those
crises and often holding them accountable if they do not. Societal actors can also
attempt to remake aspects of the state itself. Democratic states institutionalize
mechanisms that aim to allow for the regular and peaceful participation of
the citizenry in coordinating state action. W hen this does not work, as we shall
see in chapter 12, social movements, insurgencies, and even revolutions can
emerge from society to constrain or transform the state and its activities. Many
analysts believe, though, that revolutionary transformation is very rare in strong
states, and in particular in strong democratic states.14
The quality, strength, and type of state are not the only important factors in this
connection. Many scholars think that countries have different degrees and types of
civil society with different organizations, networks of social actors, media, and
customs and habits of organizing, talking, and meeting. Scholars do not all agree
about how precisely to define civil society, but most use this term to mean some
thing like a space relatively autonomous from state coercion within which people
can deliberate and strategize about matters that have political implications. Orga
nizationally, civil society can be thought of as housed in labor unions, in social
clubs and other voluntary groups, in churches, mosques, and synagogues, and in
many other such sites. From a networks perspective, we can see civil society as de
pendent on the existence of dense and transitive ties that are not fully embedded in
the arms of the state. In other words, civil society depends on the possibility of lots
of us being able to know and communicate with each other, without those ex
changes being predominantly coordinated (or limited) by state actors.
These civil society organizations and networks allow groups of citizens to
analyze politics and make claims on the state.15 According to many scholars,
strong civil society accompanies strong states with well-institutionalized democ
racies, but it is more problematic for authoritarian states, which will often seek to
co-opt or even eliminate citizen activities of this sort.16 This is intuitive: an au
thoritarian state’s position is strengthened to the extent that potential rivals do
not have the organizational capacity to challenge it. For this reason, many polit
ical scientists believe that proponents of democratization would do well to invest
in civil society: for example, by subsidizing a diverse array of organizations or by
trying to help lay the infrastructure for dense and transitive networks to form.
Moreover, this is not just a theory, but a policy that has been put in practice by
many groups and organizations, including the (U.S.-government-funded) Na
tional Endowment for Democracy, the World Bank, and the United States
Agency for International Development.
Other scholars take a different view, seeing “strong societies” as potential ob
stacles to the formation of strong states.17W hy might this be so? Think again for
a moment about the key characteristics of modern states, described previously.
civil society A space in society
outside of the organization of the
state, in which citizens come
together and organize themselves.
52 Chapter 3: The State
bureaucracy A form of organiza
tion that, in its ideal form, has indi
viduals operating and working
under established, specified, and
complex rules.
States concentrate power, enforce laws, and distribute resources. As such, the
creation of modern states almost always produces considerable struggle, particu
larly between state-builders and other actors who are relatively well off (in terms
of power or other resources) in a pre-state or weak-state environment. Well-
organized networks or clusters of actors in society can often resist state-building
efforts by leveraging their power to avoid taxation, the full application of the rule
of law, or the extension of rights and privileges to other groups. However, propo
nents of the view that civil society leads to stronger, more democratic states
would argue that these sorts of groups are not what they mean by “civil society.”
This realization may lead us to develop our concept of civil society a bit further.
Perhaps the concept applies only when there is a certain amount of openness. If
isolated and exclusive organizations resist the state for the sake of their minority
interests, perhaps that’s not “civil society,” which may be found only when par
ticipation and public deliberation is broad based and egalitarian.
In general, we could say that strong, democratic states tend to be relatively
autonomous from civil society but nevertheless responsive to citizens. Para
doxically, many of the strongest states might be those that are self-limiting in a
lot of key ways. Weak states are often simultaneously less autonomous and less
responsive to the broader citizenry. Weak states do not necessarily refrain from
intervening in economy and society: rather, they tend to intervene often but ir
regularly and unpredictably. And strong states sometimes help societies solve
problems of collective action, providing “public goods” that would be impossible
for individuals in large-scale societies to produce on their own.18 Nonetheless, a
debate continues about whether having a “strong society” that is influential and
wields political power correlates with a “strong state” or a “weak state.”19
Types
As noted earlier, states have many other characteristics besides exerting a mon
opoly on the legitimate use of force. In the discussion that follows, we focus first
on several key characteristics of states and next on state functions.
Characteristics of Modern States
States are defined in part by characteristics such as a bureaucratic mode of orga
nization, impersonality, and the claim of sovereignty. Here we discuss each of
these in turn.
B ureaucracy
W hen you read the word bureaucracy you might think of the Department of
Motor Vehicles or maybe even one of the offices at the college or university where
you are taking this course. There is a pretty good chance that the word does not
conjure up images of efficiency, rationality, and precision, but rather of frustra
tion, delay, and inefficiency. Yet social scientists think of at least some bureaucra
cies as ideal—typically efficient and rational.
Organizations are bureaucratic when they have a rational, universally applic
able system, administered on the basis of rules and by office holders.20 Bureau
cracies are, in their ideal form, impersonal and transparent. In other words, in a
Types 53
well-functioning bureaucracy, those rules are available for all to see. Think about
the Department of Motor Vehicles. There is a good chance that you, or at least
people you know, have a driver’s license and had to pass through bureaucratic
channels in order to acquire it. Your receipt of your license was probably not de
pendent on, for example, who you are related to, the whims of your examiner, or
the paying of a bribe. And you probably couldn’t just go to your friend the mayor
and ask him or her to give you a license rather than dealing with the appropriate
bureaucratic authority. Instead, there is a clearly stipulated set of rules governing
who can and cannot receive licenses and also governing who can and cannot
make judgments about who has satisfied the appropriate conditions. O f course,
the individual who takes you out for your practice test has the ability to exercise
a bit of personal judgment—perhaps you roll ever so slightly through a stop sign
and he or she is feeling generous and lets it slide—but this personal judgment is
sharply delimited: The examiner cannot declare that since you are so nice you get
a special license that also allows you to fly a plane, for example.
Now, why would anyone want a bureaucratic system? Going to the Depart
ment of Motor Vehicles is notoriously painful and frustrating, and working there
is probably not much better. Ironically, our common perception that bureaucra
cies are inefficient is partly a consequence of their working well. Granted, some
times this perception is true— sometimes bureaucracies really are poorly run and
inefficient—and even well-functioning bureaucracies will often lead to frustra
tion. But the key issue is the ends or goals toward which bureaucracies are ori
ented. W hen we say that bureaucracies are efficient, we mean that they are the
most efficient way to organize collective action in pursuit o f common projects. Think
of the military as an example. Wars are not conducted on the basis of the whims
of individual troops but rather through their bureaucratically organized action.
A well-functioning bureaucracy is like a system of levers linking a leader or group
at the top of an organizational hierarchy to a large number of individual actors
lower down (see Figure 3.1). Bureaucracies turn the people who hold offices into
instruments for the realization of goals set higher up in the organization. I f this
mode of organizing collective action still seems inefficient to you, imagine ad
ministering a welfare program or a health care system, or waging a war, through
non-bureaucratic channels.
Modern states are, pure and simple, much more bureaucratic than other, older,
political organizations. This feature of modern states—combined with their un
precedented abilities to extract resources (in the form of taxes) from the popula
tions subjected to their control—helps explain their efficacy and power. Note that
states with less functional bureaucracies necessarily have far lower state capacity.
Im p e rso n ality
Modern states are also more impersonal than many other political organiza
tions.21 This feature is related to their bureaucratic character but not reducible to
it. W hen we say that they are impersonal, we mean that they are not closely iden
tified with the personality of an individual.
You might find this a bit confusing. Don’t we pay an awful lot of attention to
our presidents and prime ministers? And haven’t there been some societies with
modern states in which cults of personality center on individual dictators, such as
impersonality A quality attribu
ted by some scholars to modern
states, which are presumed to be
less likely to be identified with the
personalities of their leaders.
54 Chapter 3: The State
citizenship A form of relationship
between the state and individuals
subject to its control, in which
citizens have certain basic rights
and are in some way represented
in the state.
sovereignty The key way the
authority of the modern state is
conceptualized: states are under
stood to be the ultimate authority
within their specifically demarcated
territories.
Figure 3.1 This is a simplified model of how a bureaucratic structure can achieve the
coordination of complex tasks carried out by individual office-holders. Imagine that this
organization’s mission requires the coordinated performance of nine complex tasks. How
difficult might it be to accomplish these tasks in the absence of bureaucratic organization?
Kim Jong-un of North Korea? Indeed, both of these things are true, and the im
personal character of the modern state is a matter of degree. Think of the differ
ence, though, between the type of legitimacy accorded a president of the United
States and that accorded a king in a pre-modern kingdom. Imagine what would
happen if the President of the United States, for example, were to declare that the
Constitution is just a manifestation of his or her will, or that the country is his or
her personal possession. The point is not that a modern state has never had such a
leader but that such claims are rare and typically regarded as illegitimate.
This same impersonality is extended to the treatment of the general popula
tion. The ideal-typical modern state treats members of the population as citizens,
meaning that it regards them as essentially equal in terms of their political role
and rights. Modem states tend to offer fewer special privileges to individuals
based on who they are. O f course, there are still elite cliques in modern states, and
the mere fact that these states formally treat citizens impersonally does not eradi
cate preference or discrimination based on personal characteristics.
Sovereignty
The third key dimension of modern states that we consider here is sovereignty. The
concept of sovereignty has several overlapping meanings. The two most important,
though, are (1) sovereignty as the control over some territory and (2) sovereignty
as the source of legitimate authority.22 O f course, these two meanings are related,
and they derive partly from the basic feature of the state—that it exerts a monopoly
on the use of force.
As states developed, the relationship between political organizations and ter
ritory changed in important ways. Before modern statehood, boundaries tended
to be very permeable. For example, the Pyrenees M ountains (which separate
France and Spain) were once a kind of informal division, a shared space across
which people easily moved back and forth, blurring the differences between sub
jects of the French and Spanish kings. After the rise of modern states, however,
the frontier was redefined as a formal boundary, and the population became fixed
as citizens of either France or Spain.23 Today, the boundaries between state ter
ritories are sharply delineated.
Related to this territorial distinction is the notion that the state holds ultimate
authority within its territorial zone. States are sovereign not only because they
can exercise constraining force but because they can act in other ways as well.
They can tax, organize the citizenry, and produce a variety of public services.
Territoriality is a key principle in doing so, and territorial disputes have been
quite common in the history of the state system. Sometimes such disputes are
settled by violence and other times by diplomacy. International recognition is
typically a key feature of sovereignty. That is, it is difficult for a state to maintain
claims about its sovereignty over a given territory if other states do not recognize
its sovereignty.
This characteristic leads us to a further consideration of the question of what
states do. As we have said, states have a tendency to acquire more roles and func
tions over time, and so it is ultimately impossible to construct an exhaustive list
of the state’s activities. But in the contemporary world we can observe a number
of particularly important ones, several of which we discuss next.
Traditional Functions of States
States provide defense against external threats, police internal threats, tax their
citizens, and document and sort populations, in addition to managing the econ
omy. (We discuss additional key functions of modern states in the domain of
political economy in the next chapter.)
D efense
A first key function of states is the coordination of military action, ostensibly, at
least, to protect the citizenry against potential foreign threat. As we shall see
later, this feature of states, like taxation, was a key component in their emer
gence. Moreover, it is one of the most visible tasks of states. Modern states tend
to have highly organized, bureaucratized, permanent military organizations.
Flow, precisely, the military is positioned within the state varies. As we shall see
in later chapters, in some instances military officials are key players in state deci
sion making. In others, civilian control is well institutionalized.24 This is often
very important, because if civilian control is not well institutionalized one often
sees a higher incidence of coups d’etat, and the political instability generated by
such events can have important short- and long-run effects. Even in societies
with relatively well-established civilian control of the army, however, the mili
tary remains a potentially important actor within most modern states.
Policing
States do not just establish and maintain militaries for use in conducting foreign
policy. They also establish organizations to police their societies internally. States
that do this effectively have well-institutionalized rule of law and transparent
56 Chapter 3: The State
V 1 r a illlm
a
The Mexican State and Ruie of Law PAGE 504
Mexico is a country that has had varying success in terms of state-
building. In recent years, rule-of-iaw issues have been of special
concern. The Mexican government has made an effort to crack
down on organized crime, leading to high levels of violence. The
causes of this violence, and the policies that might reduce it, are
subject to much debate.
For more on rule of law in Mexico, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 504-505. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. Is Mexico really likely to become a failed state, as some
have worried, or is this fear hyperbole? Why or why not?
2. Does the United States play a role in Mexico’s recent dif
ficulties in maintaining rule of law? If so, how?
judicial procedures.25 Again, this characteristic of states is related to the core
aspect of their definition discussed previously: Policing is one of the key mecha
nisms through which the monopoly on force is maintained. Sometimes this role
is shared with the military. For example, a number of states use national guards
to provide internal security. More generally, the organizational and administra
tive arrangement of policing varies a lot, and how these functions are organized
has much to do with how a country’s specific political institutions are structured,
as we discuss in later chapters.
States also create and maintain systems of punishment linked to the police
and judicial systems. Some states continue to use physically violent forms of pun
ishment, such as the death penalty. States typically use incarceration as a key
strategy, though they vary quite considerably in the frequency and extent of im
prisonment. The United States, for example, incarcerates an astonishingly high
percentage of its population, in relative terms.26 States also vary considerably in
the quality of their prison systems. Some scholars have emphasized the centrality
of systems of policing and incarceration in creating the modern state.27
T ax atio n
To perform the basic functions just discussed (defense and policing) among other
responsibilities, states need money. Taxation is thus among the key roles of states.
The state’s very existence is dependent on taxation, and strong states tend to be
those that tax their citizenry successfully and efficiently.28 The reason is perhaps
obvious: In many societies, at least, the state is not mainly in the business of
producing goods for sale on the market and therefore it is dependent on revenues
generated by economic activity that takes place outside of the state.
Although funding their own activities is crucial for states, efficient taxation
serves other purposes as well. States with high levels of capacity often encourage
citizens to feel that they are contributors to the state’s collective projects via
paying taxes. Without effective taxation, citizens may feel disconnected from
the state, regarding it as an alien organizational force or seeing it simply as a dis
tributor of resources. O f course, inefficient and arbitrary taxation—or taxation
perceived to outweigh individual and collective benefits—can likewise generate
alienation and opposition.
Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand?
The processes through which the earliest modern states established systems of
effective taxation were arduous and often violent. A number of early social and
political revolutions were, at least in part, responses to centralizing states’ efforts to
extract more resources.29 Today, many societies in the developing world continue
to experience taxation difficulties, and the situation is often a catch-22: Weak
states have trouble taxing their citizenry, but they cannot become stronger until
they do. These problems are sometimes exacerbated in developing states that are
rich in natural resources. In such instances, leaders may avoid the political con
flicts involved in trying to increase taxes, because they can instead rely on revenues
from exports of those resources. This situation, sometimes called the “resource
curse,” is seldom good for the long-term development of state or society.30
O rd e r, A d m in is tra tio n , a n d “L e g ib ility ”
Modern states also carry out some less obvious ordering practices. Given the
challenges of administering complex societies, most states gather considerable
information about their territory and about their population. Both state and pri
vate actors invest heavily in maps and in the demarcation of different types of
territory. For example, public lands might be administered by the state, private
lands regulated, and other forms of land ownership (e.g., communal land owner
ship, in a number of historical and contemporary cases) transformed into one or
the other. The use of private property is often subjected to considerable regula
tion. Sales and purchases of lands, houses, and businesses are tracked, and zoning
laws proscribe certain uses of each.
States also go to great expense to learn about their populations. Public ser
vices are often contingent on government registration, and states often try to
bestow services on some and withhold them from others (this includes access not
just to the state’s resources but, in the case of migrant populations, to its terri
tory). In the process, various statuses (e.g., citizen, legal resident, migrant, and so
forth) are bestowed on different individuals. Population surveys and censuses
enumerate residents, document their characteristics, and sometimes even catalog
their beliefs and values. Scholars like James Scott have referred to this as the pro
cess through which states render their populations “legible,” by which they mean
knowable and, as such, amenable to centralized administration.31 Some scholars
emphasize that these efforts to render populations “legible” sometimes lead to
the creation and perpetuation of consequential social and political categories, for
better and worse.32 On the one hand, being able to categorize and know about
the populace may make it possible to deliver needed public services more effi
ciently. On the other hand, the process of viewing society through certain cate
gories (which Scott called “seeing like a state”) can lead to states micro-managing
society in ways that are intrusive and counterproductive.
Causes and Effects: Why Did States
Emerge and Expand?
In this section we consider a core explanatory question about the rise of the
modern state: W hy did states emerge in the first place and become the dominant
form of political organization around the world? In other words, why do we live
58 Chapter 3: The State
state system The condition that
many of the most important actors
in international relations are states,
which can be understood as syste-
mically linked to one another.
in a world dominated by states? In 1500 there were few if any strong states, and
none that had the capabilities of contemporary states. Today all large-scale so
cieties try to have states, and therefore at least nominally do. This is perhaps
the most important change in modern global politics, and is in need of causal
explanation.
Several major theories of the modern state concentrate on trying to explain
the rise of states as such, while others seek to explain the rise of the state system
and its global diffusion from early modern Europe to the rest of the world. We
begin with the first set of theories, which includes political/conflict theories, eco
nomic theories, and cultural theories of the state.
Political/Conflict Theories
Political or conflict theories of the state argue that the state’s rise was a conse
quence of conflict. One set of such explanations, rooted in classical political
theory, tries to explain the state as essentially a compromise between warring
factions.33 These theories tend to be abstract, and they may be influenced by their
close linkage to political theories that aim to justify the state. You may have heard
of Thomas Hobbes’ idea that a strong state, manifested in “the sovereign,” is
needed to keep internal conflict at bay.34 Some scholars see the state as having
developed as a sort of predatory institution through which stronger actors as
serted their dominance and extracted resources from others.35 Some, in turn,
focus on predation as a case of state failure: In these cases what we need to ex
plain in the rise of strong states is how predation is minimized or restrained.36
The Arrival o f Napoleon Bonaparte at Schloss Schdnbrunn, engraved by Aubertin, c. 1820.
According to conflict theories of the state, under certain conditions war making can help states
grow stronger. It encourages the state’s ability to extract revenue, its ability to mobilize the
population, and its capacity to exert the Weberian monopoly on legitimate force.
Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand? 59
__ S I
CASE IN CONTEXT ‘ ‘ ■’ ^ ■ . ‘ – A c ^ : «§
J The State in France p a g e 434
France was one of the earliest strong states in Europe and came
to be the region’s great power in the seventeenth century.
Indeed, under the Bourbon kings in the seventeenth and eigh
teenth centuries, it was the foremost example of royal absolut
ism. As such, it figures prominently in many accounts of the
state’s rise. It is a central case in most of the major theories of the
state’s emergence discussed in this chapter.
For more on the French state, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 434-435. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What would the bellicist theory say about French state
formation?
2. What are some of the distinctive features of the state in
France?
The authors of some of these theories of the state have tried to trace the actual
historical development of the state as an organization. A much-cited version of
this theory is the “bellicist theory of the state,” which holds that states are cre
ated by war.37 The core idea is that for states to rise they have to figure out how to
do three things. First, political administration must be at least partly centralized.
In the first states that emerged in Europe, this meant that feudalism had to go.
Second, extraction of revenues from the underlying population must be dramati
cally enhanced. Administering a modern state costs lots of money, and until the
state gets good at taxing its citizenry it cannot do very much. Third, the state
must develop the ability to mobilize the population in collective endeavors.
According to proponents of the bellicist theory, warfare is particularly useful
for all three tasks, particularly once innovations in military technology changed
conflict so as to make large armies necessary.38 I f frequent foreign warfare takes
place, states need to increase their revenue generation and to mobilize important
elements of their populations in order to win. The threat posed by total warfare
also presumably helps to convince otherwise unwilling individuals to make these
sorts of sacrifices. In the process, such warfare undermines the power of non
state actors like a military nobility. In medieval Europe, where knights were the
main combatants, the upper nobility’s control of related resources ensured them
great power. But military innovations like advanced archery and gunpowder “de
mocratized” warfare in a certain sense, also rendering it far more costly, requir
ing large-scale collective efforts and revenue extraction.39
Essentially, the bellicist theory argues that warfare forges strong states. One
of the virtues of the theory is that it seems able to account for the particular his
torical trajectory of Europe in the global comparative context. For many scholars,
the fact that strong states developed first in Europe is a mystery, precisely because
of the relative backwardness of Europe in preceding centuries when you compare
it to great civilizations like China or the Islamic world.40 Indeed, these other
civilizations had developed complex, bureaucratic, imperial structures that in
many respects looked like modern states. But according to the bellicist theory,
the very dominance of these organizations helps explain why strong modern
states did not first develop in Asia or the Middle East: These large empires did
not face frequent interstate “total wars” against their rivals, though they did face
bellicist theory Theory associa
ted with scholars such as Charles
Tilly, who argue that interstate wars
were decisive in the creation of the
modern state.
60 Chapter 3: The State
IN SIG H T S
Coercion, Capital, and European States
by Charles Tilly
Tilly is the most famous exemplar of the bellicist theory of the state, as epitomized by his phrase from an earlier book: “War
made the state and the state made war.’41 He explains why
modern states replaced previous structures, as well as why the
form of this change differed across cases. Tilly finds that warfare is
the critical driver of state-building because war demands extrac
tion of resources from the population and complex administra
tive systems. Modern state development took three forms.
“Coercion-intensive” formation came in Russia, an agrarian soci
ety with little commercial development and little concentrated
capital, where the Czars used coercion to force their population
to fund wars by producing agricultural surplus. “Capital-intensive”
state-building in the Netherlands and some Italian city-states
came as monarchs borrowed funds from merchants and paid for
mercenary armies. “Capitalized coercion” came in Britain and
France and was based on capital accumulation in large towns like
London and Paris, combined with large rural populations that
could also be coerced to produce rents. According to Tilly, this
last model produced the strongest modern states.42 Competi
tion eventually produced modern states in all of these cases be
cause states proved better at fighting wars than other forms of
government.
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992.
Oxford Blackwell, 1992.
plenty of conflicts. Europe’s backwardness—the fact that it was internally di
vided with small, petty kingdoms endlessly fighting each other—meant that for
several centuries the forming European states were essentially constantly at war.
As a result, according to this theory, they developed into powerful war-fighting
machines, and their rulers effectively established the ability to tax and mobilize
the population, marginalizing their rivals in the process. Some proponents of
this theory have even used it to try to explain relatively weak state structures
elsewhere. For example, one has argued that the allegedly weak states of Latin
America may be due to the fact that Latin American states almost never fight
foreign wars.43 The theory has also been used to try to explain Africa’s relatively
weak states.44
Econom ic Theories
Economic theories of the state don’t ignore the role of geopolitical conflict, but
their proponents think that economic modernization is the fundamental cause of
the rise of modern states. Karl Marx was an influential proponent of this idea.
For Marx, the modern state simply represents the interests of the bourgeoisie, the
owners of capital.45 These capitalists create the state as an organization so that
they can manipulate the circumstances that will maximize their profits, which
ultimately, from this point of view, means exploiting labor. O f course the actual
historical processes through which this happened, according to Marxist scholars,
is more complex than this formulation suggests, and requires understanding
the specific mechanisms through which these changes happen in given places at
given moments in time.
Not all proponents of economic theories of the state have a Marxist or left-
wing perspective, however. Others see states as products of elite coalitions re
sponding to new economic circumstances. From this point of view, the best way
to explain the rise of any given state is to trace the process through which elite
Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand?
coalitions were formed and maintained. A good example is the work of North,
Wallis, and Weingast (see the “Insights” box on Violence and Social Orders).
Critics of economic theories of the state note that they often treat the state
merely as a reflection of underlying interests rather than an autonomous actor.46
You might think about whether this criticism applies equally well to both Marxist
and non-Marxist versions of this theory. And how might proponents of economic
theories answer such criticisms?
Cultural Theories
Some scholars argue that structural factors like geo-political conflict and eco
nomic change are not enough to explain the rise of states. For these scholars, we
must include cultural factors such as changing beliefs and values in the expla
nation.47 Among the most persuasive reasons for including such factors is the
notion that state-building involved a dramatic disciplining in the daily life of
individuals.48 Could state-building really have been coerced from the center of
society? Or, perhaps, did cultural changes increase people’s willingness to do
things like accept state scrutiny, pay taxes, comply with regulations, face periodic
conscription, and accept more extensive policing?
How could such “cultural factors” have played a role in the rise of states?
One possibility is that nationalism and national identity (discussed further in
chapter 13) may have contributed to the willingness to accept these impositions in
emerging states.49 The core idea here is that national identity is closely bound to
the state. I f I consider myself a member of a nation, I might see the state as the
expression of that nation, and I might accept its legitimacy. Moreover, nationalists
might have been able to justify projects of state expansion on the grounds of na
tional interest or national pride. A second idea is that religion might have played
a role in early modern state formation. In particular, some scholars have argued
that the rise of Calvinism was key to the success of early modern European state-
building (see the “Insights” box on Gorski’s Disciplinary Revolution).
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework
IN S IG H T S for Interpreting Recorded Human History
by Douglass North, Jo h n Wallis, an d Barry Weingast
North, Wallis, and Weingast aim to explain the emergence of what they call “open access orders” versus “natural states.”
Open-access orders are relatively democratic, with a powerful
state, a well-established rule of law, and other rule-governed, au
tonomous organizations to which everyone in principle has
access. ‘Natural states” are still personalized, with a weak rule of
law and less autonomous organizations. Prior to the develop
ment of the modern state, “natural states” were the rule, as
powerful landowners served their own material interests by
forming and shifting alliances. Actors were constrained mainly
by their power positions vis-a-vis competitors and the mon
arch. These authors argue that the rule of law and open access
orders emerged when important coalitions had an interest in
giving up their prerogatives in exchange for protection. Spe
cifically, when elites judged that they would be better off with
rights than with special privileges, open access orders were
able to emerge.
Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders:
A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009.
62 Chapter 3: The State
IN S IG H T S
The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise
of the State in Early Modern Europe
by Philip Gorski
Gorski argues that states develop not just because elites create organizations, but also because populations become increas
ingly willing to follow their commands.50 Gorski asks why anyone
would be willing to accept the increasing discipline of life under a
modern state.5’ He answers that Calvinism— an influential and
austere form of Protestant Christianity— paved the way in Europe.
Calvinists created “disciplined” societies of hard work, chaste
sexual relationships, and systematic relief for the poor, among
other things. Moreover, because political conflict became linked
to religious conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
early modern states often became partners in this endeavor. Not
surprisingly, “disciplined” populations were easier to govern than
populations with other cultural influences.52 Calvinists were not
the only religious actors to emphasize these modes of discipline,
but they set the standard.
Philip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in
Early Modern Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
We should note that few analysts of comparative politics view cultural factors
such as religion or nationalism as the sole explanation for the emergence of states.
These factors may, however, be critical as they interact with the economic or pol
itical processes discussed previously.
Indeed, all major theories of the state’s emergence focus on both political/
conflict and economic factors, and most ascribe at least some importance to cul
ture. For example, even characteristic proponents of the bellicist theory note the
importance of economic factors, and many proponents of economic theories of the
state acknowledge that frequent warfare in early modern Europe played an impor
tant role in state-building projects there. As you will see in later chapters, theoreti
cal advances in comparative politics are often made not by replacing old theories
with completely new ones, but by synthesizing existing theories, considering them
against new evidence, and adding new dimensions or features to them.
diffusion The process through Diffusion Theories
which a practice or idea spreads Not all theories of the state begin by trying to explain the rise of states in Western
locally, nationally, and globally, Europe. Indeed, some theories are more interested in explaining diffusion, or
C A S E I N C O N T E X T
^ i r ^ The State in the United Kingdom PAGE 546
Some analysts see in early modern England one of the earliest
strong states, and at least one major theorist sees the early for
mation of a modern English state in the late medieval era.53
Others see in the United Kingdom a historically minimal state.
Could both views be correct? If so, how could they both be cor
rect? What circumstances might favor the juxtaposition of early
state development with a relatively limited state?
For more on the state in the United Kingdom, see the case
study in Part VI, pp. 546-547. As you read it, keep in mind the fol
lowing questions:
1. What evidence is assembled by those who argue for
strong early state-formation in the United Kingdom?
2. Was the United Kingdom ever a fully absolutist state?
Why or why not?
Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand? 63
the global spread of the state as a form of organization. W hy and how, these the
ories ask, did the state come to be the dominant way of doing politics everywhere?
O f course, such theories are not incompatible with those that we have considered
so far. Indeed, often they are based on implicit or even explicit answers to that
prior question.
W hen a social or political form like the state appears to spread, there are at
least three logical explanations. One is that its development is purely coincidental.
Given the extent of the spread of the state, however, this seems unlikely. The
second is that common underlying features present in all cases explain each indi
vidual case. For example, maybe over the course of the twentieth century—when
many modern states were created—we merely saw a repeat of the same processes
that had been witnessed in early modern Europe, such as increasing interstate
warfare. But the evidence does not seem to fully fit this picture. A third logical
possibility is that the spread of the state had systemic qualities.54 In other words,
there is some sort of international system through which it diffused globally. Here
we will try to distinguish three basic models for how this might have happened.
Note that these are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive.
The first version of this theory has an affinity with the bellicist theory of the
state’s emergence. Once states are formed as war-making machines, we might
expect them to rapidly out-compete rivals because of their skill in making war.
Proponents of this sort of theory would point to the extent to which state forms
were bound up with colonialism: The European states, over just a couple of cen
turies, extended political control over most of the world, bringing state forms of
organization with them. Their military and technological capacity allowed them
frequently to achieve relatively easy victories over civilizations that often judged
them to be barbarians (not without justification, some would say).
Not all versions of this theory focus exclusively on the state’s military prowess,
however. Instead, some variations note that the state can produce social and eco
nomic gains that, in turn, reinforce it (see the “Insights” box on Spruyt’s Sovereign
State and Its Competitors).
The second version of this theory has a still greater affinity with economic
theories of the state. This version says that states spread to serve the interests of
the international capitalist class. Building on the Marxian idea that the state
l l f f ‘ 3332
What Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed? The Case of Nigeria page s i?
One major state where boundaries were created by colonial
powers is Nigeria, which is also perennially cited as a problematic
or weak state. Some argue that state weakness in Nigeria is a con
sequence of oil, others that it is a function of ethnic and religious
differences. Finally, some think state weakness there and else
where might be caused by the legacies of colonialism.
For more on the Nigerian state, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 517-518. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. Is colonialism responsible for Nigeria’s relatively weak
state?
2. What is the relationship between the state’s strength, cor
ruption, and economic development in Nigeria?
64 Chapter 3: The State
IN SIG H T S
The Sovereign State and Its Competitors
by Hendrik Spruyt
Spruyt focuses on the development of states in early modern Europe, but his theory is about the spread of the state as an
organizational form, and the resulting emergence of the state
system. The state had several rival types of organizations, including
the feudal order, city-states, and leagues of merchant cities like
Germany’s “Hanseatic League,” yet the modern state survived
while these other forms essentially disappeared. Why? Spruyt
argues the state rose up as a product of both economic changes
and political conflict. States became formidable fighting machines,
so their relative success might be partly explained through a kind
of “survival of the fittest,” but Spruyt says this is not a sufficient
explanation because other formations (such as city-states) were
often as good at fighting wars. Rather, states did other things that
helped them out-compete their rivals. In particular, states did
things that were good for their long-term economic develop
ment, such as standardizing currencies and measures and estab
lishing clearer territorial boundaries. Spruyt also notes that states
won out in part by “mutual empowerment,” as they preferred to
deal with other states and encouraged the emergence of one
another’s organizational and institutional forms.
Hendrik Spruyt,The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996.
organization Institutionalized
group such as a state, corporation,
political party, social movement,
or international body.
isomorphism In institutional
theory, the quality that two or
more organizations have by virtue
of being structurally very similar.
world society theory A theory
associated with scholars such as
John Meyer, who argue that basic
organizational features of the state
system are cultural and have diff
used globally.
represents capital’s interests, and Lenin’s idea that capitalism turned to imperial
ism in order to protect itself from internal “contradictions,”55 proponents of this
version argue that colonialism aimed to create new markets for European goods
and also sources of raw materials and exploitable labor of certain kinds. From this
point of view, colonial subjugation was one way to achieve capitalism’s desired
ends, but not the only one: Indeed, ongoing neo-colonial exploitation can take
place perfectly well via a division of core and peripheral states in the international
system.56
Yet there is a third strategy in which some scholars try to explain the spread
of the state, one which has more of an affinity with cultural theories of the state’s
emergence. Here the notion is that organizational forms like the state are them
selves cultural phenomena or ideas, and that ideas about how organizations
should be structured play an important role in determining the organizational
forms adopted by others. Organizations in a given field very often take on the
same or at least a very similar structure, a phenomenon known as isomorphism.57
For example, it used to be that universities did not have specific registrar’s offices,
financial aid offices, and so forth, just like political organizations once did not
have professional, standing armies. W hen organizational forms spread, there
seem to be two main sources of their spread: efficiency with respect to the orga
nization’s chosen ends and fit with cultural models and expectations for how such
organizations are supposed to be organized.58 In the first case, a university might
develop a registrar’s office because increasing complexity requires an office to co
ordinate classrooms, meeting times, and so forth. In the second case, anyone who
starts a university already “knows” that a university is “supposed to” have such an
office: A cognitive map or template for the organization already exists. According
to world society theory (sometimes called “world polity theory”), the state is very
much like this: It became an institutionalized part of modern politics and is
therefore replicated culturally even when causes that might have been operative
in its initial emergence are not present.59
Great Britain, the United Kingdom, or Neither? State and Nation in England and Scotland 65
IN S IG H TS
World Society and the Nation-State
by Jo h n Meyer, Jo h n Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez &
John Meyer and his co-authors are proponents of a “world society” or “world polity” theory focused on “cultural” factors.
The “world society” school treats the spread of such organiza
tions as not entirely coercive, pointing out that people in many
societies willingly and even eagerly adopt existing models of the
state. The authors propose a thought experiment. They tell us to
imagine a new island society discovered by the global commu
nity. The society would, within just a couple of years of contact
with the global order, likely define itself as a nation-state, estab
lish a government, a currency, a taxation system, boundaries,
provisions for its defense, and so forth. A thought experiment is
not proof, but there is also empirical evidence in the overlap in
structure between states and other national-level organizations
and institutions. Global organizational norms are spread through
several channels, including international organizations like the
United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund, as well as NGOs. Indeed, social science itself— including
comparative politics— probably plays a role in these develop
ments. When political scientists attempt to find ways to measure
and combat corruption, for example, or even to define features
of strong or successful states, they publicize their results and thus
contribute to global organizational convergence when changes
are implemented.
John Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco 0. Ramirez, “World
Society and the Nation-State,” 1997. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103,
No. l,pp. 144-181.
Great Britain, the United Kingdom,
or Neither? State and Nation
in England and Scotland
Perhaps the simplest tool in comparative politics is the single case study (often a country, as noted in chapter 2). Through this type of examination, we can
gather information to develop hypotheses that cut across other cases. Case analy
sis can help us identify key mechanisms and define general relationships. Debates
in comparative politics are seldom ended on the basis of a single case study, but
this approach nonetheless has much to contribute. Here we will consider how
looking at the single case of the United Kingdom (from England to Great Britain)
might help us think about theories of state formation.
The island now known as Great Britain was long made up of distinct king
doms (Map 3.1). For much of their political history, state-building projects were
specific to these kingdoms. The most influential of these in political history has
been England, which comprises a large share of the island’s territory (with Wales
to the west and Scotland to the north).
A number of scholars have considered the English state-building project to be
a paradigmatic case. To some extent, the nobility’s power to rule over the inhabi
tants of the countryside was curbed as early as the 800s, but with the Magna
Carta of 1215 the crown also took on some limitations. After Henry VIII in the
sixteenth century, the state was independent of the Roman Catholic Church,
having separated from Rome and created its own church with the monarch at its
head. Over the course of the seventeenth century, despite— and perhaps because
of—civil conflict, parliamentary power grew, and nationalism and national
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
K E Y M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Thinking through
Case Studies
Political scientists use case studies for
a variety of purposes. In later chapters
we will formally specify hypotheses
and methods for testing against
them, but here we begin by using a
basic case study to think about gen
eral theories. In this example, we
consider three of the major theories
of state-building discussed in this
chapter and ask what each would say
about the development of the state
(and nation) in the United Kingdom.
Although all three theories seem
capable of explaining the general
outlines of this case, they are not
necessarily equal. Political scientists
concerned with these problems must
come up with strategies to get lever
age over the competing theories.
66 Chapter 3: The State
T H IN K IN G
CO M PA RA TIV ELY
identity were stoked. By the close of the century, a truly “constitutional monar
chy” was established. Slowly, England developed the characteristics of a full-
fledged modern state: effective local administration developed60 into a centralized
bureaucracy, which resulted in a standing army and the authority to collect taxes
regularly after 1688.61 The country went through many fluctuations in royal power,
but the rough balance of power between the crown and the parliament progres
sively shifted toward the latter.
D u n b a r
(to Scotland
^ c . 975)
S T R A T H C L Y D E BAMBURGH
10 th cen tu ry
S C A N D I N A V I A N
S candinavian Y O R K
L ancashire
(probably
p a rt o f York)
GWYNEDD
POWYS
M E R C I A D A N E L A W
918
BRYCHEINIOG
c. 920
GWEt
Hwicce
L undenw ic •
0 miles
Y NY S
MANAU
0 km 50
Map 3.1 (a) The land that became the United Kingdom, circa 900; (b) the United Kingdom
today.
Great Britain, the United Kingdom, or Neither? State and Nation in England and Scotland 67
England’s political history merged into a single state with the other parts of the
modern United Kingdom. At different stages, this took place in different ways.
English kings conquered Wales and governed it from the thirteenth century.
Dynastic ties often meant partially shared governance between England and
Scotland. W ith the Act of Union (1707), Great Britain was born from a merger of
the Kingdoms of England and Scotland. Thereafter (at least until our day), many
state institutions were consolidated, and efforts undertaken—for a time seemingly
quite successful—to create a “British” rather than “English” or “Scottish” national
T H IN K IN G
C O M P A R A TIV ELY
68 Chapter 3: The State
identity.62 Interestingly, this does not mean that English or Scottish (or Welsh)
identities disappeared. Rather, they co-existed with an overarching sense of
Britishness. Meanwhile, over the course of centuries Ireland had been, in good
measure, incorporated by force; even after the secession of the Republic of Ireland
in 1922, Northern Ireland remained part of the “United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland.”
We can find evidence in this case study for all of our major theories of state-
building—bellicist, economic, and cultural. Let’s consider briefly how each of
these might view this single case:
Bellicist: In the early modern period, like the rest of Europe, the British Isles
were often involved in inter-state war. The imperatives of war and continental
alliances meant that the state had to be prepared for conflict, which meant
taxation and, as time went on, greater investment in the military.63 There is
little doubt that this military preparation contributed to state-building.
Economic: At the same time, the giving up of privileges in exchange for the
rule of law (as analyzed by North, Wallis, and Weingast) probably saw its
earliest expression in England. And it was Britain that, according to in
stitutional economists, first saw the emergence of sustained economic
growth. Proponents of the economic state-building theory argue that
these developments were probably linked. They see state growth as a con
sequence of the extension of the rule of law, the protection of property,
and the establishment of a well-functioning state.
Cultural: Both the culturalist theories focusing on Calvinism (Gorski) and
nationalism (Greenfeld)64 also find ample evidence in the English/British
case. Calvinism in a variety of forms was influential there, and according
to some, this case is one of the earliest instances of modern nationalism.
W hat should we make of this evidence? It shows us several things. First, it shows
us what a case study can and cannot do. Typically in comparative politics a case study
cannot fully adjudicate between rival theories of general processes. In looking only at
the United Kingdom, we will probably be unable to decide among the theories con
sidered in this chapter. But this case also shows us that existing theories may be too
simple. If all of the factors these theories emphasize are operative, we could use a
new theory that addresses how those factors fit together. Thinking along these lines
might help you create a better model of state- and nation-building in general.
Such questions are not just matters of historical interest. State- and nation-
building might settle into equilibrium at various times, but they are not really
static phenomena. Several decades ago many would have been skeptical that a
strong Scottish independence movement would emerge, that a referendum would
be held (as happened in September 2014, when 55 percent of Scots voted to
remain part of the U.K.), and that there would be talk of a possible written con
stitution for the United Kingdom as well as a distinct English Parliament. It re
mains to be seen how these issues might be resolved, but there is no denying that
both the state and the nation are in potential flux in the United Kingdom today.
As you think about ongoing processes of nation- and state-building, consider
whether the major comparative-historical theories discussed in this chapter have
something to say to us about twenty-first-century politics.
Chapter Review 69
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Concepts
• The state is the most important form of political organiza
tion in modern politics and is characterized in ideal form
by control of the use offeree, bureaucratic organization,
and the provision of public goods.
• The related ideas of the modern state, state capacity, and
failed states are some of the core concepts in comparative
politics.
Types
• Major features of modern states include bureaucracy,
impersonality, and sovereignty.
• States are coordinators of collective projects, such as
taxation, defense, and policing.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. In the “Causes and Effects” section of this chapter, we consid
ered the causes of state formation. Since the map of the world is
now covered with states, do you think these theories are of
purely historical interest? Or do they still matter today? Think in
particular of countries recently in the news— such as Afghani
stan, Iraq, Somalia, or Syria— where commentators and policy
makers still talk about a need for “state-building.” Do theories of
state formation have any relevance today in those countries?
2. Test the theories of state formation considered here against
your knowledge of U.S. history. Which of the theories seems to
explain the formation of the American state best, and why?
What were the major steps in state formation in the American
state, and how well can each theory address these stages?
3. Consider whether you think the presence of a strong civil soci
ety will tend to make a state relatively strong or relatively weak,
in the sense of the state being a powerful decision maker that
affects lots of social and political activity. Do civil society and the
Causes and Effects
• Theories about why modern states emerge focus on
political conflict, economics, culture, and processes of
global diffusion.
Th inking Com paratively
We considered some of the uses of the single “case study,”
noting that the case of the United Kingdom seems to offer
some support for several of the major theories of state-
building discussed in the chapter.
state compete and divide a fixed amount of power, or do they
reinforce each other, each making the other more powerful?
Think of a case study that might help you examine this question.
4. Return to the opening paragraphs of this chapter, which dis
cussed the possibility of the formation of new states in contem
porary Western Europe. After reading the chapter, what do you
now think about the likelihood of this happening? Ground your
answer in the theories of state formation you have learned.
5. Many people agree that our world is rapidly “globalizing.” This
globalization can be economic, can involve social norms, cus
toms, and institutions, or it can involve organized force (e.g., in
ternational organized crime, terrorist groups, and imperial
powers). If the globalization of organized force gets carried very
far, what implications, if any, might this have for the utility of the
Weberian definition of the state? Would a radically (politically)
globalized world be one in which new types of states were ob
servable? Or would it be a world of weak states?
• Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras speaks to the Greek Parliam ent in 2015. The fiscal situation of the Greek state— and Greece’s relationship with the
broader European economy— has been the subject of heated debate and much anxiety in recent years.
The subject of this chapter is political economy, which can be loosely defined as the ways politics and economics interrelate and affect one an
other.1 O ur emphasis is on politics and public institutions that affect the
economy, though we will also note ways that economic change affects poli
tics. In the next chapter, we consider the political economy of so-called de
veloping countries specifically (especially those in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America), while the emphasis in this chapter is on what are sometimes called
the “advanced, industrialized countries.”
As a subject area, political economy has a rich heritage.
You are probably reading this textbook for a course in a de
partm ent called “political science,” or possibly “politics,” “gov
ernment,” or “international affairs.” But two hundred years
ago, the academic study of “political science” in its modern
sense didn’t really exist. Prominent philosophers and thinkers
who considered questions of political organization and public
action had another name for their area of study: political econ
omy. Implicit in this name was the idea that politics and eco
nomics were deeply intertwined. To political thinkers of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including Adam Smith
and Karl M arx, what happened in the economy would affect
politics in almost any country, and vice versa.
Later on, the disciplines of “politics” and “economics”
became separate (along w ith sociology, among other fields), as
the social sciences underwent a division of labor. Political scien
tists focused especially on issues such as the state (see chapter 3),
types of governing regimes (chapters 6 and 7), and government
institutions (chapters 8 through 11). Yet the study of politics has
remained deeply concerned with questions about society and
the economy. M any chapters in this text address these inter
twined issues. Chapters 12 through 15, for instance, examine questions related
to social institutions, identification, organization, and action. In this chapter,
we explore the enduring linkages between politics and economics. O ur par
ticular emphasis here is on the political economy of so-called “advanced, indus
trialized countries,” such as those in most of Europe, plus other economically
powerful countries like Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States.
political economy The
interaction or interrelationship
between politics and the economy
in a given country or internatio
nally, to include how politics affects
economies and how economies
affect politics.
IN THI S C H A P T E R
Concepts 72
Inequality 73
Employment and Inflation 75
Types 76
Markets and States in Modern
Economies 76
Economic Functions of Modern States 82
Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States
Emerge? 86
Cultural Changes 87
Industrial Capitalism 87
Mobilization and Political Action 89
International Learning Effects 92
T HI NKI NG C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
Welfare States in the Nordic Countries 93
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Japan • Germ any
United States
United Kingdom
71
72 Chapter 4: Political Economy
gross domestic product (GDP)
The total value of goods and
services produced in a given
country or territory; per capita GDP
is divided by the population.
gross national income (GNI)
A measure of the total income of all
of a country’s citizens, whether
living in their home country or
abroad.
Concepts
To better understand political economy, we should define several of the key mea
sures and indicators that help characterize a country’s economy. Which statistics
can tell us something about its overall level—that is, its sophistication and advance
ment? Is it a large economy, is it wealthy on average, and how is wealth distributed?
Apart from the level of a country’s economy, how is it performing? A country may
be rich and successful, but its economy may be declining and performing poorly,
just as a country may be relatively poor but performing well. (We examine this
question of performance in low-income countries more in chapter 5.)
The most common ways of measuring a country’s economy involve the gross
domestic product (GDP), or similar measures such as gross national income
(GNI). Each of these provides a composite measure of a country’s total economy but
measures it slightly differently. GDP is the total market value of all goods and ser
vices produced within a country’s borders, usually in a year’s time. In other words,
the gross domestic product is the total (or gross) amount of goods and services pro
duced (i.e., the product) in a given country (hence, domestic) in a given year. GNI
is the total income from all goods and services earned by a country’s producers, re
gardless of where they operate. So a German company operating in India that earns
profits would be counted in the GDP of India but in the GNI of Germany. We will
refer to GDP as our most common basic measure of a country’s economic activity.
We often wish to compare the average wealth of individuals in different coun
tries, not just the total wealth of each country. Economists therefore turn to per
capita measurements of GDP, which represent average income per person. Rela
tively wealthy countries (such as the United States, Japan, and many in Western
Europe) may have annual GDP levels of $30,000 per capita or more, while the
poorest countries have GDPs per capita of less than $500 per year, and “middle-
income” countries are in the range of a few thousand dollars per year. One benefit
of this approach is that it standardizes GDP across countries of different sizes,
CASE IN CONTEXT
Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich?
Will They in the Future? PAGE 561
The idea of economic strength has been important for many years
in the United States. The country has had an extremely powerful
and dynamic economy for some time, but now there is consider
able worry and handwringing about the future of American eco
nomic performance. Income inequality has reached alarming
heights, and a host of social indicators for some populations re
semble those usually seen only in the “third world.” The economy
did not recover quickly from the recession induced by the financial
crisis of 2008. Finally, the U.S. government faces serious long-term
fiscal problems. Perhaps even the “most developed” countries are
never fully developed and continue to face development hurdles.
For more on political economy in the United States, see the
case study in Part VI, pp. 561-562. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. In what sense should we think of the United States as a
“developed” society? What does this case reveal to us
about the notion of “development”?
2. What specific development dangers are likely to emerge
in post-industrial societies? Flow, in cases like this, might
aspects of development itself prove potentially risky for
later-stage development?
Concepts 73
dividing production by the population size. Otherwise it would be very difficult
to compare the economic performance of large and small countries.
The overall GDP and GDP per capita measure the overall size and income level of
an economy, and GDP growth from year to year is the simplest measure of economic
performance. Very high GDP growth, such as in China over the last twenty years, is
in the neighborhood of 7 percent to 10 percent. Such rates of growth are possible in
low-income countries that are starting from a low economic base, where many people
are not employed to their full potential. In advanced, industrialized countries, how
ever, which tend to be wealthier, 5 percent growth would be very strong, and a growth
rate of about 3 percent a year or lower is more typical. Some countries also have nega
tive GDP growth rates. This happens in times of recession in advanced economies,
and it has happened frequently in poorer countries, such as many in Africa.
GDP is a simple concept, but the value of a person’s income also depends on
how much money can buy. That is, the cost of living matters. An income of
130,000 per year goes much further in a country where rent is $250 a month and
a week’s groceries cost $50, than in a country where rent is $1,000 a month and
a week’s groceries cost $200. Because prices are frequently lower in low-income
countries, a dollar (or local currency) can go farther. The adjusted measure schol
ars often use is income based on purchasing power parity (PPP). In many in
stances, in countries where average incomes are very low (such as in Africa), a
GDP/capita of about $400 may correspond to a GDP/capita at PPP of over
$1,000. Conversely, in countries where prices are very high (such as Japan and
Scandinavia), a GDP/capita may be reduced by adjusting for PPP; for instance,
someone earning $50,000 in one of these countries may only be able to buy as
much as an average person earning $40,000 in the United States (see Table 4.1).
The measurement of economic performance may extend beyond the economic
indicators discussed previously. Measures also include a range of social outcomes
including such factors as standards of living, quality of life, and cultural change.
The section on “Types” outlines several important ways of measuring develop
ment besides economic growth.
Inequality
Measures of income such as GDP do not provide much information about how
income is distributed among people. An average GDP per capita of $30,000 can
result in a country where half the people earn $60,000 and half earn nothing, or
it can happen in a country where everyone earns $30,000 exactly. The first coun
try would obviously have a more unequal distribution of income, and would have
half of its population in grave poverty. Measuring poverty and inequality is thus
important to many who study development.
Inequality measures how income is distributed. Some societies have incomes
that are distributed very equally across people, while other countries have in
comes that vary dramatically between different people. Imagine two societies.
In the first, the average income for someone in the richest 10 percent is $150,000,
and the average income for someone in the bottom 10 percent is $12,000. In the
second, the average income for someone in the top 10 percent is less (say, $75,000),
and the average income for someone in the bottom 10 percent is higher (say,
$16,000)- We might say the first country is more unequal because the ratio of the
incomes between those at the top and those at the bottom is much larger.
purchasing power parity (PPP)
An adjustment made to income
measures to account for differences
in cost of living.
inequality In the social sciences,
the differential distribution of
access to goods like power, status,
and material resources.
74 Chapter 4: Political Economy
t a b l e 4 . 1 Econom ic Measures Around the World
Country GDP/Capita {$)
G DP Growth
(% )
Consum er
Inflation (%)
Absolute
Poverty Rate* Gini Index**
Brazil 11,208 2.5 6.2 3.8 52.7
China 6,807 7.7 2.6 6.3 37.0
France 42,503 0.3 0.9 <2 31.7
Germany 46,269 0.1 1.5 <2 30.6
India 1,499 5.0 10.9 23.6 33.6
Iran 4,763 -5.8 39.3 <2 38.3
Japan 38,634 1.6 0.4 <2 32.1
Mexico 10,307 1.1 3.8 <2 48.1
Nigeria 3,006 5.4 8.5 62.0 43.0
Russia 14,612 1.3 6.8 <2 39.7
South Korea 25,977 3.0 1.3 <2 31.3
United Kingdom 41,788 1.7 2.6 <2 38.0
United States 53,042 2.2 1.5 <2 41.1
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report data 2015.
*Note: Poverty rate is measured as percent of the population living on less than $1.25/day (PPP) on average between 2002 and 2012.
** Note: Estimates for the Gini index are from 2013 or the most recent year available from the World Bank, with years available varying by country.
A poor neighborhood, or favela, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Notice the wealthier neighborhood off
in the distance. Though Brazil has made some progress in recent years, it has often been held up
as an example of high income inequality.
Concepts 75
To use specific examples, the United States has a more unequal distribution of
income than the countries of Scandinavia. The most commonly used measure of
inequality across an entire population is the Gini coefficient, which measures
how much of a society’s wealth or income is held by which percentage of the
population. The number ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 being absolute equality
with everyone having the same amount of wealth or income, and 1 being a sce
nario in which a single person owns all wealth.2 Rough Gini coefficients can be
calculated using deciles or quintiles of the population (each tenth or fifth). There
are quicker measures of inequality one can calculate as well. As noted previously,
one may simply examine the incomes of the top 10 percent versus the bottom
10 percent of the income range, for example. Inequality is a pressing concern in
many countries, from the United States to Brazil. Information about Gini coef
ficients and other measures of inequality and economic performance of this sort
can be easily found online. See, for example, the Human Development Reports
provided by the United Nations.
Em ploym ent and Inflation
Other economic measures relate to how people experience the economy on a daily
basis. Employment and unemployment are especially important because of their
impact on people’s well-being and on a country’s overall economic health. Employ
ment can be measured by the total number of jobs created or lost, or as a percentage
of the population with or without paid employment. Underemployment is another
factor being tracked, signifying the degree to which members of the labor force are
employed less than they wish to be (e.g., part-time instead of full-time) or are in
jobs “below their skill level.” In many developing countries, analysts draw a dis
tinction between formal and informal employment as well, and most consider
formal employment preferable, because it tends to offer more benefits, rights, and
support. In developed economies, far fewer people are informally employed (say, as
unofficial and unlicensed street vendors) than in much of the developing world.
Inflation is a measure of how quickly prices are rising. Prices affect the cost of
living, and people find it more difficult to plan for the future when they are uncer
tain what prices will be in the future. Inflation can ruin people’s savings by making
the amount they have saved worth less in terms of what it can buy. As a result,
high levels of inflation have brought about the collapse of many regimes. In the
worst cases, countries have slipped into hyperinflation, in which prices rise by as
much as several thousand percent per year, or more. Conversely, deflation (or
declining prices) is also a significant problem that arises in economic crises, as
people stop buying to await lower prices in the future, and the values of homes
and other assets decline. Finally, it is worth noting that inflation and employ
ment, though distinct, are related in ways that you might find surprising. Indeed,
central banks and other policymakers often face trade-offs when they try to keep
both unemployment and inflation low. An emphasis on keeping inflation low at
all costs is associated by many with higher levels of unemployment.
Fiscal measures—that is, measures of the government’s revenues and
expenditures—of a country’s economic health, such as total indebtedness, may
also be taken as indicators of a country’s economic well-being. In many circum
stances, poor fiscal indicators will imply economic challenges in the future, as
Gini coefficient The most
common measure of income
inequality in any given population,
usually expressed as a number
between 0 and 1, with 0 being total
equality and 1 being maximal
inequality.
employment Ongoing, regular
access to paid work.
unemployment The lack of
ongoing, regular access to paid
work.
underemployment When
workers are employed less than
they wish to be or below their
skill level.
inflation Increase in the prices of
goods and services.
hyperinflation Exceedingly high
inflation, which dramatically erodes
the value of money over time.
deflation Decline in the prices of
goods and services, often associa
ted with depressions or serious
slowdowns in economic activity.
fiscal measures Measures of a
government's revenues and/or
expenditures.
Chapter 4: Political Economy
debts come due. By the same token, some argue that an excessive focus on fiscal
balance sheets can hamper governments’ ability to engage in counter-cyclical
spending, evening out the business cycle and avoiding recessions. Indeed, one of
the great debates of political economy pits those who favor fiscal conservatism
and “Keynesians,” who favor higher levels of government spending. This distinc
tion often aligns with another that pits those who favor policies designed to
reduce inflation with those who favor policies conducive to “full employment.”
As you can see, thinking about the indicators of a healthy political economy leads
directly to what is probably the field’s central debate, which concerns the role of
the state in economic life.
Types
In this section, we will think about the respective roles of the market and the
state in modern economies. We first look at market-led and state-led economies
as two main types, and we consider the intellectual arguments for why each
might enhance economic performance. We then consider the types of state ac
tivities in an economy.
Markets and States in Modern Econom ies
Perhaps the most meaningful way to consider the different types of political
economies around the world is to think about how the role of the state plays out
differently across countries. We addressed the concept of the state in chapter 3,
focusing on how it originated, and on the basic features of a functioning state,
especially with respect to national defense and the administrative ordering of the
polity. However, it is clear that modern states do far more in this day and age
than simply exercise a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given terri
tory.” In the process of governing in the modern world, states act in ways that
affect the political economy. States provide a range of public services and public
goods, perhaps with a view toward creating opportunities for the citizenry and
toward protecting the vulnerable. O f course, the role of the state in the economy
is limited in most countries. In modern economies, private actors (from individu
als to corporations) play an important role, and many economic decisions are
made not by governments, but by these private actors.
Think about buying lunch from a sandwich shop. This is largely a private
transaction. The government doesn’t set the price of the sandwich (in most
countries), although it may levy a tax on the sale of the sandwich. Rather, the
seller sets the price based on a couple of considerations. One is the cost of
making the sandwich, which factors in not only the cost of the ingredients but
also the shop’s rent and the sandwich maker’s pay, for example. Another con
sideration is how much potential buyers might be willing to pay. In turn, the
potential buyer has to decide whether a sandwich at a given price is worth it.
(Maybe some days it is, and other days not.) In general terms, we might call
this a “market” transaction, even if it doesn’t take place in an actual market
place. We say this because the transaction is between two or more private
actors, based on prices set by what a seller is willing to charge and a buyer is
willing to pay.
Types 77
Many people studying political economy would argue that a “market-based”
economy relying on private actors is more efficient and will perform better than
a “state-led” economy. For example, imagine the government mandated that an
egg salad sandwich must be made in a particular way. The sandwich business’s
ability to meet buyers’ preferences would be reduced, potentially resulting in re
duced sales of sandwiches. On the other hand, many observers would note the
important roles states play in making economies work, and in promoting eco
nomic performance. If the government guarantees the contract between the
sandwich shop owner and the bank, or helps the owner access capital, this may
help the business and, indirectly, the customers. The costs and benefits of such
government (and private) actions undoubtedly accumulate across the set of ex
changes. Political economists have different estimates of the aggregate results.
M a rk e ts a n d E co n o m ic P erfo rm ance
A central debate in political economy, then, in recent years has been over which
actors should take the lead in promoting national economic advancement: private
markets or the state. W hich is more likely to foster development: governmental
intervention in the economy, or freely functioning markets with no governmen
tal intervention? O f course, a range of factors can condition how a country per
forms economically, ranging from geography, to how political institutions are
organized, to technological advancements, to the strategies of businesses, to a
range of cultural factors that may vary from one place to another. However, the
most significant debate in political economy has to do with the role of the market
and the role of the state in guiding economic decision making. We consider the
idea that a country with a market-led economy will perform well, and will follow
that with a consideration of how an economy with significant state intervention
might perform well.
A leading argument in political economy is that free markets are the basis for
creating wealth. This argument has a long and fruitful history, famously
CASE IN CONTEXT
j Political Economy of Britain PAGE 547
The United Kingdom is one of the most interesting cases for the
comparative analyst for several reasons. First, it was the first
major industrializer and is considered to have been one of the
first societies to establish a modern, growth-oriented economy.
Second, it has developed over many centuries, moving from
being a predominantly agrarian society to an industrial economy
to a post-industrial one, so it allows us to ask long-term questions
about such a sequence. Third, it was the country from which
some of the leading theories of political economy we are consid
ering here were first conceived and, to some extent, transformed
into policy.
For more on development in the United Kingdom, see the
case study in Part VI, pp. 547-548. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. Which major theories have been used in efforts to explain
the economic development in the United Kingdom, and
what are their strengths and limitations in relation to this
case?
2. What does this case suggest about the relationship be
tween the political economy of development and the
social-scientific construction of theories of development?
78 Chapter 4: Political Economy
neoliberalism An ideological
tendency that favors liberal
democracy and market-led
development.
privatization Transfer of control
(of a business, industry, or service)
from public to private.
beginning with Adam Smith’s publication of The Wealth o f Nations in 1776. The
free market perspective spawned the field of economics, whose modern school of
market-oriented thought is nowadays often called n e o lib e r a lis m . Smith’s idea of
the “invisible hand” offered the marvelous conclusion that through the individ
ual efforts of people seeking only their own well-being, society as a whole is made
better off. Society benefits not from generosity and kindness, but from the eco
nomic efficiency and expansion that takes place when everyone pursues their own
gain. This logic of market is expected to promote economic advancement within
any given country, and it also extends to the world economy as a whole, with the
idea that free trade between countries makes all countries better off.3
Advocates of free market economics are influential in policymaking today and
argue that the “invisible hand” should operate largely unrestrained, without gov
ernment interference. The proper role of government, in this logic, is largely to
establish a rule of law that protects property rights and enforces contracts.4
Beyond this, the theory is that government should leave most economic activity
to the market.5 This means that government should not be doing things such as
creating and financing companies, running factories, or setting wages. Where
government has been doing these things, the pro-market perspective holds that
economic activity should undergo p r iv a t iz a tio n , or transfer of control from
public to private. Such a pro-market perspective has informed policy recommen
dations to developing countries for many years, as we discuss in chapter 5.
The argument in favor of markets is that markets promote economic well
being, and also that states do not. Neoliberal economists commonly hold that
government intervention in the economy results in inefficiencies and losses to so
ciety as a whole. They argue that this is because only markets are able to coordinate
5 « ■ * 4 . 3 8 < * r
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S g ,
Germany 80.7 4 >99 6
India 66.4 56 62.8 135
Iran 74.0 18 85.0 75
Japan 83.6 3 > 99 17
Mexico 77.5 16 93.5 71
Nigeria 52.5 124 51.1 152
Russia 68.0 10 >99 57
South Korea 81.5 4 >99 15
United Kingdom 80.5 5 >99 14
United States 78.9 7 > 99 5
Source: United Nations Human D evelopm ent Report 2014.
utility The value that people income, but utility. Utility gives a notion of the value people derive from con-
derive from resources to which suming or having access to that which pleases them. I f I like Coca-Cola more
they have access. than Pepsi Cola, I will “derive more utility” from drinking a Coca-Cola, while a
friend who prefers Pepsi to Coke “gets more utility” from a Pepsi. In short, we
care about life satisfaction, quality of life, and happiness.
Happiness comes from more than just consuming goods and services. It may
come from having free time, or social status, or strong ties to family and friends,
or from living a spiritually fulfilling life. Social scientists face major challenges
in trying to measure human happiness, but they continue to make efforts. In
recent years, the mountainous nation of Bhutan (in the Himalayas) has made a
splash internationally by publishing its own measures of “Gross National Happi
ness.” Increasingly, more countries and more scholars are following suit, and even
China, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom have recently begun to think
about how to measure their peoples’ happiness.
Cultural Developm ent
For many people around the world, development might mean retaining and
deepening one’s own culture. In this view, economic modernization does not
necessarily improve a society: If economic growth brings commercialization and
cultural disintegration, some people(s) will wish to have none of it, and will
Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 103
prefer to define development as exercising the right to self-determination, living
autonomously from the rest of the world, and enjoying the rich cultural tradi
tions they hold dear. Perhaps an indigenous group will wish to protect its own
language and folk traditions while avoiding the influences of Hollywood and
“Western values.” For many people, “development” might not even be a positive
word, but might instead signify a push by outsiders—intentional or unintentional—
to undermine local practices.9 Increasingly, many researchers, sensitive to these
concerns, argue that citizens of the countries we study should play a central role
in defining development goals. The desire to protect traditional cultures is not
limited to small and remote indigenous groups, but can also be seen in many
modern nations wrestling with questions of growth and development, such as
France (as seen in the case study on globalization in chapter 16).
environmental sustainability
The quality that one or another
practice has with being compatible
with the long-term health of the
environment.
Causes and Effects: Why Does
Development Happen?
To examine the causes of development, we focus mainly on GDP growth per
capita, for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, these measures are the most com
monly used in studies of development. Second, GD P growth per capita often
goes hand-in-hand with several other indicators of development listed previously.
In particular, countries that grow in terms of GD P per capita often also advance
on other social indicators, with improved health, more education, higher levels of
happiness, and reductions in poverty. O f course, this is not true in all cases, and
rising GDP is not the only determinant of these other indicators, but it is true
quite often. For this reason, and since it is more comprehensive than many of
those other indicators, development scholars often use it when they’re seeking a
single indicator. That said, there can be trade-offs between GDP growth and
other indicators, such as inequality, as we have noted, and GDP/capita certainly
does not capture every dimension of development. These strengths and limita
tions of the measure should be kept in mind.
Sustainability
Finally, environmental sustainability is an important aspect of development.
W ith increasing attention to the issue of climate change, many development
scholars are attempting to understand development as that which is sustainable.
Sustainable development can be defined as development that conserves resources
to respect the needs of future generations. Only by stewarding its resources ef
fectively and not depleting them too rapidly will any society remain viable over
the long run. In order to incorporate sustainability into development discussions,
some scholars have even proposed replacing GDP with new measures that ac
count for the use of resources. They note that cutting down a tree increases GDP,
as does polluting, even though these activities may be “using up” a society’s natu
ral endowments.10 We discuss the concept and the challenge of sustainability in
the concluding chapter. Among the main political challenges in promoting sus
tainable development are the difficulties of securing collective action between
many countries when each country has incentives to “free ride” on the efforts of
others.
104 Chapter 5: Development
market-led development
An approach to economic
management in which the state
aims to control economic behavior
as little as possible.
state-led development
An approach to economic
management in which the state
plays a prominent role in
coordinating the behavior of
economic actors and intervening in
the economy.
The central question here is why economies grow, diversify, and become more
productive and successful. W hat allows countries to essentially liberate people
from their small farming plots to work in cities, factories, law offices, research
labs, banks, and hospitals? W hy have people and societies been able to accumu
late capital that they can use to foster even more productive economic activity?
The answers to these questions are debated extensively, and several theories have
arisen to explain them. We group the focal points of these theories into four
categories:
1. the role of the market and the state in promoting development, a topic we
explored in the previous chapter in the context of “developed” countries;
2. institutions such as legal rules and social norms that shape the behavior of
economic actors;
3. cultural values; and
4. the domestic and international structures that condition development, in
cluding a country’s place in the international system.
Institutions: The M arket-State Debate, Revisited
A leading institutional argument about the causes of development reflects a
major debate in political economy, which we emphasized in chapter 4. The issue
is the relative merits of market-led development versus state-led development.
According to the pro-market argument, individual decisions of free and inde
pendent economic agents will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. As
people try to maximize their own gains, the society as a whole becomes better
off. Allowing the market to work freely leads to prosperity.
On the other side of the debate, advocates for state-led approaches argue that
development requires an actor capable of coordinating disparate agents, planning
for the long term, and supplying capital for big development pushes in low-
income countries. The argument goes that the state is uniquely suited to per
forming this task. This perspective was especially prominent immediately after
World War II, when Europe was reconstructed and new states emerged from
colonialism around the globe. Development scholars envisioned a “big push” in
development in the world’s poorer countries, where massive state-led investment
would generate a virtuous circle of self-sustaining growth.11
In subsequent years, East Asia was the most rapidly growing region in the
world. Statist scholars argued that the success in that region was due to timely
and constructive state involvement in the economy, not free markets. Begin
ning with Japan immediately after World War II— and then extending to South
Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere into East and Southeast Asia—the “Asian
Tigers” offered compelling evidence. In these cases, active involvement by
well-organized and capable states helped direct investment to productive enter
prises. Effective states helped propel these economies to growth rates that
sometimes exceeded 8 percent to 10 percent per year. Similarly, statists might
attribute China’s current growth to a state that maintains a steady hand in the
economy.
State-led approaches to development were popular from the 1950s to the
1970s, but the arguments for market-led development returned to prominence in
the 1980s and 1990s. For several decades after World War II, the state played a
Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 105
leading role in the economies of many developing countries, from Japan to India
to Brazil to much of Africa. In some countries, this role was inspired or encour
aged by the apparent economic, military, and technological success of the Soviet
Union in the 1950s and 1960s, and by the easy availability of loans in the 1970s.
In the early 1980s, however, many Latin American countries in particular suf
fered from economic crises driven by accumulated debts. Less than a decade
later, communism collapsed in Central Europe and the Soviet Union broke apart
(see the country profile on Russia). These events led to a sense in many advanced
capitalist countries that communism and state planning as an economic model
had been discredited.
At this time, many prominent institutions advocated for economic liberaliza
tion in developing countries, or moves toward free-market economics. Major
proponents of this approach included the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, based in Washington, D.C. These organizations arranged
loans to many developing countries that faced economic difficulties. The loans
were conditional upon those countries opening up to freer trade and flows of
capital, and often to reductions in the role of the government in the economy. The
1980s and the 1990s were times when many developing countries moved toward
more free-market systems, with the main questions being how far and how fast
these changes would be made.
In more recent years, the debate has shifted once again for a couple of reasons.
First, the turn toward free market economics led to critiques of how the free market
performed. In many countries, reducing the role of the state in the economy was
associated with the losses of formal jobs (or increases in unemployment and under
employment), a rise in inequality, and even crises such as hyperinflation. Second,
evidence began to accumulate that “state-led” or “state-directed” development had
worked effectively in certain places, namely where the quality and professionalism
How Did China Become an Economic Power? PAGE 420
China’s development has been dizzyingly rapid in the last thirty-
five years. The country’s economic performance was largely
quite poor through most of the twentieth century, but after a
series of reforms beginning in 1978 and 1979, the Chinese econ
omy took off. The country is now often referred to as the “global
factory,” and it now rivals the United States for the title of the
world’s largest economy.
For more on Chinese development, see the case study in
Part VI, pp. 420-421. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. What factors— political, institutional, and cultural— likely
contributed to poor growth in China in the years when
Mao Zedong held power?
2. Is China’s recent success in development a simple story of
the state getting out of the way and letting markets do
their work, or is it more complicated?
3. How might we explain the emergence of the reforms that
began in 1978 and 1979? In other words, why did China
reform?
4. What sorts of challenges does the Chinese economy face
in the medium-term future?
106 Chapter 5: Development
institution A regularized or
patterned activity that shapes the
behavior of individuals and groups,
including formal organizations like
the state or political parties, as well
as more informal institutions such
as norms and values.
new institutionalism The name
given to the turn to institutional
theory in the last several decades
in economics, political science, and
sociology.
institutionalism An approach to
theorizing in comparative politics
and related fields that places
emphasis on the power of
institutions to shape the behavior
of individuals..
rational institutionalism
An approach to theorizing in
comparative politics and related
fields that places emphasis on the
power of institutions to shape the
behavior of individuals, one which
often focuses on implications of
institutions for individuals’ strategic
choices.
of the state was high. Thus, a theory emerged that the quality of the state might
matter more than the quantity of the state in determining how an economy devel
ops. High levels of performance in several East Asian countries over several de
cades— and by China in the 2000s and 2010s— showed that some of the strongest
performing economies may exhibit relatively high levels of state involvement.
As noted in the previous chapter, the discussion about the role of markets and
states is generally a matter of degree. Even most strong advocates of market-led
development would prefer the existence of a state that is capable of ensuring a
rule of law, enforcing contracts between private actors, and providing law and
order. (For instance, almost no one would favor a situation of stateless “anarchy”
as recently existed in Somalia.) And even strong advocates of state-led develop
ment frequently acknowledge that free markets can be a very useful feature in
part of the economy. (Most statists would not favor totalitarian state control of all
economic activity, as might be most approximated in North Korea.)
Finally, as you consider this key debate, keep in mind that many scholars of
development will have different outcomes in mind. Many may be focused on
economic growth, while some may be focused on explaining the degree of pov
erty reduction in a country. Others will look at inequality, still others at human
opportunities more broadly, and yet others at the environmental sustainability or
cultural appropriateness of “development.” Consider whether different measures
of development might influence one’s evaluation of different development
strategies— and if so, how.
Institutions: Beyond the M arket-State Debate
Development takes place over long periods of time, and the state and the market
are not the only things that make it happen. Other institutions also matter.
By institutions, political scientists mean the many features of a society that
shape peoples’ behavior and actions, as discussed in the previous chapter and
later chapters. The new institutional framework focuses on a broader set of
institutions.
To use an example, consider the institution of property rights. In societies
where an individual’s right to private property is well established and secure, in
dividuals are likely to behave in ways that promote development. On the other
hand, if property rights are not secure, development may be hindered. Imagine
you have a house and a few acres for growing crops. If the government can seize
your house at any time, or if squatters can simply take over your land, then you
will be unlikely to invest a lot of money in your house, or in making your land
more productive. Were private property secure, on the other hand, you might be
likelier to make those investments. And so too might your neighbors. This would
lead to a society that is more economically secure. According to this argument,
the institution of strong property rights would promote investment because it
allows individuals to reap the rewards of their investments in the long run.12
The institution-based approach to comparative politics, or institutionalism,
has several strains. Rational institutionalism holds that political and economic
outcomes are functions of individuals’ responses to their institutional environ
ments. Rational institutionalists emphasize economic logics, and many of these
scholars would be found engaging the debate about states and markets
Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 107
IN S IG H T S
State-Directed Development: Political Power
and Industrialization in the Global Periphery
by Atul Kohli
Atul Kohli works to overcome the “state-market divide” by explaining successful economic development as a function of
both the public sector and private capitalist enterprise. Kohli has
argued for the importance of understanding state capacity (as de
fined in the previous chapter) and the importance of constructive
state intervention, and places the state prominently in the title of
the book, but not to the exclusion of private actors. He uses the
metaphor of a chariot pulled by two horses— the state and private
business— and notes that where these pull in the same direction,
development occurs, but where the two horses pull in opposite
directions, the chariot will not move (or may topple). Kohli uses the
case of Korea to show success and Brazil as a moderate success,
but highlights the African case of Nigeria as a failed economy
where the state does not work to promote private enterprise.
Atul Kohli, State-Directed Developm ent: Political Power and Industrialization in
the G lobal Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
mentioned previously. Historical institutionalism also finds that institutions
matter but traces these consequences through time, showing how historical
changes shape future events. For historical institutionalists, the timing and se
quencing of events matters, as do specific circumstances that may arise at “critical
junctures” in time, when a country may take any number of different paths.13 The
reason historical trajectories are so important is that changes are path dependent:
The farther a society goes down a certain path, the less and less likely it is to di
verge from that path. For example, if a country develops by privileging a number
of state-linked businesses, it will be hard for the government to change this with
out some sort of crisis. History is “sticky,” and cannot be easily reversed. Histori
cal institutionalists also tend to focus on how institutions produce collective
actors and organize interests, in contrast to the individualist tendency of rational
institutionalism. Institutionalists argue that development is shaped by the insti
tutions in place, by how institutions are created, and by how they evolve over the
long run. The preceding example of property rights could be seen as involving
both rational institutional and historical institutional approaches, and a major
recent work provides another example.
Culture and D evelopm ent
The approaches just discussed characterize institutional actors as the protago
nists of development, yet there are other approaches to development that empha
size deeper features of a society itself—features that reflect commonly held
customs, norms, habits, and values. That is to say, for many trying to understand
development, culture matters. Many scholars are interested in both culture and
institutions as predictors of development, and the links between these factors are
not always clear.
C ivil Society, Social C a p ital, a n d T ru s t
A society where people can cooperate and work together is likelier to thrive than
one filled with distrust and lacking organization. One of the earliest and most
prominent modern proponents of this view was Alexis de Tocqueville, in his
classic Democracy in America. Tocqueville attributed America’s economic vibrancy
historical institutionalism An
approach to theorizing that places
emphasis on the power of institu
tions to shape the behavior of
individuals, and how this operates
overtime.
path dependent The name given
to historical processes in which
future developments are shaped or
partially determined by events at
previous stages in those processes.
108 Chapter 5: Development
civil society Public space or zone
of social life, at least partially
autonomous from the state, in
which individuals are free to
engage in deliberation and social
movement activity, for example.
social capital Advantage that
individuals or groups hold by virtue
of their social relationships.
trust The extent to which an
individual has confidence in the
reliability or good conduct of
others.
in part to a variety of cultural characteristics (including hardy frontier mentali
ties and inventiveness), reserving special mention for the degree to which Ameri
cans constructed an active civic life, noting famously that “Americans of all ages,
all stations of life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations.”14
Rich associational life—which may itself be a consequence of institutions—can
generate the values and complex structures needed for a diversified economy.15
It is very difficult to imagine a modern economy without complex organiza
tions, such as corporations or cooperatives, that either are relatively large or have
rich linkages to many other organizations. Researchers find that civil society—
the public space or zone of social life—links directly to economic outcomes (see,
e.g., the “Insights” box on Fukuyama’s Trust). Societies with extensive social net
works in political and economic life are said to have the virtue of high levels of
social capital, advantages held by virtue of relationships.
Social capital can build on itself and help reinforce a society’s development.
It is said to work in several ways. First, density of network ties, as already men
tioned, may generate trust, or confidence in the reliability or good conduct of
others. This is because shared ties help people build and maintain reputations,
and in dense networks characterized by high transitivity (i.e., the people you
know also know each other), people have a lot to lose from behaving in untrust
worthy ways. It is also because in dense networks information tends to flow
rapidly, which has many economic benefits. The notion of “bonding capital” is
based on density of ties and the idea that deepening these ties has benefits for the
economy. Another form of social capital is sometimes called “bridging capital,”
which is the set of benefits that come from networks extending out to reach new
people and places.16 Sometimes these benefits are beneficial for the group, such
as when trade between previously disconnected subgroups becomes possible.
Sometimes benefits accrue mainly to the relatively small number of people who
are themselves the “bridges” and who can act and profit as “brokers” (of informa
tion or contacts, for example).
IN SIG H TS The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development
by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson) and James A Robinson
This article traces differences in economic development around the world today to the varying historical paths of
different world regions. Colonialism and geography played es
pecially important roles, with the impacts playing out over
more than a century. Colonizers such as Britain established dif
ferent types of states in the different regions of the world.
Where mass settlement was not possible (for reasons of geog
raphy and endemic disease), colonizers set up states that
worked primarily to extract resources with little investment.
This happened in tropical Africa, for instance. Places that were
easier to “settle,” such as America, ended up with stronger state
structures. Over time, these institutions evolved into colonial
states and later into independent states in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. States that were originally designed to ex
tract resources tend to continue that way today (with negative
consequences), whereas countries actively settled by colonizers
tended to develop into systems more capable of promoting
development. The historical development of the state as an in
stitution (from decades or centuries ago) still casts a long
shadow over development today.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development,’ American Economic Review 91 (2001): 1369-1401
Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 109
R eligion
Some argue that religious differences between groups and between nations may
also explain differences in development.17 Theories of this kind gained promi
nence early in the twentieth century and have remained part of the discourse
about economic and social change ever since. In contemporary development
studies, scholars have attempted to explain the relative success of different world
regions on the basis of religious beliefs. For some time, scholars theorized that
Confucian values hindered the economic performance of East Asian countries,
relative to Europe and the United States. They posited that cultural expectations
of obedience and respect for authority could limit the creativity and entrepre
neurial spirit that capitalistic growth requires. Paradoxically, as East Asia has
flourished in recent years, scholars have found advantages in Confucian values,
emphasizing how a strong belief in order and authority, respect for the state, and
respect for education may all facilitate growth.
Similarly, some scholars hypothesize that features of Muslim faith may have
hindered development in the Arab world. For instance, the Quran restricts lend
ing on interest, which may make large investments difficult (though it should be
noted that many modern Islamic states have developed “Islamic bonds” and other
financial instruments). Muslims show high rates of opposition to globalization,
which may imply an unwillingness to participate in the global economy.18
Finally, the degree of religion may matter more than the type of religion. Religious
institutions of many kinds can bind people together and may therefore increase
trust and cooperation, which in turn can lead to positive political, social, and eco
nomic outcomes. In any event, many arguments linking religion and development
operate through intervening or mediating variables. That is, religious beliefs affect
certain behaviors or institutions that in turn affect economics, perhaps with several
steps in between. This was one of the original lines of thinking pioneered by Max
Weber, a founder of modern sociology and political science, in his book The Protes
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958; first published, in German, in 1905.).
Value Systems
Cultural factors that shape development may include values other than those as
sociated with religious beliefs. Prominent candidates for values that favor devel
opment are those that allow people to orient their behavior toward the future
IN S IG H T S
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
by Francis Fukuyama
The argument that civil society matters did not exist only for Tocqueville’s nineteenth-century America. Francis Fukuyama
argues that economic modernization in many countries around
the world has been rooted in the cultivation of trust. Societies
with high levels of trust have been able to move beyond the
small, family-owned economic units that dominate low-income
economies, creating major corporations that can take advantage
of their size to increase productivity. Insofar as a division of labor
and specialization are central to economic expansion, the emer
gence of such strong institutions in the high-trust societies ac
celerates growth. Fukuyama thus traces economic development
ultimately to a fundamentally cultural value.
Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New
York: Free Press, 1996.
Chapter 5: Development
A group baptism among Evangelical Christians in El Salvador. Evangelical Christianity is
prominent in Central America and a number of other countries, notably in many parts of the
developing world. Scholars debate religion’s relationship with economic development.
rather than toward the present, to engage in long-term planning rather than the
day-to-day. The virtue of thrift, or a propensity to save, can matter here, as suc
cessful societies are those in which people can defer gratification from today into
the future, in the hopes of using savings to invest and build more wealth. Work
ethic will also be important; this can link back to the religious values but find its
roots elsewhere in a culture.
Individualism is also often considered important, as it may allow those who
accumulate wealth to build with it, rather than feeling compelled to distribute it
to friends, acquaintances, and hangers-on. According to these theories, notions
of individual accountability and responsibility, rationality and pragmatism in
some places contrast with the lack of such progress-promoting virtues in societies
where people spend everything they earn, leaving little upon which to build.
System s and Structures: Dom estic and International
Institutionalist approaches generally hold that development is determined largely
by the actions and decisions of individuals, as shaped by institutions and the in
centives and constraints they create. Culturalist approaches generally see people’s
behavior in the economy as shaped and constrained by beliefs, values, norms, and
habits. In the case of statist and neoliberal approaches, the domestic forces that
matter are the extent and nature of states and their involvement in the economy.
But there are other approaches as well. Some scholars—most notably Marxists—
have traced economic outcomes to fundamental underlying structures in an
economy, such as the basic form of economic production, and the system of social
classes generated by these forms of production.
Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 111
D o m e stic E con o m ic S tru c tu re s a n d C lass In teres ts
Several schools of development scholarship emphasize the impediments and
traps confronting societies as they attempt to promote development. In this view,
certain powerful groups may block development by seeking to perpetuate their
own advantages at the expense of the populace at large. Even where the institu
tions of democracy seem to be functioning well, interest groups or lobbies may
demand special treatment from the government that prevents the reforms needed
for economic growth. Scholars on both the right and the left of the political
spectrum may adopt this view regarding the importance of domestic structures
and vested interests. On the right, some scholars have argued that democracy
itself can undermine capitalism, because in democracies special interests will
often seek preferential treatment from the government.19 The most important
scholar on the left was the intellectual founder of one of the twentieth century’s
most important ideologies: Karl Marx.
In te rn a tio n a l E co n o m ic S tru c tu re s a n d C lass In teres ts
Karl Marx’s ideas were made the official ideology in the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.),
after that country was created out of the Russian Revolution of 1917. And while
Marx’s ideology was eventually considered a recipe for “socialism in one country”
by the dictator Joseph Stalin, some Marxist schools of thought also foresaw an
internationalized crisis of capitalism. Many early Marxists hoped for a “perma
nent revolution” around the world, and diagnosed the global inequalities that
capitalism had engendered. (Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Russian Revolution
and the U.S.S.R.’s first head of state, led the charge with a book entitled Imperi
alism: The Highest Stage o f Capitalism)10 Over time, however, many Marxist ap
proaches in social science shifted from emphasizing prospects for global socialist
revolution to offering critiques of how politics operates within capitalist
economies.
According to Marxian arguments, the structure of the international economy
will place some powerful countries in the favorable position of capitalist accumu
lation. Meanwhile other countries and world regions are subjected to serving the
role of providing low-wage labor and resources, though a small number of elites
residing in the low-income countries may be complicit with the interests of the
rich countries. For example, a select number of rich Nigerian businesspeople and
politicians may work with the international business community to ensure
capitalist investment in Nigeria, which will result in profits for the international
capitalists and their local “collaborators,” but the Nigerian people as a whole will
not benefit.
Many scholars adopted such perspectives to account for underdevelopment in
the “global south,” the “Third World,” or the “less developed countries.” In the
views of many of these scholars, the international economy has been a zero-sum
game, in which one person’s gain is another person’s loss: In order for some to be
rich, others in the world must be poor.21 One of the leading concepts has been
dependency, which holds that low-income countries will remain in a subordi
nate economic position relative to wealthy countries, depending on markets in
the rich world as a place to sell their low-value goods while importing high-value
goods from those rich countries. In its earliest versions, dependency theory held
dependency A theory that argues
that developing countries cannot
simply embrace free trade because
this will lead to ever-increasing
wealth disparities between them
and the advanced economies.
112 Chapter 5: Development
Does the Global Economy Help
or Hurt Developing Nations like Brazil? PAGE 407
Brazil, after having an economic record that was mixed, at best,
since independence, has now recorded dramatic growth for mul
tiple years. Moreover, the country is making rapid progress in re
lation to two of its traditional scourges: income inequality and
poverty (though much work remains to be done). Surprisingly to
some, these gains have been made under governments identi
fied with the political left (others, of course, are not surprised by
this). Brazil may be finally realizing its ambition to become a
hemispheric power, and perhaps, ultimately, a global power, if it
can sustain this performance.
For more on Brazilian development, see the case study
in Part VI, p. 407. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. How might income inequality and economic underde
velopment interact? In the Brazilian case, historically, does
one cause the other, are they independent, or are they
mutually reinforcing?
2. Why has the Brazilian economy taken off in recent years?
Are the social programs of the Lula da Silva and Rousseff
governments simply siphoning off economic surplus for
other (humanitarian) ends, or can they be thought of
as further investment in the Brazilian economy and its
medium- to long-run prospects?
that low-income countries faced deteriorating terms of trade relative to the capi
talist countries at the center of the world economy, which would make the goods
from the dependent countries ever less valuable.22 The theory was revised when it
became clear that some developing countries experienced “partial” development,
moving from the world’s “periphery” to its “semi-periphery.” 23 The revised ver
sion of dependency theory thus acknowledges that development is possible for
low-income countries, but that their circumstances necessitate the state’s active
involvement in the economy to promote industrialization.24 The early version of
dependency theory that argues that developing countries will always be disad
vantaged has been discarded, but this revised version of the theory continues to
inform the debate about development today through its discussion of the state’s
role.25
G eo g rap h y
Another set of structural variables that may condition development is geography.
The location that a country or region inhabits is largely unchangeable, and may
shape economic opportunities. One major geographic factor is whether a country
has access to the sea; landlocked countries rely more on relations with their
neighbors if they want to trade with the rest of the globe, and the distances to
global markets and logistical challenges associated with being landlocked might
f hinder growth.26 By a similar logic, development might be favored in areas with
good natural harbors, or in countries that have oceans as barriers to would-be
attackers. One might say then, that North America was rz\xtive\y favored by ge
ography as it grew. More controversially, location in the tropics has long been
posited as a hindrance to development.27 The logics here range from the plausible
Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 113
IN S IG H TS
The Modern World System
by Immanuel Wallerstein
Wallerstein developed a theory of international politics in which each place on the globe would fit into a certain role
in the global economy. Known as world systems theory, this ap
proach broke the world into categories of states: core, periphery,
and semi-periphery. The core countries constitute the economic
and technological center, accumulating the preponderance of
profits from global production. The peripheral areas are those
poor locations destined to supply basic inputs to the world
capitalist system, mainly raw materials (including minerals and
foodstuffs) and cheap labor. Semi-peripheral areas— roughly the
“middle-income” countries— would have their own particular
structural role as well, perhaps “allowed” or “encouraged” to in
dustrialize to a certain degree in order to keep the global system
functioning.
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System. Berkeley: University of
California Press [1974] 2011.
to the blatantly racist; a recent plausible view is presented in the “Insights” box on
the work of Jared Diamond. Geography’s impact on development may not be
constant over time. In other words, geographic factors may prove advantageous
or disadvantageous only when coupled with certain technologies or institutions.
W hen the World Values Survey, a massive, ongoing project being carried out
by an international network of social scientists, polled over eighty thousand
people in more than eighty countries about the most important issues they face,
the topic of economic growth and development stood out above all others.28 A
strong economy can lead to a better quality of life and greater satisfaction for
most people, while a weak economy can severely restrict social improvements and
make politics more divisive. Since people care so much about this issue, develop
ment is not exclusively an academic concern. It matters to policymakers and ev
eryday citizens as well. For instance, imagine you are the top economic official in
a poor African country, and you want to know how best to raise people out of
poverty in your country. Comparing South Korea to Brazil, you may examine
why export-led growth (an economic strategy based on selling natural resources
or products in foreign markets) seemed to work in South Korea, and import-
substitution worked for a time in Brazil, and may ask under what conditions each
can work.29 W hether a policymaker or a citizen, can you draw practical lessons
for your country from development successes and failures?
The issue of development involves many substantial questions. W hy do some
countries advance and grow while others do not? W hy do countries grow at some
times and not others? W hy does poverty increase or decline? W hy does educa
tion improve, or why do health outcomes decline? W hy is inequality on the rise
in some places, and declining in others? These are only a subset of the questions
that may be asked about the topic of economic and social development. Even if
we consider mainly economic growth, as we did through much of this chapter,
scholars debate fiercely about the strongest and most successful explanations.
W ith the intent of developing your skills as a comparativist, we will not conclude
by saying which answer is “correct.” Instead, we offer two observations.
First, there is likely some truth to each of the arguments we have presented
about why development happens. Markets can help, states can help, institutions
can matter, culture can matter, and international and domestic structures can
export-led growth A strategy for
achieving economic growth
dependent on sending natural
resources or agricultural or
industrial products for sale in fo
reign markets.
114 Chapter 5: Development
IN S IG H T S
Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies
by Jared Diam ond
Jared Diamond sought to answer a question once posed to him by a friend from the poor nation of Papua New Guinea: Why do
some people have more “cargo” (that is, “stuff”) than others? Dia
mond found answers in nature and geography. In Africa, the
poorest continent in the world today, people faced natural disad
vantages from their environment. For instance, none of the large
resident animals—zebras and rhinos, for example— could be do
mesticated, which held back advances in farming and precluded
the development of African cavalries. In Europe, by contrast, farm
ing and militaries both advanced with the use of the horse, an
animal that could not survive in Africa due to endemic parasites.
In Eurasia, people could also expand their populations along the
continent’s long east-west axis, which allowed migration and
growth, while African peoples were prevented from migrating
and expanding by the varying climates along the continent’s
north-south axis. Diamond argues that geographic and climatic
forces led European peoples to develop the powerful societies
that colonized and dominated the rest of the world.
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.
matter. It is possible and appropriate to combine elements of these different ap
proaches—for example, noting that culture, geography, and the role of the state
all affect development. The reason these theories have earned mention in the
chapter is that they have been supported by some evidence in the real world.
Second, as we noted in chapter 2, it is also important to make meaningful argu
ments that do not simply say that “everything matters.” Rather, through close
examination of empirical evidence in specific case studies, we can find for our
selves what factors matter under what conditions, and h o w different factors might
work together. For example, one might discover that both geography and culture
partially shape economic institutions in a particular case, and that these institu
tions, in turn, both directly and indirectly shape development.
Since development is a process that unfolds continuously over time, an espe
cially useful comparison can be of the same country at different points in time.
For example, why was the import-substitution model successful in Brazil for a
time, and why did it seem to fail at a later point in time? Using the theories from
this section, you can formulate hypotheses to explain such successes and failures.
T H IN K IN G
CO M PA RA TIV ELY
K EY M ETH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Most-Similar-Systems
(MSS) Design
As noted in the first chapter, one way to
set up a useful comparison is to choose
two cases that are very similar on sev
eral criteria yet different on a key out
come. The comparison of the two
Explaining the Development of North
and South Korea
At the beginning of this chapter we noted that the neighboring countries of North and South Korea have had radically different experiences with devel
opment. South Korea went from being one of the poorest countries on earth in
the late 1950s to one of the richest by the 1990s. It has seen its incomes skyrocket
and its economy transform into an industrial powerhouse, while the population
has gone from having a majority illiterate and in poverty to one in which less
than five percent of people fit in those categories. North Korea, of course, started
in roughly the same position as the south. Yet today, it remains extremely poor,
Explaining the Development of North and South Korea 115
as noted at the beginning of this chapter. It experiences periodic famines and
frequently depends on foreign aid that its leadership extorts through creating
international crises. As shown in the following table, if we use the 2009 esti
mates, South Korea’s per capita GDP is almost sixteen times North Korea’s— an
astonishing economic divergence. Explaining such differences over time between
economically successful and unsuccessful countries is one of the classic questions
in development studies. In fact, a major recent book in this area {Why Nations
Fail, by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson) addresses this precise diver
gence between the Koreas and others like it.
Country Per Capita GDP (CIA World Factbook)
North Korea $1,800 (estimate as of 2011)
South Korea $33,200 (estimate as of 2013)
Here we walk through how a comparative analyst might try to explain this
difference. We would note right away that we don’t aim to offer a definitive
“answer” to this question that focuses on one theory over another, though some
might argue that this is a relatively straightforward comparison with an obvious
answer, as we note a bit later. We want to emphasize that we use simple thought
experiments here for the sake of simplicity; these are not full hypothesis tests
using substantial amounts of evidence. As you read this section, focus on the logic
of hypothesis testing, and the general strategy we use to apply theories to these
real-world cases. Note that for more definitive results, we would need to consider
much more evidence and carefully measure each of the variables we consider.
One reason this is an interesting comparison is that North and South Korea
are very similar in terms of several variables we might expect to affect develop
ment, including culture and geography, but these countries vary dramatically in
terms of the dependent variable (development). Table 5.2 summarizes some simi
larities and differences between the two cases, noting how much or how little
variation there is on the key variables.
South Korea’s political and economic institutions are based much more than
North Korea’s on capitalism and the use of domestic and global markets, as well
as democracy in more recent decades. (In fact, for Acemoglu and Robinson, the
comparison of the Koreas is a prime example of the importance of political insti
tutions in shaping economic outcomes. You might see this as the “leading candi
date” theory to explain the divergence, though we would emphasize the logic of
considering different theoretical perspectives). In terms of external influences,
the country followed a model established by Japan, in two ways. First, Korea was
a Japanese colony before World W ar II, and Japanese colonialism brought eco
nomic linkages to Japan and a powerful state, along with an emphasis on educat
ing the workforce.30 Second, Japan’s economic success served as a model in terms
of policy. South Korea’s state adopted a pro-business strategy that included some
state intervention, but with strict rules: Companies receiving state support had to
meet targets for production and exports, or they would be cut off.31 Thus, the
South Korean case was interpreted by some as a constructive form of state inter
vention, and by others as a country where the state did right by “emulating” the
rules of the market.
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
K EY M E T H O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
(continued)
Koreas and their differences in eco
nomic development is an example.
Choosing two countries that have
much in common allows the analyst
to isolate the variables that are likely
to cause the different outcomes. In
this case, geography and many as
pects of culture are similar, which
means these variables are unlikely to
explain the major differences in out
comes. Comparative political scien
tists do not have laboratories to work
with the way natural scientists do, so
‘most similar” cases are as close as
one can get to controlling for many
variables the way one does in a labo
ratory. In fact, some MSS designs
come from what is called a ‘natural
experiment,’ such as when a country
is divided into smaller parts and
analysts can observe the subsequent
outcomes across the different parts of
the country. Examples include com
parisons of East and West Germany
after the country was partitioned, or
comparisons of India and Pakistan
after the partition of British India.
Another pair of countries with simi
larities is the Dominican Republic and
Haiti, which are located on two halves
of the same island. Of course, in each
of these instances, the two cases will
have developed quite differently over
time. Setting up MSS design is not.
enough to definitively demonstrate
which variables cause an outcome, as
that requires exploring the evidence,
but it can help rule out unlikely
causes of variations in outcomes.
116 Chapter 5: Development
t a b l e 5 . 2 Possible Explanations for Variations in Developm ent
SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA
Variable Case 1: South Korea Case 2: North Korea Extent of Variation
Independent Variables for Hypothesis Testing
Culture
Korean heritage (with minority Christian
population)
Korean heritage (with negligible
Christian population)
Limited
Geography
Korean peninsula
Coal and mining resources
Korean peninsula
Coal and mining resources
Limited
Economic and Political
Institutions
Mixed state/market economy
Capitalist orientation Influenced by Japan,
United States
Export-led growth for decades
Use of markets Democracy (in recent years)
Command economy Communist
rule Influenced by China, U.S.S.R.
Inward-looking economy
Almost no use of markets
Autocracy for decades
Major
Dependent Variable
Development
High development and growth
Advanced economy
Low development and growth
Poor economy, major poverty
Major
Even the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and the global economic
crisis that began in 2008 did little to dent South Korea’s long-term achievements.
In fact, South Korea has served as a model for other Asian economies, much as
Japan had served as a model for South Korea.32 Indeed, several features of China’s
current economic approach appear to have drawn from South Korea’s experience
in promoting export-led growth. This has had interesting implications for the
different theories mentioned previously: The focus here is on political and eco
nomic institutions, but there is also renewed interest in cultural theories of devel
opment because development has spread so convincingly across East Asian
countries in particular.
North Korea differs quite dramatically from South Korea in its political and
economic institutions, while it shares a similar geography and a common cultural
background from the period before the two countries were divided. The country
was pulled into the Soviet orbit after the end of World War II, while South
Korea was aligned with the United States. Eventually, a major conflict broke out,
the Korean War, in which North was supported by China under Mao Zedong
and South Korea was supported by the United States (with numerous American
troops) and its allies. Eventually, the conflict was halted without satisfactory
resolution for either side, and as a result we are left with the two countries, each
of which claims to be the legitimate government of all of Korea. North Korea
still employs a Soviet-style “planned economy.” This means that all key decisions
about production and funding are made by the state, and to the extent that
market forces govern exchange they do so only informally. In essence, the two
countries vary not just in terms of their development histories, but also in terms
of the nature and extent of their states’ involvement in the economy.
Explaining the Development of North and South Korea 117
How would each of our theories explain the relative economic fortunes of
North and South Korea in recent decades? (See Table 5.3.) Notice that the insti
tutional arguments are promising for the reasons noted previously. At the same
time, while we note that the cultural arguments might not work at first glance,
that does not mean “culture” is irrelevant. A scholar doing a deeper exploration
of the two countries might find ways to show that political cultures changed over
time between the two countries in ways that affected the economy as well. In
short, both countries maybe culturally “Korean,” but that does not mean they are
identical on that variable: the North Korean political culture is certainly different
from the South Korean political culture after decades of separation and such dif
ferent experiences.
As you can see here, our thought experiment does not definitively establish
that one of these theories is right, but it demonstrates how we would initially
proceed in applying these general theories of development to the basic outlines of
these two cases. This helps us think about what types of arguments might work
and which might not in explaining variations in outcomes by country.
t a b l e 5 . 3 H ypothesis Testing: North Korea and South Korea
Theory
Hypothesis: What Explains
Variation?
T h o u g h t Experim ent and
H ypothesis Test Next Steps for Theory
Institutions (market
institutions)
Different enforcement of
property rights and contracts
South: Strong enforcement
North: Weak enforcement
Promising
Bring in additional cases and
examine these cases further.
Consider how to account for South
Korea’s practice of
state-led development.
Institutions (states and
state policy)
Different qualities of state and
state policy
South: High quality (with robust
industrial policy)
North: Low quality
Promising
Account for why North Korea has
failed with statist strategy. Examine
South Korea’s mix of state
involvement and market forces in
state-led development.
Culture
Different cultural backgrounds,
including values, religion, and
habits
Not promising (Despite
some differences, countries
have similar cultural
backgrounds)
Adapt hypothesis to include values
and habits along with other
variables.
Develop more complex hypothesis
on how institutions change national
economic cultures over time, for
example.
The World-System
Different positions in “world
system”
South Korea: American and
Japanese influence
North Korea: Soviet and Chinese
influence
Somewhat promising but
incomplete (Positioning in
the global system likely
mattered by influencing
institutions)
Adapt hypothesis to include world-
system along with other variables.
Develop more complex hypothesis
that also draws on institutional
theories, for example.
118 Chapter 5: Development
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
C o n c e p t s
Development is a topic of pressing interest to billions of
people around the world, and it can be measured in many
different ways.
• The most common ways of measuring development are
economic, most notably the level and growth of per capita
GDP, but also the extent of poverty and economic
inequality.
T y p e s
Development can be measured by social indicators (such
as health and education), standards of living, satisfaction
and happiness, equity across societal groups, cultural
change, and environmental sustainability.
Cases from around the world show that many of the indica
tors of development positively correlate with one another,
but not always.
C a u s e s a n d E f f e c t s
Using economic growth as an outcome, scholars have
theorized about many important factors that lead to
development. An important debate is about whether the
economy should be led by the market or by the state.
The current consensus is that both market and state play
important roles in a modern economy.
Institutions such as property rights play key roles in
development and may link to the market and the state.
• Culture shapes development as well. It may be manifested
in levels of trust and social capital, or in norms, ethics, and
cultural tendencies that emerge in different places at
different points in time.
A final category of explanations for development can be
found in “structural” or “systemic” factors, where the
backdrop of the world economic and political order can
either support or hinder economic advancement.
• There is surely some truth in each of these approaches, but
these must be investigated with respect to specific cases.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. The “Causes and Effects” section of this chapter focused on
growth, but can you use at least one theory from that section to
propose why some developing countries have more or less in
equality (as defined in chapter 4) than others?
2. The so-called “BRIC” countries— Brazil, Russia, India, and
China— all boomed at points in the 2000s. Does this correlation
suggest they are all following similar development patterns?
Does this timing provide evidence to support one theory about
the causes of development more than others? Does it mean
something “global” was causing growth, and not something
specific to each country?
3. Many countries have more and less successful economic peri
ods over time. Which of the theories in this chapter does this
fluctuation support? Does it “disprove” any theory based on cul
ture, because a country’s culture is relatively “stable”? Does it
“prove” that development depends on things that change over
time, like a government’s policies?
4. Many prominent developing countries are (or have been) major
exporters of oil. Why have the resource-rich countries not ben
efited from consistent, rapid growth? To what extent are natural
resources beneficial for development, and to what extent are
they a “curse”?
5. Why do countries go through economic boom and bust cycles
in their development? If countries are “most similar” (see
chapter 2) to themselves, should economic performance be
relatively consistent over time, unless there are major changes in
policy (as was the case in China)?
CHAPTER 6
Democracy and
Democratization
• Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s most famous democracy activist, approaches the lower house of parliament to begin her term as Leader of the
Opposition in May 2012. Suu Kyi suffered many years of persecution and oppression, including nearly two decades of house arrest.
magine a country where less than half of the population can vote, half have
very limited basic rights, and social roles are allocated on the basis of ethnic
or racial affiliation, so that members of some groups have virtually no rights
and are the property of other people. Imagine still further that elections are
periodically held but that to stand any chance of election one must be from
the elite class, meaning (1) a wealthy landowner; (2) a wealthy businessman;
or (3) a doctor, lawyer, clergyman, or other professional whose social net
works intersect with those of wealthy landowners or busi
nessmen. I f we told you that this situation were true of a
given developing country, would you consider it fully demo
cratic? Probably not, and yet the country we are describing is
the United States of America in the years after its founding.
O ur point is most emphatically not to deny the democratic
status of that society. It was, at the time, in spite of the condi
tions we have just listed, one of the most democratic large-scale
societies the world had ever known. Rather, our point is that
deciding whether a given country is democratic is more compli
cated than it appears at first glance. Democracy changes over
time, meaning that its benchmarks and criteria are moving tar
gets. Moreover, the line between more and less democratic re
gimes is somewhat gray
Most people reading this chapter have lived only in demo
cratic societies. Democracy is, for much of the Anglophone
world, part of the backdrop of politics: It is simply assumed to be
present (yet, as the preceding example demonstrates, this has
not always been the case, and even today there are democratic
deficits in this world). W here regimes are democratic, individu
als and groups can freely contest their ideas and try to shape
political life, with the winners of fair elections having greater
opportunity to craft their preferred policies and laws through
the democratic process. The losers typically accept the principle
that in a democracy it is possible one will lose a political battle,
a debate, or an election; they continue to support the system or the regime, even if
they oppose the particular government administration of the moment.
In much of the world, however, authoritarianism is the rule, and the very
existence of democracy itself is a fundamental political issue. Only in recent
120
IN THIS C H A P T E R jj
Concepts 121
Democracy and Democratic Regimes 121
Regime Change and Democratization 124
Types 125
Types of Democracy 125
Types of Democratization 129
Causes and Effects: What Causes
Dem ocratization? 131
Modernization 132
Culture and Democracy 134
The International System 135
Domestic Institutions 136
Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals
and Groups 137
Combining Arguments and Theories:
Multiple Causes 139
TH INKING C O M P A R A T IV E L Y 1
Is American Dem ocracy a Model? 141
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
China • Brazil • India •
United States
Concepts 121
decades has the world reached the point where over half of its citizens live under
democracy. Understanding whether a country is democratic is thus a prerequisite
for further discussions about politics, whether we are interested in legislatures
and executives, or the power of interest groups and political parties, or religious
politics and gender politics. W h ile the precise definition o f democracy is
debated— and many will disagree on which countries are democratic— most po
litical scientists will concur that prominent countries such as China, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, North Korea, and Cuba are not democracies, and that many more coun
tries, such as Russia, fall far short of full democratic practice, even if elections are
held on schedule. W e discuss authoritarian regimes in the next chapter.
In this chapter, we begin by addressing the concepts of two major catego
ries of regime type: democracy (or democratic regime) and democratization,
the process through which authoritarian polities become (more) democratic.
W e then discuss subtypes of democratic regimes, using a number of our case
studies to exemplify them. Finally, we turn to political science debates about
the causes of democratization and democratic consolidation. W hy do they
happen where they do, in some places and not others? A nd why do they happen
when they do, at some times and not others? We present several possible ex
planations. We close with a critical examination of whether the United States
should be treated by political scientists as a model for democracy elsewhere.
Concepts
Democracy is one of the most fundamental concepts in politics, and given its
importance, scholars have contested and reworked the concept and causes of de
mocracy over the years.1 As with many constructive debates in political science
(in contrast with the winner-and-loser, zero-sum dynamics of debates in elec
toral politics and campaigns), contestation over the definition is not a disagree
ment to be lamented, but rather an important part of the study of democracy.
D em ocracy and Dem ocratic Regim es
Despite disagreement over exactly what democracy means, there is broad agree
ment on two salient points. First, many political scientists would share an intui
tive sense of which geographic units in the world are relatively more or less
democratic. Second, even in the midst of some disagreement, political scientists
commonly accept definitions of democracy that emphasize two main types of
rights, which we discuss further a bit later in the chapter: political rights to par
ticipate in electoral processes, and civil rights and related freedoms. The promi
nent non-governmental organization Freedom House, which monitors democracy
in countries around the world, explicitly builds both elements into its assessment
(Map 6.1). Leading works in recent years emphasize the distinction between
mere electoral democracy and a more genuine democracy that also includes civil
democracy A form of regime
associated with “rule by the
people” that signifies rights and
liberties for citizens, including
political rights to participate in
elections and civil liberties such as
freedom of speech.
political rights Rights of indivi
duals to participate in political life,
including the right to political
speech, the right to vote, and the
right to join political associations.
civil rights Rights of individuals to
participate in civic life, including
freedoms of assembly, speech,
access to information, and equal
access to institutions, among
others.
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2015
122 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
Map 6.1 Democracy in the world, 2015
regime A form or type of govern
mental system, with an emphasis
on institutions and rules.
democratic regime A regime
with predominantly democratic
Institutions, including basic civil
rights and regular, free elections.
procedural definition of
democracy A conception of
democracy, contrasted with a subs
tantive definition, that emphasizes
the minimal standards, procedures,
or rules that a country should have
in place to govern political life.
rights protections. To define democracy, most scholars use what is called a pro
cedural, or minimal, definition. This approach emphasizes the minimal stan
dards that a country should have in place—procedures or rules that govern
political life— as contrasted with a variety of substantive issues noted later.2
By using the term regime, political scientists are referring to a form or type of
governmental system, with an emphasis on institutions and rules. The most sig
nificant distinction is between democratic and authoritarian regimes. You can
think of a democratic regime as one with democratic institutions and rules.
Similarly, an authoritarian regime has authoritarian institutions, structures, or
rules. The regime is conceptually distinct from any particular democratic govern
ment. Thus, Iran has had an Islamic Republic as its regime since 1979 but has had
several different governments under presidents such as Mohammad Khatami,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani. The United States has had its
constitutional republic since 1788 but many different governments in its regime.
Note that one’s definition of “democratic regime” depends on one’s definition
of “democracy.” For instance, some might classify Mexico or Nigeria as demo
cratic regimes because they have relatively free and fair elections and protections
for civil liberties. But others might consider these countries not to be fully demo
cratic on the grounds that they fail to provide sufficient levels of security and
opportunity for citizens.
P ro c e d u ral (M in im a l) D e fin itio n s o f D em o cracy
Procedural definitions o f democracy say that what makes a country democratic
is that it follows certain procedures, or rules and methods. Yet most leading
procedural definitions of democracy view it as more than just elections every
few years; they also include the civil rights and civil liberties that should be
Concepts 123
guaranteed to every citizen on an ongoing basis. Thus, even when political scien
tists speak of minimal, or procedural, definitions of what democracy is, they
mean more than elections. Consider the following lists of political rights and
civil liberties, which many political scientists agree are central to democracy3:
Political Rights:
• Elections are free and fair, and most individuals can vote.
• Elections are regularly scheduled or held periodically.
• Elections have multiple political parties, or some choice.
• Elections are open to most any individual to run for office.
Civil Liberties:
• Freedom of speech and expression
• Freedom to access sources of information/freedom of the press
• Freedom of assembly/to join interest groups and parties
Note that all of these are essentially measures of whether certain rules or pro
cedures are followed. Also, note that the first four of these may be seen as directly
related to electoral processes, and they presume that peaceful transfers of power
do take place in accord with electoral decisions. The latter three are about politi
cal action outside of the realm of electoral processes and center on the rights of
the public not to be harassed by the state. Important civil liberties can be found
in the U.S. Constitution’s first ten amendments.. Passed together in 1791, this
Bill of Rights set an international standard for civil liberties.
To illustrate the importance of both categories of freedoms, consider a thought
experiment in which a country has regular free and fair elections but allows no
protest, controls the press, and represses free speech. This would be less a true de
mocracy and more a competitive authoritarian or electoral authoritarian regime.4
Conversely, a system in which people have relative freedoms to voice their griev
ances but no right to elect their government officials would also be non-democratic.
Only by fulfilling the basic requirements on both counts will a country earn a repu
tation for democracy.
Other criteria could conceivably be added. For instance, some leading scholars
have proposed adding the following two additional criteria in determining
whether a country is democratic:5
• Democracies are not overruled by an outside power (such as a colonizer).
• Democracies must maintain a clear distinction between civilian and
military rule.
These two additional features further clarify the requirements for a democ
racy, ruling out the likes of countries that look like democracies internally but
that systematically overrule the will of the populace. These may include locations
such as the so-called “independent” homelands under South Africa’s apartheid
government before 1994.
S ubstantive D e fin itio n s o f D em o cracy
While procedural definitions long dominated the debates about democracy in
political science, recent years have seen an increasing turn to more substantive
definitions o f democracy. This range of definitions examines the notion of dem
ocratic depth and quality, suggesting that democracy is not just about certain
substantive definition of
democracy A conception of de
mocracy, contrasted with a proce
dural definition, that views a
polity’s democratic status as de
pendent on the satisfaction of
certain substantive ends, such as
the extension of broad rights or the
reduction of income inequality.
124 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
regime change Any major
change of regime type, including
democratization, democratic bre
akdown, or certain types of autho
ritarian persistence in which one
type of authoritarian regime gives
way to another.
regime type The form of a politi
cal regime, such as democratic
versus authoritarian, as well as
subtypes, such as personalistic
dictatorships or totalitarian
regimes.
democratization The process of a
regime becoming more democra
tic, including both democratic
transition and democratic
consolidation.
democratic breakdown The
process through which a democra
tic regime partially or completely
loses its democratic status.
rule-governed procedures being followed but rather about certain outcomes, in
particular the coordination of a certain kind of collective action. Proponents of a
substantive definition of democracy often argue that countries can always un
dergo further democratization and that the question of democracy is not re
stricted to whether countries meet a minimum threshold.
Elements of a substantive definition may include the following:
• Participation, social inclusion, and civil society involvement
• Equity/equality by gender, race, or other groups
■ Accountability (including lack of corruption) and institutional performance
• Public knowledge and awareness
• Poverty, inequality, and other economic outcomes
Obviously, these criteria rarely lend themselves to yes/no evaluations. Even
the world’s most established democracies can always make progress toward
greater democratic depth or quality. In the United States, for instance, the per
centage of citizens who vote in Congressional elections ranges from about
40 percent in years without a presidential election to about 60 percent in years
when a presidential election is held. This contrasts with much higher voter turn
out in most of Europe, leading some to suggest that the United States falls short
on certain substantive aspects of democracy. W ith respect to the economy, the
American political and economic systems from the 1980s to the 2000s were
characterized by higher levels of inequality than Europe (thus suggesting a sub
stantive shortcoming in the American model relative to the European), but also
generated lower levels of unemployment in most years (thus possibly suggesting
a substantive advantage of the American model over the European).
Questions of substantive democracy lend themselves to some of the most intrigu
ing research questions in comparative politics. In fact, as the number of democracies
in the world has risen in the democratic wave since 1989,6 questions of substantive
democracy have taken an increasingly important position in comparative politics
relative to procedural democracy. O f course, studying procedural democracy and
studying substantive democracy are not mutually exclusive, as a country’s reaching
the procedural/minimal threshold may be related to improvements in the substantive
elements just listed. For students interested in researching democracy, either or both
of these definitions may be useful, but it is important to distinguish between them.
Regim e C h an g e and D em ocratization
The history of democracy and authoritarianism is one of change from one regime
type to another. Democratization is the process that leads from authoritarian
ism to democracy, while changes in the opposite direction are commonly called
democratic breakdown (and not “authoritarianization”)7. We discuss the latter
in the next chapter.
Democratization may be seen as a process that a country completes once it
transitions from authoritarianism to a basic minimum democratic threshold, or it
may be a more indefinite, ongoing process that continues to consolidate even
after a country has reached a basic level of political and civil freedoms. Democ
ratization itself can thus be a rich and diverse area for study. Two additional
concepts that are central in the literature on democratization highlight the dif
ferent stages of the process: transition and consolidation.
Types 125
Transition is the movement from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one.
This can happen through revolutionary means. For example, the Arab Spring up
risings of 2011 might lead to successful democratization, and have clearly taken
some steps in this direction, but in some respects this democratization seems to
have stalled in a number of the effected countries. Transition can also happen
through more gradual and negotiated means, such as the transition from the
Augusto Pinochet dictatorship to Chilean democracy in 1990.
Consolidation refers to the process through which the new democratic order
becomes institutionalized and therefore more likely to endure. For example, in
the Chilean case, many thought the election and peaceful transfer of power from
the very popular, left-leaning president Michelle Bachelet to the right-leaning
Sebastian Pinera in 2010 and back again to Bachelet in 2014 was a sign of just
how successfully consolidated Chilean democracy was after only two decades.
Types
As noted earlier, not only are there varying ways to define both democracy and
authoritarianism (as we shall see further in the next chapter), but democratic and
authoritarian regimes come in a variety of forms, with major implications for life in
political society. Here we discuss representative versus direct forms of democracy
before moving on to consider major forms or elements of transition to democracy.
Types of D em ocracy
Democracies— and ideas about democracy—come in multiple forms, with one of
the most important contrasts being that between less direct (or representative)
Chilean presidents Michelle Bachelet and Sebastian Pinera at Pihera’s inauguration in 2010.
Many viewed this peaceful, democratic transition from a left-leaning to a rightist president and
back again to Bachelet in 2014 as a sign of the consolidation of Chilean democracy.
transition The movement from an
authoritarian regime to a democra
tic one.
consolidation The process
through which a new democratic
order becomes institutionalized
and therefore more likely to
endure.
126 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
constitutional republic A polity
without a monarch in which the
basic rules of politics are laid out in
a constitution.
constitutional monarchy Apoli
tical system in which a monarch
such as a king, queen, or emperor
plays a role as a head of state, but
has powers limited by a
constitution.
representative democracy A
conception of democracy in which
politicians and institutions are
understood to represent the elec
torate, who nevertheless can cons
train their behavior through
periodic elections and other forms
of participation.
multiparty democracy A demo
cracy in which at least two parties
compete for power.
democracy and direct democracy. The heart of the difference lies in the degree
and form of mediation between voters and the state.
R epresen tative D em o cracy
Much of what we consider democracy is actually a representative form of govern
ment that is either a constitutional republic or a constitutional monarchy.
Democracy, in the original sense of the term, signified direct rule by the people,
through mass assemblies or legislation by direct vote of the masses. Clearly,
modern nation-states do not typically govern on this basis, but democracies in
stead rely on elected representatives who vote for legislation on behalf of the
populace as a whole. This form of government has come to be called representa
tive democracy when it meets several criteria that show government is based on
the people.
Foremost among the criteria for being considered a representative democracy
is constitutionality, which guarantees rights to citizens. Constitutional rights
limit the powers of government and also limit the power of the political majority,
so that those who lose an election need not fear that their rights will be “alien
ated” by the “tyranny of the majority.” The United States is a constitutional re
public, while the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy in which the
monarch is little more than a national figurehead and elected officials do the
business of governing. Both can be considered representative democracies. We
will refer to representative democracies to identify these modern nation-states
where the population elects representatives democratically and citizens are guar
anteed constitutional rights. These regimes are thus characterized by the citi
zenry having two broad categories of rights, both of which are necessary for a
country to merit being called a democracy: political or electoral rights, and civil
rights or civil liberties.
Political rights relate directly to electoral processes and include what is often
considered the most fundamental of all democratic rights: the freedom to vote in
free and fair elections. Also understood in the definition of political rights are
various features that underpin and extend this simple consideration of electoral
freedom. All citizens who have reached the age of majority (such as eighteen
years) should have the right to vote; the franchise should not be restricted to one
sex, one race, one ethnicity, or one religion. Elections should be held with some
reasonable frequency (and not, say, every fifty years). Citizens should also have
the right to present themselves as candidates for office and should be allowed to
join different political parties in their running for office; they should not be re
quired to join an official single party. Democracies may differ on many criteria,
but all that are worthy of the name multiparty democracies will fulfill the
preceding.
Civil rights or civil liberties are those that guarantee citizens the ability to
participate in civic life outside of elections. They are coequal with political rights
in determining whether a country is democratic. Some of the key civil rights are
usefully summarized in the First Amendment to the United States Constitu
tion: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, nor
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech or of the
press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances.” All elements here suggest the free
dom of an individual’s conscience with respect to his/her own beliefs. Freedom
of religion is noted first, in the so-called “Establishment Clause.” Freedom of
speech follows and includes an individual’s right both to speak and to obtain
information from multiple sources of information via access to an independent
press. Freedom of conscience and speech is also linked to the freedom to assert
one’s belief that government should change its laws or policies. Such assertions
may take place through peaceful assemblies, such as rallies or protests, or public
statements.
O f course, democracies differ in both political rights and civil liberties, and
these rights are rarely absolutes. To take the case of the civil liberties surrounding
free speech, the oft-cited example is that “freedom of speech does not give you
the right to yell ‘fire’ in a crowded theater.” More formally, we may consider that
freedom of speech may be bounded by the need to protect others’ freedoms as
well. Hence, even democracies that stand firmly on the principle of free speech
will wrestle with questions of what sorts of speech may be illegal, including libel
and slander, and hate speech or provocations to violence (such as calling for the
assassination of a head of state). The principle of free speech does not stop debates
about whether making campaign contributions should be a form of protected
speech, or whether such contributions may be limited to prevent donors from
buying undue political influence.
Similarly, other civil liberties have reasonable limits that are shaped by inter
pretation of constitutions and the law. For instance, a democratic free press may
not be allowed to report nuclear secrets that could compromise national security,
and freedom of religion may not extend to allowing murderous cults to engage in
human sacrifice. The right to bear arms, found in the United States Constitu
tion’s Second Amendment, may be interpreted in various ways, including giving
individuals the right to possess a range of firearms, but it clearly does not give
private citizens the right to possess their own weapons of mass destruction.
Political rights are also shaped differently in different countries. Many of
these variations simply reflect the number of possible ways of crafting democratic
institutions. Elections may come at fixed intervals (maybe every five years, or
every seven), or on a more flexible schedule. Exercising the vote may be manda
tory or optional. Elected officials may switch parties freely when in office or they
may be required to resign their seat if they change parties.
Some arrangements are touted as democratic but seem to call the process into
question. For instance, many systems with questionable (or worse) democratic
credentials have made the case that all political discourse can be contained
within one single unifying national party, such as China’s Communist Party.8
W hile this clearly violates the principle of multiparty democracy, it nonetheless
seems clear that some single-party countries are more democratic than others.
An example that shows the complexity of the debate is the African nation of
Uganda from the 1980s to the mid-2000s. There, a generally popular president
maintained that the best system for governance in Africa was “no-party democ
racy” because in too many African countries political parties tended to reflect
and reinforce volatile ethnic divisions. This argument was plausible but dubious
since the president sat atop the so-called “National Resistance Movement,”
128 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
referendum
specific issue.
Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni in a victory parade following his fifth reelection, in 2011.
How democratic is Uganda?
which was not officially a party but represented the state. W ithout any political
parties, the state itself (and its president) may wield control that looks rather
anti-democratic.
In short, representative democracies include a range of debates about the spe
cific nature and extent of civil liberties, and there are numerous ways to set up the
political institutions of such systems. As it is often said, not all democracies
follow the American model, or the British model, or any other. They do, how
ever, share in common the basic features discussed in this section.
D ire c t D em ocracy
The challenges of understanding democracy do not end with reaching the demo
cratic threshold. As noted previously, many of the world’s most powerful democ
racies today continue to deal with the challenges of deepening democratization.
Among the controversial issues in these polities are some options that may be
seen as taking democracy closer to the people yet sidestepping elected represen-
Apopularvoteona tatives. Referenda (or plebiscites)—in which specific issues are put to popular
vote— are prominent here. These feature in individual countries in the European
Union, as well as in American states, most notably California, with its possibili
ties for citizens to place initiatives and propositions on the statewide ballot, and
to recall elected officials.
Types 129
The increasing use of referenda, plebiscites, or ballot initiatives may be consid
ered an increasing use of direct democracy. (At least the votes themselves are
direct democracy, though there are questions and debates about which items
should be placed before the people in these forms, and who should place them
there.) While democracies may be increasingly using direct democratic initia
tives, they are not a necessary feature of representative democracy.
Direct democracy can also take the form of citizen assemblies, community
councils, and similar forms of association. Often, proponents of direct democ
racy also favor representative democratic institutions, seeing these as comple
mentary. Some people, though, see direct or “participatory” democracy as an
alternative to representative forms.
Types of Dem ocratization
In this section we discuss two different aspects or stages in the process of democ
ratization. You can think of them as types of democratization, but only in a cer
tain sense. A fully successful case of democratization will involve both democratic
transition and then the consolidation of the emergent democracy.
D em o c ra tic T ra n sitio n s
Democratic transitions are changes from one regime type (authoritarianism)
to another (democratic rule). In some countries, these may be relatively rapid
processes, taking only several days. By contrast, some countries go through
long, slow transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. Brazil in the 1980s
and Mexico in the 1990s are examples of slower-motion transitions, in which it
became increasingly clear over time that the authoritarian system was being
replaced by a democratic regime. Tlie variation in the duration of transitions
was expressed in a statement by historian Timothy Garton Ash. In the midst of
the cascading transitions to democracy in Central Europe in 1989, he described
the events by saying, “in Poland it took ten years, in Hungary it took ten
months, in East Germany it took ten weeks, perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will
take ten days.”9
Transitions are also diverse in their causes and impacts. Some are relatively
controlled by the authoritarians who are on their way out of power, while others
come from the collapse of the previous power structure. In Latin America in the
1980s, many countries (such as Brazil and Chile) had slow transitions to democ
racy in which the military built in advantages for itself to ensure that its policies
and preferences would influence democratic politics for some time. Other demo
cratic transitions have happened in more revolutionary fashion in countries rang
ing from the Philippines to the West African nation of Benin.
D em o c ra tic C o n so lid a tio n
Democratic consolidation is typically a longer-term process than transition.10 It
may be seen as the process by which democracy and its political and civil rights
become normal or habitual for citizens. The term “consolidation” has been char
acterized as happening when democracy is “the only game in town.”11 That is, a
democracy may be seen as consolidated when there are no major political groups
direct democracy A conception
of democracy that places great
emphasis on direct citizen involve
ment in politics, especially invol
ving plebiscites and/or citizen
assemblies.
democratic transition The pro
cess through which a non-demo
cratic regime becomes democratic.
democratic consolidation The
process through which, after a
transition from authoritarianism, a
polity strengthens its democracy.
130 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
advocating for a return to authoritarianism or for the overthrow of the demo
cratic system. Related to this, consolidation may have happened when the popu
lace as a whole has rejected the idea of authoritarianism and supports the
democratic regime. Compared with these ideas or values, a more mechanical
indicator of consolidation may be when a country has “turned over” its govern
ment two or more times; that is, the people who used to govern lose an election
and step aside, and then the people who replaced them eventually lose and step
aside. W hen and where this happens, it is a good sign that democracy is accepted
by all the major political actors and has become routine.
Consolidation is challenging even in leading democracies. Many countries
that have made the transition to free and fair elections and civil liberties will
face difficulties in guaranteeing these for the citizenry. Even the world’s longest-
standing democracies, such as the United States, have not fulfilled all of the
promises often associated with democracy. Consolidation is a long-term en
deavor, because delivering full democratic rights to all citizens (and indeed de
veloping a full notion of who is a citizen) is a historically complex process.
To look at the American example, note that rights may be progressively ex
tended to more groups (often beginning with relatively wealthy male property
holders and slowly incorporating others) and not offered to everyone at once.
It is also a process that can suffer setbacks as countries fail to consolidate or
revert to authoritarian rule.
For those interested in the minimal, procedural definition of democracy, de
mocratization may be most associated with transition, a process in which a for
merly non-democratic (i.e., authoritarian) regime is liberalized and attains
democratic credentials. On the other hand, consolidation may require consider
ation of how robust a democracy becomes, as well as questions about whether a
country will maintain its basic standards of political and civil rights over time.
For those political scientists interested in understanding broad patterns of levels
of democracy around the world, a transition above a certain threshold may be
sufficient for the purposes of a given study, while those interested in understand
ing a democracy’s quality and depth may necessarily be examining its process of
consolidation.
CASE IN CONTEXT
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil PAGE 408
For years Brazil alternated between authoritarianism and transi
tory attempts at democracy. In recent decades, though, its de
mocracy has achieved noteworthy consolidation, and few now
fear a return to Brazilian authoritarianism. Given that Brazil is one
of the world’s largest countries, and an increasingly influential
one, this is a very positive development. But how did it happen?
And what lessons does Brazil offer to other countries interested
in democratic consolidation?
For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, p. 408.
As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How does Brazil’s recent economic performance relate to
its democratic consolidation?
2. How, and to what extent, has Brazilian democracy come
to include poorer Brazilians?
Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 131
Causes and Effects: What Causes
Democratization?
Uncovering what causes and sustains democracy is a central challenge facing
political scientists. Here, we combine the debates about democracy and democ
ratization to ask why democracy varies both across countries and over time. In
other words, we consider both where democracy happens and when it occurs.
Note that both of these considerations get at the underlying question of why
regime types emerge, consolidate, and shift. W hile we cannot capture the entire
debate, we highlight five prominent lines of theory:
1. modernization theory, which traces democracy to broad social changes, es
pecially economic development and the changes that accompany it;12
2. cultural theories, which attribute democratization and democratic consoli
dation to cultural variables that predispose some countries to democracy
and prevent or hinder democracy in other places;13
3. systemic or structural theories, which situate countries in an international en
vironment where major powers or global trends may condition whether
democracy emerges or not;14
4. domestic institutional theories, which find that the advent and success of de
mocracy depend on the forms of political institutions within a country
(such as political parties and interest groups, or the ways branches of gov
ernment are shaped);15 and
5. agency-based theories, which argue that individual actors, or small groups of
actors, are the drivers of changes in regime types (whether democratic or
authoritarian).16
We consider these five perspectives in turn.
As noted in the previous chapters, different theoretical perspectives are not
entirely mutually exclusive, but they do offer different arguments about political
behavior and what causes it. W hile good arguments may draw from multiple
Is China Destined for Democracy? PAGE 421
One of the most important questions in contemporary global
politics is whether China will democratize in the coming years—
and, if so, how. In certain respects, since reforms began there in
the late 1970s after the death of Mao Zedong, we have seen
some limited democratization at the local level. But China re
mains an authoritarian state dominated by a single party, and
virtually no political scientists would consider it democratic.
For more on authoritarianism and potential democratization
in China, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 421-422. As you read it,
keep in mind the following questions:
1. What would each of the theories from the previous
chapter predict about the prospect of China’s
democratization?
2. What might major theories of authoritarian persistence
discussed in this chapter say about this case?
3. Which of these predictions do you find most plausible,
and why?
132 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
modernization theory A theory
that traces democracy to broad
social changes, especially econo
mic development and the changes
that accompany it.
perspectives, it is important that comparative political scientists understand
both what they are arguing and how they might be arguing against some other
perspective. Fundamentally, arguments are based on efforts to test specific
hypotheses—derived from theories— against empirical evidence.
M odernization
Perhaps the most central debate in modern comparative study of democracy centers
on elements of modernization theory. Advocates of a modernization approach
examine the relationship between economic development and democratization.
W ith respect to the causes of democratization, an extensive literature finds
changes in economic structure to be a key to democratic change; in these analyses,
economics drives much of politics. Modernization scholars argue that economic
change drove democratization through the emergence of such factors as a middle
class (or bourgeoisie) and a literate population. Urbanization over decades and cen
turies was key in turning former lords and peasants into small businessmen who
demanded greater political say without being either reactionary or revolutionary.
More recently, the link between modernization and democratization finds new
support (with modifications and revisions) for the idea that democracies become
more stable and secure when they are relatively wealthy.
Conversely, poor countries that lack the stabilizing force of a robust middle
class will tend toward authoritarianism. In the absence of the modernization
process outlined previously, no democratic push can emerge. Societies divided
between a small, wealthy elite and impoverished masses will be prone to
Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics and Some Social
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy
by Seymour Martin Upset ‘
A s discussed in this chapter, one of the most consistent findings in comparative politics has been that economic devel
opment often “goes with” democracy and democratization. In
other words, having a highly developed economy increases the
likelihood of stable democracy. Classical theorists drew attention
to this connection, but the political sociologist Seymour Martin
Upset was the first scholar to demonstrate the relationship with
strong empirical evidence, showing that a range of development
variables correlated with democracy.
Recall from chapter 2 that correlation is not the same as
causation. The mere fact that there is a relationship between
two variables does not mean that one necessarily causes the
other. Maybe democracy causes economic development, after
all.17 Modernization theory predicts that causality will move
from economic development to the creation and consolidation
of democratic institutions. It does so by trying to specify causal
mechanisms through which growth might be expected to
promote democracy. Lipset pointed to numerous potential
mechanisms, such as literacy and education, but his main idea
was that economic development leads to the creation of a
strong middle class, and that this middle class, in turn, pro
motes democratization and democratic stability. If Lipset is
right, proponents of democracy should be very attentive to
social and economic factors like increasing income inequality,
since a decline of the middle class might weaken democratic
institutions.
Seymour Martin Upset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York:
Doubleday and Co., 1960; and “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53,
no. 1 (1959): 69-105.
Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 133
reactionary, non-inclusive politics dominated by the former, or to revolutionary
mobs where the latter can seize power. Neither group has an interest in leaving
political power to the other. Only economically modernized societies, with
their relatively moderate middle classes, can strike the balance between these
extremes.
Modernization theory includes a variety of different approaches. According to
some versions, the economic and social forces of modernization that shape de
mocracy do not only occur at one point that triggers a democratic transition.
Rather, economic development may also support the persistence of democracy,
once democracy is established.
Modernization theory faces the challenge that there are exceptions it has
trouble explaining. For example, India is the world’s largest democracy, and it
remains quite poor. Moreover, it democratized well before its recent years of
economic growth. Can modernization theory explain India’s democratic success?
And how can modernization theory explain the fact that democratization often
happens rapidly and in waves?
Different versions of this theory specify different hypothetical mechanisms
linking economic development to democracy. Remember, what we mean by
“causal mechanism” is the process through which something produces something
else, according to a theory.18 Scholars can agree that two variables—like eco
nomic development and democracy—are related without necessarily agreeing
about how they are linked, as discussed in chapter 2. As we have seen, classic
k
CASE IN CONTEXT
b Democracy’s Success in India:
W hat Can W e Learn from a Deviant Case? PAGE 464
India is a major anomaly for modernization theories of develop
ment. In essence, the relationship between its political and eco
nomic development has been the inverse of what modernization
theory would predict. India is the world’s second largest society
and its largest democracy— consider, therefore, the share that
Indian citizens hold in the world’s broader democratic popula
tion. This anomaly has potentially serious implications and
makes the puzzle of Indian democratization all the more
intriguing.
For more on the case of democratization in India, see the
case study in Part VI, p. 464. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. What, if anything, does Indian anti-colonial resistance
have to do with the country’s democratization?
2. What, if anything, does Indian democratization suggest
about the importance of individual actors, leadership,
and institutional design?
3. Can you think of a way to “save” modernization theory in
the face of the case of India?
Indian voters, 2012. India is the world’s largest democracy.
134 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
versions of modernization theories of democracy point to the intervening vari
able of a strong middle class.19 Some more recent versions of modernization
theory suggest a different intervening variable: Economic development might
produce democratic values such as the value of “self-expression.”20 We return to
this issue later in the chapter.
Culture and D em ocracy
Economic development is just one of many conceivable causes of democratiza
tion. Other significant contributions have emphasized new factors, especially as
the regional emphasis among democratization theorists has shifted from histori
cal change in Western Europe to those in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Cul
tural arguments may be able to provide substantial leverage on understanding
political trajectories in different countries.21
One prominent cultural argument is the “Asian values” argument, as articu
lated by certain non-democratic leaders in Asia who argued why Asia is not con
ducive to democracy like the “West” is.22 According to this argument, Asian
cultures value stability and harmonious social relations over individual rights,
and are comfortable with respect for authority and deference to the state. Ac
cordingly, democracy is not a priority but is secondary to ideas of order, hard
work, and social progress. An additional caveat is in order here: A country’s “cul
ture” may be defined in many different ways and by different individuals or
groups. The assertion by a Malaysian or Singaporean prime minister (or anyone
else, for that matter) about what his country’s culture is should not be taken as
the definitive word on the subject. Indeed, political cultures may be deliberately
shaped by states and governments— especially in non-democratic countries—for
a number of purposes. Many Malaysians and Singaporeans may differ with the
former prime ministers Lee Kuan-Yew or M ahathir Mohamed about their own
societies’ compatibility with democracy. Not all culturalist arguments are so
transparently self-serving for authoritarian leaders, however. Some scholars have
tried to explain authoritarian persistence in Latin America as a function of al
leged cultural tendencies toward “corporatism” and “authoritarian centralism.”23
Still others have argued that religion makes a difference in shaping the likeli
hood that a country will be democratic.24
W hile arguments like these are significant, political scientists rarely demon
strate that such-and-such a country or continent is not democratic because of
some fixed cultural element that is static and unchanging, and sophisticated ap
proaches to cultural explanation do not attempt to do so. To take Africa as an
example, political scientists would rarely rest on an argument such as, “Africa is
not very democratic, because its people don’t want it,” or “Africa has lots of au
thoritarian rule because people belong to tribes.” Besides sounding judgmental
(in ways that can border on racism, when some wrongly assume Africans are less
capable of sophisticated political calculations), the conception of culture here is
too thin. Cultural scholars recognize that values, norms, and customs are shaped
and reshaped, defined and redefined over time. Culture is dynamic rather than
static. W hile cultural differences among countries may help explain some conti
nuities over the course of years, ideas and values are also constantly shifting. For
instance, cultural arguments may note that Latin America was long deemed to
Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 135
IN S IG H TS
Democracy in America
by Alexis de Tocquevilte I
Tocqueville’s analysis of American democracy is complex and multi-faceted. Scholars influenced by his work, however,
have often focused on one of its key aspects. He believed that
the protection of liberal rights and the functioning of democratic
institutions depended in good measure on mores or values and
feelings embedded in the population. In other words, democ
racy depends partially on “political culture.” Above all, he was
impressed by the degree of participation in democratic politics
he witnessed in the United States: People got involved and
seemed to enjoy their involvement.
Tocqueville didn’t think of political culture as some unchang
ing thing attached to a group. It wasn’t that Americans were in
trinsically disposed to democracy. Rather, these tendencies were
shaped by social and institutional factors. For example, the pat
tern of immigration and the nature of inheritance in the United
States had led to relatively higher levels of pre-existing equality:
The country had no real hereditary nobility, for example. He also
felt that American political institutions at the national level were
largely well designed, singling out the country’s administrative
de-centralization. Perhaps more important, particularly in New
England, local townships had established political institutions
that depended upon participation. These institutions, Toc
queville famously wrote, inculcated certain “habits of the heart”
in those who participated in them, awakening a desire for
deliberation.
The critical idea here, therefore, is not that some countries are
culturally destined for democratization and others for authori
tarianism, but that social and institutional conditions do influ
ence political culture, which can then help constrain politics.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Debra
Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002 (first published, in French, in
1835 and 1840).
have male-dominated polities, but may also note the increasing empowerment of
women in many countries in Latin America that may have played a role in the
processes of democratization there, as with the case of the Mothers of the Disap
peared (Madres de [la] Plaza de Mayo) in Argentina.
The International System
For any country, the prevailing tendencies in the international system are likely
to affect the chance of democracy. To use just the twentieth century as an ex
ample, it may seem sensible to suggest that the period between the two World
Wars (including the Great Depression), the Cold War, and the post-Cold War
era were three very different time periods with respect to the question of how
widespread democracy would be. Looking at snapshots of the global situation at
certain moments in time can convey the importance of the international
environment.
During the Cold War, for example, the countries of Eastern and Central
Europe (the so-called “Second World”) were obviously kept under authoritarian
rule by the power of the Soviet Union. Less obviously, but just as truly, the poor
est countries of the “Third World” also languished under dictatorships sponsored
by both the Soviet Union and the United States. In a time period when the major
international powers prioritized security and influence over democratic rights in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, military leaders found it relatively easy to retain
power over civilians. To use a slightly earlier historical example, colonial rule was
non-democratic. For many of the peoples of the world, the political and eco
nomic system of the colonial era—when Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and
136 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
Holland dominated much of the globe—was one of non-democratic rule by dis
tant powers.
As seen in the examples of post-war Japan and Germany, the international
system can promote democracy as well as hinder it. After the collapse of com
munism from 1989 to 1991, democratic ideas were transmitted and propagated
around the world. Samuel Huntington’s work, for instance, includes an emphasis
on the “learning” different countries could do from one another, with popula
tions worldwide witnessing democratization in other countries and, in effect,
concluding that “if they can do it, so can we.”25 The positive “demonstration ef
fects” of watching neighboring countries change surely helped propel a wave of
democratization that spread globally.
As with the other theories noted earlier, there is actually a variety of possible
versions. There is no question that global patterns of democratization are real.
The important question is what causes those patterns. One possible answer is to
point to common conditions of the sort identified by other theories (e.g., perhaps
waves of democratization are products of shared or global economic develop
ment). Another is to focus on the structural features of the global system, as in the
example of Soviet and U.S. influence during the Cold War noted previously. A
third approach combines the international system and cultural perspectives, such
as Huntington’s idea of democratic learning and “demonstration effects”26 or in
the notion that certain prestigious ways of organizing politics diffuse globally
and exert cultural influence because they are perceived by “world society” to be
legitimate.27
Dom estic Institutions
Whether a democracy is sustained or collapses, whether transitions to or from
democracy happen, and how well a given democracy functions may depend on
the institutions in a given society. To review the concept from earlier chapters, we
mean by institutions those features of a political system that shape the behaviors
of actors. These can include organizations and groups, rules and patterns, and
norms and values. Some arguments about the effects of domestic institutions are
best addressed in later chapters: Does federalism or unitarism work better to hold
countries together (chapter 8);28 do parliamentary and presidential forms of gov
ernment affect the likelihood of democracy (chapters 9 and 10);29 and so on. But
the possible impacts on democracy are noteworthy here.
To use an example familiar to many students of American history, the first
attempt at self-government in the American colonies was the loose confederation
established by The Articles of Confederation of 1781, and it was a political failure
that imperiled the security of the young post-Revolutionary nation. It was only
with the passage of the Constitution (in 1787 and 1788) that the foundations of
the new nation were secured, owing to a new institutional framework that gave
greater power to the central government. The success of the latter charter (and
the failure of the former) might be attributed not to major economic development
or cultural change in a few short years in the 1780s, but rather to the more endur
ing design of the formal and legal framework for the union—that is to say, to a
more suitable institutional design.
Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 137
IN S IG H T S
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth C e n t u r y ^ ^
b y S a m u e l H u n tin g to n . . . . . .
Huntington observes that democratization takes place in “waves,” or historical periods in which lots of societies
democratize and others in which societies tend more toward
authoritarianism. He identifies three major waves of democrati
zation: from 1828 to 1926, from 1943 to 1962, and from 1974 until
the 1990s. Between these came “reverse waves” of increasing
authoritarianism. Huntington’s interest was in explaining the
contemporary “third wave” of democratization. Huntington
pointed to multiple factors, but drew particular attention to two
types of external or systemic factors. One was the role of “exter
nal actors” such as the European Union, the United States, and
the Catholic Church under John Paul II in fomenting democrati
zation. For example, the United States changed its policies in
the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, arguing that a respect for
democracy and human rights needed to be emphasized along
side national interests. In the early 1980s under Ronald Reagan, the
National Endowment for Democracy was established, designed
to assist global democratization.
Another factor was a process of “snowballing,” in which de
mocratizing regimes influenced one another through example.
Successful democratization in one country shows that democra
tization is possible elsewhere: It also provides models for how to
achieve the transition. During a democratic wave, demonstration
effects might even present pressure to democratize as authoritar
ian forms come to seem less legitimate.
Perhaps the fundamental question to be asked of theories
like Huntington’s is how much factors like demonstration effects
and international system pressures explain. Are they more, less,
or equally important to factors internal to democratizing societ
ies, like institutional reforms or economic development? And
how can they explain the variation in patterns of democratiza
tion across cases?
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Dysfunctional political institutions can also undermine a regime, whether it
is democratic or authoritarian. Chile’s longstanding democracy collapsed in
1973, for many reasons, at least some of which were electoral; in elections in
1970, electoral rules split the center and right parties, allowing leftists to obtain
the presidency with the support of only about one-third of the country. This
likely contributed to some middle-class support for the overthrow of the demo
cratically elected regime by the military. The Weimar Republic in Germany be
tween the two World Wars was hobbled by similar institutional issues in the
electoral system, as well as by an unclear division of power between the President
as head of state and the Chancellor as head of government. One might not at
tribute Germany’s democratic collapse and the rise of Nazi rule to institutional
factors alone, but these surely contributed to dissatisfaction with the democratic
regime that undermined its support. So too can authoritarian regimes fail partly
for lack of functional institutions, as when Mexico’s PRI finally lost power in
2000 after seventy-one years; again, the reasons were numerous, but institutional
factors range from the fragmentation of the leading party, to the development of
opposition at local and state levels, to increasingly competitive elections, to the
increasing recognition of the government’s inability to provide services.
Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals and G roups
There is little doubt that many political outcomes are ultimately traceable to ac
tions by major individual decision makers; that is, powerful individuals in
138 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
positions of leadership. The question is whether these decisions are shaped and
conditioned by other factors— such as economic development or institutions— or
must be understood primarily in terms of individual choices.30 A prominent ex
ample from recent years was from South Africa in the 1990s, where national hero
Nelson Mandela had a prominent role in the process of democratization. Like
other “Founding Fathers” in the United States and elsewhere, Mandela seemed
“uniquely” capable of making difficult decisions and compromises, leaving open
the question about what would have happened in his absence. In the South Afri
can case, there were many other individuals—both prominent political figures
and lesser-known negotiators—who also had significant individual roles. Can
individuals and groups make democracy happen?
The emphasis on specific individuals and groups tends to be focused more on
specific transitions in certain countries than on broad patterns of democracy
around the world. Analytically, we might expect individuals and other actors to
matter more when the question at hand is about specific changes at a certain
historical moment. Looking broadly at the world map and trying to understand
where democracies are found might naturally lead us to consider broad forces,
such as geography and the large sweep of world history, or perhaps cultures.
Looking more closely at a single country at its particular moment of democrati
zation might push us in the direction of more “proper names.”31 Much as looking
through a telescope gives a sense of large-scale natural and environmental forces
and looking under a microscope gives a sense of the detailed actions of individual
organisms, so too might looking “cross-nationally” give a sense of broad scope
and looking “within a country at a given moment in time” give a sense of indi
vidual action.
This approach is about more than just great individuals—the Mahatma
Gandhis, George Washingtons, and Nelson Mandelas of history. Groups and
coalitions matter. For instance, the transitions from the 1970s and 1980s (which
included southern Europe, Latin America, and central-eastern Europe, as well
as some countries elsewhere) highlighted the importance of divisions within au
thoritarian leadership as a cause of democratization. In particular, some leading
scholars (discussed further in the following “Insights” box on Transitions from Au
thoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy) argued that democracy comes about when
splits within an authoritarian regime lead to “softliners.”32 These softliners interact
with pragmatists in the opposition to form a powerful coalition for moving toward
democracy. This movement comes at the expense of hardliner authoritarians and
to the disappointment of those “maximalists,” or radicals, in the pro-democracy
movement who oppose any cooperation or negotiation with elements of the au
thoritarian regime. The bottom line in Table 6.1 pushes democratization.
t a b l e 6 . 1 Actors in Dem ocratic Transition
Authoritarian Regime Pro-Dem ocratic Forces
Extreme Hardliners Maximalists/radicals
Moderate Softliners Minimalists/pragmatists
Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 139
Important interest groups or pressure groups can exercise their collective
power in ways that facilitate democratization or democratic breakdown. Trade or
labor unions might call a strike and immobilize a country and its economy, help
ing to bring down a regime. O r business groups or investors may boycott a regime,
refusing to invest and ruining the economy to push politics to the breaking point.
Powerful religious movements and representatives of the clergy might help to
bring down a regime from their positions within their churches, mosques, or
temples. And many other mobilized groups in civil society—from human rights
campaigns, to ethnic solidarity movements, to university students (yes, you), to
revolutionaries—have helped keep regimes in place and helped bring them down.
Co m bining A rgum en ts and Theories: M ultiple Causes
It is not always necessary to pick one and only one of the preceding categories to
explain why democratization succeeds or fails. Many scholars of democratization
will acknowledge the importance of multiple causal factors. Arguments can rec
ognize complex causality (or causal complexity): Most important outcomes, like
democracy, will be the result of multiple factors.
To use just two of the aforementioned perspectives, for instance, cultural
change and economic development can affect one another, and both can condi
tion democracy. Or, as noted previously, Samuel Huntington documented a
“wave” of democratization in the 1980s and highlighted five causes.33 In addition
to economic modernization came the declining legitimacy o f authoritarian regimes,
the role of the Catholic Church, and two external factors: demonstration effects (or
the effect of watching your neighbors become democracies), and greater interna-
tional support for democracy from the United States and other large powers.
The argument by Inglehart and Welzel discussed in the “Insights” box in
corporates elements of more than one theory discussed in this chapter. But,
IN S IG H T S
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule
(4 vols.) by Guillemm O’Donnell, Philippe C fbm itter, and Laurence. Whitehead
Unlike the accounts produced by modernization theorists, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule stresses the uncertainty of demo
cratic transitions. According to these scholars, transitions are
extremely complex and indeterminate, meaning that producing a
general theory of transitions is a challenging if not impossible task.
Nevertheless, they draw some important general conclusions. First,
they judge international systemic factors to be important, but less
important than the jostling of domestic actors. Second, they stress
that the uncertainty in question is above all the uncertainty faced
by those very domestic actors. In other words, they frame the ques
tion from the perspective of actors within transitioning societies.
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, in their summary of
the project’s conclusions, note that governing coalitions in au
thoritarian regimes tend to divide into two camps: “soft-liners”
and “hardliners” (see Table 6.1). At the same time, one tends to
see a division in the opposition between “radicals” who want no
compromise with the existing regime and “pragmatists” who are
willing to work with the existing regime if they see the chance for
a democratic transition. Successful transitions tend to involve
collaboration between soft-liners in the authoritarian regime
and pragmatists. Critical here is that these soft-liners need to feel
as if they are able to initiate and partially control the process: In
other words, they are unlikely to cooperate if they expect to be
persecuted in the aftermath of a transition. Likewise, the dynam-
ics internal to the opposition is important. Pragmatists must be
able to ensure sufficient buy-in on the part of other opposition
actors such that agreements can be honored.
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds.,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (4 vols.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986.
140 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
IN S IG H T S
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy:
The Human Development Sequence
by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Wetzel
Inglehart and Welzel use survey data to analyze the relationship between economic development, cultural tradition, and de
mocratization in more than eighty countries.
The fundamental difference separating their work from
earlier modernization theory is that they posit a distinct mecha
nism. Recall that Lipset argued that economic development
produced democracy fundamentally through creating a vibrant
middle class. Inglehart and Welzel think of economic develop
ment as shaping political institutions through culture, as re
flected in the values and aspirations of individuals. They find that
societies with low levels of development tend to have people
who are focused on “survival values.” For example, they may
place a lot of stock in family authority, presumably because the
social bonds of the family are critical to survival in the context
of material scarcity. Societies with higher levels of development,
however, show higher levels of “self-expression values,” meaning
higher valuation of individual-level autonomy and freedom.
According to the authors, any society achieving increasing eco
nomic development is expected to see increasing “self-expression
values.” They find that religious and cultural traditions shape the
timing and extent of this change, but that economic develop
ment is the cause of the change.
So how do they get to democracy? They find that higher levels
of self-expression values correlate with democratic institutions.
They presume that the individual’s culturally induced demand for
greater autonomy is the source of political-institutional change.
In other words, Inglehart and Welzel’s model looks like this:
Economic development —> Cultural change —> Democratization
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
importantly, it does more than simply make a list of all the possible arguments
and say they are all valid. It would not be very analytically powerful to say,
“Democracy comes from a whole range of cultural values, economic moderniza
tion, and a whole bunch of structures and institutions.” As suggested in chapter 2,
this may be correct, but it is not much of an argument. One can take a stronger
stand by showing how different theories and factors inform one another. Notice
the steps in the chain of logic in the preceding sketch at the end of the Inglehart
and Welzel “Insights” box. To use this example, showing that economic modern
ization precedes changes to cultural values in a particular sequence is more
powerful than simply listing both and saying, “They both matter.”
CASE IN CONTEXT
Is American Democracy in Trouble? PAGE 562
There is no doubting that the United States has been one of the
most important and influential democracies in the world. Virtu
ally all political scientists continue to regard it as a democracy
even still. However, some scholars have expressed concerns
about declining levels of public trust and civic association, along
with increasing levels of income inequality.34
For more on the question of whether American democracy
may be in trouble, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 562-563. As
you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What are the implications for this Issue of the major theo
ries of democracy and democratization discussed in this
chapter?
2. How does this question relate to procedural versus sub
stantive definitions of democracy?
3. If, indeed, income inequality and declining trust (in insti
tutions and in others) suggest that we have reason to be
concerned, what could be done about it?
Is American Democracy a Model? 141
Is American Democracy a Model?
The central question in the study of democratization is why democratization happens or does not happen. This necessarily involves an understanding of
the dates and time periods at which democratization may occur. As we noted at
the beginning of this chapter, from an American perspective this may seem like
a relatively straightforward proposition, but this is an illusion. Consider the fol
lowing multiple-choice question:
In what year did the United States of America achieve democracy?
a. 1776
b. 1787
c. 1791
d. 1863
e. 1920
f. 1965
g. None of the above
At first glance, the most obvious answer might appear to be A, the year of the
signing of the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, one may argue that the
signing of the Constitution in 1787 was the crucial moment, as this established
a representative republic. The year 1791 witnessed the ratification of the Bill of
Rights, a moment indispensable to democratization if democracy is understood
to require civil liberties as well as political rights. Although the years at the
founding were pivotal moments in American democracy, these are not the only
possible correct answers to the question. The year 1863 saw President Abraham
Lincoln issue the Emancipation Proclamation, a declaration recognizing that
upon the end of the Civil War, America would end slavery, its most conspicuous
and infamous source of “unfreedom.” The year 1920 may be an even less obvious
date, but one whose consequences for democracy were direct and massive: It is
the year in which women were first provided with constitutional guarantees of
the right to vote. This dramatic extension of voting rights not only enshrined the
principle of universal suffrage but also had the effect of increasing the electorate
by a huge percentage. The year 1965 may seem, to most eyes, to be too recent to
count as part of America’s democratization process, but it is the year of the pas
sage of the Voting Rights Act, a culminating step in the American process of
guaranteeing the vote to all of its adult citizens.
Yet one may also argue with some validity that “None of the above” is the best
response to the question of when America achieved democracy. This would be true
particularly for those who view the quality and depth of democracy in America
as halting or subpar. Notice here that the criterion is not one that is easily reached
through passage of a law guaranteeing the right to vote. Rather, it depends on the
degree to which individuals exercise their rights and the degree to which each
individual has an equal ability to influence the society’s political life. The differ
ence here is significant, and most political scientists would agree that it makes
sense to measure democracy both according to a basic threshold and relative to
an ideal. Few political scientists disagree about the importance of the aforemen
tioned procedural definition of democracy that takes into account basic political
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
K E Y M ETH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Within-Case Analysis
Not all comparison in comparative
politics is about comparing multiple,
distinct cases. That is, sometimes we
make comparisons and conduct
analyses within cases. Typically, we do
so for different reasons than when we
compare cases. When we compare
multiple cases, we are often trying to
get “leverage” on some key variation.
Within-case analysis, in contrast,
is often used for the purpose of trac
ing causal processes.35 In the case at
hand, we are interested in comparing
different junctures in the process of
democratization in the United States.
This is useful precisely because com
paring different aspects or stages of
that process might reveal a more
complex and realistic pattern of
causality.
So, when would you use this?
Ideally, within-case analysis is used in
the context of broader, comparative
analysis.36 A comparative politics
researcher might use the within-case
analysis we describe in this section as
part of a broader comparative project
that looks at long-run democratiza
tion in the United States in compari
son with other cases.
142 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
rights to vote and the presence of fundamental civil rights. The question is
whether this definition sufficiently covers all of the characteristics of a democ
racy. By these criteria, the United States is clearly above an international demo
cratic threshold, and has been at most of the historical moments discussed
previously, today along with most of the other advanced, industrialized countries
in the world (and a healthy number of lower-income countries).
On the other hand, democracy in the United States has been characterized by
different scholars in less favorable light, according to other plausible criteria: low
voter turnout, low levels of voter knowledge and interest, disproportionate influ
ence of certain interest groups and lobbies, excessive polarization, and under
representation of women and minorities in elected office, among other issues.
You may deem some of these to be problematic, or all of them, or none. But for
the purposes of our discussion, does this mean that democratization in the
United States is incomplete? I f one adopts a minimalist or procedural definition
of democracy, then by nearly all accounts the United States is a democracy. If one
adopts a substantive definition, however, then the United States has shortcom
ings, as do all other countries that meet the procedural definition of democracy.
The causes of transitions to democracy are numerous, and the United States is no
exception. Analysts may find that one or more of the broad categories of explanation
account best for democratization. In other words, there may be a need to disaggre
gate the concept of democratization, which may be a name that we give to a se
quence of distinct processes. It is not a foregone conclusion that the same factors that
produced initial democratization in the United States are responsible for the end of
slavery or the extension of suffrage. Just the same, we can attempt to explain differ
ent aspects of stages of democratization via the theories we have considered in this
chapter. Moreover, if different theories are more or less effective at explaining differ
ent aspects or moments in U.S. democratization, this might tell us something useful
about those theories for broader comparative purposes. For instance, understanding
the extension of suffrage to women and the civil rights achievements of the 1960s
(most notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965) may lead
some in the direction of social actors and groups including the women’s suffrage
movement (such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Seneca Falls Convention) and
the leaders of the civil rights movement (such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the
Southern Baptist Convention, and the NAACP). Others may focus on the eco
nomic and social factors at the time that drove the country toward change. Within-
case findings about this can then be brought back to comparative analysis, as we can
ask whether similar processes are also visible at similar junctures in other cases.
Table 6.2 demonstrates how our different theoretical approaches might be
used to explain a variety of democratizing moments in American history. These
are not definitive statements but are simply illustrative of how scholars in differ
ent theoretical “schools” or “traditions” might approach the same question. We
choose three different moments since America’s movement toward indepen
dence: the American Revolution; the Emancipation Proclamation and the aboli
tion of slavery; and the extension of civil and political rights to women and to
blacks in the twentieth century. Notice the research question and the outcome at
the top, and then consider the cells of the table as possible ways different scholars
might address these questions and explain these outcomes.
Is American Democracy a Model? 143
t a b l e 6 . 2 Causal Interpretations of Am erican D em ocracy
and Dem ocratization Across Tim e Periods
Eighteenth Century Nineteenth Century Twentieth Century
Dependent
Variable
Independence and Constitution
Emancipation/Abolition of
Slavery
Universal Suffrage
Research Question
Why did American colonists push
for independence and establish a
democratic republic?
Why did President Lincoln and
Congress end slavery during/
after Civil War?
Why did unrepresented groups
(women and African Americans)
at last attain voting rights?
Modernization
(Economic/Social
Change)
Merchants and small businesses of
colonial economy seek to establish
independence from British Crown
Decline of slave-based economy
and economic conflict between
industrial North and agricultural
South
Growing demand for labor
necessitates greater political
inclusion of excluded groups
Culture
Frontier culture and settler groups
(Puritans, etc.) incompatible with
distant monarchy; local institutions
encourage democratic norms
Changing perceptions of African
Americans among national elites;
religious culture nurtures
abolitionism
Declining tolerance for prejudice
on the basis of sex or race
Structures/Systems
(International)
French-British rivalry creates
opportunity for colonists to
succeed in battle against Crown
International trade and relations
with great power Britain
(including blockade and
question of Britain recognizing
Confederacy)
American power and “arsenal
of democracy” necessitate full
domestic inclusion for global
leadership
Institutions
(Domestic)
Fractured thirteen colonies
attempt loose Articles of
Confederation and learn need for
stronger union under Constitution
Congressional and constitutional
impasse between Southern
“nullification” and states’ rights
advocates versus Northerners
Evolution of congressional
majority in populous regions
of country in favor of change
Agency/Actor
“Founding Fathers” have formative
role in Revolution and shaping
new nation
Abolitionists drive political
debate; extremist groups
generate reaction
Women’s suffrage movement
and civil rights movement
central to creating demand
for change
Regarding our earlier point about why you might use within-case analysis,
note that it is perfectly possible that the best explanation of the eighteenth-
century sequence is derived from the theory that focuses on structures/the world
system; that the nineteenth-century sequence is best explained by the theory that
focuses on culture; and the twentieth-century sequence is best explained by
modernization theory. Or some other such combination may be the strongest.
The payolf here is that if we were to find this, it would bring nuance to our gen
eral theory in a useful way, and we could bring this insight back to comparative
analysis.
144 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization
C h a p te r S u m m a ry
Concepts
• The word democracy has numerous meanings.
• One major distinction is between procedural and substan
tive definitions of democracy.
Regime change can include both the development of de
mocracy and also the breakdown of an existing democratic
regime.
Types
• Types of democracy include both representative and direct
forms.
Democratization can be thought of in terms of both demo
cratic transition and consolidation.
Causes and Effects
Scholars have developed a number of theories to explain
why democratization takes place when and where it does.
Perhaps the most famous is modernization theory, which
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. As we have noted in this chapter, India is somewhat unusual for
having achieved a robust democracy before achieving eco
nomic modernization. What would modernization, cultural,
structural, institutional, and actor-centered theories say about
this case? Which of these theories do you think could make
most sense of the Indian case? Why?
2. We have noted in this chapter that democracy can take a variety
of forms, with one major distinction being between “represen
tative” and “direct” democracy. But what is the relationship be
tween these forms? Are they ultimately compatible? Do gains in
one involve trade-offs in the other? Think about this question in
relation to case examples.
3. In recent years there has been much discussion among politi
cians and public intellectuals about whether democracy can be
engineered or even imposed. Some think that if the appropriate
conditions are established, democracy can flourish anywhere.
Others think that societies need to come to democratization
organically and on their own. What would each of the theories
we have considered have to say about this question?
4. “American Exceptionalism” has long held that the United States
is different from Europe in that it did not establish a robust
predicts that economic development increases the likeli
hood of democratization.
• Another theory is that political culture shapes the possibili
ties for democracy and democratization, and that some
political cultures increase the possibility of the establish
ment and persistence of authoritarian regimes as well.
• Systemic and structural theories say that democratization is
more a function of factors operative at the level of the in
ternational system than things happening within societies.
They focus, among other things, on waves of democratiza
tion and also of democratic breakdown.
Some theories place more emphasis on contingency,
agents, and institutional design.
Thinking Comparatively
We looked at several key sequences in the history of de
mocratization in the United States, and we introduced the
concept of within-case analysis.
socialist tradition. More generally, we could say that, since Alexis
de Tocqueville, some have viewed the United States as excep
tional in its longstanding liberal democracy. Critics, of course,
have argued that this democracy has been limited and indirect.
Recently, we have seen two notable trends that bear on demo
cratic practice in the United States: (a) increasing levels of
income inequality; and (b) declining public trust in major institu
tions. What, if any, are the implications of these trends for the
future of American democracy? What would each of the major
theories of democratization and democratic consolidation say
about these issues?
5. Imagine that the leader ofa poor country with low levels of rule
of law and dysfunctional political institutions asks you to help
design a new democratic system for their polity. What would
each of the theories considered in this chapter say about the
possibility of your doing so? Now imagine that you were asked
to help institutionally engineer increasing democratization in
the United States. Ask the same question of this project. Are the
implications the same? Different? Why?
IN TH IS C H A P T E R
Concepts 147
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian
Regimes 147
Transitions to Authoritarian Regimes 148
Types 148
Types of Authoritarianism 148
Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to
Authoritarianism 152
Causes and Effects: What Causes
Authoritarian Regim es to Emerge
and Persist? 158
Historical Institutionalist Theories 159
Poverty and Inequality 160
State Weakness and Failure 162
Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian
Persistence 163
Barriers to Collective Action 164
Special Causal Circumstances Surrounding
Hybrid and Semi-authoritarian
Regimes 163
TH INKING C O M P A R A T IV E L Y
Why Did Zim babwe Become and Remain
Authoritarian? 167
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Iran • Russia
Germany
• Mexico • France
146
I n the 1960s, there was a country in Africa called Southern Rhodesia. It was
I a British colony that asserted its independence and was ruled by a white
minority descended from colonial settlers. This country granted few rights to
the black African majority and concentrated economic and political power in
white hands. By the 1970s a resistance movement emerged to overthrow the
white regime, led by a charismatic rebel leader who vowed to bring democ
racy to the black African majority. A fter a long struggle, this movement for
democracy finally overthrew the repressive white regime in
1979, and a negotiated settlement with the support of Britain
gave rise to a freer society in 1980. The transition even set in
motion some much-needed land reform that would reshape
the terrible inequalities between poor blacks and rich white
farmers, and the new president set to work.
The name of the charismatic liberation hero was Robert
Mugabe, and he renamed the country Zimbabwe. After an
initial burst of enthusiasm with Mugabe’s rule (as he invested
in causes such as girls’ education, a policy and idea well ahead
of its time in sub-Saharan Africa), however, things turned
quickly. Beginning in the 1980s, his regime was responsible
for massacres of opponents and innocent victims in the
region known as Matabeleland. By the 2000s, he was presid
ing over a brutal and repressive regime that encouraged so-
called “war veterans” from the liberation war to occupy
white-owned farms and frequently kill the owners and
anyone loyal to them; the fact that many of these alleged
“war veterans” were just teenagers, and thus born after the
liberation war, was not lost on many observers. In the midst
of the killing and disorder, Zimbabwe’s economy collapsed
into hyperinflation, and the agriculturally rich country once
known as “the bread basket of Africa” came instead to be
known as the continent’s basket case. Mugabe is still in
power as o f early 2015, more than thirty years later, and he
presides over a regime that is deeply dependent on him as an
individual. It was not obvious from the start that the story
would turn out this way, but Mugabe is now widely reviled— around the
world and by many Zimbabweans— as one of the most abusive and despotic
dictators in Africa.
Concepts 147
How does this happen? W hat gives rise to such brutal regimes, and what
allows them to persist even as they preside over ruination? W hile the previous
chapter sought to explain democracy and democratization, this chapter turns
the question around to look at authoritarian regimes. These sorts o f regimes
were for a long time the majority of all governments. They cast a specter over
the entire twentieth century, and they still exist in many forms today.
® « •
Concepts
In the previous chapter we looked at democratic regimes and transitions to de
mocracy. In this chapter, we focus on two main concepts: authoritarianism (along
with authoritarian regimes) and authoritarian transitions.
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Regim es
At first glance, authoritarianism might be viewed simply as the absence of de
mocracy as outlined in chapter 6, but the concept is in fact much more nuanced
and complex. It can be thought of as a characteristic of some ideologies (e.g.,
fascism and some varieties of socialism) or even as a behavioral tendency, as in
so-called “authoritarian personalities.”1 In general, we characterize an ideology
or behavioral tendency as authoritarian to the extent that it is favorable to hierar
chy and to closed, concentrated processes of decision making.
Authoritarian regimes are those that exemplify, to one degree or another, this
authoritarian ideal. While many of us have had the good fortune to grow up in
democratic societies, we should recognize that in many places and times authori
tarian regimes have been the norm. Indeed, if we were to take a historical view of
political regimes, we would see that most different subtypes (e.g., oligarchies, em
pires, monarchies, and sultanates) fall into the general authoritarian category.2
While we are interested in modern regimes here, there is still a lot of variation
to explore. Modern authoritarian regimes vary in several respects. One is the
extent to which the regime centers on an individual, as opposed to a ruling elite
clique, junta, or bureaucracy. Personalistic regimes may invoke the names of his
tory’s greatest villains: Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot in Cambodia, and even as far back
as Caligula in the Roman Empire. O f course, these personalistic rulers relied on
institutions such as political parties, militaries, or secret police to support their
rule, but their rule was quite different from that of the nondescript generals and
admirals who ruled Brazil or Argentina in the 1970s. Another distinction is the
degree to which the regime expounds an overarching ideology, such as commu
nism or fascism, as opposed to governing without attempting to socialize the
citizenry in such ways. A third major difference is the extent to which and the
way in which the regime constrains or violates human rights. Most theorists
would recognize all authoritarian regimes in the contemporary world as violating
some basic rights, such as the right to self-determination and basic political free
doms. However, some authoritarian regimes are willing to leave individuals
alone, in relative freedom, so long as they accept the regime’s authority and stay
away from politics. Others aim to control almost every aspect of their citizens’
authoritarianism A form of
government or regime that is
non-democratic.
authoritarian regime
A non-democratic regime.
148 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
democratic breakdown The
transition from a democratic to a
non-democratic regime.
authoritarian persistence The
ongoing continuation of an
authoritarian regime, such that
democratic transition does not
take place.
hybrid regime A class of regime
that appears to be neither fully
democratic nor fully authoritarian,
such as electoral authoritarianism,
delegative democracy, and illiberal
democracy.
totalitarian regime A form of
authoritarian regime that aims to
control everything about the lives
of its subject population, such as in
the Soviet Union and Germany
under the Nazis.
lives. The subtypes of authoritarian regimes described in the “Types” section
express some of these distinctions.
Transitions to Authoritarian Regim es
Regime change is not a one-way street from authoritarianism to democracy; on
the contrary, democracies can break down and collapse, and authoritarian re
gimes can persist and solidify their rule. Although the end of the twentieth cen
tury witnessed a wave of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and Africa, more recent years have recalled that authoritarianism
persists and even grows in some places.3 Reversion to authoritarianism in demo
cratic countries has a long history, from the breakdown of the Weimar Republic
and the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s to the many coups in Latin America
and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Consolidation may stop or be reversed. Tran
sition may fail, or a country may retransition from democracy back below the
threshold to authoritarianism. Political scientists do not use the word authoritari-
anization, but we do examine these processes of democratic breakdown and
authoritarian persistence.4 We also need to consider the various paths to the
establishment of hybrid regimes (which combine authoritarian and some demo
cratic elements).5
Types
As noted previously, authoritarian regimes vary in important ways. In this sec
tion, we discuss the key subtypes of authoritarianism, as well as the variable
forms that transitions to authoritarian regimes can take.
Types of Authoritarianism
Some of the most important types of authoritarian regimes are totalitarian re
gimes, theocracies, personalistic dictatorships, and bureaucratic-authoritarian
regimes. We discuss each of these in more detail in this section.
T o ta lita ria n R egim es
Totalitarian regimes represent the most notorious form of authoritarian rule,
epitomized by the communist and fascist regimes of the twentieth century that
sent millions of people to their deaths, especially in Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union, particularly during the years of Joseph Stalin’s leadership. Many
would consider today’s North Korea to be another example of a totalitarian
regime. Totalitarian regimes deny civil rights to citizens and do not hold free and
fair elections, but their manipulations and machinations go far beyond those of
many other authoritarian regimes.
Totalitarianism gets its name from the attempt to overhaul or control the to
tality of a society, most notably through propagation of an official governing
ideology to which all people are expected to conform.6 Totalitarian regimes will
go to great lengths to preclude freedom of thought and conscience, often using
secret police, spies, and informants to report on suspected dissidents; freedom of
thought is antithetical to the ambitions of totalitarian leadership. There is usually
one official governing party, often led by a dominant figure who is the subject of
hero worship or a cult of personality. State control over the economy is common
and prevents any economic actors from building up a power base that might be
Types 149
used to challenge the total domination the state has over public life. Many
totalitarian regimes use prisons, work camps, and mass executions in an attempt
to re-educate society and to eliminate supposedly undesirable elements, espe
cially ethnic minorities. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin and Nazi Germany
under Adolf Hitler are the most horrific examples, with each responsible for
millions of deaths in the mid-twentieth century.7 To a large extent, the history of
that century was the story of the struggle between liberal democratic regimes and
totalitarian regimes.
Totalitarianism may be a modern phenomenon. There certainly are precedents
for totalitarianism in historical societies, such as ancient Sparta. But for the most
part, the relative weakness of pre-modern states precluded the possibility of true
totalitarian regimes, despite efforts that look quite totalitarian, such as medieval
European states’ efforts to censor literature and to enforce Christian orthodoxy
by force.
Some analysts argue that the concept of totalitarianism was an artifact of
the Cold War, or even a propaganda tool for the liberal-democratic West, used
to demonize the Soviet Union and its allies.8 There is no doubt that totalitari
anism was most associated with the atrocities committed by both the Nazis
under Hitler and the Soviets. It is important as a concept, however, as it allows
us to describe important variation between forms of authoritarianism that aim
to control everything in the lives of their people and those that allow greater
latitude. Contemporary Russia and Venezuela, for example, while not totali
tarian states, as some of their critics contend, clearly exhibit a number of
authoritarian features, while contemporary N orth Korea and even, to some
extent, Cuba go much further in their restrictions on personal freedoms and
might be labeled “totalitarian.” Finally, some scholars argue that totalitarian
regimes are so distinctive in terms of the characteristics we have discussed
here to deserve their own category, rather than to be thought of as a type of
authoritarianism.9
T heocracies
Some authoritarian regimes are closely linked to religions and religious institu
tions. If religious leaders control an authoritarian state, or if a state imposes very
strict religious restrictions and uses religion as its main mode of legitimation, we
refer to it as a theocratic regime. In the pre-modern world, many if not most
states were theocratic, and the monarchies of Western Europe, for example, had
strong theocratic features. Today there are fewer theocratic regimes, but some
stand out as particularly noteworthy, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Many states,
though, continue to involve religion or to impose religious restrictions, a subject
to which we return in chapter 15.
P erson alistic D ic tato rsh ip s
Not all authoritarian regimes are totalitarian or theocratic. Indeed, many con
temporary authoritarian regimes are not. Some simply allow little role for the
population in political decision-making, but the state does not aim to control
every aspect of their lives. Among more limited authoritarian regimes we find
the classic forms of dictatorship that have been particularly common in modern
political history. The terms personalistic dictatorship and the more antiquated
theocracy An authoritarian state
controlled by religious leaders, or a
state with very strict religious res
trictions that uses religion as its
main mode of legitimation.
personalistic dictatorship
A form of authoritarianism in which
the personality of the dictator is
highlighted.
150 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
CASE IN CONTEXT
Democratic Features of Authoritarian Systems? The Case of Iran PAGE 475
In 1979, Iran underwent a social revolution that brought a radical
and religious government into power. Some regard this govern*
ment as totalitarian, as it imposes strict controls on public expres
sion, religion, and issues of “morality.” Religious leaders at the top
of the hierarchy have ultimate control, and thus we would be
justified in considering it theocratic. Interestingly, though, in this
context Iran still has some quasi-democratic features as well.
Elections are still periodically held, and they are actually con
tested, though not always fairly. In short, there is some debate
within the Iranian state, but within a rather narrow band policed
by religious authorities, and in a broader context that most
would regard as highly authoritarian.
For more on authoritarianism and democracy in Iran, see the
case study in Part VI, pp. 475-476. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. On what grounds does Iran claim to be democratic? What
criteria do social scientists use in judging it not to be so
despite some clearly democratic features?
2. What are the implications of Iran’s totalitarian and theo
cratic approach for the long-term viability of its regime?
Does totalitarianism help the regime stay in power or
create vulnerabilities?
“sultanism” refer to domination of a political system by a single individual.10 This
individual concentrates power and governs as he (or she, but usually he) sees fit.
Autocracy, despotism, dictatorship, or tyranny can be used to express similar
ideas, though some of these terms can sometimes refer to domination by a clique
of more than one leader. As distinct from totalitarian rule, the sultan/autocrat/
despot may not aim to establish an overarching ideology. In other cases, an ideol
ogy may be promoted but does not come to be implemented to the extent that it
would be in a totalitarian regime. As distinct from theocratic rule, while a per
sonalistic dictator might support religion, repress religious minorities, and use
religion as a tool of the state, it is the dictator—and not the religious system in
question—that is the highest authority.
The justification for rule in personalistic dictatorships may be based on the
assertion of the public interest, such as the ability to promote economic success,
or the need to combat subversives. Sometimes, dictatorships of this sort are ex
plicitly framed as temporary. On other occasions, they have been presented as
likely “necessary” for a long time. The idea of “democratic Caesarism” has some
times been used to justify them, the suggestion being that some societies on the
path to democratization are not yet ready for democracy but, rather, need a strong
leader to help them get ready, or even to maintain order over the longer term.11
Conveniently, though, such self-appointed leaders are often slow to judge the
countries they rule to be actually ready. Some authoritarian rulers of this sort
argue that democracy is not right for all countries, and some hold that a country
needs a strong leader to keep people in line. There have been a number of person
alistic dictators in Africa, among other regions of the world, and several of them
are unfortunately memorable. They include the tyrants Mobutu Sese Seko of the
former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Jean-Bedel Bokassa
of the Central African Republic (who declared himself emperor), and Idi Amin
of Uganda.12
Types 151
B u re a u c ra tic -A u th o rita ria n R egim es
Personalistic dictatorships and related forms of autocracy shade into a form of
authoritarian regime that became very common in parts of the developing world
in the mid- to late twentieth century: the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime.
These regimes are usually focused less on a single individual than on personalistic
dictatorships, instead relying on an organized bureaucracy (often, though not
always, the military) to run the country.
Though less often associated with particular historical figures, such regimes
are not necessarily less brutal than personalistic regimes. The Argentine military
in the 1970s, for example, was infamous for torture and for methods of execution
that included throwing dissenters out of helicopters into the Atlantic Ocean.13
Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Asia and Latin America used a range of
justifications for assuming rule, including the political impasses and economic
failures of civilian regimes in their countries.14
Like most personalistic dictatorships, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes
tend to be less ideological than totalitarian regimes, or more pragmatic. They can
be right-wing or left-wing, but the fundamental rationale they typically use in
trying to garner legitimacy is the alleged need to establish order or economic
progress. They tell their societies they can achieve full modernity only through a
strong hand and technical administration. Yet these regimes, which were very
common in the 1960s and 1970s, typically viewed their role not as displacing
civilian regimes in order to call new elections, but as governing their countries
for extended periods. In other words, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes seldom
view themselves as merely brief caretakers.
Some would consider the category of “party dictatorships” to overlap with that
of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Lor example, some would argue that the
Mexican government during the period of the Partido Revolucionario Institu-
cional’s (PRI) dominance shaded into bureaucratic authoritarianism (see discus
sion in the “Case in Context” box titled “Mexico’s ‘Perfect Dictatorship’ and Its
End”). Party dictatorships are distinguished from personalistic dictatorships
most clearly by the fact that it is a party, rather than a single individual, that aims
to hold onto power. In the contemporary world, China might be considered a
good example of this.
H y b rid a n d S e m i-A u th o rita ria n R egim es
Sometimes regimes are hard to classify as either democratic or authoritarian.
Indeed, this seems to be a growing problem. This is especially true after the third
wave of democratization (discussed in the previous chapter), which led to stronger
democratic international norms with which regimes wish to appear compliant.15
Accordingly, regimes developed techniques and learned from one another about
how to appear to comply with these norms while nevertheless remaining in power.
Over the years, the range of variations among different types of regimes has led to
a proliferation of names for regimes that fit somewhere in between full democracy
and complete authoritarianism. Some scholars have urged caution about coming
up with new names, noting that while there are many subtypes of democratic or
authoritarian regimes, we want more than simply “democracy with adjectives.”16
Nonetheless, these terms have resonance and have become prominent.
bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime A type of authoritarian
regime, common in Latin America
and elsewhere in the mid- to late
twentieth century, that was
associated with control of the state
more by a group of elites (often
military) than by a single individual
leader.
152 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
illiberal democracy A polity with
some democratic features but in
which political and civil rights are
not all guaranteed or protected.
delegative democracy A hybrid
form of regime that is democratic
but involves the electorate
“delegating” significant authority to
a government.
electoral authoritarianism
A name applied to situations in
which authoritarian regimes
nominally compete in elections.
competitive authoritarianism
A form of government or regime
that allows some political
competition but not enough to
qualify as fully democratic.
Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, as he is sworn into the presidency for his third term, in
2012. Ortega’s supporters claim that his policies aim to reduce inequalities and poverty, while
his critics charge that his government is not fully democratic.
The notion of illiberal democracy emerges from the many experiences
where countries have reasonably fair elections but then do little to hold elected
leaders to account.17 W hile these countries are described as democracies,
largely due to reasonably fair elections, they may share more in common with
authoritarian regimes. Several regimes in Latin America have been character
ized as delegative democracies,18 while the term electoral authoritarianism
has been used to describe hybrid regimes elsewhere.19 More recently, some of
these regimes have been labeled as competitive authoritarian, meaning that
they do allow some political competition but not enough to qualify as fully
democratic.20 Note that these terms are not perfect synonyms. A delegative
democracy is considered at least partially democratic. Competitive authoritari
anism blurs the line in this connection, the key idea being that the regime is
not truly democratic but that it exerts control through elections that are at least
nominally competitive. The incomplete nature of democracy in many hybrid
regimes was described by the Peruvian scholar Hernando de Soto, who once
discussed politics in his country in the 1980s and 1990s by saying, “every five
years we elect a dictator.”21
Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to Authoritarianism
As mentioned previously, many forms of regime change can end in authori
tarianism. These include the replacement of one form of authoritarian regime
with another, as well as democratic breakdown and transitions to hybrid re
gimes. We discuss these here, but first we will take a look at authoritarian
persistence.
Types 153
A u th o rita ria n P ersistence
Authoritarian persistence is a pressing issue in light of the many non-democratic
regimes in the world today that seem enduring, perhaps including China,
Cuba, N orth Korea among others. In discussing democratic transition and
consolidation in the previous chapter, we noted that these processes may not
always be completed. Such a case may suggest partial democratization, but the
flip side of the coin is the persistence (and therefore apparent “success”) of an
authoritarian regime. At some level, this distinction may seem to be merely se
mantic, but we must take care not to assume that all countries are destined to
become democracies in the end.22 Indeed, questions about the persistence of
authoritarianism become more interesting if an authoritarian regime persists
despite predictions that it should not.
Authoritarian regimes have their own characteristics and attributes, which
may contribute to their stability. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party—
which was an economic failure for its first thirty years in power—has very
successfully presided over that country’s decades of economic growth since it
undertook reforms beginning in 1979. This economic success is undoubtedly part
of why the authoritarian regime has endured and democratization has not gained
steam after the brutal crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989. In
short, to understand regime types and regime changes, we must recognize that they
depend not only on the details of how a transition goes but also on the features
of authoritarian regimes.
Moreover, it is worth noting that there are at least two main kinds of authori
tarian persistence. The first is the persistence of a single authoritarian regime, as
■ I
Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia PAGE 533
For decades Russia was the center of the Soviet Union, which, like
virtually every modern state, claimed to be democratic, though
in this instance quite dubiously. Then, between 1989 and 1991,
the Soviet Union fell apart, more quickly than almost anyone had
anticipated, leading to the emergence of a hybrid regime under
Boris Yeltsin. A period of economic and political instability fol
lowed until Vladimir Putin, aided by an oil boom, began to
impose political order. He did this, in part, by developing a hybrid
of electoral politics with strong authoritarian features, consid
ered a classic case of competitive authoritarianism.23 The state
has been used to repress his opponents, and his 2012 re-election
to the presidency has been denounced by many for its irregulari
ties and has been the source of much popular protest. Putin
could conceivably alternate between holding the presidency
and governing indirectly through others in the coming years,
though his ability to hold onto power over the long term remains
to be seen.
For more on Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime, see
the case study in Part VI, pp. 533-534. As you read it, keep in mind
the following questions:
1. If Russia is a competitive authoritarian regime rather than
a democracy or a fully authoritarian regime, when did it
become one? What does the case suggest about how we
can distinguish hybrid from democratic and authoritarian
regimes?
2. How much of Russia’s authoritarian character is a function
of the state’s ability to make use of oil wealth? If there is a
prolonged downturn in the market for oil, will the hybrid
regime model be likely to continue to work indefinitely?
Why or why not?
154 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
suggested earlier. Often this persistence is accompanied by major internal
changes to the regime. An example, again, is the rule of the Chinese Communist
Party. Today’s Communist Party embraces very different policies and a different
style of rule than it did, say, under Mao Zedong in the 1960s. Yet the same party
and the same basic state have remained in place, and thus most political scientists
would consider this a case of a single authoritarian regime’s persistence. In other
words, the reforms of Deng Xiaoping and his successors, while radical, did not
constitute an institutional break in regime type, but rather a slower transition
that leaves the regime firmly in the authoritarian category.
Let’s consider a different sort of pattern: the substitution of one authoritarian
regime for another. Whereas the first type of authoritarian persistence that we
considered has no punctuated regime change, this type does. Some authoritarian
regimes give way to other authoritarian regimes, often of very different types.
One example is modern Iran. In 1979, millions of protestors backing the Islamic
Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the longtime ruler, the Shah Reza
Pahlavi, a U.S.-supported authoritarian leader (see extended discussion in the
Country Profile and Case Studies for Iran in Part VI). The result was a very dif
ferent type of regime: The Islamic Revolution was theocratic (i.e., led by religious
clerics), conservative, and nationalistic, as opposed to the secular, modernizing,
and pro-Western rule of the Shah. Yet both were authoritarian and both opposed
liberal democracy. Indeed, what is particularly interesting about this case is the
question of which of the two authoritarian Iranian regimes in question is less
democratic, a subject Iran scholars debate. From Cuba to China to Ethiopia,
there is a long history of regimes that change in style, type, or ideology, substi
tuting one flavor of authoritarianism for another.
Authoritarian regimes use a number of techniques and strategies in their ef
forts to persist. These are sometimes called strategies of “regime maintenance.”
One such strategy is to produce economic benefits for citizens. This can take the
form of efforts to produce growth (as in Singapore or, more recently, China) or in
the form of patronage and clientelism, which involve the state using its own re
sources to benefit supporters.24 Authoritarian regimes also often use repression.
—
Mexico’s “Perfect Dictatorship” and Its End PAGE 505
Mexico was once called “the perfect dictatorship.” The PRI, the PRI politician to the presidency, but very few observers think this
party that governed from 1929 to 2000, won every election in signaled a return to the old system.
that period through a combination of inducements and repres- For more on Mexico’s regimes, see the case study in Part VI,
sion, and by incorporating most of the major political actors in pp. 505-506. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
society, such as business and labor unions, into a standing rela- 1. What mechanisms and tactics did the PRI use to maintain
tionship with the regime. In 2000, the PRI lost for the first time in its authority and control for so long?
seventy-one years, and Mexico’s regime changed. The story was 2. What explains the eventual decline of a party that was
one of the most compelling regime changes of the late twenti- able to govern for so long? What variables or historical
eth century. In 2012 Enrique Pena Nieto was elected, returning a changes contributed to democratization?
This can take the form of using police to stifle protest activities and, in its most
egregious cases, the use of large-scale violence against civilians. Authoritarian
regimes also typically try to limit the access of political opponents to resources
like information, media, and public space. We return to some of these issues in
chapter 12.
D em o c ra tic B reakd o w n
The decline of democratic regimes may be the most iconic type of regime change
leading to authoritarianism. Examples abound, such as the collapse of Germany’s
Weimar Republic in the 1930s leading to the rise of the Nazis (see box on “De
mocracy and Authoritarianism in Germany”) and the coup d ’etat against the
Allende government in Chile in the 1970s that led to the Pinochet dictatorship.
Democratic reversals and returns to authoritarian rule are also diverse in form,
much like democratization and authoritarian persistence. Some countries may
“authoritarianize” (that is, witness a democratic breakdown) in fits and starts,
perhaps with partial losses of freedom and increasingly suspect elections inter
spersed with moments of continued political participation by the citizenry. One
could argue whether this applies to Russia under Vladimir Putin or Venezuela
under Nicolas Maduro today. Other democratic breakdowns may be abrupt and
dramatic, with a military force overthrowing a democratic regime in a coup, or
an elected ruler declaring a state of emergency and martial law; examples are
numerous in the history of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.
As is the case with democratization, these democratic breakdowns may also
reverse (in this case with a return to democracy), sometimes indefinitely and
other times only temporarily, or stop somewhere in between democracy and au
thoritarianism. One democratic breakdown that stopped, for instance, was in
Ukraine in 2004, when hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets in
the Orange Revolution to protest a fraudulent and manipulated election. W hile
Ukraine was a flawed and partial democracy before the Orange Revolution, the
movement undoubtedly prevented further movement in the direction of authori
tarianism at that time. Sadly, weak institutions contributed to a renewed crisis in
Ukraine in 2014, leading to violence, further weakened institutions, and the loss
of some of the country’s territory to Russia.
Several patterns of democratic decay and collapse are worth special attention.
First, democratic regimes sometimes collapse because voters elect authoritarians.
This may sound surprising. W hy would people vote for an authoritarian when
they have democracy? One reason is that they may not know they are voting for
an authoritarian. A political candidate who promises law and order, economic
development, and the end of corruption may give no indication that he or she
intends to close the parliament and the court system and to declare martial law
as means to this end. Another reason is that in some societies where democratic
consolidation is incomplete, democracy may appear to have weaknesses as well as
strengths, and voters might have different trade-offs to calculate than do citizens
in well-institutionalized democracies. Consider a democracy that has produced
painfully poor economic performance, and one in which corruption is rife and
rule of law is only minimally established. Are you sure you would not be tempted
156 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
Orange Revolution Protestors in Ukraine in 2004.
to vote for an authoritarian who promised to end 80 percent annual inflation,
extremely dangerous streets, and an obviously corrupt and thieving class of party
leaders who drained the national treasury and deposited the funds in accounts in
the Cayman Islands? Perhaps you would not (we believe that we would not), but
you can probably understand why some people would.
Second, democratic regimes sometimes collapse because organized actors in
society move against them. Organized labor can strike; middle-class individu
als can demonstrate, marching, setting up barricades, or banging pots (a form
of protest common in Latin America called the “cacerolazo”); businesses can
withdraw capital; and, perhaps most dangerous, the state bureaucracy itself can
refuse to comply with the orders of civilian leaders. This is most dangerous
when the military, or segments of the military, lose faith in democracy or in the
given democratic regime. W hen this happens, a coup d’etat becomes more
likely. In the view of most analysts, coups d’etat are intrinsically anti-democratic
when brought against democratic regimes. They can, however, issue in different
sorts of outcomes, including democratizing effects. Indeed, coups against au
thoritarian regimes sometimes happen, and sometimes for the sake of estab
lishing democracy. Many coups, though, involve the military acting against a
civilian (and often democratic) regime, and substituting an authoritarian regime
in its place.
Third, as we discuss in greater detail in chapter 12, sometimes regime change
takes the form of revolution. These revolutions can in some instances be democ
ratizing, but in many other instances they actually lead to greater concentration
of power under an authoritarian regime. The history of France in the nineteenth
century, after the French Revolution, shows the ambiguities of such outcomes, as
the country went through both democratizing and dictatorial periods.
Types 157
Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany
Germany is a country that has seen a number of major regime
changes over the course of its modern history. As such, it is a
sort of laboratory for scholars interested in questions of democ
racy, democratization, and democratic breakdown. It has seen
failed democratic consolidation, emergent authoritarianism, the
splitting of the country after military defeat, with parallel authori
tarian (East Germany) and democratic (West Germany) polities
and, finally, successful reunification with a well-consolidated
democracy.
PAGE 450
For more on this case, see Part VI, pp. 450-451. As you read it,
keep in mind the following questions:
1. Why did Germany see so many transitions in the twenti
eth century?
2. Does the German case help us understand why transi
tions happen more generally, or is it idiosyncratic?
3. These transitions occurred back and forth in the same
country. What are this fact’s implications for theories
about why regime change happens?
T ra n sitio n to H y b rid o r S e m i-A u th o rita ria n R egim e
Hybrid regimes can emerge out of either democratic or authoritarian regimes, as we
discuss in further detail in the “Causes and Effects” section later in the chapter.
Partial democratic breakdown can lead a formerly democratic polity to fall into
semi-authoritarian status. A traditionally authoritarian regime can enter into the
same hybrid status as a result of partial and limited democratization—or else super
ficial efforts to appear compliant with international norms and expectations. Here
we will sketch a fictitious but roughly representative example of each scenario. Polity
A involves a transition from a more democratic regime to a hybrid regime, and
Polity B involves a transition from a more authoritarian regime to a hybrid regime.
The citizens of Polity A achieved notable democratization several decades
ago, against the odds. Similar countries in their region remained authoritarian or
Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France PAGE 435
We think of France as one of the world’s leading democracies,
and it is. However, for many decades, France dealt with a serious
case of authoritarian persistence. Unlike the United Kingdom or
the United States, which experienced gradual but steady democ
ratization, France swung sharply between republican and impe
rial forms of government in the nineteenth century. Even in the
twentieth century, the Vichy government was authoritarian. Of
course, it owed its position to the Nazis’ quick military victory over
France, followed by France’s collaboration, and should not be
thought of as having emerged organically from French political
life. At the same time, it was not without its French supporters.
France is a good case for the analysis of authoritarian persis
tence. Why, after all, did authoritarianism keep coming back in
spite of the strong republican tradition that developed after the
revolution of 1789?
For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 435-
436. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. Why did the French Revolution not lead to uninterrupted
democracy?
2. What major features of nineteenth-century French
society might have contributed to its cycles of
authoritarianism?
3. What lessons, if any, does nineteenth-century France offer
to democratizers of contemporary authoritarian states
and to those undergoing slow processes of democratic
consolidation?
158 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
reverted to authoritarianism in subsequent years, but Polity A remained demo
cratic. O f course, there were problems. Ongoing poverty and inequality were
major issues. Political parties became bureaucratic and prone more to elite cor
ruption than to representing the populace. Those parties came to dominate po
litical life: You could not access state resources or services without going through
the parties. Then, a major regional crisis struck. The country’s debt expanded
dramatically, and as a result it had to make major cuts in public spending. Polity
A’s state could no longer do the kinds of things its citizens expected the state to
do, such as (more or less) effectively policing, providing some minimal health
care and food and housing assistance for the poorest, and managing the business
cycle through effective government spending when times were tough. A political
candidate came along promising to change all of that by throwing the corrupt
elites out of office. Once elected, this leader began to argue that the very institu
tions of representative democracy were part of the problem because they were
inherently elitist, and that the existing legislature and judiciary were full of
representatives of the old parties. The leader used this argument to justify the
constitutionally questionable transformation of these institutions. Soon, the leg
islature and judiciary were filled with loyalists of the new leader, as were the
electoral authority and the military. Elections continued, but in many ways the
deck was stacked against the regime’s opponents.
The citizens of Polity B lived for many decades under an authoritarian regime.
That authoritarian regime collapsed, however, and savvy politicians rushed to fill
the ensuing political vacuum. These political entrepreneurs quickly (maybe even
recklessly) embarked on major political and economic reforms, ostensibly creating
a brief and limited democracy. The result was that the publicly owned resources
the state had amassed during its many decades of authoritarianism quickly fell
into the private hands of a small, highly concentrated group. At the same time,
living standards for the majority of the population fell dramatically, and social
problems such as crime and drug addiction soared. W ithin a few years, a leader
arose promising to restore the country’s glory and the people’s old standard of
living, blaming the new elites for Polity B’s problems. This leader, like the leader
in Polity A, continued to allow regular elections to be held but practiced intimida
tion of the press, selective prosecution, and occasional fraud to remain in power.
Both Polity A and Polity B underwent transitions to hybrid or semi-authoritarian
regime status. You may call them “Venezuela” and “Russia,” if you like, though
with those two countries, there will be disagreement about whether they are hybrid
or authoritarian regimes.25 The first started from a position of relatively robust de
mocracy and the second from long-standing authoritarianism. These are only two
of numerous possible patterns through which such regimes can emerge.
Causes and Effects: What
Causes Authoritarian Regimes
to Emerge and Persist?
In this section we consider four major theories of the emergence of authoritarian
regimes: those that focus on class coalitions at critical junctures, those that focus
on poverty and inequality, those that focus on weak states, and those that focus
on political culture. We also discuss some special causal circumstances surround
ing hybrid regimes.
Historical Institutionalist Theories
As discussed in chapter 5, historical institutionalist theories look for critical junc
tures in which institutional patterns become set.26 In explaining the emergence of
authoritarian regimes, these theories look for junctures where either authoritarian
institutions are formed or coalitions supportive of authoritarian rule are estab
lished. W hy might these events happen at certain key moments in the develop
ment of a polity? Well, first of all, there are in many societies at many times
certain groups that would be better off without democratization, or believe that
they would be. Such groups might include (1) representatives of organizations who
receive special treatment under an existing authoritarian state—perhaps religious
organizations or, in some circumstances, military actors; (2) economic actors who
want to control the state to use it as a tool against those who wish to redistribute
wealth or to expand economic rights; or (3) individuals or groups who fear that
democratization will lead to the confiscation of their wealth or the reduction of
their privileges—possibly wealthy economic actors such as landlords or business
owners and/or nobles, depending on the circumstances. If elite actors have reason
to fear democratization, they might try to form and maintain nondemocratic in
stitutions and to assemble a coalition supportive of such institutions.
A historical institutionalist theory tries to explain how institutions get set in
a particular pattern, and then explains subsequent development as a consequence
of the institutional path that has been established. Such a theory would thus
mainly try to explain why authoritarian institutions were established in the first
place. It may further argue that the coalitions of actors supporting the institu
tional arrangements must remain present to account for the persistence of those
arrangements.27
Let’s imagine another fictitious society. It undergoes a transition from one
type of authoritarian regime— an absolutist monarchy with an agrarian economy
and an economy based on estates—to a more modern dictatorship. The following
actors are present at the transition:
• the existing state, which is authoritarian to the extreme;
• the representatives of the old nobility, who fear revolutionary change,
having read about those ghastly rebellions in France;
• landowners, some of whom are noble and some not, who make their living
from collecting rents from peasants on their land;
• a relatively small but increasingly powerful group of industrial
entrepreneurs;
• a relatively small but growing group of industrial workers;
• a large religious organization that has exerted a monopoly with the support
of the old state; and
• a large mass of peasants.
The old state had bankrupted itself and then had begun imposing heavy taxes
on the rents acquired by agricultural elites (including the dominant church,
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 159
160 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
which owns a lot of land). It had also taxed its own exporters heavily, arguing
that manufacturing should serve the interests of the crown by producing goods
for sale only to the king’s subjects. It had cut all military spending. Under such
circumstances, a coalition has formed among four elite groups: landowners, the
military, the church, and the industrial entrepreneurs. While these groups’ inter
ests are not identical, they all are being hurt by existing policy. If this coalition
brings about regime transition, though, that regime might be authoritarian, be
cause each of these groups wants to protect its existing privileges. Now let’s
imagine further that this coalition successfully creates new institutions: We
might expect those institutions to endure and for authoritarianism to persist until
some new crisis emerges later in the country’s history. The importance of such
coalitions is central to the classic argument by Barrington Moore about why au
thoritarian and democratic regimes emerge (see the “Insights” box on The Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy).
Some would argue that Moore’s argument is not really historical institution
alist because he places so much emphasis on class relations (which, in terms of
the state-society schema discussed in chapter 3, fall on the society side of the
ledger) and democratic or authoritarian outcomes. A key question here is the
extent to which the persistence of a given democratic or authoritarian regime is a
consequence of (1) ongoing class coalitions or (2) institutional inertia. Moore,
despite being criticized for not being sufficiently state-centric,28 seems to have
assumed that once the conditions for democratic or authoritarian regimes are
established they are largely set for the foreseeable future. Some other, rational-
choice institutionalist accounts differ in this respect.
Poverty and Inequality
If we accept modernization theory’s explanation of democratization—that eco
nomic development causes societies to become more democratic—we would
expect the obverse to be true as well. Economic collapse, increasing poverty, and
increasing income inequality likely predict a turn toward authoritarianism, and
ongoing economic stagnation and poverty likely predict authoritarian persistence.
This theory is intuitive. I f you are worried about where your next meal is going
to come from, or how to access health care for your seriously ill children, you are
probably less likely to devote your energy to demanding the right to vote, en
gaging in political speech, protesting, reading political newspapers, and the like.
As a result, all else being equal, we would expect pressures in poorer societies to
link more directly to the satisfaction of basic economic and social needs than
political liberties. This most emphatically does not mean that poorer people do
not value political rights and liberties, as has sometimes been asserted, but rather
that some needs will tend to strike us as more immediate than others, depending
on our circumstances.29 International survey research that tracks political atti
tudes supports this finding: As economic development increases, prioritization of
political freedoms tends to increase, whereas in poorer societies, “survival values”
score more highly.30 Again, people in poorer societies would, all else being equal,
likely prefer democratic regimes in many instances, but they may be less likely to
successfully press for democratization and/or the maintenance of democratic
institutions.
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 161
IN SIG H TS
The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World
by Barrington Moore &
Moore is essentially the intellectual grandfather of one variety of contemporary historical institutionalism. He offers a
modified Marxist account of why some societies ended up with
liberal democratic, fascist, or communist/socialist regimes by the
twentieth century, and he finds his answer in the class structures
of the societies he studied as they made the passage to moder
nity. While Moore’s book is nuanced, the key variable he notes is
the presence or absence of a “bourgeoisie” or “middle class.” If a
strong middle class was present when a society passed to politi
cal modernity, it was likely to end up a liberal democracy.
Conversely, countries without a strong and large middle-
class present during the passage to modernity were likely to
result in coalitions averse to democracy. There are lots of ways
that this can happen. An existing agrarian elite might join forces
with the small middle class to outcompete peasants, or the
middle class might form an alliance with the peasants themselves,
producing a revolution that tends toward authoritarianism. Moore
argued that the first scenario tends to produce right-wing authori
tarianism and the second, left-wing authoritarianism.
Think for a moment about the relationship between Moore’s
argument and that of S. M. Lipset discussed in the previous chap
ter. Each is interested in the presence or absence of the middle
class as a key determinant of whether a regime is likely to be
democratic or authoritarian, yet there are important differences
between their arguments. Can you identify them?
Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
Economic factors of this sort might matter not just in how they affect citizens’
attitudes but also in how they shape the institutional environment. W hile his
torical institutionalists argue that paths are set at critical junctures, determining
long-run outcomes, rational-choice institutionalists are more interested in how
institutions relate to the ongoing interests of groups and individuals in the polity.
Further, rational-choice institutionalists look at how shifting configurations of
interests and institutions change the bargaining positions of those groups and
individuals.
Income inequality, in addition to absolute poverty, is another likely factor
contributing to the establishment of authoritarian regimes. Societies with high
levels of income inequality seem more likely to be authoritarian than those with
low levels of income inequality. The relationship between these variables is com
plex, however. One source of the association between authoritarianism and in
equality may be that authoritarian regimes sometimes promote social and
economic inequality in addition to obvious political inequality. In an authoritar
ian regime, there is not open access to the state.31 Rather, some elites are privil
eged, and other citizens are excluded from connections and decision-making
power. This discrepancy is clearest in cases where dictators amass property for
themselves and their associates, such as the infamous Somoza family, which held
power in Nicaragua from 1936 to 1979 and came to hold an absurdly high per
centage of Nicaraguan territory as its personal property.32 I f a large segment of
the population has limited access to resources, we would expect that segment to
be less involved in democratic participation or in pressing for democratization.
Income inequality may help favor authoritarianism in another way as well: It
may engender envy and social division of the sort that potential authoritarian
leaders can exploit. Many authoritarian regimes will present themselves as
162 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
IN S IG H T S
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Daron Acemoglu a n d Jam es Robinson &
Like the arguments discussed in the previous section, Acemoglu and Robinson’s account of the determinants of regime
type is also “institutionalist,” but it falls closer to the rational
choice framework. To simplify the argument, Acemoglu and
Robinson argue that political modernization exhibits one of sev
eral main paths. The first is mostly unproblematic and steady
democratization, like in the United Kingdom and the United
States. The second is a see-saw pattern of alteration between
authoritarianism and democracy, as in parts of Latin America.
The third is authoritarian persistence based on shared prosperity
and relatively good governance. The fourth is authoritarian per
sistence based on repression.
Their game-theoretical approach views institutional arrange
ments as products of different actors pursuing their interests. On
one hand you have elites, who want to maintain their elite status,
which means privileged access to power and other resources.
Then you have the general population, which has an interest in
democratization. Elites hold power prior to democratization, and
they can be expected to preserve as much of it as possible. So
what determines the pattern of political modernization is the
relative situation of elites and the general population. Elites can
choose repression or can try to placate the general population in
one of two ways: They can make “pro-citizen” concessions and
try to run a polity that keeps the population rich and happy, or
they can make the “credible commitment” of institutionalizing
citizen control through democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson
suggest that they will choose democracy only if they have to and
if they expect that they can hold on to more resources through
doing so than through choosing another path. However, if elites
cannot implement pro-citizen policies, and if democracy is likely
to lead to a dramatic decline in their privileges, they are likely to
choose repression.
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
avengers of injustice. Populist leaders who tend toward authoritarianism can
claim to represent disenfranchised poor people and can promise to redress visible
inequalities. Interestingly, this seems to be a characteristic of both left- and right-
wing populism.33
State W eakness and Failure
Another theory focuses on state structures, arguing that weak or failing states are
more likely to yield authoritarian politics.34 This may be related to economic the
ories of authoritarianism. W hile some forms of authoritarianism go with strong
states (e.g., totalitarian forms), many tend to be linked to weak states or to those
shading toward state failure. Even the major totalitarian polities emerged from
states that faced serious difficulties, such as late-Czarist Russia in the 1900s or
Weimar Germany in the 1930s.
As noted in chapters 3 and 4, one of the key features of strong states is that
they are well institutionalized. Well-institutionalized states tend to be less per
sonalistic and more resistant to the efforts of private actors to co-opt them for
their own gain. “Predatory states” or regimes, however, are those in which one
group in society is able to capture the state and use it for the group’s own bene
fit.35 In some of the worst cases, the boundary between the private property of
the ruler’s family and that of the state is unclear, and ruling elites use the military
instrumentally against their opponents within society.36 So we seem to have a
kind of paradox. On one hand, well-institutionalized, strong states with high
capacity may be less likely to fall into authoritarianism, but when they do, there
is a higher chance that they will develop totalitarian forms of authoritarianism,
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 163
which requires a strong state to begin with. Just the same, authoritarianism in
weak states with predatory regimes can be very destructive as well.
O f course, state failure or state weakness can be an independent variable that
causes authoritarianism, but it in turn is caused by something else. State failure
or state weakness happens for a reason, as discussed in earlier chapters. It may be
that low economic development leads to weak states, which in turn leaves a polity
vulnerable to authoritarianism. If this is the case, low economic development can
be thought to indirectly encourage authoritarianism through its impact on state
weakness. In other words, causal sequences like the following simplified model
are possible, with the arrows understood to represent probabilistic causality:
Low economic development —> Weak state —> Authoritarianism
An alternative theory might look like the following, also treating a weak state as
a variable that intervenes between a more distanced cause and authoritarian
politics:
Unstable class coalitions -» Weak/poorly institutionalized state —> Authoritarianism
This theoretical causal sequence rests on the assumption that strong states might
be products of stable class coalitions. I f this is true, and if weak states breed au
thoritarianism, then unstable class coalitions might be thought to indirectly raise
the likelihood of authoritarian outcomes.
Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian Persistence
Other theories of authoritarian regimes hold that the beliefs, norms, and values
of a country’s citizens determine its regime type. The idea here is that people in
societies that are culturally authoritarian are more likely to have and keep au
thoritarian regimes. Theorists have identified different types of authoritarian cul
tures, and some argue that certain countries or regions have inherently different
values. Not surprisingly, as noted in chapter 6, authoritarian rulers are sometimes
happy to support this type of argument, such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, who
claimed “Confucian values” were not compatible with “Western” democracy.
Which values are hypothesized to matter depends very much on the theory in
question. Some scholars have argued that certain types of national identity might
be more conducive to authoritarianism than others.37 Others have suggested that
certain countries or cultural regions, like Latin America, have a generalized
“centralist” disposition that increases the likelihood of accepting authoritarian
regimes.38 Others have noted that some societies establish “traditions” of au
thoritarianism, and that the weight of tradition predicts a higher probability of
future authoritarianism.39 Still others have argued that what matters are not gen
eral cultural dispositions of this sort but rather the variation, observed through
extensive survey research, in attitudes toward civic participation.40
Even those who are skeptical of the claim that political culture strongly pre
dicts authoritarianism will often be more receptive to the idea that political-
cultural variables can, under certain circumstances, increase the likelihood that
certain types of authoritarianism will develop. This idea might be clearest in the
case of modern totalitarian regimes. It is very difficult to explain tho path taken
164 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
IN SIG H T S
The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy
in Five Nations
by Gabriel Alm ond an d Sidney Verba
A lmond and Verba’s book is as much a theory of democracy as authoritarianism, but here we will draw out its implications for
the study of authoritarian regimes. Almond and Verba base their
analysis on survey research that was carried out in five countries:
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and
Mexico. The research was conducted in 1959 and 1960, when
Mexico was still an authoritarian system (with the PRI dictatorship)
and when Germany and Italy had been liberated by the Allies from
the Hitler and Mussolini governments in the relatively recent past.
Almond and Verba create a typology of political-cultural ori
entations with three main categories: parochial cultures, subject
cultures, and civic cultures of participation. Parochial cultures are
characterized by populations that are largely distant from politics
and try to stay out of the government’s way, trusting it and other
actors outside of their local groups very little. Subject cultures
have higher levels of investment and trust in the state than paro
chial cultures, but they have lower levels of trust than participa
tory cultures, and members of subject cultures are not optimistic
about their chances to influence politics. Members of civic cul
tures of participation, though, have high trust in government
and other actors and also believe themselves to be very capable
of shaping political decisions through participation.
Almond and Verba recognized that institutions also shape
public attitudes, but their work suggested that public disposi
tions and attitudes were important factors in determining
whether a given regime would be democratic or authoritarian.
Gabriel Alm ond and Sidney Verba, Th e C ivic Culture: Political Attitudes and
D em o cracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
collective action Action
undertaken by individuals and
groups to pursue their ends in
formally or informally coordinated
ways, often in pursuit of some
common or public good such as
expanded civil rights or sustainable
use of common resources.
by Soviet or Nazi totalitarianism without paying some attention to the ideas of
Marxist and fascist thinkers and the ways in which these ideas influenced the
thinking and strategic behavior of key actors in the establishment of those
regimes.
Barriers to Collective Action
Rational-choice and game-theoretical approaches constitute a major alternative
to political culture theories in attempting to explain authoritarian persistence.
Such approaches try to model the rational processes of decision-making in which
citizens and politicians engage.41 They tend to presume that these actors know
their own interests (or preferences) and have imperfect information about the
likely behavior of others. According to these approaches, actors are unlikely to
engage in c o lle c tiv e a c tio n unless it becomes rational for them to do so, meaning
the chances of success seem high, their contribution seems important to the de
sired outcome, and they are unlikely to face major costs for participating in such
action.42 These approaches constitute alternatives to political cultural theories of
authoritarian persistence because they assume that most people want more de
mocratization (regardless of their culture), but that sometimes there are major
barriers to democratic transition such that it would be irrational for any individ
ual actor to take the necessary steps to provoke a transition.
Imagine a repressive authoritarian state. It severely restricts rights, grants
decision-making authority to a small elite, authorizes a police agency to use vio
lence and torture as key tools for stifling dissent, censors media heavily (includ
ing social media), and reads e-mails and taps the phones of any potential
democratic activists. Let us also assume that the regime’s repression has been
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 165
successful to date and that there is no viable resistance at present. Now imagine
that you really want to topple this regime and usher in a democratic replacement.
Unfortunately, you are unlikely to be able to accomplish this change on your
own. You are going to need lots of people to participate in collective action with
you. Now let’s imagine the conversation you might have with your best friend as
you try to convince him or her to help you in the struggle:
YOU: Eh, hey, what do you say we try to topple the authoritarian
state?
FRIEND: …Umm …
YOU: Aren’t you tired of this repressive regime?
FRIEND: Um, aren’t they tapping the phones? Let’s talk about this later.
[Later, in a safe place, the conversation resumes:]
YOU: So I was saying, what if we…
FRIEND: Are you crazy? They’ll probably catch us, and if they do, who
knows what they’ll do? Anyway, there’s no way it could work.
In essence, rational-choice theories of authoritarian persistence say that your
friend is right in this scenario, and that authoritarian persistence will likely last
until events change your friend’s calculations, along with the perceptions and
calculations of many others.43 This could happen in a number of ways. For ex
ample, imagine that the large foreign power that used to bankroll the repressive
state’s security apparatus has made human rights the new centerpiece of its
foreign policy, and has therefore cut off such aid. O r imagine that there is a
change in leadership in the regime, and the new leaders reduce repression.
IN S IG H T S
Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East
European Revolution of 1989
by Timur Kuran
&
Kuran tries to explain how rapid transitions from authoritarian rule could take place when previous data indicates support
for the old regime. He is particularly interested in the revolutions
that took place in 1989 in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany. His key insight is that under certain circum
stances preference falsification may be quite common. If it is risky
or socially unacceptable to publicly state your preference for
more democracy, you are unlikely to do so. In such an environ
ment, people are likely to overstate their support for authoritari
anism. This preference falsification is costly: it is psychologically
unpleasant to have to pretend to like things that you do not like.
Some people most opposed to the regime are least willing to
falsify their preferences and are the first to make their voices
known. If they do so without major repercussions, more people
begin expressing their true preferences. A cascading pattern
then develops as it becomes safer for more people to speak out
against the regime.
Many authoritarian states seem to implicitly understand this,
which is why so many of them devote such resources to control
ling discourse and public gatherings. Barriers to the collective
expression of preferences for democracy are barriers to mobiliza
tion against authoritarian regimes.
Timur Kuran,”Now Out o f Never: The Element o f Surprise in the East European
Revolution o f 1989.” World Politics 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1991): 7-48.
166 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
Or that governance and the economy get so bad your friend feels that he or she
has nothing left to lose. In such circumstances, collective action becomes possi
ble, and authoritarian persistence is at risk.
These factors can interact with political culture. Part of the information that
a rational actor takes into account is the likely behavior of his or her peers. This
information is largely gleaned from their public expression of their beliefs and
attitudes (the same things students of political culture are studying), and some
times populations under authoritarian regimes might appear to be more support
ive of the regime than they really are. We return to these themes in later chapters
on political parties, social movements, and revolutions (chapters 11 and 12).
Special Causal Circum stances Su rrounding Hybrid
and Sem i-Authoritarian Regim es
As noted earlier, in contemporary politics we have witnessed an increase in the
number of hybrid regimes, a pattern of political change that has given rise to a
good deal of new and productive theorizing. To some extent, explanations for the
emergence of hybrid regimes differ from those for the emergence of more trad
itional forms of authoritarianism, though we would not want to exaggerate these
differences.
Equally important, if we are interested in transitions from or persistence of
hybrid or semi-authoritarian regimes, we need to be attentive to their special
characteristics.
We should not draw the conclusion that the factors cited earlier to explain the
rise of authoritarian regimes or authoritarian persistence are irrelevant to hybrid
regimes, but we should note that a particularly important variety of hybrid re
gimes—the competitive authoritarian regimes of recent decades—seem to show
their own, historically specific, causal factors of importance.
IN SIG H TS
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After
the Cold War
by Steven Levitsky a n d Lucan A. Way &
Levitsky and Way are interested in understanding the sorts of transitions that are likely to develop out of’competitive au
thoritarian” regimes, a term that they have coined to label re
gimes that do allow (often problematic) elections alongside
other non-democratic features. As they note, competitive au
thoritarian regimes should not be thought of as transitional:
There is no reason to assume that competitive authoritarian re
gimes will become democratic or more fully authoritarian. How
ever, certain characteristics do predict the likelihood of
transition from competitive authoritarianism to democracy or
full-blown autocracy. First, lots of linkages to the West predict a
move toward democratization. If there are not so many linkages
to the West, though, two main paths are possible. The first is
ongoing authoritarianism in the context of a strong state. This
path is most likely, the authors argue, when (a) the state is strong
at the beginning of the process and (b) the party or other stron
gest organizational vehicle in the competitive authoritarian en
vironment (which is the core of the competitive authoritarian
regime) has lots of “organizational power.” The second path is
authoritarian persistence with lots of instability and turnover,
which is more likely in the context of a weaker and less
stable state.
Steven Levitsky a nd Lucan A. Way, Com petitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid
Regim es After the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain Authoritarian? 167
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain
Authoritarian?
Authoritarian regimes come in many varieties, and they come from many different origins. We have emphasized that there is no single thing called
“authoritarianism” that one theory can explain. Rather, authoritarian regimes have
distinct features and exhibit many different types of transitions (and nontransi
tions). Scholars have developed a number of explanatory models to account for
these. Some of the main general factors in most cases, though, include (1) histori
cal relationships between contending groups, (2) the strength and form of exist
ing institutions, (3) a country’s level of economic development, (4) political-cultural
traditions and tendencies, and (5) the strategic situations and choices of key
actors. O f course, as we have seen in other chapters, it is not enough to merely
list such contributing factors; we must figure out how such factors interact
and which are most important. W hat do you think? And how could we test your
ideas empirically?
As we noted at the outset of the chapter, modern-day Zimbabwe is an authori
tarian regime that is characterized by many of the features we have discussed. It is a
“personalist” regime, the population of which is subject to many of the vagaries of au
thoritarianism. It is characterized by repression, a lack of secure political rights, seem
ingly arbitrary rule, and so on. Not everywhere in Africa is like this, and Zimbabwe
itself has not always been like this, so our research question might be “W hy is
Zimbabwe authoritarian? W hy did it become so, and why has it remained so?”
We should expect theories of authoritarian rule to be able to account for an
authoritarian regime like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. Looking at the various
causal theories of authoritarianism we can consider how each might propose an
explanation for the emergence and/or persistence of the regime. In the section on
“Causes and Effects” in this chapter, we have looked at several such theories. We
list them in Table 7.1, along with what the theory might explain is the cause of
t a b l e 7 . 1 Authoritarianism in Zim babw e: Theories, Explanations,
and Exam ples of Su p p o rtin g Evidence
Theory Theoretical Explanation Exam ple of S u p p o rtin g Evidence
Historical
Institutionalist
Coalitions of powerful political actors
emerge that favor elite domination.
Mugabe receives support of the military and key economic
actors.
Poverty and Inequality
Poorer citizens seek economic security
and allow authoritarian rule.
Mugabe appeals to some poorer citizens as populist.
State Weakness
Weak, poorly institutionalized, predatory
state will be authoritarian.
Mugabe has engaged in predatory behavior and
undermined institutions.
Political Culture
Cultural values shape the type of
authoritarian regime that emerges.
Mugabe has worked within bounds of top-down “tribalism.”
Collective Action
Disapproval of the regime is impeded by
repression.
Mugabe regime creates large numbers of exiles.
TH IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
KEY M ETH O D O LO G IC A L T O O LS
Evidence and
Empirical Critiques
One reason that many theories con
tinue to endure in different areas of
comparative politics is that most of
the majortheories have some empiri
cal support. This makes it challenging
to determine which theory is the
most accurate. In reality, most theo
ries will not be accurate under all
circumstances, but rather each will
explain some outcomes better than
others. So how do you avoid simply
making “laundry lists” (as noted ear
lier) and saying, ‘Everything matters’?
In preparing to make theoretical
arguments, it is of course important
for any particular question to examine
how the empirical evidence lines up
with the theoretical predictions and
the specific hypotheses you might
offer. One very useful tool can be
evidence that allows you to critique a
particular argument.
In aiming to build arguments,
there is one very important miscon
ception: that the only valuable type
168 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism. We also list in the third column an example of
evidence that we might find supports this theoretical proposition. Note that the
examples of supporting evidence here are not proven but are simply plausible for
this particular case.
Looking at the theoretical prediction and the examples of evidence to support
experienced in the study of comparative politics. Sometimes, at a certain stage in
the development of research on a topic or question, we do not know which theory
truly offers the best explanation for a given phenomenon, and multiple explana
tions seem promising.
Does this mean we are stuck? Or that we should assume that all theories work
equally well and that we should list them all as the answers to our research ques
tion? No. On the contrary, it is common for many good research questions to
have multiple possible answers. Indeed, it is often a sign of a good question that
it can have many possible answers: It suggests that the question is open-ended,
and not one with a foregone conclusion that is self-evident and therefore uninter
esting. In the parlance of comparative politics from chapters 1 and 2, a good
theory must be falsifiable, and the fact that multiple possible theories can address
a question is often a sign that the question is well conceived. Furthermore, theo
ries in comparative politics will not last if they get no empirical support, so we
should not be surprised if more than one theory has evidence working for it. But
the job of the comparativist is to analyze the relative merits of these different
arguments and to find ways to adjudicate among them.
W hat can you do if several different theories each have some evidence going
for them? O ur most important tool here is looking for evidence that works against
one theory or another. This disconfirming evidence that allows you to critique
one or more theories can sometimes help identify which theory stands strongest.
In fact, evidence that works against one theory can be just as valuable as an extra
bit of evidence that supports a theory. It may be more valuable, since the implica
tions of truly disconfirming evidence are stronger than the implications of some
evidence that is simply consistent with a theory.
W hat might be examples of disconfirming evidence for the theories in our
Zimbabwe example? Table 7.2 has the same theories and theoretical explanations
as Table 7.1, except this time we consider evidence that might show that Mugabe
and Zimbabwe do not follow what the different theories predict. Notice that we
can actually come up with at least plausible examples of disconfirming evidence
as well for any of the theories we noted previously.
Here we see examples of how each theory could have some evidence against it,
just as each theory had some evidence for it. Comparativists can use evidence both
to support and to critique different theories as they try to identify which theory is
(continued)
of evidence is that which supports a
hypothesis or theory. In fact, some of
the most valuable evidence is that
which allows you to critique or chal
lenge one particular argument. This is
useful especially when you are trying
to determine the strongest argument
among many that have some sup
porting evidence.
the theory, we may see a problem: We can find some plausible evidence to sup
port all of these theories! We can go right down the column and come up with
decent evidence. Robert Mugabe’s authoritarian regime has indeed received the
support of some key coalition actors, and it has appealed to many of the poor in
a populist fashion, and it is a poorly institutionalized predatory state, and it has
represented itself as a quintessentially African unit resisting Western influence,
and it has seen many hundreds of thousands of its opponents flee the country
rather than risk repression. Indeed, this discussion illustrates something often
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain Authoritarian? 169
strongest. We should be particularly attentive to evidence that would post a strong
challenge to a theory. For example, in Table 7.2, the evidence presented for the
“political culture” and “collective action” theories might suggest real weaknesses
in their ability to explain Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism. We cannot say, for in
stance, that traditional Zimbabwean political culture is the source of Mugabe’s
authoritarianism if Zimbabwean political culture is not actually authoritarian.
Likewise, we cannot say that the source of his authoritarianism is that dissidents
cannot organize or speak if, in fact, dissent is widespread and organized.
On the other hand, some theories can be defended in the face of potentially
challenging evidence, either because the evidence is being interpreted wrongly or
the theory has been construed in a limited or wrong way. Imagine proponents of
the historical institutionalist theory trying to make their argument. They might
acknowledge the evidence that Mugabe has alienated many elite economic actors,
and that this has negative implications for the argument attributed to historical
institutionalism in the table: “Coalitions of powerful political actors emerge that
favor elite domination.” They could point out, though, that commercial and
farming elites are not the only important actors among whom coalitions could
form, and that the Zimbabwean state under Mugabe has created a new coalition
of powerful actors from the military and masses of unemployed men. Theories
cannot proceed by being adapted to deal with each individual case, but if a theory
has been misconstrued or its implications not fully built into tested hypotheses,
seemingly disconfirming evidence might still be compatible with the theory.
Authoritarianism remains one of the most analytically and morally pressing
questions in comparative politics today. As it has become clear that democracy
was not simply going to predominate all over the world after the Cold War,
scholars have reengaged with urgency on the question of authoritarian rule. The
types and causes of authoritarianism are numerous and complex, but young
scholars who develop the analytical skills of comparativists will be in a position
to shed real light on these issues in the years to come.
t a b l e 7 . 2 Authoritarianism in Zim babw e: Theories, Explanations,
and Exam ples of Contrary Evidence
Theory Theoretical Explanation Exam ple o f Contrary Evidence
Historical Institutionalist Coalitions of powerful political actors
emerge that favor elite domination.
Mugabe’s economic policy alienated key economic
actors, including industry and commercial farmers.
Poverty and Inequality Poorer citizens seek economic security
and allow authoritarian rule.
Mugabe is relatively unpopular among peasants and
poor urban dwellers.
State Weakness Weak, poorly institutionalized, predatory
state will be authoritarian.
Zimbabwe’s state and Mugabe’s party and military have
exhibited considerable capacity in the past.
Political Culture Cultural values shape type of
authoritarian regime that emerges.
Zimbabwe’s deep cultural values have little to do with
tribalism, but instead have deep emphasis on human
rights.
Collective Action Disapproval of the regime is impeded by
repression.
Zimbabwe’s people have been relatively open to
expressing dissatisfaction with the regime.
r TH IN K IN G
.C O M P A R A T IV E LY
170 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Concepts
Authoritarianism refers to political systems that are hierar
chically ordered and have relatively closed decision-making
processes.
Types
• There are many different types of authoritarian regimes,
including totalitarian regimes that attempt to control entire
societies through ideology, personalist dictatorships cen
tered around individual autocrats, and bureaucratic-author
itarian regimes centered around groups such as the
military.
• There are also many different possible transitions (or lack of
transitions) between regime types other than democratiza
tion: Authoritarian regimes can persist, they can give way to
other authoritarian regimes, or they can turn into hybrid
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. We have discussed in this chapter the distinction often drawn
by political scientists between democratic regimes and
“hybrid” or ‘competitive authoritarian” regimes. Where, pre
cisely, is the line between these sorts of regimes? Consider any
two cases of democratic regimes and try to work out what
combination of developments would lead you to reclassify
them as “hybrid.”
2 . We discussed a number of different theories of authoritarian
ism. Note that the historical institutionalist theories, the eco
nomic theories, and the political culture theories all aim to
explain both the emergence and the persistence of authori
tarian regimes. Can these theories explain the emergence
and persistence of hybrid regimes equally well? If so, demon
strate how. If not, what sorts of modifications might help
them to do so?
regimes, while democracies too can break down and move
toward authoritarianism or hybrid regimes.
Causes and Effects
• There are many theories about the causes of authoritarian
ism and its persistence, including theories based on: histori
cal institutional factors; poverty and inequality; state
weakness; political culture; and impediments to collective
action.
Th inking Com paratively
• Theories about the causes of authoritarianism (like theories
in other areas) may ail find some supporting evidence, and
a useful strategy forjudging the power of theories for spe
cific research questions is also to consider how evidence
may disconfirm a theory.
3. Is authoritarianism simply the opposite of democracy? Is it best
thought of as an absence of democratic freedoms and rights? Or
is democracy best thought of as an absence of authoritarianism?
Why?
4. Identify your preferred theory to account for the persistence of
authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, Nazi Germany, or another country
of your choosing. Consider yourself a theorist associated with this
preferred theory. Now imagine you have been called in to consult
with the U.S. State Department about the best way to deal with
authoritarian regimes the U.S. deems dangerous, such as North
Korea, Syria, or Iran. What would your theory imply as a policy
recommendation for how to deal with authoritarian regimes?
5. Describe some of the incentives that would make an authoritar
ian ruler seek to hang onto power, even when he or she senses
the regime is unpopular and performing poorly.
CHAPTER 8
Constitutions
and Constitutional
Design
• Leaders of the transition from apartheid at the adoption of South Africa’s democratic constitution, May 1,1996. From left to right in front row:
F. W. de Klerk (president 1989-1994), Cyril Ramaphosa, Nelson Mandela (president 1994-1999), and Leon Wessels.
onsider the following passage:
IN THIS C H A P T E R
Concepts 174
Constitutions 174
Constitutional Design 175
Types 176
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions 177
Separation of Powers: Judicial Review and
Parliamentary Sovereignty 178
Federalism and Unitarism 180
Authoritarian and Democratic Constitutions
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects
of Federal Constitutions? 184
Are Federal Constitutions Good for
Social Stability? 185
Are Federal Constitutions Good for
Democratic Rights? 187
Are Federal Constitutions Good for the
Economy? 188
Judicial Review and Democracy 190
TH INK IN G C O M P A R A T IV E L Y
What Explains the S im ilarities Between the
Brazilian and South African
Constitutions? 193
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
United Kingdom • Iran
India • United States
We, the people o f South Africa,
Recognise the injustices o f our past;
Honour those who suffered fo r justice andfreedom in our land;
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt
this Constitution as the supreme law o f the Republic so as to
Heal the divisions ofthe past and establish a society based on
democratic values, socialjustice and fundamental human rights;
Lay the foundationsfor a democratic and open society in
which government is based on the will o f the people and
every citizen is equally protected by law;
Improve the quality o f life o f all citizens and free the
potential o f each person; and
183 Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its
rightful place as a sovereign state in thefamily ofnations.
May God protect our people.
Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso.
God seen Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa.
M udzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika.
This passage is the preamble to the South African constitu
tion passed in 1996, which established the foundational laws
and was intended to form the basis for democracy in the country,
after decades of racial discrimination and white-only rule known
as apartheid. One of the functions of constitutions can be to ex
press the values of a society, especially those relating to the unity
and aspirations of the people. The South African charter was a
Nigeria . major step in creating a “New South Africa” based on equality
and respect for the dignity of the country’s peoples (even if it
certainly did not solve all the country’s racial problems with the stroke of a pen).
The preamble addresses this aspiration and notably concludes with an expression
translated into six of the country’s major languages. These aspirations may vary
from place to place: The lengthy introductions to China’s and Iran’s constitutions,
172
Constitutions and Constitutional Design 173
for example, document the history of the revolutionary movements that gave rise
to the regimes currently in power. The United States too has a famous preamble
in its Constitution of 1787: We the People o f the United States, in order to form a more
perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, providefor the common de
fence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings o f liberty to ourselves and our
posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitutionfor the United States o f America.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and most others like it,
also does more than express the country’s ideals in writing. It is a very specific
legal document that creates a design for the country’s formal political institu
tions, including the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It also ad
dresses the division of power between a central government and the provinces
(as they are called in South Africa, which are akin to the states in the U.S.).
W ith regard to judiciaries in particular, the South African constitution estab
lished a very important power of constitutional interpretation: judicial review.
Judges were given the authority to rule which laws are consistent with the
constitution and which are not. The South African judiciary even ruled on
whether the Constitution itself was constitutional, evaluating the text, deter
mining what was adequate and proper and what was not. It accepted much of
the text submitted in 1994 but sent the Constitution back to its drafting body,
the Constituent National Assembly, to clarify some issues and rewrite others.
In this chapter, we examine constitutions, the questions of whether and
how they separate power between levels o f government, and whether they are
interpreted by judiciaries. W e leave the discussion of the constitutional roles
of legislatures and executives to the subsequent two chapters, where we treat
those two branches of government individually. The issues related to consti
tutions and constitutional interpretation matter because, in most modern so
cieties, constitutions establish many of the formal organizational features of
the state and thus are keys to understanding politics.
This chapter begins our examination of formal government institutions,
which are the structures and organizations that shape political behavior. The
most obvious among these are the branches of government, two of which we
explore in depth in subsequent chapters (the legislative and executive branches1),
and we also include political parties and interest groups that are a regular part
of political life. Because the very foundation of political institutions is usually
located in constitutions, we focus on these basic charters in this chapter and on
the question of constitutional interpretation. How is political power divided
among different governing institutions? W ho rules on whether a law is consti
tutional? We take a close look at these issues and discuss both federalism and
judiciaries, which are key elements of what constitutions say and what they do.
institution Social or political
structure or set of practices,
including government
organizations, that shapes the
behavior of individuals and groups.
174 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
constitution Fundamental and
supreme laws, usually written in a
charter, that establish the basis of a
political system and the basis for
other laws.
constitutionalism The limitation
of government through a
constitution.
Concepts
We look first at concepts and definitions, outlining what we mean by constitu
tions, federalism and unitarism, and judiciaries. We then turn to types across
different countries, to show how constitutions, constitutional design, and consti
tutional interpretation may vary from place to place.
Constitutions
Constitutions are the foundational charters and fundamental laws of most modern
states. They elaborate the structure of government and express the founding prin
ciples of the regime. They are usually written documents passed by some sort of
constitutional convention or constituent assembly that brings together many of a
country’s leading political figures to hammer out the rules, laws, and structures
needed to establish the basis for political life. This may occur at the founding of a
country, as in the case of the United States, or when a new political regime is estab
lished, as has happened in France many times with the creation of new republics.
Constitutions have come to symbolize the social contracts that societies make
to “constitute” themselves, in which “the people” confer authority to political
actors in exchange for the establishment of order and a rule of law. The history of
constitutions links closely to the idea of constitutionalism, or limited govern
ment, and is thus part and parcel of the story of the evolution of modern gover
nance, and especially the emergence of democracy itself.
As the basic founding laws of a society, constitutions are the set of rules and
norms on which all other laws are based. In the United States, for instance, the
U .M U IU ;
French protestors against the constitution of 1958.
Concepts 175
Constitution is the ultimate point of political reference: Even the president, as
head of state, must act in accordance with its principles. Military enlistees and
new citizens swear an oath of allegiance not to the president or the Congress, but
to uphold and defend the Constitution “against all enemies, foreign and domes
tic.” In a real sense, the Constitution is the foundation of its entire political system.
In other countries as well, constitutions provide the basis for political unity, defin
ing who and what the state is. These sets of laws outline the basic structure of the
state and its patterns of governance, noting which branches of government have
which powers and which responsibilities. In many cases, constitutions recognize
or grant the basic rights of a country’s citizens, though these rights are not always
guaranteed in every case. Indeed, even highly authoritarian regimes often make
use of constitutions, regardless of whether rights are infringed in practice.
In most cases, constitutions are written down in a single document that is
subject to change by a process of amendment. They will not attempt to include
the massive amount of statutes or laws that are needed to govern the society and
establish its policies, but will rather outline how these laws and policies are to be
established and who decides on whether they are legitimate. They are, in short,
the law above all other law, and the basis for political life.
Constitutional Design
Constitutional design refers to the features of the constitution that shape the
powers of different political institutions. These features vary, though all constitu
tions define the basic structure of government. Constitutional design is impor
tant because it gives countries the chance to set up effective institutions. Consider
the example of the United States briefly. The founding of the nation after the
American Revolution was mainly the story of writing a constitution that would
make one country out of many former colonies. Starting out, it was unclear
whether the new nation would survive or would prove vulnerable to disintegra
tion.2 The Constitution, which has lasted to this day, was designed to correct the
deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, a charter that had left the govern
ment of the thirteen original colonies operating with little central government
power. One of the central issues in the U.S. Constitution was thus dividing
powers between the central government and the states. The early history of the
American republic was largely about creating a constitution that would allow the
country to come together as a political unit. Indeed, the country’s defining event
of the following century, the American Civil War, was also about the relative
constitutional powers of the states and the central government, specifically re
garding the issue of slavery and whether states could nullify national laws.
This question of federalism, or the separation of powers among different levels
of government in a country, is often central to constitutional design. Federalism is
a political system in which multiple levels of government have some degree of
autonomy in the same territory. Only in some countries do subnational govern
ments (such as states, provinces, or regions) have constitutional protection or au
thority and a guarantee of autonomy from the central government. These may be
called federal systems. For instance, the fifty states in the United States or the
nine provinces in South Africa have constitutional guarantees of their authority
to govern and establish laws in their respective regions, even as the central
constitutional design Features of
constitutions that shape the basic
features of the political system,
such as separation of powers and
responsibilities between levels of
government and branches of
government.
federalism System of government
with constitutional design of sepa
ration of powers between central
government and subnational
governments.
176 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
unitarism System of government
in which central government is
predominant and the powers of
subnational governments are
limited to those delegated by the
center.
separation of powers The
division of powers in a government
system between branches of
government or between levels of
government.
judiciary The branch of govern
ment responsible for the interpre
tation of laws in courts.
judicial review System of
constitutional interpretation in
which judges rule on the
constitutionality of laws passed by
legislature and executive.
government also has the right to do so. As the American president (and political
scientist) Woodrow Wilson put it, “The question of the relation of the states to the
federal government is the cardinal question of our constitutional system.”
By contrast, the absence of federalism is unitary government or unitarism, in
which the institutions and branches of the central government effectively wield
political power. Most countries in the world are unitary. In these countries, local
governments (such as towns, cities, or villages) will have some authority to shape
local rules, but the laws made by these local governments are subject to central
authority. As we shall see, federalism is not necessarily more or less democratic
than unitarism, but its implications for how government works are numerous.
Constitutional design usually also involves establishing a separation of
powers among distinct branches, each with its own responsibilities and duties.
Constitutions frequently begin by establishing a legislative branch responsible
for formulating and passing laws. This may be called a parliament, a congress, or
an assembly, or may be given any number of other names, as we examine in the
chapter on legislatures (chapter 8). The executive branch (chapter 9) is the other
portion of the government that is usually elected, at least in democratic regimes,
and the powers and functions of the executive branch are routinely outlined in a
constitution as well. For both of these branches, constitutions will often outline
the procedure by which representatives are chosen, in addition to the powers they
hold and duties they must perform. Constitutions also often address the struc
ture and power of the judicial branch as well as the structure of the administra
tive apparatus.3 This delineates the separation of powers between the three
“branches” of government: legislatures, executives, and judiciaries. We discuss
legislatures and executives in full chapters (9 and 10, respectively), though these
are also clearly elements of constitutional design.
Judiciaries are branches of government that have particular importance in
how constitutions are interpreted. The principal duty of the judiciary is to preside
over cases in courts. This implies the power to interpret the laws put into effect
by the other branches of government, but the extent of the judiciary’s power to
interpret (and even strike down) laws varies from one country to another. In
some countries, judiciaries have considerable powers of constitutional interpreta
tion, while in other countries, they do not rule on whether laws are constitu
tional. The principal distinction is the strength of judicial review, which refers
to the power of constitutional courts to determine the legality of laws.
These two features—the extent of federalism and the respective roles of the
branches of government—are central to both constitutional design and consti
tutional interpretation. For the remainder of this chapter, we discuss variations
in constitutions themselves, as well as the different ways constitutions are de
signed and interpreted. These variations are considerable, as we will see in the
section that follows.
Types
There are several ways countries differ in how their constitutions are designed
and interpreted. In general, constitutions can be designed to be flexible and easily
changed or rigid and difficult to change. A second issue is how the constitution
is interpreted, and specifically whether the judiciary has the power to interpret
the constitution. A third element is the degree of federalism in a constitution.
Finally, we note that both democratic and authoritarian regimes have constitu
tions, and these may differ in some ways but may also look quite similar on paper.
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions
One of the central distinctions among different types of constitutions is how easily
they can be changed. Many constitutions are designed to be relatively difficult to
change. Amending them may require supermajorities in each chamber of the legis
lature (i.e., more than just a simple majority of votes) or approval by a number of the
units of the federation—the states, provinces, or regions. Some constitutions, such
as that of the United States, are even harder to change. An amendment to the U.S.
Constitution requires a two-thirds vote in each of the two houses of Congress, fol
lowed by approval of three-fourths of the states’ legislatures. It has been amended
only twenty-seven times since its passage, and only seventeen times since 1791.
At the other end of the spectrum are highly flexible constitutions that are easy
to change, at least nominally. The most obvious case is those that can be changed
by a simple majority of the legislature. The Constitution of the United Kingdom
is one of the most flexible, at least according to the law. This is because in the
British system, the Parliament is sovereign: I f a majority of the legislature passes
a law, that law is by definition constitutional.
This flexibility relates to another unique feature of the British constitution.
Today, nearly all countries in the world have a single written document (which
can be amended) that defines the parameters of the political system. The princi
pal exception to the rule of written constitutional charters is the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom does not have a single constitutional text, but rather several
documents are deemed to have constitutional significance as the country has
developed its political system over the course of many centuries. The major con
stitutional documents include the Magna Carta of 1215, but also a range of other
laws of great significance and stature, such as the Bill of Rights of 1689, which
emphasized certain limitations on the power of the monarchy, and the Acts of
Settlement of 1701, which established patterns of succession to the throne. In
this sense, it may be said that the United Kingdom has a “written” constitution,
but one that relies on a range of written documents rather than a single one.
W hat is considered constitutional in the United Kingdom is also determined by
acts of Parliament and precedents in common law. This makes the constitution
adaptable as laws and cultural practices change. New Zealand, a former British
colony, similarly relies on a set of major acts of Parliament that established the
constitutional basis for the country’s governance. This does not, however, mean
that the United Kingdom has no constitution; in fact, it has one of the longest
traditions of constitutional government in the world.
Apart from the United Kingdom’s constitution, which is based on many doc
uments and traditions, and the U.S. Constitution, which is a brief framework
with a handful of amendments over the years, there are many written constitu
tions that differ in style and form. As societies have grown more complex, con
stitutions in more recent years have often grown longer and more intricate as they
attempt to balance a range of different interests, institutions, and ideas. The
178 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
South African Constitution, mentioned at the top of the chapter, is an example.
So too is the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, as noted in the concluding “Think
ing Comparatively” section of this chapter.
Constitutions regularly recognize the rights of citizens or grant rights to the
citizenry. In the case of the U.S. Constitution, many fundamental rights were
actually passed as a set of amendments to the original document, known as the
Bill of Rights. Since then, however, many contemporary constitutions (including
the South African and Brazilian examples) have incorporated significant rights
into the main text from the very beginning, which is likely one cause of constitu
tions becoming much lengthier over time. That is, articles in the original consti
tutional texts of many countries specify civil rights and civil liberties, political
rights, and social rights (such as access to certain public services).
O f course, rights may be well protected or disrespected in practice, regardless
of their inclusion in the document. For example, the Brazilian case is one where
constitutional rights and protections have been promised, yet the government
has been unable to deliver in some areas such as public services. In such cases,
the constitutional guarantees may be more aspirational in nature, even in a dem
ocratic country. We return later in the chapter to the question of constitutional
protections in practice when we look at how constitutions may be somewhat
different for authoritarian systems.
Separation of Powers: Jud icial Review
and Parliam entary Sovereignty
In many (but not all) countries, courts have the power to decide some constitu
tional issues and rule on whether a law passed by the legislature is constitutional.
I f constitutional courts find that the law is not consistent with the constitution or
basic laws of a society, they may strike down the law. In these countries, constitu
tional courts are usually separated from the civil and criminal court systems. In
systems with separation of powers, this is the “check” that the judiciary has on the
legislature. Constitutional courts are not the only type of courts. Local courts are
for local disputes and for claims involving local laws, including arrangements over
property (such as buying and selling houses), issues of marriage and divorce, traf
fic violations, and some criminal offenses.4 Constitutional courts are reserved for
major constitutional issues about whether a law passed by the government is valid.
The process by which national courts examine the constitutionality of law is
called judicial review. Most constitutions provide for a process of judicial review
in which constitutional courts have judges who rule on the constitutionality of
law. Judicial review is the central political power of the judiciary, and it occurs
when judges examine the constitutionality of a law passed by the legislature. In
countries with judicial review, the constitution is seen as the supreme law of the
land, and it is the role of the courts to verify that laws passed by the legislature
are consistent with the constitution.
Judicial review generally operates with a high court or “supreme court” at the
pinnacle of the judicial system that serves as the final arbiter of constitutional
law. This may be built on top of a system that has “lower courts” in different
states, provinces, or localities around the country.5 The high court is composed of
a select number of established jurists or justices. (In the United States, there are
Types 179
nine justices on the Supreme Court, nominated by the president and approved by
the Senate for life terms.) In systems with judicial review, the decisions of such
courts are often final and can be overturned only by subsequent judicial decisions
or by legislatures amending the constitution itself. This system of constitutional
interpretation by judges is regularly a source of debate and disagreement in the
United States and in other countries, as discussed in the “Causes and Effects”
section later in the chapter.
The most prominent examples of countries without constitutional courts and
judicial review are those where the constitutionality of law is determined by the
parliament. In such cases, the judicial system is composed of courts that rule on
the merits of specific cases in accordance with the laws that exist, without ques
tioning the legitimacy of those laws. O f course, here too there may be some in
terpretation of what the laws mean, but the court is not empowered to strike
down or alter laws passed by the legislature. The United Kingdom is the most
noteworthy example. In the United Kingdom there is no high court empowered
to rule on most matters of law; the few minor exceptions relate to the question of
how some powers have been decentralized to the regions of Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland, and this has been true only since 2009.6
Constitutional interpretation in the United Kingdom generally follows
the doctrine known as parliamentary sovereignty. This means that if the
legislature—often called the Parliament—passes a law, that law is, by definition,
constitutional. The legislating body is the highest political and legal authority in
the land. In theory, the British Parliament could easily overturn long-standing
parts of the British constitution at a moment’s notice.
parliamentary sovereignty
System in which the
constitutionality of laws passed by
legislature and executive are not
subject to constitutional
interpretation by judiciary.
Delegates to Brazil’s Constituent Assembly celebrate the passage of the country’s constitution
in 1988.
180 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
W hy has this not happened? W hy has there not been massive zigzagging in
terms of what the constitution means, from one election to the next, as new par
ties take power and lose power? In reality, the British Parliament refrains from
overturning the founding laws of the polity because it follows national norms,
values, customs, and traditions. Much as American political parties would prob
ably not envision getting rid of major elements of the Constitution, even if they
had the supermajority they would need, so too the British system exhibits consti
tutional stability from one elected government to the next. It may seem self-
evident that demanding procedures have kept the U.S. Constitution from being
amended more frequently, but the United Kingdom shows that procedure is not
the only determinant of how and when constitutions change. Consensus in the
society matters, as do tradition, habit, custom, and values.
Federalism and Unitarism
The distinction between federal and unitary countries (and countries in between)
is a fundamental difference in the way power is divided in a society. Federal
countries have a system in which power is separated between the central govern
ment and some subnational governments that are partly autonomous. In unitary
systems, power is located at the center. In unitary states, the center may delegate
certain powers to local, regional, state, or provincial governments, but it retains
the constitutional or legal authority to reverse its decision at virtually any time.
F ed eralism
The question of ruling large, complex territories is perennial, but the idea of fed
eralism as a solution came more recently.7 The United States was an early leader
in establishing federalism (along with Switzerland). Led by James Madison, con
sidered the “Father of the Constitution” and a leading author of The Federalist
Papers, the nation’s founders developed an intricate political compromise de
signed to satisfy both the larger and smaller of the thirteen original colonies that
came together to create the new nation. As the colonies became states in the
union, the American system reserved considerable rights to those states that the
central government (called the “federal government”) could not infringe on.
They backed up these rights in the form of a Senate where each state was to have
equal representation, regardless of population. This idea of compromise between
central power and regional (or state or provincial) power came to appeal in a
range of contexts. Other countries did not adopt the American system in its en
tirety, but many saw virtue in the general approach to reconcile national and
subnational interests.
Today, many federal countries around the world have intricate sets of interact
ing institutions. Originally designed to unify diverse territories while preserving
subnational autonomy, federal institutions now do more than simply offer a way
to ensure that nations do not fall apart: They divide governing power and allow
some laws and policies to vary from place to place within a country, even as some
national laws (and the national constitution) take precedence everywhere inside
the borders.8 Federalism is now seen by some as a strategy to ensure more than
stability and protection, as it may also promote democratic inclusion, as well as
capture the benefits of economic unity. For these reasons, many of the world’s
Types 181
No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality
in the United Kingdom PAGE 548
The United Kingdom has no single document that counts as its
written constitution, and it also has no process of judicial review
to interpret the constitution on most matters. It is the archetypal
case of parliamentary sovereignty. The British constitution is thus
one of the most flexible in the world. Yet there is considerable
continuity in the system: The country has a long-standing set of
traditions and values that seems to transmit the meaning of the
constitution from one generation to the next. How does this
system work, and what are its consequences?
See the case study on the United Kingdom in Section VI,
pp. 548-549. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. In what ways does the doctrine of parliamentary sover
eignty link together the various themes of this chapter: a
flexible constitution, federalism versus unitarism, and ju
dicial review?
2. Would this sort of constitution be feasible in a new coun
try today, or is it feasible only in the relatively unique cir
cumstances of Britain’s history?
3. In what ways could one make a case that the U.K. system
is more or less democratic than the U.S. system?
largest countries either are federal or have prominent features that resemble
federalism.
Although only about twenty of the nearly two hundred total countries in the
world are considered federal, these twenty countries account for a large portion
of the world’s population. Many of the largest and most populous countries are
federal, including the world’s four most populous countries after China: India,
the United States, Indonesia, and Brazil. Other federal countries include Nigeria,
which has the largest population of any African country, and Pakistan, Russia,
Mexico, and Germany, which are some of the largest countries in their respective
regions of the world. Using a relatively inclusive definition designed to capture
virtually any country that might be considered federal, we have constructed
Map 8.1.
There are debates about whether many of the countries shaded in Map 8.1 are
reliably federal (such as Spain and Pakistan). Several institutional elements and
historical features may suggest otherwise, and federal countries do not always
respect real autonomy for subnational units. Conversely, other countries may
have some federal features yet remain unitary states, as is the case with China,
where provinces have gained economic and political autonomy relative to the
central government in recent years. China shows that some countries can seek
the benefits of decentralized government without necessarily establishing
federalism.
Federal systems may be defined as those where subnational governments have
constitutional guarantees of some power and autonomy in their own jurisdic
tions, as well as constitutional protections from infringement on the part of the
central government. In practical terms, virtually all federal countries share other
characteristics: an upper legislative chamber defined in the constitution with ter
ritorial representation for the states/provinces/regions that provides them with
political protection, and full legislative and executive branches at the subnational
182 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
CO N TIN EN T A FR IC A A SIA EU RO PE NO RTH AM ERICA SO U TH AM ERICA O C EA N IA
FE D E R A L
CO U N TR IES
Comoros
Ethiopia
Nigeria
South Africa
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Pakistan
Russia
United Arab Emirates
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Germany
Spain
Switzerland
Canada
Mexico
United States
Argentina
Brazil
Venezuela
Australia
Micronesia
Map 8.1 Federal systems around the world (in yellow).
level.9 W hile the specific definitions may vary, it is clear that federalism is
intended to ensure representation for the subnational level in national
decision-making.
U n ita rism
Most countries in the world are unitary states, in which the central government
is the only level of government specified in the constitutional charter. In unitary
states, power is not constitutionally divided between layers of government but
resides exclusively in the central government. This central government may then
create (or allow for the creation of) more local levels of government, but these
lower levels are dependent on the center and often accountable to the center.
Municipalities, prefectures, counties, or other local governments may elect offi
cials locally, but these will generally have little power. To use a translation from
the French, the republic is “one and indivisible.” Local governments may be able
to elect officials, but the national government will make most significant policy.
For instance, the center may establish the national school curriculum and may
staff the offices of the health service, with relatively little scope for discretion at
the local level.
Unitarism is especially prevalent in countries with certain characteristics.
One is small size, as contrasted with the large size of most federal states. Most
countries that are small are also unitary, with the exceptions being a handful of
federal countries composed of a cluster of small islands.10 Another tendency is for
unitarism to hold in places where the population is ethnically, linguistically, and
culturally homogeneous. Federalism seems to take root more where populations
are linguistically diverse, as in Belgium and Switzerland, which are divided into
different linguistic communities. Finally, unitarism may vary at least in part on
colonial heritage. For example, former French colonies in Africa have long tended
to follow the highly unitary features of France itself, while former Spanish and
British colonies have varied in their structures.
Authoritarian and D em ocratic Constitutions
Historically, making government constitutional meant eliminating the divine
right or absolute power of monarchs, such as kings, queens, princes, sultans, or
emperors. Constitutionalism, as established in western Europe progressively over
the centuries, meant preventing such rulers from exercising power in an arbitrary
fashion, and holding them at least partially accountable to the will of at least
some of the people. As the power of monarchs faded in many countries, the
drafting of constitutions became one way to limit the power of government, to
divide and separate power such that a single person or family could no longer
dominate. In parts of Europe, for example, constitutional monarchy was seen as
distinct from divine right monarchy or absolute monarchy, because executive
power came to be derived by a mandate from the consent of the governed.11
Still, not all countries with constitutions exhibit the characteristics of democ
racy and limited government. In fact, the actors that demanded constitutional
ism and the end of absolute monarchy were in many cases themselves elites,
nobles, revolutionaries, or military leaders. They were not always interested in
political rights and civil liberties for all, and they did not always represent the
people. For many centuries, the rights established in constitutions were often
restricted to a small subset of the population, such as property-owning males of
a certain racial or ethnic background.12
Even today, not all political systems are perfectly constitutional, nor are all
systems legitimate, fair, and just. Writing down a set of basic laws and rights on
paper does not guarantee that those laws and rights will take effect or be enforced
in practice; some countries that have constitutions fail to protect rights. Authori
tarian regimes usually have constitutions, even where they deny political rights
and civil liberties to their people. Such regimes may seek to establish their legiti
macy on the basis of claims made in the constitution. For instance, a revolution
ary socialist government may draft a constitution holding that the Communist
Party is the sole entity capable of expressing the general will of the people. This
would not seem “democratic” or “constitutional” to the minds of most people
who value individual rights and liberties, but the document itself could nonethe
less be recognized as a constitution. Other authoritarian regimes may place less
importance on political parties (or may outlaw parties entirely) and instead vest
the ruler(s) with the authority to determine what the population as a whole
requires.13
184 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
Authoritarian constitutions will not typically declare dictatorial rule, how
ever, and in fact may appear quite progressive in terms of the rights and powers
they list. Even totalitarian regimes may formulate extensive sets of rights in their
constitutions, at least on paper, whether they defend these in practice or not.14 In
some instances, authoritarian regimes may even outline some rights that a demo
cratic constitution may not contemplate. For instance, the constitution of the
Soviet Union established rights such as guarantees of education, access to health
care, housing, and a pension in old age, none of which are listed in the United
States Constitution. Some authoritarian regimes simply continue to govern
under the constitutional charter of a previous democratic regime but will suspend
or override certain elements of the constitution. Military regimes have been
known to establish martial law or states of emergency, which sometimes extend
for long periods of time and during which normal constitutional principles do
not apply. This is often done using the justification that national security requires
exceptional measures.
Some countries also base part of their judicial and legal system on another
authority: official religious law. This tendency is most noteworthy in the Islamic
world, where sharia law plays an important role in many countries, though the
use of religious law is not limited to Muslim countries. Sharia law is based on the
Qur’an (Koran), the Holy Book of Islam, and to a lesser extent on other core Is
lamic texts. Countries that follow sharia have judges and clerics that rule in con
junction with their interpretations of the Qur’an. Judiciaries in both Saudi Arabia
and Iran are linked to the state religions, and they rule on the basis of religious
law in many areas. Even interpretations of issues not treated directly in the
Qur’an are reasoned by analogy with reference to the Holy Book or to the words
and deeds (known as the sunnah and the hadith) attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad.
Religious law is not necessarily authoritarian, nor does it characterize all
Muslim countries. For instance, Turkey is a majority Muslim country that is
politically secular. Other countries, such as India and Indonesia, make partial
use of Islamic law, such as applying it in certain kinds of legal cases between
Muslims (such as family law about marriage, divorce, and parenthood between
Muslims). Israel, the United Kingdom, and other countries make provisions for
the use of religious law by Orthodox Jews and others, largely as an option for use
by populations who wish to resolve such matters in religious courts. In fact, one
leading scholar has argued that recent years have seen a rise in “constitutional
theocracy,” in which constitutional law is combined with recognition of an offi
cial state religion and some use of religious beliefs or texts as a foundation
for law.15
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects
of Federal Constitutions?
Two essential questions in the study of political institutions are (1) whether a
given design is superior to others and (2) whether the ideal institution depends
on country contexts. Political scientists engage in extensive debate over the
relative merits of different forms of institutions, whose foundations may lie in
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions? 185
Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran PAGE 476
In Iran (and in Saudi Arabia), clerics have considerable power,
both at the pinnacle of the political system and at lower levels of
government. Some analysts may see this power as emerging
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran in
2012. Behind him is a picture of his predecessor and leader of
the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
from a dominant cultural feature and thus reflective of the norms
of the people. Some may also see it as fitting that different societ
ies have different systems reflecting cultural differences. For
others, basing law on a single religion (and a single religious text,
as interpreted by clerics) constrains, by definition, the rights and
liberties of those who are not Muslim or otherwise religious.
See the case study on Iran in Part VI, pp. 476-477. As you read
it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. Flow is the judiciary an especially powerful branch of
government in Iran, and what are its powers?
2. Are there checks on the judiciary’s power, and if so, what
are they? Or should the country be seen as a case of
“judicial sovereignty” as opposed to parliamentary
sovereignty?
3. Is it possible to conceive of religious law that is compati
ble with democracy— and if so, how?— or is separation of
religion and the state a necessary feature of democracy—
and if so, why?
constitutions, as we’ve discussed. We can consider at least three substantial ques
tions about the consequences of federal constitutions: (1) Are they good for social
stability, (2) Are they good for protecting democratic rights, and (3) Are they
good for the economy? We consider these questions here, as well as whether ju
dicial review is necessary in protecting rights and upholding the law.
Are Federal Constitutions G ood for Social Stability?
To help answer the question of stability, we can start by looking at the origins of
federalism and unitarism in different societies. A long-standing argument held
that federalism was the result of disparate political units coming together for the
purpose of security, with the post-revolutionary United States being the classic
example.16 It may also be, however, that countries go federal in order to hold to
gether; that is, they may devolve authorities to regions to prevent secession or
division.17 As for unitarism, here too the causes may be found in deep historical
legacies, including efforts by monarchs long ago to consolidate power or to unify
authority. As noted in chapter 3, the modern nation-states of Europe were cre
ated from the merging of much smaller units such as principalities, as well as the
splintering of large empires.
From one perspective, federalism may be an institution uniquely capable of
holding together a polity. By conferring powers to levels of government below
the national, federalism may give more people a stake in the political system.
If certain regions or groups feel they have greater autonomy, then they may be
186 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
IN S IG H T S
Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance
by William Riker
Riker’s work is one of the leading arguments about what causes federal systems to emerge. In his examination of the
creation of federal systems from the American Revolution up to
the 1960s, Riker finds one commonality across diverse cases: Fed
eralism is the result of a bargain among regional actors and a
prospective national government that is driven by external
threats. Riker also notes that the American federal system is rela
tively centralized, because most of the institutions of the na
tional government do not serve the interests of the states, and
the center prevails in most disputes involving the center and the
states. The exception that keeps American government from
being totally centralized is the system of political parties, which
ensures that some power remains with local actors, due to how
candidates are nominated, among other factors. Despite offering
considerable explanation of the origin and operation of federal
ism, Riker surprisingly concludes that federalism is an institu
tional arrangement of relatively little significance, noting the
fundamental similarities in governance between federal and
unitary states.
William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, &
Co., 1964.
more willing to participate instead of demand independence. Movements de
manding separatism, secession, or break-up of a country will gain less traction in
countries where these groups have powers reserved to them by a federal constitu
tion. One such approach has been taken by Ethiopia, where the constitution ac
tually gives different regional groups the right to secede (though it is unclear how
this would work in practice). The expectation is that by giving autonomy and
power to the ethnic groups, and by offering an out, the constitution will encour
age compromise and enhance the recognition of the merits of unified govern
ment. By this logic, federalism enhances stability.
On the flip side, federalism might lead to exacerbating differences and under
mining stability. By drawing significant lines (almost literally) between different
groups, federal systems may end up encouraging different regions of the country
IN SIG H TS Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model
by Alfred Stepan
Stepan offers a corrective to the argument offered by Riker, noting that many instances of federalism in established coun
tries are not the result of “coming together,” but of central gov
ernments working on “holding together” different groups in a
single country. Examples may include India, Belgium, and Spain.
In addition, Stepan notes there are two other ways that federal
countries may be unlike the American model. First, federal sys
tems may vary in how much power is given to the territorial
chamber, such as a Senate. Some forms of federalism have pow
erful chambers that protect the interests of the states or prov
inces by giving voters in some areas a disproportionate number
of representatives. Finally, Stepan notes that some instances of
federalism are “asymmetrical,” with greater powers given to
some subnational regions than others. In addition to the three
“multinational” countries mentioned previously, Canada also fits
this model: Its French-speaking province of Quebec has been
recognized as a “distinct society” from the other provinces in ma
jority Anglophone Canada. In sum, Stepan notes the diversity of
federal arrangements and argues that all federalism does not
follow the U.S. model.
Alfred Stepan, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model.’ Journal of
Democracy 10, No. 4 (1999): 19-39.
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions? 187
Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding
1 Together or Tearing Apart? PAGE 519
Nigeria is one of the most interesting cases in the world for the
study of how federalism relates to secession and violence. The
country began with three regions around the time of indepen
dence in 1960, and after a civil war broke out among the regions
in the late 1960s, governments have created new states in an at
tempt to defuse conflict. Federalism is thus explicitly linked to the
question of stability.
See the case study on Nigeria in Part VI, pp. 519-520. As you
read it, keep in mind the following questions:
What is the nature of regional divisions in Nigeria, and
along what lines are people in the country divided?
In what ways could expanding the number of states be
expected to address the challenge of stability and vio
lence between regions?
To what extent have the attempts to further federalism
contributed to reducing conflict, and to what extent can
we know how successful it has been?
to develop independent identities. This question emerges in Canada, where
Quebec nationalism may have grown as the province’s autonomy has increased.
In other countries with more precarious economies and more fragile societies,
such as Nigeria, ethnic minorities or regions that feel they are being treated un
fairly by the central government are often critical of the federal system. In some
such cases, they may increase demands for secession or separation, which may
even explode into ethnic violence.
Are Federal Constitutions G ood for Dem ocratic Rights?
Federalism may have an impact on democracy in ways similar to those discussed
earlier: Federal institutions may make government more stable and may facilitate
democratic incorporation of the demands of many groups, or federalism may
reinforce divisions. Beyond the question of whether federalism is likely to make
democracy persist, we may also find the question of democratic rights.
Consider a very heated cultural debate, such as abortion in the United States
and many other countries, and how it relates to the question of federalism. The
pro-life position holds that embryos and fetuses are people and therefore have a
right to live (usually starting from the time of conception), implying that the bio
logical mother may not choose to abort a pregnancy. The pro-choice position
holds that a woman has a right to have control over her own body with respect to
reproduction, and that the government may not dictate to her what she must do
in terms of the decision to terminate a pregnancy.
There are many ethical, moral, and legal aspects to such a debate, but for the
moment we ask only a question about federalism. One perspective on abortion
has been a “states’ rights” perspective, which maintains that different states in the
United States (say, liberal Vermont and conservative Alabama) should be allowed
to have different laws governing abortion, which would reflect the different sets
of values and beliefs of the majorities in each place. This structure would allow
different parts of a federal country to express their own views on rights and would
be consistent with some of the perceived advantages of federalism.
188 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
Now consider another perspective. Whichever side of this debate you may
come down on (pro-life or pro-choice), it is worth asking the following question
with respect to federalism: Should people have different fundamental rights in a
country, depending on where they happen to be born or live? Let’s say that Ver
mont adopted a more pro-choice set of policies and Alabama a more pro-life set
of policies. If you favor the pro-life argument, should a human embryo or fetus
in Vermont have fewer rights than one in Alabama? Should Vermont be allowed
to adopt its set of policies because of federalism? If you favor the pro-choice argu
ment, should a woman in Alabama have fewer reproductive rights and less choice
than one in Vermont? Should Alabama be allowed to adopt its set of policies
because of federalism?
It seems clear that different regions (such as states) should be allowed to pass
their own preferred laws and policies to reflect the democratic wishes of their
residents. On the other hand, it seems that some major debates get down to ques
tions of constitutional rights that may need to apply everywhere in a society. This
question is fundamentally about what is in a constitution and what federalism
should be. The question about democracy and rights under federal constitutions
is not straightforward, as this example shows.
Are Federal Constitutions G ood for the Economy?
Federalism may be good or bad for an economy, depending on one’s point of view
and on circumstances. On one hand, some see federalism as generating healthy
competition among states or regions, which can be good for the economy. If state
A sees that businesses are relocating to state B next door (maybe for reasons of
lower taxes or better public services, for example), then state A may do its best to
govern in a way more like state B (say, by lowering taxes or providing better ser
vices). Such situations will exert a form of positive peer pressure for good economic
policies that will benefit the country over the long run. Federalism, by inducing
economic competitiveness among states, approximates the kind of competition
one sees in a market, which may be good for the economy. O f course, this idea of
healthy competition implies that states will perform differently from one another,
which may lead to significant differences in development and opportunities within
a federal country, as the case of India shows (see the “Case in Context” box).
Along with inducing healthy competition, decentralizing power is theorized
to have another advantage: It can allow people to sort themselves into different
jurisdictions along with other people who share their policy preferences. Let’s say
town X and town Y are side by side. Town X has higher taxes and better-funded
schools, while town Y has lower taxes and less school funding. Maybe a family
with young children in school will wish to live in town X, and a retired couple
with grown children will prefer to live in town Y. Decentralized government can
accommodate both, whereas more centralized government would impose the
same tax rate and the same amount of school funding for both families.18 This
example is more truly a question of decentralization than of federalism, since it
deals with local communities, but the principle also extends to federalism and
the roles of states, regions, or provinces.
In federal systems, the state or provincial level of government often has a great
deal of responsibility in many public services. In the United States, states have a
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions? 189
India is one of the world’s fast-growing economic powerhouses,
but it is also the country in the world with the largest number of
people living in extreme poverty. Some of the dramatic differ
ences in development in India can be understood by looking at
differences across states. Some states have performed very well,
while others have performed quite poorly. The country retains a
politics that has a very regional flavor, despite decades of efforts
at political centralization.
See the case study on India in Part VI, pp. 464-465. As you
read it, keep in mind the following questions:
Development in India page464
1. What are the positive and negative examples of develop
ment in India’s states, and what lessons does each of
these offer?
2. What factors can account for the variations in the perfor
mance of Indian states?
3. What lessons do you draw from the Indian case about
whether federalism might contribute to poverty reduc
tion or perhaps worsen poverty?
major role in deciding on issues of health policy and in providing support to the
poor, while local governments have the most significant responsibilities in pri
mary and secondary education. Public schools are funded primarily from local
taxes, and more Americans participate in local school boards than in any other
type of elective office. In many countries around the world—federal and unitary
alike—local governments commonly oversee such issues as local sanitation, local
roads, and services such as the police, parks, and public lighting.
Although federalism and decentralization have many arguments in their
favor, they can complicate economic performance in many circumstances. In
countries such as Argentina and Brazil, states and provinces have acted irrespon
sibly, overspending and forcing the central government to bail them out.19 Situa
tions like this make economic management difficult, because the states know
there is always someone there to bail them out if they overspend; they have a soft
budget constraint rather than a hard budget constraint.21 We often see this
Fiscal Federalism
by Wallace Oates
Oates developed a “decentralization theorem” of the advantages of decentralized government and federalism under
certain circumstances. First, Oates argued that federalism al
lowed for local governments that are closer to their constituents
than the central government, and that this allows them to have
better information about what local residents need or want.
They can use this information to better provide services. Oates
also built on the argument that giving local governments the
authority to offer different services would allow people to pick
and choose where they want to live, based on the mixes of taxes
and services they would get in each place.20 While central gov
ernments would be needed to provide for truly national needs,
such as defense and a common currency, the decentralized gov
ernments would be better equipped to make decisions about
many local issues. The practice of decentralization raises many
issues, including which services are local and which are national,
but this theory served as a summary and basis for future debates
over what should be the responsibility of central versus local or
state governments.
Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.
190 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
judicial activism Term used,
often pejoratively, to characterize
judicial actions that actively
reinterpret legislation and thus
imply exercising powers typically
reserved for the legislative branch.
problem in federal countries where states can exercise a lot of leverage over the
national political process through representatives in the legislature, such as sena
tors.22 In general, federalism can create incentives for politicians to overspend
and be fiscally irresponsible.23
Moreover, federalism can allow for inefficient resource allocation. One exam
ple may be that the Senates of Brazil and of the United States routinely allocate
monies disproportionately to less populous, more rural states. In issues from farm
policy to national security, smaller states are able to use their leverage in the federal
system to guarantee for themselves certain benefits in the form of government
funds. We cannot draw a firm conclusion, therefore, about whether federalism is
good or bad for the economy (or for stability or democracy); as comparativists
recognize, context and other conditions matter.
Ju dicial Review and D em ocracy
Along with the division of power between levels of government implied by the
issue of federalism versus unitarism, another prominent feature of most consti
tutions is the division of power among branches of government. In particular,
one major question is who is responsible for interpreting the constitution, as
noted earlier in the section on judiciaries. A judiciary with constitutional powers
of review can engage in an interpretation of the laws, and a question for many
observers is whether this is appropriate and to what extent. In the United States,
one of the biggest debates about the judicial system is over judicial activism, a
term that has a negative connotation for many observers.24 Judicial activism is a
hot-button issue in the United States, and the phenomenon is also recognized
and debated in other countries as well. According to critics, unelected judges
and justices may take advantage of the power of judicial review to essentially
legislate from the bench, as opposed to situating lawmaking power with the
representatives in the legislature. This practice may take some of the most heated
and controversial debates out of the democratic process by removing them from
Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Economic Management
IN S IG H T S in Multi-Tiered Systems
1 by Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels &
Rodden and Wibbels note that federalism can prove harmful to the economy rather than beneficial to it under certain cir
cumstances. They argue that whether federalism is good or bad
for the economy depends upon other institutions, such as how
political parties are structured and how state (or provincial) gov
ernments obtain their revenues. For example, if state govern
ments rely on money transferred from the central government
for their revenues, they frequently overspend because they can
pass on the costs of their spending to the center. On the other
hand, if state governments get most of their revenues from their
own taxes, they may spend more responsibly and not put the
national economy at risk. Political parties matter because central
government leaders that have political leverage over state-level
officials can hold them to compliance with what the center
wishes, while a political party system in which the center has
little control over state-level actors is more problematic. Each of
these scholars continues and develops related arguments in sub
sequent books, highlighting political incentives and the need for
hard budget constraints for states if federalism is to work well.25
Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, “Beyond the Fiction of Federalism:
Economic Management in Multi-Tiered Systems.’WoM Politics 54, No. 4 (2002):
494-531.
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions?
the arena of elections, public debates, and protests, and placing them in the
arena of lawsuits, legal challenges, and the rulings of a small number of un
elected judges in robes.
For some, judicial review is crucial to protecting rights and upholding the
law.26 By this argument, judges have the role of interpreting laws to ensure com
pliance with the letter of the constitution and legal precedent. Proponents of an
active judiciary may argue that courts have often led legislatures (rather than
followed them) in the recognition and expansion of fundamental rights. For this
reason, proponents might argue, a judicial system has the task to interpret laws
and guarantee that they are consistent with rights and obligations laid out in
constitutions. One can witness both sides of this debate, for instance, in the
question of whether judiciaries can and should require that a state offer marriage
benefits to same-sex couples. Judges hold different perspectives on the role of
courts in interpreting constitutions, as is evident in court decisions themselves—
which are authored by judges— or in the writings of those judges and justices.
As a result of the political heat it generates, “judicial activism” is a term sus
ceptible to unclear definition. For instance, critics of judicial activism in the
United States have often been conservative critics of justices’ rulings on social
and cultural issues, such as the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973, which legalized
abortion, and recent judicial decisions at the state level to expand civil union
benefits and marriage rights to gay couples. However, studies in the 2000s
showed that on the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices who most frequently voted
to overturn Congressional laws were the more conservative members.27 More
over, several of the rulings listed previously for the United States—including
A ceremony to install the new chief justice in France’s Cour de Cassation, the country’s highest
judicial body for civil and criminal matters. France shows that not all judiciaries are structured
the same: It has a separate constitutional council (Conseil Constitutionnel) to determine the
constitutionality of laws.
192 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
some widely acclaimed and unanimous rulings—may be seen as activist in retro
spect. As you consider the case of constitutionality in the United States (see the
“Case in Context” box), you can use your own analysis to determine if any rulings
fall under this definition.
There is one clear way to end judicial activism: End judicial review. This is not
merely a thought experiment or hypothetical exercise. In fact, as noted earlier,
one can look to the United Kingdom as a model. One argument against extensive
use of judicial review is that judiciaries remove contentious issues from the public
arena. According to this argument, debates about the most fundamental issues in
a democracy are fought out by the strongest ideologically committed advocates in
front of unelected judges. These issues are thus examined and decided on by
small groups and powerful individuals, and they may not be reflective of broader
public opinion. Those arguing against judicial activism would often prefer to
have society’s most contentious issues decided in legislatures rather than in
courts. The United Kingdom prevents judicial activism by granting the legisla
tive branch of government an unambiguously higher power than the judicial
branch. One way to view opposition to judicial activism is to ask about the extent
to which one would sacrifice judicial review. Put another way, judicial review and
some degree of judicial activism are the flip side of the checks and balances be
tween branches of government.
Most countries with written constitutions do have a constitutional court that
is responsible for judicial review. By some accounts, the power of judiciaries has
increased around the world over time. It should be noted that the debate is not
limited to the United States and United Kingdom but, rather, stretches around
the world. W hether judicial review has been beneficial to democracy remains
open to interpretation.
Whatever its causes, the debate persists between advocates of powerful judi
cial review processes who argue that judges often lead the law, asserting human
rights that may take a long time to work through legislative channels, and those
who see it as undue interference by unelected judges in major political issues.
Both parliamentary sovereignty and separation of powers are compatible with
democracy; they are simply different ways of understanding how constitutions
should be interpreted.
CASE IN CONTEXT
Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem? PAGE 563
For over two hundred years, the United States has enshrined the
principle of judicial review of laws. Courts can strike down laws
passed by Congress, if it deems the law to be in violation of the
Constitution. The tension between the powers of Congress and
those of the judiciary are not easily resolved.
See the case study on the United States in Part VI, pp. 563-
564. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What might be some of the challenges and problems of
judicial activism?
2. Can you think of circumstances in which judicial activism
would be appropriate and desirable?
3. What sorts of issues should be decided by the judiciary,
and what sorts of issues should be decided by elected
lawmakers?
What Explains the Similarities Between the Brazilian and South African Constitutions? 193
IN SIG H T S
Toward Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences
of the New Constitutionalism
by Ran Hirschl
&
H
irschl observes a move toward powerful judiciaries around
the world in recent decades and asks about the causes and
consequences of this change. He looks at the causes of greater
judicial power— or “juristocracy,” as he calls it— in Canada, Israel,
New Zealand, and South Africa. For Hirschl, the decision to create
strong judiciaries comes from strategic calculations made by
some elites, who believe that their interests will be better pro
tected by judiciaries than by elected officials; that is, they believe
that encoding certain principles as constitutional rights will pro
tect their dominance. When these elites are under threat, a
coalition of economic leaders, political leaders, and members of
the judiciary can combine to create a constitutional system
where challenges to their power can be debated in terms of
rights to be protected by the judiciary, and thereby removed
from most public political debate. Hirschl argues that a conse
quence of increasing judicial review is not the progressive expan
sion of rights, nor enhanced democracy, but rather a protection
of the interests of elites.
Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
What Explains the Similarities Between the
Brazilian and South African Constitutions?
Contemporary Brazil and South Africa were quite different places in many ways when they both convened constituent assemblies to write new consti
tutions in the late 1980s (in Brazil) and early 1990s (in South Africa). South
Africa was emerging from a long history of racial injustice and segregation in the
system known as apartheid from 1948 to 1994. Conflict in the society was cen
tered on the state’s oppression of the black majority, and the responses of black
South Africans to that oppression, though violence also erupted among and be
tween ethnic groups. In South Africa, the transition to democracy in the early
1990s took place against the backdrop of attempts to move beyond a racially
charged past, with the white-led National Party and the black-majority African
National Congress (nominally headed by Nelson Mandela) taking the lead roles
in negotiation. Brazil, by contrast, had no such legacy of legal, formal discrimi
nation (though it certainly had a long history of “unofficial” racism and discrimi
nation) in the twentieth century. It was a country coming out of two decades of
military rule, with the military seeking a peaceable exit from power. We might
thus expect them to come up with very different constitutions as their leaders
formed conventions to establish a common framework for governance.
Yet the two countries’ constitutions share many fundamental similarities.
Most obviously, they both are based on a written constitution. Both constitutions
expressed aspirational goals for the countries, but more important, they estab
lished basic political institutions, and the countries featured many similarities in
their constitutional designs. Both established constitutional courts that would
become powerful in interpreting the constitutions. Both also established a
TH IN K IN G
C O M P A R A TIV ELY
K E Y M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Most-Different-
Systems Design
As noted in chapters 1 and 2, com
parison can be based on two cases
that are quite different in many ways,
and not just based on countries that
are similar in many ways. Countries
that are “most different” can make for
very compelling comparisons where
one finds a common outcome
between them. Since the commonali
ties come from such different cases, it
can give some confidence that they
are attributable to some of the few
similarities between dissimilar coun
tries. In some cases, such as the prev
alence of written constitutions
discussed in this chapter, the reasons
for the common outcome may be
that lots of countries follow a similar
logic. For the example here, the two
countries of Brazil and South Africa
established constitutions with several
similar features, including strong
194 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
principle of shared power between the central government and state or provincial
governments; that is, both had a degree of federalism.
Perhaps most noteworthy, however, is the sheer length of the constitutions.
As of its adoption, Brazil’s constitution of 1988 had 245 articles and filled a small
book with all of its provisions. South Africa’s (approved in 1996) had a very simi-
can ask questions about the causes and consequences of institutions.
The reasons for the resulting similarities maybe numerous. We might propose
several hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 could be a matter of historical timing, in that
both countries adopted their constitutions at a similar moment in history; this
may have mattered more than geographic distance between them. Simply put,
constitutions written in an era (like the 1980s and 1990s) may be extensive be
cause countries have grown compelled to address more sets of rights and issues
when drafting a new constitution (for a “new country”). Perhaps socially complex
societies (whether due to multiethnic identities or complex economic systems, as
both Brazil and South Africa have) require more negotiations between conflict
ing parties. This may result in extensive constitutions detailing the compromise.
The American constitution in the late 1700s might simply not envision all the
issues that would emerge in modern societies, but those writing constitutions
today may write more thorough contracts. For example, a constitution that re
ceives input from both men and women of different races, social classes, and
ethnic or linguistic backgrounds may necessarily involve more written agree
ments than one written by a more homogenous group operating on a shared set
of assumptions.
O ther hypotheses might also explain the extensive nature of these two
constitutions. Hypothesis 2 might be less focused on historical background
and more on the powerful actors in the constitution writing process, with an
emphasis on the economic and political interests of the negotiators. The po
litical parties in South Africa, and the politicians and military in Brazil,
might have thought it necessary to make clear statements about the rights of
all parties in the constitutional convention, with guarantees for both the new
democratic governments and provisions that would provide some protection
to the departing (non-democratic) government. Hypothesis 3 could be that
the cases are not completely independent but are actually linked, in that the
South African and Brazilian constitutions may have been modeled on certain
aspects of other constitutions (whether in Germany or Mexico). Insofar as
judicial review and institutions to
support federalism. This happened
despite the fact that the two constitu
tions were created on different
continents and in different social
circumstances by rather different
groups of actors. The fact that the
countries are ‘most different” in many
ways yet similar in outcomes makes it
an intriguing pair of cases for hypoth
eses about why constitutions take the
forms they do.
(continued) lar 243 articles, and took on a comparably huge number of issues: It instituted
large numbers of rights beyond the freedoms of speech and liberty, specified
rules for issues such as funding for political parties, introduced a variety of mu
nicipal structures, created a formal role for traditional leaders, established proce
dures for the division of revenue between the levels of government, and described
the design of the national flag. Here, it can be useful to do a brief glance at an
other “shadow” case that we don’t explore fully: These constitutions are both
extensive, especially when contrasted with an American constitution that fits on
just a few pages.
W hy might such different countries have such similarly extensive constitu
tions, with features of judicial review and of federalism? We do not offer defini
tive statements about why constitutions vary in this way, but illustrate how we
What Explains the Similarities Between the Brazilian and South African Constitutions? 195
countries do not exist in vacuums, the South African and Brazilian constitu
tions may have been modeled in part on experiences elsewhere. I f research
turns up evidence (as is the case) that South African and Brazilian constitu
tion writers did explicitly look to other constitutions as models when writing
their own, that would provide some support for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 might identify other key similarities amid the differences be
tween the countries, much as was discussed in chapter 1. South Africa and Brazil
may have many differences, but there are also some key political and social simi
larities that may affect constitutional design. For instance, both are racially and
ethnically diverse, and both have high levels of economic inequality. The consti
tutions were certainly attentive to potential inequities, which may be construed
as evidence for this hypothesis. They are also relatively large countries with vari
ous identity groups living in different locations; this may favor a degree of feder
alism (which itself requires more extensive constitutional language than smaller,
unitary states).
We will not explore the causality in detail, but as with previous chapters we
can simply think about what sort of evidence would support each hypothesis.
Research can help determine which of the preceding hypotheses has the strongest
support from the empirical evidence, and the findings from a specific comparison
of these two cases will then have implications for broader research questions
and other countries. W hy do constitutions take similar forms in such different
TH IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
Pius Langa (left) and Dikgang Moseneke in 2005. Langa was the first black chief justice of
South Africa’s constitutional court.
196 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design
TH IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
countries? W hy do very different countries adopt federalism under disparate cir
cumstances? These questions can be asked with respect to comparisons across
many countries. Someone with expertise on the Brazil-South African compari
son (or a similar comparison) will not have the final word on this for all countries
but can contribute to thinking comparatively about important political questions
such as constitutional design. The comparison can point to fruitful avenues for
further research on the design and interpretation of constitutions. The compara
tive method we outlined in the beginning chapters and used in the previous
chapters—including its use of the most-similar-systems design and most-different-
systems design—can help us in the area of institutions as well.
O f course, we should note that these two constitutions are not completely
similar. They have many differences that can also be the subject of further re
search. For one, the Brazilian constitution established a system with a president
elected by popular vote, while in South Africa, the legislative chamber known as
the National Assembly elects the president. The range of questions one could ask
about these constitutions is thus considerable, and the same holds for the other
major institutions explored in this chapter. Much as we can ask questions about
federalism, we might look at seemingly similar countries and ask why one ends
up being federal and the other unitary. Both Germany and Italy formed into
coherent nation-states in the second half of the nineteenth century, and both
have major regional differences internally, so why is one federal and the other
unitary? Or, with regard to judiciaries, why have courts become so significant in
constitutional interpretation even in former British colonies, given that Britain is
the home of parliamentary sovereignty? These sorts of questions serve to show
that institutions can be examined using the same comparative perspective devel
oped and used in the earlier chapters. The possibilities of comparing institutions
continue as we look at the branches of government in the next chapters.
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Concepts
• Constitutions are the basic charters of modern states,
and they are written documents in most countries.
Constitutions lay out the basic framework for government
institutions in a country, and they are the foundational
laws of that country.
■ • Two of the leading elements of constitutional design
are federalism versus unitarism and the power of the
judiciary to review for constitutionality laws passed by
legislatures.
Types
• Federal countries are those in which subnational units
such as states or provinces have some constitutional
protection and political autonomy from the national
government.
• Unitary countries are those in which the central govern
ment is sovereign and any subnational administrative
units are subordinate to the national government.
• Countries with judicial review have constitutional courts
that rule on whether laws passed by the legislature are
Chapter Review 197
in accordance with the constitution, and these
courts have the power to strike down legislation as
unconstitutional.
• Countries with parliamentary sovereignty do not
have judiciaries that review the constitutionality
of legislation.
Causes and Effects
• Federalism has been associated with enhancing national
stability and democracy under some circumstances, and
with conflict in other cases.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. Imagine the U.S. Constitution were to be lengthened to add one
hundred more articles, like many of the more extensive consti
tutions in the world today. What would be the likely content of
these added articles? If the United States hosted a convention to
write a new constitution today, do you believe the resulting
document would be as brief as that formulated in the 1780s, or
would the result likely be longer? Why?
2. What would happen if all copies (yes, including Internet
copies) of the United States Constitution simultaneously dis
appeared? Would the rule of law break down? Or would the
society remain robust and functional? What does your answer
to this question imply about whether the text itself is of great
import, or social outcomes depend more heavily upon customs
and culture?
3. Imagine a country that has just achieved a ceasefire in a de
cades-long civil war. You have been asked by the government to
accompany several constitutional experts to the country to
advise the new “constituent assembly,” whose job it is to write
a new constitution that will ensure “stability, democracy, and
• Federalism has also been linked with improvements in
economic growth and development, as well as economic
difficulties.
• There is a long-standing debate about whether judicial
review contributes to the protection of democratic rights
or not.
Th inking Com paratively
While many countries have written constitutions, these
differ in many ways, and it is an open question whether one
country’s constitution is suited to other circumstances.
prosperity.” Under what circumstances would you advocate
that the country adopt a federal structure?
4. Why has the U.S. Constitution survived for over two centuries?
Do you believe it is because of the design of the document
itself, or because it happened to be implemented in a place with
a certain history, geography, and cultural backdrop? Framed in a
comparative sense, is the U.S. Constitution simply well suited to
the conditions prevailing in the United States, or would it likely
have enjoyed the same longevity elsewhere? Would it only work
in large, heterogeneous societies, or only work in societies with
our particular history of “coming together,” or only in a society
relatively far removed from most major foreign wars?
5. The United Kingdom is a country where a wide range of indi
vidual rights are respected, much like in other democracies.
Given that many major rights are well protected, what are the
problems with parliamentary sovereignty and a lack of judicial
review? Are there any disadvantages of eliminating judicial
review (and the potential for judicial activism) in well-estab
lished democratic societies?
CHAPTER 9
Legislatures and
Legislative Elections
• Phil Goff, a prominent Labour Party politician in New Zealand, votes in the 2011 elections.
What can New Zealand teach other countries about how to run a democracy? A t first glance, the country is so distinctive that one might say
little. The island nation has just over four million people, and its greatest
claim to fame may be its intimidating rugby team or that it was the setting for
The Lord o f the Rings movie trilogy. Its capital, W ellington, is the southern
most of any country on earth. Yet this former British colony has an electoral
system for its legislature that many countries might wish to consider.
New Zealanders actually have two votes in their parlia
mentary elections. They have one for a specific individual to
represent their district, and one for their most preferred party.
W hen all the votes are tallied and computed, the winners in
each district go to parliament, just as in many countries around
the world, including the United States. But there is a catch:
Along with these representatives go a number of additional
members chosen from lists made by the political parties. These
“at-large” members of parliament are allotted to each party in
a way that makes the overall composition of the parliament
proportional to the vote each party received. The idea is to give
each New Zealander his or her own representative for the local
constituency, while making parliament more generally reflec
tive of party preferences in the country as a whole.
New Zealand is not the only country to use this compli
cated approach to electing its legislature. In fact, the New Zea
land model drew some inspiration from Germany’s similar
model, as we discuss later in the chapter. W hether the system is
ideal or not depends on how each individual believes representa
tion and legislatures should work, which we also discuss in this
chapter. W hat is certain is that considering the relative merits of
models like New Zealand’s and Germany’s, as contrasted with
other models in countries ranging from the United States to the
United Kingdom to Japan to Brazil, will provide insight into
both representation and the legislatures that are designed to ensure it.
This chapter offers an introduction to the study o f legislatures, w ith spe
cific attention to the electoral rules and systems that shape them. We discuss
how legislators are elected to represent the citizenry. In the two subsequent
chapters, we elaborate on many aspects of representation and elections.
199
IN TH IS C H A P T E R
Concepts 200
What Legislatures Are 200
What Legislatures Do 201
Types 202
Unicameral and Bicameral Legislatures 202
Electoral Systems 205
Executive-Legislative Relations 211
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns
of Representation? 213
Patterns of Representation 213
Electoral Systems and Representation 215
Legislative Decision Making and
Representation 218
Executive-Legislative Relations and
Representation 220
T H IN K IN G C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
Representation in New Zealand and
Beyond 222
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
United Kingdom • Brazil • Japan
Germ any • United States
200 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
legislature Assembly or body of
representatives with the authority
to make laws.
Chapter 10 discusses the executive branch, but it must be noted that a discus
sion of executives cannot always be separated from that of legislatures. As a
result, we discuss briefly in this chapter the relationships between legislatures
and executives, but leave to the next chapter the way in which many of the
issues play out in parliamentary and presidential systems. Similarly, in talking
about legislative representation in this chapter, we discuss political parties,
but a fuller treatment of those im portant institutions is left to chapter 11.
Concepts
Politics is about making laws to govern people, and legislatures are the most
important bodies that shape the process of making and changing laws. Legisla
tors legislate. W hile heads of state and heads of government in the executive
branch may be the first individuals that come to mind when we think of politi
cians, the legislatures of the world are often what we will think of when we view
politics as a whole process of governing.
What Legislatures Are
Legislatures are deliberative bodies composed of the decision makers who rep
resent the population at large. Legislatures make laws and many political deci
sions, especially in democracies, but also even in personalistic dictatorships,
which may rely on legislatures in their efforts to seem legitimate or to create the
appearance of deliberative decision making. Legislatures are where debates take
place about the fundamental values and preferences of voters. They are where
interest groups and lobbyists often turn when they seek to influence the political
process. They are where presidents and prime ministers often start their careers,
and they are also typically the institution in government with the greatest re
sponsibility for overseeing the conduct of the executive (an institution discussed
in greater detail in the next chapter). In these bodies, legislators are of course
important political figures, being leaders in major debates, whether in actual
face-to-face settings in the legislature itself or through the use of the media.
The rise of legislatures, as opposed to executives, is part and parcel of the story
of the emergence of constitutional and democratic regimes. For centuries, the
history of representative government was the history of elected legislatures in
creasingly taking political authority from unelected executives. Parliaments, as
semblies, congresses, and other legislative bodies asserted their rights to represent
the populace, usually critiquing the unaccountable power of monarchs, such as
kings, queens, or emperors. O f course, the earliest legislatures were not truly
representative in most cases. The Parliament that asserted its authority over King
John II of England with the drafting of the Magna Carta in 1215 were not
elected “commoners,” but rather nobles in their own right. The French Estates-
General revealed its inegalitarian character in its basic structure, with separate
meetings for nobles, clergy, and commoners (the “third estate”). Even earlier, in
the republics of ancient Rome, membership in the Senate was generally restricted
to male property-holders or upper-class patricians. In many forms of colonial
rule, as well, legislatures were initially chosen not by the people at large but
rather by an elite subset of the population.
This existence of less-than-democratic legislatures can be found in authoritar
ian regimes today. In authoritarian systems, legislatures may be selected in a
number of ways that exclude a free and open vote. For instance, the legislature
may be comprised only of a subset of the population, such as being members of a
certain dominant political party. This would be the case in Communist regimes
such as China, where only members of the official Communist Party (or their
close allies) are elected to office in practice. In other authoritarian regimes, legisla
tors may be appointed by unelected executives. These are legislatures, even if the
quality of representation is suspect.
Despite these non-democratic instances, many countries have moved toward
more democracy over time, with more regular elections and the extension of the
franchise to more people, most notably women, ethnic minorities, and men of
lower social and economic status. Citizens in all contemporary democracies
elect legislators, with the population at large having some choice among mul
tiple political parties and/or candidates. The ability of those citizens to vote
directly for the executive branch is not universal. W hile some democratic coun
tries also have a direct election for the executive (such as a president), many
others have an executive elected by the legislature itself, and that executive is
nominally responsible to the legislature. In these systems, the people vote for
their executives only in an indirect fashion, by choosing a legislature that in
turn selects the executive branch of government. This makes the legislature of
elected representatives the signature element of virtually any democracy.
What Legislatures Do
Representatives generally make law by proposing legislation and then organizing
votes and bringing these to the floor of the legislature. Legislators who propose
or favor a piece of legislation often undertake the necessary compromises and
“horse trading” that enable laws to get passed. The necessary trading and com
promises may take place among the multiple parties in a governing coalition (as
elaborated on in the chapter on executives) or within parties, as different legisla
tors make specific demands of one another in exchange for “yea” or “nay” votes.
Depending on the power of party leaders to control the legislators, it may be
necessary to make many concessions to specific legislators.
The specific process of legislation will vary from one legislature to the next.
In some instances, a strong executive cabinet may be comprised of members of the
legislature itself, and the rules governing legislative elections may make passage of
the executive’s favored proposals almost “automatic.” In other circumstances, leg
islation may have to pass through multiple houses, or may have to work its way
through votes of multiple committees just to get to the “floor” for a vote. Indeed,
in some systems, the legislative process requires both these and more. In the
United States, for instance, proposed legislation must often pass through commit
tees in each of the two chambers of the legislature, then must pass votes in the
whole body, then through a conference committee that reconciles any differences
between the two chambers’ bills, before going to the president for a signature.
The powers of legislatures are considerable in most democracies. In many coun
tries, one of the main powers of the legislative branch is the so-called “power of the
202 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
bicameral legislature Legislature
with two chambers, which may
have equal or unequal powers.
chamber An assembly or body of
a legislature, often referring to one
of two such bodies in a bicameral
legislature.
purse.” Legislatures typically have control over government budgets and are empow
ered to disburse funds to the executive branch and to the administrative agencies, or
to cut ofF funding to certain initiatives that are unpopular or that it deems to be
mismanaged. This power to allocate resources is one of the reasons executives must
be attentive to the needs of legislatures, even in the absence of new laws being passed.
Legislatures often debate as part of the functions of representing the elector
ate and making legislation, and in doing so they also serve the function of focus
ing national discussion. Legislatures are where many public debates play out. The
halls of the legislatures are designed for speechmaking, discussion, and debate,
but this does not only happen in the chamber itself. Legislators also engage in
less formal debate by shaping and responding to public opinion in the media and
through interactions with citizens who have requests, complaints, arguments,
suggestions, ideas, and new perspectives. O f course, not all such debate will be
meaningful. Especially in authoritarian regimes, legislative debates may be re
duced to displays of loyalty to the executive. In North Korea, legislators’ most
apparent role is to serve as an applauding audience for a dictator. In democracies
too, not all legislators clarify and improve political discussion: they may also
obfuscate or muddy the waters of political discussion, or may be beholden to
special interests acting against the public good (though many such examples are
matters of opinion). And they may—perhaps deliberately— spread misinforma
tion or misleading information. In principle, however, elected legislators at the
national level are expected to be opinion leaders that contribute to national dis
cussions and propose solutions to public problems.
There are also several overlooked roles of legislatures. One is “socializing” politi
cians. Legislatures can be a “training ground” for future chief executives, such as
presidents and prime ministers.1 Another role is constituent service: Citizens often
contact their representatives’ offices for assistance with a variety of concerns specific
to local individuals or groups. Last but definitely not least, legislators often try to get
reelected.2 Indeed, some scholars believe that the fundamental force driving legisla
tive action is the push for electoral success.3 Getting reelected may not be part of the
“job description” of being a legislator, but it is certainly one of the more time-con
suming aspects of the job in many countries. This may involve extensive campaigning
and fundraising in candidate-centered elections, or working to retain a spot on the
political party’s list of favored representatives in systems where electors vote by party.
Types
Legislative bodies may take a number of forms. They may have one or more houses
or chambers, for example. In addition, the electoral processes that give rise to the
legislators are numerous. Elections may involve voting for specific candidates, for
political parties generally, or both. These different forms of legislatures and legis
lative elections give rise to different patterns of representation, as we shall see.
Unicam eral and Bicam eral Legislatures
Legislatures consist of one or more houses of assembly. Bicameral legislatures—
those with two chambers, or houses—are common in democracies, especially in
relatively large countries. This is the case in the United States and many nations
Types 203
Sometimes legislative politics gets heated: Parliamentarians from opposing parties fight in
Taiwan, 2010.
in Latin America, for instance, where congresses consist of two legislative cham
bers, with each having its own name (such as House of Representatives or Cham
ber of Deputies). Many other countries exhibit a similar structure, using different
names to signify the two chambers. In bicameral countries, the lower chamber
is usually the one whose composition most closely reflects the population at large.
Examples are the House of Representatives in the United States or the House of
Commons in the United Kingdom. The upper chamber is usually smaller in size,
and its composition is often less directly reflective of the population at large; it
may represent territories such as states or provinces, as in the case of the Senate
in many countries, or specific groups, such in the House of Lords in the United
Kingdom. The lower chamber has greater authority than the “upper chamber” in
many countries. In countries such as Germany, the upper chamber is limited to
voting on certain items that pertain to the states, and in other countries such as
the United Kingdom, the upper chamber has even more limited (largely vesti
gial) powers. Here again, the United States is a bit of an exception in that its
upper chamber—the Senate—has at least as much power as the lower chamber.
Unicameral legislatures are quite common in countries with small popula
tions. For instance, unicameral parliaments are used in Scandinavia and are
common in sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the Middle East. Unicameral
representation is usually most appropriate in unitary states and in countries that
have relatively homogeneous populations; conversely, unicameral legislatures are
uncommon where there are histories of different regional population groups with
lower chamber In a bicameral
legislature, the house that typically
has a larger number of legislators
than upper chambers, and often
represents the national vote either
more proportionally or through
smaller geographic constituencies.
upper chamber The chamber in a
bicameral legislature that is usually
smaller in number of legislators,
often representing larger geogra
phic constituencies such as states
or provinces.
unicameral legislature
Legislature with a single chamber.
their own identities, or in which regional minorities may demand special repre
sentation on the basis of territory. In addition to working in small, unitary de
mocracies, unicameralism is also common in systems in many authoritarian
regimes where a single political party dominates. In these cases, the governing
regime may seek to minimize the “separation of powers” between national and
regional interests that is implicit in bicameralism, and prefer to channel all politi
cal demands through a single body dominated by the single party. The world’s
most populous country, China, fits the bill here, as it also has a unicameral legis
lature, despite its size.
Beyond the basic unicameral or bicameral structure, legislatures vary in an
other simple way: They have many different names, as noted earlier. For example,
a legislature may be called a congress ox parliament, an assembly, a house, or a cham
ber. Some of these terms have relatively specific meanings, or are most commonly
used in certain ways to designate whether a legislative body constitutes the entire
legislative branch or merely one part of it. Congresses and parliaments generally
refer to the entirety of a legislative branch, which may include more than one
chamber. Houses and chambers often refer to one of the component parts of the
legislature, especially in the many countries with a bicameral (two-chamber) leg
islature, as noted later. Assemblies may refer to either a legislature as a whole or
one particular house or chamber within it.
Congresses and parliaments also have different connotations, as shown in
Table 9.1. W hile the distinction is not a hard-and-fast rule, congresses are typi
cally branches in a system with a separately elected head of government, while
parliaments are often the name used for legislatures that choose their own head
of government. In most congresses, the separately elected head of government—
often called a president—does not depend on the congress for his or her position,
204 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
t a b l e 9.1 Com m on Attributes of Congresses and Parliaments
Type of Legislature Congress Parliam ent
Example United States United Kingdom
Head of Government President Prime Minister (or Premier, Chancellor, etc.)
Election of Head of Government Separately elected by voters Selected by Parliament
Independence of Head of
Government
Executive does not depend on
confidence of Congress
Executive depends on confidence of Parliament
Separation vs. Fusion of Powers Separation of powers between Congress
and executive
Executive fused with Parliament
Checks vs. Supremacy Checks and balances between branches
in constitution
Parliament supreme by constitution (but see next
row)
Strong vs. Limited Executive Executive limited by separation and
checks
Executive may dominate lawmaking in practice
congress A form of legislature,
typically associated with a presi
dential system in which there is a
separation of powers.
parliament A type of legislature,
often associated with systems in
which the legislators vote on the
leadership of the executive branch
and the formation of a
government.
Bicameral vs. Unicameral Either, but usually bicameral Either
vw. broad w w w .b r o a d
Chloe Smith, Member of Parliament from Norwich (U.K.) and a representative of the
Conservative Party, and John Smith, of the Monster Raving Loony Party, whom she defeated.
but rather is accountable to the populace at large and to the constitution gener
ally. These are usually systems designed with separations of powers and checks
and balances between the legislative and executive branches. By contrast, parlia
mentary systems have executives that depend on parliament to legislate and even
to retain their position. W hile the parliament is often the supreme lawmaking
body, this does not mean the executive is weak: These systems may actually fea
ture strong executive powers in practice, depending on whether the executive
can control his or her political party and its allies in parliament. We elaborate on
this basic distinction further in chapter 10, when we discuss presidential and
parliamentary executives, and we look at party systems in chapter 11.
Electoral System s
Different legislative systems vary in how they organize elections. Among the
various options, there are two basic categories of electoral systems used for legis
latures, and any number of combinations of these two systems. The first is the
district-based electoral system, and the second is proportional representation.
D is tric t Systems
District systems allocate one or more seats in the legislature to each of a number
of districts in the country. These districts are usually territorial, with different
geographic regions representing the different districts. These districts may be
known as constituencies, and in most such systems, the district will have a single
representative. The most common version is the single-member district (SMD).
district system An electoral
system in which voters select
representatives from specific
geographic constituencies.
constituency A group of voters or
a geographic district that legisla
tors or other elected officials
represent.
http://www.broad
206 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
single-member district (SMD)
Electoral system in which voters
choose a candidate and the winner
is elected by the most votes earned
or through winning a runoff vote.
first-past-the-post Electoral
system in which the candidate
with the most number of votes is
elected, regardless of whether a
majority has been attained.
Single-member district systems divide up a country into a number of territo
rial districts, with each district having the right to elect one legislator. This
person is then expected to represent the interests of that district in the legisla
ture. In most circumstances, political parties will run candidates for the seat in
the legislature, and those representing major, well-known parties will have an
advantage over those without such a party affiliation. Parties often have consid
erable discretion in how they choose their own candidates. In some countries,
party leaders may exercise considerable control over who the candidates will be
in each district. Another procedure is openly contested “primary” elections in
which members of the same party run against one another for the party’s nomi
nation to a seat. While major parties have an advantage in name recognition and
in communicating to voters what their candidates probably believe, “indepen
dent” candidates may also run if they meet the qualifications for getting their
names on the ballot.4 Ballot access is challenging in some countries but famously
easy for candidates in others, especially for small local elections. Getting on the
ballot is easy in the United Kingdom, for example, where the Monster Raving
Loony Party has become a standby. Consider the SMD system in the United
Kingdom in the “Case in Context” box entitled “The Mother of Parliaments”
(which is not about the Monster Raving Loony Party).
Elections in SMD systems can have different features. A common approach
is the first-past-the-post, or “plurality” system, in which the district holds elec
tions and the candidate with the most votes wins. This may sound obvious, but
note that in such a system, it may be common to have a winner with less than 50
percent of the vote, if there are many candidates who split up the vote between
them. This can lead to surprising outcomes in some cases. For instance, consider
an election in a relatively conservative district in which two conservative candi
dates run along with one liberal one. The liberal may only win 40 percent of the
CASE IN CONTEXT
The Mother of Parliai
and the Westminstei
ments: The United Kingdom
‘ Model PAGE 549
The British Parliament is often considered the ‘mother of parlia
ments” given its long history and the way it inspired legisla
tures around the world. It is the most famous example of a
parliamentary system, in which the legislature chooses and has
constitutional powers over the executive; we explore this
system further in chapter 10, contrasting it with presidential
systems in countries such as the United States. While the British
model, known as the “Westminster model,” has been emulated
often, it has rarely been adopted in its exact form by other
countries.
See the case study of the British Parliament in Part VI,
pp. 549-550. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What features of the British Parliament seem especially
“democratic” relative to the American model, and which
less so?
2. What role does the notion of “parliamentary sovereignty”
leave for the other branches of government, namely the
executive and judiciary? How can the Prime Minister and
the executive be powerful when the Parliament itself is
sovereign?
3. What is the effect of the single-member district voting
system on the proportionality of Parliament? Will this
type of system be an advantage or a disadvantage for
small political parties?
Types 207
vote but take the election if the two conservatives split the remaining 60 percent.
Accordingly, many SMD systems adopt other electoral rules, with a popular ver
sion being a runoff system between the top two candidates that ensures that the
eventual winner will have received a “mandate” by winning a majority of the
valid votes cast.
In general, first-past-the-post systems will often disproportionately favor
larger parties that can gain a winning number of votes in many districts, even if
these parties cannot win an outright majority of the votes cast. It can also dis
favor slightly smaller parties that might get a solid fraction of the vote but not
enough to gain a plurality in many districts. A well-known example of this is
the United Kingdom, where the Conservative and Labour parties have often
won majorities of parliamentary seats without winning a majority of votes cast.
The third-largest party, such as the Liberal Democrats in the 2005 and 2010
elections, usually win a smaller proportion of seats than votes. In the 2010 elec
tion, neither of the two largest parties won a majority, but in the 2005 election
Labour won a majority of seats (over 55 percent) with a minority of votes in the
country (35 percent), while the Liberal Democrats won only 9.6 percent of the
seats for their 22 percent of the vote (Table 9.2).
Not all district systems are single-member districts. There are also
multi-member districts (MMDs), in which more than one representative is
elected from each district. These arrangements are less “winner-take-all” because
they allow for multiple representatives and also multiple parties to have represen
tatives in the same district.
W hat happens in these M M D systems often depends on the size of the dis
tricts and the number of representatives in each. Imagine if the United States had
a system for its House of Representatives with two representatives in each dis
trict. Since the Republican and Democratic parties are usually the two leading
parties in each district and are usually fairly close in polling, most reasonable
calculations would result in the two parties each getting one seat in most districts
around the country. But if districts were to have, say, ten representatives, the re
sults might be significantly different. The two leading parties may split the seats
between them. Or perhaps the two leading parties would each take four seats,
and then a couple of smaller parties— say one on the far left and one on the far
right—would win one seat each. This would change the composition of the leg
islature, encouraging more small parties to have representatives. Because M M D
divides seats up according to the relative performance of different parties, this
points in the direction of the next broad category of electoral systems: propor
tional representation.
runoff Electoral system in which
the top candidates after a first
round of voting compete in one or
more additional rounds of voting
until a candidate receives a
majority.
multi-member district (MMD)
Electoral system in which district
constituencies have more than one
representative.
t a b l e 9.2 Results for Top Parties in United K in gd o m General Election, 2005
Party Total Votes Percentage of National Vote Num ber of Seats Percentage of Seats
Labour 9,552,436 35.2 355 55.2
Conservative 8,784,915 32.4 198 30.7
Liberal Democrat 5,985,454 22.0 62 9.6
208 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
proportional representation (PR)
In its pure form, an electoral system
in which voters choose a preferred
party and seats are allocated to
parties according to the percen
tage of the vote the party wins.
open-list proportional
representation Electoral system
in which voters choose a candidate
but votes are aggregated by
political party to determine the
allocation of seats across parties.
P ro p o rtio n a l R e p rese n tatio n (P R )
Many countries maintain that the most important factor in representation is not
the district or geographic territory one represents, nor having an individual can
didate to represent certain people, but rather the distribution of seats between
parties. The logic is simple: If party X wins 44 percent of the vote in the country,
party Y 33 percent, party Z 22 percent, and all other parties 1 percent, then party
X should have about 44 percent of the seats in the legislature, party Y about 33
percent, and party Z about 22 percent. Proportional representation (PR) can
do a better job than SMD of making this happen.
Systems featuring an element of PR still face the challenge of allocating seats
once the votes are tallied. There are many ways to allocate seats, but certain rules
are common. First, in many PR systems, a threshold is often required to earn
seats in the legislature. This may be 5 percent, for instance. W ith that threshold,
any party with less than 5 percent of the vote would not earn a seat in the legis
lature because their vote totals were insufficient. This prevents PR systems from
being dominated by lots of small parties—which would make complex coalitions
necessary and likely not be conducive to stability— and can help ensure govern-
ability by restricting power to a handful of substantial parties. Second, the
number of seats for each party cannot perfectly reflect the vote, because there are
always fewer seats than there are voters, and there will be some “remainders.” In
general, the number of votes a party gets is rounded off to a certain number of
seats. For instance, if three parties contest an election for 12 seats, and all the
votes for party A would suggest it earned 6.7 seats, party B earned 3.1 seats, and
party C earned 2.2 seats, then one actual distribution might be 7 seats for party
A, 3 for party B, and 2 for party C. A variety of calculation methods exists for
sorting out the seats from votes in proportional representation systems.5
PR is designed (by definition) to offer proportionality in the vote for different
parties, as we explore further in the “Causes and Effects” section. A leading ex
ample of a relatively “pure” PR system, albeit one where democracy is very sus
pect, is now found in Russia. South Africa also uses a model that features the
classic form of PR for its lower house, the National Assembly. However, most
countries using PR do not use it in its purest form. Rather, they blend it with
district-based systems or make other modifications, as discussed in the section
on hybrid systems later in the chapter.
Proportional representation may work in different ways, with different details.
For instance, in the variant of PR known as open-list proportional representation
(used in Brazil and many European countries), voters choose individual candidates,
but the candidates’ votes are combined together with the other members of their
party, and then seats are allocated based on the parties’ performances. This makes
the legislature proportionally representative, yet the votes for candidates still in
fluence which individuals are elected to the legislature: The candidates with the
most votes within their party will have the highest priority for earning a seat. The
system attempts to combine some of the features of PR with the right to vote for
individual candidates (hence, “open list” rather than a “closed list” controlled by
the party). It encourages candidates to seek individual support and can leave par
ties “less disciplined” than under forms of PR in which the party exerts greater
control over its slate of candidates.
Types 209
w I ■
Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline in Brazil’s Legislature PAGE 409
The Chamber of Deputies in the Brazilian Congress uses open-list
proportional representation.This system allows each voterto select
a specific candidate, and then attempts to achieve proportionality
by aggregating the votes across parties. In Brazil, a consequence
seems to have been weak political parties and a messy legislature,
at least at some moments in time. For years, many scholars consid
ered the electoral system to be the key item in Brazil’s politics that
could be changed to improve the quality of governance.6
See the case study on the Brazilian Congress in Part VI, p. 409.
As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What do you think might be the reasons behind the
adoption of open-list PR?
2. What are the consequences of this system for political
parties, and why? Should this result be expected in all
countries with this system?
3. If in fact the Brazilian Congress is becoming more coher
ent over time, yet the open-list PR system has stayed the
same, what can explain the change?
Even with the distinction between PR and SMD, and the diversity of rules
and mechanisms for each, there is additional variety in the types of electoral
systems around the world. As suggested previously, many countries attempt to
find a balance between the perceived advantages of PR systems and SMD sys
tems. We might call these “mixed” or “hybrid” systems.
M ix e d o r H y b rid
Many countries have sought to balance the advantages of SMD and PR systems,
and have invented a number of seemingly ingenious mechanisms for doing so,
though these generally make the electoral system more complicated. These sys
tems—which represent a hybrid between the two sets of systems already dis
cussed—may have individual elected representatives but attempt to retain (or
create) the proportionality among parties that PR systems provide. We return to
the cases of Germany and New Zealand at the end of the chapter, but note here
that it is possible in theory to elect representatives from districts, and then ensure
proportionality of party representation in the legislature, mainly through the ad
dition of supplemental “at large” seats to the legislature.
Other mechanisms ask voters to do more than choose their preferred candi
date: They ask voters to rank candidates. The electoral system then uses this in
formation about ranked preferences to determine winners. The alternative vote,
also called the instant-runoff vote or preferential vote, is a simple version. All
votes are counted to see voters’ first choices. I f no candidate wins a majority, the
candidate with the lowest total is eliminated, and the votes for this last place
candidate are redistributed according to those voters’ second-choice picks.
I f there is still no majority, then the candidate with the next-lowest total is elimi
nated, and their votes are redistributed as well, and so on until one candidate has
a majority of the vote.
A similar system is the single transferable vote (STV), which is used in some
M M D systems where more than one candidate is elected. Under STV, the voter
ranks candidates, just as in the alternative vote. But some winning candidates
alternative vote Voting system in
which voters rank candidates and
the votes of low-ranking candida
tes are reallocated until a winner is
determined.
single transferable vote (STV)
Electoral system in which voters
rank candidates and the winners’
surplus votes are reallocated to
other, lower-ranking candidates
until a slate of representatives is
chosen.
210 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
t a b l e 9 . 3 Voting Procedures Under Different Electoral System s
Electoral System Procedure for Voter
Single-M em ber District (SMD) Choose candidate; top candidate is elected by most votes or runoff.
Proportional Representation (PR) Choose preferred party; seats allocated to parties by vote percent.
O pen-List PR Choose candidate; votes aggregated by party for allocation of seats.
Mixed Systems/Hybrid Systems Choose candidate and party (two votes), or other combination of above.
Sin gle Transferable Vote (STV) Rank candidates; winners’ surplus votes reallocated until slate chosen.
Alternative Rank candidates; votes of losers reallocated until winner found.
strategic voting Voting in a way
that does not reflect a .voter’s ideal
preference, so as to prevent a
less-desired outcome.
indirect election Electoral system
in which representatives are
chosen by other elected officials,
rather than directly by the citizenry
at large.
will have more than enough votes to win a seat, with some votes left over. The
“surplus” votes for winning candidates are redistributed to voters’ second choices
(and third choices as necessary, and so on) until a slate of candidates is elected.
Table 9.3 presents voting procedures under different electoral systems.
These ranking systems have a major advantage: They encourage voters to pick
their most preferred candidate, thus reducing the need for strategic voting.
Under strategic voting, many citizens may not vote for their favorite candidate
because they fear he/she will not win, preferring instead to vote for a favorite (or
a “least bad” option) among those who have a reasonable chance of winning.
Ranking systems are used in Australia, and for some local elections in the United
States. And the applicability of these voting models is not limited to traditional
politics: This vote procedure is also used to select the winners of the Academy
Awards, or Oscars.
Indirect election is also a possibility for choosing legislators, and is used most
often for the upper chambers of bicameral parliaments. Legislators in the lower
chamber (which in reality is the more powerful chamber in most bicameral coun
tries) choose the members of the upper chamber in some countries. Alternatively,
CASE IN CONTEXT
The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet
The Japanese Diet uses a mix of proportional representation and
single-member constituencies. For much of the period after
World War II, the country was dominated by the Liberal Demo
cratic Party (LDP), but it now has a more competitive legislature.
In the House of Representatives, 300 members are chosen in
their districts, and 180 by proportional representation. The upper
chamber, known as the House of Councillors, is also elected by a
mixture of district-based systems and PR, but with subtly differ
ent rules. This is a simple example of a hybrid electoral system.
PAGE 491
See the case study on the Japanese Diet in Part VI, p. 491. As
you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What might be the reasons for developing a hybrid
system such as this?
2. What would be the expected consequences of this ar
rangement for the size and success of political parties?
3. Would there be advantages to adopting such a system in
countries such as the United States that rely exclusively
on districts?
the members of the upper chamber of legislatures may be chosen by the states/
provinces/regions of a federation. In Germany, for instance, the members of the
Bundesrat, the upper chamber of the legislature, are chosen by Germany’s state
legislatures.
There is a virtually limitless number of conceivable electoral systems around
the world. W hile certain trends predominate, this small selection of possible
formats serves to illustrate the variety of options. The preferences for one system
over another owes a great deal to national traditions and habits, as well as to the
structure of the polity, to include population size, and the importance of group
identities and the extent of homogeneity in the population. Moreover, they are
presumably “sticky” in the sense that parties and groups that do well within a
given electoral system, and who therefore can potentially block changes, typi
cally have an interest in preserving the system from which they benefit. For this
reason, one seldom hears calls from the Republican and Democratic parties for
the adoption of an alternative framework.
E xe cu tive -Le gisla tive Relations
Legislatures routinely have responsibility for oversight of the executive branch.
A classic example might be legislatures requiring testimony by military leaders
on the conduct of a war, since the military may come under the authority of the
executive branch, yet may be required to report to the legislature. Similar ex
amples of such legislative oversight can occur in any number of policy areas, with
cabinet ministers and executive officials regularly being required to submit re
ports and to undergo legislative questioning. This may entail the right to review
executive appointees to major political positions (including those to the judicial
branch in some instances, as well as appointees to some high-ranking executive
offices in the administration). Oversight may also, in especially discordant situa
tions, result in a motion of censure, in which the legislature sanctions or scolds
the executive for actions it deems inappropriate.
Beyond simply providing oversight, the legislature may be empowered to
remove the executive from office if the executive “loses the confidence” of the
people (or its elected representatives in the legislature). In parliamentary sys
tems, the relationship between the executive and the legislature is relatively
close, because of the fusion of the two branches of government. The executive
consists of a government elected by the members of the legislature, including a
cabinet of ministers led by a prime minister (or equivalent). In these systems,
the executive is “responsible” to the legislature and relies on the backing of the
legislature for its continuation as a government. This fact confers power to the
legislature to remove the executive from office, according to rules that vary
from country to country. For instance, in many countries, a majority of the
legislature voting “no confidence” in the executive will result in the govern
ment being disbanded and new elections being called. In Germany, however,
bringing down the government requires a “constructive vote of no confidence,”
in which the vote of no confidence must be accompanied by a specific proposal
for a new government that will take effect upon the completion of the confi
dence vote.
212 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
The German Bundesrat, which represents German states, or “Lander.”
The parliamentary model allows the legislature to remove the government—
making a call for new elections—without necessarily leading to a major consti
tutional crisis. In presidential systems, the procedure for removing a member of
the executive is usually more elaborate, at least for the highest-ranking officials
in the government. Legislatures can use processes of impeachment (or of de
manding resignation) to remove the executive from office under relatively strin
gent conditions. In parliamentary systems, legislatures can remove executives at
most any time for a lack of confidence in governing ability. In presidential sys
tems, their power to do so is more limited by the fixed term of office given to the
president.
CASE IN CONTEXT
Institutional Design: Germany’s Bundestag and Bundesrat PAGE 451
Germany’s legislative elections feature yet another wrinkle in the
mix between district-based systems and PR. The elections for
the Bundestag have constituencies but also aim to ensure overall
proportionality to make the lower chamber reflective of voters’
party preferences. The system is known as a mixed-member pro
portional system, and it allows (or requires) voters to vote twice:
once for an individual and once for a party. Members of the
Bundesrat, meanwhile, are selected by assemblies in the states
(Lander).
See the case study on the German parliament in Part VI,
pp. 451-452. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What are the mechanics of how the size of the Bundestag
is calculated?
2. Which sorts of political actors in Germany would be ex
pected to like this system, and which would not?
3. Does the structure of representation in the Bundesrat
affect the way one views the electoral system in the
Bundestag?
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 213
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns
of Representation?
Many heated debates center on the systems that elect legislative representatives.
At question is how representation will be structured, and particularly how votes
are translated into seats. Earlier in the chapter, we outlined the district-based
representation and proportional representation approaches to legislative elections
as well as hybrid forms. In general, district-based systems are more centered on
the election of individual candidates and the latter more centered on the election
of political parties, though we discuss a few caveats to that rule. A question for
further consideration is “W hich type of election is more representative?”
This, of course, depends on what “representative” means. W hen you consider
what it means to have a legislature represent the people, what is essential? Is it
necessary to have a single politician representing your district? I f so, how do
those who voted against that politician feel “represented”? Advocates of PR or
party-based elections argue that political systems should come as close as possi
ble to making sure each person’s vote “counts” in representation. I f you wish to
vote for a smallish (but non-trivial) party because that party matches your beliefs,
your vote should not be “wasted” simply because that party does not win a district
seat. Rather, your vote should be reflected in the proportion of seats allocated to
that party in the legislature.
Patterns of Representation
The first challenge with a causal argument about “what types of legislatures are
more representative” is having an understanding of what representation means.
In the terms of chapters 1 and 2, we have to define the dependent variable. It may
be that no single, easily quantifiable indicator of “representativeness” exists, but
this should not stop us from engaging in comparative analysis. In fact, the study
of the consequences of different legislative forms is a leading example of how
comparativists debate challenging concepts that are difficult to define.
representation In legislatures,
the process by which elected
legislators reflect the interests and
preferences of voters in their
constituencies.
IN S IG H TS
Legislative Politics in Latin America
by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, editors
This edited volume looks at Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in comparative perspective. The book makes refer
ence to the U.S. system, because much of the work on legisla
tures is based on studies of the U.S. Congress, but it explores
how Latin American legislatures work differently from the U.S.
system and from one another. Morgenstern and Nacif (and the
numerous authors of the chapters in the book) show that many
assumptions about legislatures are based on study of the U.S.
Congress but do not hold in Latin America. First, while many
scholars of Congress assume that getting reelected is an ambi
tion for Congresspersons, many legislators in Latin America may
actually be looking to move to other positions, including such
state-level positions as governor. Second, legislatures in Latin
America are generally more “reactive” than “proactive,” respond
ing to presidents in different ways. In making these arguments,
the book examines three areas in detail: executive-legislative
relations, the internal structure of legislative bodies, and the pro
cess by which policies are made. Through this approach, the au
thors develop a more nuanced comparative understanding of
the variables that make legislatures differ.
Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds. Legislative Politics in Latin America.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
214 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
The central function of legislatures is to represent citizens; a relatively small
number of legislators represents the population at large, and individual legislators
can never exactly represent the views of each and every citizen, but the process of
election is seen to approximate the idea of “rule by the many.” Electoral represen
tation may take place on the basis of geography, identity group, or political party.
In many countries, people in local or regional districts may choose one or more
area residents to represent their constituency. In some other countries, specific
seats may be set aside for women (as in the case of local assemblies known as the
panchayati raj in India), racial or ethnic groups, or specific underrepresented
castes or social groups, as is discussed further in chapter 14. Yet not all represen
tation is based on individual representatives, as PR systems offer representation
by political party, with citizens voting for parties instead of individual candi
dates. In this case, representatives appointed by the political parties staff the
legislature, voting generally in accordance with the policy directives of the party
as a whole.
Implicit in democratic elections is the fact that many citizens will not agree
with their representatives some of the time. One may vote for a losing party or
candidate, or one may be disappointed with a position taken by a representative
one voted for. This raises the question of whether representatives should follow
the public opinion of their constituents or their own consciences.
Ask yourself if you believe elected legislators should reflect the opinion of the
public that elects them. It may seem obvious that legislators should follow public
opinion. After all, representatives are there to represent the people who elected
them, and can reasonably be expected to reflect the preferences and values of
their voting constituents. Incidentally, while Congresspersons in the United
States exercise some independence from their constituents, one of the best ex
amples of pure obedience to the majority’s will comes from the United States: It
is the case of the Electoral College, where the states appoint delegates for the
presidential election who are presumed to vote in accordance with the popular
vote in the state that delegated authority to them.
IN SIG H T S
The Concept of Representation
by Hannah Pitkin
Pitkin elaborates the concept of representation that is so central to the study of legislatures and legislative politics, and
does so through an examination of the term, its origins in politi
cal theory, and even its etymology. One of the key elements of
Pitkin’s work is the distinction between representation that en
tails following the will of a constituency’s voters and representa
tion that involves individuals exercising their own discretion
and judgment once they are elected. Calling this the “mandate-
independence controversy,” Pitkin argues that no clear rule can
be established for whether representatives should follow the
general wishes of the electorate or should follow their own
counsel if they find these views incorrect. Rather, the essence of
representation is acting on behalf of others, which implies that
representatives should habitually be in harmony with the wishes
of their electors, but are also justified in voting independently
where there are compelling reasons to do so on behalf of that
same group. The rule for mandate versus independence must be
examined on a case-by-case basis.
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University o f California
Press, 1972.
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 215
Contrasting with the argument of following public opinion, however, is an
argument that legislators should be expected to exercise independence, and per
haps should even “think better” of the whims of the populace. In other words,
voters do not expect to elect unthinking automatons that will do whatever the
majority happens to prefer at any moment in time. Rather than simply being as
signed to do the majority’s bidding, representatives may be partially chosen for
their thoughtfulness and reason, ability to foresee the consequences of legislative
choices, and for their skill at compromise. They may be expected to exercise dis
cretion, in other words. They may also be expected to “make the tough choices,”
even if the populace does not favor these.
Clearly, elections are the leading accountability mechanisms for legislators in
democracies. I f representatives vote in ways that are too far removed from the
interests and preferences of their constituents, they can expect forceful chal
lenges from political opponents (whether in other parties or in their own), and
they can probably expect not to win reelection if they get too far “out of line.”
On the other hand, public opinion is fickle, and representatives need to cast
votes not just on what is popular at a given moment in time, but also with a view
toward the future, both at the time of the next election and beyond. As noted in
the preceding “Insights” box, there is no unambiguous answer to whether repre
sentatives should exercise independence from the voters who elected them, or
should follow those voters’ wishes closely. But the distinction between these two
goes to the heart of the challenging votes that representatives must make on a
regular basis.
Electoral System s and Representation
Some of the most fundamental questions about representation come from the
electoral systems outlined previously: SMD, PR, and hybrid systems imply dif
ferent forms of representation. Each has advantages in providing for a certain
form of representation, and each faces challenges in providing representation by
other definitions.
Where legislators are elected in districts, a large portion of the populace may
not have voted for its representative. For instance, in an American district where
a Democrat is elected with 52 percent of the vote versus 48 percent for a Repub
lican (or vice versa), nearly half of the district may feel it is “not represented” by
the chosen Congressperson. More strikingly, imagine an elected legislator who
wins with less than half the vote. Consider a district with 65 percent of voters
that say they are liberal and 35 percent that consider themselves conservative. Say
the liberals split the vote, with a Democrat getting 33 percent and the Rent Is
Too Damn High Party candidate getting 32 percent. The conservative Republi
can candidate squeaks out a win with 35 percent. This means that 65 percent of
the district did not vote for the legislator that represents them, even though this
group may agree that they would prefer a liberal. O f course, this can and has
happened in reverse, with liberals winning conservative districts due to splits in
the vote between conservative candidates.
In any electoral system, the question of how to divide up legislative seats is
crucial, and SMD systems face challenges of apportionment and districting of
seats. In lower chambers of most legislatures with district systems, the districts
apportionment The process
by which legislative seats are
distributed among geographic
constituencies.
districting The process by which
districts or other geographic
constituencies are created for the
purposes of elections.
216 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
gerrymandering Creation of
districts of irregular shape or com
position in order to achieve a desi
red political result.
malapportionment Apportion
ment in which voters are unequally
represented in a legislature, such as
through relatively greater numbers
of legislators per capita for low-
-population areas and lesser
number of legislators per capita for
high-population areas.
are often expected to be discrete geographic areas, but they are also expected to
have comparable numbers of voters for the lower chambers of most legislatures.
O f course, precise ratios of seats to the population of each district are not possi
ble. For example, a district with 1,535,000 voters might be expected to have the
same number of representatives as one with 1,536,000 voters. Yet as populations
of different areas change, keeping districts at roughly the same population re
quires changing boundaries. This leads to processes of redistricting, as described
in the United States “Case in Context” box. One of the challenges of redistrict
ing is that legislators themselves often have a role in the districting process,
whether directly or through officials they have nominated, and this creates in
centives for legislators to shape districts that favor them or their party. One con
sequence is gerrymandering, in which districts are created in irregular shapes or
of odd composition in order to achieve a desired political outcome. The term has
the negative connotation of being deliberately designed by incumbents to protect
their advantage, though it should be noted that districting has often sought to
shape boundaries in ways that favor historically underrepresented groups, such as
racial minorities.
Malapportionment comes with imbalances in allocating seats to different
districts. The extent of malapportionment varies tremendously from one country
to another, but it is generally more common in upper chambers of bicameral
parliaments, which are often designed to protect the territorial interests of states
or provinces. Malapportionment can be defined as the extent to which a system
gives some regions a higher ratio of representatives to voters than others. Would
such countries be anti-democratic? Would this only apply in authoritarian re
gimes? Not unless you deem the United States to be anti-democratic or authori
tarian, as it is one of the most striking examples of legislative malapportionment,
at least in the Senate.
States, regions, or provinces are represented in Senates and “upper chambers”
of legislatures. As might be suspected, federalism affects apportionment. Federal
countries that wish to guarantee representation for smaller, less populous regions
will— almost by definition—create seats in the legislature that disproportionately
favor those regions. In Brazil, for example, the smallest state (Roraima) has three
senators for about 400,000 residents, while the largest state (Sao Paulo) also has
three senators, but for over 41 million people. The relevant ratios are that Roraima
has one vote in the Senate for every 133,000 residents, while Sao Paulo has one
vote only for about every 14 million people. Similarly, differences in state repre
sentation are found in the United States, where Wyoming has one Senator for
approximately every quarter of a million people, while California has a Senator
for about every 18 million residents.
The consequences of apportionment and malapportionment are significant. In
a theoretical sense, the question of apportionment is about nothing less than the
basic principle of “one person, one vote.” Put another way, malapportionment
could be viewed as the degree to which an electoral system deviates from the
“one-person, one-vote” principle: Even if everyone has the right to vote, not ev
eryone’s vote “counts the same” if seats are malapportioned. It may have arisen for
historical reasons and may be necessary to ensure national unity, but in a very real
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 217
sense, one might say that the vote of a resident of a small state counts much more
than the vote of a resident of a large state.
People in Wyoming have more representatives per capita in the Senate than
Californians, and Vermonters more than Texans. Looked at through this lens,
the residents of America’s twenty-five lowest-population states comprise about
16 percent of the population and represent half of the Senate. In theory, these
fifty Senators voting as a bloc could (with a vice presidential tiebreak) stop a
policy favored in states representing 84 percent of the American population.
(This phenomenon is made more striking by the Senate rule known as the fili
buster, which in theory allows a bloc of only forty-one out of one hundred sena
tors to stop legislation; see “Case in Context: The United States Congress:
Dysfunctional or Functioning by Design?”)
The advantage of small states in representation may have consequences that
translate into political outcomes as well. The most obvious examples are those
policies that favor low-population regions that are “overrepresented” by malap
portionment, especially rural regions. In many instances, malapportionment
may serve to prevent or impede implementation of a policy that will favor a ma
jority of the population. In France, the Senate (Senat) has long been known as the
“agricultural chamber” because it provides an institutional bulwark to protect the
interests of French farmers. The same may be said of farm policy in the United
States. In Brazil, the military created additional new states at the end of authori
tarian rule in the 1980s, and this was interpreted by some as a deliberate effort to
ensure a larger number of Senators from pro-military regions of the country.
By contrast with SMD, elections in PR systems are often party-centered,
rather than candidate-centered. For proponents of PR, one advantage of these
systems is precisely the emphasis on parties, their platforms, and their policy
proposals, rather than the particular ideas and charisma of individual candidates.
In candidate-based elections, charismatic and/or thoughtful individuals may
CASE IN CONTEXT
The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or Functioning
by Design? PAGE 564
The United States is one of the inspirations for democracies
around the world, but there are certain aspects of its system that
stray from the “one-person, one-vote” ideal, at least in terms of
how much representation each person gets per capita. Appor
tionment in the Senate and the pattern of districting in the
House of Representatives are both areas that have been subject
to criticism. The apportionment in the Senate means that resi
dents of smaller states have more representatives per capita than
residents of larger states. In the House of Representatives, a big
question is how decisions are made to shape districts, and how
this affects who is likely to be elected.
See the case study of the U.S. Congress in Part VI, pp. 564-
565. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. If virtually all adults are allowed to vote, then in what
sense could one say the U.S. electoral system is less ‘one-
person, one-vote” than other possible systems? Is this
characterization fair, and why or why not?
2. What is it about the U.S. electoral system that favors the
status quo, whether in terms of policy or in terms of who
gets elected?
3. What features of the U.S system, if any, would you alter?
218 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
communicate well with voters, leading to successful election campaigns, yet
these skills may matter less in the job of legislating and making policy decisions.
Instead, what matters is which party has a majority, or which parties are in the
coalition that makes up the governing majority. By ensuring that the whole of the
legislature reflects the interests or preferences of the whole country, PR entrusts
government to the largest party or leading parties that can make up a governing
coalition. In theory, this can make government more capable of passing laws and
enacting policies that “the people as a whole” want.
PR also tends to support multiple smaller parties, as contrasted with SMD
systems, which favor large parties and accentuate the tendency toward two-party
systems instead of multiparty systems. We explore the impacts of these electoral
systems on party systems in chapter l l . 7
Under SMD, smaller parties may earn a healthy minority of the vote (say,
10-15 percent) in many districts across a country, yet still be largely shut out of
the political process. Let’s say the two largest parties—call them the Liberal and
the Conservative parties—get an average of 40 percent of the vote each, ranging
from about 30 percent to about 50 percent in each district, depending on the
district’s political leanings. Say also that two smaller parties (the Libertarians
and the Greens) get about 10 percent of the vote in every district. Even if the
country had five hundred districts (each with one seat in the legislature), it is very
possible that the Liberals and Conservatives would split all the seats between
themselves, while the Libertarians and Greens would have zero seats under the
district system, because the Liberals and Conservatives would outpoll them in
every single district. Under PR, the Libertarians and Greens would not be shut
out: In a five-hundred-seat legislature, they would each get about fifty seats, re
flecting their support of 10 percent of the population each. PR would give these
smaller parties leverage in political debate, as they may be able to swing to and
from the larger parties, making the difference between the Liberals or Conserva
tives having a majority or not.
On the other hand, PR does not provide voters with a single identifiable leg
islator who “represents them.” This can be troubling for several reasons. First, it
can mean that voters do not know to whom they should direct their demands. It
may be more challenging to participate and feel represented when one must con
tact an office of a political party, rather than the office of one’s district representa
tive. This is especially true for voters who voted for a losing party and must go
through a period of government in which they feel it will be very difficult to have
someone who can speak on their behalf. Second, and related to this, PR can
break the geographic link between citizens and their legislators. W hile political
parties may have local offices and look to attend to local issues, they tend to re
spond to the overall national constituency in PR systems. By contrast, in district
systems, the adage goes that “all politics is local,” and citizens may feel more
represented when it comes to getting political attention for local issues such as a
need for bridge repair, sanitation, or other local issues.
Legislative Decision M aking and Representation
Another source of questions about the quality of representation comes from how
exactly decisions are made within the legislatures. For some time, a particular
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 219
IN S IG H T S
Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House
by Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins
Cox and McCubbins argue that the U.S. House of Representatives gets things done largely by the majority party operat
ing as a “legislative cartel.” As contrasted with other studies that
argue that much of the work of policymaking is determined by
committees, Cox and McCubbins note that committees are im
portant but not independent of partisan forces. Majority parties
in the House of Representatives routinely shape rules in ways
that allow them to dominate the legislative process. In addition,
because the majority party dominates decision making, much
of the truly important negotiation goes on within the “cartel.”
In this model, there is little real debate on policy in the broader
legislature itself, and this is not a model of representation that
follows the ideal of a deliberative body of equal representatives.
Instead, the system is reduced to an intra-party game in which
the party leaders are key actors attempting to manage their ma
jority party vote. Leaders of the parties create the structures that
give rise to powerful committees and control the legislative
agenda.
Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in
the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
emphasis was placed not on individual members but on committees and their
roles.8 These organizations can take on the role of “legislatures within the legis
latures,” as a select group of parliamentarians or congresspersons shapes a policy
and then presents it to the larger body with the expectation that it will be passed
in the larger house. As politics has grown more complex and technical over time,
legislators have tended to specialize in certain committees and defer to their
party colleagues on others. If committees are powerful, then representation is
less about each individual vote in the assembly and more about who is assigned
to what committee and how this sets or shapes the agenda.
Political parties are some of the key actors in legislatures and are often more
important than individuals. In terms of representation, parties are considered
“disciplined” if their members vote together, and less disciplined if their mem
bers vote differently from the party line. This party line is usually determined by
the way the national party leadership would like the members to vote. Legisla
tures vary dramatically in the extent to which their parties exhibit discipline.
One of the key factors in determining party discipline is the degree to which
party leaders control the electoral fates of their members.9 Dominance by party
leaders may seem to be “less representative” than systems in which legislators
vote more independently, but many systems—whether SMD, PR, or hybrid—
rely on party discipline to get legislation passed.
Assume for the moment that most politicians would like to get reelected or to
continue their political careers. (While not always true, this shouldn’t sound like
too far-fetched an assumption.) This implies that politicians will be attentive to
the people who nominate and select them. Now notice that who chooses the
nominees and the representatives will differ from one electoral system to the
next. In many party-centered systems, voters select parties and the party itself
chooses who will be the representatives to the parliament. In practice, this gives
a great deal of power to the leaders of the party, who can “set the lists” to deter
mine who will become a member of the legislature. Where individual party
members depend on party leaders for their nomination, they will typically adhere
to the wishes of the leadership, currying favor with those who set the party list.
committee In a legislature, a body
composed of a group of legislators
convened to perform a certain set
of tasks.
220 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
executive-legislative relations
The set of relationships between
the executive and the legislative
branches of government.
On the other hand, many candidate-centered systems allow voters to choose
party nominees, as is the case with party primary elections in the United States.
In these instances, party leaders’ leverage declines.
Differences in electoral rules should imply variations in the discipline of the
political parties. Electoral systems that give more power to party leaders should
lead to systems where parties vote in a disciplined fashion. Systems that encour
age candidates to focus on district constituencies should lead to less-disciplined
parties, with more representatives who have an “independent” streak or vote like
“mavericks.” O f course, these representatives will often be bucking the trend of
their parties in order to conform to the preferences of the districts they represent.
Even in such cases, parties have tools that they can use in their efforts to keep
their representatives “in line.” We examine these issues further in chapter 11 on
political parties and party systems, but note its significance here for understand
ing how legislatures operate.
Legislative decisions may be shaped by committees or by political parties (and
their leaders), but in either instance it is clear that decisions are not simply a func
tion of adding up the preferences and the single vote cast by each representative.
Other institutions within the legislature shape what issues get on the agenda and
how they are presented to the legislature as a whole. These institutions ensure
that legislatures have “structure” in how decisions are made: This is a different
view of representation than is suggested by public and open debate on the floors
of the voting chamber.
Exe cu tiv e -Le gisla tiv e Relations and Representation
In most countries today, the power of legislatures and the nature of representa
tion depend heavily on executive-legislative relations. At times, legislatures
will have considerable powers over executives—some of which are noted in the
next chapter, such as “votes of no confidence.” On other occasions, legislatures
will be relatively less powerful than executives. The balance of power between
these two branches says a great deal about how politics plays out in any given
country.
Executive-legislative relations are shaped by a number of underlying powers
these institutions have vis-a-vis one another. A national constitution may be the
ultimate source offormalpower for legislatures and executives. Legislatures with
formal powers to recall or bring down the government may see their leverage
over the executive enhanced. This may be expected to make the executive more
accountable to the legislature, and to make it more attentive to the legislature’s
demands. As important as these formal powers arz partisan powers. Where party
leaders in the executive have considerable powers to control the political fates of
their fellow party members, they will be able to influence the so-called “rank-
and-file” members of the legislature. This refers to the party discipline criterion
mentioned previously. Where executives have control over party lists, executives
will have considerable control in executive-legislative relations.
Executive-legislative relations are more complex than simple rules on paper
of who has constitutional power. In many parliamentary democracies, legisla
tures have the nominal authority to remove the executive at any time with a vote
of “no confidence” in the executive, but this does not necessarily mean that there
Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 221
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu applauds with members of his Likud Party. In 2015,
Netanyahu called a parliamentary election more than two years before it was required, in an
attempt to reestablish and manage his governing coalition.
will be constant turnover in the executive branch.10 Similarly, in presidential
systems, where executives are directly elected, there is most often a formally
established balance of powers between the branches, but this can vary from
time to time as the political fortunes of presidents fluctuates. Forms of execu
tive-legislative relations shape the quality of representation as much as electoral
systems and the internal functioning of legislatures; the exact ways it does so
vary tremendously.
IN S IG H T S
Divided Government
by Morris Fiorina
Fiorina examines the common phenomenon of divided government in the United States’ two-party system, in which
American voters frequently elect an executive of one party and
a legislature led by the other. For more than a century, Ameri
cans have often voted against the president’s party in midterm
elections— that is, in years when no presidential election is
held— disrupting unified governments and “checking” presi
dential authority by supporting the opposing party. More re
cently, years with presidential elections have also seen an
increase in ticket-splitting, where voters choose a president of
one party and a Congressperson of the opposing party at the
same time. Several conditions can contribute to divided
government. Some are due to circumstances. For example, in
the United States the declining strength of political parties over
time contributed, as voters became more attentive to individual
candidates than to party labels. But other reasons may be more
purposive or rational, as people may choose to divide govern
ment, whether consciously or unconsciously. For instance,
ticket-splitting can make sense for moderate voters concerned
that unified government by either party could be too far left or
right: given this concern, divided government provides for a
style of “coalition” government that requires cooperation and
moderation between the parties.
Morris Fiorina, Divided Government. New York:Macmillan, 1992.
222 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
IN SIG H TS
Comparative Legislatures
by Michael Mezey
This book offers a typology of legislatures according to two dimensions. The first is whether the legislature has strong or
modest policymaking powers, and the second is whether it re
ceives more or less support from elites and from the society at
large. The two dimensions, and the types of legislatures that
emerge, can be seen in the following table.
Modest Powers Marginal Reactive
Where legislatures are empowered and supported, they can
be active in setting the policy agenda; such is the case with the
U.S. Congress. The British Parliament, by contrast, is much more
reactive, because the Cabinet and Prime Minister have the
powerto set most policy in motion. Less-supported legislatures
(as in some developing countries) are vulnerable to being domi
nated by the executive or other actors, even if they have strong
powers “on paper.” The most precarious situation is for constitu
tionally weak legislatures that are also ill supported: These are
marginal. In addition, Mezey shows a fifth category of “minimal
legislatures,” which have very limited powers but some support
from elites; these are often found in authoritarian systems such
as the former Soviet Union. The key consequence of a given
type is whether the legislature itself is forceful or weak in shap
ing policy.
Michael Mezey, Comparative Legislatures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979.
Less Support More Support
Strong Powers Vulnerable Active
Altogether, many factors shape the nature and quality of representation. Elec
toral systems can give rise to candidate-centered politics, party-centered politics, or
a mix of the two. How legislatures themselves operate then also shapes representa
tion: Sometimes parties and their leaders wield considerable control, sometimes
certain committees wield power, and sometimes power is more open to all members
of the legislature. Finally, the relationship between the legislature and the executive
gives rise to different patterns of representation. All of these affect representation,
as do many other factors. Representation itself is a hard concept to measure, but it is
at the crux of most comparative questions about how legislatures matter.
T H IN K IN G
CO M PA RA TIV ELY
K EY M E TH O D O LO G ICA L TO O LS
Hypotheticals and
Counterfactuals
The approach to the question of
representation here is designed to
stimulate debate on the best model
for an electoral system, and whether
countries might change these. This
question involves taking political
lessons from one country case, com
paring these with another case, and
then making a proposal based upon
Representation in New Zealand and Beyond
Can any electoral system plausibly claim to have the “best of both worlds” when it comes to representing the electorate? The debate between PR and
district-based electoral systems often comes down to one common debate: Is
representation choosing a political party and its platform, or voting for a specific
candidate closest to one’s views? It is likely that an observer will have a “gut
reaction” to the advantages of one or the other, while acknowledging that the
opposing side “has a point.”
Party-based elections allow the electorate to focus on the issues and platforms
that most interest them, and then to hold the elected government accountable for
acting on such issues. They also give a sense, of course, that the overall represen
tation in the legislature actually reflects the will of the overall population, rather
than the will of specific subsegments of the population. Candidate-centered
elections, on the other hand, give voters the sense that they have one or more
Representation in New Zealand and Beyond 223
people who represent their interests, and this allows the voters to hold their spec
ified representative accountable for providing services to their constituency. On
the downside, district-based elections may result in disproportionate influence
for certain parties— especially large parties at the expense of small parties— and
proportional representation elections may sacrifice the identifiability of a specific
legislator for a specific constituency. It may seem ideal if a country could have a
political system that would have both of these characteristics: individual repre
sentatives for different districts of the country, and also a legislature whose over
all composition reflects the partisan preferences of the country.
So an ideal might be a system where each citizen would have a representative
for their district, and the overall composition of the legislature could be guaran
teed to be proportional. As noted before, countries such as Germany and New
Zealand have done this. In fact, New Zealand switched its electoral system by
national referendum in 1993, and the change brought about a German-style
model that explicitly intended to bring greater proportionality into what was
previously a first-past-the-post system. This makes the country an especially
compelling case that illustrates how electoral systems change the proportionality
of seats. In both Germany and New Zealand today, each voter has two votes: a
vote for a candidate to represent the district in the parliament, and then a vote for
one’s preferred party. Voters may vote for their favorite party and the local candi
date from the same party, but no one is required to do so: One can “split” the
ticket, picking one’s favored candidate and then voting for another party. In each
district, the candidate with the most votes is elected to the legislature, and there
are a fixed number of such seats. The electoral commission also tallies all the
votes for the parties, and figures out how to make the legislature accurately re
flect the proportion each party received.
For example, say the parliament has two hundred seats, of which one hundred
are elected from districts and one hundred are available for allocation to the par
ties according to the party vote. I f the Social Democratic Party won only twenty-
five out of one hundred seats in the districts, but their party vote was 30 percent
of the total, the system ensures them about sixty of the total two hundred seats
(30 percent) in the parliament. Meanwhile, the parties that win more seats in the
constituencies than their party vote are allowed to keep the extra seats they have
won, and these are called overhang seats. So if the Freedom Party wins twenty-
two seats in the districts, but only 10 percent of the overall vote, they are allowed
to keep their twenty-two seats, and are not limited to the twenty that their party
vote would imply. A consequence of this is that the exact number of seats in the
legislature is not constant. For example, the lower house of the German legisla
ture (the Bundestag) does not have a fixed number of seats; while the parliament
elected in 2009 had 622 legislators, the parliament elected in 2013 has 631.
The intended result is both identifiable representatives for each district and
overall PR. A sample of a ballot from such a system can be seen in Figure 9.1,
which is from New Zealand. Notice that the candidates in the right-hand column
represent some of the parties listed in the left-hand column.
W hy might some argue for countries like the United States to adopt this sort
of approach? One major challenge is a willingness to accept a totally new view of
representation as both district-based and proportional, which is not how the
TH IN K IN G
C O M P A R A TIV ELY
K E Y M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O LS
(continued)
an expectation of what would
happen if an institution were
changed. Of necessity, this means a
degree of prediction and speculation,
but based on inferences. Hypotheti-
cals are questions designed to get at
what likely might happen in a scenario
under certain circumstances; notice
that the root of the word is the same
as “hypothesis.” Counterfactuals are
ways of considering what would have
happened in a given case under
different circumstances; an example
might be “what would history have
been like if the American colonies
had lost the Revolutionary War?” Of
course, it cannot be known with
certainty what would have happened
in a certain situation under other
circumstances. In fact, this is why the
comparative method— with its most-
similar- and most-different-systems
designs— is so helpful. But these
thought experiments can help us
think through the implications of
changes in variables such as electoral
systems.
Careful analysts will not be cava
lier about using hypotheticals and
counterfactuals. Predictions and
policy recommendations are only
valuable if based on considerable,
careful study and thoughtful consider
ation of possible consequences. In the
case here, there could be unintended
consequences of any country switch
ing its electoral system, and it is the
duty of the analyst to think these
through. Good comparative analysis
should be based on evidence of
things that have happened, not simply
guesses about “what might happen if.”
Nonetheless, hypotheticals, counter
factuals, and thought experiments are
used all the time by comparativists
eager to play out of the logic of how
outcomes might be different in coun
tries with different institutions, social
structures, and cultures.
224 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections
T H IN K IN G ”
CO M P A RA TIV ELY
j
country has operated historically. It would also require accepting that a computer
will make the necessary adjustments to make the legislature proportional. But
this process and its decision-making criteria would be quite transparent, being
determined before the elections and visible to any and all observers. If you are
living in a country that does not use this model, how would you attempt to ex
plain to a German why your country should not change to such a model?
The idea of representation varies from country to country, with different coun
tries having different patterns of representation and different ways that represen
tatives are chosen. Ask yourself how and why you might object to the hybrid
electoral system used in Germany and New Zealand (if in fact you do object).
Entertaining these sorts of questions will lead to a deeper understanding of how
legislative institutions work, as well as what is meant by the concept of represen
tation that is so fundamental to politics.
30001
Y O U H A V E 2 V O T E S 30001
P A R T Y V O TE
E x p la n a tio n
T h i s v o t e d e c i d e s t h e s h a r e o f s e a t s w h i c h
e a c h o f t h e p a r t i e s l i s t e d b e l o w w i l l h a v e i n
P a r l i a m e n t . V o t e b y p u t t i n g a t i c k i n t h e c i r c l e
i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e p a r t y y o u c h o o s e .
EL E C T O R A T E V O T E
E x p la n a tio n
T h i s v o t e d e c i d e s t h e c a n d i d a t e w h o w i l l b e
e l e c t e d M e m b e r o f P a r l i a m e n t f o r t h e
A O R A K I E L E C T O R A T E .
V o t e b y p u t t i n g a t i c k i n t h e c i r c l e i m m e d i a t e l y
b e f o r e t h e c a n d i d a t e y o u c h o o s e .
BUSINESS PARTY
UNION PARTY
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY
HERITAGE PARTY
£/! WORKER’S LEAGUE
–
4 9 LIBERTY PARTY
FREE TRADE PARTY
FREEDOM PARTY
CHATHAM ISLANDS PARTY
KOTAHITANGA PARTY
NZ FABIEN PARTY
o NZ SOCIALIST PARTY
TRANSUBSTANTIATION PARTY
Vote for only one candidate
4§
J L .
Li t.b js-
Fin a l Directions
1. If y o u s p o i l th i s b a l l o t p a p e r , r e t u r n i t t o t h e o f f ic e r w h o ii lu e d i t a n d a p p l y f o r a n e w b a l l o t p a p e r .
2. A f te r v o t i n g , f o ld t h i s b a l l o t p a p e r s o t h a t it s c o n t e n t s c a n n o t b e s e e n a n d p l a c e i t in t h e b a l l o t b o x
3 . Y o u m u s t n o t t a k e t h i s b a l l o t p a p e r o u t o f t h e p o ll in g p la c e .
Figure 9.1 Sample Ballot from New Zealand.
(Source: New Zealand Electoral Commission)
Chapter Review 225
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Concepts
Legislatures are deliberative bodies that are the foundation
of modern governments.
Legislatures pass laws and make policy, but they also lead
public debate and have responsibilities for overseeing the
executive, among other functions.
Types
• Legislatures can be bicameral (with two chambers) or uni
cameral (one chamber).
Legislatures are elected by many different methods, includ
ing single-member districts (SMD), proportional represen
tation (PR), and mixed or hybrid systems.
• There are several different patterns of interaction between
legislatures and executives.
Causes and Effects
A function of legislatures is representation, which can be
conceptualized in different ways, and the nature and
quality of representation are affected by several factors.
Electoral systems can result in representation based on
individuals, parties, or some mix of the two.
Legislatures vary in the ways they function internally, and
this too affects how they represent the populace.
• Executive-legislative relations also affect patterns of
representation.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. Imagine you are the leader of the Monster Raving Loony Party, a
small party in the United Kingdom whose manifesto is posted at
the following link: http://www.loonyparty.com/about/policy-
proposals/. You are a big believer in the cause and are eager to
win some seats in Parliament. Currently, you are at 6 percent in
most opinion polls, but elections are not due for another couple
of years. However, the government has called for public com
ment on a commission considering changing the electoral
system in the United Kingdom. What would you propose the
system should be for House of Commons elections? Consider
ing political incentives, what do you expect would be the reac
tion of Members of Parliament from the three leading parties
there: the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, and Labour?
2. Imagine you are an American, accustomed to (and approving
of) the SMD system for electing congresspersons, and you are
debating with a European who lives in a system that has always
had PR. This European argues that the PR system offers chances
to more political actors, saying that this enlivens debate and
forces the legislature to take into account the interests of a
broader range of people. Can you convince your interlocutor
that the American system is preferable to the European one?
3. What are the disadvantages, if any, of a system that requires
ranking candidates and then calculates winners on the basis of
voters’ second or third choices?
4. There are several types of legislatures, according to Mezey and
to Morgenstern and Nacif (see “Insights Boxes” in this chapter).
Can you see advantages in systems that feature “reactive” or
otherwise weaker legislatures? Could this be a useful pattern of
executive-legislative relations? Or are these sorts of legislatures
simply less desirable than their stronger and more active
counterparts?
5. Would you expect changes in institutional structures (such as a
legislature or legislative elections) in a given country to reshape
the political outcomes and policy decisions, or would these fun
damental outcomes likely be shaped by cultures and other
structures and thus be mostly independent of the institutional
design? How could you find evidence or arguments to support
your claim?
http://www.loonyparty.com/about/policy-
CHAPTER 10
Executives
• British Prime Minister David Cameron with Queen Elizabeth in 2015. According to convention, the Queen issues an invitation to him to form a
government, though this is essentially a symbolic gesture. Elections determine who w ill control parliament.
I n 1776, a group of leaders from the thirteen Am erican colonies signed a
Declaration of Independence from G reat Britain. M ost o f the document
listed abuses perpetrated by King George III, B ritain’s monarch and head
of state. Following the Am erican Revolution, which ended w ith indepen
dence in 1783, the former colonists established a system o f government
strikingly different from th at o f Britain. Known as a republic, the United
States had a w ritten constitution, no monarch, powerful state govern
ments, and several branches of governm ent th at were inde
pendent and designed to balance one another. The new
republic arranged for an elected president as head of state
and head of government.
Over the next two centuries, as both the United States
and G reat Britain became more m ature democracies, the
American presidential system and the British parliam entary
system became two defining models for how governments
could function. W ith its executive branch led by a prime
minister, and a monarch who increasingly became a figure
head in a ceremonial position, Britain became the “M other
of Parliaments” around the world. M eanwhile, many other
countries came to emulate the American system of a presi
dency w ith checks and balances.
In the United States and Great Britain, the executives have
kept their same basic form over time, though their powers have
shifted somewhat. Parliament formally retains political power
and sovereignty in Britain, and the prime minister depends on
retaining the legislature’s confidence, yet the prime minister
has considerable political leverage. The American president has
become more influential over time as the United States has
grown, but still remains deeply entrenched in the same basic
system of checks and balances that endures to this day. The two
countries have been models for other countries for centuries,
and they remain the points of departure today for understand
ing how executives work.
IN TH IS C H A P T E R
Concepts 228
Types 229
Executive Structures: Presidential and
Parliamentary 230
Formal Powers 232
Partisan Powers 235
Coalitions 235
Informal Powers 240
Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive
Stability? 240
Stable and Unstable Regimes:
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and
Democracy 240
Stable and Unstable Executives: Styles of
Presidential Rule 243
Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns of
Parliamentary Rule 246
T H IN K IN G C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
Beyond the A merican and British
Models 247
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
France
China
United States
Nigeria
Russia
227
228 Chapter 10: Executives
executive The branch of govern
ment, or the individual(s) at the top
of that branch, that executes or
administers policies and laws in a
country.
bureaucracy The organization of
unelected officials, often conside
red part of the executive branch,
that implements, executes, and
enforces laws and policies.
head of state A person with exe
cutive functions who is a country’s
symbolic representative, including
elected presidents and unelected
monarchs.
head of government The top
executive official responsible for
forming governments and formula
ting and implementing policies.
prime minister A chief executive
in a parliamentary system of
government.
president An executive leader
that typically combines the func
tions of head of state and head of
government, and is not directly
responsible to a legislature.
monarch A head of state in a
monarchy, who usually inherits a
position for life and may have
either substantial political powers
or very limited ceremonial powers.
Concepts
Executives earn their name because they execute or administer policies and laws.
In most countries, executives implement and administer the laws passed by leg
islatures, though in some authoritarian regimes the executive may act without a
functioning legislature. Executives also contribute to the making of law. Legis
latures (as examined in chapter 8) are usually authorized to initiate and pass laws
in representative democracies, but executives play a major role in the public
debate and decision making that leads to new laws. For example, executives may
send budget requests to the legislature, or they may work with legislators to for
mulate a policy that the executive branch desires.
In most cases, executives have a substantial role in determining which laws
and policies pass. In the United States, for instance, the president usually signs
final bills as they become laws and has the power to veto (disapprove) bills,
though the legislature can override the veto with a strong enough majority. In
parliamentary systems, the executive shapes the agenda of the parliament to
decide which initiatives will come to the floor for debate and also pressures par
liamentarians to pass its desired policies. The relative power of the executive and
legislative branches is one of the leading issues that determine how political deci
sions are made, and the relationship between the branches is a major theme run
ning through this chapter.
The executive is the branch of government that runs the government
bureaucracy, such as the Department of Defense or Department of Education in
the United States, or the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture in a Eu
ropean country. These departments or ministries include large numbers of offi
cials and civil servants that work for the executive branch. For this reason, the
executive branch is often held to be responsible for the quality of government
actions. W hen social services improve, executives may successfully claim credit,
or when a war policy fails, the executive may take the blame. Legislatures have
their portion of responsibility, since they typically pass the laws authorizing ex
ecutive action and also expenditures, but executives are responsible for executing
the laws on the books.
The executive can also refer to specific individuals who lead this branch of gov
ernment. These “chief executives” are heads of state or heads of government. The
distinction between these two—head of state and head of government—is signifi
cant. In brief, the head of state is a country’s symbolic national representative, while
the head of government is responsible for forming governments and formulating
and implementing policies. Prime ministers are examples of heads of government.
Presidents often combine the powers of head of state and head of government.
Monarchs such as kings, queens, and emperors are classic examples of heads
of state. Traditional monarchs still wield political influence and power as heads
of state in some contemporary societies, such as the sultanates and emirates of
the Arab world and some small nations such as Swaziland. In Europe, tradi
tional monarchies persist but are essentially figureheads with only symbolic
power. In some other countries—usually where the nation-state is of more recent
origin, such as India and Israel— a ceremonial president may be the nominal
head of state, with political power again reserved for the head of government in
the form of a prime minister.
Types 229
The responsibilities and powers of the executive branch are extensive. By most
measures, the executive could be the most powerful and dominant branch of
government: It commands the bureaucracy and maintains nominal control over
the military, and it is responsible for spending the budget approved to it by the
legislature. In other words, the executive has powers of the pen and the pistol,
and some control over the purse. Indeed, when democracies break down into
authoritarian regimes, a typical result is the dissolution of the legislative branch
and the loss of independence for the judiciary; it is often the executive’s domina
tion over other branches that distinguishes authoritarianism from the more bal
anced institutional arrangements of a democracy.
Executive branches of government consist of both a set of elected politicians
and a more permanent bureaucracy or civil service. Elected officials will gener
ally have discretion to make only a limited number of political appointments to
allies, supporters, and copartisans. Beyond these, most of the bureaucracy is ex
pected to remain neutral, executing the law regardless of election results. This
ideal is not always upheld in practice, but bureaucrats are generally expected to
implement and administer policies, rather than to promote a political vision of
what government should do.1
As a point of clarification, in many countries the elected executive officials
and high-level political appointees are called the government. This is distinct
from the entirety of public institutions in a country. For example, in parliamen
tary systems, when a “new government” is formed, this does not mean that the
state bureaucracy changes, except perhaps at the highest level. Similarly, in the
United States, the word administration can be used to refer to the top elected
officials in the executive or to the broader bureaucracy that executes policy.
Understanding politics requires understanding how executives are selected. In
turn, understanding executives depends on understanding legislatures, which we
discussed in the last chapter. Especially in representative democracies (but also even
in some authoritarian regimes), executives rely on legislatures or assemblies to pass
laws that the executive will then implement or “execute.” In this chapter, we begin by
identifying what executives are and what they do. We then discuss the consequences
of different patterns of executives. One of the main distinctions is between presiden
tial and parliamentary forms of government. We use our cases to examine executives
comparatively and discuss which forms are most likely to support democracy.
Types
There are two basic ways to structure the executive branch of government: presi
dential and parliamentary systems. The United States is an example of presiden-
tialism, while the United Kingdom an example of parliamentarism. Some
countries, such as France, have executive systems that combine features of presi-
dentialism and parliamentarism, as do some less democratic countries, such as
Iran. The relative power of the executive depends upon a range of formal and
informal powers, including the ability of the chief executive to discipline and
manage their party and any other parties needed to comprise a governing coali
tion. Presidential and parliamentary systems thus have different kinds of
executive-legislative relations. We discuss these variations throughout this
section (and a summary view of types can be found in Table 10.1).
government In the context of
executives, the set of top elected
executive officials and high-level
political appointees that shape and
orient policy; also refers to the
broader administrative apparatus
of the state.
administration The bureaucracy
of state officials, usually considered
part of the executive branch, that
executes policy.
executive-legislative relations
The set of political relationships
between the executive branch of
government, which executes laws/
policies, and the legislative branch,
which often has the authority to
pass those laws/policies.
230 Chapter 10: Executives
presidentialism A system of
government in which a president
serves as chief executive, being
independent of the legislature and
often combining the functions of
head of state and head of
government.
direct election With regard to
executives, an electoral system in
which voters cast a vote directly for
the head of government or head
of state.
t a b l e 10.1 Executive Structures
Form o f Executive Features
Presidential President is directly elected by population at large.
President is ceremonial head of state and chief executive.
Legislature is elected independently of executive.
Parliamentary Prime minister is indirectly elected by parliament/legislature.
Prime minister is head of government.
Ceremonial monarch or president may be head of state.
Semi-presidential (hybrid) President is directly elected by population at large.
Prime minister or chief minister is responsible to parliament.
President may have power to appoint prime minister, dissolve
legislature, etc.
Executive Structures: Presidential and Parliam entary
Under the executive system known as presidentialism, the populace at large
votes in elections for a chief executive, usually called a president, in a nationwide
election.2 This president is usually elected for a fixed term of several years and
depends on the voting populace for their position, though the legislature or courts
may have the power to remove the president in serious cases of criminal behavior,
unconstitutional action, or other impeachable offenses. Most presidential systems
in democracies feature direct elections in a nationwide popular vote, with par
ticular electoral rules varying by country. In many countries (such as Mexico), the
top vote-getter among all candidates wins, with or without a majority; in others
(such as France, as seen in the “Case in Context” box), there is a first round be
tween all candidates and then a runoff between the top two vote-getters, unless
one candidate receives an outright majority in the first round. The United States
is actually an exception in its presidential electoral process, since election depends
on winning a majority of the electoral votes allotted to the various states.
Presidential systems also have legislatures as another “branch” of government,
and the issue of executive-legislative relations is important. In nearly all presidential
systems, both the executive and the legislature are expected to abide by the rules of
a written constitution, though these rules may be flouted by powerful presidents in
less-democratic countries. Each branch of government has certain powers, rights,
and responsibilities, with the legislature generally having the power to make most
law. Presidents have the power to execute these laws, but they cannot make most
laws themselves. They typically have the right to assent to a law proposed by the
legislature, or to veto it; specific rules for what happens in case of a veto vary by
country, but the legislature can often overturn the president’s veto with an ample
majority. The intricate dance that results between the executive and legislature in
trying to get laws passed and instituted is known in the American system as a set of
“checks and balances” between different political actors. Judiciaries also have a role
in this set of checks and balances, as they have some authority to interpret the law
and rule out provisions that conflict with the constitution or legal code. Checks and
balances between independent branches of government may seem the most intuitive
Types 231
Electing the French President:
The French presidential election contrasts with the American presi
dential election. In France, the election is based on the nationwide
vote and usually features two rounds. The first round is between a
large number of candidates, while the second round is a “runoff” be
tween the top two candidates from the first round. These electoral
systems can produce different results because of the ways they en
courage or discourage people to vote for compromise candidates.
See the case study on the French executive in Part VI,
pp. 436-437. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
W hat Do Runoffs Do? PAGE 436
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the
French runoff system?
2. Might any recent American elections have turned out dif
ferently if the electoral system were changed to follow
the French model?
3. Would a change to such a system have any implications
for smaller parties, or would the overall effect be not
much change?
way to set up a democracy—at least to many Americans—but it is not the only way,
as we see from parliamentary systems.
Parliamentarism works differently from presidentialism. The first step is an
election of members of parliament (MPs), in which voters vote for a political
party and/or elect a specific representative of a political party from their district.
The second step is where these MPs select an individual as head of government
and chief executive. This is an indirect election, in which most voters never vote
directly for the individual who becomes head of government. In most cases, each
major party participating in the election has a prominent standard-bearer known
to the public, so while individuals may not get to vote for this individual, there is
often a leading face associated with the party. The leader of the party that wins
the most votes is often selected by the parliament as the head of government,
though not always. Since many parliamentary systems have a quite a few large
parties with none that is large enough to claim a majority of seats, the selection
parliamentarism A system of
government in which the head of
government is elected by and
accountable to a parliament or
legislature.
indirect election With regard to
executives, an electoral system in
which most voters never cast a
ballot directly for the individual
who becomes head of
government.
“The Most Powerful Person in the World”?
Checks on American Presidents PAGE 566
The President of the United States is both the ceremonial head
of state and the titular head of government, as well as the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the nation’s armed forces. Presidents are
part of a system of checks and balances between executives
and the other branches. The nature of these American-style
checks and balances is the subject of much of the study of
executives.
See the case study on the U.S. presidency in Part VI, p. 566. As
you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. Why might the founders of the American constitution
have insisted on checks and balances between the
branches of government?
2. Are there negative consequences of checks and balances
for making laws and making governments work, and are
there examples where these have played out?
3. Before reading on parliamentarism, can you conceive of
other ways to protect democracy that would not involve
this style of checks and balances?
232 Chapter 10: Executives
semi-presidential system A
mixed or hybrid system combining
aspects of presidentialism and
parliamentarism.
formal powers The powers
possessed by a political actor, such
as a chief executive, as a function of
their constitutional or legal
position.
veto Anactofexecutivepowerin
which an executive rejects a law
passed by a legislature.
dissolving the legislature The
practice of a chief executive dis
banding the legislature, often ac
companied in a democratic regime
by the calling for new elections.
of the head of government depends on negotiations between the parties to see
who can form a coalition big enough to govern; we discuss this later in the chap
ter. W hat heads of government are called in parliamentary systems varies by
country and by language and include prime minister, premier, and chancellor.3
An indirectly elected head of government wields a form of executive power that
is fused with legislative power. The fact that the executive and legislature come out
of the same body gives rise to a different kind of executive-legislative relations
than in presidential systems. On one hand, parliamentary systems often feature a
high degree of party unity, with executives that can count on the “backbench”
legislators in their party to support executive proposals. This is in part because
legislators who do not vote along with the executive may create conditions for “no
confidence” in the government, which can put legislators’ seats at risk, as we dis
cuss later. On the other hand, executives in parliamentary systems depend on the
continued “confidence” of the legislature, since the legislature selected them and
generally has the power to vote out the government. This is much easier to do in
most parliamentary systems than in presidential systems that require complicated
procedures to impeach presidents or force resignations. Parliamentary systems
thus have back-and-forth exchanges between executives and legislatures, but
“checks and balances” have different meanings than in presidential systems.
Other countries combine features of presidentialism and parliamentarism.
These systems typically feature both a directly elected president as the head of
state and a prime minister chosen separately as the head of government. In these
semi-presidential systems, the prime minister and other government ministers
or cabinet officials may be appointed by the president, but they are responsible to
the legislature (or parliament) and can be dismissed by the legislature. France is
a useful example of this system, as can be seen in the discussion of the political
regime in that country (see Part VI, p. 427).
Many other configurations of executive power are possible besides the preced
ing three democratic examples. In Iran, for instance, the president may have
some power in executive-legislative relations but is relatively powerless compared
with the religious clerics. W hether the Supreme Leader in Iran is best seen as a
judicial or executive authority (or both) is open to debate, but it shows that many
executives often operate in an intricate web of institutions and cannot simply
make decisions unilaterally.
Formal Powers
W hat executives can do depends on the formal powers they have, which are usu
ally outlined in a country’s constitutional charter or basic laws. One important
formal power is the ability of some presidents to veto laws passed by the legisla
ture. Depending on the country, the legislature may be able to override the veto
with a majority or super-majority of greater than 50 percent. Veto power gives
executives a chance to react to the legislature, but executives may also have more
proactive formal powers.
An example of a proactive executive power is the ability in many countries
to dissolve the legislature. In some countries, this may be exercised only on
rare occasions or perhaps a limited number of times per presidential adminis
tration, while in others it maybe exercised frequently when the executive deems
it will improve governance or perhaps give the government a larger majority. In
the United Kingdom, for instance, elections must be held at least every five
years, but a prime minister and the government are entitled to call an early
election— sometimes called a “snap election”— at a moment that may be most
advantageous for the governing party. In some countries, this can be a major
advantage to the incumbent, as governments can schedule elections at their
convenience after big boosts of government spending, a phenomenon known as
the political business cycle.4
Other formal powers in some countries include the power to pass certain laws
or orders without the intervention of the legislature. For example, presidents may
have the ability to issue decrees, which are orders that have the power of law de
spite not being passed through a legislature. These have been used extensively in
more authoritarian regimes to limit political mobilization. Decrees have also been
used by assertive presidents in relatively democratic countries such as Brazil in the
1990s, when a president sought to halt an economic crisis. These may go into effect
immediately and, in some instances, may only be overturned by restrictive votes in
the legislature or by expiring after a certain period of time. Executives can also
issue executive orders to the bureaucracy that shape the way the bureaucracy
enacts and interprets the law. This can affect whether and how important regula
tions are enforced. In some situations, presidents may be empowered to declare a
nationwide state o f emergency that confers extraordinary powers to the president
(and often to the military) to govern with less input from the legislature. The case
of Russia shows that it is possible to centralize a great deal of decision-making
power in the executive branch, whether as president or as prime minister.
It is also important to know what executives cannot do, because all democra
cies (by definition) have numerous checks on executive power. The first and most
obvious restraints on executives are periodic elections for new governments. These
ensure that an executive cannot remain in power indefinitely without popular
support. Second are constitutional limitations on executive power, such as rights
guaranteed to all citizens that the executive may not infringe. Third are separa
tions of powers. This may include separating powers between levels of govern
ment, such as between central governments and state and local governments in a
federal system. It also includes the ways the judicial and legislative branches
check executive power and ensure oversight of the executive. Strict term limits
on time in office may also be seen as a restriction on executive powers, as is the
case with the American president, who may now serve a maximum of two terms
and a total of eight years.
The other branches of government are responsible for ensuring that executives
do not overstep their limits. Constitutional courts may rule that an executive has
acted unconstitutionally or illegally. Legislatures may have even stronger mecha
nisms. One is public rebuke, such as the ability to censure or reprimand the ex
ecutive. Legislatures may also be able to prevent executive action by withholding
funds from executive agencies. In many instances, the legislature can also remove
executives from office. In presidential systems, for example, this can occur after
an impeachment process.
In parliamentary systems, the legislature chooses the executives, and the ex
ecutive formally depends on the support of the legislature to retain office.
decree An executive-made order
that has the force of law, despite
not being passed through a
legislature.
executive order An order made
by a chief executive or top official
to the bureaucracy that determines
how the bureaucracy should enact
or interpret the law.
state of emergency A condition
allowed by some constitutions in
which guarantees, rights, or
provisions are temporarily limited,
to be justified by emergencies or
exceptional circumstances.
term limit Restriction on the
number of times or total amount of
time a political official can serve in
a given position.
impeachment A process by
which a legislature initiates procee
dings to determine whether an
official, often a top-ranking execu
tive official, should be removed
from office.
234 Chapter 10: Executives
Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers PAGE 534
The dominance of the executive branch in Russia has become in
creasingly clear in recent years. Centralization has been especially
accentuated under Vladimir Putin, who was president from 2000
to 2008, prime minister from 2008 to 2012, and became president
again in 2012. Putin’s role as head of state and head of government
showed that some executives are capable of wielding authority
through formal means and informal means. The powers of the ex
ecutives have implications for the fate of democracy in Russia.
See the case study on the Russian executive in Part VI,
pp. 534-535. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What factors give rise to centralization by executives in
countries like Russia?
2. Does the Russian case suggest that semi-presidential sys
tems are likely to be unstable?
3. Does the power of Vladimir Putin say anything generaliz-
able about the relative importance of formal and informal
powers?
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev at Putin’s inauguration
following the controversial elections of 2012. Even when
Putin was prime minister and Medvedev was president,
according to most observers Putin remained in charge.
vote of no confidence A vote
taken by a legislature that expres
ses a lack of support for the gover
nment or executive, which, if
successful, often results in the
dissolution of the government and
the calling of new legislative
elections.
The legislature has the power to dismiss the executive if it no longer deems the
government to be functioning adequately. This mechanism, the vote o f no
confidence, makes removing an executive much easier than in a presidential
system. The vote of no confidence comes in many forms. In its simplest form, a
confidence vote is simply called by members of parliament, and the government
is voted out if a majority votes no confidence. The head of state then calls new
elections for a new government. In Germany, on the other hand, there is a so-
called “constructive vote of no confidence,” which is designed to ensure that there
will always be a government in place. There, the legislative majority voting no
confidence in a government simultaneously proposes a new government that will
take its place.
More formal powers for the executive leads to greater influence over legisla
tures, while more checks on executive powers gives greater authority to legisla
tures.3 Weaker formal powers may limit executives in their ability to promote
their initiatives or agendas. It is relatively obvious that the ability to veto legisla
tion enhances a president’s power, for example, or that a legislature that can
easily override a veto weakens the executive’s power. However, as noted before,
formal rules do not fully determine an executive’s power, and it is not always clear
how formal rules themselves matter. For example, Brazil’s president used decrees
a great deal in the 1990s, but most legislation of any significance ultimately had
to be passed through the legislature.
In parliamentary systems, one of the main issues with regard to formal powers
is how confidence votes work. Where they are used, votes of no confidence are
Types 235
examples of the legislature exerting its control over the executive, but the exis
tence of votes of no confidence is not proof of legislative power. In fact, legisla
tures can be powerful even without using confidence votes. Often, the mere
threat of a confidence vote will be enough to force the executive to do the legis
lature’s bidding. Actual votes of no confidence may rarely come to the floor of the
parliament, and may succeed even more rarely, even where executives are weak.
Parliamentary countries are not all destined to have a merry-go-round of
failed governments that last only a brief time before being voted down in confi
dence votes. Some countries have notoriously unstable systems while other coun
tries rarely witness a confidence vote. Because prime ministers usually represent
one of the largest parties in parliament, the executive in a parliamentary system
will often have substantial support in the parliament. Parliamentarians who call
for a no confidence vote place their own careers on the line, since these votes usu
ally trigger new elections or shake-ups within the party.
Partisan Powers
The formal powers of an executive are not the only factor that determines whether
an executive has leverage over legislation. Formal powers are often less important
than the partisan powers of the executive—that is, the president’s leverage over
same-party legislators and over parties in the governing coalition. Chief execu
tives who can exercise such authority and can thus control the careers of other
politicians will typically be able to pass a great deal of legislation.
The balance of power between the executive and the legislature depends partly
on whether executive leaders can control the electoral fortunes of legislators. One
of the most important forms of control is over the party’s list of candidates for
elections, as noted in the previous chapter. If the executive leaders can choose
who will be on party’s list of candidates, then those would-be candidates will be
responsive to the needs of the executive. On the other hand, the executive’s par
tisan powers are lessened if party leaders do not control the electoral fortunes of
copartisans. Where party candidates are chosen by voters in primary elections,
for instance, they will tend to be more loyal to their constituents than to their
party leadership. This may result in legislators who vote against the wishes of
their party leaders in the executive. In some parliamentary systems, a critique is
that party leaders in the executive can “ram legislation through” and get it ap
proved by a “rubber stamp” parliament. Where executive leaders control the elec
toral fortunes of legislators and have a strong majority, the executive maybe able
to push its prerogatives through the parliament with ease, knowing that coparti
sans will support it. By contrast, a critique of certain presidential systems is that
some executives may have too little partisan power and thus difficulty passing
laws, as the case of Brazil shows.
Coalitions
The power of executive leaders also depends on whether a party governs alone or
is part of a coalition of two or more parties. Governing coalitions form among
parties in the legislature, but they determine the composition of the executive
and the government, so we consider them in this chapter. Coalitions usually arise
when there are several major parties in a country and the party that won the most
partisan powers The powers
accruing to a government official,
such as a chief executive, by virtue
of the official’s leverage or power
over members of a political party.
coalition Agroupoftwoormore
political parties that governs by
sharing executive power and
responsibilities.
236 Chapter 10: Executives
China’s current political system is authoritarian, with a complex
state administration interweaved with the single dominant
party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At present, Xi Jinping
has consolidated power over the party, the presidency, and the
military. How one becomes China’s “paramount leader” is a
study in the politics of party and state in China’s intricate
system.
See the case study on the Chinese executive in Part VI,
pp. 423-424. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How does a paramount leader consolidate power and
emerge in China’s system?
2. Why might an authoritarian regime such as China’s re
quire or desire to have any “checks and balances” be
tween different actors?
3. Can we tell if strong top-down authority of paramount
leaders contributed to China’s economic growth, held
China back economically, or both?
cabinet The group of senior
officials in the executive branch,
including ministers, who advise
the head of government or head
of state.
portfolio The set of duties and
tasks that correspond to a given
ministerial office.
legislative seats in an election does not have the majority needed to pass legisla
tion on its own. In parliamentary systems, where the executive depends on the
confidence of the legislature, heads of government frequently need to hold to
gether a coalition in order not to be voted out of office. This is especially common
under systems of proportional representation (see chapter 9), where small parties
are likelier to emerge and remain in existence. On some occasions, a governing
party may have a majority but choose to form an alliance with another party for
other reasons.6 Coalitions are somewhat less common in presidential systems,
where an election is held for a single chief executive that represents a certain
party. In the United States, for instance, the party winning the presidency typi
cally holds all the seats in the cabinet. Yet even in presidential countries like
Brazil, presidents sometimes need to form a cabinet that represents various par
ties in order to have a coalition of parties that can get legislation passed.
In parliamentary systems, the largest party in the legislature has the advan
tage in forming a government, and is usually the one from which the head of
government emerges.7 Parties with fewer seats are the “junior” members of the
coalition but will demand some political reward for agreeing to participate in
government. This comes from cabinet appointments to control ministerial
portfolios. By controlling certain ministries, coalition members can reward their
supporters with ability to shape policy in the area where they control the cabinet
position and can help some of their top partisans with high-ranking appoint
ments in the bureaucracy.8
Chinese leaders at the opening session of the National
People’s Congress in Beijing in March 2015. In the second row
stand five prominent leaders, with President Xi Jinping and
Premier Li Keqiang second and third from the left,
respectively.
Types 237
German chancellor Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (center) talks with then-
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle of the Free Democratic Party (right) and others as they
negotiate to form a governing coalition.
Forming governing coalitions is a political art, especially in countries with
many parties in the legislature. Not all coalitions are based on the largest party
in parliament, for example. If a group of smaller parties gets together, they may
be able to exclude the largest party or parties from the government. This may
happen, for instance, if one extreme party (say, right-wing or left-wing radicals)
gains the largest number of seats, but all other parties combine to prevent them
from holding power. Substantial bargaining will take place over how cabinet
positions will be distributed among the parties. Generally, the more seats a party
wins, the more it can demand in ministerial portfolios and policy concessions.
There are several types of governing coalitions. Consider the following hypo
thetical example of the country of Santa Gabriela (Table 10.2). There are one
hundred seats in the parliament, and the parties are arrayed along the political
spectrum from far left (XL) and left (L) through the center (C) to right (R) and
far right (XR). Imagine that each seat represents 1 percent of the vote, so that
party R got 27 percent of the vote and therefore twenty-seven seats.9 Many pos
sible kinds of coalitions can be formed after this election. We give one example
t a b l e io.2 Hypothetical Distribution of Seats
in Parliam ent of Santa Gabriela
Party XL L C R XR
Seats 30 7 21 27 15
238 Chapter 10: Executives
for several types of coalitions, listing the largest party first in each case, and en
courage you to figure out other possible examples that fit each type of coalition.
W hat different coalitions might form, and which parties might be represented in
the executive branch?
A minimum winning coalition has no “surplus” parties beyond those re
quired to form a government. So, for instance, a coalition of the four parties C,
R, L, and XR would not be “minimum winning” because parties C, R, and L
could still have more than 50 percent of the seats even without the seats of XR.
However, removing any one of the parties from the C-R-L coalition would give
the coalition less than the 50 percent of seats needed. C-R-L is thus an example
of a minimum winning coalition. There are several other possibilities in this elec
tion, such as an XL-XR-L coalition. A more restrictive version of a minimum
winning coalition is minimum connected winning; this arrangement occurs
when all parties in the coalition are “connected” to one another on the political
spectrum. This prevents the example of the parties XL (far left) and L (left)
forming a coalition with the party XR (far right), which would be improbable
because there is no realistic “connection” linking these parties. There are other
parties in between, namely R and C. The logic is to include policy preferences as
a factor in coalition formation. This rules out several minimum winning coali
tions, but C-R-L is an example of a minimum connected coalition.
The minimum size coalition goes a step further and says the coalition that
governs will be that closest to the threshold needed, usually 50 percent plus one
seat. A coalition that includes only 51 percent of the seats is preferred to a coali
tion that includes a larger percentage of seats, because the participating parties
will maximize their relative power within the coalition by not dispersing power.
There will often be only one possible minimum size coalition, even when there
are many possible “minimum winning coalitions.” In Santa Gabriela, XL-C is
the minimum size coalition.
Other logics can also shape the types of coalition that emerge (Table 10.3).
One logic is to minimize the number of parties involved: two-party coalitions
will be preferred to three- or four-party coalitions, even if the two-party coali
tion means more seats. Another option is that coalitions should contain the party
t a b l e 1 0 . 3 Types of Coalition
Type of Coalition Definition of Coalition Exam ple Seats (#)
Minimum Winning No extra or surplus parties that are not needed to govern X L – X R – L 52
Minimum Connected Winning Minimum winning and parties are connected on policy spectrum C – R – L 55
Minimum Size As close as possible to minimum number of seats needed (often
50 percent)
X L-C 51
Minimum Number of Parties10 Fewest number of parties needed to form majority X L-R 57
Median Party” Includes the median party in the middle of the political spectrum X L-C 51
Minimum Range Minimum number of spaces between parties on policy spectrum R – C – X R 63
minimum winning coalition
A governing coalition that contains
no surplus parties beyond those
required to form a government.
minimum connected winning
coalition A minimum winning
coalition in which all parties in the
coalition are “connected” or adja
cent to one another on the political
spectrum.
minimum size coalition A gover
ning coalition that is closest to the
threshold needed to govern, typi
cally 50 percent of the legislative
seats plus one seat.
Types 239
holding the median seat in parliament or the “middle” parliamentarian on the
political spectrum, because this echoes the will of the “median voter” or average
citizen. In this case, party C is the median party. The median party coalition may
or may not be “minimum winning.” A final type of majority coalition will mini
mize the range or number of “spaces” on the political spectrum between parties.
Between C and XR, for instance, there are two “spaces” (C to R, and R to XR).
The same is true for L and R, while XL and R would have three spaces. Such
coalitions prefer parties that are not too far apart, but there is no requirement
that parties need to be “connected” or adjacent to one another. In Santa Gabriela,
two spaces is the minimum possible. Sometimes this includes three parties con
nected to one another, and sometimes two parties with a space in between them.
These coalitions all have a governing majority and all share a logic in which
participating parties attempt to minimize the size or scope of the coalition.
However, there are also two other major possibilities in coalition formation.
A grand coalition may be made up of two or more parties that represent well
over half of the electorate, and hold well over half the seats. One motivation for
a grand coalition is national unity among the largest parties in a time of crisis.
An example was the national unity government in Britain during World War II,
when Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour all joined to support the war effort.
Less dramatically, the “Grand Coalition” from 2005 to 2009 in Germany
emerged after a closely contested election in which neither party came close to a
majority, but preferred a centrist coalition to another coalition that might have
included parties on the left wing of the political spectrum.
Finally, not all governments necessarily have a majority of the seats in the
legislature. In some parliamentary systems, the largest party (or a group of parties)
may be able to form a government even with less than 50 percent of the seats. This
happens where there are three or more major parties represented in parliament
and no party gains a majority of seats. The government’s ability to remain in
power is tenuous in these cases, lasting until a vote of no confidence occurs or the
next election is held. In Canada from 2008 to 2011, the Conservative government
of Stephen Harper governed with only 46 percent of the seats in Parliament, since
the next largest party was the Liberals (25 percent of seats), followed by two other
parties (the New Democratic Party and a regional Quebec-based party, the Bloc
Quebecois), with whom neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals could form a
majority coalition. The Conservatives formed a government, which fell in 2011
when the other three parties agreed to vote no confidence and call new elections;
the Conservatives then won an outright majority in the ensuing election.
In general, parties and their leaders decide to participate in a coalition because
they prefer to be in government where they can affect policy, rather than in op
position. Parties often have to compromise in order to join a coalition, and will
prefer to form a government with those parties with which they agree on policy.
In general, parties may prefer not to have a coalition that is very large and has
well above 51 percent of the seats. The reason is relative power. A party that holds
33 percent of the seats (for instance) will have most of the say in a coalition com
prised of parties representing 55 percent of the seats in parliament but would only
have a smaller fraction of the power in a coalition comprised of parties represent
ing 70 percent of the seats. This is why we might expect coalitions to be relatively
grand coalition A governing
coalition composed of two or more
major parties that hold a superma
jority of legislative seats and repre
sent a supermajority of the
electorate.
240 Chapter 10: Executives
t a b l e 1 0 . 4 Presidential Powers
Type of Power D efinition Exam ples (Not in A ll Countries)
Formal Powers Powers assigned to the office of the
president by constitutional authority or
by law
Dissolve the legislature Issue decrees and executive orders
Veto legislation
Partisan Powers Powers to control decisions and votes of
legislators and other politicians through
control of political party
Control lists of candidates for office
Appoint party members to executive office
Affect career paths of party members
Informal Powers Powers of the president that are not
official, but come from informal ability to
influence public policy
Influence public opinion and public debate
Campaign for individuals or causes
Patronage and clientelism
informal powers Those powers
possessed by an office holder that
are not “official” but rather based
on custom, convention, or other
sources of influence.
patronage The use of
government favors, typically in the
form of employment, to garner
political support.
clientelism The practice of
exchanging political favors, often in
the form of government employ
ment or services, for political
support.
close to 50 percent of the seats, though it must obviously be above 50 percent in
order to constitute a governing majority.
Informal Powers
Apart from formal and partisan powers, executives can have others that we
simply call “informal powers” (see Table 10.4). These include the ability to
influence public debate and public opinion. For instance, if the president of
France wishes to force a public debate on immigration, he may bring up the
issue in speeches and talk about it in the media. In the United States, we know
this as the “bully pulpit of the presidency.” There is nothing in most democratic
constitutions giving the president legal authority to shape public opinion, but
he is clearly free to use the podium and public position to shape politics. Indeed,
one prominent scholar has referred to the most essential power of the American
president as the “power to persuade,” since formal authority alone will not work
to control the legislature or the bureaucracy.12 In many countries, presidents
can also use the government as a source of patronage or for the purposes of
clientelism. This means providing jobs or other benefits to supporters, with the
executive known as the patron and the recipients of this support known as the
clients. Patron-client politics is generally seen as poor governance, but it is
clearly a power that some presidents have.
Causes and Effects: What Explains
Executive Stability?
One big question in the study of executives has been whether parliamentary
forms of government are better for protecting democracy than presidential forms
of government. While it may come as a surprise to American students, the debate
has generally had presidentialism “on the defensive.” Advocates of parliamentary
forms of government have argued that parliamentarism better protects democ
racy. They point to evidence from Europe and several former British colonies
around the world. These countries have a long history of parliamentarism and a
stronger record of democracy than many presidential systems.
Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive Stability? 241
The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations PAGE 521
With its tendency for patronage and the need to balance the pre
carious relationship between North and South, Nigeria shows that
social context greatly affects the environment in which presidents
operate, regardless of constitutional powers. Given longstanding
conflicts and challenges to governance in the country, the elec
tion of the executive in Nigeria takes into account the realities of
ethnic divisions across the different regions of the country.
3. What are the intended effects of the new constitutional
rule shaping presidential election in a multi-ethnic coun
try like Nigeria?
2. What accounts for the similarities in certain features of
the presidency across both military and civilian regimes?
1. Would you consider the Nigerian presidency a strong or
weak institution? Why?
See the case study on the Nigerian executive in Part VI,
p. 521. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
Stable and Unstable Regim es: Presidentialism ,
Parliamentarism , and D em ocracy
The debate has been whether presidentialism or parliamentarism affects the sta
bility of democracy, not about whether parliamentarism is preferable to presiden
tialism in every respect. Presidential systems may have other advantages over
parliamentarism, such as allowing voters to identify clearly with an individual
candidate, giving voters a greater range of electoral choices, and providing the
opportunity to “split a ticket” and cast a vote for one party in legislative elections
and another party in the executive election.
Consider what is likely to happen in each type of system and how it will affect
democracy. According to the argument in favor of parliamentarism, a parliamen
tary regime makes governments likelier to reach compromise and share power.
There are often multiple parties represented in a parliamentary cabinet. Presiden
tial regimes, on the other hand, generally have only one party represented in the
cabinet and are less willing to compromise and share power. Moreover, if a par
liamentary executive becomes unpopular, it can be easily removed by a no confi
dence vote. This means that a crisis in a particular government does not become
a crisis of the whole political regime, whereas removing an unpopular elected
president from office creates more of a constitutional crisis. (See the “Insights”
box on the work of Juan Linz.)
Yet some scholars disagree that parliamentarism is better for democracy than
presidentialism.13 One critique introduces another factor into the equation: the
political party system. In this critique, the argument is that parliamentary sys
tems are not necessarily more inclined to power sharing. It depends on how leg
islators are elected and how many parties end up being represented in parliament.
If a parliamentary system has just a couple of major parties, there will be few
incentives for prime ministers to share power. (See the “Insights” box presenting
Mainwaring and Shugart’s critique.)
Another way to critique the argument in favor of parliamentarism is to exam
ine specific empirical cases to see why democracy has succeeded in some places and
not others. Parliamentarism has been predominant in Europe and presidentialism
242 Chapter 10: Executives
IN SIG H TS
The Perils of Presidentialism and The Virtues
of Parliamentarism
by Juan Linz T’ T :
Juan Linz argues that parliamentary systems are better for democracy than presidencies, for five reasons:
1. Competing vs. Clear Legitimacy. Presidentialism divides
power between the legislature and executive, which
makes it unclear who is responsible for public action. Par
liamentarism makes clear that the executive heads the
government.
2. Fixed vs. Flexible Terms. Presidential systems have rigid
terms for presidents (such as four years), which makes
changing an unpopular government difficult. Parliamen
tary governments may be replaced at any time upon
losing the confidence of parliament.
3. Winner-Take-All vs. Power Sharing. Presidentialism allows a
single party to lead the executive branch. Parliamentarism
leads to more power sharing (via coalitions). This helps
democracy by including more participants in decision
making.
4. Presidential vs. Prime Ministerial “Style.” Presidencies lead to
more authoritarian, bombastic style than is found with
the negotiating tendencies of prime ministers.
5. Outsider vs. Insider Executives. Presidents are likelier to be
outsiders than prime ministers because parliamentary
leaders have been in politics for decades.
Linz argues that these factors in the long run increase the
likelihood that presidential systems will be taken over by
authoritarians.
JuanLinz, “The Perils ofPresidentialism.”Journal of Democracy 1,No. 109901:51-69;
and’The Virtues of Parliamentarism.” Jourr-a of Democracy 1, No. 4 0990): 84-91.
in Latin America and Africa, for example. We can see this by contrasting the
stable democracy of the parliamentary system in the United Kingdom with the
presidential systems of Brazil and Nigeria that have had periods of military rule.
But Europe may have had successful democracies not because of parliamen
tarism, but rather because it is rich. The less successful histories of democracy in
Brazil and Nigeria may not be because of presidentialism, but because those
countries and others in their regions are lower-income. Close attention to the
empirical cases chosen (the when and where of an argument) can affect our con
clusions about how and why democracy persists.
To put it another way, remember that correlation is not causation (see
chapter 2): Just because parliamentary Germany is more democratic than Iran
and Iran has an elected president does not mean that parliamentarism causes
Germany’s democracy to succeed or that directly electing a president causes Iran’s
democracy to fail. The challenge is to document cause and effect rather than to
assume it. This means that we need to try to anticipate and control for other,
confounding variables—such as rich versus poor societies—when we look for
causal relationships between outcomes such as parliamentarism and successful
democracy.
The argument in favor of parliamentarism is a model for reasoning through
the consequences of institutional design. Similarly, the response by critics exem
plifies how thoughtful critiques can use both empirical evidence and theoretical
argumentation to counter prominent theories. The argument that says party sys
tems matter helps to specify further the conditions under which parliamentarism
and presidentialism work well to support democracy. Both the theory and the
Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive Stability? 243
Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A
IN SIGHTS A Critical Appraisal
by Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugqri
Mainwaring and Shugart offer a two-part critique of Linz’s argument. The main theoretical critique is that parlia
mentarism can be just as “winner-take-all” as presidentialism.
In Britain, for example, a parliamentary executive may in fact
have even more power than a presidential executive, if the
prime minister tightly holds the reins of his/her own party.
Where one party governs in a parliamentary system and the
executive can dominate the legislature, parliamentary majori
ties are truly “winner-take-all.” This article also offers an empiri
cal critique that considers other factors. Presidential systems
are most common in poorer countries (such as Latin America
and Africa), while parliamentarism prevails in wealthy countries
in Europe. It may be that wealth is actually causing democracy
in Europe and poverty is causing authoritarianism in Latin
America, and presidential or parliamentary government has
little to do with these outcomes. Mainwaring and Shugart also
note that parliamentary systems are more common in small
countries (and islands) and in countries with a British colonial
heritage, and that each of these factors may also increase the
likelihood of democracy.
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and
Democracy: A Critical Appraisal.” Comparative Politics 29, No. 4 (1997): 449-471
critique are part of the constructive process of building scientific knowledge
about the world.
In the debate over presidentialism and parliamentarism, it may be useful to
consider examples such as India, which has long been one of the world’s most
surprising democracies: It is a relatively poor country (though growing rapidly),
highly unequal, with more than a billion people from many different religious
and ethnic backgrounds. Its parliamentary system is based on the British model.
Parliamentarism may or may not have contributed to India’s rather successful
democracy, and you can consider the Indian case to test this hypothesis. Has the
parliamentary system resulted in power-sharing rather than “winner-take-all”
politics, for example? Has it resulted in a prime ministerial “style” that is less
centralized than in presidential systems? There is evidence both for and against
the argument that parliamentarism has been a cause of India’s democracy, as you
will begin to see in the following box. Investigating further can allow a full hy
pothesis test of whether India follows the logic outlined by Juan Linz in the
“Insights” box.
Stable and Unstable Executives:
Styles of Presidential Rule
Looking beyond whether a democratic regime persists, there is also the question
of how executives govern. Popularly elected leaders in a democracy are expected
to work within a society that has rules and other institutions. For example, the
legislature is expected to have some say as well as the president, and the president
is not expected to be above the law. However, chief executives govern in very dif
ferent ways, and there are some circumstances where elected executives wield
considerable power. In many cases, even if a regime is formally a democracy, the
president may assert more authority and centralize power considerably. One such
244 Chapter 10: Executives
IN SIG H TS
Delegative Democracy
by Ci i illermo O’Donnell
O’Donnell argues that there is a kind of democracy called delegative democracy that differs from the normal representa
tive democracy. In delegative democracies, a president is elected
and then proceeds to govern however he or she sees fit. Power is
concentrated in the single individual that runs the executive, and
this executive sees himself/herself as having been delegated
power fora period of time, rather than seeing himself/herself as
a representative of the people’s interests. O’Donnell considers
this a kind of democracy, because the president will respect cer
tain limits, such as elections and limits on the term of office, but
there are few checks on presidential power and little account
ability of the president to other institutions. Courts and legisla
tures in particular have relatively little influence. O’Donnell finds
this type of system to have existed in many parts of the develop
ing world, from Latin America to parts of Asia and Africa. The ex
istence of delegative democracy highlights the importance of
executive power in determining the extent and nature of de
mocracy in a country.
Guillermo O’Donnell,”Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5, No. I
(1994): 55-69.
populism A political approach in
which leaders, often heads of
government and top executive
branch officials, make direct
appeals to “the people” and seek
to develop direct political ties
with the masses.
type of regime is “delegative democracy,” which confers substantial power to
presidents. W hile the concept of delegative democracy was originally conceived
for Latin American countries, you may consider whether the case of Russia under
Vladimir Putin fits with the model.
Executives influence the economy as well as politics, and they may contribute
either to good or to poor economic performance. Executive powers in the econ
omy include proposing budgets for the legislature to approve, collecting taxes,
and regulating the economy. Executives also make decisions about staffing key
economic institutions, such as the central bank that controls the money supply.
Finally, the executive in some cases will make major interventions in the econ
omy. Examples include nationalizing companies or privatizing them, and per
haps bailing out important industries such as banks in a financial crisis. All
together, these economic responsibilities mean that the executive branch has a
great deal of leverage over the economy.
So how does a strong executive benefit or hurt the economy? One argument is
that powerful executives can damage the economy through populism, a political
approach in which leaders make appeals to “the people” and seek to develop
direct political ties with the masses. W ith populist approaches, presidents often
use the resources of the government to reinforce their personal power, making
themselves into the symbolic embodiment of the nation and working to under
mine other institutions. In many cases, such leaders literally hand out money as
they go spending large sums of government revenue to help their supporters and
increase their own popularity. This propensity for populism will likely hurt the
economy over the long run, if it results in excessive government spending. In a
similar vein, executives can control patronage, as noted previously (under “Infor
mal Powers”), and they may use control over government as a way to distribute
favors to certain groups; this too can prove detrimental to the economy in the
long run.14
On the other hand, strong executives may also make for a strong state, which
is often associated with good economic performance, as seen in chapters 3 and 4.
Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive Stability? 245
Juan and Eva Peron of Argentina in 1951. They are among the most important populist figures in
the history of Latin America.
This may include decisive national leaders such as strong presidents, or strong
bureaucracies in the executive branch. Examples would include ministries and
government economic councils in East Asia that were responsible for major deci
sions that promoted economic development. To use a contemporary example, it
is difficult to understand China’s recent development without talking about the
importance of decisions made by executive officials and leaders, from the presi
dent and premier to top officials at the central bank.
Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism
IN S IG H T S in Latin America: The Peruvian Case
by Kenneth Roberts
Roberts examines the concept of populism, which is often associated with powerful and charismatic presidents, and
argues that its most important characteristic is a leader who
establishes personalistic links with the people. This happens
when other institutions are weak, and the tendency of popu
list presidents to individualize power relates to the “delegative
democracy” of O’Donnell noted in a previous box. Historically,
populism was most significant in the 1930s and 1940s in Latin
America, when several charismatic presidents asserted per
sonal power and spent large sums of government money in
support for the working classes. This would suggest populist
presidents are inclined to hurt the economy in the long run,
but Roberts notes that populism can be consistent with more
limited spending. In fact, some populist presidents in the
1990s, including Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in
Argentina, and Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela, imple
mented free market neoliberal reforms (see chapter 4). This
suggests to Roberts that populism is less about excessive eco
nomic spending and more about the chronic weakness of
other institutions outside the executive.
Kenneth Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin
America: The Peruvian Case.”Worid Politics 48, No. I (I995):82-II6.
246 Chapter 10: Executives
consociationai Systems that use
formal mechanisms to coordinate
different groups sharing access to
power.
Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns
of Parliam entary Rule
A final set of causal questions about executives is what makes their governments
endure or collapse. Most of the preceding “Case in Context” boxes point to rela
tively stable governments that last from one election to the end of a term of office,
at least in the years from the 1990s to the present. Other countries, however, are
more notorious for executive instability due to coalitions that break down fre
quently. The case of Italy shows that governments in some countries are unstable
while others endure. Italy has changed prime ministers nearly forty times since
the end of World War II; during that time, the United States has had twelve
presidents, only one of which resigned from office. This means a change of gov
ernment has happened in Italy more than once every two years, though elections
are only required to be held every five years. The turnover in the executive is even
more dramatic if one counts a government as new every time a cabinet is re
shuffled to accommodate various parties. By this criterion, Italy has had over
sixty governments since World War II, leaving the average duration of a govern
ment at just about one year. This gives Italy perhaps the most unstable govern
ment among advanced democracies, though the constitution and the basic
structure of government have persisted for some time. That is, Italy has seen
unstable governing coalitions in a stable regime.
Despite the frequent turnover of governments, there are some ways in which
Italian politics exhibits continuity. There are not necessarily new faces leading
Italian politics every year or so. In fact, the very first post-war prime minister,
Alcide de Gasperi of the Christian Democrats, led eight different cabinets in his
eight years in office before finally losing the prime minister’s chair. Several prime
ministers, including recent Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, have been in the
post three or more times. Moreover, there have been some time periods when
prime ministers have been relatively secure, including Berlusconi from 2001 to
2006. Nonetheless, many governments have lasted less than a year, and very few
last more than three.
A flip side of instability is the fact that many parliamentary systems are rela
tively inclusive of different parties and interests. This can be as a result of the
electoral rules that favor multi-party systems (as discussed in chapters 7 and 9),
or because cooperation happens where different groups in society have reasons to
share power and build trust. For example, where countries are divided into dif
ferent ethnic groups, elites and leaders may attempt to find mechanisms that will
help govern without worsening conflict. However, these incentives are not lim
ited to divided societies. In many European countries, political parties and inter
est groups have developed political systems that strive for consensus and inclusion
of major actors in all big government decisions. These mechanisms are sometimes
known as consociationai arrangements, as discussed in the next “Insights” box.
The debate about whether presidentialism or parliamentarism is “better” enters
into this discussion of unstable coalitions and consociationai arrangements. Note
that in the preceding “Insights” box, the parliamentary systems are quite stable,
while the presidential systems in Colombia and Lebanon have struggled more to
prevent conflict. An argument in favor of parliamentarism holds that the flexible
terms of office mean that a “crisis of government” does not become a “crisis of
Beyond the American and British Models 247
IN S IG H T S
Consociational Democracy
by Arend Lijphart
This article shows that there are many ways for different groups and parties to share power in the executive branch,
whether the system is parliamentary or presidential. In societies
where reaching consensus is a priority and there are many politi
cal parties, one leading form of power sharing is the grand coali
tion cabinet that includes multiple parties. Another way to share
power is for leading political elites to appoint powerful advisory
councils and committees that reflect the interests of many
major actors. Efforts such as these have featured in countries in
central and northern Europe, such as Netherlands, Austria, and
Denmark. Presidential systems can find mechanisms for sharing
power as well as parliamentary systems. At the time of Lijphart’s
writing, examples included agreements by the two leading par
ties to alternate the presidency in Colombia and between differ
ent religious groups to divide executive posts in Lebanon. This
idea of consociational democracy suggests that executives
need not be “winner-take-all” if there are other factors that push
toward social consensus.
Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy.”Wor\d Politics 21, No. 2 (1969):
207-225.
regime.” That is, a government that fails and falls does not imperil the whole
constitutional system. In a sense, Italy shows that. On the other hand, it is not
clear that such instability in governments is desirable either. Certainly, the fixed
terms of presidential systems at least theoretically provide the possibility that a
government will adapt and respond to unpopular moves in time. Moreover, ex
treme instability in governments is likely to place many politicians in “permanent
campaign” mode, which may compromise their focus on governing.
O f course, whether a country has stability or instability in its governments
depends on several features of political institutions: political parties and how
they operate; electoral rules; rules about votes of no confidence; and whether
party leaders can “discipline” the members of a party’s rank and file. In addition,
history and social realities contribute to these outcomes, and only further com
parative research can point to the factors that cause these different outcomes.
Beyond the American and British Models
The United Kingdom and the United States are emblematic examples of the two basic ways of structuring the executive in a democracy, and the com
parison of the parliamentary and presidential systems has become a central
debate in the comparative study of executives. In both of these countries, democ
racy has persisted for a long time, and indeed both countries have increasingly
extended the franchise and other democratic rights to more people over time.
These two emblematic cases serve to show that both presidential and parliamen
tary systems are compatible with democracy, if social conditions are conducive.
As the chapter suggests, however, looking only at these two cases will tell us
little about the variety of types of executives, much less give us a full understand
ing of the merits of different systems. Apart from executives that follow the two
basic forms—presidential and parliamentary—there are hybrids and other
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
K E Y M E T H O D O L O G IC A L T O O L
Case Selection
O n e m ain lesson fro m th e d e bate
o v e r pre sid e n tialism v e rsu s pa rlia
m e n tarism is th e im p o rta n c e o f case
se le c tio n f o r c o m p a riso n s. C a se s are
o fte n (b u t n o t ne ce ssa rily) c o u n trie s
th a t w e se le c t to study, a n d s e le c tin g
th e rig h t o n e s is key. T h e d isa d v a n
ta g e s o f pre sid e n tialism for d e m o c
ra c y c e rta in ly a p p e a r to be gre ater in
248 Chapter 10: Executives
TH IN K IN G
CO M PA RA TIV ELY
K EY M E TH O D O LO G ICA L TO O L
(continued)
countries that are lower-income and
have been democracies for only a
short time, as noted by Mainwaring
and Shugart in the “Insights” box
earlier in the chapter. To make a
causal argument, it is important to
understand the background condi
tions that shape the likelihood of
democracy.
Would it be reasonable to com
pare a low-income presidential coun
try in Africa with a long-established
parliamentary regime in northern
Europe and make inferences about
how presidentialism affects democ
racy? Or would a comparison of the
United States and a European coun
try be more appropriate? Conversely,
is the United States a representative
example of all presidentialist coun
tries around the world, or is it a
special case? The right selection
depends on the specific question
the researcher is asking and the
argument one hopes to make.
Several rules of thumb are useful
for beginning comparativists in select
ing cases. The first is to select cases
that make possible a comparison on
the basis of most-similar-systems
(MSS) or most-different-systems (MDS)
analysis. This choice will help prevent
“selection on the dependent variable,”
in which a researcher looks only at
countries with similar outcomes and
makes faulty inferences based on
limited information.15 A second gen
eral rule is to select cases where the
researcher does not have a precon
ception or bias that will complicate
the honest assessment of the
evidence.
models that combine features of both. From France to India to Switzerland to
Uruguay, countries around the world have a huge variety of executive structures
beyond the American and British archetypes.
In fact, the United Kingdom and the United States themselves are not static
in how executive power works. The United Kingdom’s form of parliamentarism
has usually been winner-take-all for the winning party, but a coalition between
two parties governed from 2010 to 2015. Comparative research can help us to
explain how executive power can change over time within a country, and not just
in the United Kingdom. W hy do some Italian coalition governments last longer
than others, if the rules that shape elections of the legislature and the executive
remain the same? Similarly, presidentialism is expected by some to lead to more
“winner-takes-all” politics, but these systems also divide and share power in dif
ferent ways over time. Some American presidents have asserted greater executive
control over other branches. Prominent examples include Abraham Lincoln in
the Civil War and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in World War II. Other presidents
have followed Congress more. The extent of executive power—and why it varies
from time to time—is thus an open question even after 230 years in a country
like the United States. As with parliamentarism, this question is not only for the
American case but also applies in countries such as Nigeria.
Consider Table 10.5, which includes a basic summary of the executive struc
ture for the twelve countries profiled in this book. You will note a diverse array
of executive structures, with some countries sharing certain features in common.
You may detect patterns in the presidential and parliamentary experiences of the
countries, and you can select cases for further comparison. The comparative
method allows researchers to analyze why countries developed the executive
structures they did, or what the consequences of these structures have been. It is
also possible to do a comparison over time within one country, along the lines
suggested previously for the United Kingdom or the United States. W hy have
executive structures changed or remained static over time? This question could
be asked for any number of countries, including France, Iran, Nigeria, or Russia.
Considering what you may know about these countries from this table and from
other chapters, can you suggest what might be good test cases for studying the
causes and effects of executive structures?
Selecting the right cases for comparative study can make the difference be
tween an effective analysis and a weaker one. W hile we have referred to the
United Kingdom and the United States as emblematic examples of parliamentary
and presidential systems, the selection of cases for further study only begins with
acknowledging these two models. The best cases to select will depend on the
question being asked. Considering Table 10.5, a question about why ceremonial
presidents have lost some of their powers over time might best be addressed by
looking at countries such as Germany, India, Japan, or the United Kingdom. On
the other hand, a question about the partisan powers of directly elected presi
dents might be well suited to a comparison of countries in the Americas, such as
Brazil, Mexico, and/or the United States. A question about the informal powers
of heads of state or chief executives might be able to draw on any number of the
countries in the table. Russia and France might make for a useful analysis of the
causes or consequences of semi-presidential systems.
Beyond the American and British Models 249
r T H IN K IN G
.C O M P A R A T IV E LY
t a b l e 1 0 . 5 Co m p a rin g Cases
Case Executive Structure
Brazil Directly elected president chosen by national popular vote. Runoff election
held between top two vote getters if none receives a majority in first round.
President has weak partisan powers, but can issue decrees.
China Executive structure includes president as head of state and chief executive.
Two other top positions— often held by president— are head of the single
(Communist) party and head of military. Premier is head of government in
legislature.
France Semi-presidential system combines presidentialism and parliamentarism.
President is directly elected and appoints prime minister, but this appointment
must be approved by legislature and government depends on confidence of
National Assembly. President has power to dissolve legislature.
Germany Parliamentary system with chancellor as the chief minister chosen by lower
house of parliament (Bundestag), often at the head of a governing coalition of
multiple parties. Ceremonial president has relatively limited powers.
India Parliamentary system in which prime minister is head of government chosen
by lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) and depends on confidence of this
body. President is also chosen by legislature, but has relatively minor powers.
Iran President is elected and has authority vis-a-vis legislature, but real power lies
with Guardian Council of top clerics and Supreme Leader, also a cleric (ayatollah).
Other councils (Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts) also wield power.
Japan Parliamentary system in which prime minister is head of government chosen
by parliament (Diet), and depends on confidence of lower chamber (House of
Representatives). Emperor is ceremonial head of state.
Mexico President is directly elected by popular vote; top vote-getter wins even if no
majority is attained. No re-election is allowed. For decades up to 2000, presidents
in the dominant PRI party picked successors by “pointing the finger” (dedazo).
Nigeria President is directly elected in national popular vote, separate from legislature.
Prior to 1999, military leaders often led executive after coups. Largest party
prior to 2015 elections (POP) attempted to alternate northern Muslims and
southern Christians in executive posts.
Russia President is directly elected head of state. President appoints prime minister
(chairman) as head of government, subject to approval of the legislature (State
Duma). Vladimir Putin has exerted considerable authority both as president
and as prime minister.
United
Kingdom
Prime minister is elected by House of Commons, the lower chamber of
Parliament. Executive has strong powers to set agenda and pass legislation,
largely due to partisan powers. Monarch is ceremonial head of state, with no
real political power.
United States Directly elected president chosen by electoral college. Executive powers are
separate from and checked by legislature. President has veto power, but
cannot dissolve legislature. President has relatively weak partisan powers over
legislature.
250 Chapter 10: Executives
T H IN K IN G ‘
C O M P A R A T IV E LY ,
Executives do not operate in a vacuum. They are affected by other structures
̂ and institutions. The legislative branch of government is a most important ex
ample, but the institutions of federalism and constitutional authority discussed
in the previous chapters matter as well. Political parties (discussed in the next
chapter) are equally important. Moreover, features of certain executives, such as
populism, are partially shaped by factors that lie beyond political institutions,
such as high income inequality, low levels of public trust, and perhaps even cul
turally rooted styles of leadership. Much of the discussion in this chapter cannot
be isolated from how legislatures, political parties, and other institutions operate,
and, ultimately, from political society more broadly. The ways all of these features
interact will shape how executives perform.
W ith the concepts and arguments developed here, you should be able to inves
tigate other executive structures around the world and form your own hypotheses
and comparative arguments about them. There is much research to be done about
the relative powers of executives in political systems and the consequences of
these. This suggests that executive power will for a long time demand further
study in countries around the world.
C h a p te r S u m m a ry
Concepts
• Executive branches execute and administer the laws
proposed by legislatures in representative democracies.
In non-democratic or authoritarian regimes, executives will
often have a great deal of power.
Types
• Executives can be structured in two main ways—
parliamentary and presidential— though there are also
executives that combine features of both.
• The United Kingdom is the original and most famous
example of a parliamentary system, and the British model
is known as the Westminster model.
• Presidential regimes predominate in the Americas and in
Africa, including in the United States.
• Like many other countries, France, Russia, and China
combine some aspects of parliamentarism and some
aspects of presidentialism.
• Executives have formal powers outlined in the law,
partisan powers that come from influence over a
political party, and other informal powers
associated with the prominence and position of the
executive.
Causes and Effects
• There is a debate about whether parliamentarism is better
for democracy than presidentialism, because
parliamentarism should lead to fewer outsiders and less
radicalism, and it allows legislatures to remove unpopular
executives.
Chapter Review 251
Presidential systems are most prevalent in lower-income
regions and parliamentarism in Europe, so the advantage of
parliamentarism may be due to other factors.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. Consider the “Insights” boxes on Linz and on Mainwaring and
Shugart. Note that Mainwaring and Shugart disagree with only
one of Linz’s five theoretical arguments against presidentialism.
What theoretical arguments can you offer defending presiden
tialism on the other criteria?
2. Considering the experiences of other countries described in this
chapter and in Part VI, are there any institutional features you
would advocate the United States should adopt? Why?
3. Do you think populism is possible under parliamentary rule?
Why or why not?
4. We reproduce Table 10.2 here. Imagine yourself as the leader of
each of the different parties and that you are interested in
having an influence on government policy. What other parties
would you approach in an attempt to form a coalition, and what
would be your ideal coalition in each case? Why?
Powerful executives have been associated with both
centralization and populism, but also with promoting
economic development.
Parliamentary systems can operate in many ways and may
have relatively stable or unstable governments.
5. Consider Table 10.2 again. Identify the possible coalitions fol
lowing the various criteria for coalition formation:
a. Minimum winning
b. Minimum connected winning
c. Minimum size
d. Minimum number of parties
e. Median party
f. Minimum range
t a b l e io.2 Hypothetical Distribution of
Seats in Parliam ent of Santa Gabriela
Party XL L C R XR
Seats 30 7 21 27 15
• Communist demonstrators in Russia in 1999. They are carrying a picture o f former Communist dictator Joseph Stalin, who led the Soviet
Union from the m id-1920s to 1953. Even years after the fall o f the Soviet Union, some hoped for the Communist Party’s return to power.
Throughout the Cold W ar (1945 to 1991), the United States and the Soviet Union (or U.S.S.R.) were seen as political opposites in many ways. One
of the key differences was between capitalist and communist economic
systems, of course, but some of the other major differences were in how poli
tics operated. The United States was a liberal democracy in which different
political parties— mainly the Democrats and Republicans— competed for
votes and in which citizens were free to join different interest groups to
express their beliefs and opinions. The U.S.S.R. was a country
dominated by a single party and state that claimed to be the
sole legitimate representative of all the country’s people.
In political terms, the United States was a m ultiparty pluralist
democracy, while the U.S.S.R. was a single-party totalitarian
regime. This was a fundamental difference in the two coun
tries. W hile most Americans believed that the right to free
dom of association and to vote for multiple parties was based
on individual rights, the leaders of the Soviet Union argued
that the Com m unist Party alone— in collaboration with the
state— could speak for the rights of workers.
The U.S.S.R. and its eventual collapse seemed to show
that single-party rule was illegitimate, as were systems where
the state plays a major role in deciding which organizations
have a voice in politics. Yet many countries today remain
dominated by a single party. As M ap 11.1 shows, for example,
the African continent has a large number o f countries where
a single party has been dom inant since the 1990s— and many
of these are even full-fledged democracies. The United States
has only two major parties, far fewer than some other democ
racies in Europe and elsewhere that may have five or six major
parties represented in the legislature. The number of major
parties in a country thus continues to vary in the post-C old
W ar world.
Countries today also vary in how the state interacts with interest groups.
Again, the U.S. model— in which different groups compete openly for influ
ence in a “marketplace of ideas”—is not the only way a democracy can work.
W hile few people openly advocate for Soviet-style authoritarian rule, many
do advocate for much more structured interaction between major interest
IN TH IS C H A P T E R
Concepts 255
Political Parties 255
Party Systems 255
interest Groups 256
Types 257
Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All
Parties 258
Party Systems: Dominant-Party, Two-Party,
and Multiparty Systems 259
Interest Groups: Pluralism and
Corporatism 264
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems
Em erge, and What Effects Do They
Have? 267
Party Systems and Representation 267
Interest Groups and Representation 272
T H IN K IN G C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
Party System s in Sub-Saharan Africa 275
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
China
Russia
Japan •
Mexico
Germ any
253
254 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
. •*’. *
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groups and the state than we see in the United States. For example, maybe
major business groups and leading labor unions should have regular access to
the top officials in government. Indeed, many people have argued that incor
porating the decisions of all major groups into decision making will allow for
more consensus and compromise, and in the end a better democracy. There is,
in short, an ongoing debate about how the interests of citizens should be
brought together and represented. That is the subject of this chapter.
Concepts 255
Concepts
Most people will never be elected to or even run for public office, yet many will
participate in politics in some way or another, beyond the act of voting. For exam
ple, many will be active in some type of organization with a political or public goal,
whether to promote some cause or interest or just to support a candidate for public
office. Politics is not exclusively the domain of elected officials and appointed judges
but also depends on citizens organizing and mobilizing to make their voices heard.
In considering institutions in the last several chapters, we have focused on the
branches and structures of government itself: elected legislators and executives, as
well as judges that may be elected or appointed. Yet many of the most important
institutions that shape politics and policymaking in different countries are composed
of groups of individuals who are not necessarily politicians themselves. Citizens do
work in groups to have a profound impact on political life. They support their pre
ferred candidates for public office and may join a political party to do so, and then
they may volunteer time or contribute money to those parties. They also form interest
groups that share common ideas or goals, and they may volunteer time or contribute
money to those groups as well. In so doing, they bring together people with common
interests in attempts to influence politics, policy, and the lawmaking process.
Political Parties
We consider political parties first because they are closely linked to the institu
tions of government we have examined so far. The main goal of political parties
is the election of their candidates to public office. This goal is not only pragmatic
but also ideological (related to ideas, ideals, and beliefs): Parties want their
elected representatives to make policy decisions the party supports.
Because elections channel party interests and ideas into the political process,
parties must be responsive to what the electorate wants and demands. Being re
sponsive does not mean, however, that they simply do or say whatever it takes to
ensure the election of their candidates; rather, they are typically defined by a
particular set of principles, which they try to stand by. Parties must often coordi
nate large numbers of voters around a common platform, or set of ideas that the
party takes as its basic principles. Platforms help parties distinguish themselves
from other parties in competitive electoral environments. Because parties have a
role in developing political ideas and in gathering voters around these ideas, it is
often said that parties articulate and aggregate political interests.
Party System s
Countries have different numbers of major political parties, and the different pat
terns of party politics are called party systems. At one extreme, some authoritarian
regimes outlaw political parties entirely, often on the grounds that they divide
people into factions. Other countries are dominated by a single party, whether be
cause voters prefer this party in reasonably free and fair elections, or because the
dominant party has systematic advantages, or because other parties are outlawed. In
most full democracies, the citizens’ right to vote for different competing parties is
seen as indispensable. Sometimes the result of exercising this right is a party system
with two major competing parties, and sometimes it is a system with more than two
major parties. We explore these different types in greater detail later in the chapter.
political party A political organi
zation that seeks to influence
policy, typically by getting candi
dates and members elected or
appointed to public office.
party system Patterns of party
politics characterized by the
number of relevant parties in a
country.
256 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
interest groups Organizations
that make demands in the political
system on behalf of their consti
tuents and members.
Interest Groups
The other main type of organization that has a major role in comparative politics
is the interest group. These are organizations that make any number of demands
in the political system on behalf of their constituents and members; such groups
often have an active membership that pays dues to participate in and support the
organization. Interest groups generally advocate for some policy position or po
litical perspective, though they may not always seek to support specific candi
dates in elections. Like political parties, interest groups may endorse politicians
in the hope of getting support for their causes, may contribute to or support
campaigns, and so on, but they may also focus on petitioning or lobbying politi
cians to pass certain policies or laws. Interest groups want to see laws and policies
that reflect their interests or views on the issues, so these groups often make
public expressions of their political views.
Examples of interest groups are numerous and show the range of what such
groups are and do. They include organizations of business owners and labor
unions of workers, for instance. In some circumstances, interest groups may be
huge, as confederations of labor unions in some countries may represent a large
fraction of all workers or households. Interest groups can also reflect the interests
of a relatively smaller group of people and may serve different demographic
groups. In the United States, prominent examples include the National Organi
zation for Women (NOW), which advances causes on behalf of its many
Members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo marching in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, in 2003 demand information about family members
who were “disappeared” by the Argentine dictatorship between
1976 and 1983. While many interest groups correspond to economic
interests, the Mothers are an example of an interest group based on
shared commitments and beliefs about the rights of citizens.
Types 257
members, and the National Rifle Association (NRA), which represents the in
terests of many gun owners.
Some interest groups advocate on behalf of their members and also provide
certain services or products to their members. For example, the AARP (formerly
the American Association of Retired Persons) estimates that it has between
40 million and 50 million members, mostly senior citizens and people in or ap
proaching retirement. It advocates on behalf of benefits for seniors, such as Social
Security and Medicare, in addition to providing services such as supplemental
health insurance for its members. The American Automobile Association (AAA)
advocates on behalf of motorists and also provides members with travel discounts
and access to tow truck services. For our purposes, interest groups are broadly
defined but can include any organizations that advocate on behalf of a particular
cause or in favor of certain legislation or policy.
The concept of interest groups is closely linked to the concepts of civil society
and social movements. The first of these, civil society, is made up of many types
of civic associations and social organizations, including volunteer organizations,
neighborhood associations, and the like. Many of these are interest groups,
though some may not take a political stand or advocate for a specific policy posi
tion, instead preferring to mobilize group members to take action on their own
for improvement of their community, for instance. In the next chapter, we dis
cuss another set of actors and organizations known as social movements, which
are often distinct from interest groups in the ways they make their demands and
the conditions under which they operate.
Interest groups and political parties are responsible for the functions of
interest articulation and interest aggregation. Interest articulation is the pro
cess by which individuals and groups express their demands, needs, or wants in
a political system. This is especially associated with interest groups, which pub
licly express their viewpoints, though parties do some interest articulation as
well. Interest aggregation is especially associated with political parties and is the
process by which individuals’ preferences are brought together to make collec
tive decisions. In most modern countries, it is not possible for those in govern
ment to govern by knowing each individual and taking his or her unique
perspective into account. Rather, governments rely on citizens to express them
selves collectively through mechanisms such as parties and interest groups.
Citizens take on the responsibilities of making demands from their government,
and doing so regularly involves the collective action of many people. Contrast
what a single person working alone can achieve in politics with what people
working together can achieve, and you will see the importance of interest
aggregation and collective action.
Types
Political parties can take on a variety of different forms, and political systems can
have different numbers of parties. The number of different examples and types of
interest groups are too numerous to mention, but we can outline how interest
groups work in different countries by looking at something of great political im
portance: the structures of interest group representation.
civil society The set of organiza
tions in civic life outside the state
through which citizens associate
and articulate and advance their
interests; includes civic associa
tions, interest groups, and
volunteer organizations.
interest articulation The process
by which political actors express
their demands, needs, or wants in a
political system, often through
interest groups.
interest aggregation The process
by which individuals’ preferences
are brought together to make
collective decisions, often through
political parties and the party
system.
258 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
elite parties Political parties in
which membership and scope
were largely restricted to a small
number of political elites.
mass parties Parties consisting of
large numbers of citizens as mem
bers and that undertake massive
political mobilization.
catch-all parties Political parties
that are flexible on their ideological
positions and aim to attract sup
port from a broad range of interest
groups and voters.
Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All Parties
For the average observer, the most distinguishing features of different political
parties are the views they champion. For example, the Democrats and the
Republicans in the United States can be distinguished by the parties’ platforms
on issues ranging from abortion to immigration to health care to taxes. Some
parties are on the left of the economic spectrum, and others are on the right. In
the United Kingdom, for instance, the Labour party has historically been associ
ated with workers and unions, and the Conservative party is tied to business.
Some parties—such as the “Green Party” in many countries— support environ
mental groups and are in turn supported by environmentalists. In many countries,
there are parties that represent specific ethnic and racial groups, such as the
Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa that is strongly identified with the Zulu
people. There are single-issue parties— such as those specifically opposed to
immigration or favoring the legalization of marijuana— and there are even
parties with no identifiable ideology whatsoever. Some obvious distinctions thus
exist between political parties in the people they represent and the basis of
their platforms.
Alongside differences in what the policies parties want, there are differences
in how political parties are structured, an aspect that has changed over time.
By most accounts, political parties first emerged as coalitions between indi
vidual legislators and politicians who shared common political interests and/or
common beliefs; they formed their parties together to promote these common
interests. These parties were known as elite parties because their membership
and scope were largely restricted to a small number of political elites. By con
trast, the twentieth century saw massive political mobilization of large num
bers of citizens in larger parties. Communist and Socialist parties, for example,
emerged as powerful groups in many countries, and they envisioned their
structures as containing millions of workers and laborers who would pay dues,
have membership cards, and become part of a broad movement. These came to
be known as mass parties, and they were not restricted to leftist groups but
became common among both fascists and more democratic groups attempting
to include larger numbers of citizens in party politics. More recently, some
major political parties have shifted to become catch-all parties, which are flex
ible on their ideological positions as they aim to attract support from a broad
range of interest groups and voters.1 Proponents of the catch-all thesis have
argued that when one party becomes successful as a catch-all party, it puts
pressure on other parties to adopt the same approach and become more catch
all themselves.2
Other categories may exist as well, but this change over time describes many
of the major shifts in the types of parties that exist. For some scholars, however,
the distinctions between elite, mass, and catch-all parties can be overstated, be
cause all of these types are subject to common problems. One of the leading
critiques of how parties operate—which we explore further in the next chapter,
when we discuss social movements—was made by Robert Michels: It is that they
tend to operate from the top down, having “oligarchical tendencies,” regardless
of their ideology and rhetoric.3
Types 259
Party Systems: Dom inant-Party, Two-Party,
and M ultiparty System s
The many forms and structures of political parties shape the politics of different coun
tries. But as important as the parties themselves is the party system in which they
operate. How politics plays out in a given country depends on which parties can get
enough seats to have a strong voice and make a difference. A Green Party may be rela
tively inconsequential in policymaking if it never gains legislative seats because one or
two other parties dominate, but it may affect policy more if it is routinely one of five
or six parties that holds seats and is sought after as a partner in a governing coalition.
The most basic characteristic of party systems is how many major parties can be
expected to compete meaningfully in elections to participate in government. Some
countries have one party that is dominant, others have two, and yet others have
more than two major parties that compete and jockey for position. Countries with
only a single large party can be referred to as dominant-party systems. These occur
in both authoritarian and quite democratic countries. Among democracies, South
Africa is an example of a democratic country with a dominant party, the African
National Congress (ANC). Many authoritarian regimes have dominant-party sys
tems in which the governing party is in charge of politics. One particular type of
system with a dominant party is the authoritarian single-party system in which
parties besides the dominant one are banned or disallowed. Examples have come
from around the world, including many communist regimes—especially during the
Cold War, but also in countries such as China, North Korea, and Cuba today—as
well as right-wing dictatorships such as Nazi Germany and right-leaning regimes
in Asia, and many regimes with less clear ideologies in Africa up to the 1990s.4
The 100th anniversary of South Africa’s African National Congress Party (ANC) took place in
2012. ANC supporters listen to South African president Jacob Zuma address a crowd gathered
for the anniversary celebrations in Bloemfontein, South Africa.
dominant-party system Party
system in which a country contains
only one large political party that
predominates politically, often
controlling the legislative and exe
cutive branches of government.
single-party system An authori
tarian system in which parties
besides the single dominant party
are banned or disallowed.
260 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
Single-party regimes are often authoritarian, but they do have their defenders.
Proponents of single-party regimes may say these are better suited to the needs
of some countries. One such argument has been that liberal democracy is not
equally well adapted to all cultures and regions of the world. This perspective was
associated with, among others, Lee Kuan-Yew, the long-time prime minister of
Singapore. Lee’s argument in favor of single parties was based on a concept of
“Asian values” that were argued to be distinct from “Western values,” as noted in
chapter 6.5 This included an emphasis on community and deference to authority
as opposed to a foremost emphasis on individual rights, and thus a cultural ac
ceptance of dominant parties that may be most capable of delivering strong eco
nomic performance. A similar argument has been made more recently by the
Chinese Communist Party.
Another argument has held that multiparty systems can be too divisive. This
has featured prominently among leading parties in ethnically divided countries
in Africa and countries divided along sectarian lines in the Middle East. In the
African country of Uganda, for example, the current president—who has been in
power since 1986—long argued for “no-party” democracy on the grounds that
political parties in Africa would simply split the vote along ethnic lines and give
rise to tribalism or conflict. These lines of argument have been contested by many
scholars, including African and Asian scholars who see the argument for domi
nant parties or restrictions on multiparty systems as an effort by elites to justify
their own regime’s continuation in power. Nonetheless, these examples feature
prominently in discussions about whether dominant parties are appropriate
or not.
W hile many single-party systems are not democratic, some democracies have
single dominant parties as well. Examples include several countries in Africa
today, such as South Africa, which is dominated by the African National Con
gress (ANC). The major distinctions from the authoritarian regimes just dis
cussed are that voting is relatively free and fair and civil liberties are protected: It
just happens that people elect and continue to re-elect the same party to govern,
even though they could potentially make other choices. Some regimes have made
the case that a single political party can encompass the many political debates in
The Chinese Party System PAGE 424
China is the most influential and important dominant-party
system in the world today. The country is authoritarian and func
tions essentially as a single-party system. The various mechanisms
for ensuring the dominance of the Communist Party are useful to
understand, especially since the “Communist” in Communist Party
has changed so dramatically with the many changes in China.
See the case study on the Chinese party system in Part VI,
pp. 424-425. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How has China’s Communist Party developed and main
tained its dominance?
2. What are some of the mechanisms it uses to maintain this
system?
3. Do you find there to be any legitimate justifications for
single-party rule, and on what does the Chinese Commu
nist Party base its legitimacy?
Types 261
Japan has been ranked as a free country by the independent or
ganization Freedom House for every year since it began keeping
track of democracy around the world. Yet for most of that period
up to recent years, Japan was dominated by the Liberal Demo
cratic Party (LDP). How a dominant party could coexist with de
mocracy was one of the key questions of Japanese politics for
many years.
See the case study on the Japanese party system in Part VI,
pp. 491-492. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. What are the characteristics that distinguish a dominant-
party system from a single-party system?
2. What accounts for the continued victories of the LDP over
so many years?
3. Does the existence of repeated victories by the same
party call democracy into question?
two-party system A political
party system consisting of two
significant parties that have a duo
poly on opportunities to govern.
reasons we explore
a country, but most observers in Western democracies argue that the right to
choose from different parties (with their advocacy of different policies) is essen
tial to democratic governance. A characteristic of dominant-party systems is a
lack of competitiveness in national elections and, hence, a relatively certain out
come of those elections.
To many people living in advanced, industrialized democracies, the
two-party system is more common and familiar than the dominant-party
system. In two-party systems, there is a duopoly of power between two major
parties that are seen as the main contenders for most major political offices. This
duopoly usually persists over multiple elections. The two major parties present
different platforms, which often correspond to one more liberal and one more
conservative party in terms of economic policy, though this is not always the
main political distinction. Such a model can be seen in the United States with
the Democrats and Republicans, for example, as well as in many other countries
around the world, such as Spain, with its left-leaning Socialist Workers’ Party
(Partido Socialista) and right-leaning People’s Party (Partido Popular). As we
discuss in the “Causes and Effects” section, the way elections work is a major
factor in determining whether a democracy will have a two-party system. In
particular, the presence of single-member districts in legislative elections (as
discussed in chapter 9) contributes to the likelihood of two-party systems for
Yukio Hatoyama (center) of the Democratic Party of Japan
formalizes a coalition in 2009 with the leaders of the People’s
New Party and the Social Democrats. The agreement ensured
that Hatoyama would become the prime minister and
brought an end to more than fifty years of nearly continuous
rule by the Liberal Democratic Party.
262 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
multiparty system Apolitical
party system consisting of more
than two significant parties that
have opportunities to govern.
fragmentation (of party
system) Contrasting with concen
tration, the extent to which politi
cal power and representation in a
party system are characterized by
relatively large numbers of relati
vely small parties.
concentration (of party
system) Contrasting with frag
mentation, the extent to which
political power and representation
in a party system are characterized
by relatively small numbers of
relatively large.parties.
Two-party systems may seem natural and stable to those who have lived their
lives in them, but they are not the most common party system in a democracy.
In fact, most democracies have more than two major parties. The scholar Arend
Lijphart studied thirty-six long-standing democracies and found that multiparty
systems with three or more parties were the norm in about half of these coun
tries.6 Some multiparty systems have two parties that are strongest year in and
year out, but these compete against a handful of other parties that regularly win
enough seats to influence the outcomes of elections. Whereas in two-party sys
tems one party or the other will typically win a given election by taking a major
ity of seats, multiparty systems quite often result in no party winning a majority
because the vote is divided more ways. To recall some of the lessons of chapters 9
and 10, a no-majority win often happens when legislative elections are based on
proportional representation, and it often results in executive branches that func
tion with a coalition of multiple parties.
W ithin these different categories— dominant-party, two-party, and multi
party systems—the specific nature of the party system can still vary from case to
case. For instance, a multiparty system can be considered relatively fragmented,
with many small parties, or relatively coherent or concentrated, with a small
number of larger parties.7 Two-party systems may see frequent alternation of
power between the two, or may see one party that is stronger and wins more
often for an extended period. Dominant-party systems may feature different de
grees of dominance by the leading party, ranging from single-party regimes with
100 percent of the seats in a legislature to systems where a dominant party wins
elections routinely but narrowly.
Counting the actual number of parties that matter is more challenging than it
might sound. To determine the nature of a party system, assume one wants to
consider only relatively serious parties that have a chance of winning a reasonable
number of seats. As a hypothetical example, take the United States House of
Representatives with its 435 members. I f 434 were from the Republicans and
Democrats, while one representative was a member of the Socialist Party or Lib
ertarian Party, would it be reasonable to call this a multiparty system? Most
would say it would remain a two-party system. W hat about the United Kingdom,
Consensus-Based Politics in Germany PAGE 452
Germany, like many other countries, is a multiparty system in
which it is common for a relatively small number of parties to wield
most of the influence. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have been the major players
there for years, though several other smaller parties have retained
influence and sometimes been in government coalitions.
3. Thinking back to chapter 9, what sorts of coalitions
would you expect to emerge in a multiparty system, and
which parties would you expect to enter coalitions
together?
2. What does a multiparty system imply for the quality of
governance?
1. What factors might account for Germany having more
than two important parties?
See the case study on the German party system in Part VI,
pp. 452-453. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
Types 263
where the Conservative and Labour parties have long been the two largest, but
the Liberal Democrats regularly command a substantial fraction of the seats that
is enough to prevent either of the other two from winning a majority? As of 2012,
the Liberal Democrats were in a position where they were a necessary part of the
Conservative-led governing coalition. Is this a two-party or multiparty system?
Could we call it a “two-and-a-half”-party system?
Perhaps surprisingly-, the answer for many political scientists is yes, we can
say a country has “two-and-a-half” major parties. There are a number of metrics
used to measure the effective number o f parties, and these are designed to get at
how many major parties of consequence a system contains.8 Another way to look
at this issue is how fractionalized or fragmented a party system is, on a range
between a perfectly concentrated dominant-party system to a perfectly frag
mented system in which each seat goes to a different party.9
We will not explore the formulas in great detail here, but a simple example can
illustrate the difference between a more fragmented and a more concentrated
party system. Table 11.1 gives some fictional countries, for which any resem
blance to actual countries is coincidental. The middle columns reflect the propor
tion of legislative seats won by each of the five largest parties in descending order.
So PI is the largest party, and P5 is the smallest (if there is a P5; these systems
have different numbers of parties). The formula for the effective number of par
ties takes the proportion of seats held by each party, squares each one, and adds
these squares together. The result is a fraction, and the calculation then takes the
inverse. So a system with two parties each having 50 percent of the seats would
have l/[(0.50)2 + (0.50)2] = 2 as the effective number of parties. And a system
with three parties each having 33.3 percent of the seats would have l/[(0.333)2 +
(0.333)2 + (0.333)2] = 3 as the effective number of parties. This formula gener
ates the results in Table 11.1 for less clear-cut cases.
The effective number of parties calculated by this formula should be close
to what one might expect from the proportions of seats won. There is a clear
dominant-party system and a clear two-party system, even if other tiny parties
compete in those two countries. In Duopolia, the two small parties matter more
than the small one in Monopolia because they can tip the balance of power from
P I to P2 or vice-versa. The United Realm looks like it should have about “two-
and-a-half” or three parties: The third-largest is only half as powerful as the two
largest parties, but it is also big enough to tip the balance of power once again.
Fragmentia, meanwhile, has close to five meaningful parties, but we probably
would not think of P3, P4, or P5 as being quite as important as P I or P2. By
contrast, Coalitiastan has two clear leading parties, and it looks more concen
trated than Fragmentia, so it has a smaller effective number of parties but will
also require governing coalitions for as long as this distribution of parties stands.
As a result, it is more than just a two-party system. In fact, P3, P4, and P5 are all
important, and either of the big parties would need at least two of them to make
a coalition government; the effective number of parties is more than three.
A final aspect of party systems to consider is party system institutionalization,
or the extent to which a party system is stable and remains so over time. It has
several aspects.10 One is the persistence and electoral success of parties over time.
Do parties endure for a long time once they are established, or do they come and
effective number of parties
A measure designed to capture the
number of meaningful parties in a
party system that weights the
number of parties represented by
their size.
party system institutionalization
The degree to which a party
system is stable and remains so
over time, as measured by such
characteristics as the persistence of
parties, the stability of their ideolo
gies, and the degree to which they
are distinct from the specific indivi
duals that lead them.
264 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
t a b l e 11.1 N um ber of Parties
Proportion of Legislative Seats Won (%)
Country P I P2 P3 P4 P5 Effective No. o f Parties
People’s Republic
of Monopolia
99 1 1.02
United States of
Duopolia
49 48 2 1 2.12
United Realm 40 40 20 2.78
Federation of
Fragmentia
27 25 17 16 15 4.71
Coalitiastan 38 35 9 9 9 3.43
Note: P = Party.
go, with old ones fading away and new parties emerging constantly? A more
volatile party system is less institutionalized. Another aspect is the degree to
which parties have stable ideologies, programs, or platforms. This relates to the
question of whether a party is coherent and cohesive or not.11 A final aspect is the
degree to which parties operate as institutions, as opposed to being focused on
certain individuals. Where a party system is more institutionalized, a party’s
name has significance: It is likely to be around and to be associated with a certain
set of ideas. By contrast, in less institutionalized party systems, a party’s name (or
brand) is less meaningful and more often subject to the whims of personalistic
leaders.
Party systems are often more institutionalized in longstanding democracies
and less institutionalized in less-established democracies, but this is not always
the case. In France’s well-established democracy, for example, the main party of
the center-right has gone through many changes in name and structure in recent
years, even as the right has won the presidency regularly for nearly twenty years.
Conversely, other countries, such as Chile and Ghana, developed institutional
ized party systems soon after becoming democracies in the 1990s.12 Despite
these exceptions, the tendency persists: Substantial breakdowns of party system
institutionalization are more common in fragile democracies, as the case of
Russia showed from the 1990s to the current authoritarian era dominated by
President Vladimir Putin (see the next “Case in Context” box).
Interest Groups: Pluralism and Corporatism
Like political parties, interest groups are distinguished from one another by the
specific ideas they hold as well as by their structure, which varies widely. Apart
from the forms and functions of specific groups, there are also different patterns
of how interest group representation works in politics. The most fundamental
distinction is between countries where interest groups compete openly to influ
ence government decision making— a pattern known as pluralism— and countries
Types 265
where there is a formal, established relationship between certain interest groups
and state power—a pattern known as corporatism. The distinctions between the
two forms of interest group representation can be summarized in terms of
whether specific interest groups are identified as having a monopoly on the rep
resentation of a specific interest; both forms are ideal types, and many countries
have had some mixture of the two forms.
Pluralism reflects the idea that interest groups compete in a “marketplace of
ideas.” Countries that have pluralist politics will often have large numbers of
competing groups that strive to affect policy. Under a pure form of pluralism,
none of these groups would have privileged access to the government or receive
preferential treatment, even if they would sometimes win and sometimes lose
arguments about what the government should do.
Under corporatism, on the other hand, certain major groups are designated
as representatives of certain interests, and these have a more structured interac
tion with the government in power and with the state’s administration (or bu
reaucracy). Advocates of corporatism sometimes assert that people “naturally”
belong to certain interest groups— such as workers belonging to labor unions and
business owners belonging to business organizations— and that organizing on
this basis is thus important for political representation. Rather than an open
competition among all interest groups, corporatist arrangements seek consensus
based on regular interactions between designated groups and the state. Using the
same root word as corporatism, one way to understand the phenomenon is that
there is “incorporation” of specific interest groups into the decision-making
structures of the state.13
Since many of the major decisions made in politics are about economics and
economic policy, the most important interest groups in corporatist countries are
usually organizations representative of business and those representative of
labor. Business and organized labor confer with the state on issues such as
wages, benefits, taxes, and policy toward foreign capital and international com
petition. At the national level, the bargaining between groups often involves
peak organizations, which are top-level associations that bring together many
like-minded organizations. Examples include national labor federations made
pluralism A system of interest
group representation in which
groups compete openly to in
fluence government decisions and
public policy, and in which specific
groups do not have official prefe
rential access to decision making.
corporatism A system of interest
group representation in which
certain major groups are officially
designated as representatives of
certain interests, and have a more
structured interaction with the
government in power and with the
state’s administration.
peak organization Top associa
tions, such as labor federations and
large business organizations, that
represent common interests by
bringing together many like-
minded organizations.
Personalism and the Party System in Russia PAGE 535
Russia illustrates the challenge and importance of party system
institutionalization. The country has seen some major parties
come and go while a single individual, Vladimir Putin, has accu
mulated more power. Even in the absence of single-party rule, a
poorly institutionalized party system can facilitate authoritarian
tendencies.
See the case study on the Russian party system in Part VI,
pp. 535-536. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. Building on the observations of previous chapters, how
do weak institutions in Russia facilitate the rise of a “strong
man” like Putin?
2. What might account for the poorly institutionalized party
system in Russia?
3. Which seems to have come first, the weak party system or
the personalism of Putin?
266 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
IN S IG H T S
W ho Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City
by Robert D ahl ”
Dahl’s work focuses on one city— New Haven, Connecticut— and documents how different sets of actors and interests
have important roles in governing. It has become one of the
foundational descriptions of how pluralism operates. Dahl finds
that different aspects of policy and political decisions were influ
enced by quite different groups and not always by the same
elites. The book argues that New Haven’s social elite was not the
same as its economic elite, and that the business community was
not always the dominant player in decisions. Elected politicians
wielded considerable power in shaping policy, but they were
also responsive to interest groups and needed to sell their pro
grams to voters at large. Among interest groups, the sets of actors
that predominated differed. Dahl examined decisions about
urban planning and development and education, as well as nom
inations for public office. While the business sector played a role
in some aspects of decision making, the popularly elected mayor
and appointed boards wielded significant influence. Dahl’s work
on the functioning and benefits of pluralism countered the view
held by others that in a capitalist democracy, a single “power
elite” dominates across the many aspects and areas of politics.”
Some critics continue to argue that pluralist accounts understate
the extent to which economic elites can shape politics.
Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
up of many different unions, or business organizations representing many dif
ferent companies or industries.
Corporatism has been a major force in contemporary history. In fact, some
have argued that the twentieth century was the “century of corporatism.”15 Over
the course of the twentieth century, corporatism was influential across much of
Europe and Latin America and in many parts of Asia and Africa. The geographic
and historical reach of this phenomenon has led to many variants: Some are more
social and some more pro-market liberal in Europe, while some forms in Latin
American have been more state-led, others more led by labor, and yet others
more inclusive of the peasantry.16 Some analysts have advocated corporatism as a
relatively successful and harmonious way to promote economic growth and de
velopment, while others have criticized it as favoring specific groups over indi
vidual rights and lending itself to exclusionary politics. Countries such as Mexico
may provide evidence for either perspective.
It is possible to distinguish between more authoritarian and more democratic
forms of corporatism.17 In quite a few instances, corporatism has overlapped with
dominant-party systems, and a single leading party undertakes the coordination
of different interest groups. This has often been an authoritarian form of corpo
ratism in which interest-group participation is highly regulated by the state. Ver
sions of these circumstances can be seen in many single-party countries. Indeed,
corporatism was especially noteworthy for part of the twentieth century as a
strategy by which central governments could co-opt different groups, bringing
them into the political system on terms set by the state or the leading party. In
corporated groups included workers and unions, business elites, peasants or
farmers, and even students. This featured prominently in Latin American coun
tries, for instance, where one of the leading examples is Mexico between the late
1930s and 2000 (see the “Case in Context” box).
Corporatism happened under authoritarian regimes and dominant-party re
gimes in many cases, but it is not limited to dominant- or single-party systems,
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 267
_ , ■ . : : .
_ _
A CASE IN CONTEXT ,
–| The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico pageso6
As noted in chapter 6, Mexico was once called “The Perfect Dic
tatorship.” Part of the reason for this name was the ability of
Mexico’s PRI party to bring major interest groups under its
banner. These included labor, business, and the state bureau
cracy, as well as the armed forces. This broad-based form of cor
poratism made it very difficult for competitors to defeat the PRI,
and the party governed uninterrupted from the 1930s to 2000.
See the case study on the Mexican party system in Part VI,
pp. 506-507. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How are interest group representation and the party
system related in this case, and how did corporatism
relate to the ability of the dominant party to retain power?
2. How was Mexican corporatism distinct from many other
versions of corporatism?
3. What were some of the causes of the end of single-party
dominance, and how do these relate to the corporatism
that prevailed for so long?
and in fact has featured prominently in many of Europe’s multiparty systems,
especially in social-democratic countries of northern Europe. This can be seen as
a more democratic form of corporatism. Many of the political systems of north
ern Europe are consensus based and have been multiparty regimes in which cor
poratism has played a major role. We now examine the pros and cons of pluralism
and corporatism.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems
Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have?
There are many questions about cause and effect in the study of parties, party
systems, and interest groups. W hy do different party systems emerge? W hy do
some countries have greater party system institutionalization than others? W hy
do certain types of parties—such as Communist parties, social democratic par
ties, conservative pro-business parties, or fascist parties— emerge in some coun
tries and not others? W hy do some interest groups have greater impact in some
places than others? We cannot address all of these here, but we encourage further
research on this range of questions. We will focus on three questions: the causes
of the emergence of party systems, the consequences of party systems on the
quality of representation, and the consequences of different patterns of interest-
group representation.
Party System s and Representation
Party systems are closely related to how political representation works. In some
senses, party systems are both a consequence of how representation works and a
cause of how representation takes shape. We examine both sides briefly.
W h a t F actors S hape P a r ty Systems?
Looking first at what causes different types of party systems to emerge, one main
factor is the type of electoral system, as we discussed in chapter 9. Recall that a
basic distinction among types of electoral systems is between district systems and
268 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
proportional representation systems; in their simplest forms, the former has leg
islative elections within the geographic subdivisions of a country, while the latter
allocates legislative seats according to the overall proportions of seats parties win
in an election.18 W hat would these different types of systems imply for whether
two-party or multiparty systems will emerge?
In democracies that have single-member district systems, there is a pro
nounced tendency for two-party systems to emerge and persist, while multiparty
systems are quite common in countries that use proportional representation. For
many analysts, the electoral system itself seems to have an impact on the number
of viable parties that emerge. The logic behind this is intuitive. Proportional
representation, for example, is designed to accurately reflect the overall distribu
tion of preferences for different parties, and the result is often many different
parties winning legislative seats. District-based representation, by contrast, often
favors relatively large parties that can win a plurality of votes, and tends to result
in fewer seats for small parties. The consequence of district systems as opposed
to proportional representation was most famously associated with Maurice
Duverger (see the “Insights” box on his book Political Parties).
O f course, the electoral system is not the only cause of political party systems.
Geographical, historical, social, and economic factors are also important, and
certain political traditions or political cultures may lend themselves to more con
centrated party systems or more fragmented systems.19 Africa, for example, was
home to a large number of one-party states in the 1960s to 1980s. The reason
may be seen as geographical, because tendencies persist in certain regions of the
world (with countries sometimes modeling their political systems on those of
their neighbors), or as economic because it applies to countries with certain levels
of income. These tendencies in regions and in individual countries are also his
torical and social. Again in Africa, the historical context for many one-party
regimes was the struggle for independence and freedom under a leading nation
alist party, a phenomenon that can still be seen today with dominant parties even
INSIGHTS Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties]
by hiaurice Duverger
Duverger’s work in this book and related articles discusses numerous features of political parties and party systems, but it
is most renowned for its establishment of “Duverger’s Law.” The
core result of this finding was that two-party systems tend to
emerge where elections are based on a simple plurality vote. The
logic is that parties on each side of the political spectrum (left and
right) will recognize that they cannot afford to split the vote in a
plurality system. To use an example, if six parties on the right each
got 10 percent of the vote, their combined total would be 60 per
cent, but individually they would lose to the Communists if the
Communists had, say, 40 percent of the vote. The parties on the
right would therefore work together— to collaborate on selecting
candidates and even to merge— in order to compete with party
on the other side. The left would do this as well, leading to a two-
party system. By contrast, Duverger finds that proportional repre
sentation is conducive to multiparty systems because it
encourages small parties, and other systems such as runoff elec
tions have effects in between these two extremes. Duverger sug
gests that this is a virtual law of political life, and is true in so many
cases that it is often seen as one of the strongest findings in politi
cal science, though he and others do note occasional exceptions.
Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties], Paris: A. Colin, 1951.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 269
IN S IG H TS
Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis
by Giovanni Sartori &
I n a major investigation of the origins, types, and functioning of
I different political parties, Sartori finds that different political
party systems emerge due to differences in beliefs among
groups in society, and not just due to the type of electoral system
used. He outlines a wide range of types of party systems that can
be classified as one-party systems, two-party systems, and more
limited and extreme forms of party “pluralism” with three to five
or more than five parties. In Sartori’s argument, ideological dis
tance and “segmentation” between groups is a key variable.
Where groups in society are rather close together on the political
spectrum, a multiparty system emerges with a relatively small
number of parties. By contrast, where people are deeply divided
and fragmented by ideology, a more fractious multiparty system
is likely to emerge. In one-party countries, Sartori sees several
types of party systems that range from totalitarian regimes (like
Nazi Germany or Soviet communism) to more pragmatic domi
nant parties; the “ideological intensity” of the dominant party
again matters in the specific party system that takes shape.
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1976.
in relatively democratic countries such as South Africa and Tanzania. Yet we
must also be careful not to generalize about regions, as we show in the “Thinking
Comparatively” section at the end of the chapter: All continents have mixes of
party systems. Africa has two-party systems and fragmented multiparty systems
as well as dominant-party systems, and the same goes for other continents.
A leading argument linking social and other political factors to the party
system holds that which parties emerge and where parties stand depend largely
on ideology and the beliefs of the citizens. This may sound obvious, but it is quite
distinct from the argument that the electoral rules and other institutions deter
mine what party systems will look like. Parties often have deep roots in an ideol-
ogy or in a social base, and party systems will be shaped by the parties that
emerge. A prominent example would be Communist parties around the world,
which traditionally have had a strong ideological basis in Marxism and strong
support among members of the working class and labor unions (as well as intel
lectuals in some cases). The presence and strength of Communist parties on the
left has also had the effect of shaping other parties on the right of the political
spectrum. The link between the working class, Marxist ideology, and Commu
nist parties shows that party systems are shaped not only by the electoral system,
but also by social realities and political culture. Other examples include Chris
tian Democratic parties or other parties on the center-right in Europe and the
Americas that are influenced by a degree of social conservatism. A prominent
scholar who has worked on ideology and party systems is Giovanni Sartori.
H o w D o P a r ty System s S hape P olitical O utcom es?
In addition to being caused by various factors, party systems are themselves
causes of political outcomes. In particular, they may shape whether politics are
very moderate or more extreme. For example, one consequence of a two-party
system under many circumstances is the tendency of the major parties to try to median voter The voter who is
attract the hypothetical median voter, or the voter who is theoretically in the theoretically exactly in the middle
middle of the distribution of voters in a certain geographic area. I f we assume for of the distribution of voters.
270 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
strategic voting The practice
of voting in a way that does not
reflect one’s ideal preference, in
order to prevent electoral out
comes one thinks are worse,
such as voting for a second-best
candidate one thinks can reaso
nably win.
Political Spectrum
Figure 11.1 Voter Distribution and Political Party Strategy with Median Voter.
the moment that voters in a given district can be put on a spectrum from most
liberal on the left to most conservative on the right, as in Figure 11.1, then the
voter in the exact center is shown by the vertical line. In this example, the Con
servative party will generally capture the votes to the right of center, and the
Liberal party will capture the votes to the left of center. I f both the Liberals and
the Conservatives are strategic and rational, they will each do what they must to
capture the entire half of the electorate that is on their side—plus a little more.
Since the Liberals know that people on the far left are unlikely to vote Conserva
tive, and the Conservatives know that people on the far right are unlikely to vote
Liberal, the best strategy becomes trying to capture those represented by the
median voter—the person right in the middle. In this case, the median voter is
the swing voter (i.e., one who could go either way), and winning the swing vote
is the key to getting a majority: 50 percent of the vote plus at least one person.
The major parties will therefore propose policies that appeal to the median voter.
Visually, you can think of this as the parties positioning their platforms where
the vertical line is: Both become relatively moderate and centrist.
O f course, parties must try to attract the median voter while still retaining the
votes of the ideologues at their respective ends of the political spectrum. Yet
those more extreme voters on the far left and far right also make their own ratio
nal calculations. They know that not voting for the large party on their side
(when there are multiple parties on a side) may help tip the election to the other
side. A very conservative voter, for example, has a reason to vote for a moderate
Conservative party if doing so helps prevent the Liberal party from winning in
stead. This thinking discourages relatively extreme voters from voting for smaller
and more extreme parties. Voters thus engage in strategic voting, or voting in
ways that do not reflect their ideal position, in order to prevent outcomes they
think are even worse. Since swing voters are often the deciding factor in winning
or losing an election, some analysts suggest that single-member districts and
two-party systems draw candidates and voters alike toward the middle, in the
direction of the median voter, therefore having a moderating impact on
representation.
There are several reasons why a system with two dominant parties might not
lead to moderation, however. In particular, one could imagine that the distribu
tion of voters does not always look like what is shown in Figure 11.1. Perhaps it
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 271
An Economic Theory of Democracy
This work by Downs is known especially for its theorizing about the median voter. The book develops the logic noted
in this section, in which parties rationally adjust their platforms to
appeal to the median voter. Downs does not, however, assume
that all politics consists of appealing to the median voter. He
notes the limitations to the median voter theorem and the con
ditions under which it will not hold. This work built on research in
economics and political strategy and applied it to the study of
elections and political parties. In addition to developing the spe
cific median voter model, this form of research inspired much of
the work in rational choice theory. According to this theory, most
behavior of individuals or groups (such as political parties and
interest groups) can be explained by actors attempting to maxi
mize their economic or political gains.
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper
Collins, 1957.
looks more like that in Figure 11.2, which is known as a bimodal distribution
because it has two peaks: many voters who are fairly Liberal, and many voters
who are fairly Conservative, but not many in the center or at either extreme. In
this case, the Liberals might try to maximize their vote by offering platforms that
appeal to voters on the left, about where the vertical line is shown. The Conserva
tives will do the same on the right. If they failed to do this, they would open
themselves up to defeat by another new party that could claim more of the vote
by positioning themselves strategically. For instance, if this country had exactly
one hundred people, and the Liberals went for the center, then another party—
call them the Left Party— could position themselves just to the left of the Liber
als, and the Conservatives would position themselves just to the right of the
Liberals. The Conservatives would sweep the vote on the right, and the Left
would take the vote to the left. The Liberals would thus be committing political
suicide. More likely is that the Liberals and Conservatives would each go for the
M edian voter M edian voter M edian voter
on the left overall o n th e right
i f e i h
L e ft Party R ig h t PartyLiberals C onservatives r
Po litical Spectrum
Figure 11.2 Bimodal Voter Distribution.
272 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
vertical line to capture the votes on their respective sides. In this case, a system
with two dominant parties leads to polarization, not moderation.
We return to this example in questions at the end of the chapter. For now,
though, you can imagine how such a political system might develop into a more
competitive multiparty system, as new parties might emerge in an attempt to
position themselves strategically. The key point is that this distribution of voters
within this party system does not result in the two big parties going for the
median voter if the parties are strategic and rational.
There are other reasons, too, why parties might not attempt to appeal to the
median voter. Imagine a case where voters cannot simply be arrayed along a spec
trum from right to left, and you will see that predicting their voting is much
more complex.20 Since people care about many different issues, such as religious
or moral issues and the economy, it is not always clear what the left and the right
will mean. Finally, it has been observed in the American context, for example,
that there are essentially “safe seats” in many districts because certain parts of the
country are quite liberal or quite conservative; parties as a whole are therefore less
likely to move toward the center, because each legislator responds to his or her
own district’s voters.21
It should be noted that the ways dominant-party and single-party regimes
shape political outcomes is not as straightforward as it might seem; even in these
systems, there are debates about the quality of representation. For over a century,
many communists claimed that only a Communist Party could truly represent
and speak on behalf of workers,22 but the collapse of communism around the
world seemed to discredit this alternative to the multiparty democracy associated
with liberal individualism.23 Similarly, single-party fascist regimes—including
Nazi Germany—led to an association of single-party regimes with authoritarian
and even totalitarian rule. The result was that prominent theories about democ
racy often assume multiparty competition to be the best form of political repre
sentation.24 This did not, however, mean that all multiparty systems extend the
principle of competition in the same way in the realm of interest groups. In mul
tiparty democracies, interest groups may operate in relatively open competition
under pluralism or in a more structured fashion using corporatist arrangements,
as we discuss next.
Interest Groups and Representation
Pluralism and corporatism are each advocated by their respective proponents on
the basis that they provide better and more effective representation. To start with
pluralism, this theory describes how interest groups work in some countries, but
it is also a theory about how interests should operate. Some theorists called “plu-
ralists” openly advocate that this is the best approach for a government system:
The government should listen to the competing arguments laid out by different
social interests and mediate between them. This is closely linked to classical lib
eral ideas about democratic politics, which hold that government decisions
should be based on respect for individual liberties. In the case of pluralism, an
emphasis is on the equal opportunity for different groups to influence politics,
with guarantees of rights to organize and assemble to petition the government.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 273
For instance, if workers in a given industry are seeking a nationwide increase in
the minimum wage, but industrial capitalists fear this will harm profits and eco
nomic growth, it becomes the role of elected representatives to listen to the pop
ulace, process its demands, and respond accordingly.25
Yet there are also major critiques of the pluralist model. As is the case with
presidentialism and other institutions in previous chapters, the model used in the
United States is not presumed to be the best model for all democracies. The cri
tique of pluralism can take at least two major forms that relate to interest groups.
The first is that pluralism in essence gets bogged down due to the actions of
special interest groups and is an inefficient way to make good decisions about
effective policy.
One of the main challenges to assumptions about pluralism is the existence of
the collective action problem. People do not necessarily participate in interest collective action The pursuit of
groups for all the beliefs they support. Rather, they consider the benefits of their political or social goals by mem-
own action and the costs of undertaking the action. This is especially true with bersofagrou p.
public goods, where if a benefit for a certain person is small, then joining an in
terest group may not be worth the effort. The same is true if costs to the indi
vidual of joining the group are high. Achieving a desired result is rarely due to
one more person’s action, so people have an incentive to be free riders: Let others
do the work and hope to participate in the collective reward.
The other critique of pluralism comes from the perspective that corporatism
does a better job at integrating interests and ensuring the structured representa
tion of major groups in society. The argument draws upon a variety of empirical
examples, ranging from economic growth successes in East Asia to harmonious
social policies in Europe. In terms of economic growth, the likes of Japan and
IN SIG H TS
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups and The Rise and Decline of Nations:
Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities
byMancurOlspn
Olson’s early book, The Logic of Collective Action, is the basis of the field of study in how collective action occurs, as out
lined previously. The logic of collective action applies to interest
groups as well as other actors we discuss in the next chapter.
Rather than assuming people will easily form interest groups to
press for public demands, Olson noted the free rider dilemma
and the tendency of interest groups to function better when
they provide specific benefits for their members. This is a critique
of pluralism in the sense that interest groups cannot be assumed
to form to represent diverse interests. Olson extended this cri
tique in his later work, The Rise and Decline of Nations, in which he
argued that the accumulation of special interests over time slows
down economic growth because governments respond to po
litically powerful actors, rather than to the needs of the economy.
One empirical example is striking: The United Kingdom, a victor
in World War II, did worse economically for several decades than
Germany and Japan, which lost the war. Olson attributes this to
the continuity of special interests in the United Kingdom as con
trasted with the elimination of many of those interests for the
defeated countries.
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965; and The Rise and Decline
of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982.
274 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
South Korea from the 1950s to 1980s were countries where scholars found that
close linkages between the state and top business organizations (as well as
labor) were important in setting national goals and reaching high levels of eco
nomic performance.26 Meanwhile, in the context of long-established democra
cies in Europe, corporatist arrangements were argued to be a political solution
that gave rise to consensus-based decision making. This was reputed to be
useful in reducing social tensions and in ensuring a relative political harmony
between business and labor, since both were regularly integrated into political
decision making.
O f course, corporatism can also have major disadvantages. It does not reflect
an “arms-length” relationship between interest groups and the state. This raises
the question about how the groups that participate in corporatist arrangements
are chosen, and how this representation changes over time. W hat seems like
useful collaboration at certain moments can seem like “crony capitalism” and
favoritism at others. In addition, the structured relationships may favor some of
the institutions that are powerful in the status quo. For example, who is more
truly representative of American industry, Google or General Motors? While
this may seem a minor issue, corporatism may tend to “calcify” relations between
the state and certain actors. If the automobile industry and auto workers have
close relationships with the state for decades, will they combine to support the
General Motors of the world rather than the Googles? While corporatism has
been seen by its proponents as facilitating policymaking, it may also be prone to
make real reform more difficult. The economies of Europe in the 1990s faced a
major challenge to economic growth as reform of labor and business relations
became difficult. In situations where reform is needed, corporatist arrangements
can impede economic adjustments by protecting the status quo for many workers
and businesses.
Corporatism also tends to result in decision making by a relatively small
number of elites, specifically those in government, business, and labor. In a more
severe form, corporatism has been highly exclusionary and authoritarian. The
idea of corporatism even contributed to totalitarian ideologies such as the early
years of German Nazism in the 1930s and the period of Italian Fascism under
Benito Mussolini from the 1920s to the 1940s. For many, this association with
totalitarian regimes discredited corporatism as corporatist arrangements in
fringed individual rights in favor of groups and the state; totalitarian regimes
provide the worst examples of this. To return to the school of thought favoring
pluralism, James Madison and the authors of The Federalist Papers (1787/1961)
argued that it is natural for people to form different “factions,” and the best way
to prevent any one of these from becoming too powerful and tyrannical was to
encourage these different groups to compete. The debate between pluralism and
corporatism is thus unresolved, with different empirical cases offering different
lessons. Indeed, the debate may not be fully resolved because many countries
feature elements of both models.
Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 275
Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, different political party systems have flourished at different times and in different places around the world.
The United States has been a relatively stable two-party system for decades, while
some countries in Western Europe have often had multiparty regimes, where
parties that perform the best in elections often do not win a majority and thus
need to make coalitions with other parties to govern.
Meanwhile, single-party and dominant-party regimes have rarely been
found in Western Europe since the end of World W ar II, but have been much
more common in Asia, the Middle East, occasionally in Latin America, and in
Eastern Europe under Soviet rule. Africa is a final region of the world that has
seen many single-party and dominant-party regimes. One may be tempted to
reach some relatively straightforward conclusions about what shapes party sys
tems: Poorer regions and developing countries are likelier to have single-party
systems. Leaders in Africa and scholars alike have at different times offered
justifications and explanations for single-party dominance. The same has held
in countries from Syria to Singapore. One might even hear (or make) argu
ments that these regions are culturally or politically unprepared for multiparty
democracy.
However, one should not jump to such a conclusion. To take Africa as an ex
ample, the continent also has a number of other types of party systems, from
multiparty competition in the tiny country of Benin to a stable two-party system
in Ghana. Moreover, there is a major distinction between the quite democratic
dominant-party systems in countries like Botswana or South Africa and the
more authoritarian dominant-party systems in countries like Cameroon or
Ethiopia.
This illustrates the importance of avoiding excessive generalizations that do
not match up with the evidence. In particular, it is advisable to engage in a bit of
“comparative checking” so as not to generalize from one or two cases. Indeed, the
particular cases that do not fit the generalization would be useful ones to exam
ine further, if they are “deviant cases” as noted in chapters 2 and 5.
There are several causes and consequences of different party systems and pat
terns of interest-group representation, and this area is still the subject of consid
erable research and debate. W hile it seems that electoral institutions do help
shape party systems, these systems are also influenced by ideologies, cultures,
economics, histories, and many other factors. Similar factors also shape how
plural or corporatist is the state’s relationship to interest groups. In turn, the pat
terns that emerge in party systems and interest group representation affect what
citizens do and how they vote and participate in politics. This chapter has thus
begun to give a bigger role in politics to those citizens who may never consider
themselves politicians. This focus on the actions and behaviors of groups of citi
zens will continue into our next chapters, where we look at the many ways people
identify politically and express their interests and beliefs through different kinds
of action.
THINKING
COMPARATIVELY
K E Y M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Com parative Checking
Comparative politics will often be
based on the examination of a small
number of case studies. This allows
the analyst to dig into the case in
depth, but it also has the disadvan
tage of giving a “small sample size” of
just a couple of cases. Unless one uses
quantitative and statistical methods,
one often does not subject the hy
pothesis to full testing across all the
possible cases. A danger of this can
be making inferences too quickly
without keeping sight of whether the
argument applies beyond the cases
in the study. Ideally, we would like to
make arguments that apply to more
than just the cases we examine. A
partial solution to this challenge is
comparative checking, or relatively
brief glances at other cases to see if
the argument holds up or has obvi
ous flaws. This does not mean doing a
full study of more and more cases,
but rather briefly reviewing other
cases to see if one’s conclusions seem
to work at a glance. In layman’s terms,
a bit of comparative checking can
help tell if an argument “passes the
sniff test.” If so, one has greater confi
dence in the argument; if not, the
comparative check can be useful in
forcing the analyst to revisit the
argument to see if it can be modified
to make it more applicable to
other cases.
276 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups
C h a p te r S u m m a ry
Concepts
Political parties are organizations that have the aim of
nominating candidates and electing representatives to
public office.
• Political party systems are different patterns in the number
of major political parties and in the patterns of party
politics.
Interest groups are organizations that advocate for some
policy perspective or political goal, and they may or may
not support specific candidates.
Types
Political parties have taken forms including elite parties,
mass parties, and contemporary catch-all parties.
• Political party systems can be divided into dominant-party
systems, two-party systems, and multiparty systems.
• Interest groups can compete with one another for political
influence in a system known as pluralism, or they may have
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. Look back at the voter distributions in Figures 11.1 and 11.2.
Imagine you are trying to start a third party called the Right Party
to compete with the Liberals and Conservatives in a country that
those two parties have dominated politically. You believe that
the Conservatives are too moderate and would ideally like to po
sition yourself as far to the right as possible. Strategically, what
would be your best position on the political spectrum, keeping
in mind that the height of the peaks in the figures reflects how
many voters there are on that part of the spectrum? Would your
strategy be different for Figure 11.1 as opposed to Figure 11.2?
2. Building on the last question, now place yourself in the position
of the Conservatives. What would prevent parties from beating
you? If the Right Party comes along, how could you prevent this
other party from taking your place? What argument would you
make to voters about why they should vote for you rather than
a party that is farther out on the political spectrum?
3. The United States has long been associated with the ideas of
pluralism. Are there any advantages that could be had from
more structured interactions with the state under
corporatism.
Causes and Effects
Political party systems are shaped by electoral rules as well
as other factors such as ideology and social and historical
influences.
• The political party system itself also affects politics by
helping to determine whether major parties tend toward
the center of the political spectrum or not.
• Pluralism and corporatism have both been argued by their
respective advocates to result in stronger democracy.
Thinking Comparatively
• Certain types of party systems may be more prevalent in
some regions of the world, but it is important to engage in
comparative checking to avoid over-generalizing.
developing greater corporatist arrangements? What are some of
the advantages that would be expected by advocates of corpo
ratism in democratic societies? What would you expect to be
the drawbacks of any such changes?
4. Thinking backtosomeofthe comparative strategies from previ
ous chapters, how would you determine whether a certain
country’s party system is shaped more by its electoral rules or by
other factors? Flow can comparison help you answer this ques
tion, and what sorts of comparisons might you set up to distin
guish between different causal factors?
5. This chapter has addressed both party systems and interest
groups. Do you find one of these sorts of groups responds to
the other more? Which set of organizations do you find more
important in shaping how politics operates and what govern
ments do? If you were given $100 that you were required to
donate to either a party or interest group, which would you
donate to, and why?
CHAPTER 12
Revolutions and
Contention
• Egyptian protestors restrain a tank in early 2011 during the “Arab Spring” uprisings. Throughout much of the Arab world, remarkable changes took
place in this period and have continued since. Where will these revolutions— and their aftermath— lead?
IN THIS C H A P T E R
Concepts 279
What Is “Contention”? 279
Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary
Contention 279
Types 280
Social Movements 280
Revolutions 284
Insurgencies and Civil Wars 287
Terrorism 287
“Everyday Resistance” 289
Thinking About Contention: Summary
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions
Happen? 291
Relative Deprivation 291
Resource Mobilization and Political
Opportunities 292
Rational Choice 294
Cultural or “Framing” Explanations 296
TH INK IN G C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
The “Arab S pring” of 2011 298
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
Brazil
Iran
• France Russia
I n late 2010, in a small town in Tunisia, a policewoman insulted a street vendor and toppled his produce cart. This would normally have been an
event of limited consequence, but what happened next made history. The
vendor, M ohamed Bouazizi, went to the municipal offices to register his
complaint. Rebuffed there, he set himself on fire in the street. H e is believed
to have done so to protest his humiliation and his lack of opportunity. His act
galvanized protestors, seeming to indicate to many that “enough is enough”
when it came to poor governance and a lack of social oppor
tunities. The symbolic tactic of self-immolation would be
repeated in Tunisia and elsewhere. Faced with continuous
street protests, the Tunisian government—which did not use
overwhelming force— fell by mid-January, not long after
Bouazizi died of his injuries. By the end of the month, pro
tests had spread to other Arab countries, notably Egypt.
There, the state began to make strong efforts to quell pro
tests. O n one hand, it repressed protesters, among other
places in the famous gathering point of T ahrir Square in
Cairo. O n the other hand, it became clear that there were
290 limits to the army’s willingness to repress the population.
By mid-February 2011, the government of Hosni M ubarak
had fallen. The uprisings then spread to other parts of the
Arab world.
For years, many analysts and citizens had been skeptical
about democratic opening and regime change in this region,
and yet suddenly the air was full of excitement and a sense of
opportunity. Outcomes have varied dramatically. Tunisia
and Egypt ousted their old governments largely as a result of
protests. The former case, so far, seems like a democratic suc
cess story. In the latter case, post-revolutionary elections led
China • to M ohammed Morsi and the M uslim Brotherhood briefly
holding power, before they were displaced by a military coup
in July, 2013. Libya witnessed a NA TO -supported insur
gency that eventually dislodged the Qaddafi regime. Syria harshly cracked
down on protestors, followed by insurgency, partial state failure, and the de
facto control of some parts of its territory by ISIS. Saudi Arabia has been
mostly quiet. This process and these varied outcomes are in need of
278
Concepts 279
explanation. W hy is this happening at all? W hy in a “wave”?1 Finally, why
has contention been successful in some places, less successful in others, and
non-existent in still others? Revolutions and related efforts remain an impor
tant part of the contemporary world, and they are among the most interesting
subjects in comparative politics.
Concepts
Students of comparative politics ask many questions about dramatic events like
social movements and revolutions. W hy do some instances of collective action
achieve their apparent objectives, while others do not? How do individuals and
groups select different strategies and tactics for the pursuit of their interests?
W hy are some conflicts “reformist” and others “revolutionary”? W hy are some
violent and others peaceful? In shedding light on these and other questions, com
parative political analysis can help to influence policy choices for governments
and social movement organizers.
Conflict is a near constant of political life, because politics involves disputes
over resources. These include not only material resources, such as housing, food,
consumer goods, and access to services like medical care, but also less tangible
goods like status 2S\A power? All modern societies distribute resources unequally,
though they vary considerably in the extent and form of this inequality. Politics
can be viewed as an arena in which resources are distributed, and one in which
conflict takes place over how they are distributed. In this chapter we consider
some of the many forms that such conflict takes. Social scientists interested in
studying conflict often refer to it as “contention.”3 They refer to the joint efforts
of individuals to bring about a preferred outcome as “collective action.”
What Is “Contention”?
Conflict can be peaceful or violent, and can happen inside formal institutions or
outside of them. In democratic societies, conflict is normally channeled through
participation in electoral politics, via the institutions discussed in chapters 8
through 11. For example, people can organize themselves into political parties
and try to use these parties to gain office and work through the executive or leg
islative branches of the state. Constitutions, discussed in chapter 8, can from this
perspective be viewed as the formal rules in terms of which conflicts in a society
will be resolved. Non-democratic societies also sometimes have formal channels
through which some conflict can be negotiated. For example, local councils or
committees, as well as governmental organizations like the police, might be re
sponsive to citizen inquiries in some such societies. However, even in democratic
societies formal politics is sometimes not sufficient to deal with conflicts.
Revolutionary and N on-Revolutionary Contention
W hat political scientists call “contention” is behavior that occurs mostly out
side of formal political channels.4 The category includes social movements,
revolution A form of collective
action in which some large-scale,
structural change is either
attempted or accomplished.
contention The name, most
associated with scholars like Sidney
Tarrow and Charles Tilly, referring to
the pursuit of collective goods
largely outside of formal political
institutions.
collective action The name given
by social scientists to joint efforts of
individuals and groups to bring
about a shared, preferred outcome.
formal institutions Institutions
that are governed by formal rules
and typically linked to complex
organizations like the state or
corporations.
social movements Ongoing,
organized collective action oriented
toward a goal of social change.
280 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
social revolutions Revolutions
that dramatically change social
structures.
insurgencies Contention with
formalized military conflict.
civil wars Sustained military
conflict between domestic actors.
terrorism in the context of
revolutions or insurgencies, a tactic
used by some participants that
involves violence directed at non
military targets.
everyday resistance Efforts to
resist or obstruct authority that are
not clearly organized over time,
such as work stoppages,
slowdowns, and sabotage.
civil society A space in society
outside of the organization of the
state, in which citizens come
together and organize themselves.
social networks Structures of
social ties and connections among
individuals.
social revolutions, insurgencies and civil wars, and even terrorism, as well as
so-called “everyday forms o f resistance,”5 in which people without the resources
needed to organize themselves for ongoing mobilization nevertheless resist
power. Scholars try to understand both the nature of these different sorts of con
flict and their causes.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference is between forms of contention
thought of as “revolutionary” and those that are not. Social scientists debate the
exact definition of revolutions, as we will see, but most agree that they either at
tempt to or succeed in radically transforming social, political, and economic rela
tionships. O f course, other forms of contention also involve efforts to make
change, but often more gradually or less radically.
Types
Not all forms of contention are as transformative as the “great social revolutions”
of France, Russia, and China. As we shall see in this section, scholars have de
fined several distinct types of revolution according to actors’ aims or accomplish
ments, and there are many important but non-revolutionary forms of social
change.
Social Movements
Social movements are in some ways the most normal of the major forms of con
tentious action and are considered a healthy part of civil society, at least in de
mocracies.6 As discussed in chapter 3, “civil society” can mean different things,
but the main idea is that modern, democratic polities allow for citizens to come
together and debate questions of value and policy, ideally free from state coer
cion.7 Thus civil society can be found in media sources like newspapers and the
Internet but also in public gatherings and interactions between citizens, and
above all in the social networks that make this kind of deliberation sustainable.
Social movement organizing takes place in this space: That is, social movements
have a kind of autonomy from the state.8
Social movements take place when citizens organize over time in the pursuit of
common purposes. For example, movements have sought the expansion of suf
frage rights to women or members of minority groups or movements to advance
“pro-life” or “pro-choice” positions. In contrast, regardless of its goals, a sponta
neous protest like a riot or a mob is not a social movement. Flowever, social
movements might use public demonstrations as a tactic. W hat would make a
string of public demonstrations a social movement, then, would be their common
underlying coordination.9 Some group or connected groups of people, linked via
social networks, work together on common goals and use protest activity as a
way of achieving those goals. Other tactics might include community organiz
ing, “consciousness-raising,” educational or propagandistic work, and political
lobbying. Since social movement activity is the most “normal” of the major forms
of contentious action, most modern democratic societies have essentially reserved
a place for it alongside formal politics. Former social movement leaders often
enter into formal politics, perhaps most famously Congressman John Lewis, who
was the Chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in the
Types 281
A protest by Spanish indignados (or “indignant ones”) in 2012. These protests, which some
consider similar to the “Occupy” movement in the United States and elsewhere, were notable in
Spain, among other countries. Analysts note that Spain’s very high rate of unemployment
contributed to discontent, especially for youth.
civil rights movement in the 1960s. Increasingly, social movement activity of this
sort is becoming transnational, crossing the boundaries of the nation-state and
taking place in what some call global civil society.10 Think, for example, of pro
tests against globalization like the World Social Forum, the Occupy Movement,
or the demonstrations of the Spanish indignados (“indignant ones,” including
many unemployed and underemployed Spanish youth). These sorts of protests
often deliberately seek to cross national borders and to protest forces that do so
as well.11
Social movements organize, or coordinate collective action, in many different
ways. Organizations created to serve the purposes of social movements are called
social movement organizations. W hile we must be careful to remember that
movements do not reduce to such organizations, social movement organizations
are often very important. Some are more elite-led, and others more grassroots.
For example, the Solidarity movement in the 1980s in Poland that eventually
triumphed over the communists had clear leadership, while social-movement or
ganizing against the authoritarian regime in Iran in 2009-2010 was more decen
tralized, communicating via technology like texting, Twitter, and Facebook, and
even involving activists literally calling to one another from rooftops. Some are
highly unified, meaning that most activists agree and that there is not a lot of
competition between different groups with their own aims. Others are more
factious and divided. W hat seems to be true in most cases is that, for social
movement activity to endure, some organizing must take place, and this often
means that some individuals will be set off from other participants as leaders.
organization The ongoing
coordination of collective action in
the pursuit of common purposes.
social movement organization
An organization that has been
created to help maintain and lead
social movement activity overtime.
282 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
Brazil has often been considered a country of elite-led transitions
and non-revolutionary change, but in fact it has generated im
portant examples of contentious action. One of the most inter
esting cases is the Landless Workers Movement, which organized
to try to make landownership more equal in this very unequal
society.12 The movement has had some notable success and has
influenced the left-leaning governments of Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-present).
See the case study of the Landless Workers Movement in the
Brazil country materials in Part VI, p. 410. As you read it, keep in
mind the following questions:
1. Why would Brazilian society have important populations
interested in land reform?
2. How did Brazilian activists organize to put land reform
on local and national agendas? What sorts of organiza
tional structures did they create to facilitate collective
action?
3. Why might some people be worried about the potential
co-optation of this movement?
iron law of oligarchy The idea,
developed by Robert Michels, that
collective action always produces
new elites.
mobilization The engagement of
individuals and groups in sustained
contention.
Some argue that social movement activity (like party organizing) eventually runs
up against the “iron law o f oligarchy”.13 According to this theory, organizational
leadership necessarily creates its own interests and every movement creates a new
elite. It is worth noting that these concerns apply not just to social movements
but also to other forms of contention discussed later.
Imagine that you and your classmates create a social movement. Your goal is to
organize in favor of curricular changes at your university (maybe you don’t want to
have to take comparative politics!). If there is broad consensus among the students,
there are clear and available mechanisms for communication (maybe on social
media), and, most important, if your goals are clear and minimal and do not en
counter sharp resistance, relatively little organization and complex coordination
will be necessary. But what if the goals are less clear, or can only be accomplished
in stages, or meet with strong resistance by the administration? For example, you
want to take comparative politics but students have a number of conflicting sug
gestions about how it should be taught. Then the movement will need to achieve
ongoing mobilization. In this instance, some individuals are going to have to
assume positions of leadership, making decisions about what sorts of statements to
issue, how to frame arguments and goals, and when to call for demonstrations.
Otherwise, individual protest actions will be easily dispersed.
Typically, some individuals form groups and present themselves as strategic
leaders. Once such groups are formed, the groups themselves, as well as the lead
ers within them, often get a vested interest in the group and the movement.
Perhaps you were relatively unknown before the formation of the social move
ment but now you have lots of status and a thousand friends (at least on Face-
book). Do you, upon the movement’s accomplishing its goals, really want to go
back to being that kid in the back of the classroom to whom nobody pays atten
tion? Something of the same applies in “real world” social movements: Leaders
and their organizations often acquire status and power. This does not always lead
to conflict with the movement’s goals, but it can.
Moreover, in most major social movements, alternative groups claim the
mantle of leadership. This can be seen clearly in the most famous social move
ment in U.S. history, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, in which
there were periods of tension and cooperation between the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC), as well as pre-existing organizations like the National As
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and more “radical”
organizations like the Nation of Islam and the Black Panther Party, which pre
sented itself as leading a distinct, if related, “Black Power” movement.14 The
point is not that the leaders of these different groups pursued only their own
interests—they were all clearly devoted to the expansion of civil rights, and each
played an important role in the movement’s achievements—but that the interests
of organizations and their leaders matter in social movements.
At the same time, the American civil rights movement offers cautionary evi
dence against simply associating social movements with their most visible leaders
and leading organizations. Grassroots participation and organization and on-
the-ground improvising were common. To take just one example, the Montgom
ery Bus Boycott of 1955-1956 depended heavily on the ingenious improvisational
work of hundreds or even thousands of black citizens not identified as social
movement “leaders” in the conventional sense.15 W hile social movement organi
zation depends on official leaders, it also depends on the initiative of grassroots
activists.
Leaders and activists involved in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which took place in 1955
and 1956 in Alabama.
284 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
class structure The ongoing and
patterned relationships between
“classes,” typically understood as
groups of individuals linked
together by economic interest or
activity.
political revolutions Revolutions,
the main effect of which is to alter
political institutions rather than
social and economic structures.
Most important, movements are dependent on ongoing mobilization. A great
deal of work in recent years has been devoted to tracing and explaining different
patterns of mobilization. Two of the most important political scientists in this
area stress several key “mechanisms of mobilization,” including “diffusion, bro
kerage, and new coordination.”16 This means that when mobilization happens
successfully, it spreads, often “shifting scales” (moving from the local to the state,
national, or global level or else moving in the other direction from more macro
levels to local activism); it involves individuals, groups, and organizations bring
ing previously disconnected actors together in pursuit of common goals; and it
involves novel efforts on the part of those actors to work together.17 We can think
of this as basically an effort to break down some of the elements of what is hap
pening when a social movement achieves mobilization. An important part of
explaining any social movement is explaining how such steps are traversed.
Social movements shade into other forms of contention. Since social move
ment activity has been normalized in contemporary democracies,18 it shades into
electoral politics. Social movements also shade into revolutions. We can distin
guish revolutions from social movements based on differences in goals or in con
sequences, though there is perhaps no single clear line separating the two
categories. Social movements tend to be viewed as reformist. They aim to make a
society live up to some of its idealized values, or to extend rights associated with
citizenship to groups to which those rights were previously denied. In other
words, social movements aim to affect important social change but not dramatic
structural transformation. Revolutions, in contrast, aim at the latter.19
Revolutions
Most commentators agree that revolutions must be relatively sudden and must
achieve dramatic social and political change. Beyond this, revolutions are chal
lenging to define.20 They must be transformative, at least in intent, and, depend
ing on how narrowly we want to define “revolutions,” in their actual consequences.21
Thus, a reform program is not a revolution, though failed reforms can help pro
duce revolutions.22 They must involve, like social movements, some level of popu
lar mobilization.22. Given the difficulty in defining “revolution,” one common
strategy has been to enumerate types of revolutions. One basic distinction is be
tween so-called social revolutions and more limited political revolutions.24
Social revolutions transform social and political structures. In other words,
they make major changes in how power and other resources are distributed in
society. For thinkers like Karl Marx, social revolutions more specifically trans
form the distribution of material resources among groups. Contentious action,
according to this line of thinking, is only a social revolution if the class structure
is transformed. Thus the Russian Revolution of 1917 would be considered a social
revolution because it used the power of the state to transform the basis of eco
nomic activity, for example, by “nationalizing” industries, redistributing land
from wealthy landowners to collectives comprised of peasants, and so forth. The
same is true of the French Revolution, which essentially destroyed France’s no
bility and the social system on which it rested.
Political revolutions are probably more common than social revolutions.
A political revolution changes political institutions like the state rather
Types 285
than transforming social structures like a class system or the basic features of an
economy. It is important to distinguish political revolutions from other kinds of
political change, however. Electoral transference of power between parties or
groups would not be considered a political revolution, because it would not actu
ally change political structures. For example, when a new president is elected in
the United States, no new constitution is written, and no radical changes to the
structure of government itself are contemplated: The new administration seeks
only to use those structures somewhat differently than its predecessor and, per
haps, to gradually reshape them. Likewise, incremental changes in political
structures through, say, consecutive constitutional amendments would not be
considered a political revolution, because political revolutions are typically un
derstood to happen suddenly.
We might also like to distinguish coups d’etat, which often present them
selves as “revolutions,” from revolutions themselves. For some scholars, what
would distinguish a coup d’etat from a revolution is that the former is elite-
driven (typically by the military and sometimes in alliance with civilian actors),
whereas revolutions necessarily involve the mobilization of some other important
groups besides elite actors holding formal power. However, sometimes military
leaders respond to ongoing public mobilization by staging a coup. In such in
stances, depending on the outcome, scholars are more likely to consider the event
a revolution.26
Other examples of political revolutions might include some of the Latin
American wars of independence in the early nineteenth century and the wave of
anti-Soviet revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early
1990s. In these latter cases, far-reaching political transformations took place, and
the satellite states of the Soviet Union were replaced with democratic republics.
These changes, in turn, gave rise to economic changes that impacted the class
structure in these societies: Most political scientists would still consider these
“political revolutions,” however, since such changes were not direct aims or con
sequences of the revolutions in question.
A third possible type is anti-colonial revolutions.27 Most of the social and
political revolutions discussed so far in this chapter are made against the state
coup d’etat The use offeree or
threat offeree, typically by the
military or a coalition involving the
military, to impose a non-electoral
change of government.
anti-colonial revolutions
Revolutions brought by subjugated
populations against colonial
powers, typically with the purpose
of removing them so that the
society in guestion can achieve
independence.
[ I
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The French Revolution
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PAGE 437
The French Revolution might be the most iconic and well-studied
revolution, and leaders of other revolutions have often looked to
its history for guidance.25 While not all scholars consider it the first
modern revolution, most agree that it was seen as novel and that
it dramatically influenced and still shapes revolutionary patterns.
For more on the French Revolution, see the case study in Part
VI, pp. 437-438. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. Why would the French aristocracy help bring about re
forms that ended up undermining its group interests?
2. Why do some scholars see this as a “bourgeois
revolution”?
3. Flow do causal factors like state weakness, status-order
problems, and new, potentially revolutionary, ideologies
like nationalism interact in this case?
286 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
Third-World revolutions
A concept developed by John
Foran holding that revolutions in
the developing world have special
characteristics.
subaltern Occupying lower rungs
in a hierarchical system.
The French Revolution has been a model for many revolutionaries ever since it took place, and it
is a case that has been considered by virtually all theorists of revolution.
and/or the groups controlling the state before the revolution. But sometimes
groups are subject to the domination of powers beyond their own nations
and states. In such cases, those powers are sometimes the ultimate targets of the
revolution. For example, in the middle of the twentieth century numerous anti
colonial revolutions, typically motivated by nationalism, were made against colo
nial powers as well as local interests perceived to serve them. Their articulated
goal was the removal of these powers so that the nation could “rule itself” inde
pendently. W hether anti-colonial revolutions should be considered a type of
political revolution or their own category is open to debate.
The fact that formal colonialism is now relatively rare has not stopped all
scholars from treating “Third World Revolutions” as a distinct type.28 Accord
ing to such scholars, inequalities in the developing world depend for their en
forcement not just on the states, armies, and police of those states themselves, but
on an international networks of more powerful states (e.g., the United States,
Western Europe, Japan, perhaps now China) and international organizations
(e.g., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). “Third World Rev
olutions,” these scholars argue, therefore have distinct dynamics and should be
analyzed separately. Just the same, this category overlaps with the broader dis
tinction between social and political revolutions. A given case might, for certain
purposes, be classified as both a political revolution and a “Third World” or anti
colonial one.
Revolutions may take place “from below” or “from above.” All revolutions
involve elite and subaltern actors (those lower down the social hierarchy or with
Types 287
less power and status before the revolution), but some are more and some less
elite-driven than others. This distinction is complicated by the fact that, as we
will see in the “Causes and Effects” section, different theories of revolution place
greater or lesser emphasis on elite and popular participation in explaining revolu
tions. In any case, the categories of revolutions “from below” or “from above” cut
across some of the other types of revolutions discussed in this section. For ex
ample, India’s anti-colonial resistance included both elite and subaltern actors.
Insurgencies and Civil Wars
Insurgencies can be thought of as enduring, organized, armed actors contesting
the power of the state. Insurgencies in some instances shade into revolutions, and
many insurgencies claim to be making revolutions. Insurgencies also sometimes
look like social movements, and they can often be tied to social movements car
ried out by civilians. We might distinguish insurgencies from revolutions and
social movements, however, by the degree of formalization of military conflict.29
One notable recent work defines insurgents as “nonstate armed actors that use
violence to reformulate or destroy the foundations of politics in a given coun
try.”30 Often, conflicts between groups of insurgents or between insurgents and
the state are classified as “civil wars.”
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish revolutions from the civil conflicts to
which they give rise.31 For example, consider the U.S. Civil War. If it had turned
out differently, it might have been subsequently defined as a political revolution,
even though the goals of the Confederacy were conservative. Consider further
the wars of independence in Latin America in the early nineteenth century.
These were revolutions, though they did not achieve major social-structural
change. They were led at first by civilians who aimed to create independent re
publics and to make citizens where there was before only the monarchy and its
subjects. However, because Spain used its army to attempt to put down these
revolutions, the conflict took military form. Different actors in these societies
took sides. A number of groups were loyal to the crown and fought against the
revolutionaries, and thus we might even think of these conflicts as “civil wars.”32
Insurgencies might develop when several conditions occur. First, a govern
ment that oppresses the residents of a given region, class, or group, or one that
otherwise seriously fails to fulfill their expectations, is likely to generate the
desire for insurgent activity. Second, a political system that does not allow for
other avenues for the expression and resolution of grievances increases the likeli
hood of insurgency. Third, a weak state increases the chances of an insurgency
developing. For an insurgency to endure, neither the insurgents nor the state can
be strong enough to decisively win. Guerrilla tactics are designed to produce just
this sort of situation.33 This often leads to protracted conflicts spanning years or
even decades.
Terrorism
Definitions of terrorism have been controversial. We can define it as broadly as
the use or threat of violence for political ends, or as narrowly as the use of vio
lence by nonstate actors against civilians for the purpose of reducing civilian
support for one or another official policy. Some would argue that terrorism
guerrilla tactics Military
techniques designed to produce
ongoing stalemate, usually
employed in situations of
asymmetric military capability.
288 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
should be seen as a tactic or strategy rather than a distinctive type of contentious
action.34 If we view terrorism in this way, then it really is nothing more than a
potential tool of individuals and groups participating in the other forms of con
tention discussed in this chapter. Yet terrorism is a concept that appears more
complex upon examination. It necessarily involves violence, or at least the threat
of violence. Definitions of terrorism must all take into account the following
issues: (1) who or what is perpetrating the violence; (2) who or what is the target
of the violence; and (3) the goals, purposes, or consequences of the violence.
Not all definitions give the same answer to each of these questions.
The broadest definitions of terrorism say that it makes no difference who or
what is carrying it out.35 Most important, they accept that states can be terrorist
actors. This was the original meaning of the concept, which derives from descrip
tions of the violence of the French Revolution.36 States like the former Soviet
Union, Nazi Germany, or Chile under Pinochet (1973-1990), in executing thou
sands of citizens (or many more in the former two cases) without fair trials, em
ploying torture, and so forth, were doing essentially the same thing as nonstate
actors like al Qaeda or would-be state actors like the so-called Islamic State (also
known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL). Narrower definitions seek to exclude
state-led terrorism, or at least to designate a separate category (“state terrorism”)
for it.37 The rationale for this is that the causes of organized violence perpetrated
by a state and by a group of clandestine civilians are likely to be very different
even if, for the victims, the effects are the same.
Broad definitions of terrorism say that the judgment of whether a given case
of violence is terrorism does not depend on the status or identity of its victims.
Narrower definitions tend to exclude violence directed toward certain classes of
victims. For example, some would not consider violence directed at military in
stallations or at military personnel, particularly in wartime, to be terrorism.38
The question gets a bit fuzzier when we consider other functionaries of the state:
Is violence carried out against the police terrorism? W hat about bombing a gov
ernment building, such as a post office, when it is closed after working hours?
The narrowest definitions assert that a distinctive feature of terrorism is that its
victims are themselves civilians.39 Broad definitions, again, say that the “pur
poses” of the violence are unimportant, or that they cannot even be reliably
known.40 Narrower definitions claim that, to be terrorism, violence must be in
tended to instill fear in a population.41 Still narrower definitions assert that this
intended fear must be part of a calculated strategy to bring about some major
political change.42
As with revolutions, terrorism can be divided into types. For example, some
terrorism— sometimes called “demonstrative terrorism”—seeks to make a show
for publicity purposes, while “destructive terrorism” is oriented more directly
toward coercion.43 The best conceptualization and definition of terrorism de
pends on the sorts of questions that a scholar is asking. I f we are interested in the
question of how terrorism affects civilian victims, we might want to include vio
lence carried out by both nonstate actors and states in our definition (unless we
have reason to believe that who does the violence makes a difference in how it is
experienced by its victims). I f we are interested, though, in explaining common
patterns of civilian-on-civilian violence in places like Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and
Types 289
IN SIG H T S
Understanding Terror Networks
■ by Mark Sageman
Researchers like Marc Sageman take a “social networks” perspective on these groups, meaning that they look at terrorist
linkages as webs of relationships rather than as formal organiza
tions or as ideological groups. According to Sageman, at least
through the mid-2000s, al Qaeda was part of a “small world net
work’ characterized by “dense interconnectivity.*,4This contrasts
sharply with the structure of a formal military organization or
even a typical social movement, which tend to be more fixed in
structure and hierarchical.
As Sageman suggests, this network structure of many con
temporary terrorist groups has important implications. Gov
ernments opposing such groups cannot just take out “the
leader,” whose importance may be mostly symbolic, since
others can easily take his/her place. The decentralized nature of
the organizations means multiple actions can be carried out si
multaneously, and that not all participants have full knowledge
of plans or even of the group’s structure. Of course this carries
certain disadvantages for such groups as well, particularly inef
ficiency. However, it helps to explain the resilience and endur
ance of such networks. Some terrorist groups, such as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have in recent years been
engaged in quasi-state-building activities. The more successful
they are in this regard, the more centralized their organizational
structures will become (if the reason why is not clear, think back
to chapter 3). As such, it may be that terrorist groups vary signifi
cantly in terms of their organizational and network structures.
Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University o f
Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
Israel/ Palestine, we might opt for a narrower definition. In such cases we would
probably exclude violence carried out by a state.
Some prominent examples of contemporary terrorism act as “terror networks,”
exhibiting a particular pattern of organization. I f we focus our attention on con
temporary “terror networks” rather than on terrorism as a tactic, we might find
something more comparable to the other types of conflict discussed in this chap
ter, though most acts of terrorism are not carried out by networks of this sort.
Much of the attention has been on organizations like al Qaeda and related
groups.
“Everyday Resistance”
Some groups resist when they don’t have the organizational resources to mobilize
into social movements or revolutions. Banditry and other forms of resistance de
fined by the broader society as “crime” can often be understood in this way.45
Subaltern groups employ what the political scientist James Scott has called
“weapons of the weak” to practice “everyday resistance.”46 For example, they
might struggle symbolically against inequality by telling stories that challenge
prevailing power relations. They might struggle against it materially by engaging
in tactics like work stoppage, slowdowns, boycotts, or even sabotage (some of
these behaviors can be used as tactics in social movement organizing as well, of
course). As Scott describes such efforts, “they require little or no coordination or
planning; they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they
often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct,
symbolic confrontation with authority.”47
W hy would some individuals and groups resist inequalities in this way,
rather than through formal political participation or joining social movements
290 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
individualization The treatment
of problems as linked to the
interests of individuals rather than
as issues of common concern or
interest.
collective behavior A paradigm
for understanding various forms of
contention, popular for part of the
twentieth century, which
emphasized the irrational, social-
psychological dynamics of protest.
and revolutions? The short answer is that there are often barriers to participa
tion in these sorts of activities. Subaltern groups likely to engage in “everyday
resistance” are also likely to be excluded from formal politics. This may because
of an autocratic state or simply a matter of their distance from formal political
life. For example, a centralized authoritarian state might deliberately not extend
any political voice to the rural poor. Or political parties in an established de
mocracy may discover that there are no gains to be made in catering to margin
alized constituencies, either because their numbers aren’t sufficient, or they
aren’t perceived to be likely to vote, or no other parties are competing for their
support.
But why wouldn’t such people just join social movements or revolutions?
At first glance, it may seem harder to understand why someone would engage in
“everyday resistance” rather than other forms of contentious politics. Here we
need to step back and think about what makes mobilization possible. In the case
of resistance against totalitarian regimes like the Nazis, the answer is clear:
A repressive state makes organizing too dangerous. But what about other
circumstances?
Let us consider a fictitious (though fairly realistic) scenario. The residents of a
rural region in a developing country live in small villages. Each village family
has its own plot of land. They have traditional privileges to cultivate this land but
no formal property rights, and the villagers share in farming some commonly
held land. Villages are themselves separated by great distances, dangerous roads,
and harsh mountain conditions. The state, aiming to increase agricultural pro
duction for export, establishes a company that will oversee the cultivation of
non-traditional crops, say, pineapples and bananas. However, rather than orga
nizing workers into a formal labor force on industrial plantations, this company
keeps workers in their traditional villages, paying them piecemeal for their pro
duction of bananas and pineapples, and questions their claims to use the land
traditionally allotted to them. The residents of these distinct villages may define
their interests in similar terms: Under ideal circumstances, they might want to
organize to remove the company, or to gain a voice in its decision making, or
simply for higher wages. However, their ability to do so depends on their ability
to transcend the individualization of their behavior and goals. They need some
mechanism of communication through which they can agree about these goals
and coordinate their action. In the circumstances described, this becomes very
difficult. Individuals without the resources to resist collectively often resist in the
only ways that they can. If communication between individuals with common
interests is difficult and restricted to the local level, direct resistance and ob
struction of perceived opponents rather than social movements and revolutions
to dislodge or replace them are likely.
Th in k in g A b out Contention: Sum m ary
Scholars have a variety of views on how distinct are these different types of
contentious action. Some decades ago, most of them were placed under the
general category of collective behavior.48 But now we often try to treat them
separately (though, admittedly, many social scientists continue to focus on
common features of different types of collective action). For example, some
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 291
scholars specialize in explaining social revolutions and others social move
ments, assuming that these are distinct phenomena with distinct causes. Some
argue, though, that we can treat them as existing on a continuum of contentious
action.49 These phenomena— and their causes— can overlap. We divide them
here— as ideal types—for the sake of clarity, but in reality the lines separating
different forms of contention are not always so clear.50 Moreover, an instance of
collective action can change form, moving, say, from everyday resistance to
social movement organizing to social revolution.
Causes and Effects: Why Do
Revolutions Happen?
There are a number of theories that have been used to explain contentious action.
Here for the sake of clarity we focus on explanations of revolutions specifically.
It is worth noting, however, that each of the explanatory strategies discussed here
have been applied (with differing levels of success) to many of the forms of con
tentious action discussed previously. As you go over these explanatory theories,
think about how they might be modified and applied to other forms of conflict.
Note that some theories try to explain why revolutions and other forms of con
tention are attempted and others try to explain why they are successful, a subtle
but important difference.
Relative Deprivation
According to our first theory, relative deprivation can change people’s psychology
and increase the demand for social transformation. This family of theories at
tempts to explain revolutions as abnormal deviations from a normal status quo.
The theory assumes that societies tend toward a kind of “equilibrium” state in
which conflict is normalized or settled through formal political channels.
However, sometimes certain conditions—for example, rapid economic growth,
efforts to reform the state, or the intervention of a foreign power—produce dis
equilibrium to which revolution serves as a response. This theory goes by different
names (as it has been presented in different forms) such as strain theory;51 the
“collective behavior theory”;52 “social psychological theories”;53 or even the
Tocqueville effect.54 Most theories of this kind specify a social psychological
mechanism linking changes in the social order to the desire for rapid social
transformation. People’s lives are disrupted, this produces tension, and they re
solve that tension through reconstructing society and its political institutions.
There are certain surprising things about many revolutions that “disequilib
rium theory” can help to explain. Some major revolutions have taken place
during or just after periods of economic grow th or some other sort of improve
ment in the lives of one or another group.55 This seems surprising, as we might
intuitively expect groups that are suffering to be more inclined to revolutionary
behavior (and sometimes they are!). However, this theory suggests that dra
matic upward and downward mobility raise the possibility of revolutions, be
cause they upset established conventions and status-relationships and open up
the possibility of a potentially revolutionary group experiencing relative
deprivation.56
strain theory A theory suggesting
that major social change causes
social “strain” or conflict which
increases demand for revolution.
Tocqueville effect The name
given by some scholars to
Tocqueville’s observation that
changing relative status positions
were an important factor in some
groups participating in the French
Revolution.
relative deprivation The state of
having or feeling that one has less
than other members of one’s
reference group (including one’s
own group over time).
292 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
You likely are already aware of the Russian Revolution of 1917,
sometimes called the Bolshevik Revolution, which brought into
being the Soviet Union. This was one of the most consequential
revolutions in history, in part because its success contributed to
the polarization of global politics throughout much of the twen
tieth century. The Russian Revolution is interesting, though, not
just because of its consequences, but because of how it stands in
relation to revolutionary theory. It was a Marxist revolution that
didn’t strictly follow Marx’s template, in particular because of in
novations made by Russian Marxists, especially Vladimir Lenin.
Among other things, Lenin emphasized that revolution was pos
sible in Russia even though it had not experienced the most
robust capitalist modernization. He also emphasized that a small
“vanguard” of organizers could lead a revolution, which some
think contradicts Marx’s idea that major structural forces, rather
than leaders and groups, produce revolution (an idea with which
Lenin did not entirely disagree).
To learn more about this process, see the case study in the
Russian country profile materials in Part VI, p. 536. As you read it,
keep in mind the following questions:
1. What were the major factors that increased the probabil
ity of revolution in Russia?
2. What is a “Leninist party,” and how important were Lenin
and the sort of organization he championed to the revo
lution’s success? More generally, what does the Russian
case tell us about how much individuals and leaders
matter?
3. Could the Russian Revolution have produced a different
outcome, or was Soviet authoritarianism inevitable given
the conditions of Russian society at the time?
absolute deprivation A condition
of being deprived of resources
below some given threshold, as
distinguished from relative
deprivation.
political opportunities The
availability of political options to
redress grievances.
Resource M obilization and Political O pportunities
Theories of relative deprivation focus on explaining demand for revolution.
By contrast, “resource mobilization” theories assume frequent or even constant
demand for social change, often treating it as a consequence of absolute
deprivation rather than relative deprivation. Proponents of this theory argue
that what matters in producing a revolution are political opportunities or events
that allow potential revolutionaries to “mobilize resources.”57 The most
IN SIG H T S
Political Order in Changing Societies and W hy Men Rebel
by .bimuetHuntington arid Je d Gut; &
Here we jointly consider two classic works by different political scientists who shared partially overlapping perspectives.
Huntington argued that revolution takes place when the devel
opment of the political system lags behind economic and social
modernization. This process creates demands for broader incor
poration of groups that previously were not involved in political
life, but institutions are not able to accommodate those de
mands. As he put it, “ascending or aspiring groups and rigid or
inflexible institutions are the stuff of which revolutions are
made.”58 Revolutions are most likely when, during moderniza
tion, the alienation of a frustrated and growing middle class takes
place at the same time as the alienation of the rural poor.59
While Huntington placed less emphasis on social psychologi
cal aspects of this process, others, like Gurr, focused attention on
relative deprivation as the linkage between modernization, aspi
ration, and dissent. In other words, revolutions are explained by
the social psychology of status differences. Both of these theo
ries owe a good deal to the classic works of Alexis de Tocqueville
and Crane Brinton. Critics of this theory assert that it is overly
general and that it assumes that consensus rather than conflict is
the normal state of affairs in society.
Sam uel Huntington, Political Order in C h a n gin g Societies. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968: and Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 293
important political opportunity for revolutions is state breakdown, when a state
loses its ability to carry out its core functions and to stifle dissent.60 Other politi
cal opportunities that might facilitate contentious action would include elite con
flict, military or other coercive forces becoming discontent with the prevailing
order, the opening of a political system, or the creation of new groups or com
munication technologies that facilitate organizing.61
Another set of resources for would-be revolutionaries are pre-existing pat
terns of mobilization. If we return to our previous example in the “Everyday
Resistance” discussion, we would say that the villages described there had a low
potential for mobilization. This is why we would expect the villagers to engage in
“everyday resistance” rather than organized strikes, social movement activity, or
revolution. However, some other environments provide patterns of mobilization
that can facilitate organizing and collective action and can thus be thought of as
resources. For example, in a heavily industrialized society, factory workers labor
closely together and may have a history of mobilization via labor union organiz
ing. In this instance, there is a pre-existing pattern of mobilization, as well as
potential organizational resources, which can be put to new uses.
In an industrial setting, the relevant organizational resources would be the
labor unions themselves. However, organizational resources can take many forms.
W hat is key to all of them is that organizational resources allow some central
coordination, which can be important in early mobilization: It is very difficult for
any given leadership to remain in control of a revolutionary process for long.
Along similar lines, social networks and media access are important resources
facilitating contentious action.
Finally, political opportunity and resource mobilization theorists are inter
ested in access to material resources. Revolutions, like any other collective behav
ior, need to be financed. This doesn’t mean that they have formal budgets and
actors responsible for balancing them, of course, but especially in those many
revolutions in which violence is a key tactic, revolutionary actors need access to
weapons, meeting places, and supplies for the combatants.
state breakdown Dramatic
decline in state capacity.
CASE IN CONTEXT
The Chinese Revolution page42s
In some ways the Chinese Revolution imitated the Russian
Revolution described in the previous section. Like the Russian
Revolution, it was based on Marxism, and many of its leaders
hoped to create a world of equality and social harmony. How
ever, it evidenced some major differences, perhaps the most
important being the centrality of peasant participation (Marx
thought that peasants were not revolutionary, but Mao Zedong
felt that in Chinese circumstances the peasants were the most
important revolutionary class).
This revolution raises two key questions that interest us, and
you can consider them further by looking at the case study in the
China country profile materials in Part VI, pp. 425-426. Those
questions are the following:
1. When did the Chinese Revolution begin or end? Was the
overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the establish
ment of the republic its own revolution, or just a part of
the broader revolution that led to the establishment of
the (Communist) People’s Republic of China in 1949?
2. Why did the communists, rather than their opponents,
the “nationalists,” triumph in the Chinese Revolution?
Does this case show us that organizational resources and
practices are key to successful revolutions?
294 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
IN SIG H TS
States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
France, Russia, and China
by Theda Skocppl •
&
Skocpol’s theory is a structuralist theory of revolutions. This means that she aims to explain social revolutions by focusing
on the behavior of social structures (most importantly, states and
social classes) rather than individuals and their beliefs, goals, and
strategies. In concentrating on her three main cases of France,
Russia, and China, Skocpol found two necessary conditions which
she argued together cause social revolution. First, state collapse,
provoked by foreign conflict, creates the possibility of revolt, divid
ing elites. Second, certain conditions facilitate revolt among the
rural poor. According to this theory, if the potential for peasant
mobilization accompanies “state breakdown,” successful revolution
will take place. Skocpol’s emphasis on state breakdown was antici
pated by scholars like Alexis de Tocqueville and Crane Brinton, and
has been carried forward byJackGoldstone and others.
Critics of this theory worry that it is too mechanistic, that it
leaves out human agency, and that it pays little attention to cul
ture and ideology.62 Others suggest that it only applies to a lim
ited range of cases.
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
France, Russia, and China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Rational Choice
The rational choice theory of revolutions says that to understand revolutions we
need to understand the conditions under which it becomes rational for people
to engage in collective action.63 Proponents of the rational choice theory of con
tentious action, including revolution, sometimes present it as a complement to
resource mobilization/political opportunity theory.64 It shares the general as
sumption that conflict is endemic to society and that individuals rationally pursue
their own interests. However, it pushes these assumptions much further.
This approach focuses on individuals’ rational analysis of costs and benefits for
participation in contentious action. According to this theory, states hold together
when they prevent individuals from making the choice to pursue dissenting in
terests through alternative organizations.65 W hen states are successful in doing
this, they hold together because the majority of individuals—even if they do not
like the state or the regime that controls it—judge that it would not be in their
own interests to engage in protest activity or revolution. Indeed, according to this
theory, this is the state of affairs most of the time: It is seldom rational for the
individual to join organized protest activity.
For example, imagine that you are disaffected with life in your society, frus
trated that you have to take so many courses to get a college degree, irritated that
those who hold power get to decide what will happen in class and can coerce you
into reading certain books (like this one). You meet someone who suggests that
you should join their revolutionary group, which will seek to overturn the aca
demic hierarchy by force and award PhDs to everyone on the grounds that they
have already learned a lot in the “real world.” For the sake of argument, imagine
that you agree with the beliefs and goals of their group and that you would really
like to see such a social revolution take place (but please don’t contemplate this
too seriously!).66 You have basically two choices: You can join the revolutionary
group or you can choose not to join. There are also two basic possible outcomes:
The revolution might succeed or it might fail. Chances are, your participation
t a b l e 12.1 Is It Rational to Jo in the Revolution?
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen?
Participate Do Not Participate
Revolution Succeeds Share in collective benefits Share in collective benefits
Revolution Fails Face personal costs Face no personal costs
really isn’t going to make the difference. So if you think in purely rational terms
and only of your own interests and goals, you will likely conclude that the right
thing to do is to abstain from joining and to just hope that the revolution suc
ceeds. If you join and it fails you will likely face sanctions, like jail time or worse.
If you abstain and it fails there will be no cost and no benefit. I f you abstain and
it succeeds there will be no cost and all of the benefits. If you join and it succeeds
you will reap these same benefits but will have to bear the costs of risk and par
ticipation. Table 12.1 illustrates a basic scenario of this sort in which it would be
irrational to join a revolution.
In other words, the rational thing to do is to be a free rider: not join and hope
others do the job for you. This is how rational choice theory explains the relative
strength of states and the weakness and infrequency of revolutions despite the
fact that they believe conflict is endemic to society. Most people make the ratio
nal choice to not participate in revolutions most of the time, even those people
who have an individual interest in dramatic social change.
Efforts to explain revolution and related activities, from this point of view,
should focus on conditions that alter the rational calculus of interest of potential
revolutionaries, as illustrated in Table 12.2.
I f a situation becomes so polarized that there will likely be costs brought to
bear on individuals by both sides (the state and a revolutionary group), this in
creases the cost of abstention. I f this is coupled with a perceived weakness of the
state, this will likely increase the willingness of a number of individuals to join
the revolution. Another example: If the revolution’s success seems fairly likely,
and its current participants can plausibly promise rewards to participants, this
will also likely increase participation.
t a b l e 12.2 One Scenario in W hich Many A ctors May Ju d g e
It Rational to Join the Revolution
Participate Do Not Participate
Revolution Succeeds Share in collective benefits but
also receive personal favors and
special access to resources
because 1 am a “revolutionary.”
Share in collective benefits,
but no personal favors or
special access to resources.
Revolution Fails Low likelihood of personal costs
because the state is weak and so
many people are participating in
the revolution.
My group may be targeted for
reprisal, so 1 may face personal
costs even though 1 didn’t
participate.
free rider Someone who benefits
from a collective or public good
without contributing to it.
296 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
IN SIG H TS
The Rebel’s Dilemma
by A ‘ ‘ -” Lichbach
Lichbach develops Mancur Olson’s approach to the “logic of collective action” discussed in the last chapter, creating a
powerful theory of dissent and pioneering the application of
collective action theories to revolutions and related forms of
contention. According to Lichbach, the analysis of revolutions
and other forms of collective action involves discerning the solu
tion to collective action problems arrived at in particular cases.
In other words, we need to figure out the circumstances under
which it would be rational for one or another individual to join in
contention. Solutions run the gamut from “increasing benefits”
to “increasing the possibility of making a difference,” from “in
creasing the possibility of winning” to “lowering costs.” The logic
of our description of rationalist analyses of revolutionary partici
pation follows from his work in The Rebel’s Dilemma.
Critics might charge that this theory makes the unrealistic as
sumption that human beings are always self-interested and ratio
nal. Some might also suggest that this approach is insufficiently
attentive to social structures.
Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma. Arm Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1995.
Cultural or “Fram ing” Explanations
Proponents of cultural or “framing” theories argue that previous theories like
resource mobilization or political opportunity theory pay insufficient attention to
variation in how social movement and revolutionary actors think about their par
ticipation, and the causal impact of differences in how movements’ and revolu
tions’ targets are “framed.”67 Others argue that contention itself has changed,
becoming more focused on cultural issues like “identity.”68 Many are interested
in “new social movements” like the global feminist movement or movements that
mobilize around ethnic identities, a subject to which we turn in chapter 14.69
framing The way in which a given The core idea of fram ing is that every type of social action we engage in takes
problem or situation is described place via “discourse” or “stories” that we tell about ourselves, our behavior, and its
and understood, with implications context.70 Participants in all kinds of social behavior aim to construct narratives
for how it might be addressed. that make sense of their behavior in the social environment. Your act of reading
this textbook might be “framed” in relation to a basic narrative about how you are
a student enrolled in a college or university. Your long-term horizon probably
includes some sort of job or advanced study (and hopefully a job after that!). Your
act of reading is likely framed in relation to your role. As a student, you want or
are expected to learn, and your act of reading the text is, at least officially, under
stood in this light. Note that these “frames” are more or less collective in charac
ter. In other words, you can reject them privately if you want to, but it is very
difficult to do so publicly— say, by standing up in class and telling your instructor
that you don’t want to learn—without facing consequences.
According to these theories, the same is true in situations of social movements
and revolutions. I f you were to stand up in your classroom and declare that you
are starting a social revolution, it is unlikely that this frame would “make sense”
to those around you. More likely, they would have an alternative frame via which
to interpret your outburst: You “are weird” or “have issues.” Even if one thinks
that common interests would suggest that some group, say factory workers,
should organize or even revolt, if the appropriate frames are not in place it is
unlikely that they will be successful. The factory worker in the United States who
stands on the shop floor and declares a social revolution is likely to be greeted
with the same response as our fictional student doing the same in class.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 297
Iran’s Islamic Revolution and “Green Revolution”? PAGE 478
In 1979, many observers were surprised when a revolution swept
the Shah out of power in Iran, putting a religious regime in the
place of his more secular dictatorship. Many revolutions seem to
be “left wing,” which in many people’s minds means socialist and
secular. Yet here was a conservative revolution that seemed, at
least, to be counter-modernizing. Of course, the reality on the
ground was more complicated. The coalition that led to the
Shah’s downfall brought together many actors, from religious
leaders like the Ayatollah Khomeini to secular Marxists to middle-
class students. Just the same, the revolution has been taken by
many to call into question existing theories of revolution.71
For more on the Iranian Revolution, see the case study in the
Iran Country Profile materials in Part VI, p. 478. As you read it, keep
in mind the following questions:
1. Was the Iranian Revolution “reactionary”? Is a religious
revolution a contradiction in terms or just unusual when
judged against the background of modern European
revolutions?
2. What caused the Iranian revolution? How important
were religious ideas? Does the Iranian Revolution en
hance the plausibility of cultural/framing theories of
revolution?
3. Why did this revolution take place in Iran but not in
other Islamic countries at the time, like Egypt or Saudi
Arabia?
So where do frames come from? They are part of culture. Different communi
ties, practices, and walks of life exhibit shifting “frames” through which social
problems and appropriate responses are constantly interpreted. The idea is the
same, however: Contentious action like revolution can only take place when par
ticipants have a frame for conceiving of it and talking about it. In many, if not
most, modern social revolutions this language is provided by nationalism.72 Some
scholars have even argued that the very idea of revolution (sometimes called “rev
olutionism”) is itself a prerequisite for revolutionary activity.73 From this point of
view, revolution cannot take place simply whenever there is inequality, anger, and
frustration. Rather, revolution is only possible when the idea of revolution al
ready exists as a model for addressing that discontent. Scholars increasingly em
phasize that ideas about how to protest play an important role in contention.74
Others stress the enduring influence of ideologies, a subject to which we turn in
chapter 15.75 One relatively recent theory of revolutions in the developing world,
along somewhat similar lines, stresses the importance of “political cultures of
opposition.”76
As you approach the close of this chapter, you now know that scholars have a
range of ways in which they conceptualize and explain contention, and that they
do not all agree. In general, though, theories might lead us to expect that several
conditions would increase the likelihood of successful contention:
1. Some pre-existing grievances felt by one or more groups.
2. A weakening in the institutions that repress collective dissent, yet without
sufficient political opening such that disputes can be resolved via formal
political institutions.
3. The emergence of new methods or means of organizing and communication,
whether these be technological (e.g., newspapers, social networking sites,
enhanced transportation) or of some other form (e.g., semi-spontaneous
298 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
IN SIG H TS
Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions
by John Foran –
I n a book that aims to explain a large number of revolutions in
I the developing world, Foran brings together several elements
of many of the theories noted in this section of the chapter. To
these he adds two things. First, he argues that to understand
revolutions in the developing world we need look beyond just
the actors in the specific societies in which revolutions are taking
place. “State breakdown” then becomes the breakdown of the
international system’s ability to reinforce existing social relations.
Flowever, Foran avoids what many critics regard as the ex
cessive structuralism of approaches like Skocpol’s by noting
the necessity of “political cultures of opposition.” For a revolu
tion to take place, the actors involved must be united by a lan
guage that (1) makes sense of their grievances and (2) channels
them toward revolutionary activity, rather than quiescence or
everyday resistance.
Critics of such approaches suggest that “ideas” and “culture”
are hard to measure and that it is thus difficult to calculate their
causal role.
John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
organizing like the Montgomery Bus Boycott), or else new access to such
means and methods.
4. Sufficient organizing success such that actors perceive some reasonable
chance of further success.
5. The emergence of ways of talking and writing about underlying social
problems that points toward contention rather than quiescence as the
solution.
6. Organizational leadership that maintains the unity of contentious organiz
ing rather than fracturing contention.
As you know, different theories place greater and lesser emphasis on each of
these factors, and common sense tells us that they all matter. Drawing on the
methods discussed throughout this book so far, think about how we might ad
vance research from this point, determining with greater precision the relative
weight of each of these factors and the precise ways in which they interact to
produce successful organizing or revolt.
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A RA TIV ELY
K E Y M ETH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Deviant or
Negative Cases
A “deviant case” is a case that has a
notably different outcome from what
one or another theory might predict.
Such observations, also called “nega
tive cases,” are useful not because
The “Arab Spring” of 2011
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, beginning in Spring 2011 many authoritarian governments in North Africa and the Middle East witnessed
a tremendous wave of contention. The protests began in Tunisia and spread
quickly to many countries, with the most immediate consequence in Egypt,
where hundreds of thousands of people crowded into Tahrir Square to demand
change.
This truly momentous development encouraged further protests in other parts
of the Arab world. Major protest action began, among other places, in Yemen,
Libya, and then Syria. In the Libyan case, the dictator Muammar Qaddafi was
quite willing to use massive force to repress protestors. Chillingly, authoritarian
The “Arab Spring” of 2011 299
A Tunisian man casts a vote in elections in October 2011 made possible by the “Arab Spring.’
(continued)
they necessarily invalidate a given
theory but because they allow us to
gain more leverage as we attempt to
test hypotheses. Often they do so by
producing anomalous results that
require re-thinking of original theo
ries. In this section, be attentive to the
way in which the “negative case” of
Saudi Arabia could cause a scholar to
reconsider existing theory.
dictators seem to have learned the lesson that repression is the way to preserve
power. NATO intervened militarily in Libya, ostensibly to protect civilians, but
ultimately to provide material assistance to rebels who eventually dislodged the
Qaddafi regime. The outcomes in other cases have been mixed. The memory of the
Arab Spring still inspires hope in many, but it would be a stretch to say that it
democratized the region. So far, outcomes run the gamut from Tunisia’s seemingly
successful initial transition to democracy to pronounced state weakness in Libya,
considerable repression in Egypt, and major gains for terrorist groups in Syria, not
to mention great loss of life and massive displacement of people from their homes.
W hat would we want a theory of contention to be able to explain about these
events? There are many interesting questions to be answered, but among the most
central we would want to include the following: (1) W hy did this wave of conten
tion emerge? (2) W hy were the proponents of regime change successful in Tunisia
and Egypt but not in Syria and only with NATO support in Libya? And, finally,
(3) W hy has no significant contention been seen in Saudi Arabia, where a number
of similar conditions can be found? In other words, any theory of what caused the
revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere should be able to account for Saudi
Arabia as a “negative case” in which at least some of the key factors in the other
cases are present but in which the outcome is sharply different. These are not the
only interesting questions one can ask about the Arab Spring revolts and their
aftermath, but here we focus on them, largely restricting our discussion to the
events of 2011.
To work toward establishing hypotheses, let us first think about what our
theories would predict, and then we will briefly consider some of the common
and varying conditions present in our cases. See Table 12.3.
As you can see from this table, not all of the hypotheses generated from these
theories are mutually exclusive. Indeed, you can probably see ways in which they
could be combined. This does not mean that the underlying theories are fully
compatible: certain general theoretical issues cannot be glossed over. For ex
ample, some versions of rational choice theory says that demand for revolution is
constant, while relative deprivation theory says it varies. Nonetheless, we can
draw on different theories as we attempt to explain the complexities of a series
of cases.
300 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
A number of factors may have contributed to the emergence of the “Arab
Spring.” Many commentators have noted that demographic pressures produced
discontent. These are societies with a comparatively high number of young
adults and few economic opportunities for them. Another clear factor is the
sense of frustration that many in the Arab world feel with their countries’ non-
democratic status, particularly when judged against a world in which democracy
has seemed ascendant for some decades now. Others point to social media, ar
guing that Twitter and Facebook helped protestors solve collective action prob
lems, noting that some of the regimes have tried to restrict access to information
technology.
W hat conditions were common in these societies before the wave began?
Islam is the majority religion in all of them. Each began the sequence as an au
tocracy and, indeed, with a long history of authoritarianism. Each has relatively
high poverty (though this varies in extent from case to case, as we shall see). Yet
there are important variations along these dimensions. Note that the two cases
where contentious action was most successful—Egypt and Tunisia— are not
major oil exporters (Table 12.4).
This might suggest that being an oil exporter potentially thwarts this sort of
contention, perhaps because oil export provides resources for the state to main
tain legitimacy or even to repress opponents. Obviously, the lack of major gov
ernment oil revenues is not a sufficient condition for successful contention, given
that Syria also is not a major oil exporter, and its regime has, despite serious op
position, held onto power. To some extent, though, this is a matter of scale. In
relative terms, the Syrian government, at least in years prior to the conflict, de
rived considerable resources from oil exports.
Another point of variation concerns the relationship between religion and
politics. While, as noted earlier, they are all majority-Muslim countries, there
are important differences in this regard. Perhaps the sharpest contrast here can
t a b l e 1 2 . 3 Contention: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence
Moving Toward Hypothesis
What d o e s the th e o ry p re d ict Possible Instance
Theory ca u se s contention? What w ould a case lo o k lik e i f it fo llo w e d the theory?
Relative Deprivation Increased discontent due to declining Demographic and economic trends mean poor job prospects
status of key groups for young adults, who mobilize against regimes they see as
barriers to advancement.
1. Political opening (from democratic re- 1. Low willingness/capacity to repress protests leads to more
forms or fiscal weakening of the state) successful contention.
2. Pre-existing mobilization capacity 2. More and larger pre-existing political groups leads to more
among key groups contention.
Rational Choice Theory Changes in the strategic situations faced Lack of repression of early protests changes actors’ views on
by key actors risks of contention. Weak state responses make victory seem
more likely, producing cascade of participation.
Political
Opportunities/
Resource Mobilization
TH IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY j
Cultural or “Framing” Changing ideas or cultural change Contention emerges and strengthens as the very idea spreads
Theory before or during the process that radical change is needed (e.g., the “Arab Spring” idea).
The “Arab Spring” of 2011 301
t a b l e 12.4 Net Oil Exports, 2009, Barrels
Per Day (in Thousands)
Tunisia 5
Egypt -38
Libya 1,525
Syria 117
Saudi Arabia 7,322
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm.
be found between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is essentially a theoc
racy (though Islam in Saudi Arabia is Sunni Islam, meaning the clergy do not
hold formal power, which is held by the royal family). The regime’s legitimacy is
maintained both by religious arguments and by lavish spending of oil revenues.
Egypt has a long history of Islamic militancy, but for decades it was dominated
by secular nationalists who attempted to marginalize political Islam. Framing
theories of revolution might note that this could advantage the proponents of
contentious action, since religious modes of dissent could likely be more readily
used as a wedge in a society like Egypt than in Saudi Arabia. O f course, this can
also produce problems for revolutionaries. The Arab Spring led the Muslim
Brotherhood to power, but their overreach prompted resistance and their even
tual fall, and some critics of the current regime suggest that Egypt has returned
to “Mubarak-lite” style governance.
Another issue is the degree of poverty faced by these countries. I f the relative
deprivation theory is right, we would expect to find one or another group experi
encing economically generated discontent. W hile these issues are complicated,
for the sake of simplicity here we will just look at per capita income (Table 12.5).
Again, for the sake of simplicity, we will take these data to indicate that Tunisia,
Egypt, and Syria are likely to have a high degree of economically induced discon
tent, Libya a moderate degree, and Saudi Arabia a low degree.77 Finally, if we
t a b l e 12.5 2010 Per Capita Incom e in Selected
Countries (in U.S. dollars)
Country GDP Per Capita (USD)
Tunisia 4,222
Egypt 2,654
Libya 11,321
Syria 2,931
Saudi Arabia 15,836
T H IN K IN G
C O M P A R A TIV ELY
Source: UN Statistics Division, Social Indicators, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/ products/socind/,accessed on
July 17,2012
http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/
302 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention
examine the sequence of contention in these societies, we see an important dif
ference in the process of contention. In four of the five cases (Egypt, Tunisia,
Syria, and Libya), strong contentious action developed, but in two of them
(Egypt and Tunisia) the military was unwilling to fully repress the regime’s op
ponents in the early states of collective action (Table 12.6). This suggests that the
military and its linkage to the existing regime—which we can take to be a func
tion of state capacity—is critical to outcomes. Focusing on general judgments of
just these variables, we can summarize the cases as shown in Table 12.6.
I f we take our negative case— Saudi Arabia—out of the comparison, a clear hy
pothesis suggests itself: Successful collective action appears to be a function of the
state’s failure to repress. Other features are held constant, with the exception of the
fact that Libya is an oil exporter, which is perhaps relevant only insofar as it facilitates
the state’s repressive capacity. In other words, factors like economic discontent and
the religious versus secular character of the regime appear to be constants and thus
causally unimportant. This is broadly consistent with our “political opportunity
theory” discussed previously. However, when we bring Saudi Arabia into the com
parison, this no longer appears to be the case. Rather, Saudi Arabia, where no major
contention has emerged, varies from the other cases in two respects: (1) it is a reli
gious regime and (2) it does not seem to have witnessed dramatic, economically
generated discontent. In other words, the inclusion of this case makes these factors
relevant, which is critical to the hypotheses suggested by framing and relative depri
vation approaches. Note that it does not demonstrate their causal force, however.
The purpose of this exercise is to get you thinking about how to make com
parisons and not to fully explain variation in the “Arab Spring” once and for all.
Indeed, this task will likely take years, both because we need to see how these
processes play out and because scholarship in political science often depends on
many efforts by many scholars to generate and test hypotheses. W hat you can see
here, however, is one way in which we may begin to proceed if we wish to make
sense of emergent patterns in the “Arab Spring.” Note how much case selection
matters. W hat would we conclude if Saudi Arabia weren’t included? Can you
think of other cases that might change our conclusions if we included them? Or
cases that point to causal factors that we have not considered here?
t a b l e 1 2 . 6 Contention in the “Arab Spring”: Five Cases
Major oil exporter? Theocratic regime?
Econom ically
generated discontent?
State/military w illing to
repress protest?
Tunisia N N Y (high) N
Egypt N N Y (high) N
Libya Y N Y (moderate) Y
Syria N* N Y (high) Y (so far, to the extent possible)
Saudi Arabia Y Y N Y (presumably)
*As stated in the text, the Syrian state has in recent years derived considerable revenues from oil export, even though the country’s share in the total international oil
market is small.
T H IN K IN G
CO M PA RA TIV ELY
Chapter Review 303
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Concepts
• Comparative political analysts are interested in how and why
conflict sometimes takes place outside of formal institutions.
• There are a number of forms that such conflict takes. We were
especially attentive to the differences between revolutionary
and non-revolutionary strategies to create change.
Types
Social movements are probably the most common form of
organized conflict in advanced industrial democracies. Social
movements are commonly regarded as organized collective
action in the pursuit of social reforms of one or another kind.
Revolutions are perhaps less common in advanced indus
trial societies but quite common in modern societies more
generally. Revolutions are usually thought of as producing
dramatic change rather than mere reforms.
• Social revolutions change structures like the class system.
• Political revolutions change the state.
Anti-colonial revolutions create newly independent states
after removing colonial powers.
Insurgencies shade into revolutions. We can distinguish them
by the degree to which insurgencies take protracted military
form, often in the absence of large-scale civilian mobilization.
• Terrorism can be studied as a tactic employed by participants
in social movements, revolutions, and insurgencies or as a
particular form for the organization of resistance. In the latter
case, much attention is placed on “terror networks.”
• “Everyday resistance” is the name scholars give to the ways that
groups resist and express discontent in the absence of the
resources needed for complex organization and coordination.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. This chapter began and ended with a brief discussion of the
“Arab Spring.” Based on the theories and concepts discussed
here, why do you think the protests described there have been
successful and others unsuccessful? What do these cases tell us
about contention in general?
2. The United States is a society in which wealth is unequally distrib
uted and a number of groups feel aggrieved. Why is it that there has
not been a strong revolutionary tradition in the United States? What
would the theories we have considered say about this question?
3. In today’s world some groups claim to be making revolutions
through democratic elections. In your view, is this possible? How
would this change our definition of revolutions? Does it make sense
to broaden our concept so as to include such cases? Why or why not?
Causes and Effects
• There are at least four general types of theories of revolu
tion, and these theories can, with some modification, be
applied to other forms of contention.
• Theories of “relative deprivation” and “social disequilibrium” try
to explain revolutions through focusing on an increase in the
demand for revolutions. It looks at the impact of moderniza
tion on existing political institutions and social hierarchies. It
suggests that when modernization impacts these hierarchies,
social equilibrium is broken and important groups seek to
produce a new equilibrium through revolution.
• Theories of political opportunities and mobilization try to
explain revolutions through focusing on supply of mobilization
opportunities rather than demand for revolution. It suggests
that new political opportunities, such as state collapse and the
presence of useful ways of organizing dissent, matter most.
Collective action theories argue that collective action prob
lems are the main barrier to revolution. When revolutions
do take place, the best way to explain them is to show how
collective action problems were solved.
Framing or cultural theory says that other theories must be
supplemented by a focus on ideology or culture. Material
conditions are not enough to produce revolutions. Rather,
people need to have ideas that “frame” their grievances in a
way that suggests that revolution is the legitimate solution.
Th inking Com paratively
• The “Arab Spring” of 2011 presents a set of interesting and
useful cases for these theories.
4. All of the major forms of contention discussed in this chapter
are hard to control and to lead. They often lead to unin
tended consequences and escape the grasp of those who
began them. Which types of contention would be most dif
ficult to lead, and why? Which ones might be a bit easier to
lead, and why?
5. In this chapter we considered numerous forms of contention, and
then we focused on explanations of revolution. These explana
tions could potentially be applied to some of the other forms of
contention as well. For which forms of contention do you think
these explanations would be most successful? And for which do
you think they would face the greatest difficulties? Why?
CHAPTER 13
,
• Rwandan refugees in 1994. This image is disturbing because it took place in the midst of the Rwandan genocide, one of the worst outpourings of
ethno-nationai violence in recent years. Can comparative political analysis help us to understand and put a stop to such horrific events?
The twentieth century witnessed some of the greatest atrocities in human history, from the Nazi Holocaust to the deaths of millions through vio
lence, starvation, and famine in China, Cambodia, the Soviet Union, and
Bangladesh, among many other places. As a response to the horrific events in
Nazi Germany in particular, the international community declared that it
would never again allow genocide, the mass murder of people of a particular
racial, ethnic, or national group. Although mass killing continued around the
world in subsequent decades, it was only in the late 1990s that
much of the public realized that genocide had not been eradi
cated (though some observers were aware that it had never
really disappeared). The genocides in both Rwanda and the
Balkans were well documented, but the international re
sponses to these crises were dramatically different. In the Af
rican case, the international community did very little, and
peacekeepers stood by as the killing occurred, as their man
date did not authorize interference. In the European case,
N A TO mounted a joint military effort, bombing Serbia and
forcing an end to formal hostilities, eventually bringing some
of the leaders to The Hague for criminal trial.
Now, in the twenty-first century, genocide has continued,
most notably in Sudan, and the international community has
largely remained divided and confused about how to proceed.
To some extent this response may be due to a lack of sufficient
will. But it may also be due to failure to truly understand vio
lence linked to political identities. I f this is true, policymakers
may need to begin by understanding the nature and causes of
national and ethno-national identities more generally. Comparative analysis
of political identities and nationalism aims to help us better understand these
issues. W hy do some identity groups engage in violence against others? Is it
mostly related to the identities themselves or to circumstances such as eco
nomic development or political institutions?
Comparative politics also aims to go beyond questions about violence to
ask about political identities more generally. W h y do modern societies almost
invariably define their populations as nations? W hy do they approach citizen
ship and national membership differently? W hy do some societies seem to
place so much emphasis on race and ethnicity as a basis for nationalism, and
genocide Efforts to diminish or
destroy a people and/or culture.
IN TH IS C H A P T E R
Concepts 306
Identity 306
Nationalism and the Nation 306
Types 307
Primordialist Approaches 307
Perennialist Approaches 308
Modernist Approaches 308
Types of Nationalism 311
Causes and Effects: What Causes
Ethno-N ational Conflict? 313
T H IN K IN G C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
Ending Ethnic and National V iolence 321
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
United Kingdom • Mexico • Japan
Germ any • Nigeria
305
306 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
identity The social label ascribed
to an individual or group that
locates the individual or group in
political society more broadly.
social identity theory An
important theory in social
psychology that sees personal
identities as linked to and partially
derived from group identities
and roles.
national identity An identity that
locates one’s social position in
relation to national membership.
others seemingly less so? W h a t causes collective identities to change? In recent
years, interest in identity and its political consequences has grown. As always,
in this area of research, comparative analysis depends on clearly formulated
concepts.
Concepts
We must begin by clarifying the meaning of the concepts of “identity,” “the
nation,” and “nationalism.”
Identity
W hat is identity? Probably the best way to begin thinking about it is at the level
of the individual. At the most basic level your identity is your sense of self. You
have a sense of who you are and of what makes you special and unique. You also
participate in attributing identities to others. In other words, as social identity
theory argues, even our own personal identities are constructed on the basis of
social sources, and the ongoing acts of having an identity and labeling others are
social.’ Every day, we construct symbolic representations of the social world in
which we live and our place in it. Thus our personal identities—our senses of
ourselves as individuals— are drawn from roles linked to the role and group iden
tities (e.g., student or professor, Brazilian or American, woman or man, brother
or sister) that our society makes available to us.
The identities that matter most in politics are group identities. Group identi
ties draw boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, though the way in
which such boundaries are constructed varies a great deal. For example, some
times group identities are very sharply bounded, and individuals are not allowed
to pass from one group to another.2 In other situations group boundaries are
permeable, and one can choose whether or not to belong to the group in question.
Likewise, certain sorts of identities are compatible, such as being simultaneously
Spanish and Catholic, whereas others are likely to be perceived by some people
as incompatible, such as being simultaneously an anarchist and a fascist.
Identities are cultural, historical, and political. This means that they are created
by human societies and expressed symbolically, that they change over time, and
that they influence and are influenced by the ways that power is distributed in
society. W hen we study them we should be attentive to how they are constructed
by different individuals and groups, how their forms change over time, and how
different individuals and groups, with varying access to resources, struggle to
identify themselves and one another for their own purposes. In short, identities
are the social labels ascribed to individuals or groups, locating the individual or
group in political society more broadly.
Nationalism and the Nation
In this chapter we focus on what might be the most important form of political
identity in today’s world, national identity. As suggested at the beginning of this
Types 307
chapter, for some the idea of nationalism conjures up images of stringent restric
tions on immigration, of discriminatory behavior, and, at its worst, of genocide.
And yet while nationalism and national identity can be and sometimes are linked
to exclusion and violence, this is not the whole story.3 They are also linked in
some cases to inclusive citizenship and democracy. Indeed, some scholars think
that modern democracy would not have emerged without nationalism. In gen
eral, we could start by defining nationalism as the idea that nations should be the
basic units of social and political life. Nations, in turn, are often defined as rela
tively large groups that think of themselves as equal and sovereign.’1′ In other
words, in modern politics, nations are thought of as the source of the state’s le
gitimate authority. This is why all modern governments, even authoritarian ones,
claim to speak on behalf of the “people” or “nation.” To reiterate, nationalism is
the view that we all have a national identity and that this identity is important.
National identity says that we are members of nations, and that these nations are
sovereign and equal.
Types
Scholars of nationalism typically follow Anthony Smith in dividing theoretical
approaches to the subject into several main groupings: “primordialists,” “peren-
nialists,” and “modernists.”5 Primordialists think that all societies have some
thing like nationalism, and that the main problem involves explaining why this
is so. Perennialists disagree and think that not all societies have nationalism, but
that some pre-modern societies did have it. Modernists take national identity to
be a modern phenomenon, which for most means from the late eighteenth cen
tury to the present).6 Whether you are a primordialist, a perennialist, or a mod
ernist depends on how you conceptualize nationalism and the nation. The major
classifications group theories by the date of national identity’s emergence, and
this is really a question of how you define the nation, national identity, and
nationalism.7
Prim ordialist A pproaches
Primordialists tend to treat national identity as being the same thing as collective
identity more generally. In other words, they think there is not much of a differ
ence between the identities of modern nations and the type of identity found
among groups as diverse as, say, the pre-Colombian Inca, medieval Europeans,
members of traditional Hindu castes, and members of the hunter-gatherer soci
eties that human beings inhabited for most of our evolutionary history. For pri
mordialists, since collective identity is necessary for societies to function, a form
of nationalism is a universal feature of human societies.
Some primordialists are devotees of sociobiology or evolutionary psychol-
ogy.8 These are theories that aim to explain almost all of human behavior and
society in terms of evolutionary theory. These scholars tend to treat national
identity as biologically rooted, and to explain it in relation to its ability to en
hance the reproductive success of our ancestors. For example, positive in-group
sentiment might have helped by enhancing altruistic behavior to perceived in
group members and non-favorable behavior to the out-group. Other scholars
nationalism The view that the
world is and should be divided into
nations that are thought of by
nationalists as sovereign and
egalitarian.
nation A group thought of as
sovereign and equal, typically
comprised of a large, often
geographically bounded
population.
primordialism The label applied
by Anthony Smith to those theories
of national identity that see it as
continuous with pre-historical
(“primordial”) forms of identity.
perennialism The label applied
by Anthony Smith to those theories
of national identity that see it as
neither exclusively modern nor
continuous with pre-historical
forms of identity.
modernism The label applied by
Anthony Smith to those theories of
national identity that see it as
exclusively modern.
sociobiology An approach to the
study of societies that sees human
society as governed by the same
(evolutionary) principles as animal
societies.
evolutionary psychology An
approach to the analysis of human
behavior that seeks to explain it
almost exclusively on the basis of
evolutionary theory (see also
Sociobiology).
308 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
treat national identity’s ubiquity as more of a social or cultural imperative than a
consequence of evolutionary processes.9 Because human beings are social crea
tures they need to form identities. W hat unites all of these theorists is the basic
idea that nations are “primordial units” to which people feel passionately loyal.
Perennialist A pproaches
Perennialist approaches say that not all identities are natural and universally
present, but that nationalism is not solely modern. There is great diversity in the
ways that perennialists treat national identity. A number of them see nationalism
as originating in medieval or early modern Europe.10 A common strategy is to
define national identity as present when a single, strongly identified group has its
own territory and language.11 Another is to define an ethno-cultural community
as a nation when it has a state that corresponds to it.12 Perennialists then mean to
exclude certain political identities from the category “national” but define the
phenomenon far more inclusively than the modernists. In other words, they do
not treat kinship groups and nations as overlapping or close categories, as many
primordialists would. There are comparatively fewer scholars who defend “peren-
nialism” than “primordialism” or “modernism.”
M odernist Approaches
Most modernists see nationalism as emerging first in Europe in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and spreading from there, though they differ on the
details. The clearest definitions of nationalism from this perspective focus on
several key aspects of national identity. First, nationalism says that the nation
cannot just be some small elite, but has to correspond to most or all of a society’s
population. Second, it says that society’s members are all equal in some way. Fi
nally, nationalism says that the nation is sovereign.13 Modernists note that these
features did not apply to most societies and identity groups historically, but that
in the modern world this mode of identity has spread rapidly and is now
dominant.
CASE IN CONTEXT
National Identity in the United Kingdom PAGE 550
English nationalism is often considered one of the first, or per
haps the very first, case. Interestingly, though, different scholars
see it emerging in different historical moments: medieval times,
the sixteenth century, the seventeenth century, and even the
early twentieth century. Moreover, English national identity has
co-existed with British national identity, and also with regional
identities— to some, also national— like the Scottish, the Welsh,
and the Northern Irish. All of this raises questions about how we
define and empirically study the nation.
For more on the changing face of English/British national
identity, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 550-551. As you read it,
keep in mind the following questions:
1. How is it possible that different scholars date the emer
gence of English nationalism so differently?
2. How does English nationalism relate to British
nationalism?
3. How does British nationalism relate to the identities of
Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish Britons?
Types 309
■ _ CASE IN CONTEXT
# Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity
in Mexico p a g e 507
Many structuralist theories focus on industrial capitalism as a key
cause. At first glance, structuralist theories focused on capitalism
seem well prepared to explain the emergence of national iden
tity in Europe, but they sometimes encounter trouble when ap
plied to developing world societies. Mexico is a case in point.
One cannot begin to speak of modern industrial capitalism in
Mexico until, at the very earliest, the late nineteenth century, and
many would judge even this too early. Yet nationalism was an
important force in Mexican politics from the early 1800s.
For more on the case of Mexican nationalism, see the na
tional identity case study in Part VI, pp. 507-508. As you read it,
keep in mind the following questions:
1. Flow would the approaches to nationalism discussed in
this chapter treat the Mexican case? Which account
seems to fit the case best?
2. If we consider Mexico against the background of Latin
America more generally, what light does the comparison
shed on this question?
Modernists comprise a large share of scholars studying nationalism and na
tional identity, and members of this large group disagree about many things.
One major point of disagreement separates those who are more “structuralist”
and those who are more “constructivist.” The basic difference between these two
approaches is not too difficult to understand, though there is a large debate in
social science about what these terms mean. Structuralists see big, difficult-to-
change parts of society—such as major features of the economy—as determining
what really matters about national identity. Constructivists emphasize that na
tions are symbolic constructs, and so place greater emphasis on the creative ef
forts of individuals and groups to define and redefine their identities.
An example of a structuralist theory is Ernest Gellner’s linking of industri
alization to national identity (see “Insights” box).14Gellner argued that national
structuralism An approach to
nationalism studies that sees big,
difficult-to-change parts of society
as determining what really matters
about national identity.
constructivism In nationalism
studies, the view that nations are
symbolic constructs and so place
greater emphasis on the creative
efforts of individuals and groups to
define and redefine their identities.
IN SIG H TS
Nations and Nationalism
by Ernest Gellner
Gellner argues that industrial capitalism produces nationalism, in part through the instrument of the state. For Gellner, capi
talism requires a homogeneous, interchangeable, socially and
geographically mobile workforce as well as standardized lan
guage. Holding laborers in place by feudal ties or localism will be a
major barrier to economic development, and capitalism is facili
tated by literacy, common language, and a mobile workforce com
pensated in wages. Gellner’s theory is that these needs lead to
nationalism, because nationalism encourages the social character
istics that capitalism requires. Nationalism takes a language of “the
people” and gives it high status. The national state standardizes its
usage through official documents, the education system, and so
forth. Likewise, nationalism says that everybody in the nation is
fundamentally equal, which breaks down hierarchical ties and
gives rise to the interchangeability of modern workers. Critics
worry that the theory doesn’t clearly specify “causal mechanisms”
through which the effect is produced. Nationalism seems to “go
with” capitalism, but we need a theory of how capitalism produces
nationalism. If nationalism is created forthe sake of capitalism, who
are the “agents” who accomplish this, and what are their motiva
tions and goals? Gellner’s answer to this question is that the state
coordinates the rise and maintenance of national identity, but that
it does so because of underlying economic forces.
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
310 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
IN SIG H T S
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity
byh I’rdkenUld
Greenfeld argues that nationalism is fundamentally cultural and needs to be understood as an imaginative response to
social conditions. To understand nationalism’s emergence and
growth, we must understand why the idea spread that humanity
is divided into distinct “peoples” who are “sovereign” and “equal.”
For Greenfeld, the key preconditions for the development of na
tional identity are problems in stratification systems through
which societies hierarchically divide themselves, such as the class
structure. Elite status-inconsistency— a condition present when
the stratification system breaks down and elites are no longer
sure of their status— leads some groups to seek to transform
identity, and national identity often seems to such groups to
serve their interests well. Greenfeld examines this hypothesis
against a number of cases (including England, France, Russia,
Germany, and Japan), finding pronounced status-inconsistency
in each case in the key groups that are most central in redefining
their societies as nations. At the same time, Greenfeld acknowl
edges the importance of institutions like the state prior to na
tional identity’s emergence in helping to shape the type that
develops in any given case. Scholars working with this theory
also note that political institutions play an important role in
spreading and preserving national identity.
Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992.
identity and nationalism are useful (or “functional”) for industrializing societies be-
cause they promote social mobility, shared language, and common understandings.
An example of a constructivist theory is Liah Greenfeld’s argument that na
tional identity is an imaginative response to contradictory public claims about a
economics,group’s status.15 Greenfeld emphasizes social psychology, rather than
in analyzing the processes through which national identity emerges and thrives
(see “Insights” box).
These theories reveal just how different such structuralist and constructivist
approaches can be, but simultaneously reveal points of similarity. For example,
the group status-inconsistency that Greenfeld emphasizes may often be due to
“structural” changes in society such as shifting ways of organizing social and
economic class or innovations in the ways that states recruit their staff. In other
words, the fact that such a theory emphasizes social psychology and symbolic
construction does not mean that it ignores structural characteristics of society.
CASE IN CONTEXT
Importing National Identity in Japan? PAGE 493
Japan had a clear civilizational identity for centuries before
modern nationalism. Indeed, under the Tokugawa regime, the
country turned inward and sharply limited commercial and cul
tural contact with the outside world. Yet many scholars think that
it only developed modern national identity in the late nineteenth
century. One of the most striking things about the case of Japan
is how quickly industrialization and economic growth followed
the development of national identity.16
For more on Japanese nationalism, see the case study in Part VI,
p. 493. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What does Japan show us about the relationship
between nationalism and other key aspects of
modernization?
2. Are economy-centered, state-centered, or constructivist
theories best suited to explaining the case of Japanese
nationalism?
Types of Nationalism
As discussed in chapter 1, political scientists can move up and down Sartori’s
ladder of abstraction in searching for more or less general conceptualizations of
nationalism. At the level of greatest generality, scholars might look at the psy
chological preconditions of collective identity itself. A primordialist perspective
might be useful in this case. At the same time, only modernist conceptualiza
tions might offer sufficient specificity for asking questions about modern nation
alism’s emergence, since they are most able to draw clear qualitative distinctions
between national identity and other identities out of which it might grow or that
might otherwise resemble it in certain respects.
In order to ask and answer more specific comparative questions about national
identity and other variables, however, one needs still more specific conceptual
izations. These typically take the form of typologies of nationalism. Most com
monly, typologies posit a choice between two main forms of national identity
(see Table 13.1). For part of the twentieth century, the distinction was between
so-called Western nationalism and Eastern nationalism.17 Note that these
geographical distinctions were largely intended to capture an alleged difference
between the nationalisms characteristic of Eastern and Western Europe. Western
nationalisms, such of those of France and Britain, it was often alleged, were
compatible with tolerance, liberal-democratic political institutions, and so forth.
Eastern ones, however, like those of Germany or Russia, were based on the col
lective notion of the “volk,” tended toward xenophobia, and were perhaps inhos
pitable to liberal-democratic institutions.18
Later, this distinction was developed and clarified into a distinction between
civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.19 While different scholars parse these
concepts in slightly different ways, the main issue here is a distinction between
those societies who treat citizenship as technically open and as not based on eth
nicity, and in turn take citizenship as the marker of national membership, and
those that either have closed conceptions of citizenship (citizenship is and should
be, according to such nationalisms, a biological inheritance) or that do not treat
formal citizenship as a true marker of national belonging. France and Germany
have been commonly taken as examples of these two kinds of nationalism. One
might expect that societies characterized by civic nationalism could do a better job
of incorporating immigrant communities and might even be less prone to inter
state conflict, though this should be thought of as a hypothesis and not a fact.
t a b l e 1 3 . 1 Traditional T yp o lo g y of Nationalism
“Western,” “Civic,” or “Eastern” or “Ethnic”
“Territorial” Nationalism s Nationalism s
France Germany
United Kingdom Russia
United States Central and Eastern Europe
Western nationalism An
antiquated term for what is now
often called “civic nationalism”
(see Civic nationalism).
Eastern nationalism An
antiquated term for what is now
often called “ethnic nationalism”
(see Ethnic nationalism).
civic nationalism A form of
nationalism that says that you are a
member of the nation if you are a
citizen of its state.
ethnic nationalism A form of
nationalism that says that you are a
member of the nation because of
your ancestry.
Australia
312 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
CASE IN CONTEXT
Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? PAGE 453
France is often presented as a quintessential “civic” nationalism.
Germany is often juxtaposed to France as the quintessential
“ethnic” nationalism.22 Indeed, some go so far as to try to explain
the rise of the Nazis as a function of this ethnic nationalism, a
much debated and controversial claim.
For more on nationalism in Germany, see the national iden
tity case study in Part VI, pp. 453-454. As you read it, keep in mind
the following questions:
1. Why do many scholars consider German nationalism to
be ethnic nationalism?
2. What would researchers have to show in order to demon
strate that long-standing patterns of Germany identity
explain German atrocities in the twentieth century? What
obstacles might such scholars face?
3. Has German nationalism changed in the post-World War
II years?
territorial nationalism According
to some scholars, a type of
nationalism that closely resembles
civic nationalism, in that
membership is fundamentally
determined by where one is born
or where one resides rather than
one’s ancestry.
Two foreign-born children take their oaths as citizens of the United States in 2011.
Sometimes this basic binary distinction takes on a slightly different form,
such as in the distinction between “territorial” and “ethnic” nationalisms, though
there is considerable overlap here with the civic-ethnic distinction.20 Territorial
nationalism is meant to refer to nationalism in which membership corresponds
to residency in a territory, and civic nationalism to citizenship in a state, but in
the modern world these concepts are closely related.
Liah Greenfeld adds a further element to this civic and ethnic typological
scheme, arguing that while ethnic nationalisms are always “collectivistic,” civic
ones can be either collectivistic or individualistic (for examples, see Table 13.2).
This distinction can be rather difficult to understand.21 The model of individual
istic nationalism holds that nations are associations of individual persons.
Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict?
t a b l e 1 3 . 2 Greenfeld’s Expanded T y p o lo g y of Nationalism
CASE EXAM PLES
Civic Ethnic
Individualistic United States N/A
United Kingdom
Collectivistic France Germany
Japan
Russia
This suggests that, whatever the reality of the political community and the pro
cesses through which it is formed and maintained, it is conceived of by its mem
bers as voluntary or associative. Collectivistic nationalism, in contrast, sees the
nation as having a kind of collective agency or will that transcends the agency or
wills of individual members. According to Greenfeld, collectivistic nationalism
increases the likelihood of authoritarianism.
Some critics allege that all such typologies are problematic because they
appear to be linked to value judgments about different societies.23 This concern
deserves serious consideration. Typologies from political science exist to help us
better analyze politics, but they may have other effects. If our categories too
neatly sort the world in ways that make some actors appear to be more (or less)
virtuous than others, we run the risk of creating damaging stereotypes.
Indeed, if the strongest claims made by proponents of typologies of national
ism and national identity are true—if there are differences between civic and
ethnic nationalisms that have implications for both domestic and international
conflict—it would be hard for many social scientists, as citizens, to avoid making
value judgments about them. But this critique should be a helpful reminder to
us that as social scientists we should remain careful to avoid the projection of our
own values onto the cases we study. Typologies of nationalism remain impor
tant in the literature, but they are controversial. One reasonable position is that
so long as we treat such typologies as ideal types—and not as totalizing descrip
tions of specific identity groups—many critics’ concerns lose some of their ur
gency. I f we use categories thoughtfully, we may be less apt to simply label one
country’s nationalism as civic and another’s as ethnic, but rather to see that
strands of nationalism corresponding to both types pervade most polities. Con
sidering the “civic” and “ethnic” ideal types might then be most useful as we
track change within countries over time, and not only in comparing between
countries.
Causes and Effects: What Causes
Ethno-National Conflict?
Much of the recent interest in nationalism and related forms of political iden
tity—as noted previously—concerns the widespread perception that national
and ethnic conflict and violence have increased since the end of the Cold War.
313
314 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
Recent research has shown, however, that the growth of such violence began
decades earlier and that what appeared to be a spurt of such violence in the 1990s
was a continuation of a long-run trend.24 Moreover, most ethnically heteroge
neous regions see very little intergroup violence.25 Nevertheless, given the extent
and seriousness of such violence—and the hope that policy based upon social
scientific knowledge can help us to reduce it—this is a particularly important
area of research on political identities. There is relatively little theoretical consen
sus about how to explain ethno-national violence, and indeed what ethnic vio
lence is.26 We need to clearly conceptualize both “ethnicity” and “violence” (and,
of course, to remember that not all conflict is violent).27
To begin studying such ethno-national conflict, the comparative political
analyst must answer several questions. First, what makes a conflict national or
“ethno-national”? Related to this, does a conflict being “national” or “ethno-
national” matter? In other words, can we understand a conflict better, or predict
its likely course more effectively, if we know that it is linked to nationalism?
Second, what type of conflict do we seek to explain? Third, what is the appropri
ate level of analysis to address the questions asked—for example, should our
Late Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic on trial at the UN
War Crimes Tribunal in 2001.
Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict? 315
cases be distinct societies, localities, examples of group behavior, specific events,
and so forth?
As for the first question, scholars take a variety of views. Some have sug
gested that there are multiple types of ethno-national identity, and that focus
ing on these different types might help us to account for variation in probabilities
of violence.28 A primordialist view of ethno-national identity, in contrast, might
assume unchanging, irrational attachments to a given group. In addition, there
are perspectives designated as constructivist (closely consistent with the
“constructivist” view of nationalism discussed earlier) and as instrumentalist,
meaning that the analyst assumes little significant affective attachment to the
group but rather sees ethnicity as a product of political entrepreneurs seeking to
manipulate populations for the pursuit of their own strategic ends. Finally, a
number of scholars treat ethno-national identity as synonymous with “commu
nal groups” more broadly for their research purposes:29 For such analysts, it
matters little whether a given group defines its boundaries in ethnic, racial,
religious, or any other sorts of terms, so long as the observable dynamics of
conflict are the same.
Regarding the second question, about what type of conflict we seek to ex
plain, some scholars have argued for a “disaggregation” of the concept of vio
lence.30 That is, there is more than one type of violence in need of explanation,
and different kinds of violence might have different causes. The most fundamen
tal distinction, perhaps, is between violence carried out by or via the state and
violence that takes place between social actors independent of the state. Think of
the difference between state-led efforts at genocide and, say, less centrally orga
nized conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. There are good reasons to
suppose that the social and political conditions that underlie state-led genocide
do not fully explain sectarian conflict outside the state, though they do have
much in common. Much literature implicitly focuses on the former type, perhaps
because state-led genocidal efforts have been so lethal, and because they at least
give the appearance of being preventable. However, genocide and other forms of
intergroup violence, like periodic riots, can be analytically distinguished and
likely require different explanatory approaches.31
Others note, importantly, that analysts must be attentive to who the parties to
conflict are, since the “who” has great implications for the “why.”32 Lying behind
such typologies are the analytical imperatives to (1) identify the major groups
involved; (2) analyze their relative size and resources; (3) consider their relation
ship to the state and the society’s stratification system; (4) take into account how
they “frame” their own identities and those of other groups; and (5) understand
the historical context of their relationships, given that these impact both how
their identities and the potential for conflict are culturally framed and also the
strategic calculations they are likely to make about the behavior of contending
groups.
Ultimately, as with all of comparative political analysis, our goal is to provide
explanations. There are several existing explanatory strategies in this area of re
search. It is worth noting that many scholars combine bits and pieces of these
different explanatory strategies.
instrumentalism A type of
explanation in social science that
says that you can explain
something by showing how its
development or persistence is in
the (usually material) interest of
powerful individuals or groups.
316 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
CA SE IN CO N TEX
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism
and Ethno-National Conflict in a Post-Colonial Society PAG E 522
In much of the world, notably in Africa and the Middle East, as well
as parts of Asia, European colonial powers created novel borders
and boundaries. When these societies became independent in
the mid- to late twentieth century, they sometimes experienced
problems of ethno-national tension and even violence, as groups
without shared histories of long-standing political unification
struggled over control of their new polities. A good example is
Nigeria, where regional ethnic and religious tensions have been
an issue since independence. The most extreme expression of
these tensions manifested in the Biafran War (or the Nigerian Civil
War) of 1967-1970, which caused tremendous loss of life.
For more on ethno-national conflict in Nigeria, see the case
study in Part VI, p. 522. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. What would each of the major theories of ethno-national
conflict we consider in this section say about this
case? Each would find some supporting evidence. Does
one or another theory, though, explain this case more
fully?
2. How does ethno-national pluralism intersect with the
resource-rich character of the Nigerian state? Would
conflict be as much of a problem if Nigeria’s oil wealth did
not make the stakes so high?
3. Given what social-scientific theories of ethno-national
conflict can show us about this case, what sorts of poli
cies might mitigate further tensions and violence in
Nigeria?
Primordial Bonds
You will recall from earlier in the chapter that primordialists tend to believe that
national identity is essentially just another instance of a universal human ten
dency to form close (or “primordial”) attachment to groups. The basic idea of
primordialist explanations of ethnic conflict is that conflict takes place when
pre-existing groups feel that their group and/or their identity is under threat. For
instance, perhaps “globalization” is causing a group to feel that its identity is
being diluted. Or perhaps members of another group are perceived to be outcom-
peting them for jobs and other resources. Primordialist theories assume that
these groups exist prior to the level of conflict, and that it is people’s “passions”
and “loyalties” that cause the conflict.
Let us consider a stylized example. Imagine a state called Pluria, controlled
by a large group called the Plurals. But there is a region in the country of
Pluria populated by two other groups known as the Alphas (Group A) and the
Betas (Group B). The Alphas and Betas understand themselves (and each
other) to be ethno-national groups. There are few Plurals in the region where
the Alphas and Betas live. Members of group A (the “Alphas”) tend not to
trust members of group B (the “Betas”), and the Betas tend not to trust Alphas.
However, both the Alphas and Betas have lived side by side for several genera
tions without conflict. However, some Alphas perceive the Betas to have closer
ties to the Plurals, the large group that controls the state. These members of
group A begin to speculate that group B plans to exploit these ties to dominate
them. This perception of threat upsets the cooperative equilibrium that had
been in place. Once group A feels threatened, and some of its members’
Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict?
hostility to group B is noticed by some members of group B, a counter-reaction
among some members of group B develops. Some members of group A then
take this counter-reaction as evidence in support of their prior belief that
group B is opposed to their interests. Such a cycle could spin out of control and
lead to conflict, and scholars have noted many cases that correspond roughly
with this sort of pattern.
Some scholars who are sympathetic to elements of primordialist theories
would argue that primordialist explanations alone are not fully satisfactory, as
they need to be supplemented in order to explain conflict. Indeed, this may even
be true of the stylized example considered in the previous paragraph. Since pri
mordialist views of ethnic groups and nations seem to assume the permanent
character of these groups and that these types of identities exist in all or virtually
all human societies, they may have trouble explaining why in only certain cases
ethnic conflict takes place. For example, if Hutus and Tutsis, Bosnians and Serbs,
or Indian Hindus and Muslims lived alongside each other for many years, why
did conflict suddenly erupt between them at particular historical junctures? To
answer such questions, primordialists often need to invoke some other explana
tory element, like economic crisis, political conflict, “modernization,” and so
forth. To this extent, as we have seen in other chapters, scholars may need to
draw on distinct theories, creating a “hybrid” model of conflict to fully explain
many cases.
Cultural Boundaries
Culturalist/constructivist explanations argue that conflict is the result of the
distinct ways in which groups and their boundaries are constructed. In other
words, some ways of drawing boundaries increase the chances that one group
will attack another. At first glance, this theory might seem very similar to the
primordialist theory noted previously. However, it differs in seeing high vari
ability in the ways that different groups think about and represent themselves
(and others) and sees this variability as key to explaining conflict. Often, such
theories are rooted in accounts of “types” of nationalism like those discussed in
the previous section.
Thus, some argue that ethnic nationalisms exhibit a higher probability of en
gaging in violence. Others similarly suggest that the likelihood of conflict is in
creased by “barricaded” identities, which construct sharp distinctions between
in-group and out-group members and depict out-group members as threatening.
This idea can be contrasted with “bounded” identities, which facilitate having
multiple different associations.33 As with primordialist explanations, however,
other factors likely need to be invoked to explain why conflict actually takes place
when it does, and why most “ethnic” or “barricaded” identities are not engaged
in violence most of the time. Nations thought to construct boundaries in ethnic
terms are not constantly at war, and even if it turns out that groups with “barri
caded identities” are more likely to engage in violence, they are not constantly
doing so, so some other variable must explain why violence emerges when it
does.34 Thus we might see a society constructing exclusive, impermeable bound
aries as a condition that increases the probability of violence, but not a sufficient
condition in and of itself.
318 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
Material Interests
Instrumentalist explanations make the assumption that people pursue “material”
interests and that concerns like national pride or the dignity or “purity” of the
ethnic group do not really matter much to them. The theory is called “instrumen
talist” because it says ethno-national identities are just used as “instruments” for
the pursuit of other purposes. Instrumentalists’ explanatory strategy, therefore,
involves hypothesizing that certain conditions in given cases make it politically
expedient for some actors to deliberately foment ethnic boundaries and conflict.
For example, if one group engages in violence toward another, perhaps the un
derlying reason is that the first group wants access to resources controlled by their
victims. As with other theories noted so far, simple versions of such explanations
taken alone are incomplete, begging questions about how ethnic boundaries
could be useful manipulative tools to begin with if strategic action is paramount.
In other words, if everyone is rational and self-interested, why are some people
ethnic/national chauvinists to begin with? W hy does it help politicians’ chances,
in some cases, to play to such sentiments?
One potential solution to this problem is to adopt George Akerlof and Rachel
Kranton’s idea of “identity utility.”35 Economists have long argued that people
seek to maximize their “utility,” or, roughly speaking, their satisfaction from dif
ferent choices. We can recognize that people derive utility not just from material
things but also from their identities. For example, it might be reasonable to
assume that, on average, people prefer clear, dignified identities that are condu
cive to self-esteem. Then one can ask about the conditions under which people
would turn to ethno-national chauvinism as they seek those ends. In this view,
identity is thus shaped by preferences about both material and non-material
payoffs.
Rational Calculation
Rational choice explanations—which have much in common with instrumental
ist approaches—aim to model the strategic calculus of actors in situations of
potential ethnic conflict. W hat distinguishes such approaches from ordinary in
strumental explanations is (1) their typical use of mathematical models and
(2) their focus on modeling the ability of members of a group to anticipate and
thus make rational choices about how to respond preemptively to the behavior of
members of the other group (and their own). The variables that must be consid
ered in such models are many, including perceived likelihood of the other group
perpetrating violence, perceived likelihood of victory if conflict breaks out, and
perceived costs associated with avoiding violence. As noted earlier, rational choice
models do not necessarily assume that material factors are central, and thus can
be combined with any of the other perspectives mentioned here. For example,
one could in principle combine a rational choice approach with a constructivist
one, using constructivism to explain the exclusivist preferences of nationalist or
ethnic chauvinist actors, and rationalism to explain the choices they make given
those constructed preferences.
Let us try to imagine how such explanations work (see Table 13.3). It would
not be rational, for example, for you to redefine yourself as the sole member of a
group that nobody has ever heard of: There would be no actual group to offer
Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict? 319
INSIGHTS Nations, States, and Violence
by D avid Laitin
Laitin uses a “rational choice’ perspective to explain why some ethnic and national groups attempt to assimilate, why others
try to secede, and so forth. He notes that most ethnic and na
tional groups get along with little violence, though they may
have grievances with one another, and argues that the rational
calculation of interest explains why grievances sometimes result
in violence. The spread of new identities depends on strategic
decisions made by individuals about group affiliation, which in
turn are shaped by the decisions of people around them. Indi
viduals make choices about keeping or changing their own
group affiliations based on three factors: economic benefit,
“in-group status,” and “out-group status.” Group affiliation can
impact one’s income (as one’s ethnic status can determine one’s
career prospects); it can influence one’s standing within one’s
own group, and it can influence one’s standing in the other
group. For example, majority groups in some countries may con
demn efforts by others to assimilate to the majority group, while
the majority may encourage such efforts in other countries. As
similation, secession, and other options are rational or irrational,
depending on such factors.
David Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence. New York: Oxford University Press,
2007.
t a b l e 13.3 Factors Influencing Ethno-National Identity:
A Rational-Choice Approach
Adopt the Majority Reject the M ajority Ethno-National
Ethno-N ational Identity Identity
Few seek Potential rewards if No majority-group membership gains,
assimilation successful, but high risk is but risks of in-group and out-group
present, as potential costs sanctioning minimized,
include both in-group and
out-group sanctioning.
Many seek Likelihood of group No majority-group membership gains,
assimilation sanctioning goes down. and still no risk of in-group and out-group
Rewards are still present but sanctioning,
with fewer potential costs.
benefits, and nobody else would recognize that membership. Likewise, if you
were a member of a minority group in a highly segregated society, trying to as
similate to the majority identity might not be rational, since you would likely face
resistance from both majority and minority group members. However, as larger
numbers of those around you take the assimilation path, it may become increas
ingly rational for you to do so (depending, of course, on your preferences).
According to scholars like David Laitin (see “Insights” box), these are the sorts
of factors that shape the likelihood that someone will adopt a given ethno-
national identity.
Somewhere along the line there is a “tipping point” beyond which it becomes
more rational to assimilate than to persist in one’s minority-group affiliation.36
O f course, identification with an ethno-national group in most cases has no con
nection to violence. But a similar logic to the preceding applies to participation
in secessionist movements. Scholars use this logic to try to predict whether par
ticipation in such movements will “cascade,” or spread through a group.37
320 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
Social P sychology
Social-psychological explanations come in a variety of forms.38 On one hand,
these approaches focus on common patterns of boundary construction and the
ways in which social categorization structures our perceptions of those around
us. Thus, they partially overlap with cultural constructivism. On the other hand,
many stress the importance of status differences, and feelings of discontent and
envy that these produce, in engendering conflict. The overarching idea, though,
is that collectively held or group feelings and resentments lie behind conflict.39
In general, then, social-psychological theories focus on two things. First is the
interactive process of the formation of group boundaries, the perception that “we
are us” and “they are them.” This relates to both the primordialist and construc
tivist approaches described previously (approaches that differ from each other
most fundamentally with respect to the question of how such boundaries are
established and how much they vary). The second is the relative social status of
“us” and “them” in this connection. Many theories agree that some status con
figurations are more dangerous than others, and also that “status dynamics”—
ways in which status systems change— can precipitate conflict. As such,
social-psychological theories of group violence are “demand side” theories,
loosely analogous to the social-psychological theories of collective action dis
cussed in the previous chapter. In other words, they attempt to explain violence
by assuming that it is a response to an increase in intergroup grievances. These
theories view increased grievances (or the ways structural circumstances, such as
a system of group rankings, can generate resentments) as key to explaining the
likelihood of violence.
O f course, for most research questions, none of these ideal-typical explana
tions alone will suffice, but thinking through these general explanatory strategies
is a good place to begin as we try to construct hypotheses to explain specific cases
of ethnic conflict.
IN S IG H T S Ethnic Groups in Conflict
by Donald L Horowitz
H orowitz’s account of ethnic conflict emphasizes (among other factors) the social psychology of group resentment.
Horowitz notes that ethnically diverse societies can be ranked or
unranked systems. In a ranked system, at least one ethnic group
is subordinated to another (as in India’s caste system). In un
ranked systems, ethnicity might correlate with social class, but
one group is not structurally subordinated to another. In ranked
systems, conflict typically takes the form of class warfare or social
revolution, whereas in unranked systems conflict is often a drive
to exclude, expel, or exterminate other groups. Among unranked
systems, Horowitz further distinguishes between societies with
many dispersed ethnic groups and those ‘ethnically centralized
systems” with just a couple or several major groups. Major con
flict centering on the state is likelier in ethnically centralized sys
tems than in ethnically dispersed systems. While structural
power relationships between groups matter, the driver of con
flict is social-psychological: group resentment. Groups tend to
compare themselves to other groups (a process exacerbated in
many countries by colonialism) and often see themselves as en
titled to higher status than other groups. Where differences in
status persist, the potential ingredients for ethnic conflict are
present.
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California
Press, [1985]2000.
Ending Ethnic and National Violence 321
Ending Ethnic and National Violence
In this chapter’s “Thinking Comparatively” section, we consider how comparative research can influence policy. As noted at the beginning of this chapter,
much of the practical “payoff” of research in this area, it is hoped, is that we may
be able to reduce the probability of inter-group conflict.41 Obviously, policy pre
scriptions should be strongly influenced by what empirical evidence about con
flict shows us about theoretical explanations. If it seems that constructivist
explanations of violence are correct, we may hope to use policy to influence the
formation of ethnic and national boundaries. If rational-choice theories are cor
rect, we can use them to alter the calculus of interests of leaders in potentially
violent situations, perhaps by making clear that they will face consequences for
their actions if they pursue violence. In general, there are at least four main pro
posed strategies for managing conflict suggested by social scientists, and com
parative political analysis is being used to assess their reliability. These are open
questions. W hich of these views do you find most persuasive? W hat sorts of evi
dence could help us decide between them? Can you think of additional or supple
mentary approaches?
1. Institutional Approaches
By far the most influential proposal in political science has been that we may be
able to reduce conflict by structuring institutions differently. There are several
reasons for the popularity of this approach, among others that (1) political sci
ence in general in recent years has relied heavily on institutional analysis and
(2) institutions—unlike, say, culture more generally—seem to be relatively ame
nable to engineering, at least in theory.42 Typically, scholars propose one or
another version of federalism or “consociationalism” as the solution to ethnic
conflict.43 Those who favor federalist solutions can be divided into two groups.
Some wish to see decentralized political institutions cut across ethnic ties, the
goal being to reduce the likelihood that leaders of such groups could harness
political institutions in support of the interest and aims of their group. Others
wish to see federation cut along ethnic lines. For example, some policy makers
proposed a federated structure for Iraq that would have allowed considerable
autonomy for Shiites, Sunni, and Kurds. In situations where formal ethnic feder
alism is not feasible (for example, if the geographical settlement of different
groups will not allow it), consociationalism calls for other methods for the sys
tematic representation of ethnic groups as groups in the state.
2. Cultural and Civil Society Approaches
We have already noted that some suggest “peace building” initiatives, or efforts
to foster “positive intergroup contact” as key.44 In an important study, Ashutosh
Varshney argues against excessive reliance upon institutional solutions to inter
group conflict.45 His analysis of group conflict in India reveals its local character
and its roots in the structure of social networks. Conflict tends to take place in
mostly urban areas and, indeed, in specific urban areas. Varshney’s analysis led to
the conclusion that the major variable that can explain the geographical
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY
K EY M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Large-N Studies
Most of the comparative analysis
discussed in this book involves trying
to discern causal sequences in a
relatively small number of cases. This
approach has great utility. Some
times, however, we need to compare
lots of cases to make sure that our
conclusions are not artifacts of case
selection or bias.
This is exactly what James Fearon
and David Laitin did.40They noted
that much research on ethno-national
bias selects cases based on observed
incidence o f violence. That research
then finds links to patterns of ethno-
national identity. But Fearon and
Laitin chose a different tack, looking
at a large sample including many
consociationalism An institutional
approach to managing potential
conflict in polities with multiple
groups, one which involves
ensuring that each group has
political representation.
322 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A RA TIV ELY
K EY M E TH O D O LO G ICA L T O O L
(continued)
cases of ethno-nationally diverse or
heterogeneous societies. They found
that ethno-national diversity was a
poor predictor of inter-group conflict.
This does not mean that ethnicity and
nationalism have nothing to do with
rates of conflict. Indeed, more recent
work by Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas
Wimmer, and Brian Min has argued
that ethnic conflict can be predicted
more successfully when we take into
account the role of the state. This
work suggests that the key to explain
ing such conflict is to examine the
ways in which access to state power
intersects with ethnic and ethno-
national distinctions.46
Large-N studies of this sort—
which deal with a large number of
observations— can often help us to
distinguish between findings that
only hold for a small number of cases
and those which capture general
tendencies or relationships.
distribution of conflict in India is the vibrancy of civic life: More specifically, in
urban areas, the presence of civic associations that cut across ethnic lines protects
against violence, which in India took place disproportionately in areas with low
levels of associational activity. The major policy payoff here would be to find ways
to strengthen non-ethnic associationalism. W hile in some ways this approach is
presented as an alternative to institutional strategies, it is better regarded as a
complement to such strategies. In other words, we are still talking about efforts
to shape organizations rather than directly addressing networks, identities, or
behavior.
3. Procedural and Judicial Approaches
Some scholars advocate using national and international judicial institutions to
address problems of intergroup violence.47 Rational choice and related forms of
analysis draw important attention to the fact that the strategic considerations of
both perpetrators and victims of violence shape outcomes over time. On one
hand, it is important that potential perpetrators of violence have the reasonable
expectation that there will be consequences if they harm others. On the other
hand, once a cycle of violence has begun, it is important that at least some who
have ties to such perpetrators do not so fear reprisal as to reach the judgment that
ending violence would be too risky. Thus, some argue both for the importance of
“individualizing responsibility” for the worst atrocities in ethnic conflict and for
implementing forgiveness programs of one kind or another.48 The de-escalation
of South African conflict serves as a model for many proponents of this view.
4. International-System Approaches
More generally, international pressure can also reduce the violence carried out by
states.49 States and international actors can bring a variety of consequences to
bear on transgressors of international human rights norms, and these may have
an important deterrent effect. Such approaches are most likely to be successful,
many scholars believe, when (1) the claim that other states or the international
community are likely to act seems plausible and (2) the potential perpetrator of
violence is not already isolated internationally, and thus has something to lose.
As you can see, these approaches are linked to the theories of conflict dis
cussed previously. But how could we further test whether policies derived from
theories will work? One approach would be to experiment with them, but for
both practical and ethical reasons, this is not a real option. Therefore we are
largely dependent on comparing historical evidence from the real world, espe
cially when it exhibits “natural experiments” that mimic experimental compari
son. We can test existing theories of conflict through small groups of comparable
case studies or through “large-N” studies. In either of these types of analysis, we
would look for statistical correlations between variables suggested both by theory
and by the observation of intergroup violence.50
As with many of the areas discussed in this book, this is an ongoing research
agenda with lots of questions left to debate and resolve. The hope is that we can
come to more fully understand the ultimate sources of intergroup violence and,
by doing so, the most efficacious ways to reduce or prevent it.
Chapter Review 323
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Concepts
Comparative political analysts are interested in classifying
and explaining major political identities.
• National identity is an important modern political identity
emphasizing popular sovereignty and equality.
Types
• National identities are conceptualized in three major ways
by comparative political analysts; their positions are known
to scholars as “primordialism,” “perennialism,” and
“modernism.”
Primordialists group national identity with collective
identities more generally. For a primordialist, national
identity is basically the same thing as tribal, clan, ethnic,
or racial identity.
Perennialists think that nationalism has been around for
many centuries, but they do not see all collective identities
as. basically the same. Rather, they focus on one or another
criterion that makes national identity different from more
ancient identities (e.g., a common vernacular, control of a
state).
Modernists believe that nationalism is different from the
sorts of political identities that preceded it. Some believe
that modern nationalism began as early as sixteenth-cen
tury England. Many others locate the emergence of na
tional identity in the late eighteenth century.
Some scholars argue that nationalism comes in different
types. The most common distinction is between a “civic” or
liberal” type and an exclusive or “ethnic” type.
Causes and Effects
Scholars have produced a range of theories to explain
ethnic and national violence. We considered five of them in
schematic form.
One theory holds that “primordial attachments” are respon
sible for collective violence. From this point of view, in other
words, explanations of collective violence must account for
the emotional motivation of perpetrators. Such theories
often suggest that such emotional motivations are en
coded in our biology, or in any case in our social nature,
and threats to national identity (e.g., perceived imminent
violence perpetrated by another group, or fears about
cultural dilution in the face of globalization) promptthe
behavior.
• Another theory holds that the nature of the cultural bound
aries between groups strongly impacts the probability of
conflict. Groups that define cultural boundaries as imper
meable and essential are, according to this point of view,
more likely to engage in violence.
A third theory holds that material interests are the main
determinant of collective violence. In other words,
according to this theory, when groups claim to be
engaging in violence because of group affiliation they
are actually interested in increasing their access to
material resources like money, water, food supplies, or
technology.
A fourth theory holds that collective violence is best ex
plained through modeling the rational decision-making
processes of group leaders and/or members.
• A fifth theory holds that collective violence is the product
of social-psychological processes that go beyond the ways
that cultural boundaries are constructed.
Th in kin g Com paratively
We thought about major policy proposals for reducing
or eliminating inter-group conflict, and we linked these
back to our earlier, causal theories of ethno-national
violence.
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. In the “Causes and Effects” section of this chapter, we consid
ered five major theories of intergroup/ethno-national conflict.
These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Sketch a
hybrid theory that includes key elements of at least two of the
theories discussed. Make clear (1) what is potentially gained
through the linkage and (2) what, if anything, is lost about each
of the theories included in the hybrid.
2. This chapter ends with a discussion of policy recommendations
that have been made by political scientists who study ethno-
national violence. We noted that they related to theories of
324 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity
ethno-national violence. However, some do not address “root
causes,” instead focusing on institutional solutions (like conso
ciationalism) to problems that many theories would say are
based on primordial, cultural, or material differences. Is this a
contradiction? Why might someone who believes ethno-national
conflict to have such geneses still prefer institutional solutions?
3. Can the different theories of ethnonational conflict we have
considered in this chapter be combined? Try to construct a
hybrid theory, building on what you have learned from this
chapter.
4. Pick a country you know well. Which of the three major per
spectives on the historical origins of nationalism and national
identity discussed in this chapter— primordialism, perennialism,
and modernism— do you think would be most useful for the
analysis of nationalism in this case? Explain the reasons for your
selection.
» m F m
CHAPTER 14
Race, Ethnicity,
and Gender
• Brazilian President Dilma Rousseffin 2015, one of the most prominent female heads of state. Does her success indicate that gender discrimination
no longer affects politics? As we shall see, no.
329
IN THIS CHAPTER
Concepts 327
Race and Ethnicity 327
Gender 328
Sexual Orientation 329
Types 329
Disentangling Race and Ethnicity
Discrimination Based on Race
and Ethnicity 332
Gender Discrimination 333
Empowerment of Women and
Minority Groups 334
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence
the Political Representation of Women
and M inority Groups? 337
Social Movement Mobilization 337
Political Parties Based on Gender
or Ethnicity 339
Institutions for Promoting Women’s and
Minority Group Representation 341
T H IN K IN G COMPARATIVELY
Indicators of Gender Empowerment 344
CASES IN CONTEXT
Iran
India
Japan Brazil
feminism A social and intellectual
movement that aims to ensure
equal rights for women and men.
critical race theory A movement
in social, political, and legal theory
that aims to discern the subtle
effects of racism and related forms
of prejudice.
326
I n recent years, a number of countries have elected members of historically
disadvantaged groups to the highest office. This trend has been especially
notable in the Americas. Latin America, for example, has in the last decade
seen the election o f several im portant women as president: Michele Bachelet
in Chile, Cristina Fernandez in Argentina, and Dilma
Rousseff in Brazil. The Americas have also recently wit
nessed the election of presidents from other disadvantaged
social groups, such as Evo Morales in Bolivia, Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva in Brazil (before Rousseff), and Barack
Obama in the United States. Some constituencies greeted
these elections as a sign of political empowerment, and
most observers would agree that this trend constitutes
progress. But, as we shall see, it emphatically does not
mean that race, ethnicity, and gender are no longer sources
of political, social, and economic inequality.
Gender continues to strongly shape political representa
tion, economic position, and social status, thus remaining a
key and often under-examined feature of comparative poli
tics. Race and ethnicity matter, too, especially in our global
culture in which international migration is so common.1
Perhaps more than ever before, our societies are racially and
ethnically diverse (to varying degrees, of course) and increas
ingly transnational in character, which produces both oppor
tunities and challenges.2 In this chapter we consider identities
linked to gender, race, and ethnicity in relation to efforts to
achieve empowerment and political representation.
Despite the importance of gender, race, and ethnicity,
with some notable exceptions these subjects have often
been m inimized in the study of comparative politics.
Happily, this tendency has started to change, in part be
cause of fem inist and critical race scholarship. In this chapter we first focus
on gaining clarity about the concepts of race, ethnicity, and gender. We then
move on to related concepts such as gender discrimination and gender em
powerment. Then we turn our attention to how some women and members
of minority groups have worked to enhance their participation and represen
tation in formal institutions. As we shall see, while efforts to more fully
Mexico
Concepts 327
incorporate women and m inority groups into formal political processes have
a lot in common, they vary in im portant ways as well.
Concepts
Social scientists interested in these questions need to first define what we mean
by race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. Though some of these concepts
are related, they differ in important ways as well.
Race and Ethnicity
As we saw in chapter 13, all human societies construct collective identities,
which vary considerably depending on their context. Among other things, these
identities often involve boundaries between an “in-group” (“us”) and an “out
group” (“them”).3 One strategy for trying to understand various types and in
stances of collective identity is to focus on the nature of these boundaries.
Different types of identities depend on contrasting ways of drawing lines be
tween groups of people. Identities based on race, ethnicity, and gender draw
these lines in overlapping and yet distinct ways.
We shall untangle the related concepts of race and ethnicity later in the
chapter; for now we will just point to shared features of these categories of iden
tity. Both suggest that people are divided into such groups, with the bases be
tween groups allegedly established either by biological differences or by culture
and tradition. Both treat group membership as important, and both can be
sources of out-group discrimination and in-group pride. Different cases posit
boundaries Lines drawn
symbolically between groups of
people.
race The idea that human beings
are divided into different groups,
often thought of (erroneously) as
biological categories.
ethnicity The quality that one
has by identifying with or being
ascribed membership in an ethnic
group.
gender Culturally constructed
roles or identities one has by virtue
of being ascribed the status of
male or female, to be distinguished
from biological sex.
Whip-toting riot police in South Africa’s apartheid state in 1985.
328 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
transgender An identity in which
one’s gender does not conform to
conventional matching with
biological sex.
social construction The process
through which socially shared
meanings and definitions are
established and maintained.
biological determinism The view
that a feature of social life, such as
gender or ethnicity, is caused by
underlying biology.
different sorts of boundaries between ethnic and racial groups, some more per
meable than others. Unequal relationships between ethnic and racial groups can
be caused and reinforced by formal and legal differences. For example, think of
explicit segregation under “Jim Crow” laws in the southern United States before
the civil rights movement peaked in the 1960s or under South African apartheid.
Alternatively, inequalities can be buttressed by more subtle forms of discrimina
tion. Finally, as we discuss further in the “types” section below, some people
think of race and ethnicity as biological categories, though most social scientists
reject this idea.4
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a range of social-scientific views
on the nature of national, ethnic, and racial identities. Some accounts emphasize
constructivism, others instrumentalism, and still others primordialism (see
chapter 13 if you need to review these concepts and theories).
Gender
The first distinction that needs to be drawn here is between gender and sex.5
People often conflate these two ideas, but they are not identical. From the point
of view of social scientists, sex refers to biological differences between people as
linked to reproductive potential. In other words, one’s sex is the more or less
objective quality that one has by virtue of being biologically male or female.
Gender., in contrast, is cultural.6 This means that it is essentially symbolic. One
way to formulate this is to say that gender is the way in which human beings
“make sense” out of sex. For example, think of ideas like “masculinity” and “fem
ininity.” We may link these ideas to ways of acting and even different sorts of
bodies. For example, in some cultures, maybe being very muscular is masculine,
in others not; in some cultures, femininity and athletic prowess may go hand in
hand, while in others femininity may be linked to perceived physical passivity.
But given all of these differences, we know that ideas about gender (like mascu
linity and femininity) cannot be reduced to underlying sex differences. Indeed,
some individuals’ experienced gender does not “match” their biological sex in the
traditional sense, and some individuals have transgendered identities.
There are many debates among social scientists about the precise relationship
between sex and gender. The dominant view is social constructionism (or social
constructivism), which holds that biological sex does not determine gender. From
this point of view, biology is not destiny. Biological determinism, the other end
of the spectrum, asserts that gender is just a reflection of sex. As far as we are
aware, there are no serious social scientists that are true biological determinists
in this sense. The debate is really between “strong” and “weak” versions of social
constructionism. The “weak” version holds that gender is indeed culturally con
structed but that there may be some biological differences between women and
men that limit or constrain this construction. For example, perhaps evolution has
indeed encouraged some different tendencies in how one thinks about hierarchy
or relationships or sexuality itself.7 The “strong” version holds that any such ten
dencies are insignificant or do not exist at all.
In other words, social scientists agree that gender is not determined by biologi
cal sex. This premise has some important implications. Perhaps most important,
if gender is socially constructed, it can change over time. Gender might have
meant something different in 1950s America than it does today, for example. In
other words, being a woman or a man decades ago was likely experientially dif
ferent in some respects than it is today (just think of the television show M ad
Men). Note that if biological determinism is true, this change would be impos
sible. If gender can change over time, this means that (1) activists can try to shape
it, at least to some extent, and (2) social scientists can try to map and explain the
ways in which it has changed. Activities, identities, roles, jobs, even objects in the
world can be seen as “gendered,” and regardless of one’s sex, everyone can partici
pate in such gendered activities, perform such gendered roles, and exemplify dif
ferent gendered styles, in varying ways and to different degrees.8
Sexual Orientation
When social scientists speak of sexual orientation in the most narrow sense, they
refer to the fact that different people seek different sorts of sexual partners. His
torically, in many societies a heterosexual, or “straight,” sexual orientation has
been held up as the standard. People with other orientations, such as gays and
lesbians, were labeled as deviant and, as a result, often faced serious discrimina
tion. Some scholars refer to this view, which takes heterosexuality as “normal”
and preferred, as “heteronormativity” or “normative heterosexuality.”9
Even today, same-sex relationships are subject to discrimination and are even
illegal in some countries and territories, but social movements have led to de
criminalization and widespread acceptance in numerous locations. They have
also expanded civil rights in other ways for persons of diverse sexual orientations,
including, in some places, the extension of basic institutions like marriage, and
they have elevated the status of people of diverse sexual orientations. The process
of extending rights and ending discrimination is far from over, and even in coun
tries where the rights of gay, lesbian, and transgendered persons have been in
creased the most, discrimination remains a serious issue.10
Types
Different types of disadvantage and discrimination emerge in relation to catego
ries such as race, ethnicity, and gender. At the same time, these categories may
have different implications for potential empowerment.
D ise n tan glin g Race and Ethnicity
As with gender, some people imagine race to be a biological category. Scientifi
cally, however, this way of thinking is inaccurate. As scholars have emphasized,
there is far greater genetic variation within than between so-called racial groups.11
The socially constructed (and thus non-biological) nature of race becomes even
clearer when we look at the history of racial concepts. Categories such as “white”
or “black” or “Asian” may appear to be stable and thus grounded in human nature,
but they are not. Indeed, to take just one particularly striking example, in the
nineteenth-century United States, Irish immigrants were sometimes defined as
“non-white,” and even today in much of Latin America and other parts of the
world, racial categories are far more fluid and permeable than they are in the
United States.12 Further, consider the racial typologies constructed in late-colonial
330 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
racialization The historical
process through which social
relations become interpreted in
terms of racial categories.
racial formation A concept
developed byOmi and Winant
(1994) that describes the process
through which ideas of race are
constructed and develop over time.
ethnic group A group that
identifies itself as having strong
cultural commonality and a shared
sense of long-run history,
sometimes thinking of itself as a
kind of kinship group.
Latin America, where elites asserted that some people of mixed-race parentage
fell into categories such as “coyotes,” “wolves,” and “mulattos.”13
We can draw one of two possible conclusions from this set of successive and
inconsistent categorizations. One possibility is that there are distinct and bio
logically real “races” but that most people have gotten them wrong for most of
history, and that we now know what they really are. The other possibility is that
they have been social constructions all along: in other words, that people have
invented these ideas rather than discovering them in nature. Most scholars draw
the latter conclusion.14
Scholars who study racial identity increasingly speak of certain stages or peri
ods of racialization and racial formation, meaning times in which social dis
tinctions pertaining to the idea of “race” became more pronounced.15 Typically,
these processes have to do with one or another group having an interest in closing
off competition for status or resources.16 W hen individuals and groups compete
for social status, they often seek to formally exclude others from competition,
making it easier for themselves.17 Race has often been used for this purpose.18 For
example, Europeans drew distinctions between themselves and “black” individ
uals from sub-Saharan Africa for centuries, but when European colonizers of the
Americas sought to enslave those individuals on a mass scale and to exploit in
digenous groups, they drew a clearer, “racialized” line between themselves, the
indigenous population, and Africans, trying to justify their different forms of
exploitation.19
In summary, most scholars believe that race is not a real, biological fact but is
instead a social construction. An identity is a “racial” identity when people in a
society think that one or another group is significantly biologically different from
other groups, and view these imagined differences through the race concept. For
this reason it is only a useful category for comparative analysis when we are
studying societies who think about themselves and others in terms of race. In
such cases, we aim to understand (1) how they think about race, (2) how ideas of
race are constructed by different groups, and (3) whose interests are served by
these different constructions. Some important comparative analysis aims to ex
plain differences between societies’ constructions and uses of race.20
The terms “ethnicity” and ethnic group are sometimes used as synonyms of
race, but they are often applied more broadly. An influential conception of ethnic
groups is as follows: “named units of population with common ancestry myths
and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic
territory, and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites.”21 Note that,
defined in this way, ethnicity is conceptually broader than race: “Common ances
try myths” does not necessarily imply that those myths are thought to be biologi
cal, even if they often are understood to be so. I f one chooses this sort of approach,
the concept of “ethnic group” is a broader category of collective identity than
more narrowly defined “national identity” discussed in the previous chapter.22
Yet much work on questions of ethnicity and ethnic identity focuses not on
the long-term past but on the nature of these identities and the roles they play in
the contemporary world. Typically, it conceptualizes ethnicity as an identity that
is not necessarily bound to a state (though states often influence ethnicity in a
variety of ways). For example, Irish Americans, Korean Americans, and African
Americans might be characterized as “ethnic groups,” because while some mem
bers of these groups feel a sense of cultural belonging, they do not desire to form
their own state as a result. Ethnicity, as such, is perfectly consistent with mem
bership in a broader civic or multicultural community in which individuals pos
sess other collective identities besides their ethnicity.23 Sometimes, in-group or
out-group members think of ethnicity in biological terms. In other words, for
some, the concept of ethnicity shades into the concept of race. But thinking of
ethnicity this way is not a definitional feature. More often, social scientists think
of ethnicity as based on cultural commonalities, ranging from common rituals
and practices to common language. In the U.S. context, the national census con
siders categories such as Hispanic or Latino to be “ethnic” rather than “racial”
categories. This has been somewhat controversial since categories such as Asian
and African American are treated as race.24
Ideas such as ethnicity are constructed in very different ways in different soci
eties.25 Thus, identities deriving from tribal forms of organization in some parts
the world, those deriving from distinct units in hierarchical stratification systems
in some African societies or in India, and those of “hyphenated Americans”
cannot for all research purposes be treated as instances of the same general phe
nomenon, yet social scientists will often treat all such identities as “ethnic.” In
modern societies, the following components are likely to be building blocks for
how ethnicity is identified: type of national identity, how the state deals with
questions of citizenship and residency, formal and informal rules of national be
longing and participation in public life, and the broader stratification system
(which in most modern societies means the class structure).
The contemporary United States is an illustrative example. Its civic identity
has been described as a “melting pot,” but it is not hard to find contradictions of
this idea. Examples include the indigenous population’s forced relocation on very
unfavorable terms, clearly genocidal by today’s standards; slavery and then segre
gation of African Americans; and discrimination against various waves of im
migrants from the nineteenth century to the present. W hile this model of
assimilation has been hotly contested—both by scholars who argue that the
United States has never been a melting pot and by those who argue that it should
not be—the “melting pot” ideal has remained. Others, though, suggest that mul-
ticulturalism is an alternative view.26 Here the core idea is that members of dif
ferent groups do not need to leave to the side their differences. In a context like
the United States, though, this is still linked to the civic nationalism model, as
the idea is that ethnicity and race-neutral categories like citizenship are still the
basis of rights and participation in politics.
In any case, civic identity in the United States has not meant the denial of
ethnicity, at least in recent decades. Rather, it has allowed for dual and multiple
affiliations, as in the case of so-called “hyphenated Americans.” American cul
ture has encouraged immigrants and their descendants to hold onto a recon
structed version of their old national identities, redefined as ethnicity.27 This
cultural aspect has sometimes been a matter of others labeling immigrants and
sometimes one of proud internal identification (or both). Some societies, how
ever, may seek to force immigrants to give up their traditional identities in order
to assimilate.28 More generally, the state plays a role in the ongoing construction
332 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
audit studies Research carried
out by social scientists to measure
the extent to which hiring practices
are discriminatory.
of ethnicity, such as by making “official” decisions about how to use ethnic cat
egories in the census or in laws and judicial decisions involving ethnicity.29 It has
made such decisions in cases involving questions of affirmative action in employ
ment and in efforts by college and university admissions offices to ensure a di
verse student body. The state also shapes ethnicity through the way it handles
intergroup conflict, particularly in societies with multiple ethnic groups that
sometimes experience pronounced differences, such as India or Nigeria.
Discrim ination Based on Race and Ethnicity
Both ethnicity and race often serve as the basis for discrimination, which can be
both explicit and implicit. In a country like the United States, racial and ethnic
identities have a pronounced impact on one’s prospects for income, assets, educa
tion, marriage, and incarceration, among other outcomes.30 This impact is per
haps most notable in relation to assets and wealth, which is partly a legacy of
historical inequalities.31 Some discrimination is explicit and obvious: Almost
everyone recognizes the most virulent forms of racism. But while some people
believe that racial and ethnic discrimination have declined globally—and indeed,
in the United States, surveys show that explicit racism is much less prevalent
than it once was32—members of minority groups continue to experience high
rates of discrimination.33 A lot of inequality based on race and ethnicity is not
obvious to most observers.34 In the United States, audit studies (which use field
work to measure discrimination) confirm that equally qualified applicants with
names stereotypically linked to some minority groups are less likely to be offered
job interviews than applicants with stereotypically “white” names.35 In short,
social scientists who study race and ethnicity almost universally agree that even
as explicit racism has declined in societies like the United States, racial and
ethnic disparities remain a serious problem.
Discrimination and its historical legacies take very different forms in different
societies. Since race and ethnicity are socially constructed and because they in
tersect with other potential bases of cleavage in a variety of ways, there is no one
set pattern of racial and ethnic discrimination. Brazil, for example, is often con
trasted with the United States on this issue.36 Many have asserted that Brazil
does not face exactly the same problems of racism as the United States, since
there is no sharp color line the Brazilian culture of race and ethnicity. Yet it is
clear to most observers that some groups in Brazil are nevertheless disadvan
taged, leading to recent efforts at affirmative action and related approaches.
Demographics cause variation in how race and ethnicity are constructed, and
they link to discrimination as well. Societies with a long tradition as destinations
for large-scale immigration can be expected to exhibit different dynamics than
societies that have received little immigration. This observation might help ex
plain why some countries in Western Europe, such as France, have faced chal
lenges incorporating immigrant groups in recent years. Polities that presided
over long histories of slavery may exhibit dynamics different from societies with
out such histories. Cultural traditions and beliefs likely matter as well. Finally,
the principal actors involved vary from case to case. Actors that can be agents of
discrimination include not just the state but other societal institutions, as well as
groups and individuals within the society.
Gender Discrim ination
The meaning of gender discrimination may seem fairly obvious. Many people are
explicitly discriminated against on the basis of their gender. For example, a
woman might be denied a job because she is a woman, or her work might be
unpaid, or paid less than the work of an equally qualified man.37 In a number of
countries, as with racial and ethnic discrimination, political action over decades
has resulted in laws offering some protection against discrimination based on
gender and sexual orientation. Yet again, the protection offered does not fully
resolve the problem, and in a number of societies explicit job discrimination re
mains rampant. Beyond this, other forms of discrimination, perhaps less obvious,
happen in virtually all societies.38 W hile both men and women experience sexual
harassment, women are far more likely to encounter it.39 Yet social-scientific data
suggest that—in addition to persistent discrimination of this kind—women are
systematically disadvantaged in somewhat subtler ways as well.
Women are often paid less than men.40 In a number of places, this inequality
is explicit, and it still happens with frequency in advanced industrial and post
industrial societies like the United States, despite efforts to curb the problem. But
think about ways in which women suffer from pay differentials beyond such ex
plicit forms of discrimination:
• First, cultural pressures still sometimes emphasize that women bear spe
cial responsibility for raising children. As a result, “work-life balance”
issues tend to be especially acute for women, and, in just about any field,
taking time off from the workplace means lower pay and slower ascent of
the career ladder.41 Women take time off not only to give birth but because
in some cases they feel more pressure than male counterparts to stay home
with children on an ongoing basis.42
• Second, employers often engage in anticipatory discrimination for these
reasons. Women might be less likely to receive promotions— or even op
portunities to demonstrate they deserve promotions or raises—because of
expectations that their time may be divided between work and family.
• Third, discriminatory attitudes about women’s abilities and competencies
persist. For example, some people still believe, erroneously, that men are
better at math and science and related technical subjects.
• Fourth, on a related note, the labor market itself is gendered.43 Some jobs are
considered by many to be stereotypically or characteristically male, and others
stereotypically or characteristically female. Traditionally, jobs gendered as
female have paid lower wages than those gendered as male. Thus women
could, within these categories, receive “equal pay for equal work” and still,
when we think about the broader society, be paid unfairly in the aggregate.
These are just some examples of mechanisms through which gender discrimi
nation in the labor market operates. O f course, they play out very differently in
the wide range of contemporary societies.
In addition to pay inequality, women are often systematically disadvantaged
because in many societies, parents invest more in the human capital of their sons
than their daughters.44 In these instances, women are not competing on a level
playing field, as they have fewer resources. This tendency has been greatly
334 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
CASE IN CONTEXT
j Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Politics PAGE 479
Many people think of post-revolutionary Iran as a country where
discrimination against women is widespread. Indeed, this is ac
curate. However, as is so often the case with this country, the real
ity is more complex than many know. Iranian society is one in
which women— despite structural and institutional obstacles
and inequalities— do find ways to assert their agency.
For more on these issues see the case study in Part Vi, p. 479.
As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What conditions did women face in Iran before the
revolution?
2. How has the revolution impacted women’s position in
Iranian society?
3. How do some Iranian women resist coercion?
reduced, however, in many advanced industrial and post-industrial societies.
Indeed, in a number of countries, women consistently outperform men in the
educational system.45 Institutions of higher education increasingly have a hard
time achieving gender balance between male and female students, because
women tend to have higher grades and better test scores. In fact, many colleges
and universities may now be practicing so-called “affirmative action” for men.
Beyond serious, ongoing explicit and subtle discrimination in economic life,
women continue to face discrimination in the political sphere in virtually all so
cieties, though societies vary substantially in the extent to which this is true.46 It
is only over the last century that women have acquired the right to vote in most
countries (including the United States), in some far more recently, and in a few
not at all. And even in countries with long-established traditions of women’s suf
frage, women politicians rarely occupy top posts at parity with men. As we shall
see later in this chapter, there is much debate about why this is the case and what
its main consequences might be. Women are less likely than men to hold office at
all levels of government. This disparity is perhaps most notable at the upper ech
elons of the executive branch. Systematic disadvantage of women in politics most
likely reinforces other forms of disadvantage, since research indicates that women
in political office are more likely than men to aim to eradicate discrimination and
related problems.47 Beyond these issues, bear in mind that globally, women are
considerably more likely than men to experience poverty and sexual violence.
We wish to emphasize that while these claims are generally true, the global
population of societies exhibits wide variation in the extent of observable gender
discrimination and inequality. Some countries, such as the Scandinavian societ
ies of Sweden, Norway, and Finland, stand out as especially progressive, although
even these have not erased gender inequality.48
Em pow erm ent of Women and M inority Groups
empowerment An increase in the Empowerment is the expansion of the socially defined capability of a given
social, political, or economic group.49 The simplest way to think of empowerment is as the opposite of dis-
capabilities of an individual or crimination. That is, you might think about women or minority groups becoming
group’ empowered to the extent that they overcome such discrimination. This idea is
Types 335
Gender Empowerment in Japan? PAGE 493
Centuries ago Japan was noteworthy, among other reasons, be
cause it was sometimes governed by empresses. Yet contempo
rary Japanese politics has been regarded as a case in which
gender discrimination is high. How and why is this the case?
For more on the subject see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 493-494. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. On what grounds could someone claim that gender dis
crimination in Japanese politics is relatively high?
2. What are the major factors that have contributed to this
tendency?
helpful but only partially defines empowerment, which could, in principle,
extend beyond the establishment of parity. We think of empowerment as ex
panding women’s and minority group members’ capabilities in all spheres of life
that bear on politics.
Empowerment can be economic.50 For example, prohibiting or undoing economic
discrimination (such as in the labor market) based on gender, race, or ethnicity is a
form of empowerment. Many agencies encourage economic development—another
form of empowerment—by offering small loans specifically to women.51 Similarly,
many developing world societies, such as Brazil and Mexico, target women with
“conditional cash transfers”; that is, they disburse funds to those who comply with
certain conditions, such as enrolling children in schools.52 In part, this practice rests
on evidence that women are more likely than men to invest such funds in the human
Leymah Gbowee and Tawakkol Karman, who, along with Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, shared the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2011.
336 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
capital of their families (i.e., health and education) rather than in personal con
sumption. Further, one can think of women’s cooperatives—in which women not
only pool resources but also create political structures that allow them to exert
leadership— as potentially empowering. Government programs that provide ser
vices such as child care and medical care to women can also be empowering.
Empowerment can also be cultural or symbolic. One example of symbolic
empowerment is a low-status group engaging in collective action to elevate its
status. O f course, status often goes along with economic class and political
power, but we should not assume that it always does so or that it is not indepen
dently important.53 The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) move
ment in the United States and a number of other countries stands out as one that
has aimed to shape the status position of the populations it represents and sup
ports. One aspect of the movement is working to expand the political representa
tion of LGBT people. It also seeks to promote positive depictions of LGBT
people, both in the media and in everyday life. This effort has involved lobbying
media as well as more grassroots action such as gay pride parades and related
events. Such actions aim to extend social benefits to in-group members, in addi
tion to demanding broader social acceptance and elevated status. Symbolic em
powerment may be an important component in achieving political and economic
empowerment, since politics and economics are ultimately cultural.
Finally, empowerment can be political.54 We can think of the women’s move
ment and the civil rights movement in the United States as empowering, and we
can think of participation in more specific social movement and protest activity
as potentially empowering. Indeed, we would likely judge a movement or activity
successful to the degree that it empowers group members. Political parties that
aim to advance the goals of specific ethnic groups are also potentially empower
ing (for interesting reasons, as we shall see, political parties that represent women
as a group are relatively rare55). Laws and interventions to ensure political op
portunities for women and members of minority groups may be empowering as
well. Perhaps most important, we can see empowerment in initiatives that in
crease women’s and minority group members’ representation in political offices.
On a related note, some scholars interested in women’s empowerment have
focused on “state feminism,” which one political scientist defines as “the advocacy
Gender and Political Representation in Brazil: Where
Has Progress Come From? PAGE 410
Historically, Latin America has been viewed, rightly or wrongly, as
a region in which women face widespread discrimination. Yet in
recent years, the women’s movement has made notable ad
vances in this region, such as in Brazil.
For more on the state of women’s political empowerment in
Brazil, see the case study on pp. 410-411 in Part VI. As you read it,
keep in mind the following questions:
1. What have been the major successes of feminist activism
in Brazil in recent years?
2. Why, according to political scientists, have gender-linked
parties not been prominent in Brazil?
3. Why, nevertheless, has the Workers’ Party tended to be
more favorable to women’s empowerment?
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 337
of women’s movement demands inside the state.”56 This perspective reminds us
that beyond social movement organizing and political competition for elected
office, both elected and appointed office-holders inside the state bureaucracy can
contribute to the empowerment of women and other groups in myriad ways.57
In the “Causes and Effects” section that follows, we focus on political empow
erment because it is fundamental. Once a group is politically empowered, it has
an expanded capacity to shape agendas. As a result, it can then push for other
forms of empowerment.
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence
the Political Representation of Women and
Minority Groups?
In this section we consider factors affecting political representation of women
and minority groups. As noted previously, we are narrowing our focus a bit, as we
will pay less attention here to questions of economic and symbolic empower
ment, though these are not unrelated. We focus on social movement mobiliza
tion, the creation of political parties based on gender or ethnicity, and institutional
design tools such as quotas. These potential causes of empowerment are not mu
tually exclusive but rather may go together.
Social M ovement M obilization
Perhaps the most important process through which women and minority groups
can be empowered is through social movement mobilization.58 Indeed, this pro
cess often underlies the two other main processes we consider in this section:
political parties and policy responses.59 As noted in chapter 12, social movements
typically need to develop organizations to maintain their momentum and direc
tion over an extended period: Political parties are one such type of organization.
The development of a political party out of a social movement is a step in the
institutionalization of that movement’s concerns.60
Social movement mobilization can also be effective in other ways. It can act in
the form of symbolic empowerment to expand the interests of a group. Thus,
social movement activity can aim to transform political culture or popular atti
tudes about a group, such as LGBT people (as we mentioned earlier). The civil
rights movement in the United States is another clear example here. The move
ment’s goals were many and included both the political and economic empower
ment of African Americans, but one of its key aims was breaking down the
symbolic barriers that facilitated many white Americans’ support of or tolerance
for the discriminatory Jim Crow laws. Another example is activism on the part
of minority groups in a number of European societies (such as the Scottish and
Welsh in the United Kingdom and the Catalonians in Spain). These movements
have sought symbolic empowerment in addition to expanded political power.
We looked at major theories of contentious action, including social move
ments, in chapter 12. One major cluster of social movement theories, prominent
in Europe, claims that these movements have brought concerns of identity to the
foreground in recent decades.61 This assertion is debated, however, as some argue
that identity concerns have always been central to social movements.
338 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
IN S IG H T S
American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the
Resurgence of Identity and Culture
by Joan e Nagel
Nagel’s book is an effort to explain a fascinating demographic pattern in the late-twentieth-century United States: the dra
matic increase in the number of persons claiming an American
Indian or Native American identity. This trend was not a product
of an increased birthrate but, rather, of more individuals claiming
an identity that they would not have avowed previously. Nagel
finds that, in part, this change was a consequence of social
movement activity. In the civil rights era, a number of factors in
creased the likelihood of mobilization around an American
Indian identity, and an important movement among persons of
American Indian identity developed. Most notably, a group of
“Red Power” activists seized Alcatraz Island in San Francisco in
1969. But this was only the most visible event in a much more
widely dispersed process, which included additional takeovers,
marches, and many other actions.
According to Nagel, part of what social movement mobiliz
ing accomplished was a transformation in the status of American
Indian identity. Movement activists redefined this identity from
one that had been given little status in the broader American
society to one seen as a source of pride. Nagel’s account of this
case highlights the importance of social movement organizing
in empowering groups symbolically, beyond just the expansion
of economic position and political power.
Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence
of Identity and Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
In 1969, American Indian activists took over Alcatraz Island.
This protest activity drew attention to their cause.
INSIGHTS
The Power of Identity
by Manuel Castells
Castells considers the importance of identity movements in the contemporary world. He finds that identity issues
prompt a great deal of contemporary social movement activity.
The most important social transformations are cultural or cogni
tive, he argues, since “domination is primarily based on the con
struction of reality in the human mind.”62
Castells argues that there are three main kinds of political
identities. These are “legitimizing identities,” “resistance identi
ties,” and “project identities.” Legitimizing identities are tied to the
nation-state, which Castells believes to be threatened by the rise
of the global “network society.” “Resistance identities’ are tied to
members of communal groups (like some ethnic groups) and are
often oriented toward resisting the network society and global
ization. Finally, “project identities” look forward rather than back
ward. They do not aim just to defend existing communities from
larger forces but to construct new identities that transform soci
ety more broadly. Castells’ favorite example here is the global
feminist movement, which he calls the ‘movement against patri
archy.” The core idea is that this movement has had success by
changing women’s identities, and that in the process it came to
reconfigure key social institutions, such as the family. The recon
figuration of these institutions has changed gender identities
more broadly.
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity. 2nded. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
W hether or not social movement activity focusing on questions of identity is
novel, there is no disputing that it can be an effective strategy for empowering a
group. As noted previously, one way it can work is through helping establish and
support political parties that represent the interests of a group.
Political Parties Based on Gender or Ethnicity
So how do political parties help represent a group’s interests? First, most modern
electoral systems depend on political parties to organize and structure political
competition. As a result of this process, parties bind political representatives
together under common platforms, which can strongly influence votes and thus
political decision-making. This influence varies from case to case, of course, and
not all parties are equally capable of shaping the voting behavior of party mem
bers. Another reason that parties can matter is that in some political systems
parties exist as either an official (e.g., contemporary China) or de facto (e.g.,
Mexico under the PRI) layer in institutional decision-making processes.
As chapters 9 through 11 show, the nature of the electoral system and how the
legislature and executive are structured also affect the ways in which parties
organized around an ethnic group might exert influence. As we shall see, the
nature of those systems also impacts the probability that an ethnic party will
develop.
However party organization intersects with the formal organizational fea
tures of the state, parties are useful tools for pursuing group interests. W hen and
why ethnic parties are formed is a somewhat complicated question. Several vari
ables probably matter, but in interaction with one another.63 In other words, none
of them alone is likely sufficient to produce ethnic parties.
The first such variable is demographic.64 How racially and ethnically hetero
geneous is the society in question? This is not to suggest that there is an ideal
level of ethnic heterogeneity for the formation of ethnic political parties, but
that some level of heterogeneity is key. The relative shares of the population di
vided into each group, as well as the number of groups and the geographical
dispersion of groups, can influence the probability of the formation of ethnic
parties. This demographic variable interacts with several other variables, the
most important of which are likely (1) the society’s culture of ethnic affiliation
more broadly (e.g., how does the culture in general handle ethnic attachment?)
and, equally important, what other bases for political mobilization are available
that might crowd out ethnic party organizing; (2) the nature of political compe
tition in the society in question; and (3) the historical and structural relation
ships between ethnic groups.6S
The way a society handles questions of ethnic affiliation more broadly might
also be relevant to ethnic party formation. For example, does the society define
national identity in ethnic terms, or does it view national identity as attached to
citizenship?66 Imagine a society that historically treats national identity in
ethnic terms and where a large ethnic majority comprises this ethno-national
group. We would expect this situation to affect the likelihood that either the
majority group or any minority groups would seek political representation
through parties.
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 339
340 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
INSIGHTS
From Movements to Parties in Latin America
by Donna LeeVan Cott , , ■ –
Van Cott seeks to explain how it came to be that Amerindian social movements in four Latin American countries success
fully created parties pursuing their interests in the 1990s. Her four
positive cases are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, and
she notes that similar results did not take place in Argentina or
Peru. This full set of both positive and negative cases allows her
to compare societies in which there are large indigenous popula
tions (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) and those in which there are
smaller indigenous populations (Argentina, Colombia, and Ven
ezuela). This comparison shows that demographic variables
alone do not explain the fate of ethnic parties, but rather that
demographic variables interact with other factors. There are two
main factors that Van Cott considers especially important: insti
tutional factors and social movement activity.
Within the institutional factors, Van Cott believes two to be
particularly important. First, decentralization and related reforms
(including reserved seats) in some of these countries allowed for
opportunities for new political actors tied to ethnicity-linked or
ganizing. At the same time, the traditional left was weakened in
the period of the “Washington Consensus,” meaning that ideo
logical space was opened up for new ways to frame resistance
and to organize politically. In the successful cases, social move
ment activists seized on these opportunities as they created par
ties to pursue their group interests.
Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Perhaps equally or even more important, other bases for social cleavage can
crowd out ethnic attachment as a basis for forming political parties.67 This is
sometimes true of social class, for example. Sometimes a strong tradition of
class-based organizing—think of a society in which people are mobilized as
workers or as peasants—might reduce the likelihood of organizing around
ethnicity.
The nature of political competition in a society seems to matter a lot as well.
Ethnic parties seem to be more likely in parliamentary systems in which there is
proportional representation. This is because it is more likely that an ethnic party
could win some seats and play a role in a coalition government in such cases.
CASE IN CONTEXT
W hy Aren’t There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico? PAGE 508
Mexico, like many countries, has had a long history of ethnic dis
crimination. As in the United States, we might expect to find a
history of political parties forming there on the basis of ethnic
cleavages. Yet again, as in the United States, we find little such
history. This outcome, however, seems likely to be due to a differ
ent set of conditions, thus facilitating an interesting comparison.
For more on ethnic cleavages and political parties in Mexico,
see the case study in Part VI, pp. 508-509. As you read it, keep in
mind the following questions:
1. Why might one expect to find ethnic parties in Mexico?
2. What major features of Mexican political development
might help us account for their absence?
3. How does this interesting case compare with the cases of
the United States and India (discussed later)?
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 341
India stands out as a country where some ethnic-group-affiliated
parties have seen success. What accounts for this success, and
why have others failed? Political scientists in recent years have
made advances in accounting for this variation.
For more on this question, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 465-466. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
in India page46s
1. What are the basic characteristics of those parties that
have been successful?
2. How and to what extent might knowledge derived from
the case of India be applied to other cases?
3. How does the development of ethnic parties in India
compare with the cases of the United States and Mexico
(discussed previously)?
Imagine a country in which 10 percent of the population falls into an ethnic
group that has faced some discrimination, and members of this group seek to
influence the political process in order to reduce this discrimination. A party
could help in a system based on proportional representation, because if a high
percentage of group members voted for the party, it could win parliamentary
seats and bargain to join a governing coalition.68 However, if the society has a
first-past-the-post system (i.e., the winning candidate simply needs the most
votes), there is little likelihood that group members would rationally pursue party
organization. The reason is that if the party was perceived to be linked to the
needs of a minority ethnic group, it would have trouble reaching the vote thresh
old needed to win seats. O f course, depending on how such an electoral system is
structured, a minority ethnic party could achieve reasonable representation
under some conditions. For example, if an ethnic minority is geographically con
centrated, constituting a majority in some areas, it might be in the minority at
the national level but still capable of winning a number of seats in the
legislature.
Finally, the nature of the historical and structural relationships between
groups, including their relative power, could matter greatly in influencing the
likelihood of ethnic party development. For example, historical discrimination
against a group may motivate them to form a party.
So far in this subsection we have been discussing political parties based on
ethnic group membership. But what about gender? Interestingly, political parties
based on gender are much rarer than parties based on ethnicity. Some scholars
have investigated why this might be (see the “Insights” box on Mala H tun’s work).
In short, several factors curb the formation of a women-only political party.
The main reason may be, however, that women are institutionally linked to men:
Their interests as individuals and as members in other groups are tied in important
ways to the interests of individual men and other members of those other groups.69
Institutions for Prom oting Women’s
and Minority G roup Representation
One goal of many social movements and political parties is institutional design
that will expand a certain group’s political representation. W hile social movement
342 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
INSIGHTS
Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation
of Identity Groups
byM daHtun
Mala Htun asks us to consider some key differences in the ways equitable political representation can be achieved for
women and members of other groups. What she finds is that the
nature of the group and its position in society matter greatly in
achieving this representation. Gender groups seldom form po
litical parties and, as a result, the preferred method to improve
equity for women has tended to be candidate quotas (discussed
further in the section that follows). In certain circumstances,
however, ethnic groups have had greater success in establishing
political parties.
The logic that Htun uses to explain this outcome is simple
but powerful. Ethnic groups tend to “coincide” with other forms
of group difference, whereas gender tends to “crosscut” them.
For example, membership in a particular ethnic group might be
related to the position of group members in the class structure,
whereas women as a group tend to be found across the class
structure of a given society (however economically empowered
or disempowered they may be as a group). Since ethnic groups
often “coincide,” they can form parties and then seek reserved
seats. But since women are a “crosscutting group,” they have dif
ficulty organizing via parties that represent the varied interests of
women as a group.
Mala Htun, ‘Is Gender Like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity
Groups.”Perspectives on Politics 2, No. 3 (2004):439-458.
organizing and political party formation can acquire a degree of permanence,
institutional design can potentially shape outcomes independent of the ongoing
efforts of activists. In other words, this approach seeks to turn empowerment into
an automatic feature of the political institutions of a given country. O f course, we
could think of all legislation that is designed to empower women or members of
minority groups as institutional design, since laws are part of the institutional
fabric of the state. But what we have in mind here are efforts to ensure the partici
pation of women and members of minority groups in formal political office.
The fundamental institutional design feature that has been used is a quota
system, which reserves a certain number of candidacies or seats for members of a
group.70 This system has been implemented in a number of different ways. The
biggest division is between “reserved-seat” systems and “candidate-quota” sys
tems.71 Reserved-seat systems are what they sound like: systems that reserve a
certain number of seats for members of a particular group. For example, constitu
tions in some Latin American countries guarantee a specified number of seats for
members of one or another indigenous community. Reserved-seat systems are
the oldest form of quota system, and they tend to have only a limited impact on
the representation of women’s groups.72 This limited impact may be due, in part,
to the politics of implementing them: agreeing to set aside a high percentage of
all seats for members of a particular group may meet with political opposition in
many circumstances.
The other major types of systems are “candidate-quota” systems.73 Here the
idea is to guarantee that a certain number of female candidates—or members of
other groups as the case may be— are running in elections. One major way this
takes places is within political parties. Although gender-based political parties
are relatively rare, political parties may still address issues related to gender, or
they may position themselves to capture the votes of those who favor gender
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 343
■h I
equality. Thus some parties will aim to formally or informally increase the
number of female candidates within the party. W hen this is done formally, it is a
party-level quota system. For example, a Social Democratic Party in country X
might apply to itself the rule that 30 percent of its candidates for legislative office
will be women. Imagine that they face a Christian Democratic Party as their
main opponent. That party will now have to make a strategic choice: One pos
sible option among others would be to apply a quota that matches or exceeds that
self-imposed quota on the Social Democrats in order to demonstrate that, despite
other ideological and policy differences, the Christian Democratic Party is pro
gressive on issues of gender equality.
Party leadership may succeed in self-imposing quotas in systems where pro
portional representation is the norm, given that party leadership tends to have
more power to select its candidates in such systems. I f voters vote for parties
rather than individual candidates, it is easier for the party to impose formal rules
on itself as it selects candidates. How do you think such an approach would work
in the United States, where many candidates are not selected by party leaders but
in primaries where voters choose the party’s nominee? W hat would happen if,
say, the Republican Party leadership decided that it wanted to adopt a 40 percent
quota for female candidates? Unlike in systems with centrally controlled party
lists of candidates, this may be very difficult to achieve.
Another way quota systems can be adopted is through a law or constitution
stating that all parties must meet certain quota thresholds.74 But the adoption
of such a system can be difficult to achieve as well and would require major
changes in how elections are organized in a society such as the United States.
More generally, the likelihood of a country’s developing quota systems that
apply to all parties depends on each party’s calculation of its own electoral
prospects if such reforms are carried out, as well as the parties’ relative power.
If a given party stands to benefit from new arrangements, it can be expected
to support them, but if a party is either strongly ideologically opposed to the
idea or stands to have trouble meeting quota requirements, it is likely to resist
their universal imposition. Scholars debate which quota system is most
effective.75
You can see the complexity of analyzing how, when, and why institutional
design affects the representation of women or members of other groups. Two
things, however, are clear. First, global efforts to expand political representation
of women are clearly increasing, and different quota systems have led to impor
tant gains. Second, social scientific interest in these issues is increasing as well—
something to keep in mind for your next research project.
More generally, remember that the causes we have considered in this section
are not mutually exclusive explanations of how empowerment takes place. Rather,
these are potential tools for those who seek to empower minority groups, women,
and other groups. In many cases of successful empowerment, these elements
work together. For example, it is possible for social movement organizing to help
produce both political parties and new institutional designs. However, parties
and institutional design also influence the environment in which social move
ment organizing takes place. There seems to be no standard way in which these
pieces fit together.
344. Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
INSIGHTS
Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate
Selection Reform Worldwide
by Mona Lena Krook
&
Krook has developed an innovative approach to the study of empowering women through institutional design. She com
pares a number of cases of more and less successful adoption of
reserved seat and candidate quota systems, and she draws the
following general conclusions, among others:
1. The causal impact of a given variable is not universal, but
rather depends on interaction effects with other vari
ables. Thus there is no “one size fits all” approach to insti
tutional design in this area.
2. Institutional design can affect three major arenas, those
of “systemic,” “practical,” and “normative” institutions. Dif
ferent sorts of institutional design efforts affect these
arenas in different ways. Not only do formal institutional
changes matter, but moral arguments about issues such
as justice and equity do, too.
3. Processes of change differ in quality. The more successful
ones are “harmonizing sequences” in which changes
build on one another and actors adjust for unintended
consequences of previous stages, while “disjointed se
quences” are less successful.
4. Many actors with a variety of goals are involved in these
processes. These actors include, at the very least, state-
level actors like politicians, actors in “civil society” like ac
tivists, and “transnational” actors like certain NGOs. It is
exceedingly difficult to predict how such actors will
interact.
Mona Lena Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selec
tion Reform Worldwide. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
THINKING
COMPARATIVELY
K EY M E TH O D O LO G ICA L TO O L
Selecting or Creating
Indicators
An in d ic ato r is a m e asure that in d i
cate s th e pre sence , a m o u n t, or
d e g re e o f a va ria b le yo u are re se a rch
in g. G o o d indicators have to w ork
e ffe ctive ly in at least t w o w ays. First,
th e y have to b e true to th e u n d e rly
in g c o n c e p t y o u are researching.
Se c o n d , t h e y n e e d to b e a c tu a lly
m easurable, m e a n in g , a m o n g o th er
th in g s, that a n y o b se rv e r u sin g th e
indicato r w ill see it in m o re o r less the
sam e w ay. A n o th e r w ay to say this is
that indicators m u st c o m p rise m e a
sures th a t are b oth “valid” an d
“reliable.”
A useful re ce nt in d ic a to r w e have
for s tu d y in g w o m e n ‘s e m p o w e rm e n t
Indicators of Gender Empowerment
Imagine that we wanted to evaluate how well the United Kingdom and some of its former colonies are empowering women. We will include Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom in this set of
cases. Suppose the idea is to build toward considering a hypothesis about a pos
sible effect of traditional British culture on gender roles in politics and economic
life. This may sound like a strange idea, but it is not implausible, given that
gender is culturally constructed in different ways in different societies. Moreover,
some research suggests that English colonialism had different impacts from
other colonizers on the long-term democratic quality and stability in former
colonies.76 For the sake of our thought experiment here, let us just imagine that
this research has led us to hypothesize that former English colonies might show
greater political empowerment of women than former Spanish colonies.
I f we want to explore the possibility of testing a hypothesis, we cannot just
spend time in these societies and see how people feel about gender and politics.
Rather, we need to select specific indicators of gender empowerment that allow
us to measure it in a rigorous way. Otherwise, we will likely project our own
biases onto the social and political realities that we observe. If, though, we can
settle on reliable and valid indicators of gender empowerment and if, in turn, we
find that gender empowerment as measured through these indicators is consis
tent with our hypothesis, we could work toward testing whether and to what
extent colonial legacy is the operative cause of any observed pattern.
Indicators of Gender Empowerment 345
One recent indicator of the political empowerment of women was the Gender
Empowerment Measure, which brings together several more specific indicators
(see “Key Methodological Tools”). This measure has been used in a number of
United Nations reports in the late 2000s and for many purposes, despite criti
cism, was considered by many the best single measure of gender empowerment
at that time.
If we look at Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) ranks for 2009 for the
Anglo-colonies in which we are interested (see Table 14.1), we see results that
seem consistent with our initial hypothesis. Australia ranks second, Canada
fourth, the United States thirteenth, New Zealand twentieth, and the United
Kingdom twenty-first. Ranks for former Spanish colonies are not this high, with
only Spain being ranked higher than the lowest ranked British zone societies in
this respect. Should we just conclude that former British colonies are clearly sites
of higher levels of political empowerment for women? Not so fast. Since GEM is
a composite measure, it captures economic empowerment as well. It may be that
the strong showing of former British settler colonies (relative to former Spanish
colonies) in terms of GEM is a consequence of higher levels of economic devel
opment in these societies.
Let’s try a narrower indicator. Remember that we are fundamentally con
cerned with political empowerment of women in this question. W hat if we look
at the percentage of women holding legislative office? This could give us a clearer
indication of political empowerment, given that it won’t include information
about the relative economic standing of women, which we may consider to be a
different question (see Table 14.2).
Here, we see a very different pattern. In our set of comparative cases, Bolivia
is on top, and the United States is on the bottom. New Zealand is the only former
British settler colony in the top thirty, and Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Spain, Nica
ragua, Mexico, and Argentina all outperform all the other former British settler
colonies in our group (as do Costa Rica and El Salvador, though they do not rank
as highly as the other Latin American countries listed in Table 14.2).79
THINKING
COMPARATIVELY
KEY M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
(continued)
is th e GEM , o r G e n d e r E m p o w e rm e n t
M easure, w h ic h is p ro m in e n tly fea
tu re d in UN D e v e lo p m e n t Reports.
T h e GEM se e k s to m e asure t h e exte nt
to w h ic h w o m e n have p o litic al and
e c o n o m ic co n tro l o f th e ir lives an d
e n v iro n m e n ts in d ifferent socie tie s. It
is a c o m p o s ite in d ic ato r b a se d on
u n d e rly in g m e asu re s o f w o m e n ‘s and
m en’s share s o f (1) p o litic al positions,
(2) p ro m in e n t e c o n o m ic roles, a n d (3)
overall in co m e .77 N o m e asure is per
fe c t, how ever, a n d so m e scholars
have c ritic iz e d th e GEM o n te c h n ic a l
g r o u n d s.78 W e s h o u ld also note th a t it
has n o w a y to a c c o u n t for s y m b o lic
a n d sta tu s-re late d c o m p o n e n ts o f
e m p o w e rm e n t.
t a b l e 14.1 G ender Em pow erm ent Measure (GEM) Global
Ranks, Selected Countries
2 Australia
4 Canada
13 United States
15 Spain
20 New Zealand
21 United Kingdom
44 Chile
49 Argentina
50 Uruguay
51 Cuba
{Source: UN Human Development Report, 2009.)
346 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
t a b l e 14.2 Ranking of Percentage of Women in National
Legislature, Selected Countries
Rank Country
% Seats in Lower/
S in gle House
% Seats in Upper
House
2 Bolivia 53.1 47.2
4 Cuba 48.9 N/A
9 Ecuador 41.6 N/A
12 Spain 41.1 33.8
15 Nicaragua 39.1 N/A
17 (tied) Mexico 38 33.6
22 Argentina 36.2 38.9
29 New Zealand 31.4 NA
44 Australia 26.7 38.2
49 Canada 25.2 38.6
57 United Kingdom 22.8 24.1
73 (tied) United States 19.3 20.0
(Source: Interparliamentary Union 2015.)
Does this demonstrate that selected former Spanish colonies have higher
levels of the political empowerment of women than former British colonies? Not
necessarily. Can you think of some of the limitations of this indicator? One would
be that legislative representation is not the only form of representation. Another
might be that empowerment of a group, even political empowerment, likely ex
tends well beyond having members of that group hold office. Both of these are
concerns about the potential validity of this indicator as a measure of the under
lying concept we are researching: political empowerment of women. W hat we
see here is that a number of former Spanish colonies have achieved very high levels
of legislative representation of women, outpacing former English settler colonies
by this measure, which is interesting and deserving of comparative exploration.
The bottom line is that there is almost never a perfect indicator. (Indeed, the
United Nations has replaced the GEM with new measures of gender-adjusted
development and gender inequality in recent years, in response to scholarly cri
tiques.) All choices of indicators involve trade-offs. You must be mindful of these
trade-offs and remember that indicators are only stand-ins for the underlying
concepts you are researching. Indicators and measurements are crucial in under
standing the extent to which women and ethnic and racial groups are empowered
and active in politics. Conducting careful comparative research can give us
greater insight into questions that matter to us, on issues as profound as our very
identities as people.
Chapter Review 347
C h a p t e r S u m m a r y
Concepts
• The meaning of concepts like race and ethnicity varies in
relation to context. While some people think of race and
sometimes ethnicity as biological, most social scientists
view them as culturally constructed.
• Gender is distinguished from biological sex, and most
social scientists think of gender as cultural rather than
biological.
In recent years a number of societies have grown more
pluralistic and tolerant with respect to sexual orientation.
Types
• Race historically has almost always been linked to social
actors’ beliefs about biology, whereas ethnicity emphasizes
cultural traditions. The concept of race in particular has
been linked to exploitation.
Discrimination based on both race and ethnicity is a
common feature of many polities, historically and today.
Discrimination has in some societies become more subtle
over time, but its consequences, and the consequences of
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. The theme of empowerment is much discussed in this chapter,
including dimensions of empowerment and ways in which de
velopment is conceptualized and measured by social scientists.
But what is empowerment? Develop your own conceptualiza
tion and link it back to the discussion in the chapter. What, if
anything, is missing?
2. We discussed political, economic, and cultural or symbolic em
powerment. How are these dimensions related? Is one more
fundamental than the others, and, if so, why? If a group wants to
improve its position, would it be best advised to begin by focus
ing on one or another form of empowerment?
3. Imagine that you have been asked to consult with members of
an indigenous group in a hypothetical country that wants to
create a political party. How would you go about your work?
What pieces of information would you seek to collect, and why?
What major questions would you want answered, and why?
How would the answers to these questions impact your
recommendations?
4. Imagine now that you have been asked to consult with social
movement activists that represent poor rural women of a
historical legacies of earlier forms of discrimination, are
clearly visible.
• Discrimination based on gender is also a pervasive feature
of polities. Again, a good deal of progress has been made,
but gender discrimination remains a problem.
• Empowerment can be economic, symbolic, or political.
Causes and Effects
• One potential source of empowerment is social movement
mobilization.
Another is political parties, and parties tend to be more
viable for ethnic groups seeking empowerment than for
gender groups.
• Institutional design strategies like reserved seats and
quotas can also be used in support of empowerment.
Th in kin g Com paratively
• A thought experiment about relative gender empower
ment in the former colonies of Spain and the United
Kingdom demonstrates the pros and cons of two major
indicators of political empowerment.
particular ethnic group. They tell you that their ethnic, gender,
and class status compound each other and that their interests
really are distinct from those of other groups. They would like your
technical assistance as they aim to build a social movement. In
particular, they would like your advice about how to “frame” that
movement. What questions do you ask them, and how do you
advise them? How is this case different from organizing around
“women’s issues” or the interests of a particular ethnic group?
5. Imagine once more that you are an “empowerment consultant.”
You have been contacted by the representatives of a political
party that represents the interests of an ethnic group that has
historically faced severe discrimination, one that is largely found
in a particular area of the country and which constitutes about
10 percent of the country’s population. They tell you that their
country is going to write a new constitution and that they have
a number of delegates in the constitutional assembly. They
want your advice about what sorts of institutional designs they
should push for as they aim to protect the interests of their
people. What do you need to know in order to give them
advice? How would your answer depend on their answers?
• President Evo Morales of Bolivia in 20)4. Morales is Bolivia’s first indigenous president and an advocate of a left-leaning ideology that some refer to
as “twenty-first-century socialism.”
I f you were to walk through downtown Caracas, Venezuela, you might see
I huge banners with pictures of Argentinian M arxist revolutionary Che G ue
vara and slogans declaring the arrival of “twenty-first-century socialism.”
Supporters of Venezuela’s late president, Hugo Chavez, and his “Bolivarian
Revolution” (named for Venezuelan revolutionary Simon Bolivar) extol the
virtues of the regime. They are conspicuously dressed in red, a color that has
symbolized attachment to socialism and communism since the nineteenth
century. The Chavista government is not alone in its socialist
position, as governments in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Nicaragua take a similar line.
Halfw ay across the globe, if you were to stroll through
Tehran, Iran, you would encounter m ostly very different
public symbolism. The Iranian governm ent, which also calls
itself “revolutionary,” attempts to garner public support through
justifying itself in religious terms. Scholars who study rela
tionships between religions and the state find th a t in much
of the world, religion is very m uch involved in the state.1
Moreover, survey research shows th at m uch o f the world is
quite religious.2
I f you had told comparative political analysts in the
1960s that regimes like these would proliferate in the early
twenty-first century, most would have disagreed sharply. They
might even have laughed, as they expected m odernization to
render ideology and religion obsolete. Prom inent scholars
declared the “end o f ideology,” m eaning that major political
programs such as fascism, socialism, and communism had
run their course.3 Virtually all analysts agreed that religion
would fade from public life in coming decades.4 Yet both
ideology and religion continue to exert a strong influence on
m odern politics.
Their persistence has led analysts to ask a series of questions: W h a t did
the last generation of theories get wrong? D id they misunderstand m odern
ization? W h a t is modernization, anyway? W h a t is modernity? H ow has the
role of religion in modern societies changed as societies have modernized? W hy
haven’t ideologies such as fascism and socialism disappeared? Finally, the
persistence of ideology and religion draws attention to important, perennial
349
IN THIS CHAPTER
Concepts 350
Modernity and Modernization 350
Ideology 351
Religion 351
Secularization, Religion, and Modern
Politics 352
Religious Conflict 353
Types 354
Modern Ideologies 354
Modern Forms of Religion in Politics 357
Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion
and Id eo lo gy Remain Prevalent
in Modern Politics? 360
Why (and How) Does Modernization Alter
Religion’s Role in Politics? 360
Why Didn’t ideology (and History) End? 364
T H IN K IN G COMPARATIVELY
Two Lefts in Latin America? 367
CASES IN CONTEXT
United Kingdom • Russia • France ■
Iran • Nigeria
350 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
political culture The symbolically
encoded beliefs, values, norms, and
practices that shape the formal
distribution of power in any given
society.
modernity A contested term that
refers to a type of society, typically
one experiencing economic
growth and with a relatively strong
state, among other characteristics.
modernization The process
through which a society becomes
“more modern,” which is typically
understood to mean having an
advanced economy and,
sometimes, a democratic polity.
secularism The ideological
complex that favors secular (non
religious) culture.
questions of social and political theory concerning the role of ideas in politics.
To what extent do religions and ideologies affect political processes? As you
saw in chapter 5, some analysts argue that certain religious ideas increase the
likelihood of economic development. Related theories, mentioned in chapter 6,
suggest that certain religious ideas promote democratization.5 These are un
settled questions, and there is a lot of interesting work to be done in this area
of comparative politics.6
Concepts
Both ideology and religion, when considered from the perspective of political
science, are examples of what scholars call political culture. This means, essen
tially, that they are different types of representations that people hold about poli
tics and related matters. People have all sorts of beliefs, but ideological and
religious beliefs tend to be deeply held and therefore may be highly impactful.
This does not mean that religion and ideology are the same thing, of course, as
we discuss in this chapter. Ideologies are explicitly political in their orientation,
whereas religions might have political implications but are broader belief systems
that extend well beyond politics.
Given that our interest is in understanding ideology and religion in modern
politics, and since much analysis concerns the relationship between these phe
nomena and modernity, we start by discussing the concepts of modernity and
modernization. Note that you have already seen these concepts come up from
time to time in earlier chapters.
M odernity and M odernization
“Modernity” is one of the most important labels in contemporary political life.
Virtually nobody aspires to being “pre-modern.” Rather, modernity constitutes a
particular rung in the international status hierarchy, and as such has been a
moving target for societies aspiring to “modern” status over the last several
centuries.7
Modernity is a cultural construction; it has its origins in a particular time and
place.8 In other words, people created the idea of modernity, and like all ideas
that bear on competition for status and power, it served certain interests and did
not serve others. Most fundamentally, the idea of “the modern” helped both mo
tivate and justify European colonial projects in Africa, the Middle East, and
Asia.9 Indeed, this concept was perhaps one of the most formidable tools of those
colonial projects’ “soft power.”10 The European powers and some members of the
Westernized classes in the subjugated, colonized populations agreed that such
societies needed modernization. The watchwords of this vision were technical
efficiency, education, literacy, civilization, and secularism (favoring secular—non
religious—culture). It is not surprising, therefore, that anti-colonial resistance
was, in its first generation, typically carried out using this same conceptual
language:11 Rather than being the agents of modernization, colonizers were
Concepts 351
re-interpreted as barriers to it. Bound up with the notion, sometimes explicitly
and sometimes implicitly, were the corollaries that modernization was a both a
necessary and an inevitable process.
Transforming ideas like “modernity” and “modernization” into social-scientific
concepts is a difficult task, since we do not want to reproduce the biases implicit
in the original concepts.12 Indeed, some scholars have called for the abandon
ment of these concepts altogether. For this book we think the concepts are still
worth using, partly because most of the world goes on talking about modernity
and modernization. Political scientists and scholars in related fields generally
mean several things by modernity and modernization, or they focus on several
distinctive features of modern or modernizing societies.13 First, they often char
acterize modernity by growth-oriented, or capitalist, economies, rather than
stagnant or “traditionalistic” economic systems, in which there is little accumula
tion of wealth over time. Second, they often characterize modernity by its open
system of stratification, meaning that social position in modern societies is not
fixed at birth: In “modern” societies, according to this view, social mobility is pos
sible and legitimate. Third, they often characterize the chief political form of mod
ernity as the modern, bureaucratic state; they see centralization and bureaucratization
of power as hallmarks of modernity. Finally, as noted in chapter 13, some scholars
see national identity as a distinguishing marker of modernity. As we discuss later,
scholars increasingly note that modernization can take a variety of forms.14
Ideology
Most comparative political analysts think of ideologies as highly organized and
rationalized systems of ideas that directly bear on politics.15 According to this
way of thinking, your ideas about your tastes in music, fashion, food, and so forth
are probably not ideological.16 But whether you know it or not, your thinking
about politics is probably shaped by an ideology. This ideology most likely con
tains ideas about what rights people should have and where these rights come
from, ideas about whether individuals matter more than groups or vice versa,
ideas about how the economy ought to be organized, and ideas about how collec
tive decisions should be reached. Some people can be considered very ideological,
meaning that they think a lot and very clearly about these things, or even that
they are rigidly devoted to their views about them, but all of us are influenced by
ideologies to some degree.17
Major political ideologies include liberalism, fascism, and socialism, each
of which we discuss further later in the chapter. It is worth noting that these
major political ideologies are largely secular. In other words, they oppose reli
gion as a basis for organizing politics and present themselves as alternatives to
it. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that ideologies are like “secular
religions.”18
Religion
Analysts tend to think about religion in two basic, contrasting ways: by using
functional definitions and by using substantive definitions.19 Functional defi
nitions specify what religion does. They define religion by its ability to foster
social integration, to give people a sense of order through creating and telling
ideology A systematically
coordinated and cognitively salient
set of beliefs focused on politics.
functional definition Definition
that aims to define a given pheno
menon by what it does.
substantive definition
Definition that aims to define a
given phenomenon by what it is
rather than by what it does.
352 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
secularization The process
through which (according to some
theories) societies become less
religious as they become more
modern.
A line of women waits for a bus in Tehran. Note the religious imagery on the building
behind them.
myths about history and the cosmos, or by its ability to motivate collective action.
I f we use a functional definition, we see lots of things—including modern
ideologies— as religion. For certain research purposes, this view may be helpful.
More often, as we have seen throughout this book, when doing comparative
analysis we want to make clear distinctions so that we can locate and explain
variation. Substantive definitions of religion help make this possible. A substan
tive definition focuses on the content of religious belief or organization, its “sub
stance” rather than just what it does. For example, a substantive definition might
say, “Religions are systems of belief that grant a prominent place to God.” For
many purposes, though, this particular definition would not be helpful, since a
number of religions (e.g., Buddhism) do not have gods, and many others (e.g.,
animism and Hinduism) have many gods or god-like entities. More commonly,
though, substantive definitions of religion argue that what separates religion
from other aspects of culture is that it gives prominence to some transcendent
force (i.e., one beyond the normal or merely physical human experience).20 This
might be a deity, a goal such as Nirvana, or even the Platonic ideal of “the good.”
Along these lines, some analysts define religion substantively as a cultural
system or network of beliefs and organizations that are oriented toward the tran
scendent.21 Note that this definition, unlike most functional ones, allows us to
then pose empirical questions about religion’s growth, decline, or changing fea
tures because we can track change about beliefs in the transcendent over time.
Secularization, Religion, and Modern Politics
As noted previously, for a number of years comparative analysts thought that re
ligion would decline in the modern world. They called this idea “secularization”
Concepts 353
or “secularization theory,” and they came up with a number of reasons for their
prediction.22 Some noticed that as societies modernized, new religious groups
emerged, giving people greater religious choice. For example, in the modern
United States—unlike in, say, medieval France— one can choose from a wide
variety of world religions, and in particular from a huge array of Protestant
Christian denominations. Some scholars thought that this pluralism would
undermine religious belief, because religious people would be less likely to have
their beliefs constantly reinforced by like-minded people around them.23 Others
thought that modernization would cause religion’s decline because of the im
portance of science and technology in the modern world. According to this point
of view, “rational” explanations would replace “irrational” religious ones, leaving
some people “disenchanted.”24
Scholars have noticed, however, that this theory seems to describe only one
small part of the world: Western Europe.25 Much of the world is very religious,
and some claim that over the longer term societies like the United States have
actually become more religious26 Moreover, since societies with the highest birth
rates tend to be more religious than societies with low birth rates, we may see
continuing increases in global religiosity in coming decades.27
Comparative analysts continue to note some important changes in religion’s
role as societies modernize, however, and the old theories of secularization are
not all wrong. Scholars today do not agree on whether we should call these
changes “secularization,” but they widely agree that we should distinguish be
tween any change in religious belief itself and changes in religious institutions or
organizations,28 It seems that when societies modernize, religious institutions or
organizations tend to become increasingly differentiated (independent) from the
state, although, as we shall see, the extent of this varies.29 Along similar lines, in
some, but not all, modern societies, religious institutions and organizations become
privatized.30 This means that they become increasingly independent not just of
the state but of the public sphere: They lose their status in support of public
claims. For example, in societies with a strong tradition of privatizing religion,
such as France, efforts by the church to influence major political decisions are
viewed negatively. Much of the comparative analysis of religion and politics
today involves mapping institutional or organizational changes and then trying
to explain the different patterns that emerge. For example (as we discuss in more
detail in the “Types” and “Causes and Effects” sections), some societies separate
church and state and then organize religions as denominations.31 Some almost
fully privatize religious institutions and organizations, while others allow the
state to control them. Comparative analysis seeks to explain these variations.
Religious Conflict
Religious conflict is not surprising in a world with major ideological and religious
differences, especially as religion’s relationship to politics is in flux.32 Many ana
lysts assert that religion has served and will continue to serve as a motivator for
international conflict, and we certainly have seen dramatic examples of reli
giously inspired violence across national boundaries in recent years. Others draw
our attention to cases where pluralism within a polity causes great tension that
leads to violence. Analysis of such cases is often complicated by the fact that
differentiation The process
through which institutions become
increasingly autonomous from one
another, including the reduction or
other change in the linkages
between religion and other
institutions.
privatization In the context of the
social scientific study of religion,
this refers to the process of
religious practice being confined to
the private sphere.
public sphere The space in which
public life and deliberation take
place (as opposed to the “private
sphere”).
354 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
liberalism An ideology that
emphasizes individual freedoms,
representative democracy, and the
market economy.
social democracy An ideological
movement that favors both
representative democracy with
respect for basic individual rights
and state action to promote
relative economic and social
equality, viewed by some as a
variety of socialism but by most as
a variety of liberalism.
libertarianism A form of
liberalism, strongly opposed to
social democracy, that is especially
concerned with minimizing the
role of government.
religious difference tends to go along with other types of difference, such as re
gional and ethnic identity. As such, many of the theories discussed in chapters 12
and 13 are used to explain religious conflict as well.
Types
In this section we begin by describing and exemplifying the major forms of ideol
ogy visible in modern politics. We then move on to do the same for the major
patterns of religious involvement in politics.
Modern Ideologies
As noted previously, the main families of modern political ideologies are liberal
ism, fascism, and socialism. This list is not exhaustive of the ideological universe,
of course, but these are the most important major ideologies that political scien
tists have analyzed.
L ib eralism
Liberalism is probably the most widespread and influential of modern ideolo
gies. Indeed, it is so widespread that sometimes analysts do not even notice that
it is an ideology. Thus scholars who declared that ideologies would disappear in
modern society often did not include liberalism in this prediction.33
Like all complex ideologies, liberalism takes many forms, and not all of
them are fully consistent. In general, though, the ideology of liberalism holds
that (1) individuals are and should be more important than groups; (2) indi
viduals’ relationships with the state should be organized through democratic
citizenship; (3) a democratic political system should be representative, and it
should have constitutional limits that protect the rights of individuals; and (4)
free-market capitalism is the best, and for many the most “natural,” way of or
ganizing the economy.
Our fourth point in the preceding paragraph is a generalization in that differ
ent variants of liberalism take different stances on the state’s role in the economy.
As noted in the “Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom” case study, many ana
lysts consider social democracy to be a variant of liberalism, though it owes a
great deal to socialism as well: It promotes state management of the economy as
a means to preserve representative democracy. Broadly, liberalism is a contin
uum, from libertarianism—the view that the state’s involvement in the economy
and social life must be reduced to the minimal necessary level for the mainte
nance of order—to social democracy.
We should briefly mention “conservatism” in this context. In early nineteenth-
century Europe, conservatism was a distinct ideology, one which aimed to re
strain modernization processes, defend monarchy, and preserve religious
organizations in their traditional positions. We can still today speak of conserva
tism as a strong cultural tendency in many societies. Indeed, in some societies it
could still be treated as a distinct ideology. Yet in many societies conservatism
has come to constitute a form of liberalism. In the contemporary United States or
Western Europe, few conservatives would go so far as to question liberalism’s
emphasis on representative democratic institutions and markets.
Types 355
C A SE IN CO N TEX T
■
Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom PAGE 552
The United Kingdom was the birthplace of both orthodox liber
alism and Keynesianism, two main views about the state’s role in
the economy that are central to modern ideological debate.
Indeed, the society has also had strong social-democratic actors.
For more on liberalism in the United Kingdom, see the case
study in Part VI, p. 552. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. Are both of these views varieties of liberalism?
2. If so, what makes them different from other ideologies,
like socialism or fascism?
As we shall see, liberalism is often suspicious of other ideologies. Indeed,
some liberals present Nazism and socialism as more like each other than oppo
sites. Rather than viewing ideologies on the standard “left-right” continuum,
they see them on a continuum with liberalism at one end and totalitarianism at
the other.
Fascism
The ideology (or family of ideologies) known as fascism as very prominent in
the twentieth century, which saw fascist governments in Spain, Portugal, and
Italy, among other places.34 Some analysts also classify National Socialism
(the ideology of the German Nazi Party) as fascist, while others see it as a
distinct form given its totalitarian aspirations and more virulent, bizarre form
of racism.
Fascism can be distinguished from liberalism in several ways. First, fascism
does not share liberalism’s respect for the individual. Rather, fascist ideology
holds that the state, as the embodiment of the nation, is most important. In the
paradigmatic case of Italian fascism under Mussolini, fascism was grounded in a
nationalism that sought to recover the “glorious” history of Ancient Rome.
Second, in line with fascism’s lack of concern for the individual, the political
programs associated with it typically do not make much effort to protect the in
dividual’s rights. Third, fascism is anti-democratic, in that it views an authoritar
ian protector for the nation (e.g., Franco in twentieth-century Spain) as preferable
to liberal democracy, which it argues can be co-opted by ideologies and actors
hostile to the nation’s interests. Finally, while fascists often embrace capitalist
economics, they typically promote state capitalism, in which the state has control
of production and the use of capital.
Liberals criticize fascism not only for its lack of respect for individual rights
but for the horrific human rights abuses that have been carried out in its name.
Socialists critique it for these reasons as well and often add the critique that, in
their view, fascism is fundamentally about preserving the capitalist economy.
Indeed, some socialists believe that capitalism will inevitably fall back on fascism
as its ultimate defender.
fascism An authoritarian ideology
associated with regimes like the
Nazis and that of Italy’s Benito
Mussolini, favoring
authoritarianism, militarism, and
right-wing nationalism.
356 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion In Modern Politics
socialism An ideology (or family
of ideologies) that emphasizes
economic equality as a key goal, to
be pursued in large measure
through state action.
Fascists hold a flag honoring Benito Mussolini, Italy’s notorious World War II—era dictator and
ally of Adolf Hitler.
Socialism
Perhaps the most widely discussed ideology (or family of ideologies) is socialism.
Though there are many forms of socialism, by far the most influential socialist
was Karl Marx, though the ideology predated him. Marx constructed his social
ism as a critique of liberalism.
According to Marx, the freedoms promised by liberalism were illusory.35
For example, Marx said, you might believe you can liberate people by giving
them freedom of speech or religion, but this belief is based on a misunder
standing of freedom and the ways in which we are unfree. The main problem
in modern society, from this point of view, is not that authoritarian regimes
limit people’s ability to make their own choices, but that our economic system
alienates us. In our ideal state, Marx says, we would experience fulfillment
through labor. But capitalism, which divides our labor via assembly-line manu
facture and the bureaucratic organization of office work, makes it impossible
for us to find fulfillment in this way (if you have ever seen the movie Office
Space, then you should have a good idea of what he had in mind). Marx further
argued that capitalism impoverishes the majority as it enriches a parasitic mi
nority. To solve these problems, socialists like Marx argued that revolution is
necessary. The working class must seize the state and use it to take collective
ownership of factories and other elements of the productive process, which are
controlled by “capitalists.” Once this happens, Marx hoped, socialism will
eventually give way to communism, in which there will be no forced division of
labor and, thus, no alienation.
Types 357
Communist ideology in Practice:
Russia and the Soviet Union PAGE 537
A number of socialist regimes developed in the twentieth cen
tury. The Soviet Union might have been the most important of
these, if for no other reason than that it exported socialist ideol
ogy and used its influence to produce socialist revolutions in
other states, with some success. But what would Marx have
thought of the Soviet Union? Was it consistent with his socialist
vision? Or did it embody some other form of socialism?
For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, p. 537.
As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How did Lenin and Stalin change socialism?
2. Was the Soviet Union ideologically uniform, or were there
ideological struggles within it?
3. Does the demise of the Soviet Union “prove socialism
wrong”? Why or why not?
These ideas inspired much of the world in the twentieth century, leading to the
establishment of socialist or communist regimes in China, Vietnam, Russia,
Cuba, and many other places. Many socialists, however, became disillusioned
with these regimes. Some saw them as brutal and dehumanizing, with little likeli
hood of ever producing the promised world, free of alienation. Some of these disil
lusioned individuals turned to the ideology of liberalism. W ithin it, a subset
attempted to construct a modified version—social democracy, which (as men
tioned earlier) aims to preserve representative democracy and the respect for indi
vidual rights through active state management of the economy. Social democrats
have been some of the most ardent supporters of the welfare state discussed in
chapter 4. Moreover, they are hard to locate within the typology of ideologies we
have developed here. Some would see social democrats as liberals, because of their
emphasis on democratic institutions and freedoms. Others would see them as so
cialists, since many social democrats emerged from the socialist tradition and
since they tend to favor more state spending than do liberals. Finally, despite the
emergence of social democracy in the twentieth century, there are still numerous
proponents of more traditional socialism in the world, and some have played an
important role in protest against globalization and related phenomena.
Modern Form s of Religion in Politics
Students in the United States are likely quite used to the idea of the “separation
of church and state,” given its prominence in U.S. political institutions and cul
ture. Yet even in the United States, religion is politically important, and in much
of the world religious and political institutions are intertwined.36 At the organi
zational level, this involvement can take many forms. Governments often regu
late religions, stipulating what they can and cannot do. Governments also affect
religious organizations financially. Many governments offer religious organiza
tions direct financial support. Others give them tax advantages. Finally, numer
ous societies have established religions, meaning there is an official religion of established religions Religions
the state.37 Yet even in most such cases, we see some level of differentiation be- that are granted official status and
tween religious and political institutions. support by the state.
358 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
lay state State that establishes a
formal separation of religion and
public life.
religious state State in which
religion is a key part of official
politics, often involving religious
establishment, religious
legitimation of the state, and
restrictions on religious minorities.
L ay a n d R eligious S tates
Most societies see increasing differentiation of religious and political institu
tions as they modernize. This does not happen in the same way everywhere,
though there are several common patterns. A prominent one is the “laicist”
pattern, in which the state seeks to completely dominate and privatize reli
gion.38 The core idea is that public life must be “lay” rather than religious: The
state is seen as sharply antagonistic to religious organizations, as if competition
between them were zero-sum. One of the most important examples of this pat
tern is France (see the “Case in Context” box). In a society exhibiting this pat
tern, it is not just that the there is a separation between church and state but
that, culturally, religion tends to be considered a matter of private conscience
and nothing more. W hat this means will become clearer later, when we discuss
denominationalism.
We should note that lalcism sometimes goes along with socialism in ideology.
There are liberals who favor a laicist approach— and, indeed, the earliest archi
tects of laicism in both France and Latin America considered themselves liberals.
However, most modern socialist regimes have been laicist in their approach to
religion, including the Soviet Union, Maoist China, and Cuba since soon after
Castro came to power in 1959.
In societies with laicist systems, there are often minority groups and religious
organizations that favor the inverse set of arrangements: a theocratic state, or at
least one in which a single religion is given support. Moreover, sometimes these
individuals triumph and overturn lay states.
We speak of societies such as Iran as “religious states.” Like lay states, their
proponents often view competition between religion and a secular state as zero-
sum. The difference is that they favor the religious side. Religious states vary a
lot, and some are more tolerant of minority religions and of secular people than
others. Saudi Arabia, for example, is fairly intolerant. Costa Rica, which takes
Roman Catholicism as the state’s official religion, is fairly tolerant of religious
difference.
IN SIG H TS
Public Religions in the Modern World
by Jose Casanova
Jose Casanova’s Public Religions in the Modern World challenges conventional wisdom about secularization and the modern
state. Casanova begins by a close analysis of what other scholars
have meant by secularization. He comes to the conclusion that
they have meant three things but have often confused them: a
reduction in individuals’ religious belief and practice; institu
tional differentiation; and religion’s “privatization,” or its eviction
from public life. He places the first of these to the side and exam
ines differentiation and privatization. Differentiation does indeed
seem to be a core feature of modernization’s impact on religion.
Privatization, however, is an “option,” not a necessary feature. In
other words, according to Casanova, it is possible for a society to
be both religious and modern, and even for religion to enter into
public life in a modern society. Moreover, it is possible for the
social position of religion to change, and some societies have
witnessed religion’s de-privatization.
J o s e C a s a n o v a , Public Religions in the M odern World. C h ic a g o : U n iv e r s it y o f
C h ic a g o P ress, 1994.
Types 359
France is often presented as the quintessential lay state. Religion
is heavily privatized, and the population is, in comparative terms,
fairly secular in its orientation. These issues have grown more
complex in recent years, as evidenced by controversies over the
use of Muslim symbols and traditional dress in public spaces
in France.
For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 438-439. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. How is French secularism different from what is found in
the United States?
2. Why did French secularism develop in the way that it did?
3. Are recent controversies over Islamic symbols qualita
tively different from earlier episodes in the history of
French religious politics?
Sisters who were expelled from their school in France in 2003
for wearing Islamic headscarves. The issue of public use of
religious clothing and symbols has been a source of great
controversy in France.
D e n o m i n atio n alism
Scholars take full denominationalism to be somewhat exceptional. The main
example of a fully denominational system is the United States. One could argue,
though, that societies with growing religious pluralism, such as Brazil, might
be moving toward a denominational model. In addition, some societies where
established religions coexist with religious pluralism and high tolerance for reli
gious difference share certain characteristics of the denominational model.
To fully understand denominationalism, we must first understand the concept
of the denomination. If you live in the United States, you are probably used to
hearing religious groups referred to as “denominations,” which are different
from “churches” in the traditional sense and “sects.”39 A “church,” as social scien
tists usually use the term, typically tries to make itself mandatory in a given ter
ritory and to link itself to the state (in other words, social scientists who study
religion use this word in more restrictive sense than you probably do). A sect, in
contrast, often tries to turn away from the state and from public life, and is typ
ically defined as a group that removes itself from some other religious organiza
tion. Denominations are in a middle ground between churches and sects,
engaging in public life but respecting pluralism (at least in principle) and con
sidering membership to be voluntary.40 Thus, a society in which religious differ
ence is organized denominationally tends to see many different religious groups
and organizations. Unlike in a lai’cist society, however, denominations do not
consider politics to be off limits. In a denominational society such as the United
States, religious leaders of all persuasions routinely make pronouncements about
public life. Majorities in denominational societies consider religious motivations
denominationalism A system
or set of beliefs that privileges
denominational forms of religious
organization.
religious pluralism The situation
in which there are multiple
religious organizations within a
given society (the opposite of
religious monopoly)
denomination A type of religious
organization, prevalent in the
United States among other places,
that is voluntary and accepts the
principle of religious pluralism.
360 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
Religion and Politics in Iran
Iran is in many ways the polar opposite of France with respect to
religion. Rather than privatizing religion, Iran elevates one religion
and makes it the basis of the state’s legitimacy, strongly favoring
it and using it as the basis for law and politics.
For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 479-
480. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
PAGE 479
1. Why does Iran have a religious state when so many other
Islamic societies have secular nationalist states?
2. Is the Iranian religious state a modern state? Why or
why not?
to be appropriate in politics, as long as one or another religious group is not ul
timately favored by the state, though sometimes this leads to controversy.
Some scholars have viewed denominationalism very positively as offering a
good way to manage religious difference. As a result, there is some discussion
about whether and to what extent it can be exported.41 Views on this matter
depend largely on explanations of denominationalism’s origins. If its origins lie
in institutional design, perhaps it is exportable. If they lie in difhcult-to-change
features of a society, such as levels of religious pluralism and diversity, it would
be harder to export to countries without similar conditions.42 If this is the case,
however, perhaps denominationalism can develop spontaneously in different so
cieties. We should note that denominationalism often coincides with the ideol
ogy of liberalism. At the same time, many proponents of liberal ideology are
la’icist and worry that denominationalism can lead to states treating majority re
ligious groups preferentially. Further, they worry that it may lead to failure to
fully protect the rights of minority religious groups, depending on demographic
factors and disproportionate political influence.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and
Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modern
Politics?
As we have mentioned, neither ideology nor religion has ended, despite some
analysts’ predictions. Religion remains an important part of politics in most of
the world, and while the bipolar order of the Cold War is no more, ideological
difference is still plainly visible. In this section of the chapter, therefore, we
examine causal arguments about the changing role of religion and ideology in
modern politics. We begin with religion and then turn to ideology.
Why (and How) Does M odernization Alter
Religion’s Role in Politics?
Virtually all scholars agree that “modernization” changes religion’s role in politics.
They may disagree about the details, but generally, they hold that (1) as societies
modernize, religious organizations tend to be increasingly differentiated from
other organizations, especially the state; (2) as economic development increases,
Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modern Politics? 361
Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria:
Disentangling Ethnicity and Religion? PAGE 523
The impact of modernization on religion and public life becomes
especially complicated in situations of religious diversity. The
complication increases when religious difference creates tension
and also overlaps with other potential bases of conflict, such as
region and ethnicity. This is emphatically the case in Nigeria,
which has struggled with problems of religious difference, in
cluding both inter-religious violence and elite bargaining within
the state about regional, ethnic, and religious representation.
For more on religious difference in Nigeria, see the case study
in Part VI, p. 523. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. How does the state manage religious difference?
2. How might Nigeria’s federal system help?
3. What are the prospects for the development of a denomi
national approach to religious difference in Nigeria and
other societies that face inter-religious conflict?
religious belief tends to decline somewhat— maybe not as much in more reli
giously diverse societies, though this is subject to much debate.
M o d e rn iz a tio n T h eo ry a n d S ecu la riz a tio n
As noted earlier in the chapter, traditional secularization theories hypothesized
that “modernization” would lead to religion’s decline. Most often such theories
did not distinguish between decline in rates of religious belief and practice (mea
sured through surveys of beliefs or of attendance at religious services) and changes
in religion’s public role. In addition, these theories often focused on particular
features of modernization, such as increasing social mobility, increasing plural
ism, and the growth of science.
Over the last couple of decades, secularization theories have been heavily
criticized.43 Yet some scholars have continued to promote them, often assembling
IN S IG H T S
Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide
by Pippa Norris pad Poaald Inglehart
Norris and Inglehart test secularization theory against data drawn from the World Values Survey over a twenty-year
period.They hypothesize and argue that societies with high levels
of human development have more “existential security” and less
need for religion. Their argument is based on several assumptions.
First, they assume that religion’s main function is to help people
deal with what they call “existential insecurity.” In other words, re
ligion comforts people in the face of suffering and death. They
then assume that, as development increases, suffering is de
creased and death delayed. Life expectancies rise, debilitating ill
nesses are reduced, and infant and child mortality decline. They
suggest that this should lead to a decline in religiosity, and they
test their hypothesis by analyzing the relationship between
increasing human development and levels of religious belief,
and they find much support for it, as increasing human devel
opment leads to some decline in religiosity in general. How
ever, they encounter some anomalies, most notably the case
of the United States, which has both high levels of human de
velopment and high religiosity. They explain this anomaly by
noting the high levels of income inequality in the United
States relative to other countries with similar levels of human
development.
P ip p a N o r r i s a n d R o n a ld I n g l e h a r t , Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics
W orldw ide. N e w Y o r k : C a m b r id g e U n iv e r s it y P ress, 2 0 0 4 .
362 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
powerful evidence (see the “Insights” box titled Sacred and Secular: Religion and
Politics Worldwide). The evidence assembled by scholars such as Norris and Ingle-
hart is hard to ignore. That being said, critics of this theory make two arguments
worth consideration. First, it could be that some confounding variable helps ex
plain religion’s relative decline in some societies. Second, not all scholars are
convinced by Norris and Inglehart’s explanation of why the United States has
high religiosity despite its high level of development. In any case, the controversy
over secularization theory rages on.
T he “R eligious E co n o m ies” A p p ro ac h
Over the last two decades, many scholars have proclaimed a new paradigm in
the social-scientific analysis of religion.44 This is distinguished from other work
in the field by its heavy reliance on methods derived from economics and ratio
nal choice theory. Indeed, it is sometimes referred to as the “supply side ap
proach” to religion.4S Whereas previous theories treated questions of religiosity
as being ultimately about variations in levels of religious demand, the “religious
economies approach” posits that a generic level of religious demand is a con
stant, and that what explains variation in religiosity is the nature of the religious
market in any given society. As with all markets, the theory further assumes,
monopoly is bad, since competition spurs innovation and the tailoring of specific
(here religious) products to market preferences. Thus the United States, which
has high levels of religious pluralism and no established (monopoly) religion, has
high levels of religious belief. European societies, which generally have low
levels of religious pluralism and, often, established religions, exhibit low religi
osity. This approach has been hugely influential, aided by the increasingly visible
role of religion in public affairs. Sociologist Rodney Stark went so far as to argue
that the world is itself growing more religious due to increasing religious special
ization. He claimed that medieval Europe (so often the historical benchmark for
IN SIG H TS
The Political Origins of Religious Liberty
b y /’rth o n y G ili 0
Gill applies the insights of the religious economies school— which emphasizes rational choice theory and economic
models— to the question of why some countries have more reli
gious toleration than others. He argues that “religious firms” seek
to maximize their “market share.” We would expect that domi
nant religions may ask the state to establish them as official, and
smaller religions to seek toleration. Further, we would note that
political leaders often use religion to reinforce their power. If
most citizens adhere to an established church, which represents
a religious monopoly, leaders have little incentive to change the
status quo. If the religious landscape features a lot of pluralism,
they are better off just leaving religion alone.
So what causes religious toleration? One cause is any inde
pendent increase in pluralism. If minority religions grow for some
reason, politicians have incentives to treat religions more equally.
But Gill also notes that as regimes become more established,
they feel less of a need to pander to majority religions, and reli
gious pluralism will increase if they do not repress religious mi
norities. Thus a circular process of toleration and expanding
freedom can develop. Gill uses this framework to explain the
comparative fate of religious freedom in the United States, Latin
America, and Russia and some of its neighbors.
Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modem Politics? 363
religiosity) was not really that religious, because it had high levels of “religious
monopoly.”46
W hile the “religious economies approach” has been influential, empirical evi
dence on the impact of levels of pluralism is mixed. Some studies have found that
pluralism is linked to increased religiosity, while others have found the opposite,
and still others have found no discernible effect.47 Some scholars also criticize the
approach’s rather narrow focus on questions of attendance at religious services or
on self-reported measures of religious belief, rather than on institutional shifts.
In s titu tio n a l T heories
Much work in the comparative analysis of religion and politics takes a different
tack, focusing on institutions and organizations. These theories aim to explain
how and why religious organizations become differentiated from others, particu
larly from the state, and why religion becomes privatized.48
The classical sociological approach to these questions viewed societies as com
plexes of interdependent institutions that function together systemically, meaning
they are connected by ordered networks.49 Traditional forms of this approach
held that societies are functionally integrated, or that linkages between social in
stitutions depend on their related and overlapping functions. So an institution
such as the state may have as its core functions the preservation of order and the
coordination of collective projects, whereas a religious institution might have as
its core function the creation of societal legitimacy, providing a narrative that
supports the existing social order. Note that in many societies these functions
would overlap: A religious organization such as a church, mosque, or synagogue
might help legitimize the state, which in turn might protect and support the re
ligious organization.
According to differentiation theories, as societies modernize they generate an
increasing number of interdependent institutions. For example, in a relatively
simple society, socialization could take place via the large, intergenerational
family. But when the process of socialization becomes more complex—for ex
ample, when it begins to require specialized knowledge that family members do
not have—new institutions must form to serve these new requirements. Thus,
once societies reach a certain level of complexity, there is a need for a separate
educational system. W hen the complexity increases even more, differentiation
increases within that educational system (e.g., separation of primary, secondary,
and post-secondary education; longer and more complex post-graduate training;
greater field-specific technical training). This differentiation of non-religious in
stitutions would gradually reduce the scope and autonomy of religious institu
tions, turning them into one institution among others rather than society’s core
integrating institution.
Such an account raises the question of why some societies might incline
toward greater complexity to begin with. Many, perhaps most, scholars have as
sumed that increasing complexity (and therefore differentiation) is rooted in eco
nomic processes. Adam Smith, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx—representatives
of very different traditions—all saw increasing division of labor as the motor in
this process. From this general point of view, the source of ongoing differentia
tion in modern societies is capitalism. Note that this account of why capitalism
religious monopoly The situation
in which one major religion
dominates the religious landscape
within a given society (the
opposite of religious pluralism)
364 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
and economic development might lead to secularization is very different from
Norris and Inglehart’s view, discussed earlier in the chapter. Norris and Inglehart
assume that the psychology of the individual actor is the mechanism connecting
development and secularization. Differentiation theories, on the other hand,
typically assume that the mechanism exists at the level of institutions rather than
individual psychology.
Not all theories of differentiation look like this, however. Some are more
actor-centered and suggest that differentiation takes place if and when powerful
individuals and groups want it to take place. For example, some scholars have
argued that the differentiation of religious and educational institutions in the
nineteenth-century United States did not happen simply because of the society’s
increasing complexity. Rather, they argue, it happened because some key, socially
mobile groups benefited from drawing a sharp distinction between science and
religion and from bounding clear institutional turfs for each.50
As you can see, there are a number of competing theories about what happens
to religion in modern societies. Not all of these theories even agree about what is
in need of explanation. In other words, the basic empirical description of the
processes is at issue. Something similar is true, we shall see, of the analysis of
ideology’s role in contemporary politics.
W hy Didn’t Id e o lo gy (and History) End?
Scholarly attention to religion has, to some extent, displaced attention to secular
ideologies in recent years. This trend is probably best explained by current events
and contemporary history: Religion has seemed to matter more in recent political
conflict. In recent years, in particular, there has been resurgence of both the left
and the right around the globe.51 Conservative evangelical Christianity and some
conservative forms of Islam have been influential in a diverse range of societies
(for example, conservative evangelicalism has been influential in the United
States while conservative Islam has been influential in Afghanistan, among other
Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion:
IN S IG H T S The United States, France, and Turkey
by Ahmet Kuru
&
Kuru examines the relationship between the state and religion in three countries: France, Turkey, and the United States. He
makes a conceptual distinction between “assertive secularism”
and “passive secularism.” Assertive secularism is what we have
called the “lay state.” “Passive secularism” means that the state is
mostly separated from religion, but religion is tolerated in public
life: in other words, what we have called “denominationalism” in
this chapter. Kuru wants to explain why assertive secularism is
dominant in France and Turkey and why passive secularism is the
norm in the United States. He notes that ideas and culture matter,
arguing that ideas emerge in social and cultural contexts and
that “ideological path dependence” helps explain the patterns.
The key feature is whether a single, dominant religion is closely
linked to an authoritarian government before the establishment
of modern statehood. If so, it is likely that modernizers will em
brace “active secularism.” In France and Turkey, dominant reli
gions were perceived to be closely allied with and inseparable
from the enemies of a modern republic. In the United States,
there was no such clear identification, and secularism took on
the passive form.
Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States,
France, and Turkey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modern Politics? 365
IN S IG H TS
The End of History and the Last Man
by Francis Fukuyama
I n this famous, controversial, and sometimes misunderstood
I book, Fukuyama argues that political conflict has been seen
as ideological struggle since the beginning of modernity. Many
different visions of the good life have contended with one
another, from socialist to religious conservative. Liberalism was
only one contender among many, until the fall of the Soviet
Union de-legitimized socialism. Then, no alternative to liberalism
was left standing, and a consensus emerged about market rela
tions in economics, liberal democracy in politics, and open strati
fication in society.
Many read Fukuyama’s thesis as if he were simply arguing
that the “good guys” had won, though his argument is more
ambivalent, suggesting that the end of great ideological struggles
may make it harder to find meaning and achieve great things.
This argument has been the subject of major debates, most no
tably between its supporters and those of Samuel Huntington’s
“Clash of Civilizations” argument (discussed in a separate “Insights”
box). Critics of Fukuyama say he fails to see other sources of divi
sion and conflict, that the fall of the Soviet Union does not invali
date all leftist regimes and ideologies, and that his account is
teleological, meaning it assumes that history has a particular des
tination, or “end,” toward which it is directed.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. New York:
Free Press, 1992.
countries). In many societies, right-wing actors, both religious and secular, have
attempted to scale back or dismantle the welfare state. On the left, we have seen
some actors turn to social democracy, which is consistent with the arguments
of those who forecast an “end to ideology.” Social democrats and liberals in
general believe that some version of capitalism should be allowed and that liberal-
democratic government is preferable to authoritarianism. Others on the left,
however, seek an ideology that will stridently oppose liberalism, such as “twenty-
first-century socialism.”
Efforts to articulate and foment “twenty-first-century socialism” have been
particularly important. The idea here is to incorporate and respond to criticisms
made of twentieth-century socialism—for example, that it was anti-democratic,
allowed for the establishment of new oppressive bureaucratic hierarchies, and
that it was often murderous on a mass scale—without throwing out socialism’s
core aspirations. Proponents of twenty-first-century socialism, therefore, tend to
accept the Marxist critique of capitalism as essentially exploitative and alienating
and hope for a utopian future. They suggest that this can be achieved via a form
of political decentralization that they call “participatory democracy.”52
One might be tempted to dismiss this as the utopian thinking of radical politi
cal activists, but those who have done so have been consistently surprised. As sug
gested by the chapter opening, in various parts of the developing world—especially
in several Latin American countries in recent years, particularly Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Ecuador, among others—these ideas have captured the imaginations of self
described revolutionary governments. Nicolas Maduro (and his predecessor, Hugo
Chavez) in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia, and the many intellectuals and
politicians associated with them, make strident claims that ideological conflict
remains. That their governments constitute an alternative to liberalism cannot be
missed (even if it’s not always precisely clear what that alternative is).
Religious opposition to liberal/secular modernity and alternative ideologies
such as “twenty-first-century socialism” share some things in common and are in
“twenty-first-century socialism”
Ideology of government
supporters in some contemporary
societies (e.g., Venezuela, Bolivia)
that aims to emphasize the
allegedly more participatory and
democratic features of these
governments.
366 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
IN SIG H T S
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
by Samuel Huntington I
W ithin political science, Samuel Huntington was one of the earliest voices claiming that religion would play an
important, indeed resurgent, role in contemporary geopoli
tics. In The Clash of Civilizations, he famously argued that the
world is divided into a set number of distinct “civilizations,’
and that these civilizations were built around different cul
tural traditions and often incompatible values. What would
replace old ideological conflicts between the Soviet Union
and United States would be a clash between the world’s civi
lizations, particularly between Islam and “the West.” While
many critics derided this analysis as simplistic and reduction-
istic, it gained wide currency, particularly after the terrorist
attacks of September 11,2001. For many public commentators
and media figures, Huntington’s model of opposed cultural
traditions was a promising explanation. This and similar expla
nations have consequences and profound implications for
policy. If Islam is by nature anti-democratic and pitted against
“the West,” and if civilizations are based on incommensurable
moral and political beliefs, then conflict is largely inevitable,
and preparing for conflict the most prudent policy. But if this
analysis is incorrect, these implications might be misleading,
and such policies possibly even counterproductive.
Samuel Huntington,The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
other ways very different. Contemporary Venezuela and Iran have sometimes
made common cause probably not only because they share some common inter
ests but because their ideological positions are sufficiently compatible, at least in
the short run. W hat is shared? First and foremost, perhaps, is a clearly articu
lated opposition to the United States. But beyond this, they share a criticism of
liberal modernity as falsely universalizing a particular kind of experience and
as hiding deeper alienation and exploitation. It is for this reason, in part, that
IN S IG H T S
Multiple Modernities
byShm uel N. Eisenstadt
Many scholars have argued that contemporary ideological and religious conflict is less about “tradition” versus “mo
dernity” and more about different “modernities,” or different un
derstandings of what modernity means. Seemingly conservative
systems such as the contemporary Iranian regime incorporate
elements of the “modern package.” They revise the meaning of
key terms, however, in relation to their indigenous cultural tradi
tions and to the goals of those shaping the system: Iran’s “de
mocracy” may not be Europe’s democracy.
According to scholars such as Eisenstadt, we can make sense
of such cases by recognizing that there are multiple modernities.
This label recognizes that the modernization processes wit
nessed in the United States and Western Europe are not the only
available models, but rather that modernity might take different
forms in other cultural contexts. The concept of modernity may
have roots in the West, but it was carried globally via processes of
diffusion (especially, though not exclusively, via colonialism), and
it has been re-framed and re-interpreted wherever it has gone.54
Many scholars have understood the pairing of capitalism in eco
nomics and liberal democracy in politics as the core features of
modernity. These are only forms, however, of the more general
phenomenon of growth-oriented economics and political sys
tems. Thus early critical modernities arose in the competing al
ternative ideologies of the twentieth century: communism and
fascism. From this point of view, the alleged “religious resur
gence” of recent years should be considered another example of
this process of emergent alternative modernities. While Eisen-
stadt’s approach shares some common ideas with Huntington’s
assessment, it differs notably in pointing to common underlying
features of modern societies.
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities” Daedalus 129, No. 1, Multiple Moder
nities, (Winter 2000): 1-29.
Two Lefts in Latin America? 367
Chavez and others like him could compellingly use religious discourse even as he
and the Catholic Church remained in sharp conflict.53
These issues have practical, policy-relevant importance. We can only hope to
come to terms with contemporary international religious and ideological conflict
if we can first understand its sources, and the foremost task here is to examine the
nature and aspirations of regimes that define themselves as in conflict. This the
oretical perspective should help elucidate the nature of not only “anti-Western”
cultural movements but also “Western modernities” and their often unspoken
assumptions.
Two Lefts in Latin America?
Over the past decade, ideological debate has been a key feature of Latin American politics. Left-leaning politicians came to occupy virtually every
government in the region in the 2000s (with the exceptions of Colombia and
Mexico). Before long, the major ideological debate was not over the “left” versus
the “right” but, rather, over whether there were “two lefts” in Latin America and,
if so, which was to be preferred.55
The reasons for this leftward regional turn were complex, but most likely in
cluded (1) the democratization of much of the region in the “third wave,” dis
cussed in chapter 6, which opened political systems and empowered populations
to express their preferences; (2) economic problems in the “lost decade” of the
1980s and the austerity that many governments implemented to address them,
yielding a desire for change; and (3) a demonstration effect, as the region’s left
ward turn may be viewed as a wave. One lens for viewing this trend was the idea
of Latin America’s “pink tide.”56 Note that the metaphor seems to suggest a
hybrid ideology, which softens “red” socialism and communism. There may
indeed be advantages to using a single, general category of this sort. As we have
stressed throughout this book, the ultimate determinant of whether a category or
concept works is whether it allows us to gain “leverage” over an empirical ques
tion that we wish to ask. Thus, if we want to understand why Latin America
turned to the left, in general, in the late 1990s, a concept like the “leftward turn”
or the “pink tide” might be sufficient.
But what if we, like many regional political actors, are interested in asking
more specific questions that require drawing sharper distinctions?57 W hat if we
want to note variation within this so-called “pink tide”? Moreover, what if we
think the general trend might hide causal variation? In other words, could it be that
the leftward turn in some Latin American countries has very different characteris
tics and even responds to some distinct causal factors?
As we have said, virtually every Latin American society in the period in ques
tion turned to a left-leaning president of one stripe or another, except for Mexico
(which came very close to electing one) and Colombia. It is also worth noting
that Peru elected Alan Garcia, who had in his career been identified with the left
but who was, in relative terms, to the right of his opponent, Ollanta Humala
TH IN K IN G
C O M P A R A TIV ELY
K E Y M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Using Typologies to
Disaggregate
Concepts
Typologies serve a variety of pur
poses in comparative politics, as we
have seen throughout this book.
Some just serve to clarify thinking.
Some, called “ideal types,” are used in
order to show how empirical cases
stray from theoretical expectations.
Yet here we are interested in how a
typology might help us disaggregate
the concept of a “leftward turn” in
Latin America. If it serves our pur
poses, any such typology would allow
us to move beyond viewing that turn
as a single political process, and
reveal various strands or versions of
that process. Such a typology identi
fies variation, sometimes in the form
of distinct “paths,” which we can then
seek to explain. See if you think such a
typology is useful in this case.
368 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A RA TIV ELY
(who was elected president, in turn, in 2011, after moving toward the ideological
center). Chile elected a center-right president, Sebastian Pinera, but then re
elected ex-president Michelle Bachelet of the Socialist Party.
Two governments in particular have been seen as emblematic of variation
within the region’s leftward turn: Brazil under Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (and
subsequently Dilma RoussefF) and Venezuela under the Chavistas (first Hugo
Chavez and then, since Chavez’s death, Nicolas Maduro). Typically, the Bachelet
government in Chile, sometimes the Garcia government in Peru, and the Tabare
Vazquez government in Uruguay were regarded as of the same type as Brazil
under Lula da Silva (known popularly as Lula). The Morales government in
Bolivia, the Correa government in Ecuador, and the Ortega government in
Nicaragua were seen as clearly falling into the Chavista camp, whatever differ
ences were visible between these cases. Finally, the case of Argentina under the
Kirchner and Fernandez governments has been a bit more ambiguous, and some
might debate how to classify the Uruguayan government of Mujica.
On what basis is the distinction between these “two lefts” drawn? On one
hand, the difference seems to be a matter of policy, and on the other, a matter of
ideology. Thus one way to present the typology is by degree of ideological orien
tation. It would classify along a continuum that looks something like this:
Ideological Pragm atic iff
(e.g., Venezuela, (e.g., Brazil, Chile)
Bolivia, E cuador)
Viewed this way, the category represented by Brazil would be thought of as
simply being “less ideological” or “more pragmatic” than the category represented
by Venezuela. W hy might someone make this argument? Well, for one, Lula’s
rhetoric in earlier organizing and campaigns in Brazil was fairly similar to
Chavez’s rhetoric in Venezuela. Yet they governed very differently. W hile neither
caused his country to default on debt obligations (as some feared), the Chavista
policy playbook, especially after Chavez’s self-designation as “socialist” in 2005,
in some ways resembled the more traditional left, with its focus on establishing
cooperatives, nationalizing industries, controlling the exchange rate, and dra
matically increasing public spending (and at the time of this writing, the Venezu
elan government’s fiscal situation is very poor, and there is a possibility of future
default). Lula’s and RoussefFs policies in Brazil have been far less radical. Indeed,
the main strategy seems to be to allow the market to produce growth, under the
watchful eye of the state, while the state invests heavily in human capital and uses
targeted spending to try to redress extreme poverty (most famously in the Bolsa
Familia conditional cash transfer program). Both governments reduced poverty
and inequality, at least in the first decade of the 21st century, but they did so in
different ways, and analysts foresee very different prospects in terms of the sus
tainability of their approaches.58
Another major difference concerns politics and the democratic status of the ,
state. The recent governments in Brazil, and those with affinities for them, have \
clearly embraced pluralist democracy. These regimes have not been free of cor
ruption, but they have not tried to force their opponents outside of the political
process. W hile some commentators would disagree, most would say that a coun
try like Venezuela has shown less respect for pluralism, in that the regime has
juxtaposed “participatory democracy” to allegedly “bourgeois” and liberal “repre
sentative democracy,” and in many ways has endeavored to return the country to
authoritarian centralism.59 Again, one way to view the difference is to see the
more moderate pole as being “less ideological” than the radical pole.
Some people would be critical of this idea, however. Remember that liberal
ism, too, is an ideology. Maybe the juxtaposition of “pragmatism” with “ideol
ogy” falsely presents state-led development in a capitalist framework and pluralist
democracy as if they were “just practical” or somehow the natural or normal state
of affairs, operative unless a society is polluted by an ideology. From a social
scientific point of view, this position cannot be sustained. Liberalism in both
economics and politics is not a universal or natural feature of political societies
and has roots every bit as ideological as socialism and fascism. Governments like
those of Lula and Rousseff may indeed be “more pragmatic” than those of
Chavez, Maduro, and Morales, of course, but the differences point us toward
constructing a typology that sees these as variations within a broader ideological
field. Some ideologies might favor a more dogmatic relationship to key ideologi
cal texts than others.
One tempting way to read the contemporary ideological landscape in Latin
America would be to see it as a version of the ideological development that has
been seen in Western Europe and the United States, but adapted to developing
world conditions. Thus the Lula and Rousseff governments seldom endorse full-
scale traditional protectionism, work hard to attract and retain foreign direct
investment, and aim to streamline but generously fund social programs. Brazil
aims not to destroy one class in the alleged interests of another, but to reduce
income inequality in the service of sustainable development. This position con
trasts sharply, as noted before, with that of the Chavista government, which in
the economic sphere, and especially in discourse, practices a more traditional
leftist approach.60 From this point of view, the political spectrum might resemble
the model on p. 370.
This sort of typology helps us pose important causal questions. One major
question would be why the regimes sort themselves in the way that they do. A n
other would be how and why regimes within countries move between these cat
egories. For example, Chile moved from “pragmatic leftism” to “traditional
liberalism” with the election of Pinera, but then back to “pragmatic leftism” with
the return of Bachelet. I f we tracked changes within countries over time, we
might notice patterns of regimes’ ideological drift. Finally, a typology like this
might help us in posing questions about one of the most interesting areas of re
search about ideology: To what extent do the ideological predilections of popula
tions and formal political actors predict policy choices? We have simplified things
here, but if we were to use this typology we might attempt to measure (1) the
ideological content of the discourse of political figures and (2) the ideological
Two Lefts in Latin America? 369
r T H IN K IN G
.C O M P A R A T IV E LY
370 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A RA TIV ELY
T rad itio n al Socialism “Pragm atic Leftism ” T rad itio n al Liberalism
Brazil
(Lula, Rousseff)
Venezuela Mexico
(Chavez, M a d u ro ) (Calderon, Pena Nieto)
E cuador Uruguay Colom bia
(Correa) (Vazquez, Mujica) (Uribe, Santos)
Bolivia C hile Chile
(Morales) (Bachelet) (Pinera)
A rgentina
(K irc h n e r, F e rn a n d e z )
orientation of the population (through surveys), and then match them to ideo
logical regime type.61 This method would potentially allow us to see whether
differences between countries like Brazil and Venezuela spring from different
ideologies, or whether those ideologies are more responsive to structural features
of the society or to leadership decisions made within the state.
C h a p te r S u m m a ry
C o n c e p t s
Religion and ideology are two major forms that ideas take
as they shape politics.
Ideology gets defined in lots of ways, but many scholars
see it as systematically organized beliefs about how politics
and society should be constructed.
Religion, too, gets defined in lots of ways, but many schol
ars see it as a system of beliefs and accompanying organi
zations that posit a transcendental source of meaning.
Scholars used to think that religion and ideology would
both decline as societies modernize, but it now appears to
most students of comparative politics that they continue to
shape politics in meaningful ways.
T y p e s
• The main modern ideologies are liberalism, fascism, and
socialism. Much of twentieth-century international conflict
was interpreted in the light of these ideologies.
• There is consensus that while religion does not necessarily
decline when societies modernize, religion does tend to
undergo a process of differentiation. Scholars have tried to
explain this in several ways.
• There are three main ideal-typical patterns of modern rela
tionships between religion and politics: lay states, religious
states, and denominationalism.
Chapter Review 371
Causes and Effects
• Modernization theory argues that as economic develop
ment takes place, religious belief and practice will decline.
Some very strong evidence has been mustered in support
of this theory, though there are also some anomalies.
• The ‘religious economies school” is most interested in the
relationship between religious pluralism and religious
belief. According to this theory, the more diverse the
offerings in any given religious marketplace, the more
religious belief and practice you will find. As with modern
ization theory, this approach has strong evidence behind it
but also serious anomalies.
• Many theorists focus on changing relationships between
religious organizations and the state rather than just
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. As has been noted in this chapter, the United States is some
what unusual in (1) its level of religious belief and practice given
its development status and (2) the denominational way in
which it organizes religious difference. How would modern
ization theory, the religious economies school, and institutional
analysis approach this feature of the United States? Which of
these theories, in your view, is most promising as an explan
ation, and why?
2. As noted previously, some prominent actors in Latin America
claim to be making a “revolution* in favor of “twenty-first-century
socialism.” Some of their critics argue that this is no different
from earlier forms of socialist ideology. What would the “twenty-
first-century socialists’ say in response to this charge? Who do
you think is right, and why?
3. Proponents of the “multiple modernities” approach think that
modernization takes notably distinct paths in different cultural
contexts. In contrast, traditional modernization theory says that
looking at whether individual-level belief and practice go
up or down over time. These scholars have produced a
variety of theories to explain why some societies produce
lay states, others religious states, and still others denomin
ational systems.
• Strong evidence indicates that religion and ideology
have not gone away but are, rather, at least as important
factors shaping comparative politics today as they were
decades ago.
Th inking Com paratively
• The ideological landscape of contemporary Latin America
points to the potential utility of different typologies in
comparative analysis.
modernization is always the same basic underlying process,
though cultural context shapes how it happens. How could we
design a comparative analysis to judge between these two the
ories? Which cases would you select, and why? What questions
would you ask about them?
4. In certain respects, lay states and religious states are mirror
images of each other. One type of state tries to push religion
out of the public square, and the other tries to firmly plant it
there. Thinking about Ahmet Kuru’s argument, analyze the
nature of the relationship between these types of states. Why
are they in certain respects so similar? How might we explain
their differences?
5. We have seen that liberalism and socialism have been enduring
political ideologies. The other major modern political ideology,
fascism, has fewer proponents today. Has fascism likely disap
peared? Why or why not? Under what circumstances might
we expect to witness a resurgence of fascism?
CHAPTER 16
Comparative
Politics and
International
Relations
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te m e n lo o d B e B C re ft^ ^ ^ ^ ……
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(ampaignforasotialeuroi
• A poster in Ireland expresses the frustration of some Europeans, in Ireland and elsewhere, with fiscal austerity in recent years.
The years between 2009 and 2015 saw major economic upheaval across Europe as nineteen of the continent’s economies struggled desperately to
save their common currency, the euro. The crisis came after several years in
which eurozone countries (European Union countries whose currency is the
euro) in southern Europe faced high levels of debt. Greece ultimately re
quired a bailout from European funds— and then a second one in 2012—
sparking fear of contagion, since Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy also
risked defaulting on their debts. As Europe’s largest economy
and the center of the eurozone, Germany sought to hold the
euro together without a massive bailout of the slower-growing
economies. It pushed for strict controls on spending in the
southern European countries, including requirements for aus
tere budgets that would cut back on generous social programs
and old-age pensions.
The complications were numerous: Although Germany called
for austerity in southern European countries, it had benefited
from exports to those indebted countries, and banks in Germany,
France, and abroad risked collapse if the euro fell apart. By
2012, the euro seemed to be hanging on by a precarious political
and economic arrangement, one that involved a mix of cooper
ation and diplomatic fights among Europe’s major allies.
W hile the immediate crisis seems to have passed in 2015,
there are still concerns that Greece may eventually exit the
euro (in a so-called “Grexit”), thereby calling the entire future
of the common currency into question.
In Europe, recent years have showed the challenges of
reconciling international relations with domestic politics, yet
the backdrop for this crisis is decades of remarkable European
successes in creating a more unified continent. After the horrors
of W orld W ar II, G erm any and France (along w ith Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) led a process de
signed to bring Europe together economically and politically.
It was clear th at Europe w anted to avoid another cataclysmic war, and
the continent’s leaders felt th at integration was the solution. The process
began w ith a common m arket in coal and steel, w hich was symbolically
rich in indicating shared sovereignty over the very materials needed for war.
IN TH IS C H A P T E R
Concepts 375
Issues 376
Globalization and Trade 376
International Institutions
and Integration 380
Immigration 382
Environment and Sustainability 384
Transnational Networks 387
Nuclear Threats and Terrorism 388
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main
Causes in International Relations? 390
Realism 390
Liberalism 393
Constructivism 394
Marxism 395
TH IN K IN G C O M P A R A T I V E L Y
The EU and Levels of Analysis 395
C A S E S IN C O N T E X T
United States
Iran • India
France • Japan
373
374 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
free trade A policy or approach in
which a government allows foreign
goods and services to compete
freely with domestic production, as
contrasted with protectionism,
which favors domestic production.
European Union (Elf) The
political and economic union of
many European states, numbering
twenty-eight as of 2015.
Integration later expanded into a broader common market between these
countries, and the European Com m unity took on new members: the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Spain and Portugal (after these two countries became
democracies), and Greece. Integration then widened and deepened further,
moving beyond free trade to free movement of peoples across many European
borders, increasing the role of the renamed European Union (EU). Along
side this process, the Berlin W all fell in 1989, East and W est Germany reuni
fied in 1990, and the Cold W ar ended by 1991. The EU ultim ately invited
in most of the countries of central and eastern Europe, as well as countries in
Scandinavia, and even M editerranean island nations. It also created the euro
in 1999 for the majority of its countries, deepening its integration further
even as it expanded to include twenty-eight countries (see M ap 16.1).
Yet throughout all of this integration, the countries of the EU have jeal
ously guarded their sovereignty, and major decisions and treaties must be
approved unanimously. M eanw hile, some countries, such as Norway and
Switzerland, have opted to stay out of the EU altogether.
lA I_
M V
M e m b e r s o f t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n
M em bers o f eurozone (2015)
M em bers o f EU n o t in eurozone
N ote: Year listed is w hen country jo in e d w h a t is now
called the E uropean Union (from 1993), or its
predecessors, including the European C oal a n d Steel
C o m m u n ity (from 1952), E uropean Econom ic
C o m m u n ity (from 1957), a n d the E uropean C o m m u n ity
(from 1967).
*West G erm any w as a m e m ber o f the European
C o m m u n ity u ntil 1990, w ith reunified G erm any
(including E a st G erm any) being a m e m ber thereafter.
‘fibfniles
Map 16.1 Members of the European Union.
Concepts 375
European integration since World W ar II thus offers one of the world’s
greatest contemporary examples of international cooperation, while it also
demonstrates the challenges of this cooperation and the reality that most states
engage in international relations with a view toward their own national inter
ests. W hether the ambitious and remarkable European project of post-war
unification is in the process of foundering or flourishing, it is important to note
how the comparative politics of different countries interfaces with interna
tional relations.
® © •
Concepts
Throughout this text, we have examined issues of comparative politics, which
tends to focus on politics within different countries. In some instances, we have
made reference to factors that cross borders, such as revolutions or processes of
democratization that come in waves. Yet we have not focused directly on the
many areas of international relations between countries, including war and
peace and economic relationships. In discussing the actions of governments in
international relations, we are often referring to decisions made in foreign policy.
We consider two main areas under the topic of international relations: inter
national security and international political economy. International security
refers to issues of war and peace between nations and to issues of global security
and conflict more broadly. As we discuss herein and have noted previously, these
include terrorism and terrorist acts committed by nonstate actors. In addition,
civil wars and conflicts may take place within a state and yet involve the relations
between states. For example, a rebel group that is trying to take over the govern
ment in one country may seek refuge in a neighboring country. All of these issues
of security and conflict fit in the domain of international relations, but they in
tersect with the comparative politics we have discussed throughout this book.
Beyond security studies, the other principal area of study in international rela
tions is international political economy, which examines how the economic
relations between countries affect politics and how political relations affect econ
omies. In the modern world, countries trade in goods and services, and money
flows across borders, often in amounts reaching totals of trillions of dollars a day.
Comparative politics and international relations intersect on political economy
issues when it comes to questions of globalization, international trade, interna
tional finance, and efforts at integration or cooperation on economic issues.
International relations issues do not always fit neatly in one or the other of the
two main categories we’ve set out here. Consider, for instance, efforts to stop
flows of illegal drugs across borders. Is this a question of international security or
of international political economy? A plausible answer is “both.” Similar argu
ments could be made for questions of refugees fleeing violence in one country, or
of immigration more generally. Many issues in the twenty-first century are
transnational in that they cross borders. The range of issues linking comparative
politics and international relations is vast, and we explore them in this chapter.
international relations The study
of relations between countries and
between actors in the international
system.
foreign policy The set of policies
toward foreign nations made by a
national government.
international security The study
of issues of war and peace
between nations and global
security and conflict more broadly.
international political economy
The study of how the economic
relations between countries affect
politics and how political relations
affect economies.
transnational Issues or institutions
that cross international borders.
376 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
globalization The increasing
interaction, both economic and
cultural, among peoples and
societies across national borders.
capital A factor of economic
production consisting of
accumulated wealth or financial
resources available for investment.
international trade The
economic exchange of goods,
services, and capital across
international borders.
We will briefly examine some of the leading issues where comparative politics
and international relations overlap and affect one another. We look at how do
mestic politics affects international relations and how transnational issues affect
the politics of different countries. Many of the issues we discuss are some of the
great challenges and opportunities facing nation-states in the twenty-first
century.
Issues
In this chapter, rather than address the “Types” we find in different social and
political categories (such as types of revolutions, or types of development, or
types of party systems), we focus on some of the leading issues in international
relations that relate to comparative politics. These include economic globaliza
tion, immigration, transnational networks, and the global environment and
sustainability.
G lobalization and Trade
Globalization is one of the major trends in the world, a force shaping not only
the economy but many aspects of everyday life. It refers to increasing interaction,
both economic and cultural, between peoples and societies across national bor
ders. Perhaps more than any other phenomenon, globalization epitomizes how
international phenomena affect comparative politics. We begin with a discussion
of the economic relations that come with flows of goods, capital, and people
across borders.
W hat crosses borders? First, traded goods do, in the form of imports and ex
ports. These can include cars or food, minerals or natural resources such as bar
rels of petroleum, textiles, or toys. Second, services are increasingly transnational.
Examples include the now-famous customer service call centers located in India
that serve a global clientele, or medical tourism that leads some residents of
wealthy countries to seek out lower-priced surgeries in countries such as Thailand
or Costa Rica. Third, money (or capital) crosses borders for a number of reasons.
Many people and corporations have investments or own properties in other
countries. Many immigrants living overseas send money home to their families
or communities as well. And anything imported must be paid for, so money
flows constantly. Finally, people cross borders, whether in search of opportuni
ties for work or political freedoms, or to flee violence or strife in their home
countries, or for recreation or business. W ith these transnational flows come
challenges relating to the movements of goods, services, money, and people.
Turning first to international trade of goods and services, economic interac
tions between countries have increased significantly in recent years. Many people
in advanced, industrialized countries are aware that an increasing number of
goods come from overseas, but the extent is still impressive: The clothes on your
back may have been tailored in Bangladesh or Pakistan, the cell phone in your
hand may have been assembled in Brazil or China, with parts from Malaysia,
and the apple you had at lunch may have come from Chile. Increasingly, this is
true of services as well, especially as technology makes it easier and cheaper to
communicate around the world. I f you need an x-ray in the middle of the night
Issues 377
A ship makes its way through the Panama Canal between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.
in an American hospital, there is a growing chance that the image will be exam
ined by a technician in Australia, while a call to customer service in Europe may
result in talking with someone in India.
This increase in international trade has given rise to many concerns in wealth
ier countries about job outsourcing (contracting abroad) and offshoring (basing
some services or processes abroad). In some lower-income countries it has also
created enthusiasm about the prospects for growth. As wealthy countries rely on
goods produced in emerging economies, and as emerging economies rely on mar
kets in wealthy countries, the world economy becomes more interdependent (in
that individual economies are dependent on one another) and interconnected.1
The trend of increasing trade has thus given rise to many cliches about globaliza
tion, some of which may indeed have a grain of truth to them: The world is “flat”
or “shrinking,” we are living in a “global village,” and we have never been closer.2
This is not to say globalization is brand new: By some measures, the end of the
nineteenth century, when Great Britain was the leading power, was a time as
globalized as any other time in history up to the last two decades.3 Still, global
ization is especially pressing today. Countries have increasingly reduced their
barriers to trade with one another over recent decades. The importance of global
trade in reshaping countries’ economies is exemplified by the rise of China (see
the “Case in Context” box).
Trade between two or more countries— at least when it is voluntary—is based
on the idea that the countries involved gain some advantage from trading.
outsourcing In international trade
and business, the practice of an
economic actor contracting out to
other actors, often overseas. (See
offshoring)
offshoring In international trade
and business, the practice of an
economic actor basing some of
its services or processes abroad
rather than in its domestic market.
(See outsourcing)
interdependence A relationship
in which two or more actors (such
as countries) are mutually depen
dent upon one another.
378 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
comparative advantage In
international trade, the idea that
different countries or territories will
have different relative advantages
in the production of different
goods and services, which forms
the basis for gains from trade.
One of the leading principles in international trade and political economy is
comparative advantage. This principle holds that countries can benefit from
trade by specializing in the goods they can produce with the greatest relative
efficiency, and by trading for goods they produce relatively less efficiently.
The following is a simple illustration to show the benefits of trade under the
principle of comparative advantage. Imagine two countries, Pacifica and Atlan-
tica, both of which have working populations that can produce shirts and phones.
Pacifica is more populous, with 2,000 people to Atlantica’s 500. On the other
hand, it takes somewhat fewer people in Atlantica to produce a shirt or a phone
than it does in Pacifica (see Table 16.1). It takes five Atlanticans to make a shirt
as contrasted with ten Pacificans, and ten Atlanticans to make a phone as con
trasted with fifty Pacificans. This is not necessarily because the skills of the work
ers differ by country, but could perhaps be because there are more labor-saving
machines in Atlantica, for example, which allow workers there to produce more
rapidly. I f Atlantican labor has advantages that allow it to produce more effi
ciently, how could these two countries gain from trading with each other?
For simplicity’s sake, say Pacificans are interested only in buying more phones
right now, and Atlanticans are interested only in buying more shirts. The strategy
for each country without trade would lead to forty phones produced and pur
chased in Pacifica and one hundred shirts in Atlantica:
Pacifica:
Atlantica:
Have 2,000peopleproduce 40 phones.
Have 500people produce 100 shirts.
But if the two countries can trade, the strategy for each country could be dif
ferent. I f the international price were four shirts to one phone, for example, the
following is possible:
Pacifica:
Atlantica:
Have 2,000people produce 200 shirts, then trade to
Atlantica for 50 phones.
Have 500people produce 50 phones, then trade to
Pacifica for 200 shirts.
By specializing in the good they make relatively more efficiently and then
trading, both countries are better off. Pacifica ends up with fifty phones instead
of forty, while Atlantica ends up with two hundred shirts instead of one hundred.
t a b l e i 6 . i Benefits of Trade Under Com parative A dvantage
Country Population
Labor per
Shirt
Labor per
Phone Possibilities W ithout Trade
Possibilities with Trade
(Price: 4 Shirts = 1 Phone)
Pacifica 2,000 10 people 50 people Make 200 shirts or 40 phones Make 200 shirts, trade for
50 phones
Atlantica 500 5 people 10 people Make 50 phones or 100 shirts Make 50 phones, trade for
200 shirts
The example would still work even if one country or the other wanted to trade
only some of its product rather than all of it. And this example has two other
noteworthy features. First, shirts require less labor to make than phones in each
of the countries. Comparative advantage does not depend on countries differing
on which product is easier to make than the other. Second, recall that a unit of
labor (that is, a person) in Atlantica is more productive than a person in Pacifica
in making both shirts and phones, perhaps because of the machines they work
with. Atlantica has an “absolute advantage” in both shirts and phones, because
both require less labor in Atlantica than in Pacifica. Yet comparative advantage
still allows trade to benefit both countries, despite Atlantica’s absolute advantage
in both industries. This is the key lesson of comparative advantage, even though
it is counterintuitive for many people.
As for the politics of trade, some groups will clearly benefit from trade while
others will suffer, at least in the short run. Critiques of economic globalization
often focus on those who are disadvantaged by trade and who may be politically
important actors. The economic gains from comparative advantage are in aggre
gate, and while they may appear good for consumers and some producers, the
benefits are not equal for all producers.
In the preceding example, opening up to trade might actually put workers out
of a job in the Atlantican shirt industry as Atlantica imports shirts from Pacifica,
and in the Pacifican phone industry as Pacifica imports phones from Atlantica.
W ith exposure to trade, economic actors representing the relatively efficient sec
tors will benefit, and economic actors representing less efficient sectors may lose
out. Free market economics may claim that these workers can simply move to the
new industry (e.g., Atlanticans would move from making shirts to assembling
phones), but this process is not simple: It can mean periods of unemployment and
require retraining, for example. This change of industry can create economic,
social, and political disruptions and uncertainty. Moreover, the more efficient
phone making gets, the more dependent upon technology (rather than human
labor) its production might become, and it may be that those former shirt makers
in Atlantica end up working in lower-level service jobs, such as warehouse pro
cessing or retail. Finally, we should note that the process of offshoring produc
tion, if not adequately regulated or monitored, can result in environmental
damage to the locations where production takes place. It can worsen environ
mental degradation around the world if production becomes “dirtier” overall by
moving to countries with lower environmental standards.
For example, say that building phones requires a lot of capital investment to
build high-tech factories, while the shirt industry mainly requires labor and lim
ited investment in some sewing machines. If Atlantica is relatively abundant in
capital investment in the phone industry, and Pacifica is relatively abundant in
labor for making shirts, then Atlantican capital owners will benefit from trade
and Pacifican laborers will benefit.4 Conversely, Atlantican laborers may not ben
efit as they find themselves competing with laborers in Pacifica, and Pacifican
capital owners may not benefit as they find themselves competing with Atlantican
capital owners. In an even simpler sense, ask yourself this: I f you were the leader
of Pacifica, would you want to have your economy based on producing shirts, or
would you prefer to have your country produce higher-value and higher-tech
380 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
protectionism In international
trade, the practice of a country
protecting or giving favor to its
own domestic producers.
multilateral In international
relations, the actions of three or
more countries working together.
intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) The set of
international organizations that
push for cooperation between
countries and work for the
prevention or mitigation of
international conflicts.
United Nations The most
comprehensive global institution,
which aims to prevent and manage
conflict and to establish multilateral
cooperation on matters of
international law, economics, and
human development and
well-being.
international financial
institutions (IFIs) Multilateral
institutions, particularly the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, that have
considerable leverage in
international economy.
integration In international
relations, a process by which
countries agree to collaborate
economically or politically, to make
some decisions collectively and to
shape common strategies.
goods like mobile phones? The answer to these economic questions often comes
in the form of protectionism, or efforts by governments to protect domestic in
dustries from foreign competition. The politics and demands of these different
groups will influence the decisions made by governments. International trade is
clearly an area where international politics affects the domestic and vice versa.
International Institutions and Integration
Since World War II, countries have increasingly collaborated on economic and
policy matters. This too links comparative politics to international relations be
cause individual nation-states have made conscious decisions about international
relations that are often based on domestic politics. Collaboration began between
the advanced, industrialized countries and accelerated after the end of the Cold
War. At the multilateral level between many countries (i.e., when three or more
countries participated), cooperation took the form of freer and more open trade
in goods, greater movement of capital and finance, and greater cooperation in
international law to bring some criminals to justice.
Several intergovernmental organizations push for cooperation between
countries and work toward conflict prevention. The United Nations is the most
comprehensive global institution. It was designed after World War II to provide
a global forum for diplomacy and conflict prevention, and it encompasses a
number of agencies with missions to enhance security and development; these
include the development organization UNICEF, the World Health Organization
(WHO), and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
Some multilateral institutions have had significant influence in the global
economy and have been the source of much debate. This is especially true of the
major international financial institutions, namely the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These two organizations have had leverage in
international politics, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. During that period,
these institutions pressured developing countries to follow a free market model
rather than a model that featured protectionism, investments by the government
in state-owned enterprises, and greater state intervention in the economy (as
noted in chapter 5). This came to be known as the “Washington Consensus,”
because it reflected the policy recommendations of the World Bank and IMF,
both of which are based in Washington, D.C., along with the views of the United
States government. The debate about the impacts of these reforms has raged,
with advocates saying that these institutions helped developing economies make
a needed shift to open up to market forces, while critics have argued that the
draconian reforms hurt people and economies in developing countries and pre
cipitated financial crises.5
Apart from these global, multilateral institutions are a range of regional orga
nizations. At this level, there is sometimes economic and political integration,
where countries agree to open up their economies to one another and shape
common strategies toward other countries outside the regional bloc. There are
many examples, including the North American Free Trade Association
(NAFTA) and associations for free trade in South America, Pacific Asia, and
regions of Africa, but the standout example is the EU, noted at the beginning of
the chapter.
Issues 381
How the EU has achieved greater economic and political integration in a
world of sovereign nation-states is one of the great questions of modern political
economy. Over the decades from the 1950s to the present, much of Europe has
transitioned from a region of long-standing suspicions and historical animosities
(such as between France and Germany) to a more closely integrated set of coun
tries. These share a supranational set of political institutions and interdependent
economies. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, European integration
began as little more than a trade zone involving six countries and a common
market in coal and steel. Yet this cooperation expanded over time to include
more members (see Map 16.1 at the beginning of the chapter), while also deep
ening its integration. The six original members formed the European Economic
Community that established a common customs union for trade with other
countries. Over time, the members reiterated a push for “ever closer union” be
tween member countries. Subsequent treaties established the European Union,
and its many member countries agreed to pool their sovereignty on some major
issues. Besides the establishment of the euro, a notable example was the creation
of the Schengen area, which eliminated internal border controls between the
countries of the zone. The area encompasses the various EU countries on the
continent (though not the United Kingdom or Ireland). The European Union
now makes many of its decisions based on qualified majorities, rather than on a
“one country, one vote” principle.
We return to the example of the EU in the “Thinking Comparatively” section
at the end of the chapter, but we note here that integration does not mean that
nation-states have ceased to be important. In fact, even in the EU, major deci
sions about issues such as foreign policy or taxation require unanimous consent
of the member governments, meaning that each nation-state effectively has a
veto. As one of the world’s most integrated supranational bodies, the EU shows
that most integration is still deeply dependent on the nation-state. At the same
time, globalization and integration have occurred alongside the emergence of many
identities below the level of nation-state, such as ethnic groups and regional
PAGE 567
The United States has been a leading nation in world affairs for
over a century. It has been called the “indispensable nation” due
to its dominant military, its economic significance, and its cultural
power. The United States has exerted its power in many ways,
including major and minor wars, but it has also at times been re
luctant to engage in foreign entanglements.
For more on U.S. relations with the world, see the case study
in Part VI, p. 567. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. When has the United States favored greater global inte
gration, and when has it not done so?
2. What might explain the historical tendency for isolation
ism to recur in the United States?
3. What challenges are likely to be the most significant for
the United States in the future?
The United States and the World: A Love-
Relationship?
Hate
382 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
immigration The movement of
people to foreign countries.
assimilation The practice of
being integrated into another
culture, especially with respect to
immigration.
groups, in countries from Russia to Ethiopia to Mexico. Thus, even as China has
integrated with the world economy, the Uighur ethnic group in the west of the
country has tried to secure greater autonomy, and even as Spain has integrated with
the EU, the Catalonian and Basque regions have sought guarantees of greater
autonomy from the Spanish central government. Sometimes the groups seeking
autonomy refer to themselves as nations. This combination of integration above
the nation-state level and pressures from ethnic or regional groups below has put
the nation-state under pressure, but it continues to be the central actor in inter
national relations and comparative politics.
Im m igration
Another key area where domestic and international politics intersect is
immigration, defined as the movement of people to foreign countries. Immigra
tion is clearly an issue of international relations because it involves a country from
which a person leaves (or emigrates) and a country to which the person migrates,
or immigrates. It is also a matter of comparative politics because it regularly be
comes a major domestic issue in the countries involved.
The details of immigration debates vary from one country to another, but im
migration patterns can be compared. In many prominent examples, the pattern is
for immigrants to move from lower-income countries with limited economic op
portunities to wealthier countries. Immigration often induces conflicts or ten
sions between citizens of the receiving country and the newcomers, whom citizens
often deride, claiming that foreigners harm the job prospects of “natives.” For
example, one of the leading political issues in the United States is the status of
large numbers of migrant workers from Mexico, along with other Latin American
countries to a lesser extent. Immigration is a major issue across Europe as well,
though patterns of immigrants’ countries of origin differ from one European
country to another. In France, many of the tensions are with respect to North
African immigrants and their descendants. In Germany and northern Europe,
there are larger numbers of immigrants from Turkey and the Middle East.
The issues surrounding immigration are numerous, contentious, and often
blurred. One major issue is assimilation (being culturally absorbed by or inte
grated into another culture). Some immigrant groups prefer to merge with the
“mainstream” of society, while others prefer to retain their cultural autonomy.6
Moreover, there are major debates about how nation-states should accommodate
immigrants. Advocates of assimilation often argue that immigrants must adapt
to the cultural practices and conceptions of liberal values in the countries where
they migrate. Immigrants, however, may wish to retain their own cultural tradi
tions. They may argue that respect for different traditions is a basic tenet of
modern liberal societies and that assimilation to a dominant culture is not re
quired. Further, some scholars have claimed that positions in favor of assimila
tion are often based on misconceptions and simplistic notions about people of
other backgrounds.7
Middle-ground views tend to favor multicultural notions of citizenship pro
tected by a liberal state. Debates over multiculturalism are common in advanced,
industrialized countries that have substantial numbers of migrants from the de
veloping countries, and immigration has become a major issue in domestic and
Issues 383
comparative politics. This is true across the European Union, as well as in the
United States. In fact, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a splash with a
famous statement in 2010 saying that multiculturalism has “utterly failed.”8
Sometimes immigrant communities are blamed for violent crimes committed
by a handful of their members— a position that most social scientists view as
unjustified. For example, the London bombings o f2005 were not reflective of the
actions or beliefs of the Muslim population in Britain, despite arguments to the
contrary. One controversial perspective holds that Britain is now home to “Lon-
donistan,” a foreign population from Pakistan and other Muslim countries that
is unassimilated to Western values such as tolerance and respect for individual
rights, and that this is a threat to Western democracies.9 An opposing perspec
tive defends multiculturalism and argues that different communities and belief
systems can and should be accommodated within tolerant and open societies.10
W hile defending multiculturalism and promoting tolerance, some social scien
tists are interested in exploring the relationship between the reception of immi
grant groups and the development of extremist attitudes. Do discrimination and
poor economic prospects fuel radicalism?
Distinctions between types of immigrants matter, such as between those who
are documented (have attained legal residence) and those who are undocumented
(and are thus often considered illegal). A related distinction is between immigra
tion patterns of different lengths of time. Some people leave their countries in
search of temporary work (such as for a single growing season in agriculture),
others seek permanent residence in a new country, and still others seek to become
naturalized citizens of a new country. There are also distinctions between gen
erations of immigrants: Some groups consider themselves or are ascribed the
status of immigrants even though they were born in the new country. All of these
distinctions are quite important, but these separate types of immigrants are often
considered part of the same debate.
Another issue is the tension between immigrants and descendants of immi
grants from previous waves of immigration. Many countries—especially, but not
^ i
I C A S E IN C O N T E X TL ____| Globalization and Culture in France PAGE 439
As we have noted in previous chapters, France gives us many ex
amples of how cultural and economic challenges interact when
questions of immigration arise. France experiences ongoing
debate about its future in light of integration with the EU and the
arrival of growing numbers of immigrants, especially from its
former colonies in North Africa. It also has notable variation in
how succeeding generations of immigrants are treated by and
respond to French society.
For more on these issues in France, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 439-440. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. In what ways has France been ambivalent about the
progress of globalization?
2. What might explain why France was once quite favorable
to globalization but has more recently become uncertain
about it?
3. In what ways has France tried to mitigate the perceived
downsides of globalization?
384 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
nativism A political attitude that
seeks to protect the interests of
established groups of residents in a
given country against the interests
of more recent immigrants.
brain drain The departure or
emigration of skilled and educated
members of a population,
especially with reference to
developing countries in the
international system.
remittances Cash or resources
sent to a home country, often to
family and friends, by emigrants.
sustainability The notion,
especially used with regard to
the environment, that a resource
is capable of being sustained
for use or enjoyment by future
generations.
exclusively, those with civic forms of nationalism, as outlined in chapter 13—
have welcomed immigrants over time but face new challenges with each genera
tion. Many Americans famously and proudly refer to the United States as a
“nation of immigrants,” while also calling for stricter limits on immigration and
efforts to stop the flow of immigrants and deport those present. Pride in a history
of immigration can thus coexist with nativism, which seeks to protect the inter
ests of established groups of residents against the interests of immigrants. This
position attempts to portray more recent immigrants as somehow different from
previous waves. Sometimes even scholars make such claims, singling out groups
like Hispanic or Islamic immigrants as being less open to assimilation, less dem
ocratic, or less capable of economic integration.11 Impartial reviews of the evi
dence, though, belie such claims.12
Immigration thus brings together issues in the social, economic, and political
domains. The social side involves cultural assimilation and competing concep
tions of what it means to be part of a nation. Some of the hottest debates on im
migration are as much about money as they are about identity. On the economic
side, immigration raises issues of competition with native-born workers for jobs
and for some public benefits. The political domain includes aspects of the social
and economic sides but focuses on immigration as a policy issue, which is com
plicated because immigration is both a transnational and a domestic issue.
We should also note that just as immigration poses challenges, emigration—
leaving a country to live in another—has some important economic implications
for the countries left behind. One issue is the brain drain, or the fact that many
times it is the most skilled and highly educated members of a population who
leave. In some of these circumstances, relatively poor countries have invested
heavily in preparing some of their top young people to build their country, only
to see them leave for better opportunities elsewhere. On the flip side, emigrants
are often huge contributors to their home countries through remittances of cash
or resources sent back home to families and friends. Further, some emigrants
who have left their home countries have gone into exile for political or economic
reasons, because they are fleeing repression or lack of opportunity. This situation
confronts the home country with the challenge of defining whether and how
such emigrants should be reintegrated into their home societies, if and when they
return. It can apply to short-term migrant workers who leave home temporarily
for work, as well as to exiles who flee their homes indefinitely, leaving their prop
erty behind.
Environm ent and Sustainability
Contemporary debates in comparative politics and international relations are
not just about maximizing economic growth but also about the consequences
of that growth around the world. A major worry is that the current consumption
of resources and rates of environmental pollution are not sustainable, or capa
ble of being sustained for future generations. At the local level, this has become
a major issue in rapidly industrializing countries such as China, where environ
mental degradation has worsened dramatically through the pollution of air,
water, and land. The result has been contamination and disease affecting many
millions of people.
Issues 385
Environmental degradation accompanies rapid growth in China.
Environmental consequences from industrialization are horrific in many loca
tions, yet the leading issue with respect to the environment at the global level is
climate change. This is sometimes referred to in terms of global warming,
though models of climate change predict a range of effects on the climate. Most
climatologists and natural scientists agree that climate change is attributable in
part to man-made causes, and continue to collect more data that supports this
hypothesis.13 The extent of humanity’s impact on the climate is debated, but the
prevailing current theory holds that mankind’s effect on the climate has come
mainly through greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Pollutants such as carbon
dioxide and methane are emitted into the atmosphere and trap solar energy,
warming the planet below, as in a greenhouse. Many of these pollutants come
from fossil fuels used to produce energy, such as petroleum, coal, and natural gas.
This theory is the origin of the call for alternative energy sources, such as solar
or wind power.
Climate change estimates predict that global temperature averages will peak
at two or more degrees Celsius above historic averages. This change is predicted
to bring about other consequences, including melting of glaciers and ice sheets,
rises in sea levels, flooding of coastal lowlands, increased numbers and severity of
climate change A set of changes
to the earth’s climate.
greenhouse gases (GHG)
Emissions of gases such as carbon
dioxide and methane from
industrial activity and consumption
of fossil fuels that contributes to
climate change.
alternative energy Energy
sources, such as solar or wind
power, that are not derived from
fossil fuels.
386 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
externality An economic
phenomenon in which the gains
and costs from a given activity do
not accrue to the same actor.
extreme weather events such as hurricanes and avalanches, desertification of
marginal agricultural lands, and extinction of large numbers of animal and plant
species. To the extent these events materialize, they will signify major, costly
disruptions to peoples and societies across the planet. Droughts may lead to
major conflict over food and water. Flooding may actually erase some cities.
Climate change and environmental sustainability present some of the most
fundamental dilemmas in politics. One basic feature of pollution is that it is an
externality from economic activity, meaning that the gains and costs from an
activity do not accrue to the same actor. In the case of polluting, individual com
panies may gain profits from their production (or countries may grow economi
cally from it), with the act of polluting as a by-product, but the costs of that
pollution are passed on to others. Because polluters do not pay the costs to society
associated with pollution, they do not have as much of an incentive to stop it.
This condition represents the collective action problem and the “free rider” prob
lem outlined in previous chapters. One of the leading discussions about pollution
is on the difficulties of managing resources that are shared among many people
(or countries), when all actors have an incentive to free ride—to maximize their
own benefit while passing the costs of their action onto others.
Climate change is thus more than a scientific challenge: It is also a political
challenge both within and across national borders. Most efforts to halt climate
change involve securing commitments by sovereign nations to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions over time. These agreements are not easily secured, as
they require cooperation and agreement among large numbers of actors, and be
cause there is little agreement on which countries should pay the costs of halting
greenhouse gas emissions. In general, large developing countries such as China
and India hold that the developed countries are responsible for most of the emis
sions to date, and are thus primarily responsible for stopping climate change
while lower-income countries catch up in development. Developed countries
generally respond that climate change was unknown when many of the rich
world’s emissions occurred, and that much of the future damage will come from
IN SIG H TS The Tragedy of the Commons
by Garrett Hardin &
Garrett Hardin’s article is foundational in the study of common resources, and it has implications for many envi
ronmental challenges in the world today. The article focuses on
the challenges of overexploitation of common resources by
large and growing populations. Hardin’s illustrative example of
the tragedy is a pasture open to all herdsmen and their herds of
animals. As each herdsman allows his herds to graze, the pas
ture is degraded a bit and its resources (grass) are used up, yet
each herdsman has an individual incentive to encourage his
livestock to continue grazing. This situation ultimately leads to a
depleted common resource because benefits from using the
commons are individual, but costs are shared by all. Hardin
notes that this principle also operates with pollution in the at
mosphere, except that users are not “taking out” natural re
sources, but rather “putting in” contaminants and thus “using
up” a resource shared by all. Possible ways to address the trag
edy of the commons include assigning private property rights
and requiring those who exploit natural resources to pay the
costs associated with their use, or through cooperative institu
tions and practices.14
Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162, No. 3859 (1997):
1243-1248.
Issues 387
the developing countries.15 Addressing climate change thus raises many of the
central dilemmas in international politics. There have been successes in commu
nities around the world in managing common resources, but scaling these efforts
up to international levels through cooperation among nation-states is difficult.16
Transnational Netw orks
Many of the challenges facing nation-states in contemporary politics come
from nonstate actors, and especially from transnational networks of different
actors working across borders. Some transnational networks are particularly
worrying because they are criminal or violent, and comparative politics matters
here in part because these networks thrive where states are weak, failed, or col
lapsed. Since September 11, 2001, the most notorious of these has been al
Qaeda, the Islamic fundamentalist terror group. One of the distinguishing
characteristics of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups like it, as discussed in
chapter 12, is its decentralized structure, and the fact that its ideology spreads
to other like-minded organizations.17 Stopping or defeating the al Qaeda net
work is thus not as clear-cut as defeating a nation-state in a traditional war.
Similarly, although smuggling and trafficking rings may have hierarchical or
ganizations, they may be more like networks than like nation-states. The “war
on drugs” and the “war on terrorism” have pitted nation-states against much
more amorphous and flexible enemies that do not have a capital city or even a
fixed base of operations.18
O f course, not all transnational networks are criminal or violent; rather,
globalization has generated a large number of transnational networks designed
to leverage citizens’ political voice. The emergence of transnational advocacy
networks may be a key to facilitating greater governmental response to issues
such as environmental protection and preventing violence against women.19 In
some circumstances, governments may not make needed changes unless pres
sured to do so by networks of advocates and activists that cross borders. The
success of these networks may be due in part to their flexibility, which allows
them to use strategies that are not available to governments.20 Taking both
terror groups and advocacy networks into account, it is both for better and for
transnational network
A network of nonstate actors
working across state borders.
CASE IN CONTEXT
Resource Management in Japan PAGE 494
To illustrate the challenge of managing common resources, we
can look at the question of overfishing in Japan. This particular
issue shows the difficulty of coordination in situations where
each actor would like to maximize its individual benefit, yet ail
actors doing so would result in an unfavorable outcome for all.
For more on environmentalism in Japan, see the case study
in Part VI, pp. 494-495. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. In what way does Japan contribute to the overfishing
problem, and why does it not take action to stop it?
2. To what extent is it “rational” for any one country to limit
its own role in depleting common resources?
3. What are some other examples of common resources
that are difficult to manage politically?
388 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
worse that transnational networks affect the politics and societies of countries
around the world.
nuclear proliferation The
expansion of the number of
countries and other actors
possessing nuclear technology.
Nuclear Threats and Terrorism
The classic issues of international relations are those of war, peace, and conflict
among nations. This may seem to be exclusively the domain of international rela
tions and thus unrelated to comparative politics, but, as we will see in the section
on “Causes and Effects,” there is major debate about the role of domestic politics
and domestic institutions in shaping international relations.
During the Cold War, the central issue in international relations was the war
(or lack thereof) between the major powers: the United States and the Soviet
Union. Weapons that created the possibility for mass casualties in civilian popu
lations heightened the sense of urgency over war and peace. Some of these weap
ons are chemical, such as deadly gases and biological weapons that can spread
infectious bacteria, viruses, and other deadly agents through a population. But
the class of weapons that received and continues to receive the most attention is
nuclear weapons, which can create massively destructive explosions capable of
killing millions of people. The only use of nuclear weapons (then called atomic
weapons) has been by the United States in the 1945 bombing of Japan at the end
of World War II.
Nuclear weapons are currently known to be possessed by only a small number
of countries: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China,
India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel is widely assumed to have nuclear weap
ons but has not declared its nuclear status, and Iran is widely presumed to be
working toward nuclear status. In many cases, countries have argued that devel
oping nuclear weapons is a deterrent against attacks by other countries; this
probably applies in many cases, such as the U.S.S.R. seeking a deterrent to the
United States, or India seeking a deterrent to China, and Pakistan in turn seek
ing a deterrent to India (see the “Case in Context” box, “India in the Twenty-
First Century”). Many current nuclear powers are hoping to prevent further
nuclear proliferation—the spread of nuclear technology—to other states.
IN SIG H T S
The Five Wars of Globalization
by Mokes Naim
Naim notes five major “wars” of globalization that pit nationstates against flexible, decentralized criminal networks. Gov
ernments are waging wars against criminal activities in the areas of
drug trafficking, arms trafficking, intellectual property theft (or
piracy), human trafficking (alien smuggling), and money launder
ing. The criminal networks that mastermind these forms of traffick
ing and theft may be involved in more than one such area, and
trends in these areas of criminality reinforce one another. Nairn
notes that nation-states will face considerable difficulty in defeating
these networks, for several reasons: These networks are not bound
to certain geographic locations, are quite nimble compared with
government bureaucracies, and are responding to strong incen
tives supplied by the market. Accordingly, Naim recommends that
governments must adapt newer, more flexible international institu
tions to battle these networks, while also preferring regulation of
these ills over outright prohibition and criminalization.
Moists Naim, Th e Five Wars of Globalization.” Foreign Policy 134, No. 1 (2003),
28-37.
Issues 389
K U i i
Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation PAGE 480
Iran is developing the capacity to enrich and refine nuclear mate
rials. The country is also an enemy of American ally Israel, and its
regime is adversarial to the United States. The American govern
ment seeks to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon,
though Iran says its nuclear activity is for peaceful purposes.
For more on nuclear power in Iran, see the case study in
Part VI, pp. 480-481. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. What might be the American and Iranian arguments
against and for Iran’s developing nuclear processing
technology?
2. If we assume Iran will not stage a direct nuclear attack on
the United States or Israel, in what ways does Iran illus
trate the risks of proliferation?
3. How is nuclear proliferation linked to the prospects for
terrorism?
Terrorism is the other major concern in international security today. The defi
nition of terrorism is greatly contested, as discussed in chapter 12, but in the
context of international relations for this chapter we may define it roughly as the
use of violence to achieve political ends through psychological impacts on a civil
ian population. It is usually distinguished from acts of war in which militaries
attack one another, but terrorism by this definition could occur during war when
militaries target civilians. Often, terrorism is associated with nonstate actors,
but countries such as the United States also declare other countries to be “state
sponsors of terrorism.”21
It has often been said that the world changed on September 11, 2001, when the
Islamic fundamentalist group al Qaeda launched a terrorist attack on the United
States. The attack killed nearly three thousand Americans in New York’s World
Trade Center, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and on an airliner in Pennsylva
nia. This led to a United States response that began to shape the foreign affairs of
the post-9/11 period. Yet terrorism began long before 2001, and movements around
the world have been classified as terrorist organizations. Examples include the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom and Ireland, whose stated aim
terrorism The use of violence to
achieve political ends through
psychological impacts on a civilian
population.
nonstate actors In international
relations, actors in international
politics that are not nation-states;
includes multinational corpora
tions, transnational advocacy
groups, and international criminal
networks.
India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics,
J Identity, and Security page466
It is commonly said that India and Pakistan have the world’s “most
dangerous border.” The reasons for this assertion straddle the
boundaries of comparative politics and international relations.
Both countries are nuclear powers, and a range of domestic dif
ferences have resulted in long-standing tensions and conflict.
For more on these issues, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 466-467. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How do domestic politics and international security inter
act in India and Pakistan?
2. How do national and religious identity and political insti
tutions affect relations between the countries?
3. Are the issues raised here best seen as issues of interna
tional relations, comparative politics, or both? Why?
390 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
realism In international relations, a
theory that treats states in the
international system largely as
acting on the basis of national
self-interest, defined often in terms
of power, survival, and security.
was the end of British presence in Ireland, and separatist groups such as the Basque
group ETA in Spain and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. States often define terror
ist groups as those seeking to overthrow or replace an existing state structure.
Showing the ambiguities of such definitions, the white apartheid regime in South
Africa deemed the African National Congress a terrorist organization, but it was
seen as a freedom movement by the majority of South Africans and ultimately by
international public opinion. There have also been terror attacks committed in the
United States by American citizens, such as the bombing of the Oklahoma City
federal building in 1995 by Timothy McVeigh, which killed 168 people.
Terrorism is an international issue with significant domestic impacts, and a
domestic issue with significant international impacts. To take one major exam
ple, the Palestinian group Hamas is deemed a terrorist organization by Israel, the
United States, and the European Union. Yet many Palestinians see it as a move
ment of freedom fighters seeking to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation.
Internationally, Hamas is also widely assumed to be supported by Iran and prob
ably Syria. The actions of Hamas, which include rocket and mortar attacks into
Israel, are central to Israeli domestic politics and to the foreign affairs of the
United States in the Middle East. In turn, the decisions the Israeli government
makes shape the international context of the region.
The issue of terrorism is of particular concern when it overlaps with the capac
ity for mass destruction, as highlighted by the cases of Iran, India, and Pakistan.
For Iran, a concern is that it may distribute nuclear weapons to surrogate terror
groups for an attack on its enemies, rather than deploy them itself. For India and
Pakistan, a major issue was the black market network led by Pakistani nuclear
head A. CX Khan, which resulted in nuclear technology making its way into the
hands of numerous regimes and organizations. The prospects that a terror group
may get its hands on nuclear devices, whether through state sponsorship or a black
market, is one of the leading concerns in contemporary international relations.
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main
Causes in International Relations?
Several major theories of international security offer different explanations for
conflict and cooperation between states. To illustrate these, we will focus mainly
how these theories work in the area of security, conflict, and peace, rather than
international political economy. We have addressed political economy in several
other chapters (especially 4 and 5) and will return to it in the “Thinking Com
paratively” section later in the chapter. The major theories we examine in this
section are realism, liberalism, constructivism (which is generally seen as an ap
proach rather than a theory), and, to a lesser extent, Marxism. We note how
comparative politics fits into (or does not fit into) each of these theories. In each
case, we look at the theory and how it explains in general the prevalence of con
flict or peace in international relations.
Realism
Realism is probably the leading theoretical approach to international relations
today, and the other major theories have emerged more recently as responses or
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes in international Relations? 391
correctives to realism. From the perspective of comparative politics, realism is
noteworthy for the ways it does not examine the internal politics of nation-states
and finds relatively little room for domestic and comparative politics in interna
tional relations. The realist literature treats states in the international system
largely as unitary rational actors—those capable of making reasoned decisions
on the basis of national self-interest. This model holds that the main determinant
of international action is self-interest, defined often in terms of survival and
security.
This line of argument dates back to classical realists, most notably Thucydides
in ancient Greece, Machiavelli in Renaissance Italy, and Thomas Hobbes, author
of Leviathan, in seventeenth-century England.22 These philosophers emphasized
how human nature gave rise to conflict and necessitated seeking power in order
to achieve security. The leading modern example of realist thinking in inter
national relations can be found in the work of Kenneth W altz.23 W altz’s work
is the foundation for much of contemporary realism and is known as “neorealism”
to distinguish it from the classical realism of political philosophers of earlier
centuries.
The conditions of anarchy and the balance of power are central to realism, but
realism is a theory that contains many different perspectives. For example,
defensive realism holds that a lack of conflict and even cooperation can emerge
under specific circumstances, namely when it is easier to defend than to attack
and when states can see clearly what other states’ intentions are.24 On the other
hand, offensive realism holds that states are never satisfied with the status quo
(the way things are) and will seek to maximize their power whenever they can,
striving toward the hegemonic position where possible.25
Some of the work in realism features rational choice theory, discussed in pre
vious chapters (such as the work of Timur Kuran in chapter 12 and David Laitin
in chapter 13). Rational choice typically involves a formal model of strategic in
teractions between actors, often by conceiving of these interactions as “games” in
which the “players” respond rationally to incentives and to the expected actions
of other players, given their incentives. These games give rise to the name game
theory; they are designed to simplify the problem to its essence in order to ana
lyze the actions of the players.
The most famous illustration is the prisoner’s dilemma. In this game, one
imagines two prisoners being interrogated separately by a jailer. Each prisoner
can choose whether to rat out his fellow prisoner or not, and what each says af
fects the sentence of both prisoners (see Table 16.2). Each prisoner’s cell in the
table has two possibilities—to not tell or to rat out the other prisoner—giving
four possible outcomes in the table. These outcomes are known as the
payoff matrix, because they reflect the payoffs the players get depending on their
choices. The prisoners would be better off if both refused than if both were to rat
out the other, so we might expect them to cooperate and not tell. Yet the result
will be that both defect and rat each other out. Why?
Consider the situation from the perspective of prisoner 1 (called PI) by look
ing only at P i ’s payoffs. If P2 cooperates, P I is better off defecting, because he
will go free. If P2 defects, P I is still better off defecting as well, because he gets
five years instead of ten. No matter which strategy P2 chooses, P I is better off
unitary rational actor In
international relations theory and
especially realism, the idea that
states act as if they were single
individuals capable of making
decisions on the basis of rational
calculations about the costs and
benefits of different actions.
defensive realism A realist theory
that holds that peace or
cooperation can emerge under
specific circumstances, namely
when it is easier to defend than to
attack and when states can see
clearly what other states’
intentions are.
offensive realism A realist theory
that holds that states will seek to
maximize their power whenever
they can.
game theory A set of approaches
to the study of strategic interaction
between actors, often relying on
mathematical modeling and
assumptions of the rationality of
different actors.
prisoner’s dilemma (game)
A model of a game in which two
actors would benefit from
cooperation, but each has
individual incentives to defect from
cooperation.
payoff matrix In game-theoretic
models, the distribution of payoffs
to players depending on the
choices made.
392 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
Theory of International Politics
by Kenneth Waltz *
Waltz’s theory of realism holds that the actions of states can be explained by the structure of the international
system and the distribution of power within it. The central fact
that shapes the behavior of states is the anarchy of the interna
tional system, in which there is no sovereign power. Given the
anarchic system, the distribution of power within that system
shapes how states act. States behave differently depending on
whether the system has a single great power, two great powers,
or multiple great powers. A bipolar world is one with two great
powers, such as in the Cold War between the United States and
the U.S.S.R. Waltz argued that this was the most stable arrange
ment. A multipolar system has many powers, such as in Europe
in the nineteenth century and up to World War I. In a unipolar
system, there is a single power, known as a hegemon. Waltz
argued that the bipolar system would be especially stable be
cause it enables countries to join with one power or the other
to balance the efforts of the other to reach hegemony. This idea
of the balance of power came to be one of the leading premises
of realism.
Kenneth Waltz, theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
security dilemma Dilemma in
which each actor in the interna
tional system expects others to
maximize their own security advan
tage, and thus builds up power
itself, leading to an arms race.
defecting; put another way, no matter which row of the payoff matrix P I finds
himself in, he is better off in the “Defect” column. In the terms of game theory,
PI has a dominant strategy to rat out P2. By the same token, no matter what PI
decides, P2 is better off defecting and ratting out P I. So they both go to jail for
5 years, even though they both would have been better off had they cooperated.
In international relations, this logic can be used to model many kinds of
behavior when one state does not know what another is doing. One major illus
tration is the idea of an arms race, and the phenomenon called the security
dilemma.26 The security dilemma arises in situations where each actor thinks
that the other actor will be trying to maximize its advantage. Whatever the other
actor does, a country is better off building up its own arms. So both defect from
cooperation and produce more arms to protect themselves. Cooperation might
be a much better outcome overall than an arms race, but each individual country’s
incentive is to defect from an agreement. Seen from a rationalist perspective, this
is a version of the prisoner’s dilemma.
In rational choice, cooperation between actors is possible under certain circum
stances, if the payoffs to each actor are best for them individually. This can often
occur through repeated interactions.27 For example, if the prisoner’s dilemma hap
pens with repeated interactions between the “players,” then many more dynamic
possibilities are opened up as players are able to signal their intentions to one
t a b l e 1 6 . 2 The Prisoner’s Dilem m a
Prisoner 1
Cooperate (“Don’t Tell”) Defect (“Rat Out”)
Cooperate (“Don’t Tell”) PI gets 1 year,
P2 gets 1 year
PI goes free,
P2 gets 10 years
Defect (“Rat Out”) PI gets 10 years,
P2 goes free
PI gets 5 years,
P2 gets 5 years
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes in International Relations? 393
another and to reward or punish one another over time. In addition, some scholars
note that international institutions can be used to create circumstances for coopera
tion, as we discuss next, under “Liberalism.” Realism is the predominant approach,
or paradigm, in international relations, but liberalism places greater emphasis on
how domestic institutions and politics shape the behavior of states.
Liberalism
The most prominent school of thought to challenge realism in international rela
tions has been liberalism, which holds that states can have different preferences
and internal structures that lead them to behave in different ways. Liberalism
pays greater attention to the role of domestic institutions in international rela
tions, and it makes efforts to explain cooperation and peace between some states
while also accounting for conflict in other circumstances. The liberal critique of
realism holds that realism is best suited to explaining conflict and a lack of coop
eration, but that it fails to account for more optimistic outcomes. As a leading
scholar of liberalism puts it, “[t]he Realist model of international relations, which
provides a plausible explanation of the general insecurity of states, offers little
guidance in explaining the pacification of the liberal world.”28 Liberal scholars
argue that domestic institutions and comparative politics matter more. For ex
ample, free-market democracies that value individual liberties highly may be ex
pected to act differently from totalitarian dictatorships. Cooperation and lack of
conflict can emerge when like-minded states interact, when states have incen
tives to trade and exchange with one another, or when states comply with differ
ent institutional norms.
There are several strains of liberal thought.29 One, known as “commercial lib
eralism,” is based on the idea that countries engaged in economic interactions with
one another have more incentive to be peaceful.30 This line of logic dates back to
the eighteenth-century economist Adam Smith. Another strain of liberalism is
“liberal institutionalism,” which argues that international institutions—such as
liberalism In international
relations, a theory that holds states
can have different preferences and
Internal structures that lead them
to behave in different ways,
especially with regard to the
conduct of states that hold liberal
values of democracy and free
market commerce.
IN S IG H T S
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs
by Michael Doyle
Doyle is a leading contemporary proponent of democratic peace theory, and this book offers his synthesis of liberal
theory along with treatments of other theoretical approaches.
The treatment of liberalism traces the democratic peace to the
philosopher Immanuel Kant, who argued a “perpetual peace”
would emerge between liberal republics. Doyle notes that de
mocracies regularly go to war, but almost never against other
democracies. Thus, democratic peace holds between democra
cies but not between a democracy and an authoritarian
regime. The reasons for this are numerous. First and foremost,
in liberal regimes, the voting public must consent to the costs
of war, and decisions to go to war will not be undertaken lightly.
Not being led simply by dictatorial rulers, liberal regimes delib
erate carefully about war and do not enter it rashly. Second,
democracies have an ability to observe one another’s political
processes and intentions rather transparently, and extend to
one another respect and a presumption of accommodation.
And third, the logic of liberal regimes typically extends over
into commercial or economic interests, which adds material
reasons to the moral commitments that prevent conflict be
tween liberal states.
Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.’ Philosophy and Public
Affairs 12, No. 3 (1983): 205-235; and ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,
Part2.’Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, No. 4 (1983):323-353.
394 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
democratic peace A phenomenon
associated with liberalism that holds
that democratic countries will rarely
if ever go to war with one another.
constructivism In international
relations, a theory that holds that
decisions made by states need to
be understood in the context of
social and political interactions,
and that behavior is shaped by
norms and values as well as
narrowly defined interests.
free trade blocs, international forums, and international financial institutions—
can mitigate the effects of anarchy and make more cooperation possible than real
ists expect.31 One of liberalism’s strongest claims is the existence of a democratic
peace. This theory seeks to explain why democracies (almost) never go to war with
one another and have not done so since the first democracies emerged in the
1700s.32 The reasons for the democratic peace may be numerous (see the “Insights”
box on “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”), including common values
and the ability of democratic regimes to observe the domestic debates going on
inside other democratic regimes.
Several arguments in international relations focus on the importance of do
mestic politics. Some of these show how foreign policy decision making does not
come only from a calculation of a state’s interest but also depends on the actors
and interests involved in making the decision. W hen one looks inside the gov
ernment to see how a decision is actually being made, the “unitary rational actor”
looks less clear. In addition to the presence of liberal institutions, the organiza
tional processes for making decisions and the interactions between decision
makers and their advisers may be especially important in the final decisions made
by governments.33
Constructivism
The third leading school of thought in international relations today is
constructivism. Constructivism is an approach arguing that decisions made by
states need to be understood in their broader, constructed context of social and
political interactions. In particular, states will not simply view one another as
having purely aggressive intentions, even in a state of anarchy. The contexts in
which states interact may range from competitive to cooperative, and states may
respond in many different ways.34 One might not necessarily interpret all mili
tary exercises by other countries as overtly hostile, for instance, even if they do
heighten the sense of alert. Here, too, comparative politics has some role in shap
ing international relations: Countries that have reason to trust one another may
IN S IG H T S Social Theory of International Politics
by Ale< under Wendt &
For Wendt, the anarchy of the international system does not necessarily give rise to states conflicting with one another.
At the most fundamental level, states may view other states as
enemies, as rivals, or as friends. Where states expect one an
other to behave as enemies, war and conflict will be common
place. Yet Wendt notes that recent centuries have often seen
states treat one another as rivals rather than enemies. In these
circumstances, states may compete and will not be at perma
nent war; they may develop a culture in which they often
respect one another's sovereignty and do not represent exis
tential threats to one another, though reversions to war are
possible. Beyond this, states sometimes treat one another as
"friends," and see themselves on the same team. Conflict is
highly unlikely in these circumstances. Examples may be the
United Kingdom and United States, or even contemporary
France and Germany, which clearly view one another as part
ners today despite the horrific wars in their pasts. Wendt argues
that states can internalize to different degrees these world
views, and that these will give rise to different types of politics
between them.
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
The EU and Levels of Analysis 395
do so on the basis of histories or cultures that are partly shaped by domestic poli
tics. One prominent formulation from constructivism holds that anarchy does
not simply lead to conflict, but rather depends on “what states make of it”35 (see
the “Insights” box on Social Theory o f International Politics).
Marxism
Prior to the emergence of constructivism, the other alternative explanation to re
alism and liberalism was Marxism. Marxism wielded considerable influence for
many decades as an explanation for the behavior of actors in the international
system. The peak of its appeal came during the Cold War, though new variations
on Marxist theory have been proposed since. While the end of the Cold War
largely removed the prospect of communism as a viable way to address imperialism
worldwide, Marxist theory persists in diagnosing how the global political economy
functions, and especially who gains and who loses in this system. In general, Marx
ist theory emphasizes the role of social classes in shaping politics and highlights the
role of capitalist accumulation as a prime driver in international affairs. Many of
the manifestations of Marxism as it relates to international relations theory are in
the area of international political economy, and we treated some of these—such as
dependency and world-systems theory—in chapter 5 on development. Nonethe
less, there are ways that Marxist analysis relates to questions of violence and con
flict. Most notably, Vladimir Lenin, the founding leader of the Soviet Union,
theorized that brutal imperialism and domination and exploitation of poor coun
tries was the logical consequence of capitalism’s international efforts at accumu
lation.36 This formulation thus took a theory of society, economy, and comparative
politics and scaled it up to the level of international relations.
Marxism In international relations,
a theory that emphasizes the role
of social classes in shaping politics
and highlights the role of capitalist
accumulation as a prime driver in
international affairs.
The EU and Levels of Analysis
This chapter has touched on some of the leading issues in international relations that relate to comparative politics. The discussion of “Causes and
Effects” highlights how different explanatory models in international relations
reflect different perspectives on the importance of domestic politics and institu
tions on international relations. The range of topics in international relations is
so vast that it is its own field, and this discussion in a text on comparative politics
can only briefly mention a subset of the relevant issues.
Yet examining certain topics will reveal many of the key themes that link
comparative and international politics. The EU is the world’s quintessential ex
ample of efforts at supranational governance in which countries have given away
a degree of real sovereignty. As such, it poses many of the central analytical ques
tions addressed herein. For example, the crisis over the euro that started around
2009 and continues up to 2015, brings up a host of dilemmas in international
cooperation. How can countries ensure that others do not free ride? Can states trust
one another to cooperate, or will each behave in its own self-interest? At the
same time, there are even more fundamental questions, such as “W hat is Europe?”
T H IN K IN G
C O M P A R A TIV ELY
K E Y M E TH O D O LO G IC A L TO O L
Levels of Analysis
In our discussion linking comparative
politics and international relations, we
are considering different levels of
analysis. In one prominent formula
tion, international politics can be seen
through the lens of three different
levels: individual actors, domestic
political institutions and groups
within a country, and the interna
tional system.37 Through much of the
book, we have discussed the first two
of these levels of analysis: how indi
viduals and domestic political institu
tions (including groups and cultural
396 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
T H IN K IN G
CO M P A R A TIV ELY j
►
K E Y M E TH O D O LO G ICA L TO O L
(continued)
norms) affect each other. We have
looked comparatively to develop
causal arguments about a range of
topics: how domestic political groups
shape democratic institutions, how
and why individual people organize
into groups, or how institutions give
individuals incentives to behave in
certain ways. International relations
adds the international system as a
third level of analysis. This level of
analysis again affects the others, and
vice versa. One of the premises of this
discussion is that domestic politics
can affect international relations, and
it has been shown that diplomacy
and foreign policy are indeed condi
tioned on domestic politics.38 Con
versely, the international system will
affect domestic politics as well.39 It is
important to remain aware of the
level of analysis at which your argu
ment is operating, though there are
often good reasons to consider mul
tiple levels of analysis as part of your
investigation.
State employees protest against fiscal cutbacks at the Acropolis in Athens, Greece, in 2010.
Given current economic and political difficulties, many wonder what will become of the
eurozone in the coming years.
Is it a political unit that has overcome the challenge of anarchy by creating insti
tutions? Is it a certain set of peoples, or is it changing definitively due to immi
gration, transnational movement of ideas, and the spread of globalization? There
are more questions than answers when it comes to complex issues in international
relations, as Europe illustrates. As we note in concluding, this uncertainty is
important from the perspective of research in comparative politics: It means that
the central questions are not resolved, and that research areas and agendas remain
open to the curious and motivated analyst.
The EU also shows that the debates between theoretical perspectives are un
resolved, as has been the case in our other chapters. The fact of European coop
eration over sixty years may support the ideas of liberalism and constructivism:
Shared values, norms, and a common political adherence to democratic institu
tions may have facilitated peace and cooperation. On the other hand, each of the
countries in the EU has valued its own self-interest over integration on many
occasions. This observation might seem to support realist theory, though a vari
ety of interpretations is possible. W hile cooperation may support one or more of
these theoretical perspectives, so too can the seeming breakdowns in cooperation
give ammunition to realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, or other theo
retical frameworks. Here, too, the example of the EU generates major debates
that are not easily resolved except through further contestation of ideas.
The fundamental difference between comparative politics and international
relations is that the former looks primarily at politics within countries while the
latter looks primarily at politics between countries. We have noted in this chapter
Chapter Review 397
(and in previous chapters) that politics within countries affects politics between
countries, and vice versa: International forces sometimes shape phenomena such
as democratization, development, nationalism, and revolutions. The EU shows
how these levels o f analysis interact (see the “Key Methodological Tool” discus
sion in the margin). In the EU, decisions made by the European Central Bank
regarding the fate of the euro will have significant effects on politics in Germany
and Greece, at the same time that politics in Germany and Greece have major
effects on the euro and on the decisions of the European Central Bank. Paying
attention to the different levels of analysis in such situations is useful for develop
ing a clear sense of how comparative politics and international relations each
contribute to the study of politics globally.
We cannot resolve the fundamental issues of comparative politics and interna
tional relations here, of course. Even a start at doing so requires the combined
efforts of thousands of social scientists and academics, diplomats and statesper-
sons, members of advocacy and activist groups, not to mention millions (or even
billions) of citizens. It requires a collective enterprise in seeking knowledge that is
based both on collaboration and on disagreement and debate. We reiterate that the
domestic politics of countries affects international politics, and that international
politics affects domestic politics as well, and we encourage you to further explore
the major themes of these fields. We hope you will use the tools from this chapter
and the text as a whole to participate in this exploration, making your own contri
butions to the knowledge that scholars of comparative politics continue to seek.
T H IN K IN G
C O M P A R A TIV ELY
levels of analysis In international
relations, the different levels that
can be the context of a study,
including the individual level, the
nation-state level, and the level of
the international system.
C h a p te r S u m m a r y
Concepts
• Comparative politics focuses largely on politics within
individual countries, while international relations focuses
on relations between countries.
Issues
• There are a large number of issues that link comparative
politics and international relations, including globalization
and trade, international integration immigration, transna
tional networks, nuclear and terrorist threats, and the
question of environmental sustainability.
Causes and Effects
• There are several main schools of thought in international
relations, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism,
while Marxism once featured prominently as well.
Contemporary realism emphasizes the anarchy of the
international system and the efforts of each nation-state to
make itself secure in this system, which leads to frequent
conflict.
• Liberalism emphasizes the effects of political institutions
and domestic politics more than realism, and finds more
factors that mitigate the likelihood of conflict.
Constructivism emphasizes the social context in which
international interactions happen, and argues that anarchy
does not necessarily lead to conflict.
Th inking Com paratively
• International relations often operates at a different level
of analysis from comparative politics by looking at the
international system, but the levels of analysis can
interact.
398 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations
T h in k in g It T h r o u g h
1. We discussed the problem of global climate change in this
chapter as a major issue facing the international community. Im
agine that you are the head of an international commission
charged with coming up with a plan to address the problem.
You have been told to prepare three proposals, one based on
realist assumptions about international relations, one based on
liberal assumptions, and one based on constructivist assump
tions. How would your three proposals differ?
2. Substitute the problem of nuclear proliferation for climate
change in the previous question. How would your three pro
posals differ? Now compare your answers to these questions.
Does theoretical perspective impact these problems of inter
national politics in the same way across different issues or in
different ways?
3. Take a main phenomenon discussed in any of the institutional
chapters in this book (chapters 8-11), such as presidentialism vs.
parliamentarism, proportional representation vs. district sys
tems, federalism vs. unitarism, or multiparty systems vs. two-
party systems. How might these variations in institutional
design impact the likely behavior of different states in the
international system?
4. The foreign policy doctrine of U.S. President George W. Bush
from 2001 to 2009 was based on the ideas that the United States
was an indispensable leader as the world's hegemon, and that it
should act unilaterally and preemptively as necessary to prevent
threats from arising. It also held that U.S. action should promote
regime change in favor of democracy in order to enhance
American security. Does this sound like a realist doctrine, a liberal
doctrine, or a constructivist doctrine? Why?
5. The European Union has achieved significant economic inte
gration in recent decades, but it still makes many of its major
decisions by unanimous consent. One of the dilemmas of the
EU has been the trade-off between "broadening" the Union to
more members and "deepening” the integration among exist
ing members. Why might these two goals be seen as potentially
contradictory? If you were a government leader in France or
Germany, which of these two directions would you want to
see the EU favor, and why?
399
Brazil
►
Key Features o f C o n te m p o r a r y Brazil
Population: 202,656,788 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 8,514,877 square kilometers
Head of State: Dilma Rousseff (president, 2011-present)
Head of Government: Dilma Rousseff (president, 2011-present)
Capital: Brasilia
Year of Independence: 1822
Year of Current
Constitution:
1988
Languages: Portuguese (official), many indigenous
languages
GDP per Capita: $11,208 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
Human Development
Index Ranking (2014):
79th (high human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Development Report 2014.
PROFILE A
O
Introduction
B ra z il h a s alw ay s b e e n o f in te r e s t to c o m
p a ra tiv e p o litic a l a n a ly sts, b u t n o w m o re
t h a n ever. T h e c o u n tr y h a s in r e c e n t years
a c h ie v e d c o n sid e ra b le e c o n o m ic g r o w th a n d
c o n s o lid a te d its d e m o c ra c y , a f te r y e ars o f a l
te r a tio n b e tw e e n d e m o c ra tic a n d a u th o r ita r
ia n r u le i n w h ic h t h e la t te r w a s p re d o m in a n t.
I t h a s also e x e rc is e d m o re g lo b a l in flu e n c e
t h a n e v e r b e fo re — a lo n g - s t a n d i n g a m b i
tio n . S c h o la rs a re e a g e r to u n d e r s ta n d h o w it
h a s d o n e so, a n d to p r e d ic t th e p a t h t h a t i t is
lik e ly to ta k e in t h e fu tu r e . T h e re is in c re a s
in g f a ith t h a t th e s e p o sitiv e c h a n g e s have
b e e n p la n te d o n so lid g r o u n d a n d m a y be
s u s ta in e d , a n d m a n y o t h e r c o u n trie s are
lo o k in g to B ra z il as a so c ie ty t o b e e m u la te d
in te rm s o f so c ia l p olicy, c itiz e n p a r tic ip a
tio n , a n d e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t.
B ra z il a lso s ta n d s o u t in L a ti n A m e ric a
fo r se v e ra l im p o r t a n t re a so n s . F i r s t , it is th e
o n ly P o r tu g u e s e - s p e a k i n g c o u n tr y in th e
r e g io n t h o u g h its p o p u la tio n c o m p rise s a
h e f ty c h u n k o f th e t o ta l L a ti n A m e ric a n
p o p u la tio n . S e c o n d , it e m e rg e d fro m c o lo
n ia lis m as a n in ta c t u n it, d e sp ite its s tro n g
r e g io n a l te n s io n s , w h e re a s S p a n is h A m e ric a
s p lit u p in to m a n y s m a lle r c o u n trie s . T h ird ,
a n d re la te d to th is , B ra z il g a in e d its in d e
p e n d e n c e w i th o u t a w a r, b u t, i n essence,
Ethnic Groups in Brazil
Source: CIA World Factbook.
■ W h ite 47.7%
■ M ixed Race 43.19
■ Black 7.6%
I A sian 1.1%
■ Indigenous 0.4%
■ R om an C atholicism 64.6%
■ O th er C atholicism 0.4%
■ P ro testant C hristianity 22.2%
■ O th er C hristianity 0.7%
■ Spiritism 2.2%
■ O th e r 1.4%
fll N on e 8.0%
■ U nspecified 0.4%
Religious Affiliation in Brazil
Source: CIA World Factbook.
400 Brazil
Profile 401
w i t h t h e h e lp o f th e P o r t u g u e s e ro y a l fa m ily . T h is a n d s u b
s e q u e n t e v e n ts h a v e le d so m e to d e s c rib e B ra z il as a n o n
re v o lu tio n ary society in w h ic h g ra d u a l c h an g e is p re d o m in a n t.
Slavery laste d lo n g e r in B ra zil t h a n in m o st societies, a n d it
e n te re d th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry w it h a n a g ra ria n e co n o m y a n d a
h ig h ly u n e q u a l social o rd e r (R o e tt 2011; S k id m o re 2010). I t
d id , how ever, have m o re success th a n m a n y o th e r L a tin
A m e ric a n c o u n tries in ach iev in g p a rtia l in d u stria liz a tio n in
th e tw e n tie th century.
B ra z il is c h a r a c te riz e d b y p r o n o u n c e d r e g io n a l d iffe r
ences. T h e c o u n tr y is g e o g ra p h ic a lly e n o rm o u s , a n d s e t tle
m e n t p a tte rn s a n d e c o n o m ic b a se s in d iffe re n t re g io n s v a ry
c o nsiderably. T h e la rg e c ities o f th e s o u th e a s t, s u c h as Sao
P a u lo a n d R io de J a n e iro , in c lu d e h u g e p o p u la tio n s a n d are
m o re c losely l in k e d to t h e g lo b a l eco n o m y , e sp e c ia lly Sao
P a u lo . W h i l e t h is a re a c a n b e v ie w e d as a “re g io n ,” h is to r i
c ally th e r e w e re te n s io n s between th e s e c itie s, w i t h P a u lis ta s
a n d re s id e n ts o f R io s o m e tim e s v y in g fo r n a tio n a l in flu
ence. M o r e s t r ik in g c o n tra s ts , h o w e v er, are fo u n d b e tw e e n
th is a n d o th e r re g io n s , in c lu d in g t h e re la tiv e ly p o o r a n d
iso la te d A m a z o n i a n re g io n , w h e re a la r g e r A m e r in d ia n
p o p u la tio n is p re s e n t, a n d th e n o r th e a s t , w h e re so m e o f th e
e a rlie s t s e ttle m e n t w a s e s ta b lis h e d o n t h e b a sis o f s u g a r c u l
tiv a tio n . T h is a rea , to o , r e m a in s re la tiv e ly p o o r w h e n c o m
p a r e d to th e so u th e a s t.
Historical Development
B ra z il b e g a n as a q u in te s s e n tia lly a g ric u ltu ra l society, w ith
early in ro a d s b y b o t h D u tc h a n d P o rtu g u e s e c o lo n ia lists (on
th e colo n ia l p e rio d , see F a u sto 1999 a n d S k id m o re 2 010). In
th e e n d , i t b e c a m e th e p rin c ip a l c o lo n ia l p o ssessio n o f th e
P o rtu g u e s e c ro w n , w h ic h h a d p lay e d a c ru c ia l role in early
E u ro p e a n n a v ig a tio n a n d e x p lo ra tio n , m u c h o u t o f p ro p o r
tio n to its in flu e n ce a n d p o w e r w i t h in E u ro p e o th e rw is e .
P rio r to its c o lo n iz a tio n , B ra z il w a s h o m e to n u m e ro u s
A m e r in d ia n c u ltu re s . T h ese w e re fa s c in a tin g a n d im p o rta n t,
b u t th e y te n d e d to h ave rela tiv e ly lo w levels o f co m p le x social
o rg a n iz a tio n , u n lik e th e In c a , M a y a , a n d M e x ic a (or A z tec s)
in d iffe re n t p a r ts o f th e S p a n ish E m p ire . T h is h a s im p lic a
tio n s fo r th e c o lo n ia l p o litic a l a n d social s tru c tu re s t h a t d e
v e loped. T h e e c o n o m ic m o d e l t h a t d e v e lo p e d in co lo n ia l
B ra z il w as b a se d f u n d a m e n ta lly o n p la n ta tio n a g ric u ltu re ,
w ith th e in itia l focus in th e n o rth e a s t, w h e re su g a r c ane w as
th e m a in p ro d u c t fo r e x p o rt. L a te r in th e c o lo n ia l p e rio d th is
w as su p p le m e n te d b y m in in g . I n c o lo n ia l S p a n is h A m e ric a ,
m in in g te n d e d to “go w i t h ” co m p le x A m e r in d ia n o rg a n iz a
tio n a n d to p ro d u c e in itia lly s o m e w h a t “in d ir e c t c o lo n ia lism ”
R ace a n d e th n ic ity are c o m p lic a te d in B ra z il (as th e y are
everyw here!). I t is v e ry im p o r ta n t to n o t v ie w race a n d e th
n ic ity t h r o u g h a U .S .-sty le ra c ia l tem p la te . I n th e tra d itio n a l
U .S . c u ltu re o f race a n d e th n ic ity , ra c ia l a n d e th n ic categories
are o fte n im a g in e d to b e m o re r ig id t h a n t h e y ty p ic a lly are in
B ra zil. H o w e v e r, o n e d oes n o t w a n t to fa ll fo r w h a t scholars
have c alled th e B ra z ilia n “m y th o f ra cial dem ocracy.” T h a t is,
so c ial-sc ie n tific ev id en ce stro n g ly in d ic a te s t h a t ra cial a n d
e th n ic d is c rim in a tio n do ta k e p lace in B ra z ilia n society. O n e
q u e s tio n w o r th t h in k i n g a b o u t is w h e th e r th e B ra z ilia n w ay
o f “d o in g ” e th n ic ity a n d race m a k e s a d d re ss in g th is d is c rim i
n a tio n easier o r m o re d iffic u lt (see d isc u ssio n in M a r x 1998).
I n a n y case, k e ep in m in d t h a t categ o rie s lik e “w h ite ” or
“b la c k ” c a n m e a n d iffe re n t t h in g s in d iffe re n t societies.
I n re lig io u s te rm s, B ra z il re m a in s a so c ie ty o f h ig h v ita l
ity. T h e C a th o lic C h u r c h is s till im p o r t a n t to a larg e sh a re o f
th e p o p u la tio n , a n d B ra z il h a s c o n trib u te d im p o rta n tly to
th e o lo g ic a l d e v elo p m en ts in p a s t d e ca d es lik e lib e ra tio n th e
o lo g y a n d th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f e cc lesiastical b a se c o m m u n i
ties. A t th e sa m e tim e , B ra z il a lso h a s o ne o f th e h ig h e s t rates
o f P r o te s ta n t a d h e re n c e in L a t in A m e ric a . S o m e even see
P r o te s ta n t s tr e n g th as cau sally re la te d to C a th o lic in n o v a tio n
(because o f c o m p e titio n ) in c o u n trie s lik e B ra z il (see G ill
1998). P e n te c o sta l fo rm s o f P r o te s ta n tis m have b e e n p a rtic u
larly im p o rta n t, esp e cially a m o n g p o o re r p o p u la tio n s.
w i th h ig h levels o f a d m in is tra tio n c a rrie d o u t, in p a rt,
th r o u g h e x is tin g social s tru c tu re s ( M a h o n e y 2010). T hese
areas b e c a m e th e “cores” o f th e c o lo n ia l sy ste m w h ile a g ri
c u ltu ra l p r o d u c tio n for e x p o rt w as la rg e ly c o n fin e d to th e
c o lo n ia l “p e rip h e ry ” lik e A r g e n tin a a n d V en ez u e la (areas
w h ic h o n ly m u c h la te r g re w in p ro m in e n c e ). B ra zil, in te re s t
ingly, seem s to d e v ia te fro m th is g e n e ra l re g io n a l p a tte rn . I n
th is re sp e c t, p e rh a p s, it m o re closely re sem b les early E n g lis h
c o lo n ia lism in p laces lik e B a rb a d o s , w h e re h ig h ly lucrative
su g a r c u ltiv a tio n w as a lso p ra c tic e d , w ith a so cial stru c tu re
b a s e d m o s tly o n slavery.
T h e e ig h te e n t h - c e n t u r y e x p a n s io n o f m in in g a c tiv itie s,
e sp e c ia lly in M in a s G e r a is , h a d im p o r t a n t im p lic a tio n s for
t h e p o litic a l s tr u c tu r e o f th e P o r tu g u e s e c o lo n ie s a n d for
B r a z il’s fu tu r e . P e rh a p s th e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e ffe c t w a s th e
s h i f t i n r e g io n a l e lite p o w e r a n d in c o lo n ia l a d m in is tr a tio n ,
as th e n o r th e a s t c ity o f S a lv a d o r c e a se d to b e th e m a in co
lo n ia l p o r t, w i t h R io d e J a n e ir o t a k i n g o ver t h a t role. R io
w a s a lso t h e c a p ita l u n t i l it w a s m o v e d to th e n e w p la n n e d
c ity o f B ra s ilia in 1960.
402 Brazil
Historical Development
Timeline
1500
1500s
1600s
1808
1821
1822
1888
1889
1880s-1920s
1930
1930s
1937
1946
1954
Portuguese mariner Pedro Alvares Cabral is the first
European to explore Brazil.
Portuguese crown attempts to colonize Brazil by
granting Captaincies (Capitanias) to nobles, but few
successful outposts are established.
French and Dutch excursions establish inroads
along Brazil's coast, but depart by mid-1600s.
The Portuguese monarchy flees Portugal and
establishes residence in Brazil.
Portuguese monarchy returns to Portugal.
Dorn Pedro, a prince and son of Portugal's king,
declares Brazilian independence from Portugal and
remains in Brazil as Emperor.
Princess Isabel abolishes slavery by decree while
Emperor Dorn Pedro II is away in Europe.
The military deposes Emperor Dom Pedro II
and establishes a republic, now known as the Old
Republic (Republica Velha); constitutional
democracy is largely limited to land-owning males.
Economic boom based on agricultural exports
(coffee, sugar, etc.) to Europe.
General Getulio Vargas takes presidency.
Great Depression interrupts world trade, cuts off
imports and harms the economy; this gives impetus
to Brazil's fledgling industrialization in the medium
term.
President Vargas proclaims "New State" (Estado
Novo) along fascist lines.
Brazil returns to democratic rule.
Vargas commits suicide while president (1951-1954),
having been elected some years after his previous
removal.
I960
1964
1964-1982
1982
1985
1988
1988-1994
1992
1995-2003
2003-2011
2011
2015
President Juscelino Kubitschek moves capital to
new city of Brasilia.
Military overthrows President Joao Goulart in coup
d'etat.
Military rules Brazil in "bureaucratic-authoritarian"
style; industrialization deepens.
Massive street protests for direct elections (Diretas
Ja!), with trade union leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva
a prominent figure; democratic elections are held
for governors.
Presidential election is held;Tancredo Neves is
elected but dies before taking office; Jose Sarney
becomes president.
Constitution is passed by Brazil's Constituent
Assembly.
Growing inflation problems and economic crisis.
President Fernando Collor (1990-1992) resigns amid
corruption scandal.
Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (a
sociologist) ends economic crisis, begins to see
economic growth, better social services, and
declining inequality.
Presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a former
Marxist trade union leader and head of the Worker's
Party (PT); continued economic growth and
declines in inequality, as well as an expanding
international role for Brazil.
Dilma Rousseff of the PT becomes Brazil's first
female president.
Rousseff begins her second term.
A s n o te d in th e b r i e f in tr o d u c tio n , t h e tr a n s itio n to i n
d e p e n d e n c e in B ra z il w a s re la tiv e ly p e a c e fu l. T h e re h a d in
th e la te c o lo n ia l y e ars b e e n a c o u p le o f m in o r re b e llio n s
(F a u sto 1999), in c lu d in g t h e w e ll-k n o w n In c o n fid e n c ia
M in e ir a , b u t n o th in g t h a t re m o te ly th r e a te n e d th e re g im e .
N a p o le o n w as in v a d in g P o r tu g a l, a n d th e ro y a l fam ily,
u n d e r D o m Jo a o , m o v e d th e c o u r t to R io d e J a n e ir o a n d
c o n tin u e d to g o v e rn fro m th e re . D o m J o a o re m a in e d th e r e
u n til 1821, w h e n a lib e ra l re v o lt b a c k h o m e fo rc e d h i m to
r e tu r n to L is b o n . A p p ro x im a te ly a y e a r a f te r h is r e tu r n , h is
so n P e d ro , w h o h a d b e e n s e n t as re g e n t, d e c la re d in d e p e n
d e n ce . H e w as s o o n n a m e d E m p e ro r. B e tw e e n th e r u le o f
P e d ro I , th e lo n g r u le o f P e d ro I I , a n d a re g e n c y in
b e tw e e n , t h e B ra z ilia n e m p ire w o u ld la s t u n t il th e 1 8 8 0 s.
I t w a s as su c h th e o n ly m o d e r n e m p ire o f sig n ific a n t d u ra
t io n in t h e A m e ric a s . B r a z il’s e m p ire w a s q u ite c o n se rv a tiv e
in n u m e ro u s w a y s— t h e c ritic a l a llia n c e w a s b e tw e e n th e
g o v e rn m e n t, t h e C a th o lic C h u r c h , a n d a g r ic u ltu r a l e lite s—
b u t i t w a s a c o n s titu tio n a l m o n a rc h y ( R o e tt 2 0 1 1 2 6 - 2 7 ) .
O v e r th e c o u rse o f th e n in e te e n th c e n tu r y th e n a tu re o f
B ra z ilia n e x p o rts c h a n g e d , b u t its key e c o n o m ic a c tiv ity re
m a in e d th e e x p o rt o f p rim a r y p ro d u c ts . C o ffe e w a s a sc en
d a n t, a n d o n th e b asis o f coffee p r o d u c tio n a n d e x p o rt a g a in
t h e re g io n a l b a la n c e o f p o w e r a n d s ta tu s s h ifte d a b it, to th e
b e n e fit o f th e Sao P a u lo e lite. D e p e n d e n c e o n coffee, th o u g h ,
w a s n o to rio u s ly p ro b le m a tic fo r L a t in A m e r ic a n c o u n trie s.
Profile 403
C offee prices h a d a te n d e n c y to flu c tu a te w idely, m e a n in g
t h a t b u sin e ss w as h a rd to p re d ic t, a n d s o m e tim e s r u in e d
fa rm e rs. T h is a lso c o n trib u te d , w ith o u t d o u b t, to th e relativ e
w e a k n e ss o f th e B ra z ilia n sta te , as it d id to n u m e ro u s o th e r
sta te s i n L a tin A m e ric a in volved in th e e x p o rt o f coffee a n d
s im ila r g o o d s. J u s t th e sa m e , B ra z ilia n p o litic s re m a in e d
su rp risin g ly stable in th is p e rio d , a n d th e c o u n try w a s n o t
w ra c k e d b y th e re le n tle ss c ivil w a rs t h a t tro u b le d its n e ig h
bors. B ra z il was in volved, th o u g h , in th e m o s t in fa m o u s in
te rn a tio n a l w a r o f L a t in A m e ric a n h isto ry , th e “W a r o f th e
T rip le A llia n c e ,” w h ic h p i tt e d B ra zil, A r g e n tin a , a n d U r u
g u a y a g a in s t P a ra g u a y a n d re s u lte d in th e d e v a s ta tio n o f th e
la tte r c o u n try a n d k ille d so m a n y o f its m e n as to p ro d u c e
u n u s u a l d e m o g ra p h ic p ro b le m s. B ra z il a lso su ffe red h e av y
losses, how ever, a n d e x p e rie n c e d fiscal d iffic u lties as a re su lt
o f its in volvem ent.
A n o t h e r im p o r t a n t n i n e t e e n th - c e n t u r y d e v e lo p m e n t
(S k id m o re 2 0 1 0 : 7 1 -7 2 ) w a s th e h e a v y im p o r ta ti o n o f a
F re n c h p h ilo s o p h ic a l sy s te m k n o w n as “p o s itiv is m ” (th e
slo g a n o n th e B ra z ilia n flag, “O r d e r a n d P ro g re s s ,” is a
m a r k o f th e in flu e n c e o f th is p h ilo s o p h y ). I n a n u ts h e ll,
p o s itiv is m c la im e d t h a t h u m a n h i s to r y m o v es fro m “re li
g io u s” to “m e ta p h y s ic a l” to “p o s itiv e ” sta g e s as c u ltu r e b e
com es m o re ra tio n a l a n d sc ien tific . T h is p h ilo s o p h y h a d
g r e a t a p p e a l to in te lle c tu a ls in p lac es lik e B ra z il a n d
M e x ic o , w h e re i t se e m e d to o ffer a d ia g n o s is o f th e so u rc es
o f th e c o u n tr y ’s a lle g e d “b a c k w a rd n e s s ” a n d a lso a tr e a t
m e n t p ro g ra m : e c o n o m ic a n d c u lt u r a l m o d e r n iz a tio n , in
c lu d in g th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f ra ilro a d s a n d o th e r
in f r a s tr u c tu r e as w e ll as th e e x p a n s io n o f e d u c a tio n . O f
c o u rse , th e im p lic a tio n s o f th is v ie w fo r o ld -fa s h io n e d c o n
c ep ts lik e “E m p ir e ” w e re n o t to o “p o s itiv e .” P o s itiv is m , sci
e n tis m , r e p u b lic a n is m a n d o t h e r id ea s a b o u t m o d e r n iz a tio n
c a u g h t o n m o re a n d m o re a m o n g B r a z ilia n e lite s. T h e t r o u
ble w a s t h a t th e s o c ie ty w a s s ti ll b a s e d o n p l a n ta tio n a g ri
c u ltu re fo r e x p o rt, a n d th u s i m p o r t a n t a c to rs w e re o p p o s e d
to fu ll p o litic a l m o d e r n iz a tio n . A l l b e ts w e re off, th o u g h ,
a fte r th e a b o litio n o f sla v ery i n 188 8 a n d a f te r P e d ro I I w as
d e p o s e d a y e a r late r. P a ra d o x ic a lly , a n u m b e r o f th e re p u b
lic a n s w h o fa v o re d th e a b o litio n o f m o n a rc h y h a d p re v i
o u sly b e e n s ta u n c h c o n se rv a tiv e s, w h ic h se e m s to sh o w th e
c e n tr a lity o f in te r e s t in t h e i r c a lc u la tio n s (F a u sto 1999).
P re su m a b ly , th e y h o p e d to e x e rt g re a te r in flu e n c e in a r e
p u b lic . A n d in d e e d , th e re p u b lic t h a t w a s c re a te d w as fo r
m a n y y e a rs d is p ro p o rtio n a te ly re sp o n siv e to e lite in te re s t.
F ro m th is p o in t o n , in c e r ta in re s p e c ts , B ra z il s ta r te d to
re se m b le th e m o re ty p ic a l L a ti n A m e r ic a n p a tt e r n , w it h
p o litic a l in s ta b ility a n d w e a k in s titu tio n s s e rv in g as o b s ta
cles to d e v e lo p m e n t.
T h e n e x t m a jo r d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e p o l it i c a l h i s t o r y
o f B r a z i l w a s t h e c o u p d ’e t a t t h a t b r o u g h t G e t u l i o
V a rg a s t o p o w e r i n 1 9 3 0 . V a rg a s w a s a p o p u l i s t , a n d h e
l a r g e ly w o r k e d to u n d e r c u t t h e in f lu e n c e o f t h e r e g io n a l
o lig a r c h ie s t h a t h a d e x e r t e d d i s p r o p o r t io n a t e i n f lu e n c e
o v e r t h e c o u n t r y in t h e p r e v io u s d e c a d e s , t h o u g h h e d i d
r e t a i n t ie s to s o m e e lite g r o u p s ( R o e t t 2 0 1 1 ; S k id m o r e
2 0 1 0 ). V a rg a s e n c o u r a g e d i n d u s t r i a l m a g n a te s a n d la b o r
a lik e , a n d t h e l a t t e r b e c a m e a n i n c r e a s in g l y i m p o r t a n t
f o r c e i n B r a z i l ia n p o litic s i n t h i s p e r io d . V a rg a s w a s a lso
a s t a t e - b u i l d e r a n d a c e n t r a l i z e r . T h e B r a z i l ia n s ta te h e
h e l p e d to d e v e lo p w a s a ls o o n e w i t h m i l i t a r i s t i c f e a t u r e s .
V a rg a s b u i l t o n e a r l ie r e f f o r t s to in c u lc a te s t r o n g n a t i o n
a lis m in t h e B r a z i l ia n p e o p le a n d l i n k e d t h i s n a ti o n a l
is m to h is e f f o r ts to f u r t h e r i n d u s t r i a l i z e a n d m o d e r n iz e
t h e c o u n tr y . B e y o n d n o t i n g h is n a ti o n a li s m a n d p o p u
lis m , i t is h a r d to p i n V a rg a s d o w n id e o lo g ic a lly . S o m e
h a v e v ie w e d h i m as h a v in g s o m e l e f t - w i n g t e n d e n c ie s ,
a n d m a n y h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d h i m as t o y i n g w i t h s o m e
t h i n g c lo s e to fa s c is m . B y t h e e n d o f t h i s p e r io d h e h a d
b e c o m e d i c t a to r , a n d w h i l e B r a z i l ia n t r o o p s f o u g h t w i t h
t h e a llie s in W o r ld W a r I I , V a rg a s w a s d e p o s e d fo llo w
i n g t h e e n d o f t h e w a r.
I n t h e c o m in g y e a r s p o l it i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y c o n ti n u e d —
V a rg a s w a s e v e n b r o u g h t b a c k i n 1 9 5 1 , t h o u g h h e k i ll e d
h i m s e l f i n o f f ic e r a t h e r t h a n b e d e p o s e d a g a i n i n 1 9 5 4 —
b u t a m i d s t t h e d i s o r d e r B r a z i l c o n ti n u e d w i t h a p r o g r a m
o f e c o n o m ic n a t i o n a l i s m a n d i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i n g i n d u s
t r i a l i z a t i o n . T h e c o u n t r y ’s r e c o r d in t h i s c o n n e c ti o n w a s
m ix e d . G r o w t h w a s i r r e g u l a r a n d o f t e n slow , a n d i n
e q u a l i ty r e m a in e d n o t o r io u s ly h i g h , b u t t h e c o u n tr y h a d
a m o r e d i v e r s if i e d i n d u s t r i a l b a s e t h a n d i d m a n y o f its
n e ig h b o r s . U n d e r J u s c e lin o K u b its c h e k ( 1 9 5 6 - 1 9 6 0 ) , t h e
m o d e r n i s t c a p i t a l o f B r a s ilia w a s e s ta b l is h e d . I n 1 9 6 4 ,
f o llo w in g a m i l i t a r y c o u p , t h e c o u n t r y s u c c u m b e d to th e
w a v e o f “b u r e a u c r a t i c - a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m ” t h a t w a s to
d o m i n a t e t h e r e g io n fo r s o m e y e a rs ( O ’D o n n e l l 1 9 7 3 ;
S te p a n 1 971).
T h is m ili ta r y re g im e s o u g h t to ta k e a n a ctiv e role in
s h a p in g th e d e v e lo p m e n t p ro c e ss a n d d e e p e n in g i n d u s tr ia l
iz a tio n ( O ’D o n n e ll 1973). I t sa w B r a z il’s s tr o n g u n io n s a n d
d e m a n d s fo r w o rk e r a d v a n ta g e s as fa c to rs t h a t p re v e n te d
t h e a c c u m u la tio n o f c a p ita l n e e d e d to b e c o m e a n a d v a n c e d ,
in d u s t r ia l society. A c c o rd in g ly , it c e n tr a liz e d p o w e r a n d
re p re s s e d d is s id e n c e , m o s t n o ta b ly a f te r it d e c re e d
404 Brazil
I n s ti tu tio n a l A c t # 5 (Ato Institutional No. 5) i n 1 968, w h ic h
b a n n e d a sse m b ly a n d th e h o ld in g o f u n i o n e le c tio n s. T he
m ilita r y p ro m o te d in d u s tr ia l in v e s tm e n t fro m fo re ig n a n d
d o m e s tic so u rc es in a n a tte m p t to c o n v e rt B r a z il’s in d u s tr y
fro m m a k in g t h e lik e s o f te x tile s a n d su g a r to m a k in g m o re
so p h is tic a te d p ro d u c ts lik e ste el a n d a u to m o b ile s fo r c o n
s u m p tio n in B ra z il itself. T he m ilita r y p a r tia lly su c c e e d e d ,
p re s id in g ov er so m e d e e p e n in g o f in d u s tr ia liz a tio n t h a t
r e p re s e n te d a s u b s ta n tia l p o r t io n o f th e “B ra z ilia n M ir a c le ”
o f th e p o s t- w a r e ra (E v a n s 1979; C a r d o s o a n d F a le tto
1979). U ltim a te ly , h o w e v er, m a k in g th e n e c e s s a ry in v e s t
m e n ts r e q u ir e d m o re a n d m o re sta te s p e n d in g a n d d e b t. I n
th e lo n g r u n , th e b o rro w in g c u lm in a te d in t h e 1 9 8 0 s d e b t
crisis. G r o w in g p re ssu re s fo r p o litic a l lib e r a liz a tio n sig
n a le d th e e x h a u s tio n o f m ilita r y ru le .
T he m il ita r y c o n tro lle d th e p ro c e ss o f lib e r a liz a tio n in
th e in iti a l sta g e s b u t fo u n d i ts e l f p u s h e d to m a k e g re a te r
m o v es to w a r d f u l l d e m o c ra c y ( H a g g a r d a n d K a u fm a n
1995). P o litic a l p re s s u re fo r d e m o c r a tiz a tio n c a m e fro m
m a n y p o litic a l a c to rs. S e v e ral p o litic ia n s f r o m S ao P a u lo
a n d o th e r la rg e s ta te s p re s s e d t h e re g im e to g r a n t m o re a u
th o r ity to th e sta te s. B y th e m id -1 9 8 0 s , m illio n s to o k to
th e s tre e ts to d e m a n d e le c tio n s , w i t h m a n y le d b y tr a d e
u n io n le a d e r a n d p o litic a l h o p e f u l L u iz I n a c io L u la d a
Silva. T h e p ro te s ts le d to m assiv e ra llie s in th e 1 9 8 0 s c a ll
in g fo r “D i r e c t E le c tio n s N o w ” (Diretas jd!), w h ic h th e
b u s in e s s c o m m u n i ty in c re a s in g ly s u p p o r te d . A s th e m il i
t a r y re g im e r e c o g n iz e d its lo ss o f p o w e r, i t a g re e d to
Regime and Political Institutions
T he executive in B ra z il’s fe d e ra l sy ste m is d ire c tly e le cte d ,
w i th th e v o te ta lly fo r th e p re sid e n c y b a s e d o n th e n a tio n a l
p o p u la r v ote. I f n o c a n d id a te receives a m a jo rity i n th e first
ro u n d , a s e c o n d -ro u n d r u n o f f e le c tio n is h e ld b e tw e e n th e
tw o le a d in g c a n d id a te s . I n b o t h r o u n d s , v o tin g is o b lig a to ry
fo r a ll c itiz e n s , th o u g h th e se c re t b a llo t gives c itiz e n s th e
o p p o r t u n ity to “s p o il” th e ir b a llo t o r leave i t b la n k . T h is v ir
tu a lly g u a ra n te e s t h a t th e e le c te d p re s id e n t w ill h ave b e e n
v o te d in to office w ith a m a jo rity m a n d a te . T h e te r m o f office
is fo u r y ears, a n d th e p re s id e n t is lim ite d to tw o te rm s.
A c c o r d in g to th e C o n s ti tu t io n , th e p r e s id e n t h a s c o n
sid e rab le p o w e rs, in c lu d in g th e a b ility to d e c re e c e rta in
law s fo r a lim ite d tim e ( t h ir t y days), w it h t h e so -c a lle d
“p ro v isio n a l m e a s u re ” (medida provisoria). Y et d e sp ite th e s e
fo rm a l p o w e rs, th e f r a g m e n te d n a tu r e o f th e p a r t y sy ste m
lim its th e p r e s id e n t’s p o w e r o v e r th e n a tio n a l le g is la tu re .
T h e p r e s id e n t c a n o f te n c o u n t o n less t h a n o n e - th i r d o f th e
e le c tio n s fo r s ta te g o v e rn o rs in 1 9 8 2 , fo llo w e d b y n a tio n a l
e le c tio n s in 1985.
D e m o c r a ti c e le c tio n s r e s u lte d i n a m a s siv e v ic to r y fo r
T a n c r e d o N e v e s , w h o d e f e a te d th e m ilita r y - b a c k e d c a n
d i d a te c o n v in c in g ly . N e v e s d ie d b e fo re a s s u m i n g office,
h o w e v e r, le a v in g V ic e P r e s id e n t J o s e S a r n e y to a s s u m e
th e p re s id e n c y . I n 1 9 9 0 , F e r n a n d o C o l lo r b e c a m e th e firs t
d i r e c tly e le c te d p r e s i d e n t o f B r a z il a f te r t h e m il i ta r y
r e g im e . H i s p r e s id e n c y w a s m a r k e d b y s c a n d a ls a n d a
fa ile d e c o n o m ic p o lic y t h a t le d to i m p e a c h m e n t in 1 9 9 2 ;
V ice P r e s i d e n t I t a m a r F r a n c o g o v e r n e d u n t i l th e n e x t
e le c tio n s in 1 994.
T h e tw o f o llo w in g p r e s id e n ts g o v e r n e d B r a z il fo r tw o
te r m s e a c h , fo r a t o ta l o f s ix te e n y e a rs , a n d th e s e y e a rs saw
r e la tiv e im p r o v e m e n ts in a d d r e s s in g B r a z il ’s e c o n o m ic
a n d s o c ia l c h a lle n g e s ( R o e tt 2 0 1 1 ). F e r n a n d o H e n r i q u e
C a r d o s o ’s g o v e r n m e n t ( 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 3 ) c o n s o lid a te d a n e w
e c o n o m ic p o lic y — T h e Plano Real— t o g e t h e r w i t h a n e w
c u r re n c y ( th e real) t h a t b r o u g h t a re la tiv e ly s ta b le e c o n
o m y a n d th e b e g in n i n g s o f a d e c lin e in in e q u a lity . T h is
w a s fo llo w e d b y t w o te r m s o f L u iz I n a c io L u l a d a S ilva
( 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 1 1 ), k n o w n s im p ly as L u la . H e w a s a f o u n d in g
m e m b e r o f t h e W o r k e r s P a r t y (Partido dos Trabalhadores,
P T ) a n d u n i o n l e a d e r w h o w a s o n c e a M a r x i s t b u t g o v
e r n e d in a c e n t r i s t f a s h io n . C u r r e n t p r e s id e n t D i l m a
R o u s s e f f o f t h e P T w a s e le c te d in 2 0 1 0 as L u la ’s su c c e s
sor. S h e n a r ro w ly w o n r e e le c tio n in 2 0 1 4 , d e f e a ti n g o p
p o s itio n r iv a l A e c io N e v e s .
C o n g re s s b e in g c o -p a rtis a n s . E v e n th e s e c o -p a r tis a n s are
p r im a r ily c o n c e rn e d w i th sa tis fy in g t h e ir o w n c o n s titu e n
cies in t h e i r sta te s, a n d n o t w i t h p le a s in g t h e n a tio n a l p a r ty
le a d e rs . W h i l e fo rm a l p o w e rs a re u s e fu l, m o s t p re s id e n tia l
p re ro g a tiv e s o f sig n ific a n c e c a n b e c o n s o lid a te d o n ly b y ex
ten siv e n e g o tia ti n g a n d b a r g a in in g w i t h o t h e r p a r tie s , in d i
v id u a l le g isla to rs , a n d th e sta te g o v e rn o rs a n d c ity m ay o rs
w h o s u p p o r t th e s e leg isla to rs . T h is p ro c e ss ty p ic a lly i n
volves a m o re o r less e x p lic it tr a d i n g o f favors a n d re so u rc e s
(a n d o f te n o u tr ig h t c o rru p tio n ) t h a t m a k e s it c o stly to
c h a n g e th e status quo.
T h e ju d ic ia l p o w e r in B ra z il h a s as its m o s t i m p o r t a n t
i n s ta n c e th e F e d e ra l S u p re m e C o u r t (Supremo Tribunal
Federal— S T F ) , w h ic h h a s th e a u th o r ity to p r o n o u n c e o n
t h e c o n s t itu tio n a l ity o f law . T h e C o n s t itu tio n re serv e s s u b
s t a n tia l re s p o n s ib ilitie s , f u n c tio n s , a n d re so u rc e s fo r th e
s ta te g o v e rn m e n ts as w e ll.
Profile 405
Regime and Political Institutions
Regime Federal republic, representative democratic elections
Administrative Divisions Twenty-seven federal units: twenty-six states (estados) + Federal District of Brasilia
Executive Branch President
Selection of Executive Direct election by national popular vote; voting is compulsory; runoff between top two
candidates if none receives 50 percent in the first round
Legislative Branch Bicameral Congress {Congresso Nacional)
Lower chamber: Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Deputados)
Upper chamber: Senate (Senado Federal)
Judicial Branch Federal High Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) has some power of judicial review
Political Party System Multiparty system, with four to five prominent parties leading parties: PT (left/center-left),
PSDB (centrist, technocratic), PMDB (centrist, traditional), Democrats (center-right,
traditional)
Political Culture
I n m a n y w ays, B r a z ilia n s o c ie ty is re n o w n e d fo r b r in g in g
to g e th e r e le m e n ts o f d i s t in c t t r a d itio n s . I n te rm s o f its
p e o p le , B ra z il h a s la rg e n u m b e rs o f in d ig e n o u s p e o p le s,
p e o p le o f A f r ic a n d e s c e n t, a n d d e s c e n d a n ts o f m ig r a n ts o f
E u r o p e a n a n d A s ia n o rig in . B r a z ilia n p o litic s fo llo w s th e
n a tio n a l tr e n d o f b l e n d i n g a n d c o m b in in g tr a d itio n s .
W h il e u n iq u e , B ra z il is a ls o lik e m a n y c o u n trie s i n p r o
cesses o f ra p id m o d e r n iz a tio n in t h a t it p re s e n ts a fa s c in a t
in g m ix tu r e o f th e t r a d it io n a l w i t h t h e t e c h n o c r a tic a n d
“m o d e r n .”
T h is c o m p le x c u ltu r e c a n b e se e n , fo r e x a m p le , in th e
c o m b in a tio n o f h ig h ly a d v a n c e d c e n te rs o f e fficiency in cer
ta in a sp e c ts o f th e s ta te , c o m b in e d w i t h o ld -fa s h io n e d p a
tro n a g e -b a s e d b u re a u c ra c ie s (E v a n s 1989). S o m e d ip lo m a ts
in B ra z il’s F o re ig n M i n i s t r y a n d e c o n o m is ts a t its C e n tr a l
B a n k are a m o n g t h e w o r ld ’s b e s t, w h ile m a n y le g isla to rs ,
m in is te rs , a n d ju d g e s (a n d so m e p re sid e n ts) h a v e b e e n n o
to rio u s ly c o rru p t. B ra z il is h o m e to so m e o f t h e w o r ld ’s
m o s t a d v a n c e d in d u s tr ie s — in p e tr o le u m e x p lo ra tio n , a ir
c r a f t m a n u fa c tu re , a n d m o b ile p h o n e assem bly, a m o n g
o th e r a rea s— b u t is a lso h o m e to p o v e rty t h a t riv a ls th e
p o o re s t c o u n trie s o n e a r th . A s h o m e to m o s t o f th e
A m a z o n , B ra z il is a le a d e r i n g lo b a l d e b a te s a b o u t e n v iro n
m e n ta l su s ta in a b ility , w h ile a lso w in k in g a n d n o d d i n g at
w e a lth y p o litic ia n s w h o c h o p d o w n h u g e s w a th s o f p ris tin e
ra in f o r e s t fo r t h e i r p ro fita b le c a ttle ra n c h e s . A c u ltu r a l e le
m e n t t h a t w o rk s its w a y in to p o litic s is th e n o tio n o f jeitinho,
o r “f in d in g a lit t le w ay.” T h is h a s a c o n n o ta tio n o f s k illfu l
n e ss a n d c le v ern e ss, b u t a lso o f b e in g c o n n iv in g a n d eva
sive. A t its b e s t, it m e a n s c re a tiv ity a n d in v e n tiv e n e ss ,
w h e t h e r in b u s in e s s o r in B ra z ilia n s ’ r e n o w n e d a b ilitie s in
soccer. A t its w o rs t, it c o n trib u te s to p ra c tic e s lik e ta x eva
sio n , c o r ru p tio n , a n d g e tt i n g a h e a d a t a n o th e r ’s e x p en se.
T h e b le n d o f m o d e r n a n d tr a d it io n a l c a n b e se e n a m o n g th e
m a n y B ra z ilia n s w h o w ill c o n d e m n c o r ru p tio n a m o n g p o li
tic ia n s , b u t w h o a lso p rid e th e m se lv e s in a v o id in g p a y m e n t
o f t h e i r ta x sh a re .
B ra z il h a s c h a n g e d o ver tim e , a n d o fte n fo r th e b e tte r.
O n e e x am p le is t h e p o litic s b e tw e e n le ftis ts a n d in d u s tria l
cap ita lis ts . A s B ra z il h a s m o v e d in to t h e tw e n ty -firs t c en
tu ry , m a jo r p o litic a l forces o n b o t h th e le ft a n d t h e r ig h t
have m o d e ra te d . T h e W o rk e rs ’ P a r ty ( P T ) m o v e d fro m ra d i
cal M a r x is m in t h e 198 0 s to m o re s o c ia l-d e m o c ra tic p olicies
in th e 1 990s. T h e P T a n d its lea d er, L u la d a Silva, w e re u n
ac c e p ta b le to th e m ilita r y a n d u n e le c ta b le fo r m o s t m id d le -
class B ra z ilia n s in to th e 1 990s, b u t b y th e 2 0 0 2 ele ctio n s
th e y h a d b e c o m e m a in s tre a m . I n fa ct, L u la w o n e le c tio n
a n d t h e n re e le c tio n h a n d ily i n 2 0 0 6 , e a r n in g th e s u p p o rt o f
m a n y in th e m id d le class. D u r i n g L u la ’s te r m o f office, th e
g o v e rn m e n t c o n tin u e d p r o - m a r k e t re fo rm s, m u c h to th e
406 Brazil
r e lie f o f th e b u sin e ss c o m m u n ity , w h ile also e x te n d in g m o re
b e n efits to th e p o o r (see th e fo llo w in g s e c tio n , “P o litic a l
E c o n o m y ”). M e a n w h ile , th e m ilita r y a n d o th e r c o n se rv a
tiv es to u t B ra z il’s dem ocracy, e ven w h e n it re su lts in th e
ele c tio n o f p o litic a l rivals, a n d th e t r a d itio n a l o lig a rc h ic
p o litic ia n s a n d b o sses o f B ra z il’s n o r th e a s t have a lso u p d a te d
th e ir im a g e , a lb e it slowly. F e w revel o p e n ly a n y m o re in th e
o ld a p p ro a c h o f ju s t d e liv e rin g “p o r k ” to c o n s titu e n ts .
Political Economy
B ra z il h a s e m e rg e d to b e c o m e o n e o f th e m o s t d y n a m ic
e c o n o m ie s in t h e d e v e lo p in g w o rld , b u t i t is a lso c h a ra c te r
iz e d b y s h o c k in g in e q u a litie s , e x tre m e p o v e rty , r a m p a n t
c o rru p tio n , h ig h co sts o f d o in g b u sin e ss, a n d a m o n g th e
w o r ld ’s h ig h e s t ta x ra te s. I t is o n e o f th e r e n o w n e d B R I C
c o u n trie s t h a t a re p ro je c te d b y m a n y to b e e c o n o m ic g ia n ts
o f th e fu tu re : B ra z il, R u ssia , I n d ia , a n d C h in a . W h il e it
s till faces h u g e d iffic u ltie s in in te g r a ti n g its d iv erse p o p u la
tio n in to th e m o d e r n e conom y, B ra z il h a s d e v e lo p e d d r a
m a tic a lly fro m its e x p o r t- o r ie n te d a g r ic u ltu r a l b a se in th e
n i n e t e e n th c e n tu ry , w h e n th e c o u n tr y w a s d o m in a te d by
o lig a rc h ic p la n ta tio n o w n e rs w h o e x p o rte d coffee, su g a r,
a n d o th e r p ro d u c ts to E u ro p e .
T h e c o u n tr y ’s e c o n o m ic h is to r y a c c o u n ts fo r m u c h o f
w h e re B ra z il is today. B ra z il b e g a n to in d u s tr ia liz e in e a r
n e s t in t h e la te n i n e te e n t h c e n tu ry , a n d t h is p ro c e ss acceler
a te d t h r o u g h th e 1 9 2 0 s, e sp e c ia lly in th e s o u th a n d
s o u th e a s t o f th e c o u n try . T h e G r e a t D e p re s s io n a n d its col
lap se o f w o rld tr a d e w a s in itia lly a c a ta s tro p h e fo r S o u th
A m e ric a ’s a g r ic u ltu r a l- d o m in a te d e c o n o m ie s, w h o lo s t
t h e i r m a rk e ts a r o u n d th e w o rld . B u t th e d e c lin e in tr a d e le d
B ra z il to p ro d u c e m o re o f its o w n in d u s tr ia l g o o d s (su ch as
te x tile s , c e m e n t, o r p ro c e ss e d foods) r a th e r t h a n re ly in g o n
im p o rts . T h is le d to m o re a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r ia liz a tio n a n d
th e “B ra z ilia n M ir a c l e ” a fte r W o r ld W a r I I (see th e “H i s
to ric a l D e v e lo p m e n t” s e c tio n at th e b e g in n in g o f th e p r o
file). U n d e r b o t h d e m o c ra tic r u le (1 9 4 6 -1 9 6 4 ) a n d m ilita r y
ru le (1 9 6 4 -1 9 8 0 s), B ra z il m o v e d f ro m p ro d u c tio n o f sim p le
i n d u s tr ia l g o o d s to a m u c h m o re in te n siv e e c o n o m y t h a t
p ro d u c e d a p p lia n c e s, a u to m o b ile s, e le c tro n ic s , p e tr o c h e m i
cals, a n d e v en a irp la n e s . T h e i n d u s tr ia liz a tio n e x te n d e d
w e a lth to a b ro a d e r c ro s s -s e c tio n o f society, c r e a tin g a n
u r b a n m id d le class o fw o rk e rs , m a n a g e rs , a n d p ro fessio n als.
F ro m 1968 to 1973, B r a z il’s G D P h a d a n a verage g r o w t h o f
m o re t h a n 10 p e rc e n t a y e ar, b u t e c o n o m ic c o lla p se i n th e
198 0 s le d to s h u tte r e d fa c to rie s a n d s e n t m illio n s o u t o f
B ra z il is th u s h o m e to a b e w ild e rin g a n d s o m e tim e s c o n
tra d ic to r y p o litic a l c u ltu re . M o d e r n a n d s o p h is tic a te d , b u t
also t r o u b lin g a n d g ritty , it seem s a c o u n try o n t h e m o v e, y e t
also o n e s o m e tim e s s tu c k in tim e . A le a d in g sa y in g is t h a t
“B ra z il is th e c o u n try o f t h e fu tu re , a n d alw ays w ill b e .”
B ra z il is m o re d e m o c ra tic , e q u ita b le , a n d sta b le t h a n j u s t a
c ouple o f d e ca d es ago, b u t m o s t B ra z ilia n s a n d B ra z ilia n is ts
w o u ld say it h a s a lo n g ro a d to tra v e l i n its d e v e lo p m e n t.
w o r k a n d in to th e less se c u re , in f o r m a l e c o n o m y o f s tre e t
v e n d in g a n d o d d jo b s . S o o n t h e re a fte r, excessive g o v e rn
m e n t s p e n d in g le d to h y p e rin fla tio n a n d f u r t h e r d e c lin e .
F in a lly , in th e 1 9 9 0 s, th e c o u n tr y s ta b iliz e d u n d e r P re s i
d e n t F e rn a n d o H e n r i q u e C a rd o s o ( 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 3 ) a n d g re w
im p re ss iv e ly o n c e a g a in in th e y e ars u n d e r P re s id e n t L u iz
I n a c io L u la d a Silva (2 0 0 3 -2 0 1 1 ).
P o v e rty a n d in e q u a lity re m a in B ra z il’s g re a te s t eco n o m ic
c h a lle n g e s. F o r y e ars, B ra z il w a s r e p u te d to b e th e m o s t e co
n o m ic a lly u n e q u a l so c ie ty o n e a r t h , w ith o n ly a fra c tio n o f
v e ry w e a lth y p e o p le a n d h u g e n u m b e rs o f p e o p le liv in g in
p o v e rty in r u r a l areas o r in u rb a n s h a n ty to w n s k n o w n as
favelas. A s B ra z il h a s g ro w n m e th o d ic a lly o ver t h e la s t
d e c a d e o r m o re , i n e q u a lity h a s fa lle n , b u t s till re m a in s at
very h ig h levels. T he im p ro v e m en ts have b e e n h e lp e d alo n g by
p o licy c h an g e s, especially n e w a n d im p ro v e d social program s.
T h e g o v e rn m e n ts o f C a rd o so , L u la , a n d D ilm a R o u sseff
(2 0 1 1 -p resen t) have c rea te d a n d e x p a n d e d inn o v ativ e so cial
p ro g ra m s t h a t p ro v id e m o d e s t c a s h b e n e fits to lo w -in c o m e
fa m ilie s t h a t have t h e ir c h ild r e n v a c c in a te d a n d stay in
school. T h is re d u ce s p o v e rty w h ile also im p ro v in g B ra z il’s
h u m a n c a p ita l fo r th e n e x t g e n e ra tio n .
I n te rm s o f th e c o n te m p o ra ry eco n o m y , B ra z il is a m a jo r
e x p o r te r a g a in , b u t n o w w i t h a n e ven m o re h ig h ly d iv ersi
fied e conom y. I t f e a tu re s s u b s ta n tia l se c to rs in a g ric u ltu ra l
e x p o rts , m a n u f a c tu r in g , e x tra c tiv e i n d u s tr y (su c h as o il
p ro d u c tio n ), a n d services. A t th e sa m e tim e , B ra z il h a s
s tru g g le d in r e c e n t y e a rs w i t h in fla tio n a n d s lo w in g g r o w th .
F ro m a g r o w th ra te o f a b o u t 7.5 p e rc e n t in 2 0 1 0 , B ra z il h a s
d e c lin e d to u n d e r 3 p e rc e n t in r e c e n t y e a rs, a n d p ro je c tio n s
a re t h a t th is w ill d e c lin e to n e a rly z e ro in 2 0 1 5 . T h e q u e s
t io n th e re fo re , is w h e th e r B ra z il w ill b e able to c o n so lid a te
its b ro a d ly s h a re d e c o n o m ic g a in s o f re c e n t y e a rs, w h ile in
c re a s in g g r o w th ra te s o v e rall. T o th e e x te n t it is a ble to do
so, i t is w e ll p o s itio n e d to b e o n e o f t h e le a d in g e c o n o m ie s
o f th e tw e n ty - f ir s t c en tu ry .
Case Studies 407
CASE STUDIES
Does the Global Economy Help or
Hurt Developing Nations Like Brazil? C H A P T E R 5, P A G E 112
For centuries, Brazil has been one of the
most important countries to consider on
the question of whether opening up to
the global economy helps or hinders de
velopment. Depending on perspective
and the moment in history, openness to
the outside world has helped Brazil ad
vance economically and has contributed
to economic challenges; dosing off to the
global economy seemed both to help
and to hurt as well. Can Brazil help us
decide under what conditions other de
veloping countries should open or close
themselves off to trade with the advanced
economies?
Brazil's earliest interactions with the
global economy were based on the noto
rious slave trade, which brought slaves
from west Africa to harvest agricultural
products. Up until the 1880s, Brazil relied
on slave labor. While this period saw some
agro-export success, the economic gains
were obviously distributed primarily to
the oligarchic elite, and not to workers.
This early pattern formed the basis of Bra
zil’s tremendous inequality, so the overall
effect on the economy is open to inter
pretation. Brazil did continue to grow its
economy after slavery was abolished and
up to the 1920s, and it did so in large part
through agricultural exports to industrial
ized countries.
As noted in the section on "Political
Economy," ties to the global economy in
the 1930s had ambiguous effects on Brazil.
The Great Depression hit Brazil and Latin
America hard, as it cut off the trade with
the outside world on which the economy
had come to depend; this suggests that
being deprived of global markets hurt
Brazil. On the other hand, Brazil deepened
its industrialization in the wake of Depres
sion as it shifted to domestic production
for domestic markets; this suggests that
looking inward actually helped. The ambi
guities extend further with the era known
as bureaucratic-authoritarian rule under
the military from 1964 to the 1980s. During
this period, Brazil continued to protect do
mestic industry by raising barriers to for
eign corporations, but with a caveat; The
government in Brasilia also invited foreign
corporations to establish factories in Brazil
and serve the domestic market (Evans
1979). The deepening of industrialization
that followed might suggest that Brazil
benefited from either closing off to foreign
capital or opening up to it, depending on
the interpretation.
The pro-market neoliberal era of the
1980s and 1990s gave additional fodder
for debate about the merits of interna
tional economic linkages. A consensus
emerged in the early 1980s that Brazil's
indebted economy needed to be stabi
lized and reformed, but the consensus
also took on a more assertive form with
the argument that countries like Brazil
needed to get the government out of the
economy. Major U.S.-based institutions
pushed a "Washington Consensus" that
demanded privatization, deregulation,
and less spending by Latin American gov
ernments. This set of policies undoubt
edly contributed to a downturn in the
short term, but whether it created the
basis for Brazil's longer term success is
subject to debate.
Most recently, Brazil seems once again
to be benefiting from globalization while
simultaneously being challenged by it. The
country has seen a commodity boom and
rising incomes from exports, but is also
facing increasing competition from China,
for example, in a variety of areas. In short,
one cannot simply see Brazil's interaction
with the global economy as good or evil.
Connections to the global economy must
be seen as partly (but not wholly) respon
sible for many of Brazil's booms and busts
alike, and responsible for many opportuni
ties as well as many inequalities. Nor can
one look at it just at a single moment in
time. The recent era of neoliberalism and
free market economics is one period in
which openness shaped the political econ
omy of the country, but a longer historical
perspective would suggest that this is an
incomplete picture. Linkages to the global
economy must be seen more broadly and
in historical terms as one of the key ten
sions in Brazilian economic trajectory.
4 0 8 Brazil
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil
Brazil has moved back and forth between
authoritarianism and democracy for
much of its existence as an independent
country. The country was an empire for
the period from 1822 to 1889, followed by
a Republic from 1889 to 1930. Both of
these had some formal democratic insti
tutions including elected legislatures and
relatively liberal laws that enfranchised
large numbers of people by nineteenth-
century standards, but both were in prac
tice dominated by landowning elites
(Graham 1990). The twentieth century
saw a coup leading to military rule from
1930 to 1945, followed by a democratic
republic from 1945 to 1964, which in turn
fell to another military coup. Brazil's mili
tary regime fell under the category known
as bureaucratic-authoritarian (see chapter
6) from 1964 to the 1980s. A gradual tran
sition to the current democratic republic
began in 1982, resulted in a presidential
election in 1985, and was codified in the
Brazilian Constitution of 1988.
Brazil's numerous experiences with
regime change feature prominently in
studies of democratization and demo
cratic breakdown, partly because it is a
large and important country in Latin
America and partly because the histori
cal evidence can provide support for sev
eral different theories of regime change.
There is evidence, for example, that indi
vidual groups of political actors played a
major role in transitions, and that prevail
ing ideas in the military shaped its will
ingness to wield authority, but also that
the progressive modernization of the
economy played a major role in Brazil's
political changes (O'Donnell, Schmitter,
and Whitehead [1986] 1993; Stepan 1971;
O'Donnell 1973; Evans 1979).
The study of democracy in Brazil goes
beyond the question of transition from
one regime type to another. Perhaps the
most important issues today for those
studying Brazilian politics are about dem
ocratic consolidation. Since 1988, Brazil's
democracy has achieved some consolida
tion, with repeated elections that have
seen incumbents voted out of office and
the election of Lula da Silva, whose candi
dacy was at one point unacceptable to the
military. The country has protections for
civil liberties as well, and a return to out
right authoritarian rule seems quite un
likely in the near future. Yet that does not
mean Brazil has created effective repre
sentation or equal opportunity for all citi
zens. The rule of law does not extend
equally to everyone everywhere in Brazil:
Some areas (both remote rural areas and
parts of major cities) are almost lawless
and ruled by criminals, while corruption is
considerable in the police and in many
political institutions. Of course, looking at
this in comparative perspective, it is possi
ble to say that no country perfectly fulfills
the ideal of a consolidated democracy.
One of the most interesting transitions
in recent years has been a set of economic
and policy changes that have improved
the well-being of the lowest-income
people in Brazil. One of these changes is
C H A P T E R 6, P A G E 130
the overall growth of the Brazilian econ
omy, which has been stable and solid
after decades in which the country was
known for its massive crises. In terms of
government policies, the most famous is
the Bolsa Familia, or Family Allowance.
This program, known as a "conditional
cash transfer," provides direct income
from the government to poor families on
the condition that they keep their chil
dren in school and keep their vaccinations
up to date. The program predates the Lula
presidency, but it was dramatically ex
panded on a nationwide basis under Lula.
While economic growth and policies such
as Bolsa Familia may seem to be largely an
issue of economics, they can also bring
political change. First, economic growth
and "pro-poor" programs are credited
with reducing inequality and poverty in
recent years, and there is some evidence
that low-income Brazilians with access to
some disposable income participated ac
tively in reelecting Lula (Zucco 2008).
Second, such social policies suggest gov
ernment that directly addresses problems
facing the poor, which was not always the
case under Brazilian democracies that
were long considered elite-led. Third, this
set of changes brings poorer Brazilians
into greater contact with state institu
tions, such as the education and health
systems. This raises the prospect of
strengthening relations between the
state and society at large, which is one
measure of what democratic consolida
tion is about.
Case Studies 409
Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline
in Brazil's Legislature C H A P T E R 9, P A G E 2 0 9
Brazil has a bicameral legislature, like most
federal systems. The upper chamber,
called the Senate (Senado), is designed to
represent the states (estados). Three sena
tors represent each state in the Senate, for
a total of eighty-one for the twenty-seven
states of the federation, including the
Federal District that comprises the capital,
Brasilia. The lower chamber, known as the
Chamber of Deputies (Camara dos Depu-
tados), nominally represents the popula
tion at large, but in Brazil's federal system,
the electoral rules for the Chamber of
Deputies guarantee that even the lower
chamber takes on a localist flavor. One of
the most pressing issues in Brazilian poli
tics is how members of Congress come to
represent the interests of certain localities
over those of the country at large, even
though Deputies are not elected in spe
cific districts.
Representatives in the Chamber of
Deputies are elected by an arrangement
known as open-list proportional repre
sentation (or open-list PR). Deputies are
elected on a state-wide basis, and not
from specific local districts. There may be
as many as seventy deputies from a state
(as in the case of Sao Paulo) and as many
as 513 deputies in all, with the number
from each state depending on popula
tion. In elections to the Chamber, voters
choose their most preferred candidate
from a long list of options; that candidate
is affiliated with a political party, and there
are many parties in Brazil, both large and
small. The "open-list PR" system allocates
a state's seats in the Chamber of Deputies
based on the total number of votes a
party receives in each state from all its
candidates. Thus, if the state of Parana is
entitled to thirty seats in the Chamber,
and all of the candidates from the Work
er's Party in Parana together earn one-
third of all the votes in the state, then the
PT earns ten seats in the Chamber from
the state of Parana. This makes it a form of
proportional representation that reflects
the votes for different parties.
But which ten members of the Work
er's Party would be sent to Congress from
Parana in this example? This is determined
by which candidates received the most
individual votes. This “open-list" feature
means voters have more say over which
candidates go to Congress, as contrasted
with conventional PR systems in which
party leaders rank their preferred list of
representatives that will go to the legisla
ture depending on the party's share of
the vote. Obviously, candidates seeking
election want their party to garner a lot of
seats (since that gives a greater chance of
being elected), but must also gain consid
erable individual name recognition to
separate themselves from the pack. Indi
vidual candidates thus prioritize making a
name for themselves in certain cities and
towns, carving out electoral support,
while also seeking to join parties that they
think will give them the best shot at elec
tion. What they do not necessarily priori
tize is following the wishes of their party's
leaders. This weakens the cohesion of par
ties and makes those political parties dif
ficult to "discipline."
Open-list PR thus has certain intuitive
advantages, such as combining propor
tionality with votes for individual repre
sentatives, but it has also contributed to
problems in governing in a Congress that
was chaotic for many years (Power 2000).
One result was a large number of parties
represented in both chambers, and for a
long time a great deal of “floor crossing,"
as deputies moved from party to party
(call it "party hopping") in an attempt to
jockey for the best position for future
elections. It also led party leaders to at
tempt to "bribe" legislators in their party
to secure their votes on important legisla
tion; sometimes this happened with pa
tronage or "pork" for a legislator's home
district or electoral base, and sometimes
the bribes were literal. As Brazilian gover
nance grew somewhat less chaotic over
the period from 1994 to the present, the
problems associated with open-list PR
were seen as somewhat less troubling:
more legislators stuck with their presi
dents and with their parties, though the
trends of "party indiscipline" continued.
Brazil's electoral system offers an illus
tration of how institutions must be under
stood in relation to one another, and how
diverse institutional arrangements can be.
In this case, the functioning of the legisla
ture depends on both electoral systems
(as examined in chapter 9) and party sys
tems (examined in chapter 11). Many ana
lysts of Brazil have argued that the way
deputies favor their own states leads to
patronage politics rather than a legisla
ture that looks out for the national inter
ests. The debate about consequences is
ongoing, but one common academic
suggestion to reform Brazilian politics has
been the modification or elimination of
open-list PR, with the argument usually
favoring more traditional ("closed-list") PR
that would give party leaders greater le
verage over their rank-and-file members
in Congress.
410 Brazil
WBBSMw m
Brazil's Landless Movement
’ ^'̂ 00
As noted already, Brazil has often been
seen as a society where social change
comes about not through revolutions but
through gradual transitions, yet some im
portant transformative movements have
come out of Brazil. Like the rest of Latin
America, Brazil has long been character
ized by high levels of poverty and in
equality. One form of this inequality has
been in patterns of land ownership. This is
important, of course, because many Bra
zilians value social equality and would like
to see fair opportunities for all citizens. It is
also important, though, because compar
ative analysis shows that high levels of in
equality are bad for other things that
people value, like democracy. While Brazil
has not seen land reform on the scale of
those produced by major social revolu
tions like those of China, Russia, or Cuba, it
has, in recent years, seen notable efforts
to distribute some land to the poor, land
both privately owned and held by the
state. This land redistribution would have
been very unlikely without the Landless
Movement.
The Movement began in the 1970s with
the main aim of encouraging groups of ac
tivists to occupy and distribute land and to
pressure the state to sanction this. Efforts
began in the south but spread to various
parts of the country. Social movement
theory would predict that organizations
would be needed if this movement were to
develop. Sure enough, in 1984, a formal or
ganization, the MST (the Movement of
Landless Rural Workers) was created.
The activities of this movement shift
and vary over time (Ondetti 2008). The
movement first appeared in the 1970s,
had mixed experience in the 1980s and
early 1990s, and then had considerable
success during the first administration of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1999),
who implemented a major land reform
program. The movement had renewed
success under the administration of Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), although
C H A P T E R 12, P A G E 282
the MST was somewhat critical of Lula
because of expectations raised by his per
ceived ideological affinity with the Move
ment and also the associations between
his Political party— the Workers' Party
(PT)— and the MST. It will be interesting to
watch the ongoing development of this
social movement during the government
of Dilma Rousseff.
Why is the Landless Movement consid
ered a social movement rather than a revo
lution? It is important to remember that our
categories of contention are "ideal types." It
may be possible to argue that the Landless
Movement is revolutionary, since it does
clearly aim to transform the Brazilian social
structure. However, most see it as a social
movement because it does not aim to di
rectly capture the state and because it is
focused on the specific issue of land reform
rather than a total transformation of poli
tics and society, even though many of its
activists and supporters do have such
hopes for a total transformation.
CASE STUDY
Gender and Political Representation in Brazil:
Where Has Progress Come From? C H A P T E R 14, P A G E 3 3 6
Like most modern societies, Brazil has
struggled to provide gender equity.
Also like most modern societies, it still
has a ways to go on this issue. That said,
the country has made considerable
progress in recent years, especially since
the 1990s, perhaps symbolized by the
fact that the country currently has a
female president, Dilma Rousseff. Com
parative political analysts ask how and
why this progress has been made, in
part because understanding the sources
of both progress and failures may help
future organizers and party leaders to
make further progress, both in Brazil
and elsewhere.
Some of the political successes of the
Brazilian women's movement include the
following:
1. Women's suffrage in 1932, though
this proved moot in the Estado
Novo (1937-1945, when women
were equally unable to vote) and
in later authoritarian governments.
2. The decriminalization of divorce
in 1977, with reforms in the late
2000s making divorce easier to
obtain. This is important because
typically women without the right
to divorce are more likely to be
stuck in dangerous situations like
ongoing domestic violence, and it
is widely held in today's world that
Case Studies 411
CASE STUDY (continued)
Gender and Political Representation in Brazil:
Where Has Progress Come From? C H A P T E R 14, P A G E 336
people should be free to enter into
and exit relationships consensually.
3. Creation of the Conselho National
dos Direitos da Mulher (CNDM,
The National Council on Women's
Rights) in 1985 and the Secretaria
Especial de Politicos para as Mulheres
(SEPM) in 2003. This was a conse
quence of important women's
movement activism in civil society,
and it essentially coincided with
the re-emergence of Brazilian
democracy. The CNDM has been
involved in numerous important
feminist initiatives (Macaulay
2006:48).
4. In 1996, the passage of a law
proposed by the PT (Workers'Party)
establishing minimal candidate
quotas of 30 percent for both men
and women. This means is that
parties are required to run slates
of candidates at least 30 percent of
whom are women.
5. Dilma Rousseff's election in 2010.
Fiona Macaulay (2006: 39) notes that an
interesting feature of recent Brazilian
experience is that advances on gender
issues at the national level have not often
come from the state, but rather from the
Partido dos Trabalhadores (the party of
both Rousseff and Lula da Silva), though
some proposals have come from actors
from a variety of parties and even though
gender has not historically been an axis
of "party system cleavage" in Brazil. This
latter point is not especially surprising,
particularly given that gender-based par
ties, unlike ethnicity-based parties, are
rare for reasons discussed in chapter 14
(see Htun 2004; Htun and Power 2006).
More interesting is the fact that PT has, in
comparative terms, nominated many
more female candidates than other par
ties and has more consistently focused on
gender issues. Macaulay's analysis sug
gests that this is partially due to the role
that female activists and party operatives
have played within the PT.
Macaulay further points to the fact
that Brazil has a fairly decentralized fed
eral political system, and that local and
state-level reforms have also been benefi
cial to women in some areas (Macaulay
2006: 35). The downside of this, of course,
is that women's rights and their enforce
ment vary from area to area as well.
Despite substantial progress on issues of
gender and politics in Brazil, serious prob
lems remain, including limited represen
tation of women's issues, a higher rate of
poverty for women than men, and a nota
bly high rate of domestic violence. Many
would also point to Brazil's strong restric
tions on abortion in this connection.
Research Prompts
1. We have noted that Brazil is sometimes considered a "non
revolutionary" society in which transitions are gradual. Be this as
it may, it is demonstrable that Brazil stands out in the Latin
American context for the degree to which its transition to inde
pendence was peaceful. Why might this be? What would major
theories of revolution say about this, and how might this case (in
comparative Latin American perspective) help us to consider
the relative merits of those theories?
2. After decades of mixed performance, Brazil has recently
achieved impressive economic growth. What would the major
theories of development considered in chapter 5 say about this
case? What can Brazil's experience tell us about those theories?
3. Describe the nature of Brazil's electoral system. If this system were
adopted in the United States, what would its consequences for poli
tics likely be in the short, medium, and long terms? Why must we be
cautious and tentative in asking such hypothetical questions?
4. A question is raised in the case study herein about whether the
Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement is a social movement or a
revolution. How would you define it based on the description
offered here? What are the implications of your choice for your
theoretical approach to contention?
5. One of the case studies in this chapter discusses how Brazil has
moved from a more corporatist to a more pluralist mode of in
terest articulation. How and why has this happened? What sorts
of comparative cases could one select in order to better answer
this question?
6. Brazil has alternated between democracy and authoritarianism
for some time, with a strong authoritarian tradition. More re
cently, it has had notable democratic success. Is this likely to last?
Why or why not? Be sure to draw both on facts about Brazil and
on theories of democratic consolidation in your response.
B China
412
Key Features o f C o n te m p o r a ry China
Population: 1,355,692,576 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 9,596,961 square miles
Head of State: Xi Jinping (president, 2013-present)
Head of Government: Li Keqiang (premier, 2013-present)
Capital: Beijing
Year of Independence: Never formally colonized, with the exception of
Hong Kong, despite European imperial
involvement in the nineteenth century. People's
Republic of China established in 1949.
Year of Current
Constitution:
1982
Languages: Mandarin is the majority language. There are
numerous dialects and minority languages.
GDP per Capita: $6,807 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
Human Development
Index Ranking (2014):
91st (medium human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Development Report 2014.
Introduction
F o r a c o m p a ra tiv e p o litic s sc h o lar, C h i n a
is o n e o f th e m o s t f a s c in a tin g c o u n trie s . I t
ra ises n u m e ro u s q u e s tio n s a n d issu e s, as w e
s h a ll see, a b o u t e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t, d e
m o cra cy , th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n p o litic a l
p a r tie s a n d th e s ta te , a n d th e cau ses a n d
c o n se q u e n c e s o f so c ia l re v o lu tio n s, a m o n g
m a n y o th e rs . W e s h a ll e x p lo re so m e o f th e s e
h e re , a n d y o u c a n u se th e th e o rie s t h a t y ou
h a v e a c q u ire d in t h e th e m a tic c h a p te rs o f
th is b o o k to c o m p a re a n d c o n tr a s t C h i n a
w i t h o th e r cases.
O f c o u rse , a le a d in g issu e in t h e p o litic s
o f C h i n a is th e q u e s tio n o f h o w i t h a s ra p id ly
b e c o m e th e w o r ld ’s s e c o n d -la rg e s t e c o n o m y
a n d a m a jo r g lo b a l p o w e r, j u s t a fe w s h o r t
d e c a d e s a f te r b e in g c h a r a c te riz e d b y ex
tr e m e p o v e rty (th o u g h m a n y C h in e s e c iti
z e n s re m a in v e ry p oor). I t h a s d o n e so in a
n o n - d e m o c r a tic , o n e - p a r ty sta te t h a t r e
s tric ts m a n y b a sic fre e d o m s . C h i n a t h u s
p re s e n ts a c h a lle n g e to t h e s o -c a lle d “W e s t
e rn m o d e l” o f p o litic s a n d e c o n o m ic s b a se d
o n lib e ra l d e m o c ra c y a n d fre e m a rk e ts . T h e
im p lic a tio n s o f C h in a ’s rise fo r th e f u tu r e are
m assiv e, b o t h w i t h in C h i n a a n d a r o u n d th e
w o rld . W e e x a m in e th e s e issu es o f p o litic a l
e c o n o m y a n d th e re g im e in th is pro file .
A n o t h e r s t r ik in g t h in g a b o u t C h in a
fro m th e p o in t o f v ie w o f p o litic a l science is
H a n C hinese 91.1
O th er groups 8.51
Ethnic Groups in China
Source: CIA World Factbook.
I N om inally secular/atheist 8 6-
| D aoist 3 -4%
B uddhist 3-4%
SK C hristian 3—4%
I M uslim 1-2%
Religious Affiliation in China
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Profile 413
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
Harbin
MONGOLIA Sea o f
Japan
Shenyang
Qinhuangdao .
™ c B e i j i n g * .
Tianjin
Urumqi
Dalian
Qingdao
f S Yellow
Zhengzhou Seo
Nanjing ‘ .Sh a n g h a i
Lanzhou
Chengdu
Lhasa
- J
tohmaputra
East China f
SeaChongqing
Guangzhou TAIWAN
■BANG!INDIA J BURMA
(MYANMAR) Macau
U A O S PHILIPPINES
HAINAN
DAO
«300 600 Kilometers
600 Miles
th e d e g re e o f p o litic a l, e c o n o m ic , a n d c u lt u r a l u n i ty t h a t it
h a s m a n a g e d to a ch iev e d e sp ite its e n o rm o u s siz e (in te rm s
o f b o t h g e o g ra p h y a n d p o p u la tio n ) a n d its div ersity . C h in a
is a m o n g t h e m o s t g e o g ra p h ic a lly d iv erse c o u n trie s in th e
w o rld . Its la n d m ass e n c o m p a s se s o v e r 9.5 m illio n s q u a re
m ile s. P a r ts o f s o u th e r n C h in a a re tro p ic a l a n d s u b tro p ic a l,
w h e re a s in th e n o r t h w in te rs c a n b e q u ite c old. R a in fa ll
a lso v a rie s co n sid era b ly , b e in g a m p le n e a r th e c o a s t a n d
m in im a l i n th e e n o rm o u s G o b i D e s e r t. T h e w o r ld ’s la rg e s t
m o u n ta in s — th e H im a la y a s — a re s h a re d b y C h in a , b u t
o th e r re g io n s a re la rg e ly flat, a n d t h e T u r f a n D e p re s s io n
lies b e lo w sea level. C h i n a e v en h a s ra in fo re s ts i n t h e s o u th .
C h in a ’s p o p u la tio n c u r re n tly s ta n d s a t a r o u n d 1.4 b il
lio n , m a k in g it t h e la rg e s t c o u n tr y in t h e w o rld in p o p u la
tio n te rm s . D e m o g ra p h e rs e x p e c t C h in e s e p o p u la tio n
g r o w t h to slow in th e c o m in g d e c a d e s , a n d so m e su g g e s t
t h a t I n d i a ’s p o p u la tio n w ill o v e rta k e C h i n a ’s, t h o u g h th e
a c c u ra c y o f t h is fo re c a st r e m a in s to b e seen. C h in a ’s d e
m o g ra p h y h a s h is to ric a lly b e e n sh a p e d b y sta te policy. P o p
u la tio n g r o w t h w a s p a r tia lly a fu n c tio n o f t h e e ffo rts o f th e
s ta te to e x p a n d p o p u la tio n u n d e r M a o Z e d o n g . I n t h e late
1 970s, in a n e ffo rt to slo w p o p u la tio n g r o w t h , th e “O n e
C h i ld P o lic y ” w a s e sta b lish e d . T h is p o lic y im p o s e s p e n a l
tie s o n f a m ilie s w i t h tw o o r m o re c h ild r e n , t h o u g h t h is ru le
is n o t s u p p o s e d to a p p ly to e th n ic m in o ritie s a n d o th e r
g ro u p s u n d e r so m e c irc u m s ta n c e s . O n e m a jo r d e v e lo p m e n t
t h a t is a t le a s t p a r tia lly a n u n in te n d e d c o n se q u e n c e o f th is
p o lic y is t h a t m a n y fa m ilie s have u s e d se x -se lec tiv e a b o r
t io n a n d in so m e cases e v en in fa n tic id e in t h e i r e ffo rts to
e n s u re t h a t t h e i r o n e c h ild w ill b e m a le . A s a r e s u lt, to d a y ’s
p o p u la tio n in C h in a is u n b a la n c e d in r e la tio n to g e n d e r.
414 China
T h e p o p u la tio n o f C h i n a seem s la rg e ly h o m o g e n e o u s ,
b u t o n ly a t first g la n c e . O v e r 9 0 p e rc e n t o f t h e p o p u la tio n
fa lls in to t h e H a n e th n i c categ o ry . Y e t t h e re m a in in g 8.5
p e r c e n t o f th e p o p u la tio n falls in to n u m e ro u s g ro u p s (sm a ll
in p e rc e n ta g e te rm s , b e c a u se o f C h in a ’s la rg e p o p u la tio n ,
b u t s till n u m e ro u s in a b so lu te te rm s). T h e se c a te g o rie s in
c lu d e th e M a n c h u (th e e th n ic g ro u p t h a t w a s d o m in a n t
d u r in g th e Q i n g D y n a s ty ), T ib e ta n s , M o n g o ls , Z h u a n g ,
a n d U ig h u r, a m o n g o th e rs .
I n te rm s o f re lig io n , C h in a ’s sta te is officially a th e is t in
c h a ra c te r, o w in g , in p a r t, to th e le g a c y o f M a r x is m , w h ic h
h o ld s t h a t re lig io n is a fo rm o f “false c o n sc io u s n e s s.” A n
o th e r fa c to r is th e se n se t h a t t h e p a s t a c tiv ity o f re lig io u s
m is s io n a rie s , e sp e c ia lly in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n tu ry , w a s d is
ru p tiv e . J u s t th e sa m e , v ib r a n t re lig io u s c o m m u n itie s
r e m a in in C h in a , a n d re lig io n h a s h is to ric a lly p la y e d a n
i m p o r t a n t ro le in so c ia l c o n flic t (see, in p a r tic u la r , d is c u s
sio n o f th e T a ip in g R e b e llio n l a te r in th e s e c o u n tr y m a te ri
als). T h e fo llo w in g c h a r t sh o w s th e p e rc e n ta g e o f th e
p o p u la tio n t h a t p ro fesse s a lle g ia n c e to se v e ra l m a jo r re li
g io n s. S tu d e n ts s h o u ld k e e p in m in d t h a t so m e sc h o lars
e s tim a te h ig h e r levels o f re lig io u s b e lie f a n d p ra c tic e t h a n
th e s e d a ta s u g g e s t (see P e w F o r u m 2 0 0 8 ).
I n s h o r t, C h in a is a la rg e , c o m p le x , h e te ro g e n e o u s soci
e ty in w h ic h o n e m a jo r e th n ic g ro u p ( H a n C h in e s e ) p r e
d o m in a te s . T h e sta te is o fficially se c u la r, b u t u n d e r n e a th
th is su rfa c e a n u m b e r o f c itiz e n s are re lig io u s ( W e im in g
1999). I t h a s a v a rie d g e o g ra p h y a n d so m e s tr ik in g d e m o
g ra p h ic p a tte rn s . T h e s e b a sic f e a tu re s fo rm th e c o n te x t
th r o u g h w h ic h w e t r y to u n d e r s ta n d C h i n a ’s p o litic a l
d e v e lo p m e n t.
Historical Development
C h in a s ta n d s o u t a m o n g m o s t m o d e r n c o u n trie s fo r h o w
lo n g it h a s e x is te d as a la rg e -s c a le a n d m o re o r less u n ifie d
c iv iliz a tio n . In d e e d , C h in a h a s b e e n a d is tin c t g e o p o litic a l
e n tity fo r millennia. A s w e s h a ll see, h o w e v er, th is d o e s n o t
m e a n t h a t it d o e s n o t c h a n g e , o r t h a t i t is n o t c h a n g in g
now . T h e b e g in n in g o f t h e h is to r y o f I m p e r ia l C h i n a is c o n
v e n tio n a lly d a te d a t 2 2 1 b c e , a n d h is to ria n s h a v e t r a c e d th e
se q u e n c e o f im p e ria l re g im e s t h a t fo llo w e d . T h e h is to r y o f
modern C h in a , h o w e v er, b e g in s in t h e la te r y e ars o f th e
Q in g D y n a s ty (1 6 4 4 -1 9 1 2 ). T h e Q i n g D y n a s t y e n te re d
in to d iffic u ltie s in th e n i n e te e n th c e n tu r y d u e to se v e ra l k e y
facto rs: fo re ig n in te rv e n tio n , fiscal d iffic u ltie s , i n te r n a l in
sta b ility , a n d a c h a n g in g g e o p o litic a l e n v ir o n m e n t (for a n
o v e rv ie w o f th is p e r io d , see S p e n c e 1 990; F a ir b a n k a n d
G o ld m a n 2 0 0 6 ).
C h i n a in th e n i n e te e n t h c e n tu r y fa c e d in c re a s in g fo r
e ig n in te r v e n tio n . W e s te r n n a tio n s im p o s e d t h e i r o w n
“rig h ts ” to tr a d e w i t h C h i n a , u s in g fo rce w h e n necessary.
T h is e v en in c lu d e d B ritis h m e r c h a n ts ’ in tr o d u c tio n (sm u g
g lin g ) o f o p iu m to th e C h in e s e m a rk e t. W h e n C h i n a tr ie d
to re sist, th e y w e re tw ic e m ilita r ily c o e rc e d (in t h e 1 8 4 0 s
a n d 1850s), a n d a m o n g o th e r t h in g s H o n g K o n g b e c a m e a
c ro w n c o lo n y o f th e B ritis h E m p ire . B e y o n d d ir e c t in te rfe r
en ce o f th is s o r t w i t h in C h in a p ro p e r, E u r o p e a n p o w e rs
also in te r f e r e d in C h i n a ’s t r a d i tio n a l sp h e re o f in flu e n c e ,
p a rtic u la r ly in s o -c a lle d “F re n c h I n d o C h i n a . ” I t is
Profile 415
im p o r ta n t to u n d e r s ta n d t h a t C h i n a c o n s id e re d its e lf, n o t
w ith o u t e v id e n c e , to b e o n e o f th e w o r ld ’s g r e a t c iv iliz a
tio n s , a n d t h e i r re la tiv e w e a k n e s s in th e face o f E u r o p e a n
p o w e rs w as e x p e rie n c e d as h u m ilia tin g . A t t h e sa m e tim e ,
th e Q in g D y n a s t y fo u n d i ts e l f in se rio u s fiscal d iffic u lties.
I t w a s u n a b le to c o n s is te n tly ra is e th e re v en u e s t h a t w e re
r e q u ire d to p r o te c t i ts e l f a n d to m a in ta in i n te r n a l o rd e r
(F a ir b a n k a n d G o l d m a n 2 0 0 6 :1 8 7 ; S p e n c e 1990). P a r tia lly
as a re s u lt, th e c o u n tr y w itn e s s e d se rio u s in te r n a l d i s t u r
b a n c e s. A m o n g th e s e w e re th e T a ip in g R e b e llio n o f th e
1850s a n d 1 8 6 0 s, w h ic h w a s le d by H o n g X iu q u a n , w h o
c la im e d to b e th e b r o t h e r o f Je su s C h r i s t a n d w h o w a n te d
to d isp la c e th e Q i n g a n d im p o s e a q u a s i-re lig io u s re g im e .
T h e e n s u in g c o n flic t k ille d m a n y m illio n s b e fo re th e Q in g
e v e n tu a lly p u t i t d o w n . T h is w a s o n ly th e m o s t i m p o r ta n t o f
a se ries o f n in e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y re b e llio n s a g a in s t th e Q in g .
F in a lly , it is i m p o r t a n t to n o te t h a t d u r in g th is sa m e p e rio d
o f th e la te n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , C h i n a ’s n e ig h b o r J a p a n u n
d e r w e n t d r a m a tic c h a n g e s a n d b y th e e n d o f th e c e n tu ry
e m e rg e d as a m a jo r r e g io n a l p o w e r, d e fe a tin g C h in a its e lf
in th e S in o -Ja p a n e s e W a r o f 1 8 9 4 -1 8 9 5 a n d t h e n d e fe a tin g
R u s s ia in th e R u s s o -J a p a n e s e W a r o f 1 9 0 4 -1 9 0 5 .
H isto rical D e v e lo p m e n t
T i m e l i n e
1644-1912
1839-1842
1842
1850-1873
1856-1860
1860
1894-1895
1898
1899-1901
1911-1912
1912
1920-1921
1925
1926
1931
1934-1935
1936
Qing Dynasty
First Opium War (with Britain)
Treaty of Nanking. Britain takes Hong Kong and
imposes trading rights for itself.
Taiping (1850-1864), Nien (1853-1868), and Panthay
(1855-1873) Rebellions
Second Opium (or "Arrow") War with Britain and
France
Convention of Peking imposes humiliating condi
tions on China
Sino-Japanese War (China defeated)
Hundred Days' Reform, ended by coup d'etat
Boxer Rebellion, ended by foreign intervention
(eight foreign powers)
Revolution of 1911
Fall of the Qing Dynasty, foundation of Guomind-
ang (GMD or Nationalist Party), establishment of
the Republic of China, which then falls into disor
der and civil conflict
Chinese Communist Party founded
Death of Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Kuomintang
Chiang Kai-Shek leads "Northern Expedition,”
achieving partial political unification.
Japanese invasion of Manchuria
The "Long March" of the Communists, who face
repression at the hands of the Nationalists. The
march facilitates Mao's rise within the group and
the move toward the countryside.
Beginning of the "Anti-Japanese War," which can
be thought of as the beginning of the Second
World War in China.
1937
1946-1949
1949
1949
1950-1952
1950-1953
1955-1956
1957
1957,1959
1958-1960
1966-1969
1976
1976
Japanese invasion of Manchuria (Northeast China)
in lead-up to World War II
After end of World War II, Civil War between
Nationalists and Communists continues.
Communists victorious, Nationalists exiled to
Taiwan.
People's Republic of China is proclaimed.
Major land reform is carried out.
Korean War, in which China backed North Korea
against U.S.-backed South Korea
Major agricultural collectivization is carried out.
The "Hundred Flowers Campaign" in which dissent
is encouraged but then punished
The "Anti-Rightist" Campaigns, in which alleged
enemies of the revolution are repressed
The "Great Leap Forward"— An effort to force in
dustrialization and meet often unrealistic produc
tion goals. Among other things this produces a
famine that leads to millions of deaths, some say as
many as twenty million or more.
The "Cultural Revolution" and massive political
repression, especially in the late 1960s, though
some think this period lasts until Mao's death. The
government encourages students to root out al
leged enemies of the revolution. Among others,
Deng Xiaoping loses his position, only to be reha
bilitated in 1974.
Arrest of the "Gang of Four," prominent Communist
leaders of the Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong's death
416 China
Timeline (Continued)
1978-1979
1989
1993
1997
Deng Xiaoping consolidates his dominance in the
post-Mao transition. Deng Xiaoping reforms begin,
which open China to greater private enterprise and
foreign trade and begin to dismantle the collectiv
ization of agriculture, leading to greater agricultural
productivity.
Tiananmen Square assault by military on protesters
centerpiece of repression of movement for political
reform
Jiang Zemin assumes presidency.
China officially takes over Hong Kong from
United Kingdom.
2003
2008
2007-2010
2013
China becomes member of World Trade Organiza
tion (WTO).
Hu Jintao assumes presidency.
Beijing Olympics are taken by many as a sign of
China's ascendancy.
China becomes world's second-largest economy,
largest exporter, largest holder of foreign currency
reserves, and largest polluter.
Xi Jinping becomes president and Li Keqiang
becomes premier.
N o t su rp risin g ly , m a n y in C h i n a w e re n o t p le a se d b y
th is c o n s te lla tio n o f fa cto rs. I t is n o t h a r d t o see w h y th is le d
to a n u p s u rg e in C h in e s e n a tio n a lis m ( H a r r is o n 2 0 0 1 ).
S o m e d e c id e d t h a t g re a te r o p e n n e s s to b o t h J a p a n a n d th e
W e s t w o u ld b e n e e d e d , i n te rm s o f b o t h te c h n o lo g y a n d
p o litic a l id ea s. B y th e firs t d e c a d e o f th e tw e n ti e th c e n tu ry ,
th e Q i n g re g im e w a s e m b ra c in g re fo rm s a n d e v en to y in g
w i th c o n s titu tio n a lis m . H o w e v e r, th is w a s n o t e n o u g h to
sto p th e g r o w in g d is c o n te n t, a n d a p o litic a l re v o lu tio n (th e
“C h in e s e R e v o lu tio n o f 1911”) to p p le d th e Q i n g in 1912.
T h e m o s t im p o r t a n t le a d e r in th is m o v e m e n t w a s S u n
Y at-sen.
U n f o r tu n a te ly , th is re v o lu tio n d i d n o t b r i n g a b o u t
s ta b le , c o n s t it u t io n a l g o v e r n m e n t (on th is p e r io d , see
F a i r b a n k a n d G o ld m a n 2 0 0 6 ; S p e n c e 1 9 9 0 ). R a th e r ,
C h i n a d e s c e n d e d in to w h a t s c h o la rs re fe r to as th e p e r io d
o f “W a r lo r d is m ” ( S c h o p p a 2 0 1 0 : 4 7 - 4 8 ) . I n s h o r t, t h e ex
i s t in g s ta te b ro k e d o w n , a n d lo c a l p o w e r b ro k e rs w e re r e
sp o n s ib le fo r m u c h o f t h e o r d e r t h a t r e m a in e d . I t w a s in
t h is c o n te x t t h a t so m e o f t h e p o litic a l fo rc e s t h a t s till
s h a p e C h i n a w e re c re a te d . I n t h e 1 9 2 0 s, C h i a n g K a i-
s h e k , le a d e r o f t h e N a t io n a l i s t P a r t y (th e G u o m i n d a n g o r
G M D ) , s u c c e ss fu lly e s ta b lis h e d c e n t r a l p o litic a l o r d e r in
m u c h o f C h in a . Y e t th is v ic to r y w a s n e v e r a b s o lu te . T he
C o m m u n i s t P a r t y h a d b e e n e s ta b lis h e d in t h e e a rly 1 9 2 0 s,
w it h th e e a r lie r g r o u n d w o r k b e in g s e t b y t h e “M a y F o u r t h
M o v e m e n t,” a n d th e N a t io n a lis ts a n d C o m m u n is ts ex
is te d in te n s io n . A t tim e s , t h e C o m m u n is ts fo llo w e d C o
m in t e r n o rd e rs to c o o p e ra te w i t h th e N a tio n a l is ts , a n d a t
o t h e r tim e s n o t. L ik e w is e , C h i a n g K a i - s h e k a n d th e
N a tio n a lis ts a lt e r n a te d b e tw e e n c o o p e r a tio n w i t h a n d c o
e rc io n o f t h e C o m m u n is ts . M o re o v e r, th e r e w a s e v e n s u s
ta i n e d v i o le n t c o n f r o n ta tio n within t h e G M D in t h e la te
1 9 2 0 s. D u r i n g th e lo n g r e s is ta n c e to J a p a n in th e 1 9 3 0 s
a n d 1 9 4 0 s th e r e w e re p e r io d s i n w h i c h t h e N a tio n a lis ts
w e re fo rc e d t o te m p o r a r i ly c o o p e ra te w i t h t h e C o m m u
n is ts , b u t t h i s d i d n ’t la s t. A f t e r t h e w a r, th e C o m m u n is ts ,
u n d e r t h e le a d e r s h ip o f M a o Z e d o n g , g r a d u a lly d e fe a te d
th e N a t io n a lis ts , w h o r e tr e a t e d a lo n g w i t h C h i a n g
K a i- s h e k to T a iw a n . I n a c c o m p lis h in g t h is , th e C o m m u
n is ts w e re g r e a tly a id e d b y th e w o r k t h e y h a d d o n e in o r
g a n iz in g p e a s a n t c o m m u n itie s .
I n 1949, M a o d e c la re d th e P e o p le ’s R e p u b lic o f C h in a
(P R C ). A t firs t, th e n e w re g im e w a s v e ry m u c h in lin e w it h
th e C o m m u n i s t re g im e in th e S o v ie t U n io n , b u t o v e r tim e
th e y t o o k a d iffe re n t c o u rse (T eiw e s 2 0 1 0 ). A k e y e m p h a sis
o n t h e P R C w a s to e n c o u ra g e th e c o lle c tiv iz a tio n o f a g r i
c u ltu r e a n d fo rc e d i n d u s tr ia liz a tio n . I n 1958, M a o d e c la re d
th e “G r e a t L e a p F o r w a r d .” T h is is o f te n th o u g h t a b o u t b y
sc h o la rs as o n e o f t h e c le a re st e x a m p le s o f th e “v o lu n ta ris m ”
o f M a o is t t h o u g h t. W h e r e a s tr a d i tio n a l M a r x is m h a d e m
p h a s iz e d t h a t u n d e r ly in g s t r u c tu r a l c o n d itio n s w o u ld d e
te r m in e th e s e q u e n c in g o f r e v o lu tio n a ry p ro c e ss e s , M a o is m
h e ld t h a t t h r o u g h a g r e a t a c t o f t h e c o lle ctiv e w ill, C h in a
c o u ld force m o d e r n iz a tio n . U n fo rtu n a te ly , t h e “G r e a t L e a p
F o r w a r d ” p ro d u c e d f a m in e r a th e r t h a n m o d e r n iz a tio n . T h e
m a in r e a s o n w a s t h a t a g r ic u ltu r a l c o lle ctiv e s fe lt o b lig a te d
to e x a g g e ra te t h e i r p ro d u c tiv ity , a n d th e sta te in t u r n d e
m a n d e d s o -c a lle d excess g r a in p r o d u c tio n ( F a ir b a n k a n d
G o l d m a n 2 0 0 6 : 3 6 8 -3 7 4 ). M illio n s d ie d .
Profile 417
P o litic ally , C h i n a u n d e r M a o w a s a p a r ty d ic ta to rs h ip ,
o n e i n w h ic h t h e p a r t y w a s c le a rly p e rs o n a lly c o n tro lle d b y
M a o h im s e lf. T h e p a r ty a n d t h e s ta te w e re o r g a n iz a tio n a lly
i n te r p e n e tr a te d a t e v ery level. W h i l e t h e r e w e re s o m e m in i
m a l “d e m o c ra tic ” f e a tu re s in te r n a l to th e p a r t y a t c e r ta in
levels, t h e p a r ty w as u n d e r s to o d to h a v e a m o n o p o ly o n
g u id in g th e sta te . T h e r a tio n a le fo r th is w a s t h a t t h e p a r ty
w a s sa id t o t r u ly re p re s e n t t h e w o rk e rs, a n d a n y o th e r p a rty ,
th e re fo re , w o u ld n e c e ssa rily r e p re s e n t class e n e m ie s a n d b e
o n th e w r o n g side o f h isto ry .
M a o w as alw ays o n th e lo o k o u t fo r C h in a ’s t u r n aw ay
fro m rev o lu tio n . H e t h o u g h t t h a t rev o lu tio n n e e d e d to be
“p e rm a n e n t” a n d t h a t t h e b o u rg e o is “class e n em ies” o f th e
w orkers c o u ld b e a n y w h ere . F o r th is re a so n h e e n c o u ra g e d
self-criticism . I n d e e d , in th e late 1950s h e in itia te d th e
“H u n d r e d F lo w e rs” c a m p a ig n (S pence 1990: 5 6 9 -5 7 3 ). T he
id ea w as t h a t in te lle c tu a ls a n d o th e rs w o u ld c riticize a n d th u s
im p ro v e th e rev o lu tio n . H o w ev e r, M a o w as less t h a n satisfied
w h e n his o w n p o licies b e c a m e th e o b jec t o f c riticism . H e a n d
o th e rs soon d e n o u n c e d th e s e c ritics as “rig h tists.” T h is p h e
n o m e n o n w as even c le a re r in th e “c u ltu ra l rev o lu tio n ” o f th e
late 1960s (S pence 1990: 6 0 2 -6 1 7 ; F a irb a n k a n d G o ld m a n
2 0 0 6 : 3 8 3 - 4 0 5 ) . M a o tr ie d to o rg a n iz e a m o v e m e n t to ta r g e t
“rig h tists” a n d a lle g ed e n em ies o f th e re v o lu tio n , b u t so o n th e
s tu d e n t “R e d G u a r d ” g ro u p s e sc ap e d h is co n tro l. M a n y w ere
a tta c k e d a n d k ille d , a n d s till o th e rs lo st th e ir jo b s a n d w ere
im p riso n e d o r se n t t o w o rk w it h th e p e a s a n ts in th e c o u n try
side. P u rg e s to u c h e d a ll levels o f th e society, in c lu d in g fu tu re
le a d e r D e n g X ia o p in g .
M a o d ie d in 1 9 7 6 , a n d a f te r a b r i e f p e r io d a n e w , r e
f o r m is t g e n e r a ti o n c a m e i n t o le a d e r s h ip ( G ille y 2 0 1 0 ).
D e n g h i m s e l f w a s t h e c e n t r a l f ig u r e h e r e . T h e n e w l e a d
e r s h ip slo w ly a llo w e d s o m e l im i te d c r it ic is m o f M a o a n d
M a o is m . G r e a t e r i n t e l l e c t u a l f r e e d o m w a s a llo w e d ,
th o u g h t h e r e w e r e s t i ll s o m e i m p o r t a n t l im i t a t i o n s in
t h i s c o n n e c ti o n . P e r h a p s m o s t im p a c tf u lly , t h e re g im e
b e g a n to m a k e e c o n o m ic re fo r m s . A t f i r s t m a n y o f th e s e
w e r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h a g r ic u lt u r a l p o lic y . A g r i c u l t u r a l
w o r k e r s w e r e a llo w e d t o p r o f it i n d iv i d u a ll y ( th o u g h m o s t
l a n d w a s s t i l l s t a te - o w n e d ) , c h a n g i n g t h e in c e n tiv e
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m y , in t u r n p r o d u c in g
g r e a t e r p r o d u c tiv i ty . C h i n a s lo w ly a n d s t r a te g ic a ll y
p r i v a t i z e d s o m e s ta te fir m s , m o v in g to w a r d a m o d e l o f
“m a r k e t s o c i a li s m .” I t a ls o s k i l lf u l l y in c r e a s e d its i n t e
g r a ti o n w i t h t h e g lo b a l e c o n o m y . C h i n a ’s g r o w t h in
r e c e n t d e c a d e s h a s b e e n t r u l y a s t o n i s h i n g , w i t h h u n d r e d s
o f m il l io n s l if t e d o u t o f p o v e r ty .
P o litic a lly , th e re fo rm s h a v e b e e n less n o te w o rth y . T he
c e n tr a l g o a l se e m s to h a v e b e e n th e p re s e rv a tio n o f t h e
p o w e r o f th e C o m m u n is t P a rty , w h ic h h a s b e e n q u ite id e o
lo g ic a lly flexible. J u s t t h e sa m e , t h e p a r t y c o n tin u e s to d e
s c rib e i ts e l f as M a o is t, a n d , a t le a s t oste n sib ly , c a p ita lis t
re fo rm s i n th e e c o n o m ic sp h e re a re p re s e n te d as p re p a r in g
t h e w a y fo r f u lle r so c ia lism in th e fu tu r e . T h e re g im e has
e x p a n d e d th e role t h a t c itiz e n s c a n p la y in lo c a l p o litic s ,
a n d i n te r n a l p a r t y p o litic s a re n o l o n g e r j u s t th e p ro d u c t o f
th e d e lib e ra tio n o f a sin g le in d iv id u a l— th is b e c a m e e s p e
c ia lly c le a r u n d e r t h e le a d e rs h ip o f J ia n g Z e m i n — b u t fo r
t h e m o s t p a r t i m p o r t a n t d e c is io n m a k in g r e m a in s se c u re ly
w a lle d o f f fro m “t h e p e o p le .”
M a n y e x p e c t t h e tw e n ty - f ir s t c e n t u r y to b e “C h i n a ’s
c e n tu ry ,” a n d C h i n a h a s re c e n tly b e c o m e t h e w o r ld ’s sec
o n d - b ig g e s t eco n o m y . H o w e v e r, as w e d isc u ss h e re in , so m e
q u e s tio n s a n d p re s s u re s r e m a in . C a n C h i n a m a in ta in its
h i g h level o f e c o n o m ic g r o w th w i th o u t th e e c o n o m y ov er
h e a ti n g a n d h ig h in fla tio n e ro d in g c itiz e n s ’ g a in s ? W il l
C h i n a d e m o c ra tiz e , o r w i ll th e p a r t y c o n tin u e to re sist
p re ssu re s to a llo w th is ? C a n C h in e s e g r o w th b e m a d e m o re
c o m p a tib le w i t h t h e e c o lo g ic a l in te r e s ts o f th e c o u n tr y (a n d
t h e w o rld)?
Regime and Political Institutions
T h e c e n tr a l fe a tu re o f th e C h in e s e re g im e is t h e sin g le
p a r ty sy ste m , a n d d e c isio n m a k in g effe c tiv e ly re sts w i t h a
s m a ll g ro u p o f C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f C h i n a ( C P C ) e lite s in
th e to p sta te o rg a n k n o w n as th e P o litb u ro . T h e le g is la tu re
( N P C ) is e le c te d b y in tr ic a te sy ste m s t h a t e n s u re b o t h
C o m m u n is t P a r t y d o m in a n c e a n d to p - d o w n c o n tro l. I t is
in d ir e c tly e le c te d b y lo w e r-le v el a sse m b lie s t h a t s tr e tc h
d o w n to th e lo c a l level: v illa g e -le v e l a sse m b lie s c h o o se r e p
re s e n ta tiv e s in towns, w h o se le c t re p re s e n ta tiv e s in t u r n to
la r g e r counties, a n d th e i n d ir e c t e le c tio n s c o n tin u e u p w a rd
to th e levels o f prefectures, provinces, a n d fin a lly u p to th e
N P C a t t h e to p . A t e a c h level, th e C P C d o m in a te s a n d
e n su re s t h a t o n ly its p a r ty m e m b e rs a re se le c te d fo r th e
h i g h e r levels o f th e le g is la tu re .
418 China
R e g im e a n d P olitical In stitu tio n s
Regime Authoritarian
Powers in Constitution Unitary system; written constitution; officially socialist
Administrative Divisions Twenty-two provinces (and China claims Taiwan as twenty-third)
Five autonomous regions (including Tibet)
Four municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing)
Two special administrative regions (Hong Kong, Macau)
Executive Branch Three top positions with executive functions:
President of People's Republic of China; Secretary-General of Communist Party; and Chairman of
Central Military Council
Politburo is executive committee of the Communist Party, and includes top leaders of the party
Head of government is the premier, recommended by president and approved by legislature;
leads the State Council that oversees administration
Legislative Branch National People's Congress (NPC); elected in indirect elections from village level up to NPC
Selection of Executive Indirect; president selected by NPC
Judicial Branch Supreme Court elected/appointed by NPC and its committees
Political Party System Single dominant party: Communist Party of China (CPC)
T h e exec u tiv e b r a n c h h a s se v e ra l p r o m in e n t p o s itio n s , as
e x a m in e d f u r t h e r in t h e b o x “W h o G o v e rn s C h in a ? ” a n d as
n o te d in th e re g im e c h a r t. T h e p r e s id e n t is th e fo rm a l h e a d
o f s ta te , w h ile th e s e c re ta ry -g e n e ra l le a d s th e C P C . I n
p ra c tic e , a single p e rs o n o f te n h o ld s b o t h p o s itio n s , a lo n g
w i t h t h e ro le o f c o m m a n d e r in c h ie f, a n d is k n o w n as th e
“p a r a m o u n t le a d e r.” T h e p re m ie r, w h o is re sp o n sib le fo r t h e
o n g o in g o p e ra tio n s o f th e g o v e rn m e n t a n d fo r im p le m e n t
in g law s, is n o m in a te d b y th e p r e s id e n t a n d a p p ro v e d b y th e
N P C . T h is sy s te m e n su re s t h a t p o lic ie s se t b y t h e P o litb u ro
a n d th e e x ec u tiv e p a ss in to law.
Political Culture
P o litic a l c u ltu re s a re co m p le x a n d m u ltifa c e te d , lo c a te d b o th
in th e m in d s o f in d iv id u a l m e m b e rs o f so c iety a n d in p u b
licly e sta b lish e d sym bols a n d s tru c tu re s . A s su c h , m a p p in g
p o litic a l c u ltu re is a c o m p le x ta s k , above a ll in a larg e so c iety
lik e C h in a . A ty p ic a l s tra te g y is to focus o n im p o r ta n t fea
tu re s o r c u rre n ts o f a g iv en c o u n try ’s p o litic a l c u ltu re . H e re
w e b riefly fo cu s o n tw o o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c u rre n ts in
C h in e s e p o litic a l c u ltu re : C o n fu c ia n is m a n d M a o ism .
C o n f u c ia n is m is t r a c e d b a c k to C o n f u c iu s , a p h i lo s o
p h e r w h o liv e d f r o m a r o u n d 551 to 4 7 9 b c . F o r th e s tu d y
o f p o liti c a l c u ltu r e , th e p a r ti c u l a r s o f h is p h i lo s o p h y a re
n o t t h e i m p o r t a n t t h in g . R a th e r , w e a re i n te r e s t e d in h o w
g e n e r a lly C o n f u c i a n id e a s w e re p ic k e d u p a n d c a r r i e d
a lo n g c u ltu r a lly o v e r m a n y y e a rs , a n d w e a re in te r e s te d in
th e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e s e id e a s. C o n f u c ia n is m as e s t a b
l is h e d e m p h a s iz e d f o r m a l e d u c a tio n , th e i m p o r t a n c e o f
p u b lic r i t u a l , a s t r i c t c o d e o f e th ic a l re s p o n s ib ility , a n d
p ie t y to w a r d o n e ’s fa m ily a n d a n c e s to r s ( H a r r is o n 2 0 0 1 ).
W h i l e m a n y fin d t h e s e id e a s i n tr in s ic a ll y a p p e a li n g a n d
in te r e s t in g , as s o c ia l s c ie n tis ts w e b e lie v e t h a t th e y
b e c a m e i n f lu e n tia l i n p a r t b e c a u s e th e C h in e s e im p e r i a l
s ta te e m p lo y e d t h e m fo r m a n y c e n tu r ie s in its e ffo rts to
m a i n t a i n its le g i tim a c y a n d s t a f f its e lf. I m p e r i a l e x a m in a
t io n s b a s e d o n C o n f u c ia n is m d e te r m in e d w h o w o u ld b e
a b le to h o l d w h i c h o fficial jo b s . T h is e n h a n c e d a n d m a i n
t a i n e d C o n f u c ia n i s m ’s p r e s tig e in p r e - m o d e r n C h i n a , as
it w a s a s s o c ia te d w i t h b o t h t h e s ta te a n d h i g h so c ia l
s ta tu s .
C o n f u c ia n is m is o f te n u s e d b y th e o r is ts (so m e tim e s ,
p e rh a p s , f u n c tio n in g as a c u ltu r a l ste re o ty p e ) w h o e m p h a
size c u ltu r e in t h e i r e ffo rts to e x p la in se v e ra l p o litic a l a n d
e c o n o m ic p h e n o m e n a o b se rv a b le i n C h i n a a n d o th e r c o u n
trie s w i t h s tro n g C o n f u c ia n h e rita g e , su c h as J a p a n , K o re a,
S in g a p o re , a n d V ie tn a m . S o m e a rg u e , fo r e x a m p le , t h a t
Profile 419
C o n f u c ia n p o litic a l c u ltu r e u n d e rlie s a u th o r it a r ia n p o litic s .
T h is id e a w a s a ctiv ely p ro m o te d b y L e e K w a n Y ew in S in
g a p o re , fo r e x am p le. O th e r s , as p o in te d o u t i n c h a p te r 4,
have tr ie d to u se C o n f u c ia n c u ltu r e to e x p la in b o t h (1) th e
e c o n o m ic u n d e rd e v e lo p m e n t e x p e rie n c e d b y C h i n a u n til
re c e n tly and (2) its re c e n t g r o w th .
M a o is m a tt e m p te d to re p la c e C o n f u c ia n is m in th e
sp h e re o f p o litic a l c u ltu re , v ie w in g th is as n e c e s s a ry to
m o d e r n iz a tio n . F o r t h is re a so n , m a n y a n a ly sts a re su s p i
cio u s o f c la im s a b o u t th e c o n te m p o ra r y c o n se q u e n c e s o f
tr a d it io n a l C o n f u c ia n is m , sin c e t h e y a rg u e t h a t th e r e is
little c o n tin u ity b e tw e e n p r e -m o d e r n C o n f u c ia n is m a n d
c o n te m p o ra ry C h in e s e p o litic a l c u ltu re .
M a o is m — in C h in a o fte n c a lle d “M a o Z e d o n g T h o u g h t ”
(Jo s e p h 2 0 1 0 a : 1 3 5 - 1 5 0 ) — is a v a r ia n t o f M a r x is m . A s
su c h , it e m p h a s iz e s t h e im p o r ta n c e o f class s tru g g le , sees
h is to r y as th e s to ry o f c lass e x p lo ita tio n , a n d c alls fo r a
f u tu r e in w h ic h th e d iv is io n o f la b o r a n d a s s o c ia te d e x p lo i
ta ti o n w ill b e re v e rse d . H o w e v e r, M a o m a d e m a jo r re v i
sions to p re v io u s v e rsio n s o f M a r x is m . T h e tw o m o s t
im p o r t a n t a re (1) t h e c e n tr a lity o f th e p e a s a n tr y in M a o is t
th o u g h t a n d (2) M a o is m ’s v o lu n ta ris m .
M a r x w as s k e p tic a l o f p e a s a n ts as re v o lu tio n a rie s . H e
th o u g h t t h a t t h e y w e re in h e r e n tly c o n se rv a tiv e . I t w a s th e
u r b a n , i n d u s tr ia l w o rk e rs— t h e p r o le ta r ia t— t h a t w e re m o s t
fu lly a lie n a te d a n d t h a t , th e re fo re , h a d th e g re a te s t re v o lu
tio n a r y p o te n tia l. S c h o la rs h a v e o f te n n o te d th e iro n y t h a t
M a r x is m e n d e d u p b e in g m o s t su c c e ssfu l i n p lac es lik e
R u ssia , C h in a , a n d la te r t h e s o -c a lle d “T h ir d W o r ld ” w h e re
a n d w h e n i n d u s tr ia liz a tio n a n d u r b a n iz a tio n w e re less es
ta b lis h e d (th o u g h in d u s tr ia l w o rk e rs d id p lay a n i m p o r t a n t
role in th e R u s s ia n R e v o lu tio n ). S o m e w o u ld a rg u e t h a t
M a o is m is m o re c o n s is te n t w i t h w h a t a c tu a lly h a p p e n e d in
th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry . M a o e m p h a s iz e d th e re v o lu tio n a ry
p o te n tia l o f p e a s a n ts a n d c o n c e n tra te d h is o rg a n iz in g
a m o n g th e m . H e re g a rd e d t h e m as v ir tu o u s , o fte n
Political Economy
D e s p ite a lo n g a n d ric h h is to r y a n d c u ltu r e , C h i n a s p e n t
c e n tu rie s in a s ta te o f e c o n o m ic s ta g n a tio n t h a t c o n tin u e d
u p to th e 1 980s. T h ro u g h th e m id - tw e n t ie th c e n tu r y a n d
M a o ’s C o m m u n is m , C h in a w itn e s s e d p o v e r ty a n d e ven
fa m in e o n a m assive scale, b o t h o f w h ic h w e re e x a c e rb a te d
b y th e p o lic ies o f th e C o m m u n is t P a r t y le a d e rs h ip . C h i n a ’s
e c o n o m ic m o d e l c h a n g e d d ra m a tic a lly , h o w e v er, a f te r th e
rise o f D e n g X ia o p in g in 1 978. D e n g in s t i t u t e d re fo rm s
t h a t o p e n e d C h in a u p to g re a te r c a p ita lis m , w i t h th e m o s t
p u n is h in g w a y w a rd e lite s, s e n d in g th e m to w o rk w i th p e a s
a n ts fo r “re -e d u c a tio n .”
W h e n w e say t h a t M a o is t t h o u g h t e m p h a siz e s “v o lu n
ta ris m ” w e m e a n t h a t M a o th o u g h t t h a t t h r o u g h a g r e a t a c t
o f w ill a c o lle c tiv ity c o u ld “leap” o u t o f th e s tr u c tu r e d d e te r
m in a tio n o f h is to ry (Jo s e p h 2 0 1 0 a : 141-142). T h u s, a p e o p le
co u ld h e ro ic a lly ex ceed th e e c o n o m ic p ro d u c tiv ity o f w h ic h
c o n v e n tio n a l analysis w o u ld e x p e c t th e m capable. C ritic s
w o u ld p o in t to th e d isa stro u s c o n se q u en c es o f th e “G re a t
L e a p F o r w a r d ” as sh o w in g t h e d a n g e ro u sn e ss o f t h is idea.
I n th e y e a rs fo llo w in g M a o ’s d e a th , M a o is m h a s b e c o m e
m o re o p e n a n d flexible. I t r e m a in s , a t le a s t fo rm ally , t h e core
id e o lo g y o f th e sta te . J u s t th e sa m e , so m e w o n d e r i f M a o is t
“m a r k e t so c ia lism ” is re a lly so c ia lism — o r M a o is m — a t all.
C o n fu c ia n is m , w h ic h w as o fficially to h a v e b e e n re p la ce d ,
h a s b e e n g ra d u a lly e n d o rs e d as w e ll b y C h in a ’s elites. S o m e
s tu d e n ts o f c u ltu re w o u ld a rg u e t h a t th e C o n f u c ia n legacy,
d e sp ite M a o ’s o p p o s itio n to it, h a d n e v e r re a lly d is a p p e a re d
in a n y case. T h u s b o t h o f th e s e k e y s tra n d s o f C h in e s e p o
litic a l c u ltu r e re m a in im p o r t a n t in to d a y ’s C h in a , as in te l
le c tu a ls w o r k to re v ise a sp e c ts o f e a c h t h a t a re v ie w e d as
in c o n s is te n t w ith th e m o d e m w o rld (e.g., tr a d itio n a l C o n
fu c ia n is m ’s c ritic a l sta n c e to w a rd com m e rc e ).
A t th e sa m e tim e , C h in a h a s m a n y o f th e fe a tu re s o f in
d u s tria liz e d societies, a n d a g ro w in g q u e s tio n is h o w m id d le -
class c o n su m e rs (especially in c o sm o p o lita n u rb a n areas) w ill
c o ex ist w i th C o n fu c ia n o r M a o is t view s in a n in cre asin g ly
e n tre p re n e u ria l society. I n re c e n t years, m u c h o f C h in a ’s elite
a n d m asses a lik e have e m b ra c e d a v isio n t h a t “to b e co m e ric h
is g lo rio u s.” T h e c o u n try h a s e m b ra c e d m a n y a sp e cts o f capi
ta lism , ev en as th e g o v e rn m e n t tig h tly lim its p o litic a l rig h ts
a n d in te rv e n e s h e avily in th e econom y. C h in a ’s p o litic a l cul
tu r e th u s d ra w s u p o n m u ltip le stra in s o f lo n g s ta n d in g p h i
lo so p h y “m a d e in C h in a ,” ev en w h ile ta k in g o n som e o f th e
c u ltu ra l fe a tu re s o f o th e r c o n te m p o ra ry societies in a n age o f
g lo b a l c o m m u n ic a tio n s a n d e x ch a n g e.
p r o m in e n t c h a n g e s b e in g o p e n in g a g r ic u ltu r e a n d in d u s tr y
to p riv a te o w n e rs h ip .
C h in a ’s r e c e n t e m b ra c e o f g r e a te r o p e n n e s s to m a r k e t
forces h a s h a d d ra m a tic effects. I n d u s t r y flo u ris h e d , e s p e
c ia lly a lo n g th e c o a s t, as C h i n a p u s h e d e c o n o m ic g r o w th
b a s e d o n c h e a p e x p o rts a n d b e c a m e th e “w o rk s h o p o f th e
w o rld .” A g r ic u ltu r a l p r o d u c tiv ity im p ro v e d as w e ll, a n d r e
in fo rc e d in d u s tr ia liz a tio n : A s p ro d u c tiv ity im p ro v e d in
r u r a l a re a s, fe w e r p e o p le w e re n e e d e d to p ro d u c e th e sam e
420 China
a m o u n t o f fo o d , a n d m a n y r u r a l d w e lle rs m ig r a te d to u rb a n
a rea s to b e c o m e fa c to ry w o rk e rs. W a g e s w e re (a n d re m a in )
lo w b y W e s te r n s ta n d a rd s , b u t o fte n re p re s e n te d s ig n ifi
c a n tly in c re a s e d in c o m e fro m t h a t w h ic h w a s availab le in
r u r a l a rea s. I t m a y b e t h a t since t h e re fo rm s w e re p a sse d ,
m o re t h a n h a lf a billion p e o p le (o fte n e s tim a te d a t 6 0 0 m il
lio n ) h a v e c o m e o u t o f p o v e rty . C h i n a h a s b e c o m e th e
w o r ld ’s le a d in g e x p o rte r a n d s e c o n d -la rg e s t eco n o m y , b a se d
in p a r t o n e x p o rt-le d g r o w t h in m a n u f a c tu r in g a n d re la te d
in v e s tm e n t. I t h a s g o n e fro m b e in g o n e o f th e w o r ld ’s
p o o re s t c o u n trie s to m id d le -in c o m e s ta tu s in j u s t th r e e
de ca d es.
D e s p ite th e a p p a r e n t success o f m a rk e t- f r ie n d ly re fo rm ,
C h i n a is fa r fro m p u re ly c a p ita lis t. T h e sta te c o n tin u e s to
p la y a m a jo r ro le in th e eco n o m y , in c lu d in g in w ays t h a t
som e g lo b a l c o m p e tito rs say gives C h in a “u n f a ir a d v a n
ta g e .” F o r in s ta n c e , C h in a h a s re q u ir e d t h a t m a jo r fo re ig n
in v e s to rs w i s h in g to in v e s t in C h i n a m u s t p a r tn e r w ith
C h in e s e c o m p a n ie s in “j o in t v e n tu r e s .” T h is e n su re s t h a t
C h in e s e c o m p a n ie s b e n e fit fro m in v e s tm e n t a n d t h e t r a n s
fe r o f sk ills, k n o w le d g e , a n d te c h n o lo g y . T h ese a n d o th e r
sta te in te rv e n tio n s a re i n a d d itio n to c o n tr o llin g th e c u r
re n c y to p ro m o te e x p o rts .
C h i n a ’s p o litic a l e c o n o m y s till h a s se v e ra l m a jo r c h a l
le n g e s. O n e o f t h e m o s t p re s s in g fo r m o s t C h in e s e is th e
c o n tin u e d p o v e rty o f r u r a l a re a s, a n d t h e r e la te d p ro b le m o f
h ig h a n d g r o w in g in e q u a lity . U r b a n a reas a lo n g t h e c o a s t
h a v e b e n e fite d t h e m o s t fro m C h i n a ’s b o o m , a lo n g w it h
so m e c ities a lo n g m a jo r w a te rw a y s. D e s p ite e ffo rts to d e
v e lo p t h e in te rio r, C h i n a s till h a s h ig h levels o f p o v e r ty in
r u r a l areas. S e c o n d , C h i n a ’s e n v ir o n m e n t is d e g ra d e d due
to p o llu tio n t h a t h a s c o m e w i t h in d u s try . M a n y c ities have
h e a v ily p o llu te d w a te r su p p lies a n d a w fu l a ir q u a lity fro m
fa c to ry e m iss io n s a n d th e s h i f t fro m b icycles to e v e r m o re
c a rs fo r tr a n s p o r ta ti o n . T h ird , C h in a faces a d e m o g ra p h ic
c h a lle n g e t h a t m a n y w e a lth y c o u n trie s face, b u t e v en m o re
so: Its “O n e C h i l d ” p o lic y h a s lim ite d th e b i r t h ra te fo r
m a n y y e a rs, b u t i t also m e a n s a ra p id ly a g in g p o p u la tio n
t h a t m a y stru g g le in th e f u tu r e to c are fo r its g r o w in g
n u m b e r o f e ld e rly c itiz e n s . A fin a l m a jo r c h a lle n g e is th e
r u le o f la w fo r in te lle c tu a l p ro p e rty , as C h in a h a s b e e n a
h a v e n fo r d ig ita l p ira c y a n d “r ip p in g o ff” p a te n ts a n d c o p y
rig h ts o f m a jo r in te r n a t io n a l c o m p a n ie s . T h is is n o t j u s t a
p ro b le m fo r D isn e y , L e v i ’s, o r th e p h a rm a c e u tic a l c o m p a n y
P fiz e r, b u t a lso fo r C h in a ’s a m b itio n s to b e c o m e a w o rld
le a d e r in th e re s e a rc h a n d d e v e lo p m e n t t h a t le a d to a m o re
v a lu e - a d d e d e conom y. A t t h e sa m e tim e , so m e w o u ld a rg u e
t h a t th is w a y o f lo o k in g a t t h in g s p riv ile g e s th e p o in t o f
v ie w o f t h e w e a lth ie s t c o u n trie s , a s k in g d e v e lo p in g c o u n
trie s to p la y b y a d iffe re n t se t o f ru le s t h a n th e y d id w h ile
th e m se lv e s d e v elo p in g .
C h in a ’s p o litic a l e c o n o m y is e x p lo re d f u r t h e r in th e fol
lo w in g case s t u d y “H o w D i d C h i n a B e c o m e a n E c o n o m ic
P o w er? ”
CASE STUDIES
China is seen today as the greatest chal
lenge to the global economic power of
the United States, yet just over thirty years
ago it was one of the world's poorest
countries. This slow development came
despite the country's ancient history as a
leader in world trade and technological
innovation. Starting in 1949, the Commu
nist Party increased the state's role in the
economy. Mao and the Communists col
lectivized agriculture (prohibiting private
farming) and tried to promote heavy in
dustry such as steel production. From the
1950s to the 1970s, Mao attempted major
economic overhauls in the so-called
"Great Leap Forward"— which resulted in
a catastrophic famine— and the so-called
"Cultural Revolution." In 1978-1979, China
began economic reforms under a new
leader, Deng Xiaoping. These reforms fa
cilitated private enterprise and gave more
flexibility to local officials. Critically, the
reforms were gradual and strategic: China
didn't open all areas of its economy im
mediately to international market forces.
China seized advantage of growing glo
balization and adopted an export-led
growth model based on selling goods to
the world's wealthiest countries.
The last thirty years have seen spec
tacular growth of about 10 percent per
year, a rate at which the size of the overall
economy doubles about every seven
Case Studies 421
Become an Economic Power? CHAPTER 5, PAGE 105
years. With growth has come economic
power, but also a rising tide of inequality
(especially between the relatively wealthy
coastal regions and the rural interior of
the country) and significant environmen
tal degradation. Recent years have seen
some disputes with the United States
over trade and the value of the Chinese
currency, which Washington asserts is un
fairly "undervalued" to favor Chinese com
panies by making Chinese goods cheaper
to Americans and American goods more
expensive in China. Others, though, sug
gest that China should attempt to shape
the value of its currency in the pursuit of its
own interests, and not those of the United
States or other countries. This policy, which
in part involves China using the proceeds
from sales of exports to buy American gov
ernment bonds, is controversial. It is seen
by some as the United States and other
countries "borrowing from China to buy
from China."
Nonetheless, from the perspective of
the developing economy, keeping the
currency at a low value seemed to work
very well for countries such as South
Korea as they industrialized and modern
ized. It meant people in these Asian coun
tries had to defer the chance to consume
as they grew wealthier, sometimes for
a generation. In the end, however, the
willingness to save and lend instead of
borrow and consume contributed to de
velopment. Whether this tendency is a
matter of culture and society, of eco
nomic policy, or of political regime re
mains a matter of debate. Some say it
reflects an "Asian" willingness to defer
gratification (or, one could argue, a con
temporary Western inability to defer
gratification). Others suggest that only
rather authoritarian regimes can manage
such approaches. Still others might say it is
simplya matter of astute economic policy.
China's development success has
been astounding, but it also has problems.
The most conspicuous may be an increas
ing challenge of sustainability as China has
passed the United States to become the
world's largest polluter in absolute terms
(though the U.S. remains a much larger
polluter per capita than China). In addition,
China's development model may have the
"opposite" challenge of the United States
today. China as a country saves a great
deal of money and consumes relatively
little, given its size and income. The coun
try's earnings depend heavily upon ex
ports, as well as on increasing investment
in infrastructure ranging from railroads to
coal-fired power stations to apartment
buildings. While China scolds the United
States for spending beyond its means and
borrowing too much, others might criti
cize China for an economy that saves, in
vests, and lends too much.
We can learn from China's successes
and problems to address questions that
interest peoples around the world: Why
does rapid economic development
happen? Is China's success evidence that
the free market promotes development,
or that the state drives development, or
both, or neither? Is recent economic suc
cess a consequence of Chinese culture? If
so, how do we account for China's long
economic stagnation before 1979?
C A SE STU DY
Is China Destined for Democracy? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 131
Is it possible to predict whether countries
will become democracies? Some will say
yes and others no, but political scientists
are generally interested in the predictive
power of their theories for the future,
even if these theories are based on evi
dence from the past. For instance, a politi
cal scientist who argues that economic
development leads to democracy might
make this argument using existing evi
dence and building on the moderniza
tion theory seen in chapter 6. At the same
time, this theorist would also be making a
theoretical prediction: poor countries that
grow and modernize economically are
predicted to democratize in the future. If a
theory is accurate and powerful, it will
often help us to predict future events,
even if they are based on readings of the
past. The question of whether China will
become a democracy presents a useful
example of how theories make predic
tions, and how empirical evidence sup
ports or challenges theories.
422 China
CA SE STU DY (continued)
Is China Destined for Democracy?
Imagine three theorists who are asked
about the future of China. The first is a
modernization theorist, as noted earlier.
What would a modernization theorist pre
dict about democracy in China's future,
given China's rapid economic growth? A
second theorist is a certain kind of cultur-
alist who believes that a country's regime
type (whether democratic or authoritar
ian) is rooted in deep cultural values. What
would this theorist expect, if China has
never had a "political culture” of democ
racy? A third theorist might argue that
democratization depends on the actions
of specific individuals. Would this theorist
be able to make predictions about the
future?
Observing China's rapid economic
growth and emergence of an urban
middle class, the modernization theorist
might predict that China will move inexo
rably toward democracy in the coming
years. As China develops economically
and urbanizes, a middle class is emerging.
Modernization theorists would likely pre
dict that China will follow the path of
other countries that have developed:
Countries that modernize regularly prog
ress toward more rights (such as property
rights) and a middle class more willing to
use its economic and political power to
demand and protect these rights. Eco
nomic development leads to democracy,
so if China sees development, democracy
should follow.
The culturalist theorist we mentioned
might explain the lack of demand for
democracy in China by deep and long-
lasting tendencies in the population, the
political system, or the political culture.
For example, one argument about the
polities of East Asia suggests that cultures
in the region accept the importance of
state authority and may tolerate a lack of
rights as a result; this is sometimes seen as
a Confucian heritage, drawing upon the
works of the philosopher Confucius dis
cussed briefly in the "Political Culture” sec
tion earlier in the chapter. While not all
culturalists would adopt this perspective,
and this interpretation of Confucianism is
highly contestable, our hypothetical cultur
alist might say that China's cultural heritage
will work against democratization.
The third theorist may compare transi
tions to democracy in other countries and
conclude that these really depended on
the decisions of a small handful of very
important individuals. The experience of
South Africa and Presidents Nelson Man
dela and F. W. de Klerk in the early 1990s
might be such an example, as would
many other cases around the world. This
theorist would only be able to make more
ambiguous predictions about China's
future, and might conclude that “it de
pends on leaders" more than forces like
economic change or culture; it would
thus be difficult for this theorist to predict
in advance how movements toward de
mocracy in China will play out, since "it
depends" upon individuals and their
choices.
The modernization theorist would
likely predict that China is on the road to
democracy, and that democracy is all but
inevitable as China grows richer. Our
example of a culturalist would likely be
skeptical about the prospects for democ
racy. And the theorist focusing on leader
ship would probably caution both of the
others that their predictions are quite
i-fe is?
CHAPTER 6, PAGE 131
uncertain. The first two theories have
the merit of making clear predictions in
advance. They can be falsified for the
Chinese case if they get it wrong. If we
fast-forward thirty years, either the mod
ernization theorist or the culturalist is
likely to have been shown wrong, at least
for this case, and the other theory may
well have some evidence supporting it.
The third theory, about leaders, may
have more difficulty making clear predic
tions about whether China will become a
democracy at a certain point in time, but
it does make an important theoretical
prediction of its own: If and when China
does democratize, it will be primarily be
cause of the leadership and decisions of
individuals. This too can be falsified, if it is
shown that large groups of people or im
personal forces drove the outcomes in
China more than selected leaders. The
theory might say that democratization is
more unexpected in some places than
others. Someone who traces democrati
zation to economic modernization will
expect that they can "see democracy
coming," even if they cannot pinpoint the
moment it will occur.
Consider whether one or more of the
three hypothetical theorists makes the
most intuitive sense to you. Some empha
size political economy, some emphasize
culture, and some emphasize individuals,
among other possibilities. Your prefer
ence will give you some ideas about what
you would predict for China. More gener
ally, if you find yourself coming back to
similar kinds of predictions across differ
ent chapters, this may give you some in
sight into the type of comparativist and
thinker you are.
Case Studies 423
r ! CASE STUDY
W ho Governs China?
Understanding who really leads China
and holds power there requires careful
examination of leadership positions as
well as the informal influence of different
individual politicians and groups. This
authoritarian, single-party country has
over a billion people and multiple influ
ential institutions that feature promi
nently in government, yet power often
comes to be associated with individual
leaders. How does this work? As sug
gested previously under the "Regime
and Institutions' sections of this country
profile, China's system formally features
three different top executive positions,
plus a head of government called the
premier that presides over the legisla
ture. There are also two major councils
that bring together top leaders, one for
the state government called the State
Council and one for the Communist
Party known as the Politburo.
The three top executive positions are
the President of the People's Republic of
China (the formal head of state), the Sec
retary-General of the Communist Party
(the head of the governing party), and the
Chairman of the Central Military Council
(the commander-in-chief, as it were). At
present, Xi Jinping has consolidated all
three authorities in his person, so there is
little doubt about who leads the execu
tive branch. Meanwhile, to use the terms
of chapter 10, the premier is a head of
government similar to a prime minister;
he is appointed by the president and ap
proved by the legislature, the National
People's Congress. Li Keqiang is currently
in this post. There are also other members
of the Politburo that are politically
prominent, and some of them jockey for
position to be the next generation of
Chinese leaders.
It is common to talk about major peri
ods in recent Chinese history that are as
sociated with a single "paramount leader,"
regardless of these many different official
leadership posts. The paramount leaders
sometimes have held the official execu
tive leadership positions, but not always.
Recent leaders, including Xi Jinping, have
held the three key offices of head of state,
head of the Communist Party, and head of
the military, and this trifecta can be taken
as a clear indicator of their "paramount”
status. They have been president, party
leader, and commander-in-chief all in one,
leaving little doubt about who is the top
decision maker. Yet the previous para
mount leaders, Mao Zedong (1949-1976)
and Deng Xiaoping (about 1978-1992),
could be seen as the leaders of their eras
because of their ability to wield influence
over party and state institutions in slightly
different ways. Mao's control was most
direct: He was the chairman of the various
committees, commissions, and major de
cision-making bodies of his era; it is for this
reason that he is often referred to as
"Chairman Mao," and not "President Mao."
Deng Xiaoping, by contrast, did not hold
all of the top positions himself yet there
was also little doubt who the decision
maker was during his time as paramount
leader. Deng held certain posts as the
head of the administration in the State
Council, and he presided over the military
at certain times, but these were not the
true source of his leverage. Rather, he ex
ercised authority through the individuals
CHAPTER 10, PAGE 236
who served as "figureheads" in the top
three posts and through his predomi
nance among the members of the Polit
buro and other organs of state and party.
Paramount leaders have governed and
wielded power in very different ways. Mao
Zedong pushed ambitious economic
plans and attempts to modernize China in
a very top-down, authoritarian fashion.
These included the so-called Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution,
which over the long run were responsible
for the famine, stagnation, and repression
associated with Mao's rule. Deng Xiaoping
became paramount leader at the end of
1978 and remained so into the 1990s.
Deng became known as the leader who
set China on the path to economic dyna
mism with major reforms, but he was also
responsible for the violent crackdown in
Tiananmen Square in 1989. After Deng's
passing from the scene, Jiang Zemin, Hu
Jintao, and Xi Jinping continued Commu
nist Party control with economic reform.
All can be seen in different ways as prag
matists who have attempted to increase
China's engagement with the world and
further development by engaging more
people in the process, all while retaining
the tight grip of the Communist Party.
The image of Chinese executive lead
ership is one in which top politicians accu
mulate power informally within the
Communist Party and interlocking state
institutions, often making alliances as
needed with other key players while gain
ing in seniority. In contemporary China, we
might say that accumulating power within
the party and state has led to the top ex
ecutive positions, rather than the power
424 China
coming from the positions themselves.
The presidency has little formal power at
tached to it, for example, though the presi
dent is the head of state. Yet becoming
president is a clear sign of power. The elec
tion of the president is dominated by the
Communist Party in the legislative branch
(National People's Congress), but upon the
recommendation of a single candidate by
the Politburo, the leading decision-making
organ within the Communist Party. In
short, the one candidate selected by the
CPC elites is almost guaranteed to be pres
ident. It may not be surprising that the
party will often select its own leader, or the
person it wishes to become its leader, to
the position. China's intricate set of gov
erning mechanisms makes the Politburo
and other leadership organs the leading
sources of executive power in the world's
most populous country.
The Chinese Party System CHAPTER 11, PAGE 260
China is the most influential and impor
tant dominant-party system in the world
today. The country functions essentially as
a single-party system, though some other
parties are nominally allowed. China's
Communist Party has held onto power for
over six decades through a combination
of factors. The various mechanisms for en
suring the dominance of the Communist
Party are useful to understand, especially
since the meaning of "Communist" in
Communist Party has shifted so dramati
cally with the many changes in China over
the last several decades.
The first and most obvious factor is
the tight linkage between the Commu
nist Party, the Chinese state bureaucracy,
and the military. The Communists control
the state apparatus and can call on the
military as needed to protect the regime.
Through years of Communist dominance,
the state and military have contributed
to single-party rule. This has sometimes
taken place with violent repression by the
military, as in Tiananmen Square in 1989
and in purges by leader Mao Zedong in
previous decades. It has also happened
on an ongoing basis through the use of
state organs to harass certain opposition
forces that might pose a threat, imprison
prominent dissidents, and control the
media (including new media such as
Google's China-based search engine and
social media). Many of these efforts to
minimize opposition have been passed
by the National People's Congress (NPC),
but they rely upon the state for
enforcement.
A second factor is the electoral
system, which provides built-in advan
tages for the Communist Party. The most
important feature is the indirect election
process, by which local councils elect
members of governing councils at higher
levels, and so on up to the NPC. For in
stance, national-level legislators are se
lected by provincial legislators, who are in
turn selected by council members at
lower levels. The result of this indirect
election process is absolute dominance
for the Communists at the national level
in Beijing. While it is possible for
independents and even some members
of other small parties to elect a single del
egate or two at the local level, it is exceed
ingly difficult for enough independents to
be elected to get an independent or
member of another party at the next level
up. The well-established, well-resourced
Communists are present in every local
election throughout the country and
dominate the indirect elections to higher
levels; this means a virtual single-party
state at the national level, with the only
exceptions being other parties that are
closely "allied” to the Communists and ba
sically under Communist control.
A third set of factors has to do with the
Communist Party's legitimacy, including
its actual performance in government.
China's economic growth under Commu
nist Party rule has been superb in recent
years. While it is difficult to get an indepen
dent view of Chinese public opinion, even
international news reports suggest that
many Chinese are relatively satisfied with
government performance and are thus
not pressing for immediate moves toward
Case Studies 425
The Chinese Party System CHAPTER 11, PAGE 260
a multiparty system. This idea that a gov
ernment's legitimacy can be based on
economic performance has often been
tested in a democracy, and it also seems to
have held in some authoritarian and exclu
sionary systems (Epstein 1984). Legitimacy
can also be based upon other factors than
economics. The Chinese Communist Party
has made significant efforts over the years
to associate itself with a variety of ideas
that it has used to trumpet the regime's
ability to represent the Chinese people.
These have included the claim that the
Communists can uniquely represent the
working class and peasants, but have also
included touting Chinese nationalism. The
Chinese Communists have focused on
trumpeting China's greatness and rise to
power, and opposition to foreign (espe
cially Western and Japanese) influence.
This has flourished through the Commu
nist period (even though Communist
ideology is traditionally seen as formally
opposed to nationalist sentiment). This
cluster of factors shows several ways that
an authoritarian single-party system can
persist even in the presence of elections.
The Chinese Revolution
The case of China allows us to consider
two issues of concern to us in the study
of contention and revolutions. First, it
highlights the question considered in
the chapter about how to define revolu
tions and even subtypes like "political
revolutions" and "social revolutions."
Second, it focuses attention on the im
portance of mobilization in successful
revolution, a factor highlighted by re
source mobilization and political oppor
tunity theories. Interestingly, the case of
China considered alone gives at least
some support to all of the theories con
sidered in chapter 12.
The reason that China highlights the
definitional issue is that the country went
through a long process of social change,
and it is therefore difficult to precisely
date when revolution began. As dis
cussed in the preceding historical narra
tive, China saw major changes over the
course of the nineteenth century, includ
ing foreign intervention, domestic revolts
(some of which, like the Taiping Rebellion,
were revolutionary in intention), and fiscal
problems. This led many to seek the mod
ernization of both state and society. At
the same time, the state came to be per
ceived as weak, because of those very
same fiscal difficulties, the trouble it had
in maintaining domestic order, and in par
ticular its loss in the Sino-Japanese War.
State weakness— sometimes called "state
breakdown"— is seen by many scholars as
an essential precursor to revolution. The
late Qing state responded by implement
ing an ineffectual reform program, a
factor sometimes stressed by relative de
privation theories of revolution.
In 1911 and 1912, contention reached a
level most scholars would consider revo
lutionary, and yet what took place at that
time was not a "social revolution" in the
sense defined in chapter 12 The funda
mental emphasis was on the transforma
tion of political structures: the end of the
Qing Dynasty and the creation of a repub
lic. Of course, as our brief historical narra
tive shows us, the republic was weaker
than expected and China descended into
the period of "Warlordism." Now this
CHAPTER 12, PAGE 293
certainly had consequences for social
structures (just as the successful creation
of a strong republic would have), but
these consequences were indirect.
It was within this context that the rival
parties involved in the next stage of the
revolutionary process developed, the Na
tionalists (heirs to the early republicanism)
and the Communists (Averill 1998). As the
reader knows from the previous historical
narrative, the Communists were ulti
mately triumphant. The most important
factor that scholars have used to explain
this difference is their advantage in mobi
lization capacity (Skocpol 1979: 252-262).
While the Nationalists were in power,
they were often ineffective, and some of
their members acquired a reputation for
corruption (Schoppa 2010:59), although
some recent scholars argue that the
Nationalists were more capable state-
builders than traditional accounts sug
gest (see a brief discussion of these and
related issues in Edmonds 1997). In the
rural areas controlled by the Communists
during the conflict, they were focused on
426 China
+ % CASE STUDY (continued)
I The Chinese Revolution CHAPTER 12, PAGE 293
the establishment of peasant organiza
tions, indeed, as early as the late 1920s.
This strategy— which is linked to Mao
ism's emphasis on peasants as revolution
ary actors, which Marx would have
rejected— paid enormous dividends in
the 1940s when peasants helped the
Communists defeat the Nationalists once
and for all. Of course, proponents of other
theories of revolution could point to other
factors that might help to explain the
Communists' success. Cultural or framing
theories could point to the salience of
Maoist ideology. Relative deprivation and
political opportunity theories could point
to the ongoing weakness of the state.
Finally, it is important to note that the
Chinese Revolution did not end in 1949. Mao
was a proponent of "permanent revolution."
Indeed, at least ostensibly it is still going on
today. More realistically, perhaps, we could
say that it was carried out in stages during
Mao's rule. Collectivization of agriculture,
the "Great Leap Forward," and the "Cultural
Revolution" (Perry 1998) were all key epi
sodes in the Maoist effort to remake the un
derlying structures of Chinese society.
Research Prompts
1. Consider the discussion of economic development and democ
racy in China that you have read in these country case materials.
Alongside it, review the discussion of these same themes in the
country case materials on India. Both societies have been "mod
ernizing" rapidly in recent decades, but they have done so in
very different terms. India first embraced democracy and only
more recently has achieved rapid economic growth. China has
achieved dramatic growth, but so far has seen very little democ
ratization. What accounts for these different trajectories? Which
theories can you draw on from the thematic chapters of this
textbook to explain the variation between these two cases?
How might we empirically test the hypothesis that you
generate?
2. The case study on democratization in China (which connects to
chapter 6 asks you to think about what several major theories of
democratization would predict with respect to the Chinese case
in the coming years. Bring the thought experiment to its conclu
sion: Which theory do you find most plausible with respect to
China, and why? How could we get an empirical answer to this
question?
3. Compare the Chinese Revolution to the Russian Revolution, dis
cussed in the country case materials on the Russian Federation.
Both were intended to be Marxist revolutions, but they exhibited
notable differences. How were these revolutions different, and
how might a social scientist explain their differences?
4. Compare the overview of Chinese political history with our
overview of Mexican political history in the Mexico country case
materials. Both societies have had long-standing, highly com
plex civilizations stretching back centuries. However, Mexico
experienced direct colonialism, whereas China's brush with
European imperialism was largely indirect. What are the major
implications or consequences of this difference for Chinese and
Mexican political development? How could one use major
theories of comparative politics to begin generating ideas in
response to this question?
5. The chapter 11 case study shows that China is governed through
a complex set of political institutions. Compare and contrast this
with Iran, especially the box on Iran's judiciary. Can you hypoth
esize about why authoritarian regimes might have such intricate
sets of governing institutions? Do these compare or contrast
with any other countries that have witnessed authoritarian rule
in the twentieth century— such as Brazil, Germany, Mexico,
Nigeria, Japan, or Russia? What selection of cases might best
enable you to test your preliminary hypothesis?
Profile 429
p a r t because o f a stro n g c u ltu ra l tra d itio n p ro sc rib in g such
questions. T he C I A W o rld F a c tb o o k , th e m a in source w e have
u se d here fo r d a ta o n th e e th n ic co m p o sitio n o f th e o th e r co u n
tries considered in th is b o o k , does n o t list e stim a te d p e rce n t
ages o f e th n ic g roups in F rance. I t no tes sim ply th a t F re n c h
e th n ic g roups in clude “C e ltic a n d L a tin w ith T eu to n ic ” as w ell
as “Slavic, N o r t h A fric a n , In d o c h in e se , a n d B asque m in o ri
ties.” O f th ese g roups, th e N o r t h A fric a n m in o rity — m a n y
fro m F ra n c e ’s fo rm er colony o f A lg e ria — a n d su b -S a h a ra n
A frica n s m ay b e th e m o s t politica lly im p o rta n t.
M a n y in t h i s g ro u p m a y l is t Is la m as t h e i r r e lig io n ,
th o u g h t h e m a jo r ity a re p ro b a b ly n o n - p r a c tic in g . W e c a n
Historical Development
A s n o te d , F ra n c e h a s tra v e le d a ro c k y ro a d to p o litic a l m o
d e rn ity . I n 1789, F ra n c e g ave us w h a t m a n y c o n s id e r th e
firs t m o d e r n re v o lu tio n ( A r e n d t 1963; F u r e t [1988] 1995),
d e p o s in g th e B o u rb o n m o n a rc h y , e s ta b lis h in g a R e p u b lic ,
a b o lis h in g t h e n o b ility (noblesse), a n d o p p o s in g t h e p o w e r o f
th e R o m a n C a th o lic C h u r c h a n d u ltim a te ly re p re s s in g it.
T h e re v o lu tio n ev en c re a te d a n e w c a le n d a r, w i t h t h e b e g in
n in g o f th e re v o lu tio n t h e s t a r ti n g p o in t fro m w h ic h f u tu r e
y e a rs w o u ld b e c o u n te d . T h is re v o lu tio n is d is c u s s e d f u r t h e r
in a case s tu d y la te r in t h e F ra n c e c o u n tr y m a te ria ls .
A f te r a d e ca d e o f ra d ic a liz a tio n a n d in c re a s in g c o n fu sio n ,
N a p o le o n B o n a p a rte to o k p o w e r (see th e d isc u ssio n in P a rry
a n d G ir a rd 2 0 0 2 : 7 -2 4 ). N a p o le o n w as a n early exam p le o f
w h a t m o d e rn a u th o rita ria n is m ( w ith lo ts o f references to “th e
p e o p le ” a n d ev en p lebiscites a n d o th e r e le m e n ts o f d e m o c
racy) m ig h t lo o k lik e . H e f u r t h e r s p re a d m o d e rn p o litic s
th r o u g h c o n q u e st, c e n tra liz in g p o litic a l a u th o r ity a n d im
p o s in g N a p o le o n ic la w in n u m e ro u s c o u n trie s— it s till serves
as th e basis fo r la w in m u c h o f th e w o rld to d a y — a n d also
ra is in g n a tio n a lis m in th e re sistan c e h e e n g e n d e re d . E v e r
since th e tim e o f N a p o le o n ’s d o m in a tio n , p e o p le have d e
b a te d w h e th e r h is re g im e c o n so lid a te d o r re v erse d th e re v o
lu tio n . T h e b e s t a n sw e r is p ro b a b ly to say t h a t it d id b o th . O n
o n e h a n d h e r e - e s ta b lis h e d o rd e r, p r o c la im in g h i m s e l f
em p e ro r, e sta b lish in g a C o n c o rd a t w ith t h e C h u r c h , a n d
c re a tin g a n e w “n o b ility ” t h a t w a s d is tin c t fro m th e h e re d i
ta r y noblesse o f t h e p rio r re g im e . O n th e o th e r h a n d , he
sp read m a n y o f t h e re v o lu tio n ’s a ch iev e m en ts to th e re s t o f
E u ro p e a n d b e y o n d .
N a p o le o n w as o nce d e p o s e d a fte r m ilita r y d e fe a t a n d se n t
to a n isla n d exile, b u t h e e sc ap e d a n d b riefly re s u m e d h is
efforts b e fo re b e in g d e fe a te d a g a in a t W a te rlo o . F o llo w in g
o n ly e s tim a te th e re la tiv e s h a re o f t h e F r e n c h p o p u la tio n
w h o a re o fficially M u s lim s . A d h e r e n ts o f Is la m p ro b a b ly
c o n s titu te s o m e w h a t less t h a n 10 p e r c e n t o f t h e F r e n c h
p o p u la t io n . I n r e c e n t y e a rs th e r e h a v e b e e n m a n y q u e s
tio n s a b o u t t h e i r a s s im ila tio n (o r d i s c r im in a tio n a g a in s t
th e m , d e p e n d in g o n o n e ’s p o i n t o f v iew ). T h e m a jo r ity o f
th e F r e n c h p o p u la t io n is a t le a s t n o m in a lly C a th o lic , b u t,
as in m u c h o f E u r o p e , m o s t i n t h e n o m in a l ly C h r i s t ia n
c a te g o r y a re n o t r e g u la r c h u r c h a tte n d e e s . S o m e so u rc e s
(e.g., K u r u 2 0 0 9 : 2 4 4 ) e s tim a te t h a t j u s t m o re t h a n h a l f o f
th e F r e n c h p o p u la t io n (55 p e rc e n t) a d h e r e s fo r m a lly to a
r e lig io n .
N a p o le o n ’s d e m ise , F ra n c e saw th e re s to ra tio n o f th e o ld
B o u rb o n m o n a rc h y t h a t h a d lo st p o w e r in th e g re a t revolu
t io n o f 1789. L o u is X V I I I a n d C h a rle s X g o v e rn e d as c o n sti
tu ti o n a l m o n a rc h s ( F u r e t 1995: 2 7 0 - 2 7 2 ) , h ow ever, even i f
th e y a n d som e o f th e i r s u p p o rte rs m ig h t h ave p re fe rre d a b so
lu tism . I n o th e r w o rd s, th e re w a s n o fu ll r e tu r n to th e system
fro m b e fo re th e re v o lu tio n .
I n 1830, C h a rle s X w a s re p la ce d b y L o u is -P h ilip p e (also a
B o u rb o n b u t fro m th e m o re lib e ra l O rle a n s b ra n c h o f th e
fam ily) in th e “Ju ly R e v o lu tio n ” (see P a r r y a n d G ir a rd 2 0 02:
5 5 -5 9 ). C a lle d th e “C itiz e n K in g ” b e ca u se o f h is s tro n g e r a n d
m o re c o n siste n t s u p p o rt fo r t h e “c o n s titu tio n a l” in “c o n s titu
tio n a l m o n arc h y ,” L o u is -P h ilip p e w o u ld h o ld th e th ro n e
u n til 1848, w h e n a re v o lu tio n a ry w ave sh o o k E u ro p e . I n
F ra n c e , t h is b ro u g h t a b o u t th e “S e c o n d R ep u b lic .” B y th e e n d
o f th e year, L o u is -N a p o le o n B o n a p a rte w as e le cte d p re sid en t.
T h e n e p h e w o f th e fo rm e r E m p e ro r, h e d e c la re d himself
E m p e ro r N a p o le o n I I I in 1851, e n d in g th e S e c o n d R e p u b lic
a n d u sh e rin g in th e S e c o n d E m p ire . N a p o le o n I I I w as k n o w n
fo r e n c o u ra g in g in d u s tria liz a tio n a n d eco n o m ic m o d e rn iz a
tio n , a n d P a ris w as re d e sig n e d u n d e r h is w a tc h , p ro d u c in g
m u c h o f th e in f r a s tr u c tu r e a n d p la n fo r th e c ity as it is
k n o w n to d a y ( P a rry a n d G ir a rd 2 0 0 2 : 6 3 - 6 9 ; S c h w a rtz
2011: 6 0 -6 1 ). T h is w as also a tim e o f in c re a sin g F re n c h
g e o -p o litic a l a m b itio n s , as N a p o le o n I I I w a g e d m ilita ry c a m
p a ig n s , in c re a s e d F re n c h c o lo n ia l activity, a n d in v ad e d
M e x ico , in s ta llin g a m e m b e r o f th e H a p s b u rg fa m ily as E m
p e ro r M a x im ilia n th e re i n th e 1860s. E v en tu ally , th o u g h ,
m ilita ry a c tiv ity w as N a p o le o n I l l ’s d o w n fa ll. H e w as d e
fe a te d b y B ism a rc k ’s P ru s sia in th e F ra n c o -P ru s s ia n W a r
o f 1870 a n d a lm o s t im m e d ia te ly lo st p o w e r in F ra n c e. T his
tr a n s itio n m a rk e d t h e b e g in n in g o f F ra n c e ’s T h ird R epublic.
T h e T h ird R e p u b lic — w h ic h w o u ld la s t u p u n t i l W o r ld
W a r I I — is c o n sid e re d b y so m e to h a v e b e e n a F re n c h
“g o ld e n a g e,” th e “B e lle E p o q u e ,” as it is o f te n c a lle d ( P a r r y
a n d G ir a r d 2 0 0 2 : 74). I t w a s a p e r io d o f g r e a t flo w e rin g in
th e a rts a n d lite r a tu r e , b u t it a lso saw a g r e a t d e a l o f p o l it i
c a l a n d so c ia l a c tiv ity a n d co n tro v e rsy , a n d h a s b e e n se e n
b y m a n y in F ra n c e as a p e r io d o f in s ta b ility . P e rh a p s m o s t
fa m o u sly , i t w itn e s s e d t h e “D r e y f u s A ffa ir,” i n w h ic h a
J e w is h officer w a s fa lsely a c c u se d o f s p y in g fo r G e rm a n y . I t
is h a r d to e x a g g e ra te h o w im p o r t a n t th is e v e n t w a s fo r in
te lle c tu a ls a n d p o litic ia n s , w h o sa w i t as a b o u t m o re t h a n
j u s t th e g u i lt o r in n o c e n c e o f o n e m a n , b u t r a th e r a b o u t t h e
n a tu r e o f F r e n c h c u ltu r e a n d id e n tity . D r e y f u s ’s a cc u se rs
w e re t h o u g h t o f as c o n se rv a tiv e , e v en re a c tio n a ry , o fte n
C a th o lic , a n d i n so m e c ases a n ti- S e m itic . S o m e v ie w e d
th e m as h e irs to th e s u p p o rte rs o f m o n a rc h y a n d e m p ire
fro m p re v io u s c e n tu rie s . D r e y f u s ’s s u p p o rte rs w e re th o u g h t
o f as se c u la r, a n d o f te n so c ia lists. S o m e v ie w e d t h e m as th e
h e irs o f th e R e p u b lic a n t r a d i t io n (fo r m o re o n th e D re y fu s
A ffa ir, see B e g le y 2 0 0 9 ).
F ra n c e w a s b a d ly s h a k e n b y W o r ld W a r I. L ik e th e r e s t
o f th e p a r ti c ip a n ts in o t h e r c o u n tr ie s , n e ith e r t h e arm y,
n o r t h e p o litic ia n s , n o r th e c itiz e n s fu lly a n tic ip a te d th e
n a tu r e o f t r e n c h w a r f a r e , w i t h its e n o rm o u s lo ss o f life ,
te rrib le c o n d itio n s , a n d s e e m in g ly i n f in ite s ta le m a te s .
F ra n c e w a s e v e n tu a lly a m o n g t h e v ic to rs , b u t t h e c o n flic t
p la y e d a n i m p o r t a n t ro le in p ro d u c in g t h e n e x t E u r o p e a n
crisis. F ra n c e in s is te d t h a t G e r m a n y p a y h u g e i n d e m n itie s ,
a n d its p r e p a r a to r y s tra te g y fo r th e n e x t p o ss ib le w a r w i t h
G e r m a n y w a s b a s e d o n its e x p e rie n c e s in W o r ld W a r I,
p r e p a r i n g a s in g le , s u p p o s e d ly im p r e g n a b le , lin e o f d e
fe n se c a lle d th e M a g i n o t lin e .
T h e in d e m n i ty im p o s e d o n G e r m a n y c o n tr ib u te d to th e
e c o n o m ic a n d so c ia l p ro b le m s t h a t c o n d itio n e d H i t l e r ’s rise
to p o w e r. W h i l e H i t le r ro se in G e rm a n y , F ra n c e saw a d if
fe re n t p a tte r n , m o s t n o ta b ly w it h th e le f t- w in g “P o p u la r
F r o n t” g o v e rn m e n t h e a d e d b y L e o n B lu m , w h ic h w as
fo rm e d in 1936 ( P a r r y a n d G i r a r d 2 0 0 2 : 1 6 3 -1 6 9 ). T he
s h o rt-liv e d g o v e rn m e n t w a s a c c o m p a n ie d b y s trik e a n d
la b o r m o b iliz a tio n , b u t F ra n c e w as h ig h ly p o la r iz e d in t h is
p e rio d , a n d th e P o p u la r F r o n t g o v e r n m e n t w a s o v e r by
1938. W h e n w a r c a m e , G e r m a n y b y p a sse d th e M a g i n o t
L in e w i t h re la tiv e ease. T h e F re n c h sta te c o lla p se d , a n d th e
V ic h y G o v e r n m e n t w as e s ta b lis h e d u n d e r M a r s h a ll
P h ilip p e P e ta in , o n e o f th e le a d e rs o f th e a r m y t h a t h a d j u s t
fa ile d so m is e ra b ly i n s to p p in g t h e G e r m a n a ssa u lt. T h is
g o v e rn m e n t w a s lo n g se e n as e s s e n tia lly a p u p p e t o f th e
430 France
G e r m a n o c c u p ie rs , th o u g h m o re r e c e n t h is to ric a l e v id e n ce
s u g g e sts t h a t t h e V ic h y g o v e rn m e n t p la y e d a n a ctiv e ro le in
d e c isio n m a k in g a n d c o lla b o ra te d m o re w illin g ly w i t h th e
N a z is , e v en p a r tic i p a tin g i n th e d e p o r ta tio n o f Je w s. A t th e
sa m e tim e , m a n y th o u s a n d s o f F re n c h m e n a n d w o m e n
p a r tic i p a te d a ctiv ely in t h e re sista n c e , as w e ll as in th e F re e
F re n c h , le d b y C h a rle s D e G a u lle .
A f t e r th e a llie d v icto ry , D e G a u lle w o u ld b e c o m e p re s i
d e n t o f th e “F o u r t h R e p u b lic .” D u r i n g th is p e r io d , F ra n c e
fo c u se d o n r e c o n s tr u c tio n a n d e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t, as
s iste d b y th e U n ite d S ta te s ’ M a r s h a l l P la n . D e G a u lle so o n
le f t p o w e r, b u t h e w a s c a lle d b a c k in 1958, i n t h e m id s t o f
crisis o v e r F r e n c h c o lo n ia l a ffa irs in A lg e ria . T h e n e w (a n d
c u rre n t) c o n s titu tio n w as w r itte n , a n d F ra n c e ’s c o n te m p o
r a ry “m ix e d p r e s id e n tia lis t” sy s te m w a s e s ta b lis h e d . F ra n c e
w e n t t h r o u g h se v e ra l d e c a d e s o f s tr o n g e c o n o m ic p e rfo r
m a n c e a n d relative p o litic a l sta b ility . I n th is sa m e p e rio d
F ra n c e lo s t m o s t o f its im p e ria l p o sse ssio n s, e sp e c ia lly w ith
d e c o lo n iz a tio n in A f r ic a i n 1960.
A p r o m in e n t f e a t u r e o f F r a n c e ’s p o s t- w a r p o litic s h a s
b e e n t h e p ro c e s s o f E u r o p e a n i n te g r a t i o n , w h i c h h a s
o f t e n b e e n l e d b y F r a n c e in t a n d e m w i t h d e m o c r a tic
G e r m a n y . T h e e a rly y e a rs o f i n te g r a t i o n w e re e s p e c ia lly
d r a m a tic , b e c a u s e t h e tw o c o u n tr ie s h a d b e e n t h e c e n tr a l
b e ll ig e r e n ts i n c o n t i n e n ta l E u r o p e a n w a r s f r o m N a p o le o n
to H it le r . B e g in n i n g in 1 9 5 0 , F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y —
a lo n g w i t h Ita ly , B e lg iu m , t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , a n d L u x e m
b o u r g — a g r e e d to fre e a n d o p e n t r a d e in c o a l a n d ste e l.
T h is w a s s e e n as e c o n o m ic a lly s ig n if ic a n t, b u t e v e n m o re
i m p o r t a n t s y m b o lic a lly a n d p o litic a lly , as it m e a n t th e
tw o c o u n tr ie s w o u ld b e o p e n ly t r a d i n g th e ra w m a te ria ls
n e e d e d fo r w a r. F u r t h e r in te g r a t i o n c a m e in 1957, w h e n
t h e T r e a t y o f R o m e e x te n d e d t h e e c o n o m ic c o o p e r a tio n
to c re a te a E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n ity . F u r t h e r ex
te n s io n s o f t h e E u r o p e a n p r o j e c t c a m e w i t h e x p a n s io n to
m a n y o t h e r c o u n tr ie s (n o w tw e n ty - s e v e n ) , a n d t h e d e e p
e n i n g o f i n te g r a t i o n t h r o u g h fre e t r a d e , fre e flo w s o f la b o r
a n d c a p ita l, a n d th e c r e a tio n o f t o d a y ’s c o m m o n c u rre n c y ,
t h e e u ro . T h e f o r m e r E u r o p e a n C o a l a n d S te e l C o m m u
n i t y o f 1 9 5 0 h a s n o w b e c o m e th e b r o a d e r a n d d e e p e r
E u r o p e a n U n i o n ( E U ) .
T o d a y F r a n c e is c o n s id e r e d to b e , w i t h G e r m a n y , o n e
o f th e t w o m o s t p o w e r f u l s t a te - le v e l a c to rs in t h e E U . Y e t
i t fa c e s a n u m b e r o f s i g n if ic a n t q u e s tio n s . F i r s t , h a s its
s y s te m o f im m i g r a t i o n a n d a s s i m il a ti o n b r o k e n d o w n ?
S e c o n d , w h a t w i l l h a p p e n to t h e F r e n c h w e lf a r e sta te ? Is
i t in n e e d o f re fo r m s , a n d i f so, w h i c h re fo r m s , a n d w ill it
Profile 431
Historical Development
T i m e l i n e
800 Charlemagne consolidates rule in much of Western
Europe.
1870 The Second Empire ends shortly after Napoleon
Ill's forces are defeated by Prussia (under Bismarck)
1000s-1700s Rivalry between France and Britain through Middle at the Battle of Sedan in September, 1870.
Ages includes numerous wars. 1870-1940 Third Republic
1334-1453 Hundred Years' War between France and Britain 1871 Paris Commune
1643 Louis XIV becomes King of France, rules for over 1894 Conviction of Alfred Dreyfus
70 years. 1906 Dreyfus declared to be innocent
1789 French Revolution begins with the storming of 1914-1918 First World War
Bastille prison; self-proclaimed National Assembly 1936 Short-lived "Popular Front" government
issues Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. 1939-1945 Second World War
1793 The most violent part of the French Revolution 1940-1944 Vichy Government, which collaborates with the Nazis
begins, known as the Reign of Terror; King Louis 1944-1946 After the fall of the Vichy government, a provisional
XVI executed by guillotine. government is in place.
1799 Napoleon's Seizure of Power 1946-1958 Fourth Republic
1804 Napoleon's Coronation as Emperor 1954-1962 War in Algeria, culminating in Algerian indepen
1812 Russian invasion dence in 1962
1814 Napoleon's defeat and imprisonment 1958-Present Fifth Republic
1815 Napoleon returns, but is soon defeated by British at
Battle of Waterloo.
1958 Constitution establishes "Mixed Presidentialist"
system
1814-1830 Bourbon Restoration of Louis XVIII (1814-1824) and 1966 France leaves NATO
Charles X (1824-1830) 1968 Major student protests in Paris (and numerous
1830 July Revolution other countries)
1830-1848 July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe ("Citizen King") 1981 Frangois Mitterrand is elected president (the only
1848-1852 Revolution of 1848 and the Second Republic Socialist elected to this post during the Fifth Re
1848 Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte elected President of public) and governs until 1995.
the Republic 1995-2007 Presidency of Jacques Chirac
1852 Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte named Emperor 1999 France adopts the euro.
Napoleon III, beginning the "Second Empire" 2007-2012 Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy
(1852-1870) 2009 France returns to NATO.
1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, in which France is soundly
defeated
2012-present Presidency of Frangois Hollande
b e p o lit ic a l ly p o s s ib le to p r o d u c e t h e m ? F in a lly , w h a t w ill
F r a n c e ’s ro le b e i n th e E u r o p e o f t h e f u t u r e , g iv e n th e
e n o r m o u s q u e s tio n s t h a t t h e E U n o w fa ce s as i t s tr u g g le s
to c o o r d in a te r e g io n - w id e m o n e t a r y p o lic y w i t h s t a te -
lev e l fisc a l p o lic y ? O n e o f t h e i n t r i g u i n g fa c ts a b o u t
c o n te m p o r a r y F r a n c e is t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h m a n y o f
t h e s e d e c is io n s w i l l b e t a k e n a t a E u r o p e a n lev e l. I t
s h o u l d b e n o t e d , th o u g h , t h a t F r a n c e (lik e o t h e r c o u n
tr ie s i n t h e E U ) h a s a n a ti o n a l v e to o n m o s t i m p o r t a n t
m a tt e r s .
Regime and Political Institutions
F ra n c e has a semi-presidential system o f g o v e rn m e n t, also
c alled a presidential-parliamentary system . T h is h y b rid h as
b o th a d ire c tly ele cte d p re sid e n t a n d a p rim e m in iste r, w ith
th e fo rm e r th e h e a d o f sta te a n d th e la tte r th e h e a d o f g overn
m e n t. P re sid e n tia l ele ctio n s are fo llo w ed b y e lections to th e
leg isla tu re , a fte r w h ic h th e p re sid e n t n o m in a te s a p rim e
432 France
m in is te r to r u n th e g o v e rn m e n t. H o w ev e r, p rim e m in iste rs
serve a t th e d isc re tio n o f th e leg isla tu re , a n d th e low er h ouse
(the Assemblee Nationale, o r N a tio n a l A ssem bly) m ay force
re sig n a tio n o f th e g o v e rn m e n t a t a n y tim e b y a sim ple m ajor
ity v o tin g for censure. I n pra ctic e , th is h as m e a n t th a t th e
p re sid e n t a p p o in ts a p rim e m in is te r o n ly a fte r c o n su ltin g th e
lea d er o f th e la rg e st p a r ty in th e le g isla tu re to d e te rm in e th e
la tte r’s w ishes.
T h e u p p e r le g is la tiv e c h a m b e r , th e S e n a te , h a s n e a rly
c o - e q u a l p o w e rs w i t h th e N a t i o n a l A s se m b ly , b u t th e
N a t io n a l A s s e m b ly ta k e s t h e le a d o n m o s t le g is la tiv e d e
b a te s a n d le g is la tio n . A s o p h i s t ic a t e d s y s te m o f c h e c k s
a n d b a la n c e s in c lu d e s t h e p r e s i d e n t ’s a b ility to d isso lv e
t h e le g i s l a tu r e a n d c a ll n e w e le c tio n s , b u t n o m o re t h a n
o n c e in a n y g iv e n y e a r. B y c o n v e n tio n , t h e p r im e m in is te r
h a s g r e a t e r p o w e r o v e r d o m e s tic p o litic s a n d t h e p r e s id e n t
m o re p o w e r o v e r f o re ig n a ffa irs, b u t t h e s e lin e s c a n b e
b lu r r e d , e s p e c ia lly w h e n t h e p r e s id e n t a n d t h e le g is la tiv e
m a jo r ity a re f r o m d if f e r e n t p a r ti e s , a s i t u a t io n k n o w n as
cohabitation.
Regime and Political Institutions
Regime Republic, democratic
Administrative
Divisions
Twenty-seven regions (of which twenty-two are in "metropolitan France" and five are overseas); smaller
divisions are departments, arrondissements, cantons, and communes
Executive Branch Semi-presidential; president and prime minister
Selection of Executive Direct election of president, in two rounds, with second-round runoff between top two candidates,
appointed prime minister
Legislative Branch Bicameral
Lower chamber: National Assembly (Assemblee Nationale)
Upper chamber: Senate (Senat)
Judicial Branch Several top authorities: Court of Cassation (Courde cassation) as court of final appeal for individuals; appointed
Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel) has authority to rule laws unconstitutional and invalid
Political Party System Multiparty system with several parties in Parliament, generally with one large party on the center-right
(currently the Union for a Popular Movement, UMP) and the Socialist Party on the center-left; also the
National Front (far right), Communist Party (far left), and other moderate and fringe parties
F in a lly , a j u d i c i a l b o d y k n o w n as t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
C o u n c il h a s t h e p o w e r t o re v ie w m a j o r la w s b e f o re t h e i r
p a s s a g e a n d c a n r u le t h e m u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d th u s
in v a lid ; t h i s c o u n c il m a y a ls o h e a r a p p e a ls to la w s a n d
s im ila r ly r u l e o n c o n s t it u t io n a l i t y . T h e C o u n c i l is
c o m p o s e d o f n i n e m e m b e rs , t h r e e e a c h a p p o in t e d b y th e
p r e s i d e n t a n d t h e le a d e r s o f t h e t w o le g is la tiv e h o u s e s ,
as w e ll as a ll f o r m e r F r e n c h p r e s id e n ts n o t a c tiv e ly i n
v o lv e d i n p o liti c s .
Political Culture
P ro b a b ly th e m o s t d is tin c tiv e fe a tu re o f F r e n c h p o litic a l
c u ltu re is th e h is to ric a l re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n a le ft-w in g ,
s e c u la ris t, re p u b lic a n is m a n d a m o re c o n se rv a tiv e a n d less
e g a lita ria n a lte rn a tiv e , o f te n a sso c ia te d w i t h R o m a n C a
th o lic is m . W e d o n o t w is h to c a ric a tu re t h e d is tin c tio n b e
tw e e n th e s e tw o s tra n d s o f F re n c h p o litic a l c u ltu re .
T h e y h a v e e a c h c h a n g e d a g o o d d e a l o v e r tim e , as h a s t h e
re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n th e m . F o r e x a m p le , fe w o n t h e F re n c h
le f t to d a y fa v o r t h e d ir e c t a s sa u lt o n th e c h u r c h t h a t m a n y
e ig h te e n th - a n d n i n e te e n t h - c e n tu r y re v o lu tio n a rie s d id ,
a n d th e F r e n c h r ig h t is n o lo n g e r ro y a list. M o re o v e r, b o t h
tr a d itio n s h a v e fa v o re d p o litic a l c e n tra lis m , a n d som e
w o u ld say a u th o r ita r ia n c e n tra lis m . N e v e rth e le s s , h e re
fo llo w id e a l-ty p ic a l sk e tc h e s o f th e tw o tra d itio n s .
B o th r ig h t- a n d le ft-w in g th o u g h t in F ra n c e h a d o rig in s
a m o n g th e e ig h te e n th - c e n tu ry philosophes, a n d th e v ery
Profile 433
d e sig n a tio n s “le f t” a n d r i g h t ” e m e rg e d in t h e F re n c h R e v o
lu tio n . F ro m th e b e g in n in g , th e F re n c h le ft ra d ic a lly o p
p o se d h ie ra rc h y a n d royalty, p ro m o tin g d e m o c ra c y a n d
re p u b lic a n ism as a lte rn a tiv e s. V ie w in g th e R o m a n C a th o lic
C h u r c h as lin k e d to ro y a l p o litic s a n d th e n o b ility (and
in d e e d b e in g t h e “F ir s t E s ta te ” p rio r to th e R e v o lu tio n ), a n d
n o tin g its su b s ta n tia l c o n tro l over la n d , sc h o o lin g , a n d m u c h
la w m a k in g , a ra d ic a l le ft a im e d to e lim in a te th e s e “re g re s
sive” so cial actors. T h is tr a d itio n w a s la rg e ly c ritic a l o f N a
p o le o n as w e ll as th e S e c o n d E m p ire o f N a p o le o n I I I
(18 5 2 -1 8 7 0 ). O v e r th e c o u rse o f th e n i n e te e n th c en tu ry ,
m a n y o f its p ro p o n e n ts t u r n e d to so c ia lism a n d c o m m u n is m .
W h i l e b y th e m id d le o f th e t w e n ti e th c e n tu ry it w as c le ar
t h a t c o m m u n is m o n t h e S o v ie t m o d e l w a s n o t a v iab le o p tio n
for F ra n c e , th e c o m m u n is ts w e re i m p o r ta n t in th e re sistan c e
a g a in s t H itle r. M a n y c o m m u n is ts w e re se e n as n a tio n a l
h e ro es o f th e R e sista n c e , a n d a sp e cts o f c o m m u n is t id eo lo g y
r e m a in e d p o p u la r w ith in te lle c tu a ls a n d th e w o r k in g classes.
A f te r th e w a r, th e la rg e r F re n c h le ft fa v o re d so c ial d e m o c
ra cy a n d h e lp e d to c o n s tr u c t t h e F re n c h w e lfa re state.
T he r ig h t- w in g t r a d i t i o n is a ls o q u ite h e te r o g e n e o u s
a n d h a s a ls o c h a n g e d o v e r t im e . S o m e o f t h e s u p p o r te r s
o f t h e r e s to r a t io n m o n a r c h ie s o f L o u is X V I I I a n d C h a r le s
X w e re o u t - a n d - o u t r o y a lis ts , b u t e v e n t h e y w e re r e la
tiv e ly few . I n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e F r e n c h r i g h t
fa v o re d m a i n t a i n i n g a n d e v e n e x p a n d i n g t h e p riv ile g e s o f
th e C a th o l ic C h u r c h . S u p p o r te r s in c lu d e d n o t o n ly th e
r e m n a n ts o f t h e o ld n o b i l i t y b u t a ls o w e a lth y i n d u s t r i a l
is ts . M o r e t h a n a n y th i n g , t h e y f a v o re d t h e m a i n te n a n c e
o f s o c ia l o rd e r.
O v e r t h e c o u rse o f t h e la te n in e t e e n t h c e n tu ry , as is d is
c u sse d f u r t h e r in th e n a tio n a lis m case stu d y , a n “e th n ic ”
c o n c e p tio n o f t h e F r e n c h n a tio n d e v e lo p e d , su s p ic io u s o f
“c o s m o p o lita n is m ” a n d o f te n a n ti- S e m itic . T h o u g h m o s t
sc h o la rs t h i n k t h is w a s c o n fin e d to a m in o rity , it b e c a m e
im p o r t a n t b y t h e e a rly y e a rs o f th e t w e n t i e th c e n tu ry . T h is
t r a d i t io n m a y h a v e w itn e s s e d its m o s t e x tre m e e x p re ss io n
in t h e c o lla b o ra tin g V ic h y re g im e d u r i n g W o r ld W a r I I . I t
lives o n in t h e N a t io n a l F r o n t p a r t y o f J e a n - M a r ie L e P e n
(n o w r u n b y h is d a u g h te r, M a r i n e L e P e n ), a x e n o p h o b ic
p a r ty w h ic h is a bove a ll p re o c c u p ie d w i t h im m ig r a tio n ,
e sp e c ia lly im m ig r a tio n b y M u s lim s , w h ile a lso h a v in g a
h is to r y o f a n ti- S e m itis m . T h is g ro u p w a s fo r m a n y years
p o litic a lly m a r g in a l; th o u g h th e e ld e r L e P e n d id fin is h in
se c o n d p la c e in t h e p r e s id e n tia l e le c tio n s o f 2 0 0 2 , th e v a st
m a jo rity v o te d a g a in s t h im . M a r i n e le P e n d id w e ll in th e
firs t r o u n d o f th e 2 0 1 2 e le c tio n s , h o w e v e r, a n d , in d e e d ,
N ic h o la s S a rk o z y m o v e d to th e r ig h t o n im m ig r a tio n
issu e s i n th e fin a l r o u n d in a n e ffo rt to a tt r a c t h e r s u p p o rt
ers. ( M a n y c o m m e n ta to r s v ie w e d th is m o v e as a s tra te g ic
m is ta k e , c o n tr i b u t in g to H o l la n d e ’s 2 0 1 2 v icto ry .) P e rh a p s
e v e n m o re s u rp r is in g , th e N a t io n a l F r o n t d id v e ry w e ll
in th e 2 0 1 4 E U P a r l ia m e n t e le c tio n s , s h o c k in g m a n y o b
se rv e rs , b o t h in F ra n c e a n d in te r n a tio n a lly . I t is w o r th
n o t in g , th o u g h , t h a t th is w a s n o t a sp e c ific a lly F re n c h
d e v e lo p m e n t; r ig h t- w in g p a r ti e s d id v e ry w e ll in t h e 2 0 1 4
E u r o p e a n p a r lia m e n ta r y e le c tio n s m o re g e n e ra lly .
O v e r th e y e a rs F r e n c h p o litic a l c u ltu r e h a s d e v e lo p e d a
s tr o n g c e n te r t h a t b u ild s o n a c o m p ro m is e b e tw e e n t h e tw o
tr a d itio n s n o te d h e re . H is to ric a lly , b o t h th e so c ia lists a n d
th e le a d in g r ig h t- o f - c e n t e r p a r ti e s h a v e s u p p o r te d m a in
ta i n i n g t h e w e lfa re s ta te , s ta tu s q u o in te rm s o f c h u r c h -
s ta te re la tio n s , t h o u g h th e y d is a g re e a b o u t so m e o f th e
d e ta ils .
Political Economy
F ra n c e h a s o n e o f t h e w o r ld ’s m o s t a d v a n c e d e c o n o m ie s,
a n d h a s fo r so m e tim e . M e a s u r e d in te rm s o f t h e H u m a n
D e v e lo p m e n t In d e x , its c itiz e n s live in o n e o f t h e t w e n ty
b e s t - o f f e c o n o m ie s in th e w o rld . T h e F r e n c h e c o n o m y is
a m o n g th e t e n la rg e s t in th e w o rld (in th e to p five w h e n
m e a s u re d sim p ly b y in c o m e , a n d to p t e n w h e n m e a s u re d in
te rm s o f w h a t t h a t in c o m e c a n buy), a n d it h a s o n e o f th e
h ig h e s t G D P s p e r c a p ita in th e w o rld . M o re o v e r, c itiz e n s
b e n e fit fro m re la tiv e ly g e n e ro u s w e lfa re s ta te b e n e fits t h a t
are d isc u sse d f u r t h e r a b it la te r in t h is s e c tio n . T h e y a lso p a y
h i g h e r ta x e s t h a n c itiz e n s in c o u n trie s w i t h less g e n e ro u s
w e lfa re sta te s: I n d e e d , g o v e r n m e n t re v e n u e s a m o u n t to
n e a rly 5 0 p e rc e n t o f G D P .
T h e F r e n c h e c o n o m y h a s h is to ric a lly p riv ile g e d a n im
p o r t a n t ro le fo r t h e s ta te , th r o u g h re g u la tio n , g o v e rn m e n t
o w n e rs h ip o f firm s , a n d r e d is tr ib u tiv e e ffo rts. I n re c e n t
y e a rs, as so c ie tie s w i t h w e lfa re s ta te s e n te r e d in to a p e rio d
o f “r e tr e n c h m e n t ” f o llo w in g th e e c o n o m ic c rises o f th e
1970s, th e r e w e re so m e e ffo rts to scale b a c k t h is sta te i n
v o lv e m e n t, p a r tic u la r ly u n d e r c o n se rv a tiv e p re sid e n ts
434 France
Ja c q u es C h ir a c a n d N ic o la s S a rk o z y . T h e sta te h a s p a r tia lly
d iv e s te d its e lf fro m so m e o f its h o ld in g s , t h o u g h i t h a s h a d
a b it m o re tro u b le fre e in g i ts e lf fro m w e lfa re o b lig a tio n s
a n d d e re g u la tin g th e la b o r m a r k e t, as it h a s fa c e d p u b lic
re sista n c e w h e n it h a s a tt e m p te d to d o so.
T h e F re n c h e c o n o m y in so m e w ays is a ty p ic a l “p o s ti n
d u s tr i a l” econom y. N o te t h a t t h is d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t th e r e
is n o in d u s try , b u t r a th e r t h a t se rv ice s a re d o m in a n t.
In d e e d , in d u s tr y a c c o u n ts fo r 18.7 p e rc e n t o f G D P . A g r i
c u ltu r e o n ly a c c o u n ts fo r 1.9 p e rc e n t, w i t h services ac
c o u n tin g fo r a f u ll 79.4 p e rc e n t o f G D P (2 0 1 3 e s tim a te , p e r
C I A W o r ld F a c tb o o k ).
F ra n c e h a s re la tiv e ly lo w in c o m e in e q u a lity , n e a r t h e av
e rag e fo r e u ro z o n e c o u n trie s . Its G i n i in d e x is 3 1 .7 ( W o rld
B a n k 2 0 1 3 e stim a te ), w h e re 0 w o u ld m e a n p e r fe c t e q u a lity
a n d 1 00 w o u ld m e a n p e rfe c t in e q u a lity . T o p u t t h is in p e r
s p e c tiv e, th e U n ite d S ta te s h a s a G i n i in d e x o f o v e r 4 0 , a n d
so m e c o u n trie s h a v e fig u re s a r o u n d 70! F ra n c e a lso has
re la tiv e ly lo w p o v e rty . H is to r ic a lly it h a s su ffe re d fro m re la
tiv e ly h ig h levels o f u n e m p lo y m e n t, w h ic h so m e a n a ly sts
h a v e a ttr ib u te d to th e r ig id ity o f its h ig h ly r e g u la te d la b o r
m a rk e t. S o m e w o u ld a rg u e t h a t th is is a fu n c tio n o f th e
F re n c h s ta te ’s o n g o in g in v o lv e m e n t in th e eco n o m y . H o w
ever, o th e r a d v a n c e d e c o n o m ie s h a v e, sadly, “c a u g h t u p ”
w ith F ra n c e in u n e m p lo y m e n t. S o m e , n o ta b ly its n e ig h b o r
to th e s o u th , S p a in , h a v e fa r m o re se rio u s u n e m p lo y m e n t
p ro b le m s.
T h e F r e n c h w e lfa re sta te h a s b e e n re s ilie n t in th e face o f
e ffo rts to ro ll i t b a c k (P ra s a d 2 0 0 6 ). I t h a s , as n o te d p re v i
ously, se e n c o n sid e ra b le p riv a tiz a tio n , a n d th e r e h a v e b e e n
p u s h e s to w a rd d e r e g u la tio n , b u t th e sta te c o n tin u e s to p la y
a n e n o rm o u s ro le in th e F re n c h eco n o m y , e m p lo y in g
n u m e ro u s c itiz e n s a n d c a p tu r in g a la rg e sh a re o f th e G D P .
M o re o v e r, sta te se rv ice s c o n tin u e to b e fa irly g e n e ro u s in
c o m p a ra tiv e te rm s . C o m p a ra tiv e a n a ly sts h a v e id e n tifie d
se v e ra l re a so n s fo r th is . F ir s t, th e r e is th e F r e n c h tr a d itio n
o f s ta tis m t h a t w e have m e n tio n e d . S e c o n d , w h ile th e
m o d e r n F r e n c h w e lfa re sta te h a d ro o ts in th e le f tis t F r o n t
P o p u la ire a llia n c e in th e la te 1 9 3 0 s, it is i m p o r t a n t to n o te
t h a t so m e i m p o r t a n t f e a tu re s o f t h e F r e n c h w e lfa re sta te
w e re c re a te d , e x p a n d e d , a n d m a in ta in e d p re c ise ly b y c o n
se rv ativ es. I n th e F i f t h R e p u b lic , D e G a u lle e sta b lis h e d a
lo n g tr a d i t io n o f c o n se rv a tiv e e le c to ra l su ccess. In d e e d ,
w h ile in t h e U n ite d K in g d o m a n d t h e U n ite d S ta te s t h e
1 9 8 0 s saw a tta c k s o n th e w e lfa re sta te as c o n se rv a tiv e p a r
tie s r e tu r n e d to p o w e r, i n F ra n c e th e S o c ia lists fin a lly to o k
p o w e r in 1981 w h e n F r a n f o is M i t t e r a n d w as e le c te d (1 9 8 1 -
1 995). T h u s, o n o n e h a n d , th e c o n se rv a tiv e s w e re id e n tifie d
w i t h th e w e lfa re s ta te , a n d o n th e o th e r, d u r in g t h e m o m e n t
w h e n th e r ig h t w a s a tt e m p t in g to d is m a n tle a sp e c ts o f th e
w e lfa re sta te in o t h e r c o u n trie s , th e le f t h e ld p o w e r in
F ra n c e .
A n o t h e r k e y f e a tu r e o f t h e F r e n c h w e lfa re s ta te t h a t
m a y h e lp to p re c lu d e a tta c k s o n i t is t h a t (1) m a n y o f its
b e n e fits a re n o t ra d ic a lly r e d is tr ib u tiv e ( E s p i n g - A n d e r s o n
1 9 9 0 : 2 7 ) a n d (2) a s ig n if ic a n t p o r t io n o f s ta te re v e n u e s
c o m e f r o m a c o n s u m p tio n ta x c a lle d a V a lu e - A d d e d T a x
(o r V A T , s im il a r to s ta te -le v e l sales ta x e s fo u n d in th e
U n it e d S ta te s). W h y w o u ld t h is m a tte r? A c c o r d i n g to
so m e s c h o la rs ( P r a s a d 2 0 0 6 ) , c o n s u m p tio n ta x e s a re less
lik e ly to b e p e rc e iv e d as u n f a ir b y p o litic a l o p p o n e n ts o f
t h e w e lfa re s ta te , a n d th u s less lik e ly to g e n e ra te s tr o n g
o p p o s itio n .
Within the comparative European context seventeenth century as "strong" in the competitors. For this reason many histori-
France is thought of as having historically twenty-first-century world, in its time it ans have thought of the French state of
had a strong state. While we would was more unified and it more consistently Louis XIV as serving as the epitome of
not recognize the French state of the controlled its territory than many of its European absolutism. It is perhaps as a
Case Studies 435
CASE STUDY (continued)
The State in France
■■■■■■■■■■■■■■Hi
CHAPTER 3, PAGE 59
result of this strong absolutist state that
the modern French state has been so cen
tralist. The French Revolution had a well-
institutionalized, if fiscally unsound, state
to transform, and in the post-revolution
ary years the state was expanded, with
new layers of administration added. Over
the course of the nineteenth century,
the state's reach and dominance over
local society increased slowly but surely
(Weber 1976).
The French economy has featured a
prominent role for the state for many
years, especially when contrasted with
Great Britain and the United States. This
has been true at least since the time of
Jean-Baptiste Coibert, a seventeenth-
century economic thinker. France was
one of the earliest of economic modern
izers and was a great economic power in
the eighteenth century. The modern
French economy with its significant state
involvement— known as dirigisme— is a
product of the immediate aftermath of
the Second World War. President Charles
de Gaulle nationalized key industries and
used the state to promote recovery from
the damage of the war, while American
aid in the form of the post-war Marshall
Nobody doubts France's democratic cre
dentials. In the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries, it is among the
world's leading democracies. Moreover,
its 1789 revolution was and remains a
source of inspiration to pro-democracy
Plan contributed to reconstruction. The
program was successful: France achieved
solid growth and marked improvements
in the standard of living in the three de
cades from about 1945 to about 1975,
known as the trente glorieuses ("glorious
thirty”).
Under recent president Nicolas Sar-
kozy there was great debate about the
role that the state would continue to play
in the economy. On one hand, there is the
question of whether future economic
competitiveness can co-exist with the
general support of workers' rights that
state regulation makes possible. On the
other hand, there is the ongoing question
of the state's ability to make economic
policy. Monetary policy is already carried
out at the EU level, and there is now some
talk of the centralization of European fiscal
policy as well, though it is too early to tell
whether this will take place.
Heir to a revolutionary tradition that
figures prominently in its national con
sciousness, the French state has often
aimed to present itself as the defender of
"the people," including workers.The French
state has heavily regulated the labor
market, for example by implementing a
forces everywhere (even if it did not im
mediately culminate in a democracy).
Indeed, it is precisely because of the
country's democratic achievements that
it is worth reflecting on the challenges
that France faced in institutionalizing its
thirty-five-hour work week and by estab
lishing strong protections against layoffs
and firings. The state directly employs a
relatively large proportion of the workforce,
totaling 5.4 million workers and over 20
percent of the total workforce as of the end
of 2014 (DGAFP Annual Report 2014). It has
also provided generous stipends to the un
employed. Perhaps as a result, France has
often struggled with higher levels of un
employment than some other developed
countries. Former president Sarkozy has
tried to overturn some of these regulations
but was stymied by public protests.
As is discussed further in the case
study on French nationalism, the French
state has historically played a critical role
in French national consciousness. Citizen
ship, understood as a kind of relationship
that an individual has with the state, has
historically been key to French national
identity (Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992).
This is reinforced by the strongly central
ist institutional structure of the French
state. Loyalty is owed to the central state
as the institutional embodiment of the
nation, and not to other identities or insti
tutions that mediate between citizens
and the state.
democracy. If France, of all countries, en
countered such difficulties, should we
expect anything less for today's democra-
tizers? In short, the French case under
scores the difficulty of democratic
consolidation.
■
Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France c h a p t e r 7, page 157
436 France
CASE STUDY (continued)
Authoritarritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France CHAPTER 7, PAGE 157
We will not repeat the sequence de
scribed in the "Historical Development"
section of the country profile. It is enough
to note that the revolution, which de
posed the monarchy, passed through a
republican period, to the “terror," and
eventually to Napoleon's rule, which was
despotic by any modern definition. This
was followed by the restoration of the
previous monarchy, and then the "July
Monarchy" of the "Citizen-King," Louis-
Philippe, and finally by the Second Repub
lic (1848-1852). The Second Empire (of
Napoleon III) lasted from 1852 until 1870,
when, following France's defeat in the
Franco-Prussian war, the "Third Republic"
began (for an authoritative overview of
this period, see Furet [1988] 1995). Indeed,
even in the twentieth century France saw
considerable conflict between democratic
and authoritarian tendencies, finally put
to rest in the post-World War II period.
In short, French political history in the
nineteenth century presents us with a
range of political and social models,
instability, and considerable authoritarian
persistence. Why did these occur? One
hypothesis might be the collapse of the
existing order. Perhaps the elimination
of well-established, if flawed, political
models left the political arena too open to
contestation. Indeed, if the monarchy
could be abolished, was anything beyond
question, negotiation, or dispute?
Another idea comes from Alexis de
Tocqueville, the great observer of both
American and French society. As we saw
elsewhere in this book, he found much
to admire about the participatory-
democratic habits and decentralization
of American politics. In contrast, he
thought that a key problem in France was
the lack of these habits (because institu
tions had not encouraged them), along
side a centralized state and a revolution
that had awakened a passionate distrust
of all inequalities without providing op
portunities for French citizens to develop
democratic freedoms (see Tocqueville
[1856] 2002, esp. pp. 310-311).
Another approach might emphasize
the legacies of inequalities themselves:
The revolution aimed to abolish the nobil
ity, but of course privilege lived on, and
both old and new social elites and the
church did what they could to protect
their interests as they saw them (for one
variation of this argument, see Marx [1852]
2007). If it was clear to such actors that
their opponents meant for their elimina
tion, this would have major implications
for their strategic decisions. The same is
true of their opponents.
Think about how a rational-choice ap
proach (e.g., that of Lichbach 1995, or
Kuran 1991) might model the situation in
which these actors found themselves
and how such an approach might try to
explain the sequence of unstable politics
found in nineteenth-century France. Then
think about the implications of the French
case for contemporary democratizers.
Can we compare such cases over time?
And, if so, are there any limits on our abil
ity to do so?
| |
I_______I
i i i i
Electing the French President: W hat Do Runoffs Do? CHAPTER 10, PAGE 231
In France in 2002, most voters were
shocked as the results came in for the first
round of presidential voting. In this first
round of French elections, the nationwide
popular vote is tallied for the many candi
dates, and a candidate is elected only if he
or she secures an outright majority, which
is uncommon. In the absence of a major
ity, the top two candidates have a runoff
to determine the winner. This system
allows citizens to vote for their most pre
ferred candidate in the first round, then
vote for an "electable" candidate in the
second round. Typically, the runoff had
amounted to a showdown between the
leading candidate of the center-right
(often called the "Gaullist" candidate after
French war hero and later president
Charles de Gaulle) and the candidate of
the center-left Socialist Party. But in 2002,
with the first-round vote split between
many candidates on the left, the Socialist
performed poorly and came in third with
16 percent behind center-right candidate
Jacques Chirac (just under 20 percent)
and the far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le
Pen, leader of the National Front, who
tookjust under 17 percent of the vote. The
runoff came down to the right versus the
far right.
Case Studies 437
CASE STUDY (continued)
Electing the French President: What Do Runoffs Do? c h a p t e r 10, p a g e 231
For some, Le Pen's first-round success
served as a condemnation of the French
practice of having elections with a "runoff"
between the top two candidates: It gave a
huge platform and political spotlight to a
candidate on the fringe (though the Na
tional Front has done surprisingly well in
subsequent elections). What happened
next had the opposite effect, though it was
predictable: Jacques Chirac won 82 percent
of the vote in the runoff, and Le Pen won
less than 18 percent. Chirac thus took nearly
all of the vote that had gone to all other
candidates in the first round and won the
presidency overwhelmingly, and Le Pen
barely increased his tally at all despite the
elimination of all other candidates. Turnout
also increased in the second round, despite
the fact that Chirac's win was near-certain,
as French voters turned out overwhelm
ingly (while also taking to the streets in pro
test) to vote against Le Pen.
This raises the issue of whether runoffs
are good or bad for representation and de
mocracy. While anomalies such as the Le
Pen result can emerge in the first round,
proponents of the system can argue that it
performed exactly as intended: It allowed
French voters to express their initial prefer
ence, then weeded out the more extreme
candidate. It also signaled the frustration of
voters with the Socialist Party, which al
lowed that party to reshape its platform for
the future, rather than simply resting on its
laurels as the presumptive leader of the
left. As importantly, the runoff ensured
that the individual elected president ulti
mately received more than 50 percent of
the votes in a presidential election. That is,
the president ends up with a clear mandate
of over half of French voters electing him
or her. This contrasts with the American
model, for example, in which it is relatively
common for presidents to win the presi
dency with less than 50 percent of the
popular vote. It should also be noted that
voter turnout is much higher in French
elections than in the United States and
many other countries, at about 80 percent
in most presidential elections and 60 per
cent in parliamentary elections (Interna
tional IDEA 2011).
For these reasons, runoffs are cur
rently used in elections in a large number
of countries, including for parliamentary
districts in France itself. The runoff
features frequently in elections in Latin
America and Africa, where presidential
ism is common. In these countries, there
are particular historical and social rea
sons that can make the runoff appealing.
In Chile in 1970, the Marxist Salvador Al-
lende was confirmed president by Con
gress after receiving less than 37 percent
of the vote; three years later, a military
coup to overthrow the elected president
resulted in nearly two decades of brutal
dictatorship. And in Africa, presidential
elections can result in voting along
ethnic lines in the first round, but broader
coalition building across ethnic lines to
win in the second round. It is worth con
sidering how history might have been
different— and whether violence and de
mocracy would be affected— if a French-
style runoff system had existed in Chile in
1970 or did not exist in some African
countries today.
U . i i ; t ■
I I1 The French Revolution CHAPTER 12, PAGE 285
i
The French Revolution took place amid
major structural problems in eighteenth-
century French society (Furet 1995;
Doyle 2003). In this period France, like
much of early modern Europe, remained
an “estate society," divided into three
groups: a nobility with special privileges,
the clergy, and commoners. The social
status of the nobility, however, was
weakened by the ongoing efforts of the
centralizing, absolutist crown. As the
monarchy and its state grew stronger,
the nobility felt increasingly marginal
ized. At the same time, the French
absolutist state, largely through its in
volvement in foreign wars (especially the
American Revolution), faced major fiscal
difficulties (Doyle 2003). Indeed, by the
late eighteenth century it was nearly
bankrupt. Meanwhile, periodic problems
in food distribution and rural poverty en
sured that much of France's rural popula
tion felt discontent. Finally, the spread of
the Enlightenment and of nationalism
438 France
provided the bases for an intellectual cri
tique of the old regime (Greenfeld 1992;
Bell 2001).
The revolution began as a series of
efforts to reform the French state. The
crown called an "Assembly of Notables,”
but the assembly declared that the Es
tates General, which had not met since
the early seventeenth century, needed to
be called. When the Estates General con
vened, it was divided in the customary
manner into the three estates mentioned
previously. However, before long, politics
and propaganda forced representatives of
the first two estates to join the latter one,
the core idea being that the French nation
shouldn't be divided by estates, since all
of its members should be equal. The third
estate was the nation, as Sieyes declared
(Furet 1995:45-51). In other words, the Es
tates General was reinterpreted as being
something like a modern, national legisla
ture (though the leaders of the Estates
General remained bourgeois and nobles,
along with some clergy, and not "popular"
actors).
Reform quickly devolved into a novel
form of collective behavior that was sur
prising even to its most central partici
pants and those who attempted to lead
and control it. Street actions began, and
mobs attacked the Bastille prison on
July 14,1789, wishing to destroy a reviled
symbol of the arbitrary authority of the
monarch to imprison opponents at will.
By 1792, the monarchy had fallen amidst
increasing violence— much perpetrated
by mobs known as the "sans culottes"—
opening a period known as the "Terror," in
which perceived enemies of the revolu
tion were murdered in large numbers.
Robespierre was a key figure in this period,
perpetrating the paranoid violence that
ultimately consumed him. This was fol
lowed by a period of relaxation known as
the "Thermidorian reaction” and, finally,
by the rise of Napoleon. On one hand
Napoleon appears a conservative figure,
since, for example, he declared himself
emperor. But on the other hand he can be
viewed as a revolutionary whose mission
was to spread the French Revolution to
the rest of Europe, through an imperial
war.
What struck so many contemporaries
was the Revolution's destructive nature. It
seemed intent upon an eradication of the
old society, and the replacement of all of its
forms by new, “revolutionary” ones. This
included the creation of a new, revolution
ary calendar, the efforts to destroy the
Church and its teachings, the war on the
nobility, the destruction of many architec
tural sites, and so forth. The French revolu
tion subsequently became the model for
many later revolutionaries and its ideals in
spirational for nationalists and republicans
everywhere. At the same time, it surprised
nearly everyone involved, and those who
attempted to control it quickly learned that
they had helped to unleash social forces
beyond their ability to lead (Arendt 1963).
Religion and Secularism in France CHAPTER 15, PAGE 359
France is the society most closely associ
ated with the idea of lai'cite, though one
encounters it prominently in a number of
other societies as well, including parts of
Latin America (Blancarte 2008). France
was historically a Catholic society. For a
time, there had been a relatively large
Protestant minority (the "Huguenots') but
they were repressed and most fled after
1685, when Louis XIV revoked the Edict
of Nantes that had granted freedom of
conscience and practice to Protestants.
France's Catholicism was central to its
early modern identity.
Most scholars see French secularism
as having its origins in the eighteenth
century. Religion and politics had been
closely linked in continental Europe for a
long time, but the church and the state
had experienced considerable tension at
certain points in the history of their rela
tionship. As the French absolutist state
rose, a theological position known as
Jansenism, and a political theory known
as Regalism, helped the king to exert
greater control over the church. Despite
these tensions, after the French Revolu
tion began in 1789, republicans and rev
olutionaries identified the church with
the “old regime" (Kuru 2009) and thus
repressed it, murdering many priests.
The French Revolutionary regime tried
to create its own, secular religion, and to
Case Studies 439
replace religious symbols with its own,
secular ones. This was changed by
Napoleon, who concluded an agree
ment (known as a 'concordat") with the
church, but even then the state domi
nated the church, and the church never
returned to its former powers. Subse
quent French history witnessed multiple
struggles between monarchy/empire
and democratic republicanism (Furet
1995), with the former being more
closely associated with a pro-Church po
sition. Democratic republicanism was
eventually triumphant, though, and over
time French Catholicism (along with
other, minority religions) was "privatized"
(on privatization, see Casanova 1994). In
today's France the view that the Catholic
Church should have an expanded rule in
politics is marginal.
In recent years this has been linked to
great controversy, particularly because
immigration has notably increased the
Islamic share of the French population.
Great debates have been held over
whether religious garb (in particular, the
Muslim hijab) can be worn in schools and
other public organizational spaces (Scott
2007). Opponents of traditionally Islamic
symbolism in public have drawn on
long-standing national mythology about
la'iciti, though their critics suggest that
this is a cover for unspoken ethnic dis
crimination. The fundamental conflict
has concerned not whether members of
religious groups should be able to prac
tice their religion, but whether they
should be able to engage in religious ex
pression (including clothing) in public
institutions. It is worth further noting that
to some extent this issue cuts across the
French political spectrum.
Globalization and Culture in France CHAPTER 16, PAGE 383
& 5 ^ s IS?
France's relationship with globalization
has been complex. In the late nineteenth
century, France was a lead "globalizer." If
you travel in the developing world today,
you may learn that the architecture built
in the nineteenth century had a marked
French influence; this is a visible indicator
of French influence at one point in time.
French ideas were extraordinarily influen
tial around the globe in this period, at
least in more cosmopolitan social sectors
in many societies. Especially influential
was the idea of positivism, that science
and reason could contribute to the bet
terment of society. In the late nineteenth
century, the culture with the broadest
global reach was almost certainly French,
though the British Empire ensured global
expansiveness for British culture as well.
In the twentieth century, though,
France grew more ambivalent about glo
balization. Perhaps this is because rather
than being a net exporter of cultural
forms, it began to import them. France
continued to be influential in global cul
ture, especially in its former colonies, but
in many ways its leading position was
overtaken by the United States. Globaliza
tion has taken on new forms and grown,
with new media and new patterns of
communication, and the influence of
American ideas and culture has spread.
One indicator of this rise of "Anglo-Saxon"
culture has been the replacement of
French, which was long the language of
diplomacy, with English as the dominant
language in international affairs. Less for
mally, but perhaps more consequentially,
cultural forces from Hollywood to hip hop
have reshaped French film, literature,
music, and the arts.
French ambivalence about globaliza
tion also reflects economic ideas, espe
cially about global capitalism. This dates
back centuries. In the early modern
period, royal ministers exhorted nobles to
engage in commerce, but many rejected
this idea, convinced that commerce
would "disparage" (deroger) nobility (Furet
1995 Greenfeld 2001). Important early so
cialist works, many of which predated and
anticipated Marx, developed in France.
In the late eighteenth century, Rousseau
and others developed the critique that
modern social relations are corrupting;
this later found expression on both left
and right, and in both radical democratic
movements and with more extreme op
position to capitalism and democracy.
Within the French economy itself, there
has often been an emphasis on crafts
manship and small-scale production. At
the same time, France in the twentieth
century did establish major corporations,
but often did so with state support; ex
amples of major French companies that
440 France
---------- ,
i CASE STUDY (continued)
■ I Globalization and Culture in France c h a p t e r i e , p a g e 383
were state-owned or nationalized at one
time include the car company Renault,
the oil giant Total, and several major banks
and utilities.
A common refrain in France has been
the need to develop in a 'French way," re
sisting Americanization and globalization.
Economically, this is linked to common
tropes in French culture: Societies fully im
mersed in global capitalism "live to work,"
whereas some French citizens would
argue that the French "work to live."
France has thus been somewhat skeptical
of multinational businesses and of the
consequences of international trade
agreements, and it has even tried to limit
the spread and use of English words in
French business. This is not simply a
matter of the French government, but im
portant segments of the citizenry as well.
One example is Jose Bove, an activist and
"farmer" who destroyed a McDonald's
restaurant under construction in 1999.
This action was well received by many
members of the French public, and Bove
is a well-known figure in France, though
his popularity has its limits; when he later
ran for president, he received less than 2
percent of the vote. On the other hand, he
is not a typical "French farmer." His parents
were university researchers, and he spent
part of his childhood in California. In
any case, some took his stance to be a
fairly extreme expression of a common
sentiment.
While ambivalent about some aspects
of globalization, France has also been a key
mover of deeper integration in continental
Europe in the period since World War II. It
has sought to develop strong economic
ties to Germany and other economies
while developing in a way that relies heav
ily on elements of free markets yet contin
ues to guarantee an active role for the state
in the economy. It has been a strong sup
porter of the European Union, and in 2011
France, along with Germany, exercised a
considerable influence over how the EU
responded to the fiscal crises in Greece and
Italy, and worries over Portugal and Spain
as well. France also retains major global
linkages to former colonies, particularly in
North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. North
African migrants— especially from Algeria
and Morocco— constitute an important
group in French society, one which pushes
the boundaries of cultural change, given
that some members of that group are per
ceived to be less than receptive to tradi
tional French notions of laicite (see the
Introduction and the “Religion and Secu
larism” box for more information on this).
Together, these debates about eco
nomics and cultural identity suggest a
society that has conflicting and perhaps
contradictory views about the desirability
of globalization; in this, France shares
many challenges with other countries—
including the United States— that grapple
with the tough issues of how to respond
as nations in an international twenty-first
century.
Research Prompts
1. France has runoff elections, and the United States does not.
What are the major consequences of this difference? Would you
expect the consequences of this difference to play out in the
same way in a wider range of comparative cases? Why or
why not?
2. France is a society that has had many revolutions, and one in
which revolution has become a key idea in the culture. Brazil is a
society that, despite promoting social change in important,
novel, and influential ways, has largely been free of revolutions
as such. Can you explain this difference?
3. The French state captures a considerably larger share of its GDP
as revenue than other countries. Why might this be?
4. The French welfare state has survived "retrenchment" more suc
cessfully than a number of others, despite some changes,
including the privatization of a number of formerly state-owned
enterprises. How do you explain its staying power? Will it likely
remain strong in the future?
5. The United Kingdom has a fairly small extreme, xenophobic
right wing (represented by the British National Party),
whereas in France this group has been a bit larger (though
the National Front still represents a minority of French citi
zens, with its presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, winning
nearly 18 percent of the first-round vote in 2012, and the
party doing very well in 2014 EU parliamentary elections). Is
this difference a function of different ideas of nationhood,
different historical experiences, different patterns of decline
of traditional left-wing parties, different political institutions,
or something else?
R B I R
441
B Germany
Key Features o f C o n te m p o r a r y G e r m a n y
Population: 80,996,685 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 357,022 square kilometers
Head of State: Joachim Gauck (president, 2012-present)
Head of Government: Angela Merkel (chancellor, 2005-present)
Capital: Berlin
Year of Independence: Unification achieved in 1871; re-unification in
1990
Year of Current Constitution: 1949
Languages: German
GDP per Capita: $46,260 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
Human Development Index
Ranking (2014):
6th (very high human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Development Report 2014.
Introduction
Germany is a country of enduring interest to
political scientists for a number of reasons. Its
historical state-building process draws atten
tion, both because of the early success of
Prussian state-builders and because of the
relatively late development of the unified
German state (1871), after years of decentral
ization and nationalist aspiration. Germany is
also of interest because of its development tra
jectory, as it achieved relatively rapid industri
alization and economic growth in the mid- to
late nineteenth century, and came to be per
haps the preeminent European power shortly
after its political unification. The country, as
we will see, is frequently cited as a prototypi
cal case of ethnic nationalism, meaning that
boundaries between Germans and others are
typically understood in ethnic terms rather
than as a function of citizenship. As such,
Germany is frequently contrasted with
France, and a robust social-scientific litera
ture seeks to explain this difference. More
over, there are major debates about whether
German culture is changing or has changed
in this connection.
I G erm an 91.5
T urkish 2.4%
O th e r 6.1%
Ethnic Groups in Germany
Note that most of those in the "other" category are from or descend
from citizens of other European societies, including Russia.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
P rotestant C hristianity 34%
R om an C atholicism 34%
Islam 3.7%
O th e r religion or
non-affiliated 28.7%
Religious Affiliation in Germ any
Source: CIA World Factbook.
442 Germany
SWEDEN
Rostock
Lubeck
^Bremerhaven* Hambur9
Wilhelmshavei
ETHERLANDS
Bremen
BerlinHannover
POLANDMagdeburg
- Duisburg
• c
• Essen
Dusseldorf
Leipzig
Kassel Dresden
0 170 340 Miles
HOKKAIDO
N O R T H
P A C I F I C
O C E A N
HONSHU
BONIN
Philippine ISLANDS
Sea
SHIKOKU
KYUSHU
J a p a n ’s g e o g ra p h y o n ly a d d s to th e in te r e s t o f th is case.
J a p a n is n o t e sp e c ia lly r e s o u rc e -ric h , a n d its la n d is n o t
a b u n d a n t re la tiv e to its m o d e r n p o p u la tio n . A s su c h , w h e n
th e J a p a n e s e e c o n o m y m o d e r n iz e d , th e sta te lo o k e d a b ro a d
i n its se a rc h fo r n a tu r a l re so u rc e s, o n e o f th e p r in c ip a l fac
to rs le a d in g to th e c o u n tr y ’s d is a s tro u s in v o lv e m e n t in th e
S e c o n d W o rld W a r ( N a k a m u r a [1988] 2 0 0 8 : 4 8 5 ). J a p a n is
sm a ll in re la tiv e te rm s , a series o f m o s tly m o u n ta in o u s is
la n d s . T h is im p a c te d th e c o u n tr y ’s e a rly d e v e lo p m e n t in
i m p o r ta n t w ays, h e lp in g to p r o te c t it fro m c o n s ta n t th r e a t
o fin v a s io n ( G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 3 – 4 ) a n d a id in g in th e T o k u g a w a
e ffo rts to m a in ta in c u ltu r a l is o la tio n . I t h a s also m e a n t t h a t
J a p a n h a s fa c e d u n iq u e p ro b le m s w i t h la n d sc a rc ity as its
p o p u la tio n h a s g ro w n .
J a p a n is la rg e ly e th n ic a lly h o m o g e n e o u s , th o u g h n o t e n
tire ly so. A c c o rd in g to t h e C I A W o r ld F a c tb o o k , 9 8 .5 p e r
c e n t o f th e p o p u la tio n is e th n ic a lly J a p a n e se . P e rh a p s n o t
su rp risin g ly , m o s t s tu d e n ts o f J a p a n e s e n a tio n a l i d e n t ity
Historical Development
J a p a n w as g o v e rn e d fro m th e b e g in n in g o f t h e s e v e n te e n th
c e n tu r y u n t il 186 8 b y t h e T o k u g a w a re g im e , s o m e tim e s r e
fe rre d to as th e T o k u g a w a sh o g u n a te . T h is w a s a n o lig a r
c h ic a l sy ste m in w h ic h th e u p p e r n o b ility (o r D a im y o )
d isp la c e d th e e m p e ro r a n d g o v e rn e d th r o u g h a m ilita r y
le a d e r (sh o g u n ) a n d h is sta te (k n o w n as th e B a k u fu ). A
c h a ra c te ris tic fe a tu re o f T o k u g a w a J a p a n w a s its c lo se d n e ss
to th e re s t o f th e w o rld , a n d to th e W e s t in p a rtic u la r.
T o k u g a w a J a p a n w a s a n e s s e n tia lly a g r ic u ltu r a l s o c ie ty
w i t h a la rg e p e a s a n t class, a re la tiv e ly la rg e m ili ta r y n o b ility
(th e S a m u ra i), a n d a sm a lle r u p p e r n o b ility (th e a fo re m e n
tio n e d D a im y o ). T he r e la tio n s h ip s b e tw e e n th e s e g ro u p s
w e re su p e rfic ia lly s im ila r to th e fe u d a l a r ra n g e m e n ts t h a t
p re v a ile d in m e d ie v a l E u ro p e . A s i n fe u d a l E u r o p e , c o m
m erc e w a s n o t a h ig h ly r e g a rd e d a c tiv ity a n d w a s e s se n tia lly
to le ra te d as n e ce ssa ry : P a in s w e re ta k e n to a v oid tr a d in g
w i t h o t h e r so c ieties. S ta tu s d is tin c tio n s w e re r ig id a n d
l in k e d to d iffe re n c e s in p o litic a l a n d p e r s o n a l rig h ts .
T h is a ll b e g a n t o c h a n g e b y t h e m id d le o f th e n i n e te e n th
c e n tu r y (G o r d o n 2 0 0 9 : 2 2 ). E u r o p e a n p o w e rs h a d ex
p a n d e d t h e i r c o lo n ia l a d v e n tu re s in A s ia . I n d ia w a s b e c o m
in g m o re fo rm a lly c o lo n iz e d t h a n e v e r b e fo re , a n d fo re ig n
p o w e rs in te rv e n e d d e cisively in C h in a , in p a r tic u la r d u r in g
th e tw o “o p iu m w a rs .” E u r o p e a n so c ieties s o u g h t so u rc es o f
m a te ria ls b u t a lso m a rk e ts fo r t h e sale o f th e i r g o o d s . W h il e
J a p a n w a s n o t c o lo n iz e d , fo re ig n p o w e rs b e g a n to p re ssu re
n o te t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e n a ti o n te n d s to d e fin e its b o u n d a rie s
in e th n ic r a th e r t h a n civic te rm s . I n th e re lig io u s field,
so m e c a u tio n is i n o rd e r w h e n c o m p a rin g J a p a n (lik e C h in a )
to so m e o f o u r o t h e r cases. W e s te r n p o p u la tio n s t e n d to
v ie w re lig io u s a ffilia tio n as m u tu a lly exclusive. N o t all
E a s te r n re lig io n s necessarily see t h in g s th is w a y (th o u g h
so m e d o , a n d th e r e a re re lig io u s cla sh e s in A s ia n c o u n trie s
as w ell). H o w e v e r, re lig io n s lik e B u d d h is m , S h in to is m , o r
C o n f u c ia n is m c a n s o m e tim e s c o e x ist w ith o th e rs e v en in
t h e a lle g ia n c e o f a sin g le i n d iv id u a l b e c a u se th e s e re lig io n s
h a v e m o re r itu a lis tic r a th e r t h a n c re e d a l te n d e n c ie s (th o u g h
w e w o u ld n o t w is h to e x a g g e ra te th e e x te n t o f th is d iffe r
e n ce in te n d e n c y ). I n o t h e r w o rd s , so m e v a rie tie s o f th e s e
r e lig io n s a re less fo c u se d o n th e c o n te n t o f th e o lo g ic a l
b e li e f t h a n o n a series o f v a lu e s a n d p ra c tic e s. T h u s y o u w ill
n o tic e in t h e re lig io u s a ffilia tio n c h a r t t h a t , a c c o rd in g to a t
le a s t o n e so u rc e , m a jo ritie s o f t h e J a p a n e s e p o p u la tio n
c la im a ffilia tio n w i t h b o t h B u d d h is m a n d S h in to is m .
i t to o p e n to tra d e . F o r a w h ile it re s is te d , b u t d e sp ite th e
c o u n tr y ’s p ro u d m a r t ia l t r a d itio n s , it w a s c le a r w h e n C o m
m o d o re M a t t h e w P e r r y sa ile d in to J a p a n e s e w a te rs in 1853
a n d 1 854 t h a t J a p a n c o u ld n o t m a tc h th e W e s t ’s m ilita r y
t e c h n o lo g y ( G o r d o n 2 0 0 9 : 4 9 – 5 0 ) . T h e T o k u g a w a g o v
e r n m e n t r e lu c ta n tly a n d slo w ly o p e n e d to W e s te r n tr a d e .
T h is w a s d a m a g in g to t h e i r in te re s ts in se v e ra l w ays. F ir s t,
g re a te r o p e n n e s s m e a n t m o re access to n e w id ea s, lik e
d e m o c rac y , c o n s titu tio n a l m o n a rc h y , a n d n a tio n a lis m
( G re e n fe ld 2 0 0 1 ). S e c o n d , th e s e id ea s se e m e d to b e l in k e d
to c a p a c itie s t h a t th e J a p a n e s e sta te la c k e d . F in a lly , c a p itu
la tin g to W e s te r n d e m a n d s su g g e s te d w e a k n e s s , w h ic h is
alw ays b a d fo r a sta te b u t w a s lik e ly e sp e c ia lly so fo r a sta te
fo r w h o m t h e m ili ta r y n o b ility w a s so im p o r t a n t. I t d id n o t
ta k e lo n g fo r d is c o n te n t to s p re a d . A s c u ltu r a l o r fr a m in g
th e o r is ts o f re v o lu tio n w o u ld n o te , t h e to p p le d e m p e ro r r e
m a in e d as a n a lte rn a te o b je c t o f lo y a lty to th o s e d issa tis fie d
w i th th e T o k u g a w a re g im e . R a d ic a liz e d a n d tr a d itio n a l
a c to rs a lik e c a m e to see th e e m p e ro r as a p o te n tia lly u n if y
in g fig u re . F o r th e t r a d itio n a lis ts , th e r e tu r n t o a sta te b a s e d
o n t h e e m p e ro r w a s p re s e n te d as a “r e s to ra tio n ,” in th is in
sta n c e th e “M e iji R e s to ra tio n ” o f 1 868. T h e n e x t se v e ra l
d e c a d e s w e re s o m e w h a t tu m u l tu o u s , as th e n e w re g im e u n
ra v e le d J a p a n ’s se m i-fe u d a l sy s te m ( G o r d o n 2 0 0 9 : 6 2 – 6 4 )
a n d b e g a n b u ild in g a m o d e r n s ta te . T h e re w a s a m a rk e d
t u r n to w a r d W e s te r n le a r n in g , a n d a g ro w in g p u s h fo r
Profile 485
m o re p o p u la r re sp o n siv e n e ss o n th e p a r t o f th e g o v e rn
m e n t. T h e M e iji c o n s titu tio n w a s p a s s e d in 1889. B y
m o d e r n s ta n d a rd s , th is w a s n o t a n e sp e c ia lly d e m o c ra tic
d o c u m e n t, w i t h o n ly a tin y fra c tio n o f th e p o p u la tio n e li
g ib le to v o te ( G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 91, 1 2 5 ) a n d g iv e n t h a t it
d e c la re d th e e m p e ro r t o b e u ltim a te ly so v e re ig n ( M ita n i
[1988] 2 0 0 8 : 59). S u b s e q u e n t d e m o c r a tiz a tio n w a s y e t to
c o m e , a n d u n iv e rs a l su ffra g e (in c lu d in g t h e v o te f o r w o m e n )
w o u ld n o t b e e sta b lis h e d u n t il a fte r W o r ld W a r I I .
Historical Development
T i m e l i n e
1600-1868 Tokugawa regime 1941-1945 War in the Pacific, with Japan fighting U.S. and
1853 Commodore Perry (from the United States) arrives,
demanding that Japan open itself to trade with
other Allies on islands, atolls, and in regions from
the Philippines to near Japanese coastline.
the West. 1945 The United States drops atomic bombs on
1867-1868 Meiji Restoration, which is ostensibly conservative Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders.
but which will produce a program of moderniza 1947 Constitution of 1947 is proclaimed, re-establishing
tion and Westernization. democracy, and including women’s suffrage.
1870-1873 Major reforms 1953-1970S “Japanese Miracle,” a period of dramatic economic
1877 Satsuma revolt expansion
1889 Meiji Constitution, which establishes constitutional 1991-2001 Economic crisis and the “Lost Decade”
monarchy and limited parliamentary system 1993-1994 LDP briefly loses power but remains the largest
1890 Elections held under the Meiji Constitution party in Diet; coalition government initiates elec
1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War; Japan occupies Taiwan by 1895. toral reforms.
1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War 1995 Aum Shinrikyo cult/terror organization releases
1910 Japan colonizes Korea, signifying expansionist
phase of Japanese Empire
deadly sarin gas in Tokyo subway; thirteen people
are killed and many more are injured or
1914-1918 Japan is a combatant in the First World War, allied incapacitated.
with Britain, France, the United States, and Russia. 2009 LDP loses control of government as DPJ wins gen
1923 Japan suffers the deadliest earthquake in its history. eral election.
1931 Japan invades Manchuria on Chinese mainland,
establishes Manchukuo government.
2011 Massive earthquake and resulting tsunami results
in over 15,000 deaths and reactor meltdowns at the
1937-1941 Second Sino-Japanese War Fukushima nuclear power plant.
1941 Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor begins Japan’s
involvement in the Second World War, on the side
of Axis powers Germany and Italy.
2012 Shinzo Abe elected Prime Minister as LDP regains
control of government.
J a p a n w e n t th r o u g h m a n y s tr ik in g c h a n g e s in th e p e rio d
fro m th e 1 8 8 0 s to th e S e c o n d W o r ld W a r , m o d e r n iz in g its
econom y, society, a n d sta te . T h e c o u n tr y tr a n s f o rm e d its
so c ial s tru c tu r e b y d o in g aw ay w i th s a m u ra i s ta tu s d iffe r
e n c e s a n d b u i l t a m o d e r n s ta te ( G o r d o n 2 0 0 9 : 6 4 – 6 6 ) . I t
a ls o b e g a n to a c h ie v e ra p id e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t
( C ra w c o u r 2 0 0 8 : 3 8 6 – 3 8 7 ) d u r in g a n d a fte r th e F ir s t
W o r ld W a r. I n th e sa m e p e rio d , fro m 189 0 to 1910, J a p a n
b e g a n to flex its m ilita r y m u sc le o u tw a r d in A s ia . I t firs t
w o n a m a jo r w a r a g a in s t C h in a (1 8 9 4 -1 8 9 5 ) a n d c la im e d
p re s e n t-d a y T a iw a n as a colony. I t t h e n w o n a w a r w it h
R u ssia (1 9 0 4 -1 9 0 5 ) a n d la te r c la im e d K o re a as colony
(1910), a m o n g m a n y o th e r isla n d s a n d te rrito rie s . I n a m a tte r
o f d e c a d e s th e c o u n tr y m o v e d fro m b e in g a p r e d o m in a n tly
a g ric u ltu r a l so c ie ty to b e in g o n e o f t h e w o rld ’s m a jo r e c o
n o m ic a n d m ilita r y p o w e rs.
A d is tin g u is h in g fe a tu re o f th is p ro c e ss w a s th e s tro n g
ro le t h a t t h e sta te p la y e d in a llo c a tin g c a p ita l fo r p ro d u c tiv e
u se as i t i n d u s tr ia liz e d . T h e sta te o w n e d o r c o n tro lle d m a n y
firm s , a n d th e sta te l in k e d i ts e l f to p riv a te firm s t h a t r e
c eiv ed sta te a s s is ta n c e i n a c c e ssin g c a p ita l a n d i n o t h e r w ays
(C ra w c o u r 2 0 0 8 : 414). I n so m e a re a s, lik e h e a v y in d u stry ,
486 Japan
th e sta te m a i n ta in e d its in v o lv e m e n t fo r s tra te g ic re a so n s
ev en t h o u g h it to o k d e c a d e s to a c h ie v e p ro fita b ility (C ra w –
c o u r 2 0 0 8 : 4 2 2 , 4 3 5 ). T h e sta te also p la y e d a n i m p o r t a n t
role in th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f ra ilw a y s, J a p a n e s e sh ip p in g , a n d
o t h e r in f r a s tr u c tu r a l d e v e lo p m e n ts (C ra w c o u r 2 0 0 8 : 3 9 3 –
399) as w e ll as th r o u g h c r e a tin g a sy s te m o f c o m m e rc ia l law
(G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 95), a fa c to r t h a t i n s titu tio n a l e c o n o m ists
w o u ld e m p h a s iz e (e.g., N o r t h 1990). T h e J a p a n e s e e c o n o m y
to o k o f f d u r in g W o rld W a r I b e c a u se J a p a n e s e p ro d u c e rs
fo r e x p o r t c o u ld ta k e a d v a n ta g e o f th e d is r u p tio n o f e x ist
in g su p p ly c h a in s to access m a rk e ts . E c o n o m ic h is to ria n s
c o n s id e r J a p a n e s e e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm a n c e to h ave b e e n
s tro n g in re la tiv e te rm s th r o u g h o u t n o t j u s t t h e 1 920s b u t
also th e 1 930s, t h o u g h th e c o u n tr y d i d e x p e rie n c e f r e q u e n t
fin a n c ia l c rises, a n d th e e ffects o f t h e G r e a t D e p re s s io n
w e re n o ta b le ( N a k a m u r a [1988] 2 0 0 8 ).
Ja p a n e s e e c o n o m ic a n d m ilita r y e x p a n s io n to o k p lace
u n d e r a n in c re a s in g ly a g g ressiv e, m ilita r is tic , a n d n a tio n a l
istic re g im e . J a p a n in v a d e d M a n c h u r ia o n th e C h in e s e
m a in la n d in 1931 a n d a tte m p t e d to e s ta b lis h c o n tro l o f
m u c h o f th e P a c ific in su b s e q u e n t y e a rs. W h e n W o r ld W a r
I I c a m e a b o u t, J a p a n a llie d w i t h N a z i G e r m a n y a n d fa sc is t
Italy. I n 1941, J a p a n ’s a tt a c k o n P e a rl H a r b o r , H a w a ii,
b ro u g h t th e U n ite d S ta te s in to th e w a r t h a t h a d b e g u n in
1939. A f t e r m o re t h a n th r e e y e ars o f t o ta l w a r f o u g h t across
th e P a c ific O c e a n , A m e r ic a n forces c lo s e d in o n J a p a n a n d
p re p a re d fo r in v asio n . I n 1945, h o w e v er, A m e r ic a n forces
e sta b lis h e d a ir s u p re m a c y o ver J a p a n a n d f ire b o m b e d T o k y o
a n d o t h e r J a p a n e s e c itie s , le a v in g h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s
d e a d . P r e s i d e n t H a r r y T r u m a n t h e n a u th o r i z e d th e
d r o p p i n g o f t w o a to m ic b o m b s o n th e J a p a n e s e c itie s o f
H i r o s h i m a a n d N a g a s a k i o n A u g u s t 6 a n d 9, 1945. J a p a n
s u rre n d e re d six d ays later.
A f te r th e tra g e d ie s o f W o r ld W a r I I , J a p a n b e g a n e c o
n o m ic a n d p o litic a l re c o n s tr u c tio n u n d e r A m e r ic a n – le d
A ll ie d m ili ta r y o c c u p a tio n u n t i l 1952. A la s tin g im p a c t o f
p o s t-w a r re c o n s tr u c tio n w as th e b e g in n in g o f J a p a n ’s r e
m a rk a b le e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm a n c e ; it is e s tim a te d t h a t th e
J a p a n e se e c o n o m y g r e w a t t h e tre m e n d o u s ra te o f a lm o s t 10
p e rc e n t p e r y e a r b e tw e e n 1945 a n d 1973 (K o sa i 2 0 0 8 : 494).
A g a in , th e sta te p la y e d a la rg e role in t h e eco n o m y : A s
J a p a n re c o v e re d fro m th e w a r, th e g o v e rn m e n t stra te g ic a lly
s u p p o rte d th e r e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e c o al a n d ste el in d u s
trie s , u tiliz in g th e s o -c a lle d “p r io r ity p ro d u c tio n m e t h o d ”
(K o sai 2 0 0 8 : 5 0 0 —501). T h e s ta te , in c o o p e ra tio n w i t h p r i
v a te e n te rp ris e , la te r im p le m e n te d “r a tio n a liz a tio n p la n s ”
fo r k e y i n d u s trie s (K o sa i 2 0 0 8 : 5 1 6 -5 1 8 ). B e g in n in g in th e
e arly 1 9 6 0 s, t h e g o v e rn m e n t re la x e d r e g u la tio n s o n fo re ig n
tr a d e , w h ic h h e lp e d J a p a n e s e e x p o rts in t h e ir su b s e q u e n t
b o o m (K o sa i 2 0 0 8 : 5 2 2 -5 2 7 ).
D e m o c r a tiz a tio n p ro g re s s e d a lo n g w i t h e c o n o m ic
g r o w th in th e y e a rs d u r in g a n d a f te r t h e A l lie d o c c u p a tio n ,
w i t h a series o f n e w c o n s titu tio n a l g u a ra n te e s in th e c o n s ti
tu ti o n o f 1947 (F u k u i [1998] 2 0 0 8 : 156). T h is o w e d b o t h to
th e o c c u p a tio n a u th o ritie s i n s is tin g o n d e m o c r a tiz a tio n and
to J a p a n e s e e ffo rts. J a p a n ’s d e m o c r a tiz a tio n o v e r th is p e rio d
a lso m ay b e d u e to th e J a p a n e s e e c o n o m ic success o f th e
p o s t- w a r y ears: A s a n u m b e r o f th e o rie s in c h a p te r 6 w o u ld
su g g e s t, s tr o n g e c o n o m ic g r o w th a n d th e e m e rg e n c e a n d
d e v e lo p m e n t o f a m id d le class, w h ic h c le a rly t o o k p lac e in
p o s t- w a r J a p a n (F u k u i [1998] 2 0 0 8 : 2 0 4 ), a re a sso c ia te d
w i t h d e m o c ra tic c o n so lid a tio n . O n e la s tin g a s p e c t o f th e
p e a c e w a s a c o n s titu tio n a l c o m m itm e n t n o t to d e p lo y its
m il ita r y overseas.
P o s t-w a r J a p a n b e c a m e a d e m o c rac y , a lb e it o n e w it h a
n o ta b le lim ita tio n : I t w a s d o m in a te d b y a sin g le p a rty , th e
L ib e r a l D e m o c r a tic P a r t y o f J a p a n ( L D P ) fo r m o s t o f th e
p o s t- w a r p e r io d . T h e L D P ’s h e g e m o n y is a b it m o re c o m
p lex t h a n i t a p p e a rs a t firs t g la n c e , a n d th is w a s n o t sim p ly
a s in g le – p a r ty sy ste m . D u r i n g th e e arly y e ars a f te r A l lie d
o c c u p a tio n , a m u l t i p a r t y s y s te m d e v e lo p e d , b u t b y th e
1 9 6 0 s t h e L D P h a d c o m e to w i n m a j o r ity g o v e r n m e n ts
c o n siste n tly . J a p a n w a s s till te c h n ic a lly a p lu ra lis tic a n d
c o m p e titiv e p o litic a l e n v iro n m e n t, b u t th e L D P m a n a g e d
to d e fe a t its (so c ia list a n d o th e r) o p p o n e n ts a n d to re g u la rly
w i n leg isla tiv e m a jo ritie s , th u s n o t n e e d in g to fo rm c o a li
tio n s . M a n y c o m m e n ta to rs a n d c itiz e n s fe lt t h a t th is r e
d u c e d re sp o n siv e n ess to c itiz e n c oncerns. A system de v elo p ed
in w h ic h r e p re s e n ta tiv e s e sta b lis h e d lo c a l tie s a n d w o rk e d to
e n h a n c e th e in te re s ts o f lo c a l c o n s titu e n c ie s , o r g a n iz e d
p a r tia l ly th r o u g h exclusive se ts o f so c ia l n e tw o rk s c a lle d
koenkai (K a b a s h im a a n d S te e l 2 0 1 0 : 3 – 4 , 1 5 -1 7 ). T h is w as,
m a n y a n a ly sts b e lie v e, r e in fo rc e d b y J a p a n ’s e le c to ra l
sy s te m , as d is c u s s e d in th e c h a p te r 11 case study. I n J a p a n ’s
s y s te m , v o te rs v o te d fo r o n e in d iv id u a l w i t h in a d i s tr ic t, b u t
o f te n m u ltip le L D P c a n d id a te s w e re r u n n i n g w i t h in th e
d is tr ic t. T o d iffe re n tia te th e m se lv e s fro m o th e r L D P c a n d i
d a te s, p o litic ia n s s o m e tim e s t u r n e d to p e rs o n a l n e tw o rk s
a n d e v en c o r ru p tio n (K a b a s h im a a n d S te e l 2 0 1 0 : 1 5 -1 7 ).
T h is le d to c o m p le x fa c tio n a lis m a n d d iv is io n s w i t h in th e
L D P . W h il e th e L D P e x e rte d n e a r h e g e m o n y f o r d e c a d e s ,
th e y o c c a sio n a lly h a d to fo rm c o a litio n g o v e rn m e n ts as
w e ll, a n d th e D e m o c r a tic P a r t y o f J a p a n (D J P ) i n p a r tic u la r
r e m a in e d a n e le c to ra l adversary.
Profile 487
B e g in n in g in th e la te 1 9 8 0 s, it b e c a m e c le a r t h a t th e
L D P ’s g rip o n p o w e r w a s w e a k e n in g , a n d it h a d to fo rm
c o a litio n s to g o v e rn i n t h e 1 9 9 0 s as m a n y v o te rs b e c a m e
d is e n c h a n te d w it h p a r tie s m o re g e n e ra lly (L e B la n c 1999:
5). T h e p a r ty fe ll o u t o f p o w e r b rie fly in 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 4 , th o u g h
i t re m a in e d t h e la rg e s t p a r t y in th e D ie t. D u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 0 s,
d iffic u ltie s a n d fru s tr a tio n s m o u n te d as th e c o u n tr y e x p e ri
e n c e d fin a n c ia l c risis a n d a p ro lo n g e d p e r io d o f s ta g n a tio n .
S o m e h a v e su g g e s te d t h a t th is e n d e d t h e i m p lic it b a r g a in in
J a p a n ’s p o s t- w a r d e m o c rac y , in w h ic h th e L D P g o v e rn
m e n ts w e re c o n tin u a lly r e tu r n e d to p o w e r in e x c h a n g e for
su s ta in e d e c o n o m ic g ro w th .
A n o t h e r fa c to r in t h e L D P ’s lo n g d o m in a n c e w a s th e
f r a g m e n ta tio n o f th e o p p o s itio n , b u t th is w a s fin a lly o ver
c o m e w h e n th e D J P to o k o ver th e g o v e r n m e n t a fte r a r e
s o u n d in g w i n i n e le c tio n s in 2 0 0 9 . F ro m th e p o i n t o f v iew
o f so m e d e m o c ra tic th e o r is ts , a lte rn a tio n in p o w e r c o n s ti
t u te s a n a d v a n c e , as i t su g g e s ts th e p o s s ib ility o f in c re a s e d
p lu ra lis m a n d c o m p e titio n . I n 2 0 1 2 , th e L D P r e tu r n e d to
p o w e r a n d , as o f th is w r it in g , it h a s re m a in e d th e r e since,
th o u g h lik e w i t h th e P R I i n M e x ic o fe w se e m to e x p e c t it
to r e tu r n to th e level o f d o m in a n c e i t o n c e e x e rte d .
Regime and Political Institutions
J a p a n h a s a p a r lia m e n ta r y sy ste m w i t h a c e re m o n ia l e m
p e ro r. T h e b ic a m e ra l p a r lia m e n t h a s a lo w e r c h a m b e r in
w h ic h 3 0 0 o f 4 8 0 seats a re e le c te d b y d is tr ic t c o n s titu e n c ie s
a n d th e re m a in in g seats a re e le c te d b y p r o p o r tio n a l re p re
s e n ta tio n in d iffe re n t “b lo c k s ” o r re g io n s o f th e c o u n try .
T h e u p p e r c h a m b e r h a s m o s t o f its m e m b e rs e le c te d in t h e ir
re sp e c tiv e p re fe c tu re s , w i t h a r e m a in d e r v o te d i n b y p r o
p o r tio n a l r e p re s e n ta tio n as w e ll. T h e H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n ta
tiv es is th e m o re p o w e r f u l b o d y , b e in g a ble to o v e rru le th e
H o u s e o f C o u n c illo rs o n b u d g e t a n d fin a n c e m a tte r s , a n d
o v e rrid e th e H o u s e o f C o u n c illo rs w i t h a t w o – t h ir d s m a
j o r it y o n o t h e r m a tte rs . I n th e la te t w e n ti e th c e n tu ry , p e r
h a p s th e m o s t d i s t in g u is h i n g fe a tu re o f th e p o lic y m a k in g
p ro c ess in J a p a n w a s th e d o m in a n c e o f th e L D P . B e ca u se o f
th e e x te n t o f t h is d o m in a n c e , a n d p e rh a p s b e c a u se o f t h e
n a tu r e o f th e J a p a n e s e e le c to ra l sy s te m (K a b a s h im a a n d
S te e l 2 0 1 0 : 1 5 -1 7 ), th e L D P d id n o t n e e d to be fu lly r e
s p o n s iv e t o th e w is h e s o f t h e e le c to ra te . R a th e r, th e sta te
w a s a p lac e in w h ic h p o litic a l e lites w o rk e d w it h th e b u s i
n ess c o m m u n ity to m a n a g e J a p a n e s e e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm
a n ce . F o llo w in g th e rise o f c o a litio n g o v e rn m e n ts , th o u g h ,
a n d a c c e le ra tin g t h r o u g h th e D J P ’s r e c e n t su ccesses, w e
may b e se e in g a n in c re a s e in re sp o n siv e n e ss to c itiz e n s
(K a b a s h im a a n d S teel 2010). O n o n e h a n d , c o m m e n ta to rs
n o te a d e clin e in p u b lic t r u s t o f p o litic a l p a rties. O n th e
o th e r h a n d , a n u m b e r o f p o p u la tio n se g m e n ts are involved in
civil society. A l l else b e in g e q u a l, p o litic a l a ctiv ity a m o n g
th e c itiz e n ry a n d p lu ra lis t c o m p e titio n b e tw e e n p a rtie s
c o u ld b e e x p e c te d to in cre ase a cc ountability.
Regime and Political Institutions
Regime Constitutional monarchy (parliamentary democracy with ceremonial emperor)
Administrative Divisions Centralized, unitary government; forty-seven prefectures
Executive Branch Prime minister and cabinet
Selection of Executive Selected by Parliament, ceremonially appointed by emperor
Legislative Branch Bicameral parliament (Diet)
Lower chamber: House of Representatives
Upper chamber: House of Councillors
Judicial Branch The Japanese Supreme Court (which has fourteen Justices and one Chief Justice)
is the ultimate judicial authority in the country.
Political Party System Multiparty system. Dominated by the LDP for decades, though the DJP governed
2009-2012; political environment is one of pluralistic competition, with the LDP
and the DJP as the two strongest contenders.
488 Japan
Political Culture
S c h o la rs in te re s te d i n J a p a n e s e p o litic a l (a n d eco n o m ic)
c u ltu re h a v e e m p h a s iz e d a n u m b e r o f th e m e s , b u t p e rh a p s
t h e m o s t d is tin c tiv e o n e is th e a lle g e d ly c o lle c tiv istic a n d
e g a lita ria n c h a r a c te r o f J a p a n e s e b e lie fs a n d p ra c tic e s
(K u n io 2 0 0 6 ), p a r tic u la r ly w ith r e g a rd to t h e i r m a n ife s t
a tio n i n J a p a n e s e economic culture. J a p a n h a s re la tiv e ly lo w
levels o f in c o m e in e q u a lity (K o sa i 2 0 0 8 : 512). S o m e a sse rt
th a t th is m ig h t b e p a r tia lly d u e to th e c u lt u r a l fo u n d a tio n s
o f b u sin e ss m a n a g e m e n t in J a p a n . Y o s h ih a ra K u n io g o e s so
fa r as to a d d a lle g e d c u ltu r a l o r ie n ta tio n s to w a rd m a te ria l
ism , sa v in g s, h i g h v a lu a tio n o f e d u c a tio n a l a tta in m e n t , a n d
a s tro n g w o r k e th ic as k e y c o m p o n e n ts o f J a p a n e s e e c o
n o m ic c u ltu r e (2 0 0 6 : 83), e v en as h e stre sse s th e i n s t it u
tio n a l d im e n s io n s o f J a p a n ’s e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm a n c e as w ell.
I t s h o u ld b e n o te d , h o w e v er, t h a t th e s e lo w levels o f i n
e q u a lity a n d h ig h savings are m o s t n o te w o r th y in th e p o s t
w a r e ra, a n d n o t as tr u e fo r e a rlie r p e rio d s .
M u c h h a s b e e n m a d e o f J a p a n e s e c o r p o ra te g o v e r n
a n c e as a le n s in to J a p a n e s e c u ltu r e . J a p a n e s e firm s se e m
to d iffe r fro m W e s te r n firm s in k e y re s p e c ts . M a j o r J a p a
n e se in d u s t r ia l firm s h a v e re la tio n s h ip s w i t h t h e i r (e sp e
c ia lly m a le ) e m p lo y e e s t h a t m a n y d e fin e as p a te r n a lis tic ,
p r o v id in g e x te n siv e b e n e fits a n d n e a rly g u a r a n t e e i n g lif e
tim e e m p lo y m e n t fo r g o o d c o n d u c t. T h e n o t io n t h a t a ll
a re p a r t o f a “te a m ” o r e v e n a “f a m ily ” is re la tiv e ly s tro n g .
J a p a n is a m a r k e t e c o n o m y , b u t th e te n d e n c y to c h a n g e
jo b s o v e r th e c o u rs e o f o n e ’s l if e tim e t h a t h a s b e c o m e
c o m m o n in p la c e s lik e th e U n i te d S ta te s h a s n o t h i t J a p a n
to t h e sa m e e x te n t. W i t h i n J a p a n e s e firm s , o n e t e n d s to
see a s t r o n g se n se o f s o lid a rity , w h ile s ta tu s d iffe re n c e s are
m itig a t e d b y c u lt u r a l n o rm s t h a t d is c o u ra g e m assiv e
in c o m e in e q u a l it y w i t h i n t h e firm . I n a ty p ic a l c o r p o ra
tio n in t h e U n i te d S ta te s , t h e s a la rie s o f e x e c u tiv e s d w a r f
th o s e o f e n tr y – le v e l e m p lo y e e s, b u t i n J a p a n , t h e r a tio o f
e x e c u tiv e to e n tr y – le v e l e m p lo y e e s a la rie s t e n d s to b e n o t
a b ly low er.
O f c o u r s e , t h is is n o t a p e r f e c t s y s te m . R e la tio n s b e
tw e e n w o r k e r s a n d m a n a g e m e n t m a y b e less c o n f lic t u a l
Political Economy
S o fa r in t h is c o u n tr y p ro file , w e h a v e d is c u s s e d t h e lo n g –
r u n d e v e lo p m e n t h is to r y o f J a p a n , a n d w e d isc u ss t h e s ta te ’s
role in th e Ja p a n e s e e c o n o m y in th e fo llo w in g case study.
H e r e , in c o n tra s t, w e w ill fo c u s o n r e c e n t h is to r y a n d th e
t h a n i n m a n y o t h e r c o u n tr ie s , b u t l a b o r h a s a re la tiv e ly
w e a k p o s i t i o n v is – a – v is c o r p o ra tio n s : W o r k e r s h a v e d iffi
c u lt y e s t a b l i s h i n g in d u s t r y – w i d e o r g a n iz a ti o n s a n d d e
m a n d i n g c h a n g e , r a t h e r t h a n p u r s u i n g i n s t it u t io n a l l y
s t r u c t u r e d n e g o tia tio n . T h is w a s a t le a s t p a r t i a l l y a p r o d
u c t o f th e L D P ’s p o lic y o f r e d u c in g u n i o n s t r e n g t h
( M a n o w 2 0 0 1 : 4 4 ). I n a d d it i o n , s t r o n g c u l t u r a l n o r m s o f
e m p l o y m e n t s e c u r it y a n d re la tiv e e q u it y m ig h t i m p a c t
t h e c o m p e tit iv e n e s s o f J a p a n e s e firm s o v e r t h e l o n g h a u l.
M o r e o v e r , t h e a lle g e d c o lle c tiv is m a n d “te a m o r i e n t a
t i o n ” o f J a p a n e s e firm s m a y b e a f a c to r in t h e n o ta b ly
h i g h ra te s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t w o m e n ( in c lu d in g
la c k o f e q u a l p a r ti c i p a ti o n i n t h e b e n e f its o f e m p lo y m e n t
a n d s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t ) t h a t e x is ts in J a p a n e s e w o r k
p la c e s . F in a lly , t h e c u lt u r e o f J a p a n e s e firm s h a s s o m e
tim e s b e e n s e e n as a h i n d r a n c e , r e q u ir i n g re fo r m . T h e
firm s t h a t d e v e lo p e d in t h e e a rly y e a r s o f J a p a n e s e i n d u s
t r i a l i z a t i o n — th e zaibatsu— w e re h i g h ly c o n c e n tr a te d
a n d m o n o p o lis tic ( G o r d o n 2 0 0 9 : 9 6 – 9 7 ) . T h e y w o u ld
l a te r b e p a r t i a l l y b r o k e n u p in t h e p o s t – w a r y e a r s , b u t
la r g e c o n g lo m e ra te s k n o w n as keiretsu p e r s i s t e d , w i t h a n
e x a m p le b e in g M i t s u b i s h i . C e n t e r e d a r o u n d h u g e b a n k s ,
t h e s e w e re a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f p o s t – w a r i n d u s t r ia l iz a t i o n ,
b u t t h e y l a t e r c a m e to s y m b o liz e t h e p o s s ib i l it y o f c ro n y
c a p i ta l is m , w i t h c o z y r e la tio n s h ip s b e tw e e n e c o n o m ic
a n d p o l it i c a l e lite s .
T h ese a sp e c ts o f e c o n o m ic c u ltu r e — w it h a n e m p h a sis
o n c o n ti n u ity a n d o u tw a r d c o lle ctiv e h a r m o n y — c a n be
se e n re fle c te d i n p o litic s m o re n a rro w ly d e fin e d . T h e L D P
g o v e rn e d w i t h o u t in te r r u p tio n fo r d e c a d e s a n d a tte m p te d
to r e p re s e n t J a p a n ’s d iv erse in te re s ts , b u t th e p a r ty w a s a lso
d iv id e d b y fierce i n te r n a l f a c tio n a lis m t h a t c o n tr ib u te d su b
s ta n tia lly to its e v e n tu a l d o w n fa ll, as p a r ty m e m b e rs d is
a g re e d o v e r h o w to re s p o n d to c o n s titu e n t d e m a n d s a n d
n e e d s . F o r m o re o n v a rio u s a sp e c ts o f J a p a n ’s ric h p o litic a l
c u ltu r e — in c lu d in g t h e L D P , th e s ta te , a n d g e n d e r issues—
see th e m o re d e ta ile d c o u n tr y case s tu d ie s la te r in th e s e
c o u n tr y m a te ria ls .
c o n te m p o ra ry s ta te o f J a p a n e s e p o litic a l e conom y. J a p a n , as
w e h a v e n o te d , w a s th e firs t n o n – W e s te r n s o c ie ty to d e v elo p
su s ta in e d e c o n o m ic g r o w th , in m a n y w ay s e s ta b lis h in g
a p a th t h a t h a s b e e n fo llo w e d , w i t h v a ria tio n s , b y th e
Profile 489
so -c a lle d A s ia n tig e rs (e.g., S o u th K o re a , S in g a p o re ) a n d ,
m o re re ce n tly , e v en C h i n a . T h is it d id , in p a r t, th r o u g h
sta te c o o rd in a tio n . T h is d o e s n o t m e a n a S o v ie t-s ty le c o m
m a n d eco n o m y , b u t r a th e r th e sta te s tra te g ic a lly fa v o rin g
c e r ta in se c to rs a n d h e lp in g to c o o rd in a te th e d e p lo y m e n t o f
c a p ita l fo r p ro d u c tiv e p u rp o s e s : in o th e r w o rd s , s ta te man
agement o f th e e c o n o m y b u t n o t la rg e -s c a le sta te ownership.
T he Ja p a n e s e sta te h a d a h is to r y o f w o r k in g w e ll w i t h t h e
la rg e , i n d u s t r y – s p a n n in g c o rp o ra tio n s t h a t w e re so im p o r
t a n t to J a p a n e s e g r o w t h in th e t w e n ti e th c e n tu r y (see E v a n s
1989).
J a p a n w as o n e o f th e w o r ld ’s g r e a t e c o n o m ic success s to
rie s o f th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry . W h i l e e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t
p ic k e d u p d u r i n g t h e in te r w a r p e r io d , i t w a s e s p e c ia lly
fo llo w in g re c o n s tr u c tio n a n d A m e r ic a n o c c u p a tio n a f te r
W o r ld W a r I I t h a t J a p a n b u i lt m a jo r g lo b a l e n te rp ris e s a n d
b e c a m e a n e x p o r t p o w e rh o u s e , w i t h e x a m p le s o f le a d in g
firm s in c lu d in g T o y o ta a n d H o n d a in th e a u to m o b ile in
d u s try a n d S o n y a n d T o s h ib a in e le c tro n ic s . T h e tr a d it io n
o f s tro n g g r o w t h slo w e d b y t h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d w e n t in to crisis
in th e e arly 1 9 9 0 s. T h e cau ses o f t h e c risis w e re c o m p le x ,
b u t t h e y i n c lu d e d a n o v e rh e a te d re a l e sta te m a r k e t t h a t col
la p s e d a n d se rio u s p ro b le m s s p re a d in g th r o u g h o u t th e fi
n a n c ia l sy ste m (m u c h lik e i n th e U n ite d S ta te s in 2 0 0 8 ).
T h e g o v e rn m e n t r e s p o n d e d v e ry slow ly a n d o n ly “b a ile d
o u t ” th e b a n k in g s y s te m to w a r d t h e e n d o f t h e d e c a d e .
J a p a n ’s e c o n o m y h a s n e v e r c o m p le te ly re c o v e re d . A n u m b e r
o f a n a ly sts h a v e c o n c e rn s to d a y a b o u t J a p a n e s e c o m p e ti
tiv e n e ss a n d th e c o m p e titio n p o s e d b y C h i n a a n d o th e r
c o u n trie s to J a p a n ’s p o s itio n as a p r e e m in e n t e c o n o m ic
p o w e r. N o ta b ly , in t h is case, t h e c o n c e rn a lso e x te n d s to
g e o p o litic s, a n d C h i n a ’s in c re a s in g a m b itio n s in t h e P a c ific
R im m a y b e e x p e c te d to c o m e a t t h e e x p e n s e o f J a p a n ’s
in flu e n c e .
I n 2 0 1 4 a n d 2 0 1 5 , th e r e h a s b e e n c o n sid e ra b le d e b a te
o ver t h e c o u n tr y ’s c u r re n t e c o n o m ic p o lic y o f P r im e M i n i s
t e r S h in z o A b e . A f t e r n e a rly tw o d e c a d e s o f lo w g r o w t h ,
A b e p ro m is e d a se t o f d ra m a tic p o lic ie s (c o m m o n ly re fe rre d
to as “A b e n o m ic s ”) to j u m p s ta r t th e eco n o m y . T h e se i n
c lu d e d in c re a s e d g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d in g a n d lo o se m o n e ta ry
p o lic y t h a t lo w e rs i n te r e s t ra te s; i t w a s h o p e d t h a t th is
w o u ld e n c o u ra g e c o n s u m e rs to s p e n d a f te r m a n y y e a rs o f
s ta g n a tio n (a n d t h a t th is w o u ld h e lp fu lly ra is e p ric e s a fte r
m a n y y e a rs o f p ric e d e c lin e s t h a t h a d d is c o u ra g e d s p e n d
in g ). A b e a lso p ro m is e d s t r u c tu r a l re fo rm s t h a t w o u ld e n
c o u ra g e e a s ie r h i r in g a n d f irin g , th e r e b y m a k in g th e la b o r
m a r k e t m o re flexible. In d ic a to r s have b e e n m ix e d : T he
J a p a n e s e s to c k m a r k e t m o re t h a n d o u b le d fro m t h e tim e
A b e t o o k office to e a rly 2 0 1 5 , b u t g r o w t h h a s b e e n w o b b ly
a n d th e c o u n tr y ’s d e b t h a s c o n tin u e d to in c re a s e to v e ry
h ig h levels.
D e s p ite so m e c o n c e rn s a b o u t J a p a n e s e e c o n o m ic p e r
f o r m a n c e i n r e c e n t y e a rs , th e c o u n tr y ’s b a sic e c o n o m ic
i n d ic a to r s a re s t i ll s o u n d . A c c o r d i n g to t h e C I A W o r ld
F a c tb o o k , t h e c o u n tr y ’s u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te s to o d a t a n
e n v ia b le 4.1 p e r c e n t in 2 0 1 3 . ( I t s h o u ld b e n o te d t h a t th e
u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te is c a lc u la te d o n t h e b a s is o f th e
n u m b e r o f p e o p le i n th e la b o r fo rc e as t h e d e n o m in a to r , so
J a p a n ’s la rg e e ld e rly p o p u l a t i o n t h a t is o u t o f th e la b o r
fo rc e m a y a ffe c t th is n u m b e r.) G D P p e r c a p ita s to o d a t
$ 3 8 ,6 3 4 a c c o r d in g to t h e W o r ld B a n k , a n d in te r m s o f
H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t in d ic a to r s J a p a n is a m o n g th e
g lo b a l le a d e rs . T h e J a p a n e s e e c o n o m y a c c o m p lis h e s th is
w h ile m a i n t a i n i n g a lev e l o f in c o m e i n e q u a l it y s u b s ta n
tia l ly b e t t e r t h a n t h a t f o u n d in t h e U n i t e d S ta te s a n d c o m
p a ra b le to t h a t o f t h e W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n w e lfa re sta te s
( th o u g h t h e s e s ta te s s lig h tly o u tp e r f o r m J a p a n i n te r m s o f
t h i s i n d i c a to r ) . I ts g i n i lev e l s t o o d a t 3 2 .1 in 2 0 1 3 , m a k in g
i t c o m p a ra b le to m a n y w e s te r n E u r o p e a n c o u n tr ie s a n d
g i v in g i t a m a r k e d ly lo w e r le v e l o f i n e q u a l it y t h a n th e
U n i t e d S ta te s .
J a p a n w a s fa m o u s fo r its m a n u f a c tu r in g fo r e x p o rt,
w h i c h s to o d a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e “J a p a n e s e M ir a c le ” t h a t ra n
fro m th e 1950s to t h e 1 9 7 0 s, b u t to d a y services are p r e
d o m in a n t , a c c o u n tin g fo r 7 1 .6 p e r c e n t o f G D P i n 2 011,
w i t h in d u s tr y a c c o u n tin g fo r 27.3 p e rc e n t a n d a g ric u ltu re
1.2 p e rc e n t.
The economic indicators in this section are drawn from the CIA
World Factbook.
490 Japan
CASE STUDIES
As noted in the “Historical Develop
ment” section at the beginning of this
profile, Japan has shown remarkable
economic performance since the late
nineteenth century. It has done so, many
scholars believe, because of the adroit
way in which the state has managed
economic development. As noted ear
lier, Japanese economic development
began shortly after efforts to create a
modern state, one which quickly ex
panded its tax base and, among other
things, invested in human capital by en
suring that a high and growing percent
age of the population received at least
elementary education (Gordon 2009:
67-68, 70).
The Japanese state did not achieve
this by establishing a Soviet-style com
mand economy. Rather, it worked as a co
ordinating agent (Hall and Soskice 2001)
that could help the economy avoid a
series of problems, such as the lack of
capital, the establishment of basic infra
structure, the development of heavy in
dustry, and other achievements that
might have been more difficult without
coordinated effort. As one historian
puts it, “in its macroeconomic policy
the [Japanese] government followed the
principle of balanced budgets, but at the
same time in its micro-economic or sec
torial policy, it followed government
interventionist principles, by providing
special tax measures for and fiscal invest
ment in particular industries” (Kosai 2008:
535). The state remained a major player in
planning and even in operating enter
prises. One of the leading institutions in
the Japanese government was the Minis
try of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), which took on major roles in plan
ning and coordination of the economy,
in a style has been termed “plan-ratio
nal” development (Johnson 1982). This
Japanese model of the developmental
state was subsequently emulated by
other “East Asian tigers” such as Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan. In other words, the
Japanese state remained relatively lean,
and did not promote growth through
widespread state ownership, but rather it
aimed to help to shape the economic en
vironment in a way that would be good
for Japanese businesses.
In achieving this balance, it was likely
aided by the fact that labor unions tend to
be specific to firms in Japanese culture
(think of them as vertically integrated
within firms) rather than tied to classes of
workers as such as in other societies (think
of these as horizontally integrated, cut
ting across firms) (Hall and Soskice 2001:
34-35). This likely reduced pressure for
state expansion because it reduced the
likelihood of class-based organizing. At
the same time, it is worth remembering,
as noted in the “Political Culture” section,
that government policies influenced
union weakness: The LDP, which was
strongly opposed to robust union organi
zation, reduced freedom to organize and
strike and required arbitration in case of
labor disputes (Manow 2001: 44). Finally,
CHAPTER 4, PAGE 84
Japan’s rapid economic growth made
possible a distribution of the gains that
kept most actors satisfied: Pay increases
were possible while firms remained
profitable.
At the same time, the paternalistic fea
tures of Japanese firms and their ten
dency to provide lifetime employment
likely reduced potential welfare costs for
the state. This links to issues of gender and
politics discussed in the next case study:
Paternalism extended to expectations for
families in providing care for children and
others, and this often means women’s
unpaid labor (Kabashima and Steel 2010:
19) as families in the “private sphere”
take on a relatively important role in the
provision of “welfare” service (Esping-
Anderson 1997:181).
In the 1970s the Japanese state aimed
to take on more welfare functions (Kosai
2008: 536), as discussed earlier, in the
“Political Economy’ section. Some have
argued that Japan evidences a distinct
type of welfare state formation, but the
most important analyst of welfare states,
Esping-Anderson (1997), argues that the
Japanese welfare state is a “hybrid” of con
servative and liberal approaches to wel
fare state formation and functioning. It
combines low levels of social spending
with state policies to maintain full em
ployment, strong cultural expectations of
family provision, and company-based
(that is, private-sector) provision of social
insurance (there is a public system, but it
is supplementary).
Case Studies 491
_
• The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet CHAPTER 9, PAGE 210
Japan’s parliament, called the Diet, is bi
cameral, having been established in its
current form by the Constitution of 1947,
which was crafted under the American oc
cupation that followed Japan’s surrender
in World War II. Yet electoral procedures
for the Diet have changed, most substan
tially in the electoral reform of 1994 that
dramatically altered Japanese politics. The
Diet is now elected by a hybrid system
that includes features of both district-
based and proportional representation.
The lower (and more powerful)
chamber in Japan is called the House of
Representatives and was modeled in part
on the American chamber of the same
name and in part on the British House of
Commons. Currently, this lower house is
comprised of 480 representatives elected
by a system that mixes single-member
districts (like the U.S. House of Represen
tatives) with proportional representation
(more common in continental European
democracies). Of the 480 representatives,
300 win seats in specific district elec
tions, and an additional 180 are chosen
based on party lists in eleven different
regional blocks around the country. All
representation thus has a territorial com
ponent, though the 180 seats attempt to
introduce proportionality into the
system. The House of Councillors is the
upper chamber, with 152 members se
lected from Japan’s forty-seven prefec
tures, while an additional 100 members
are directly elected at a national level (in
a single nationwide district). The legisla
tive chambers are not symmetric in their
powers, as the House of Representatives
has the authority to overrule the House
of Councillors and also selects the prime
minister. Most laws gain approval from
both chambers to pass, but a two-thirds
majority in the House of Representatives
can pass legislation even over the nega
tive vote of the House of Councillors.
The system is notable not only for its
hybrid structure but also for how it re
formed a previous system. From 1947 to
1994, the electoral system consisted of
districts that would elect three to five rep
resentatives, according to whichever can
didates received the most individual votes.
The old electoral system for the House of
Representatives, called the “single non-
transferable vote” (SNTV) system, has been
argued to be more proportional than ma-
joritarian systems with single-member dis
tricts, but in Japan it seemed to favor the
long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), for reasons seen later, in the box for
chapter 11 (Cox 1996). The LDP attempted
on multiple occasions to move toward sin
gle-member districts, which would give it
even larger majorities, but opposition par
ties successfully resisted these changes.
The reformed system finally came
about in 1994. At that time, the LDP had at
last lost governing power, though it re
mained the largest party in parliament.
The reform of 1994 was intended to
change a party system that had for a long
time been characterized by individual
politicians cultivating support from local
networks; this system was to be replaced
with one in which parties would take
more programmatic stances (Horiuchi
and Saito 2003: 672). Another conse
quence of the 1994 reform was to reduce
the power of rural areas, which had been
overrepresented for decades, and give
more equal representation to urban areas.
Over the long run, the effects of the
reform seemed to contribute to the even
tual defeat of the LDP and the rise of the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which
held a clear majority of more than three
hundred seats in the House of Represen
tatives between 2009 and 2012.
Win for So Long? c h a p t e r 11, p a g e 26i
Japan has been ranked as a “Free” country
by the independent organization Free
dom House for every year since it began
keeping track of democracy around the
world. Yet for most of that period up to
recent years, Japan was dominated by the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP
governed from 1955 to 2009, except for a
brief interlude in 1993-1994, and has
again governed since 2012. Throughout
the long period of its dominance, the
system legally allowed and enabled other
parties to participate, though the LDP
rarely faced serious party competition.
The country had the free elections ex
pected of a multiparty democracy, and
was not a single-party state, but it had
one party that dominated elections. How
How Did Japan’s Dominant Party
492 Japan
C A SE STU D Y (continued)
How Did J i’ s Dominant Party Win for So Long? CHAPTER 11, PAGE 261
a dominant party— albeit one riddled
with factionalism— coexisted with de
mocracy was one of the key questions of
Japanese politics. What accounts for the
continued victories of the LDP over so
many years?
There are several possible explanations
for this. One could be based on interest
group representation in Japan, as well as
economic performance. Japan’s LDP pre
sided over a form of corporatism that may
have helped the party continue its victo
ries, not least due to economic achieve
ments for several decades up to the 1980s.
During most of the LDP’s rule, the govern
ment reached out to business as well as
other interest groups as it made its deci
sions about planning and guiding certain
aspects of the economy (Evans 1989).
Japan had weli-structured relationships
between government policymakers and
economic stakeholders; companies could
expect to give input to the policy process,
and some would receive advantages to
boost production, but these would only
persist as long as performance was good.
Government leaders kept very close ties to
top business executives, and thus they
knew what business required to build and
expand; it seems many of these ties went
back to personal relationships at the highly
prestigious Tokyo University Faculty of Law
(Evans 1989). Despite this close relation
ship, the LDP government also had some
“autonomy” from the corporations and
conglomerates; government did not
simply do the corporations’ bidding. A
result was economic success, which may
have favored the LDP’s dominance. Per
haps surprisingly, some scholars have even
argued that Japan’s loss in World War II was
part of the reason for this more coopera
tive arrangement; by contrast with the
United Kingdom, in which special interest
groups survived the war and continued
their demands when the war ended, Japan
had a new political system, a reconstruct
ing economy, and a rapidly changing soci
ety (Olson 1984). This relationship between
government and business was presumed
healthy for a time, but as Japan went
through the “lost decade” of the 1990s
with little growth and evidence accumu
lating that the country’s economic bubble
had burst, the constructive engagement
between state and business was recast as
“crony capitalism,” a system of favors to in
siders that caught up with Japan in the
long run. This coincided with the LDP’s in
creasing weakness.
There are also several arguments relat
ing to the electoral system, the internal
workings of the LDP, and Japan’s unique
political culture. As noted in the previous
case study, Japan long had an electoral
system for the House of Representatives
based on a single, non-transferable vote
(SNTV), in which LDP politicians often
competed against one another for the
seats within a certain constituency. (This
system is still used for the upper chamber,
but has now been replaced in the lower
house.) A key feature of the LDP years was
factionalism inside the party: While the
party presented a common banner, it was
riddled with internal divisions often cen
tered around individual leaders or small
groups of politicians. In this system, LDP
incumbents benefited from the mobiliza
tion by informal “support groups” from
certain neighborhoods or communities in
the constituencies. These groups were
known as koenkai, and they supported fa
vored politicians in the expectation of fa
voritism in return. Since the LDP had the
advantages of incumbency it was able to
win a large proportion of seats by distrib
uting benefits to local constituencies (Cox
1996). In addition to the koenkai and the
patronage that helped the LDP, the elect
oral system also disproportionately fa
vored rural areas, where the LDP had
its strongest base. Finally, the electoral
system fragmented the opposition, such
that the LDP commanded majorities in
the seats in the Diet even when it was un
popular and failed to gain a majority of
votes (Scheiner 2006). In this context, the
LDP became a powerful machine without
being ideologically coherent, and its flex
ibility seemed to allow it to coopt or incor
porate other actors that emerged from
other parties.
Electoral reform in 1994 eventually
gave an opening to other parties. One ar
gument that purports to explain both the
persistence and the fall of the LDP thus
finds that the LDP benefited from the
electoral system for many years, but that
the party’s decline was assured as other
parties adapted to the new electoral
system. In this logic, the LDP’s ability to
hang on for another decade and more
after 1994 was attributable in part to the
particularly charismatic Prime Minister Ju
nichiro Koizumi (Krauss and Pekkanen
2011). The LDP’s resurgence since 2012,
however, may cast this interpretation into
doubt.
There are other possible explanations
besides the preceding ones for the LDP’s
long hegemony. In general, it can be said
that any number of the variables seen in
previous chapters— from development
and the role of the state to the function
ing of electoral systems in the legisla
ture— can be posited to contribute to the
dominant-party system that governed
Japan for half a century.
Case Studies 493
Importing National Identity in Japan?
Japan— much like China— had a strong
sense of identity and civilizational unique
ness for centuries. Indeed, there is much
that resembles modern nationalism in the
Tokugawa regime’s hostility to foreign in
fluence and sense of Japanese cultural
superiority. However, most scholars of
national identity do not see Tokugawa
Japan as a national society (Greenfeld
2001; Gordon 2009: 51), because however
salient Japanese identity was, it was not
tied to the idea of the Japanese as a sov
ereign and equal people. Rather, estate-
based divisions were of critical importance,
with a huge gap between the nobility and
commoners, and political authority was
not seen as a reflection of the will of any
unified “nation.”
Nationalism as such, therefore, was
imported to Japan (Doak 2006; Greenfeld
2001). It happened in the nineteenth cen
tury, during and after the opening of the
society to the West. It is worth noting that
nationalism as a type of identity spread
globally in this way into virtually all of to
day’s societies: In other words, Japan is
not unusual in this respect, though it is an
exemplary case of this phenomenon. Why
would an identity like this spread? Who
would gain from it?
Scholars who are interested in explain
ing Japan’s turn to nationalism can focus
on several different types of interests. First,
some note that nationalism provided a
language that articulates a critique of the
Tokugawa regime, and that demanded a
response to the military and economic su
periority of foreign powers. Second, some
note that nationalism served the interest of
the Meiji state in inculcating national senti
ment in its citizens: As elsewhere, the state
endeavored to use nationalism to influence
the behavior of its citizens (Gordon 2009:
135-137). Third, some emphasize the
importance of the status-inconsistency of
elite groups— in particular the large class of
samurai— a variable that has been linked to
the importation of national identity in nu
merous other cases (Greenfeld 2001). Note
that the first two explanatory strategies
focus on the relationship between national
identity and the state while the latter one
focuses more on what’s happening within
society, outside of the state. See if you can
find ways in which these explanatory strat
egies could be blended together.
CHAPTER 13, PAGE 310
In any case, by the close of the nine
teenth century a significant portion of
Japanese society thought of that society
in national terms. Moreover, there was a
strong sense that the nation needed to
assert itself internationally, as it did in both
the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-
Japanese War, before adopting a still
more expansive policy in the twentieth
century, culminating in its involvement in
the Second World War. After Japan’s
defeat in that conflict, Japanese national
ism has found less militaristic expression,
with a strong focus on economic compe
tition as an avenue for the realization of
the nation’s status.
So, did Japan (and other countries)
really “import” national identity? It seems
clear that the general concept of national
identity, linked to popular sovereignty
and idealized equality of membership, did
diffuse globally over recent decades and
centuries, and in this sense the idea of the
nation was imported to Japan. But what
Japanese citizens made with this identity
is a different story: Japanese nationalism
was fashioned in the mold shaped by its
members, like every other nation.
Gender Empowerment in Japan? CHAPTER 14, PAGE 335
Historically, women’s participation in
Japanese politics has received little em
phasis, both in popular discussion and in
the academic literature, in part because
of discrimination and in part because
of the (male) elite-centeredness of much
work in political science (LeBlanc 1999).
What scholars have uncovered has
largely not been good. Japan stands out,
when compared to its peers in terms of
socioeconomic development, for the
relatively low political empowerment of
women. For example, despite having the
world’s eighth-highest level of HDI in
recent years, its Gender Empowerment
Measure rank was fifty-seventh globally
in 2009 (UN Human Development
Report 2009). In terms of women’s
legislative representation, Japan recently
stood at 113th (Inter-Parliamentary
Union 2015).
494 japan
Gender Empowerment in Japan?
Similar trends have been visible in
subnational representative bodies. As
Sherry L. Martin (2008: 125) puts it, “the
extent of women’s underrepresentation
in elected offices makes Japan an outlier
in comparative studies of women and
politics.” However, she notes that great
progress has been made in the last several
years. While women’s share of seats in
both the Diet and local political bodies
remains low, it has been growing. This is
likely owed to both institutional changes
and reforms since the 1990s and women’s
increasing civii society activism.
The political ethnographer Robin LeB-
lanc (1999) has emphasized that Japanese
women do have agency, and that narra
tives about their participation in political
life that are focused on elite politics often
miss the ways in which women can mobi
lize a “housewife” identity and build on
social networks to pursue their chosen
ends. This is not to say that women and
men have achieved political equality in
Japan (or elsewhere, for that matter), but
that there is more to Japanese women’s
political participation (and women’s par
ticipation in politics in other societies as
well) than can be revealed through a tra
ditional political science lens.
Beyond questions of political repre
sentation, it is worth noting that Japan
stands out as a country where gender dis
crimination in employment and everyday
life is quite high (Hausmann, Tyson, and
Zahidi 2010). Japan’s Gender Gap Index
ranks it ninety-fourth globally. To some
extent this is a function of the fact that
CHAPTER 14, PAGE 335
political empowerment is a component
of the index. In terms of two of the other
four components (equity in education
and health) Japan does very well in
comparative terms, but in terms of fair
economic opportunity, it fares poorly, in
cluding in terms of equal pay for equal
work and participation in the work force
(Hausmann et al. 2010:174-175). This is, of
course, of concern to women and others
who are opposed to inequality. But the
ramifications of gender discrimination
extend beyond such concerns. Indeed,
some evidence indicates that Japanese
economic performance suffers notably
because of gender inequity, with one anal
ysis estimating a 16 percent loss in GDP as
a result of such discrimination (Hausmann
etal. 2010:30).
Resource Management in Japan
There are two highly symbolic illustra
tions from Japan that show the challenge
of environmental sustainability and the
importance of the “tragedy of the com
mons” discussed in chapter 16. One is the
fishing of the world’s oceans, and the
other is the question of climate change.
Many situations involving the global envi
ronment are situations where multiple
countries draw upon resources that are
used by all, and the earth’s atmosphere
and its oceans are two leading examples.
The atmosphere has an ability to hold
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gasses, but growing levels of pollutants
have been associated with global climate
change. A lack of attention to this
common pool resource will make every
one worse off. In a similar sense, the
oceans have a fish stock upon which
many countries rely, yet there is dear evi
dence of overfishing and a lack of coordi
nation or adequate provision for
sustainability over the long run.
One aspect of the challenge arises
from the lack of a clear governing author
ity for these international common pool
resources. There is no overarching world
government to require states to behave in
certain ways; the United Nations does not
CHAPTER 16, PAGE 387
have significant authority, and the world’s
sovereign nations have little incentive
to give up their powers to some world
government. Certain states— especially
smaller or weaker states— may be com
pelled to behave in certain ways by
threats of war, economic sanctions, or
diplomatic pressure, but in international
relations terms, the system has an anar
chic structure in which each state is sover
eign. This gives rise to the collective
action problems at the international level.
Japan is one of world’s great offenders
when it comes to overfishing the oceans,
though by no means the only one.
■
Case Studies 495
ElCA SE STU D Y (continued)Resource Management in Japan CHAPTER 16, PAGE 387
Japanese fishing (and whaling) has been
thus one of the clearest illustrations of
how the tragedy of the commons oper
ates. The example of Atlantic bluefin tuna
is illustrative. Japanese consume as much
as three-fourths of all the Atlantic bluefin
tuna caught in the world, eating it mostly
raw as sashimi (Blair 2010). The stock of the
fish is severely depleted, and there is a risk
that it will be fished to extinction; this de
pletion happened especially after the
1970s, when bluefin tuna consumption
took off in Japan (Kolbert 2010). Yet Japan
celebrated when an international body
opted not to prohibit international trade
in the species (Kolbert 2010). As with other
cases of extinction and endangerment of
species, the example shows how quickly
irreversible change can occur when re
sources begin to decline.
Another issue links Japan symbolically
to the question of sustainability, though it
is hardly a “Japanese issue” alone. This is
the Kyoto Protocol, an international agree
ment to address the issue of climate
change. The protocol was agreed to in the
Japanese city of Kyoto in 1997 and subse
quently was ratified by legislatures of the
many countries that signed it, with the ex
ception of the United States. It was de
signed as a global response to climate
change that would commit all signatory
countries to reduce global emissions to
levels below those from 1990. Yet the
Kyoto Protocol faced challenges from the
start. The United States was the world’s
largest polluter when its congress rejected
the protocol. Meanwhile, major develop
ing countries were not required to reduce
emissions under the agreement, though
China is now the world’s largest polluter.
More recently, Russia and Japan itself de
clined to sign onto future reductions,
while Canada pulled out of the protocol at
the end of 2011. As with overfishing, the
lack of collective action is indicative of the
challenges present in issues of interna
tional environmental protection.
Research Prompts
1. Compare the modernization paths of China and Japan. In what
ways are they similar, and in what ways are they different (in
terms of both politics and economics)? Using theories from
chapters 3-7 (and, possibly, chapters 12 and 13 as well), develop
hypotheses to explain the variation that you noted in response
to the first part of this prompt.
2. Compare the period of LDP hegemony in Japan to the experi
ence of Mexico under the PRI. How did each party cement its
control? To what extent did the nature of single-party domi
nance vary? What similar and different causes lay behind single
party dominance? Then bring China into the comparison. What
might this comparison suggest about what seem to be the
main factors that influence types of single-party dominance in
more and less democratic societies?
3. Compare long-run economic development in the United King
dom, Germany, and Japan. Be especially attentive to the role of
the state in these cases. How do the cases contrast? What are
the implications of your comparison for the theory that state
involvement is bad for economic development?
4. In chapter 15 we introduced the concept of “multiple moderni
ties” that scholars like S. M. Eisenstadt have developed. Japan is
often regarded as a Western-style modernizer. Is Japanese
modernity “Western,” or does it have its own distinct
characteristics?
0 Mexico
Key Features o f C o n te m p o r a ry Mexico
Population: 120,286,655 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 1,964,375 square kilometers
Head of State: Enrique Pena Nieto (president, 2012-present)
Head of Government: Enrique Pena Nieto (president, 2012-present)
Capital: Mexico City
Year of Independence: Often cited as 1810, when the movement for
independence began, but actual
independence was established in 1821.
Year of Current Constitution: 1917
Languages: Spanish; Nahuatl; Mayan; other Amerindian
languages.
GDP per Capita: $10,307 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
Human Development Index
Ranking (2014):
71st (high human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Development Report 2014.
PROFILE Introduction
M e x ic o is a c o u n tr y t h a t receives a g r e a t d e a l
o f a tte n tio n fro m p o litic a l sc ien tists fo r n u
m e ro u s re aso n s. O n e o f th e m o s t im p o r ta n t
is t h a t i t is a la rg e c o u n try b o rd e rin g o n a c u l
tu r a l ly v e ry d iffe re n t o n e w it h a c o n tra s tin g
p o litic a l a n d e c o n o m ic h is to r y (C a m p 2 0 0 7 :
1 -9 ), th u s f a c ilita tin g c o m p a ris o n s. A n o t h e r
is t h a t its e c o n o m ic a n d p o litic a l h is to rie s are
fa s c in a tin g a n d se t u p m a n y o th e r p o te n tia l
c o m p a ris o n s t h a t a llo w us to g a in som e
lev erag e o ver a n u m b e r o f th e o rie s o f c o m
p a ra tiv e p o litics. I n e c o n o m ic te rm s , i t has
a lte rn a te d b e tw e e n p e rio d s o f g r o w th a n d
s ta g n a tio n , a n d th e s ta te ’s e c o n o m ic p o lic y
h a s s h ifte d o n n u m e ro u s o c casions o ver th e
de ca d es. S ince 1994 it h a s b e e n e c o n o m ic a lly
in te g r a te d w ith th e r e s t o f N o r t h A m e ric a via
th e N o r t h A m e r ic a n F re e T ra d e A g re e m e n t,
a n d h a s m o re g e n e ra lly in c re a s e d its g lo b al
e c o n o m ic in te g r a tio n in re c e n t years. A lo n g
w it h B ra zil, it has h a d m o d e ra te success in
r e c e n t d e c a d e s in e s ta b lis h in g a d iversified
in d u s tr ia l b a se . Y et severe p o v e rty is a p e rsis
t e n t p ro b le m , a n d e c o n o m ic d iffic u ltie s are
lin k e d to se rio u s p o litic a l c h allen g e s.
I n p o litic a l te rm s , M e x ic o h a s o c ca sio n
a lly b e e n th o u g h t o f as h a v in g a s tro n g sta te ,
sin c e th e sta te h a s o f te n b e e n in te rv e n tio n is t
| M estizo 60%
A m erindian 31
W h ite 9%
I O th er 1%
Ethnic Groups in Mexico
Source: CIA World Factbook.
| R om an C atholicism 76.5%
P rotestant C hristianity 6.3%
■ O th er 0.3%
H N o t specified 13.8%
I N o religion 3.1%
Religious Affiliation in Mexico
Note that we have included Jehovah’s Witnesses (1.1%) in the “Protestant
Christianity” category.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Profile 497
498 Mexico
in M e x ic o ’s h isto ry . I n te rm s re la tiv e to th e r e s t o f L a tin
A m e ric a a t th e tim e , t h e d e ca d es o f la te -n in e te e n th – c e n tu r y
d o m in a n c e b y P o rfirio D ia z , c a lle d th e “P o rfiria to ,” saw
fa irly s tro n g d e v e lo p m e n t ( M o r n e r 1993:6), in w h ic h th e
sta te e n c o u ra g e d fo re ig n c a p ita l to b u ild ra ilro a d s a n d to
tra n s fo rm th e c o u n try s id e , p ro m o tin g a m o re c o m m e rc ia l
a g ric u ltu ra l m o d e l a n d b e g in n in g to e sta b lish in d u s tr ia l ac
tiv ity in th e c ities (M e y e r a n d S h e rm a n 1987: 4 3 1 -4 7 9 ;
K ra u z e 1997: 218). L ik e w ise , th e sta te t h a t e m e rg e d fro m
th e M e x ic a n R e v o lu tio n (w h ic h b e g a n in 1910), a fte r se ri
ou s in s ta b ility a n d a ro u n d o n e m illio n d e a th s , w a s a sta te
t h a t c a m e to in te rv e n e activ ely i n th e e conom y, fo r ex am p le
in M e x ic o ’s e arly n a tio n a liz a tio n o f o il (1938). T h e p o s t
re v o lu tio n a ry r e g im e a lso a c te d s tro n g ly a g a in s t t h e R o m a n
C a th o lic C h u r c h , d r a m a tic a lly r e d u c in g its c a p a c ity to a c t
in p o litic s (B la n c a rte 1992). S o, o n o n e h a n d , a t k e y p e rio d s
in its h is to ry th e M e x ic a n sta te a p p e a rs to b e stro n g . O n th e
o th e r h a n d , h o w e v er, w e m u s t c o n sid e r t h a t th e sta te w a s for
m a n y d e c a d e s p ro n e to i n s ta b ility a n d irr e g u la r tra n s fe rs o f
p o w e r, t h a t e ven in th e y e ars o f re la tiv e s ta b ility p ro m o te d
b y th e I n s t itu t io n a l R e v o lu tio n a ry P a r ty ’s (Partido Revolu-
cionario Institutional, o r P R I ) d o m in a n c e fo r m u c h o f th e
t w e n tie th c en tu ry , a u th o rita ria n is m w a s th e n o rm (M e x ic o
in m o s t o f t h a t p e rio d w a s, as w e s h a ll see, a v a ria tio n o n th e
“p a r ty d ic ta to rs h ip ” m o d el), a n d t h a t i n v e ry r e c e n t y e a rs th e
c o u n try h a s s tru g g le d w it h serious p ro b le m s o f o rg a n iz e d
c rim e a n d d r u g tra ffic k in g , p r o m p tin g so m e a n a ly sts to
w o rry (so m e w h a t h y p e rb o lica lly , w e th in k ) a b o u t th e
p o s s ib ility o f a M e x ic a n “fa ile d s ta te ” o n t h e U .S . b o rd e r (for
a m o re re a so n a b le view , see O ’N e il 2 0 0 9 ). T h e se issu es are
d isc u sse d in m o re d e ta il i n th e c h a p te r 3 case study.
P e rh a p s th e s e c h a lle n g e s s h o u ld n o t b e s u rp r is in g w h e n
w e c o n s id e r (1) t h a t m o d e r n M e x ic o is g e o g ra p h ic a lly d i
v e rse; (2) t h a t it is a h ig h ly u n e q u a l so c ie ty w i t h c o n sid e r
able h e te ro g e n e ity a n d c u ltu r a l d iv e rs ity ; a n d (3) t h a t it
e m e rg e d fro m a h ig h ly c o n ffic tu a l a n d u n e q u a l p o s t-c o lo n ia l
so c ie ty in w h ic h m u ltip le e x o g e n o u s sh o c k s d is r u p te d t h e
tr a d itio n a l so c ia l s tr u c tu r e . I n te rm s o f g e o g ra p h ic a l a n d
c u ltu r a l d iv ersity , t h e s h a r p e s t c o n tr a s t is b e tw e e n th e
d rie r, n o r t h e r n p o r t io n o f th e c o u n try , w h ic h is th e c e n te r
o f m o s t in d u s t r ia l a ctiv ity , a n d th e s o u th e r n p o r tio n o f th e
c o u n try , w h ic h h a s a tro p ic a l c lim a te a n d is p o o re r, w i t h a
la rg e r in d ig e n o u s p o p u la tio n . E x o g e n o u s sh o c k s to M e x ic a n
d e v e lo p m e n t in c lu d e d n u m e ro u s fo re ig n in te rv e n tio n s t h a t
b o t h c h a n g e d d o m e s tic p o litic s a n d , in th e m o s t e x tre m e
in s ta n c e o f w a r w i th t h e U n ite d S ta te s in th e 1 8 4 0 s, le d to
m assive lo ss o f te rrito ry . T o th is lis t w e c o u ld a d d th e
i m p a c t o f fo re ig n c a p ita l d u r i n g th e P o rfiria to a n d th e
so c ia l d is lo c a tio n e x p e rie n c e d b y th e r u r a l, la rg e ly in d ig e
n o u s p o p u la tio n , a n d it is n o t h a r d to u n d e r s ta n d w h y i m
p o r t a n t g ro u p s o f r u r a l p o o r w e re w i llin g to fo llo w le a d e rs
lik e P a n c h o V illa a n d E m ilia n o Z a p a ta d u r in g t h e M e x ic a n
R e v o lu tio n (W o m a c k 1968; K n ig h t 1 990a). T h a t re v o lu
tio n , lik e t h e ev en ts t h a t c a u s e d it, w o u ld p ro v e to b e a d e
s ta b iliz in g force, e v e n as a n e w o rd e r e m e rg e d t h a t c la im e d
to g o v e rn in its n a m e .
Historical Development
M e x ic o w as a rg u a b ly th e m o s t i m p o r ta n t o f S p a in ’s c o lonies
in th e “N e w W o r ld ” (T h o m a s 1993). T h is w a s m a in ly d u e to
its e c o n o m ic v a lu e , w h ic h h a d tw o m a in sources. F ir s t, it
h a d m in in g w e a lth , a n d S p a in w as a m e rc a n tilis t p o w e r,
m e a n in g t h a t i t v ie w e d th e m a x im iz a tio n o f h o ld in g s o f
g o ld a n d silver (“b u llio n ”) as f u n d a m e n ta l to s ta te p o w e r a n d
th e k e y m e a su re o f e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm a n c e . S e c o n d , M e x ic o
h a d a la rg e , c o m p le x A m e r in d ia n c iv iliz a tio n b e fo re th e a r
riv a l o f E u ro p e a n s (in fa c t it h a d n u m e ro u s in d ig e n o u s
g ro u p s a n d c u ltu re s , p e rh a p s m o s t n o ta b ly th e M a y a in th e
S o u th , th o u g h th e i r co m p le x so c iety h a d e n te re d in to d e
c lin e so m e tim e b e fo re E u r o p e a n c o n ta c t, a n d th e e m p ire o f
th e M e x ic a , o fte n c a lle d th e “A z te c s ,” c e n te re d in to d a y ’s
M e x ic o C ity). T h is m e a n t t h a t s ta te -lik e s tru c tu re s c o u ld be
b u ilt “o n to p o f ” th e e x is tin g p o litic a l a n d so c ial in s titu tio n s
in th e so c iety ( M a h o n e y 2 010). T h is w a s sim ila rly t h e case
in t h e a re a a ro u n d to d a y ’s P e ru , fo r th e sa m e re a so n s (in th is
case, th e In c a c iv iliz a tio n w as t h e re le v a n t one). T h u s b o th
M e x ic o a n d P e ru fa m o u s ly b e c a m e “c o res” o f th e S p a n ish
c o lo n ia l sy ste m , w h ile areas lik e th e S o u th e r n C o n e (to d ay ’s
A r g e n tin a a n d C h ile ), V e n ez u e la , a n d p a r ts o f C e n tr a l
A m e ric a r e m a in e d “p e r ip h e r a l” to t h a t sy ste m u n t il th e clo s
in g y e ars o f S p a n is h c o lo n ia lism ( H a l p e r in D o n g h i 1993).
B e in g a colonial core m e a n t t h a t th e c e n tra l p o w e r p a id lots
o f a tte n tio n to M e x ic a n society (M a h o n e y 2010). C o lo n ia l
M e x ico h a d m ore colonial b ureaucracy th a n p e rip h e ra l re
gions, a n d it h a d a m o re com plex social stru c tu re , in p a r t b e
cause o f th e society’s relative c u ltu ra l diversity b u t in large
m ea su re because th e a m o u n t o f w e a lth g e n e ra te d b y m in in g ,
a n d th u s th e re n ts th a t c o uld be sip h o n e d o f f b y m u ltiple actors,
facilitate d th is . P e rh a p s n o t surprisingly, its efforts to achieve
in d ep e n d en c e follow ed a p a th th a t d iffere d in c e rta in key
Profile 499
respects fro m th e p a tte rn w itn esse d in m ore p e rip h e ra l areas.
I n places lik e B uenos A ire s a n d C aracas, local elites te n d e d to
b e stro n g supporters o f in d ep e n d en c e (L y n c h 1973). I n places
like M exico, such elites w ere less sure, a n d th e first stages o f
th e revolt a g a in st S p a in cam e o u t o f th e M e x ic a n periphery.
In d e ed , M e x ico o n ly b ecam e in d e p e n d e n t w h e n a liberal revolt
in S p a in caused som e M e x ic a n conservatives, m o s t no tab ly
A u g u s tin de Itu rb id e , to c h an g e sides, favoring a conservative
g o v e rn m e n t a t h o m e versus a lib eral g o v e rn m e n t fro m E u ro p e
(M eyer a n d S h e rm a n 1987: 2 9 4 -3 0 8 ; A n n a 1998). A t first,
M e xico trie d a n im p e ria l system , w ith Itu rb id e th e em peror.
T his laste d o n ly a m a tte r o f m o n th s b efore th e c o u n try becam e
a republic. T he im p o rt o f th is , for com parative politics, is t h a t
th is process b o th indicates a n d reinforced a stro n g tra d itio n a l
ist o r conservative s tra in in th e politics o f in d e p e n d e n t M exico.
I n a ll o f L a tin A m e ric a , politics in th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry w as
d iv id e d b e tw e e n conservatives a n d liberals, b u t th e conserva
tives w ere b o th stro n g e r a n d m ore conservative in M e x ico th a n
in m a n y o th e r places (on n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry M e x ic a n conser
vatism , see K ra u ze 1997). P erhaps m o st im p o rta n t, M e x ica n
conservatives h e lp e d th e R o m a n C a th o lic C h u rc h m a in ta in
th ro u g h o u t a g o o d p o rtio n o f th e n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry s tre n g th
a n d privileges th a t w ere a lm o st w ith o u t p a ralle l in th e region,
tw o o f th e m o s t im p o rta n t b e in g th e C h u r c h ’s e n o rm o u s la n d –
h o ld in g a n d th e fa ct th a t it w as a llow ed to o p e rate a p arallel
legal system th ro u g h w h ic h its clergy co u ld b e trie d (L y n ch
1986: G ill 2 0 0 8 ). T h is o n g o in g p o la riz a tio n w as a n im p o rta n t
factor in th e W a r o f th e R e fo rm in th e 1850s a n d th e revolu
tio n b e g in n in g a fte r 1910, as w e ll as th e su b seq u e n t C ristero
R e b ellio n in th e 1920s.
Historical Development
T i m e l i n e
1810
1821
1833-1834
1836
1838-1839
1846-1848
1853
1855
1856
1857
1858-1861
1862
1864-1867
1867
1876-1911
1910
1911-1913
“Grito of Dolores” marks beginning of indepen
dence movement.
Plan of Iguala and its “Three Guarantees” and the
establishment of Mexican independence
Valentin Gomez Farias attempts anti-clerical and
other reforms. Santa Anna displaces Gomez Farias,
prompting a period of conservative rule.
Independence of Texas
The “Pastry War’ (French invasion)
U.S. War with Mexico, which leads to the United States
seizing a considerable portion of Mexican national
territory, including much of present-day Arizona,
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah
Gadsen Purchase transfers more Mexican land to
the United States.
Ley Juarez introduces anti-clerical reforms.
Ley Lerdo forces alienation of Church Lands.
Liberal constitution of 1857
War of the Reform
European intervention, led by France
Rule by Emperor Maximilian, imposed by French
forces
Return to liberal government, under Juarez
The Porfiriato, during which Porfirio Diaz domi
nates Mexican politics
Diaz “defeats” Madero in a fraudulent election that
is the opening scene of the Mexican Revolution.
Presidency of Francisco Madero
1913-1914
1914-1920
1920-1924
1924-1928
1926-1929
1928-1934
1929
1934-1940
1968
1988-1994
1994-
1994
1994-2000
1994
2000
2006-2012
2 0 1 2 -p re sent
Presidency of Victorino Huerta, which begins with
a coup d’etat and the murder of Madero
Presidency of Venustiano Carranza, proponent of
‘constitutionalism”
Presidency of Alvaro Obregon
Presidency of Plutarco Elias Calles, who creates the
party that later becomes the PRI
Cristero Rebellion
Period in which Calles dominates but does not
hold the presidency
Founding of PRI (at the time called the PNR)
Presidency of Lazaro Cardenas, which includes nation
alization of oil in 1938 as well as major agrarian reforms
Major student protests quelled with violence.
Presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, known for
its liberal economic reforms
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA)
enters into effect.
Beginning of Zapatista National Liberation Army
EZLN activities under Subcomandante Marcos
Presidency of Ernesto Zedillo
Peso crisis, resolved with major aid from the United
States under Bill Clinton
Election of Vicente Fox of PAN signals the end of
PRI hegemony in Mexico, and progress for Mexican
democracy.
Presidency of Felipe Calderon
Presidency of Enrique Peha Nieto
500 Mexico
I n th e e a rly y e a rs o f t h e r e p u b lic , M e x ic o d e s c e n d e d
i n to w h a t sc h o la rs c a ll “c a u d illis m o ,” w h i c h e s s e n tia lly
m e a n s r u le b y s tro n g m e n . Y ou w il l r e c o g n iz e fro m c h a p te r
3 t h a t th is w o u ld b e a s y m p to m o f re la tiv e s ta te w e a k n e s s :
T h e M e x ic a n sta te w a s a t le a s t p a r tia l ly a v e h ic le fo r th e
p u r s u it o f th e p riv a te in te r e s t o f a “p r e d a to r y ” e lite r a th e r
t h a n a n o r g a n iz a tio n in w h ic h r u le o f law , e q u a l access,
a n d i n s t itu t io n a l le g itim a c y w e re e s ta b lis h e d . W h i l e th e
i n s t itu t io n a l tr a p p in g s o f a lib e r a l r e p u b lic w e re in p la c e ,
th e h o ld e r o f th e p re sid en c y u ltim a te ly a n sw e red to a m ilita r y
e lite , a n d in M e x ic o th is m e a n t A n to n io L o p e z d e S a n ta
A n n a . S a n ta A n n a fa m o u s ly s w itc h e d sid e s in M e x ic a n
p o litic s , a lte r n a t in g b e tw e e n th e c o n se rv a tiv e s a n d th e l i b
e rals (M e y e r a n d S h e r m a n 1987; B a z a n t 1985: 4 3 6 – 4 4 4 ) ,
s o m e tim e s a s s u m in g t h e p re s id e n c y h im s e lf, b u t e v en t h e n
o f te n v a c a tin g th e office to r e tir e to h is p riv a te e s ta te w h ile
a d e s ig n e e h a n d le d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’s d a y – to – d a y a ffa irs.
H i s a u th o r it y r e s te d e s s e n tia lly o n h is r e p u ta ti o n as a g r e a t
w a r r io r a n d h is a b ility to e s ta b lis h a p riv a te a r m y to o u t-
c o m p e te p o te n tia l d o m e s tic riv a ls. O f c o u rse , th e r e is o n e
e asy w a y to lo se le g itim a c y in a sy s te m o f th is s o rt, w h ic h
is to fa il i n m il ita r y te rm s . S a n ta A n n a lo s t p o w e r a f te r
th e u n s u c c e s s fu l e ffo rt to sto p th e d e c la r a tio n o f th e
i n d e p e n d e n t R e p u b lic o f T e x a s. H e w o u ld t e m p o r a r ily
g a in it b a c k a f te r h e ro ic se rv ice a g a in s t th e F r e n c h in th e
“p a s tr y w a r,” a n d t h e n lose p o w e r a g a in in s u b s e q u e n t
y e a rs, g a in in g i t a g a in d u r in g t h e U .S . in v a s io n o f M e x ic o ,
a n d lo s in g p o w e r fo r g o o d in 1855, w h e n t h e R e v o lu tio n
o f A y u tla (1 8 5 4 -1 8 5 5 ) b r o u g h t th e lib e ra ls to p o w e r
( H a m n e t t 1994).
A f t e r so m a n y y e ars o f p o litic a l in s ta b ility a n d p ro te c
tio n o f c o n se rv a tiv e in te re s ts , th e lib e ra ls w e re e a g e r to d r a
m a tic a lly re m a k e M e x ic a n p o litic s (K ra u z e 1 9 9 7 :1 5 7 -1 5 9 ).
T h is th e y a tte m p te d to d o in th e C o n s ti tu tio n o f 185 7 a n d
in tw o m a jo r re fo rm s , k n o w n as th e L e y J u a r e z a n d t h e L e y
L e rd o (a fte r t h e ir a u th o rs). T h ese law s e x p a n d e d c iv ilia n
p o w e r o v e r th e c le rg y a n d fo rc e d th e C h u r c h t o se ll its m a s
sive p ro p e rtie s . H o w e v e r, th e C h u r c h ’s c o n se rv a tiv e allies
w e re u n w illin g to a c c e p t th e n e w o rd e r, a n d a m a jo r civil
w a r, k n o w n as th e W a r o f th e R e fo rm (1 8 5 8 -1 8 6 1 ), b ro k e
o u t ( H a m n e t t 1994). E v e n tu a lly th e re p u b lic w as a ble to
d e fe n d i ts e l f a g a in s t c o n se rv a tiv e in s u rg e n ts . A t th e sa m e
tim e , M e x ic a n c o n se rv a tiv e s, le d b y J u a n A l m o n te , su ccess
fu lly c o n v in c e d N a p o le o n I I I to in v a d e F ra n c e a n d to
im p o s e a E u r o p e a n m o n a rc h , A r c h d u k e M a x im ilia n , as
E m p e r o r o f M e x ic o (M e y e r a n d S h e rm a n 1987: 3 9 1 -4 0 1 ).
Iro n ic a lly , M a x im il ia n h a d lib e ra l s y m p a th ie s a n d d i d n o t
r o ll b a c k th e re fo rm s a n d o th e rw is e p u rs u e t h e p o lic ies t h a t
h is c o n se rv a tiv e s u p p o rte rs w o u ld h a v e lik e d . A s a re s u lt,
h e so o n h a d re la tiv e ly little b a c k in g . A s lo n g as F re n c h
t ro o p s re m a in e d i n M e x ic o , h e w a s a ble to re sist J u a r e z ’s
r e s is ta n c e m o v e m e n t. B u t a f te r th e close o f t h e A m e r ic a n
C iv il W a r , w i t h t h e U n ite d S ta te s s e n d in g t ro o p s to th e
M e x ic a n b o r d e r a n d t h r e a te n i n g in te r v e n tio n in fa v o r o f
J u a r e z a n d t h e lib e ra ls , F r e n c h tro o p s w ith d re w , a n d M a x i
m il ia n ’s re g im e e n d e d s o o n th e re a fte r.
T h is m e a n t a (b rie f) r e tu r n to lib e ra l, c iv ilia n g o v e rn
m e n t. H o w e v e r, in 1871 P o r f ir io D i a z r a n o n a c a m p a ig n
o f “n o r e – e le c t io n .” H a v in g lo s t, h e b e g a n a re v o lt w h ic h
c u lm in a te d in h is t a k i n g p o w e r i n 1876. I n c e r ta in r e
sp e c ts , th is s ig n a le d a r e tu r n to c a u d illis m o , as h e w o u ld
g o v e rn , t h o u g h n o t alw ay s fo rm a lly h o ld in g office, u n t il
1910. H o w e v e r, so m e i m p o r t a n t d iffe re n c e s s e p a ra te th e
“P o r f i r ia t o ” f r o m t h e sty le o f r u le d e v e lo p e d b y S a n ta
A n n a i n th e firs t h a l f o f th e c e n tu ry . F i r s t , D i a z a im e d to
u s e h is p o w e r to fo rce th e m o d e r n i z a tio n o f th e c o u n tr y (as
h e a n d h is a d v is e rs u n d e r s to o d th is p ro c ess). A s in B ra z il,
“p o s itiv is m ” p la y e d a k e y ro le in f o r m in g M e x ic a n id e a s o f
p ro g re s s a n d m o d e r n i z a tio n (C a m p 2 0 0 7 : 3 6 – 3 8 ) . D ia z
c o u r te d f o re ig n in v e s tm e n t a n d p re s id e d o v e r s o m e g r o w th
in m a n u f a c tu r i n g , th e c o n s tr u c ti o n o f a n o ta b le sy s te m o f
ra ilr o a d s , a n d t h e tr a n s f o r m a ti o n o f a g r ic u ltu r e (M e y e r
a n d S h e r m a n 1987: 4 3 1 – 4 7 9 ; K ra u z e 1 997). A l l o f th e s e
d e v e lo p m e n ts w o u ld h a v e i m p o r t a n t im p l ic a t io n s fo r
s u b s e q u e n t p o litic s , as th e y p r o d u c e d so m e d is lo c a tio n
a n d u p s e t t r a d i t i o n a l w a y s o f d o in g t h in g s . P e r h a p s
a g r ic u ltu r a l c h a n g e s w e re th e m o s t im p o r t a n t, b e c a u se
t h e y b ro k e u p t r a d i t io n a l lo c a l la n d o w n e r s h ip p a tt e r n s
a n d h e lp e d to c o n c e n tra te la n d in th e h a n d s o f a s m a ll e lite
(C a m p 2 0 0 7 : 38), a n d i n tr o d u c e d w a g e la b o r as th e b a sis
o f th e r u r a l e c o n o m y in a t le a s t so m e a re a s. A s m a n y s c h o l
a rs h a v e p o in te d o u t, th is , a n d so c ia l i n e q u a lit y m o re
g e n e ra lly , w o u ld p la y a m a jo r ro le in th e d i s c o n te n t t h a t
f u e le d t h e M e x ic a n re v o lu tio n b e g in n in g in 1910 (C a m p
2 0 0 7 : 4 2 ; K n ig h t 1 990a). I n p a r tic u l a r , E m ilia n o Z a p a ta ’s
i n s u r g e n c y w a s fo c u s e d , a b o v e a ll, o n la n d o w n e r s h ip
( W o m a c k 1968).
T h e re v o lu tio n h a d as its p ro x im a te cause th e re v o lt o f
F ra n c is c o M a d e ro , w h o h a d r u n a g a in s t D i a z a n d lo s t in a
fr a u d u le n t e le c tio n (for a d e fin itiv e a c c o u n t o f t h e re v o lu
tio n , see K n i g h t 1 9 9 0 a , 1 990b). M a d e ro w a s e s s e n tia lly a
n o r t h e r n e lite a n d a lib e ra l. H e w a s so o n j o in e d in h is ef
fo rts b y d is tin c t so c ia l g ro u p s , t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f w h ic h
w e re le d b y F ra n c is c o (“P a n c h o ”) V illa i n th e n o r t h a n d
Profile 501
Z a p a ta . Id e o lo g ic a lly , th e s e g ro u p s w e n t w e ll b e y o n d
M a d e ro ’s lib e ra lism : T h o u g h h is to r ia n s d is a g re e a b o u t
w h a t e x a c tly t h e y s to o d for, it is a g re e d t h a t th e y s o u g h t to
re d re ss p ro b le m s o f e c o n o m ic in e q u a lity a n d n o t j u s t p o liti
c a l issues. S c h o la rs d is a g re e a b o u t w h e n , p recisely, th e
re v o lu tio n e n d e d , a n d w e c a n n o t tra c e h e re a ll o f its tw is ts
a n d tu r n s . N o te , th o u g h , t h a t M a d e r o g o v e rn e d u n t il h e
w a s a ssa ss in a te d b y V ic to ria n o H u e r t a in 1913. H u e r t a w as
in t u r n d isp la c e d b y V e n u s tia n o C a r r a n z a in 1914. I t w as
u n d e r C a r r a n z a t h a t th e r e v o lu tio n a ry c o n s titu tio n o f 1917
w a s p a sse d . C a r r a n z a w a s fo rc e d o u t i n a re v o lt in 1 9 2 0 le d
b y A lv a ro O b re g o n , a n d O b r e g o n w o u ld h i m s e l f a ssu m e
th e pre sid en c y . S e v e ral y e ars la te r, O b r e g o n w o u ld b e fol
lo w e d b y P lu ta rc o E lia s C a lle s , w h o w o u ld fo u n d th e p a r ty
t h a t w o u ld b e c o m e th e P R I a n d w h o w o u ld d o m in a te
M e x ic a n p o litic s — b o t h d ir e c tly a n d i n d ir e c tly (K ra u z e
1997: 4 0 4 – 4 3 7 ) — u n t il L a z a r o C a rd e n a s w a s e le c te d in
1934. E lia s C a lle s is b e s t k n o w n fo r c o n s o lid a tin g th e
sy ste m o f P R I – p a r t y d o m in a n c e t h a t w o u ld e n d u re u n t il
2 0 0 0 a n d fo r p r e s id in g o v e r th e p e r io d o f th e C ris te ro
R e b e llio n , a m a jo r c iv il w a r in w h ic h in s u rg e n ts a im e d , u n
successfully, to d e fe n d th e R o m a n C a th o lic C h u r c h fro m
th e s ta te ’s a lle g e d d e p re d a tio n s (B la n c a rte 1992). C a rd e n a s
is b e s t r e m e m b e re d fo r h is p o p u l is t p o litic s , fo r h is role in
f u r th e r so lid ify in g M e x ic a n c o rp o ra tis m , fo r th e n a tio n a l
iz a tio n o f M e x ic a n o il, a n d f o r h is e ffo rts a t a g r a r ia n re fo rm
(K ra u z e 1997: 4 3 8 – 4 8 0 ) .
T h e re is m u c h to d e b a te a b o u t t h e e x te n t to w h ic h th is
b ro a d e r p ro c e ss w a s re v o lu tio n a ry . I t c le a rly g e n e r a te d
so m e i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e s i n p o litic s , so c ia l life , a n d e v en
re lig io n . Y e t th e r e g im e t h a t it e n d e d u p p ro d u c in g b y
th e m id d le o f th e t w e n ti e th c e n tu r y lo o k e d i n c e r t a in
w ays lik e th o s e fo u n d in m a n y o t h e r L a t i n A m e r ic a n so c i
e tie s a t th e tim e . T h e m o s t o b v io u s d iffe re n c e w a s t h a t
a u th o r i ta r ia n p o litic s in M e x ic o w a s so c le a rly d o m in a te d
b y o n e p o liti c a l p a r ty , th e P R I . T h e m o s t o b v io u s s im ila r
ity w o u ld b e t h e t u r n to i m p o r t s u b s ti tu tio n as a d e v e lo p
m e n t s tra te g y . I n M e x ic o , fo r a tim e a t le a s t, m a n y ju d g e d
th i s a p p r o a c h to b e su c c e ss fu l, y ie ld in g th e s o -c a lle d
“M e x i c a n m ir a c le ” (B a s a n e z 2 0 0 6 : 2 9 7 ) o f m e d iu m – te r m
s u s ta in e d e c o n o m ic g r o w th . E c o n o m ic a lly , th o u g h , th e
c o u n tr y e n te r e d i n to c ris is— lik e m o s t o f L a t i n A m e ric a —
in th e 1 9 8 0 s. B y th e e a rly 1 9 9 0 s, P r e s id e n t S a lin a s d e G o r –
t a r i i n tr o d u c e d i m p o r t a n t lib e r a l e c o n o m ic re fo rm s.
S c h o la rs d e b a te th e r e la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n th e s e re fo rm s
a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t e c o n o m ic t u r b u le n c e , in c lu d i n g th e
p e s o c risis o f 1 9 9 4 . A l s o i n th e e a rly 1 9 9 0 s , M e x ic o w i t
n e s s e d th e b e g in n i n g o f a n in s u r g e n c y in th e s o u th e r n
s ta te o f C h ia p a s , p r o te s ti n g lib e ra l re fo rm s a n d “g lo b a liz a
tio n ” m o re g e n e ra lly . I n l a te r y e a rs , M e x ic o ’s c itiz e n s
b e c a m e m o re a n d m o re i n te r e s te d in b r e a k in g th e P R I ’s
s tr a n g le h o ld o n p o w e r. T h e N a t io n a l A c t i o n P a r t y (Partido
Action National, or P A N ) s u c c e ss fu lly w o n t h e p re s id e n c y
w i t h V ic e n te F o x i n 2 0 0 0 . P A N is a c e n te r – r i g h t p a r t y t h a t
te n d s to b e less a n ti- c le r ic a l t h a n t h e P R I (in d e e d , th e
C a th o li c C h u r c h p la y e d a ro le in M e x i c a n d e m o c r a tiz a
tio n , as it d i d e ls e w h e re d u r in g “t h i r d w a v e ” d e m o c r a tiz a
tio n ). I t h a s a lso c o n tin u e d w i t h e c o n o m ic lib e r a liz a tio n .
F o x w a s s u c c e e d e d b y P r e s id e n t F e lip e C a ld e r o n . C a ld e r o n
h a d s o m e su c c ess b u t fa c e d d iffic u ltie s g e n e r a te d b y h is ef
fo rts to c o n tr o l d r u g g a n g a c tiv ity , e s p e c ia lly in b o r d e r
s ta te s . I n so m e a re a s , t h e s ta te ’s a b ility to e x e r t its W e b e
r i a n “m o n o p o ly o n th e le g itim a te u se o f fo rc e ” w a s to ta lly
c a lle d in to q u e s tio n . P R I c a n d id a te E n r iq u e P e n a N ie to
w o n th e 2 0 1 2 p r e s id e n tia l e le c tio n s . O n e k e y q u e s tio n o f
M e x ic a n p o litic s c o n c e rn s w h e t h e r th e P R I h a s c o m e to
fu lly a c c e p t p lu r a li s t d e m o c ra c y o r if, u p o n r e ta k in g p o w e r,
it w il l a g a in a im to m o n o p o liz e it.
Regime and Political Institutions
M e x ic o ’s p o litic a l s y s te m is s tr o n g ly p r e s id e n tia lis t,
th o u g h i t h a s b e c o m e less so in r e c e n t y e a rs as m u l t i p a r t y
c o m p e titio n h a s b e c o m e a r e a l it y (C a m p 2 0 0 7 : 1 8 1 -1 8 3 ).
I n t h e y e a rs o f P R I d o m in a n c e th is w a s h i g h li g h t e d b y th e
e x tr a o r d in a r y p o w e r t h a t th e p r e s id e n t h a d b o t h w i t h in
t h e in s t it u t io n a l f r a m e w o r k o f t h e s ta te and w i t h i n t h e
p a rty . T h e e x e c u tiv e b r a n c h p lay s a c r itic a l ro le n o t j u s t in
t h e a d m in is tr a tio n o f t h e s ta te b u t a ls o in c o n c e iv in g a n d
p r o p o s in g le g is la tio n . I n d e e d , h is to ric a lly , t h e e x te n t to
w h ic h le g is la tio n is p ro p o s e d b y th e e x e c u tiv e in M e x ic o
h a s b e e n s ig n if ic a n t (C a m p 2 0 0 7 : 1 8 1 -1 8 2 ). C a m p n o te s
tw o a d d it io n a l so u rc e s o f t h e le g is la tu r e ’s re la tiv e w e a k
n e ss (2 0 0 7 : 1 8 7 -1 8 8 ). F ir s t, r e p re s e n ta tiv e s c a n n o t b e r e
e le c te d im m e d ia te ly a f te r s e r v in g a t e r m . S e c o n d , th e
r e s e a r c h s ta f f o f t h e le g is la tu r e is s m a ll a n d p o o rly f u n d e d ,
w h e re a s t h e e x e c u tiv e ’s s t a f f is ro b u s t.
T h e ju d ic ia l sy ste m h a s a lso su ffe re d h is to ric a lly fro m
re la tiv e w e a k n e s s a n d la c k o f in d e p e n d e n c e , th o u g h th is
502 Mexico
Regime and Political Institutions
Regime Federal republic, democratic (more fully so in recent years, especially since PAN victory in
2000 presidential election)
Administrative Divisions Thirty-one states as well as the Federal District of Mexico City
Executive Branch President
Selection of Executive President is elected by popular vote. Note that presidential selection has changed notably in
recent years (see case study box later in these country materials).
Legislative Branch Bicameral Congress
Lower chamber: Chamber of Deputies (Cdmara de Diputados)
Upper chamber: Senate (Senado)
Judicial Branch Supreme Court of Justice, composed of eleven justices (one the “president” of the supreme
court). Justices are nominated by the executive and approved by the legislature.
Political Party System Multiparty system, though for much of the twentieth century Mexican politics was
completely dominated by the PRI. The PAN broke this monopoly in 2000 but as of this
writing a PRI member again holds the presidency.
h a s c h a n g e d so m e w h a t in th e w a k e o f re fo rm s p a s s e d in t h e in 2 0 0 0 , th e r e h a s b e e n g r e a te r c o m p e titiv e n e s s in t h e e lec-
1990s (C a m p 2 0 0 7 : 1 8 9 -1 9 2 ). A f te r th e d e fe a t o f th e P R I to r a l system .
Political Culture
M e x ic o is a c o u n tr y w h e re sc h o la rs h ave fo c u se d a g o o d
d e a l o f a tte n tio n o n q u e s tio n s o f p o litic a l c u ltu re . C lassic
a c c o u n ts o f th e “c u ltu r e o f p o v e r ty ” b y a n th ro p o lo g is ts
(L e w is 1961) a n d o f th e “civic c u ltu r e ” b y p o litic a l sc ie n tists
( A lm o n d a n d V erba 1963) lo o k e d a t M e x ic o as a p r o m in e n t
case. T h e se a c c o u n ts te n d e d to v ie w M e x ic o in n e g a tiv e
te rm s , o r to tr e a t its c u ltu r e as p ro b le m a tic o r as c o n tr ib u t
in g to p e rc e iv e d e c o n o m ic o r p o litic a l de fic its. T h u s L e w is
a im e d to e x p la in m u ltig e n e ra tio n a l p o v e rty in th e T e p ito
n e ig h b o rh o o d o f M e x ic o C ity (th o u g h g e n e r a liz in g a b o u t
p e rso n s in p o v e rty m o re g e n era lly ), a r g u in g t h a t i t w as
tr a n s m it te d th r o u g h c u ltu r a l tr a its lik e a u th o r ita r ia n is m , a
te n d e n c y to w a rd in te r p e r s o n a l v io le n c e, m iso g y n y , a n d
p o o r e d u c a tio n (it is im p o r ta n t to n o te h e re t h a t L e w is w as
n o t c la im in g t h a t M e x ic a n s p o ss e s se d th e s e tr a its m o re
t h a n o th e r p o p u la tio n s ). A lm o n d a n d V erba, in c o n tra s t,
re lie d o n m o re re p re s e n ta tiv e su rv e y s o f a sa m p le o f th e
M e x ic a n p o p u la tio n as th e y c o m p a re d M e x ic a n p o litic a l
a ttitu d e s a n d o rie n ta tio n s to th o s e h e ld in o th e r c o u n trie s
lik e E n g la n d , G e rm a n y , Italy , a n d th e U n ite d S ta te s. T h e ir
g e n e ra l c o n c lu sio n w as t h a t th e M e x ic a n p o p u la tio n h a d a
less d e m o c ra tic c u ltu r a l o r ie n ta tio n t h a n th e p o p u la tio n s o f
o t h e r c o u n trie s . T h is s o r t o f a r g u m e n t h a s g e n e ra te d a
r o b u s t d e b a te in th e so c ia l scien ces a n d in p o lic y d e b a te s
a b o u t th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n c u ltu re , p o v e rty , a n d d e
m o c ra c y m o re gen era lly .
L e t u s fo c u s o n th e p o litic a l c u ltu r e e x a m p le fo r a
m o m e n t. T h a t A lm o n d a n d V e rb a ’s d a ta sh o w e d less d e m o
c ra tic a ttitu d e s a n d o rie n ta tio n s (as th e y w e re d e fin in g
th e m ) is clear. T h is is n o t th e so u rc e o f a n y c o n tro v e rsy
a m o n g so c ia l sc ie n tists. W h e r e th e a r g u m e n t g e ts m o re
c o m p le x is w h e n c a u s a l c la im s a re m a d e a b o u t th e r e la tio n
s h ip b e tw e e n th e s e v a lu e s a n d p o litic a l o u tc o m e s. A lm o n d
a n d V e rb a ’s s tu d y w a s c o n d u c te d a t th e h e ig h t o f t h e P R I
p a r ty d o m in a n c e i n M e x ic o . S o m e sc h o la rs w a n t to a rg u e
t h a t p o litic a l c u ltu r e “tric k le s u p ” a n d s tr u c tu r e s i n s t it u
tio n s ( I n g l e h a r t a n d W e lz e l 2 0 0 5 ). O t h e r s w a n t to a rg u e
t h a t p o litic a l i n s tit u t io n s p ro d u c e c u ltu re s . S o fro m o n e
p o in t o f view , M e x ic a n a u th o r ita r ia n is m w a s a re s p o n s e to
a m o re a u th o r ita r ia n p o litic a l c u ltu re . F ro m a n o th e r p o in t
o f view , th e o b se rv e d c u ltu r a l te n d e n c ie s in t h a t p e rio d
w e re re a so n a b le a d a p ta tio n s to a n a u th o r i ta r i a n p o litic a l
Profile 503
e n v iro n m e n t. N o te t h a t t h is is a g e n e ra l d e b a te in
c o m p a ra tiv e p o litic s a n d t h a t M e x ic o is j u s t o n e p a r ti c u
larly i n te r e s tin g case in th is c o n n e c tio n .
C a n y o u t h i n k o f w a y s in w h ic h w e m ig h t b e a ble to
m a k e p ro g re s s o n th is d e b a te r a th e r t h a n h a v in g e a c h side
r e p e a te d ly a s s e r t its t h e o r e tic a l p o i n t o f view ? O n e s t r a t
e g y w o u ld b e to fo c u s o n M e x i c o ’s d e m o c r a tic tr a n s itio n .
I f th e firs t th e o r y is r ig h t, i t s h o u ld h a v e b e e n d riv e n
la rg e ly b y c u lt u r a l c h a n g e . T h a t is, M e x ic a n p o lit ic a l c u l
t u r e s h o u ld h a v e b e c o m e m o re “d e m o c r a tic ,” w i t h i n s t i t u
tio n a l c h a n g e a n d f o r m a l d e m o c r a ti z a tio n fo llo w in g . I f
th e se c o n d t h e o r y is r ig h t, w e w o u ld e x p e c t e lite b a r g a i n
in g a n d i n s t i t u t io n a l c h a n g e to c o m e firs t, w i t h c u lt u r a l
c h a n g e s to fo llo w , i f a t all.
Political Economy
M e x ic o is a n im p o r t a n t e m e rg in g eco n o m y , in c re a s in g ly
in te g r a te d w ith th e b r o a d e r g lo b a l eco n o m y . Its e c o n o m ic
h i s to r y h a s b e e n m ix e d , a lte r n a t in g b e tw e e n p e rio d s o f
g r o w th a n d crisis. A s d is c u s s e d pre v io u sly , it w a s, in
e c o n o m ic as w e ll as p o litic a l te rm s , o n e o f S p a in ’s m o s t
i m p o r ta n t c o lo n ia l p o sse ssio n s. I n th e n in e t e e n th c e n tu ry ,
p o litic a l in s ta b ility c a u s e d e c o n o m ic p ro b le m s , sin c e a p r e
d ic ta b le p o litic a l a n d e c o n o m ic e n v ir o n m e n t is n e c e ssa ry
f o r in v e s to rs a n d o th e r e c o n o m ic a c to rs to a c t o p tim a lly . I n
t h e la te r n i n e te e n t h c e n tu ry , m o d e r n e c o n o m ic in f r a s tr u c
tu r e w a s b u ilt d u r in g th e P o rfiria to , b u t th e so c ia l d islo c a
tio n s c a u se d in p a r t b y t h is p ro c e ss y ie ld e d la te r in sta b ility .
T h e M e x ic a n R e v o lu tio n u s h e re d in a n o th e r p e r io d o f i n
s ta b ility w h ic h lik e ly h e ld e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm a n c e b a c k ,
t h o u g h i t is a rg u a b le t h a t th e f r u its o f d e v e lo p m e n t i n s u b
s e q u e n t y e a rs w e re s o m e w h a t m o re e q u ita b le as a re s u lt o f
th is p ro c ess. F in a lly , as i n m u c h o f L a ti n A m e ric a a n d th e
re s t o f th e d e v e lo p in g w o rld , M e x ic o t u r n e d to i m p o r t s u b
s titu tio n as its d e v e lo p m e n t s tra te g y in t h e m id d le o f th e
tw e n tie th c e n tu ry . T h is se t o f p o lic ie s c o in c id e d w i t h fa irly
c o n s is te n t a n d s tro n g e c o n o m ic g r o w th fo r se v e ra l d e c a d e s,
th o u g h e v en a t t h e e n d o f th is p ro c e ss M e x ic o w a s le f t w i t h
h i g h in e q u a lity a n d n o ta b le p o v e rty .
T o d a y ’s M e x ic a n e c o n o m y is d o m in a te d b y se rv ice s (60
p e rc e n t o f G D P ) a n d i n d u s t r y (37 p e rc e n t), w i t h a g ric u l
tu r e a c c o u n tin g fo r u n d e r 4 p e r c e n t o f G D P (2 0 1 3 e s ti
m a te s, C I A W o r ld F a c tb o o k ). U n e m p lo y m e n t is a t le a st
fo rm a lly q u ite lo w a t p re s e n t, e s tim a te d a t 4.9 p e r c e n t (2013
e s tim a te , C I A W o r ld F a c tb o o k ). A s th e C I A W o r ld F a c t
b o o k n o te s , M e x ic o h a s a h i g h ra te o f underemployment,
W h i l e th is is a g o o d stra te g y , as is o f te n th e case th e
e m p iric a l d a ta d o n o t im m e d ia te ly resolve th e c o n flic t b e
t w e e n th e s e riv a l th e o rie s , as th e r e is e v id e n c e to s u p p o rt
b o t h v ie w s. I t is p r e tt y h a r d to e x p la in th e M e x ic a n tr a n s i
tio n w it h o u t fo c u s in g o n i n te r n a l p a r ty d y n a m ic s in th e
P R I , o r g a n iz in g in th e P A N , a n d th e c rises a n d e c o n o m ic
d islo c a tio n s o f t h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d 1 9 9 0 s t h a t u n d e r c u t o n e o f
th e P R I ’s m a in p illa rs o f leg itim a c y . O n th e o th e r h a n d ,
th e r e is e v id e n c e (C a m p 2 0 0 7 ) t h a t M e x ic a n p o litic a l c u l
tu r e in th is p e rio d c h a n g e d n o ta b ly (sim p ly s p e a k in g , b e
c o m in g m o re d e m o c ra tic ), in o n e a c c o u n t “c o n v e rg in g ” a b it
w i t h th e p o litic a l c u ltu re s o f C a n a d a a n d th e U n it e d S ta te s,
ju s t as M e x ic a n e c o n o m ic c u ltu r e n o ta b ly s h if te d th r o u g h
m o d e r n iz a tio n (B a s a n e z 2 0 0 6 ).
h o w e v er. W h a t th is m e a n s is t h a t m a n y M e x ic a n s d o n o t
h a v e sa tis fa c to rily r e m u n e ra tiv e jo b s , a n d a la rg e p e rc e n ta g e
(a ro u n d a q u a r te r o f th e la b o r force) w o rk s i n th e in fo rm a l
eco n o m y . T h is is v e ry c o m m o n i n th e d e v e lo p in g w o rld , a n d
it is w o r t h k e e p in g i n m in d b e c a u se it im p a c ts th e e x te n t to
w h ic h u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te s in d e v e lo p e d a n d d e v e lo p in g
so c ie tie s a re c o m p a ra b le m e a su re s. M e x ic o d o e s c o n tin u e
to su ffe r fro m h ig h in c o m e in e q u a lity . Its g i n i co efficie n t
s ta n d s a t 4 8 .9 ( W o rld B a n k 2 0 1 3 e stim a te ). T h is is so m e
w h a t w o rs e t h a n t h e g in i c o efficie n t fo r t h e U n it e d S ta te s,
i ts e l f k n o w n as a c o u n tr y w i t h re la tiv e ly h ig h in c o m e
in e q u a lity .
T h e M e x ic a n s ta te h a s h is to r ic a lly p la y e d a n im p o r t a n t
ro le in e c o n o m ic m a n a g e m e n t. A s n o te d p re v io u sly ,
d u r i n g th e P o r f ir ia to t h e s ta te e n d e a v o re d to a t t r a c t a n d
p r o te c t c a p ita l. I ts ro le in t h e e c o n o m y g r e w a f te r t h e re v o
lu tio n a n d u n d e r th e P R I (C a m p 2 0 0 7 : 4 5 ), p a r tic u l a r ly
b e g in n i n g in th e 1 9 3 0 s a n d 1 9 4 0 s. M e x ic o p r a c tic e d s ta te –
le d d e v e lo p m e n t, n a ti o n a li z i n g e n te r p r is e s lik e o il (c re a t
in g th e g i a n t P E M E X firm ) as w e ll as r a ilr o a d s , e n g a g in g
in la n d re fo r m (w h ic h g e n e r a lly te n d e d t o w a r d th e d i s tr i
b u tio n o f re la tiv e ly s m a ll la n d h o ld in g s ) , a n d a d o p tin g a
s t r a te g y o f i m p o r t – s u b s ti t u ti n g i n d u s t r ia liz a t io n , p r o te c t
in g d o m e s tic i n d u s tr ie s . I t in v e s te d h e a v ily in i n f r a s tr u c
tu r e as w e ll. T h is w a s t h e p e r io d o f th e “M e x ic a n m ir a c le ”
( B a s a n e z 2 0 0 6 : 2 9 7 ) w h ic h p ro d u c e d s te a d y g r o w th , re la
tiv e ly lo w in f la tio n , a n d ra p id in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n . U n f o r t u
n a te ly , M e x ic o s u ffe re d , a lo n g w i t h t h e r e s t o f L a t i n
A m e r ic a , f r o m th e d e b t c ris is o f t h e 1 9 8 0 s, re la te d h e re to
th e d r a m a tic d e c lin e in o il re v e n u e s w h ic h , a lo n g w ith
504 Mexico
o t h e r fa c to rs , e x a c e rb a te d th e s t a te ’s d iffic u ltie s in p a y in g
its d e b ts . C o n s e q u e n tly , th e c o u n tr y fa c e d s e rio u s e c o
n o m ic d iffic u ltie s — in c l u d in g a n in c re a s e in p o v e r ty a n d
th e e x p a n s io n o f t h e in f o r m a l e c o n o m y — a n d M e x ic o
slow ly t u r n e d to w a r d re fo rm . M e x ic o fo llo w e d p r e s c r i p
tio n s to p r iv a tiz e a n u m b e r o f in d u s tr ie s , in c l u d i n g b a n k s
t h a t h a d u n d e r g o n e e m e rg e n c y n a tio n a liz a tio n in 1 9 8 2 ,
th o u g h th e s ta te c o n tin u e s to o w n P E M E X , C F E (a m a jo r
p o w e r c o m p a n y ), a n d o t h e r e n te rp ris e s . T h e M e x ic a n
e c o n o m y h a s a ls o se e n t h e g r o w t h o f a g rib u s in e s s in r e c e n t
y e a rs. M e x ic o h a s c o m e to b e m o re in te g r a t e d w i t h th e
g lo b a l e c o n o m y , p a r tic u la r ly t h r o u g h N A F T A (w h ic h
c a m e in to e ffe c t i n 1 994) a im in g to b o ls te r g r o w t h t h r o u g h
in d u s t r ia l e x p o r ts . T h is s tr a te g y h a s p ro d u c e d g a in s ,
th o u g h it h a s a ls o le f t th e c o u n tr y v u ln e r a b le to g lo b a l
e c o n o m ic fo rc e s, in c lu d in g th e p e s o c ris is o f 1 9 9 4 a n d th e
c o u n tr y ’s s e rio u s e x p o s u re to t h e g lo b a l e c o n o m ic c risis
b e g in n i n g in 2 0 0 8 .
CASESTUDIES
The Mexican State and Rule of Law CHAPTER 3, PAGE 56
As discussed in chapter 3, one of the dis
tinguishing features of modern states (in
addition to their relative autonomy, bureau
cratic mode of organization, and so forth)
is that they have established the rule of law.
This means that, at least ideal-typically, a
fully functioning modern state (1) has
a legal-rational framework for resolving
conflict; (2) enforces that framework trans
parently; and (3) enforces it equally, rather
than privileging one or another set of
actors based on network ties or some
other sort of affiliation.
The Mexican state has done this at
various times in its history with varying
degrees of success. As Morner (1993: 6)
notes, the state was relatively weak after
independence and then grew in strength
during the Porfiriato, entering a period of
weakness during the revolution and its
immediate aftermath before gaining ca
pacity again in the middle of the twenti
eth century. In very recent years there has
been a great deal of concern in Mexico
and abroad, particularly in the United
States, about increasing levels of violence,
drug trafficking, ongoing corruption, and
the seeming inability or unwillingness of
components of the Mexican state (army,
police, and the judicial system) to curb
criminal activity. Some areas of Mexico, it
is alleged, largely lie outside of the state’s
real jurisdiction. In some towns in parts of
the country, drug gangs essentially exer
cise state-like functions, resolving disputes
and maintaining order of a certain sort.
How could we explain the presence
and influence of powerful criminal organi
zations that make a mockery of the state’s
‘monopoly on the legitimate use of
force”? Several basic factors are likely deci
sive. First, there must be gains to be made
above those made in licit activity for an
important segment of people. Otherwise,
there would be little incentive to engage
in illicit activity. This would suggest that
continued economic development would
help to reduce organized, nonstate vio
lence (of course, organized nonstate vio
lence makes economic development
more difficult to achieve). Second, the
risks must not be so high as to discourage
a large number of criminals from partici
pating in illicit activity. In contemporary
Mexico, as in many parts of the develop
ing world, the risks that state enforcement
poses to criminals is relatively low be
cause of high rates of impunity. The state
cannot or will not enforce the law in cer
tain areas, dramatically reducing the cost
(in terms of risk) for illicit activity. Finally,
illicit groups must have the resources nec
essary to seek their chosen ends, and
these resources can be both material and
organizational. Material resources include
both guns, which in the case of Mexico
are often trafficked from the United
States, where there is little gun control,
and money, again from the United States,
as it is estimated that cross-border drug
trade sends between $15 billion and $25
billion to Mexico each year (O’Neil 2009:
70). Organizational resources include the
ongoing existence of criminal gangs, as
well as their established ties, via corrup
tion, to state actors.
Interestingly, a number of commenta
tors have tied the escalation in Mexican
drug violence to reform. Some of this has
to do with the fact that the PRI historically
sometimes worked with criminal net
works rather than aiming to squash them
(O’Neil 2009:65). Moreover, at lower levels
of the organizational structure of the
state, police corruption was common
under the PRI (Davis 2006), and remains
so. Where and when the PAN came to
Case Studies 505
Rule of Law CHAPTER 3, PAGE 56
hold office, linkages between the PRI and
drug traffickers were broken, producing
non-institutional (and thus often violent)
responses (O’Neil 2009: 65). In essence,
whereas the PRI had allowed the contin
ued existence of illicit organizations but
had co-opted them and used them for
their purposes, after the emergence of
democratic pluralism, these organizations
faced higher risks and thus sought new
techniques to maintain and protect their
autonomy and interests. Exogenous fac
tors were important as well, including U.S.
efforts to restrict the flow of trafficking in
the Caribbean region. If the costs of one
path get too high, traffickers will look for
another path, and trafficking through
Mexico rose dramatically in response to
changing patterns of U.S. enforcement
(O’Neil 2009:66; Davis 2006:62). Of course,
this necessarily bolstered the position of
Mexican illicit organizations. Thus at the
same time, Mexican criminal organiza
tions had greater profits, more autonomy,
and a reason to become more indepen
dent. Then the Mexican government at
tempted to stamp them out. At this point
the organizations had little choice but to
fight back.
It is worth noting that some of the
same commentators have seen link
ages between Mexican democratization
(O’Neil 2009; Davis 2006) and rising crime
in Mexico (this is perhaps not surprising
since reform and democratization have
been so closely linked). Indeed, the rise in
crime witnessed in Latin America from
the 1980s on does roughly mirror the pat
tern of regional democratization. Could it
be, as some authors have asked, that de
mocratization and rule of law don’t always
go hand in hand? Others (Magaloni and
Zepeda 2004) have looked at economic
data, though, and argued that while de
mocratization seems the culprit, its near
simultaneity with rising crime is largely
coincidental, and that the most important
variables associated with rising crime are
income inequality and economic difficul
ties. This is an ongoing debate in the field.
m CA SE STU DYUrn Mexico’s “Perfect Dictatorship” and Its End CHAPTER 7, PAGE 154
In Mexico in 2000, a remarkable thing hap
pened to the Partido Revolucionario Institu
tional (the PRI): It lost. The PRI ruled Mexico
from 1929 to 2000, a period of seventy-one
years that equaled the amount of time the
Communist Party ruled the former Soviet
Union. Throughout that time, the PRI held
elections, and it routinely won them. The
party’s dominance was so complete that a
leading Latin American intellectual, the Pe
ruvian Nobel Prize-winning novelist Mario
Vargas Llosa, called Mexico “The Perfect
Dictatorship.” How did the PRI dominate for
so long, and conversely, why did this finally
come to an end?
The PRI’s electoral invincibility was
built on several pillars, and including both
“carrots” and “sticks.”The “carrots” included
the successful incorporation of many di
verse interest groups into the party’s gov
erning structure; we note this later, in the
box on chapter 11, where we discuss cor
poratism under the PRI. In addition, PRI
rule included many “sticks,” though op
pression was not constant and not always
overt. The most dramatic event came in
1968, when the government cracked
down on student protesters in a plaza in
Mexico City in what came to be known as
the Night of Tlatelolco (Krauze 1997: 717—
726). Official figures at the time were that
four people were killed, but other esti
mates were much higher, ranging as high
as 3,000.
The PRI’s eventual decline was accel
erated by a range of factors and by several
events. In particular, the government’s le
gitimacy suffered when it presided over
major economic turmoil in 1982. In that
year, Mexico hit a debt crisis that left it
unable to pay back foreign debt, and this
signaled the end of the “Mexican Miracle”
of growth that it had achieved for several
decades. During the 1980s, support from
peasants and labor unions began to shift
to opposition parties, including the PRD
and the PAN. Around this time, opposition
parties first built their political base by
winning elections in Mexico’s states and
cities, with numerous governors being
elected from other parties from 1989
through the 1990s. As this happened, it
became costlier and more difficult for the
PRI to rig a national election just as the
506 Mexico
5 Mexico’s “Perfect Dictatorship” and Its End CHAPTER 7, PAGE 154
economic crisis depleted the govern
ment’s resources (Levy and Bruhn 2006).
Even less political events seemed to con
tribute further to the PRI’s decline. A major
earthquake in Mexico City in 1985 was
handled with incompetence by the gov
ernment, yet other non-governmental
organizations responded effectively,
which undermined the PRI’s claim that it
alone was capable of addressing public
needs (Haber 2006:74-76).
The declining legitimacy of the PRI
came to a head when it used less-
As noted previously, Mexico was once
called “The Perfect Dictatorship.” Part of
the reason for this name was the ability of
Mexico’s PRI party to bring major interest
groups under its banner. This included
labor, business, the state bureaucracy, as
well as the peasantry. At the same time, the
PRI successfully marginalized from politics
the military and the church, two other
major forces in Latin America that could
threaten the basis for rule (Stevens 1977:
253). The broad-based form of corporatism
that took in Mexico’s major institutions
made it very difficult for competitors to
defeat the PRI, and the party governed un
interrupted from the 1930s to 2000.
The PRI in Mexico managed the repre
sentation of different interest groups by
incorporating these various forces into
the dominant party’s decision-making
structures. Under most circumstances, it
would be challenging for a single party to
be the party of both labor and business,
than-subtle tactics to win the 1988 presi
dential election. In that year, the party-
controlled electoral council infamously
announced that all of its computers
tragically crashed just when it appeared
the popular opposition candidate Cu
auhtemoc Cardenas of the PRD party
(and son of PRI founder Lazaro Cardenas)
would win the presidential election.
When the computers turned back on, PRI
nominee Carlos Salinas de Gortari mirac
ulously found himself with an insur
mountable lead over Cardenas. The
yet Mexico’s corporatism developed a
symbiotic relationship for the interest
groups and the governing party. The labor
movement was represented mainly by the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM),
which received state sponsorship and
whose leadership maintained close rela
tions with the political leadership of the
PRI. A similar relationship emerged be
tween the PRI and the National Peasant
Confederation (CNC). In the cases of labor
and peasant groups alike, organizations
that joined the government-sponsored
confederation received particular eco
nomic benefits (such as wages or subsi
dies) that unaffiliated groups did not (see
Levy and Bruhn 2006: 73-83). Meanwhile,
business groups were more formally inde
pendent from the PRI, but they received
considerable support from the party in the
form of policies and preferential treatment,
such as subsidies, tax breaks, loans, pro
tections from foreign competition, and
ballots from this 1988 election were later
burned, but the result contributed fur
ther to the collapsing legitimacy of the
party.
The PRI managed to hold on for one
more election in 1994, but lost the presi
dency at last in 2000 (for more detail on
the transition, see the essays in Middle-
brook 2004). It returned to power with
the 2012 election of Enrique Pena Nieto,
but many observers would argue that it
will not (and perhaps does not aim to) re
cover its traditional form of dominance.
pro-business state investment (Levy and
Bruhn 2006:84). In return for this set of poli
cies that favored the broad array of interest
groups, Mexico’s unions and business lead
ers were expected to turn out the vote for
the PRI. This state corporatism worked in
different ways in other countries in Latin
America, as well as in Europe, due to the
long-standing dominant party system.
However, the PRI eventually lost its
control in Mexico. Some of these reasons
were highlighted in the chapter 7 case
study, but an important component of
the end of the dominant party system
was the decline of the PRI’s corporatist
strategy. Over time, pressures on the PRI
increased, partly due to faltering eco
nomic performance, especially after the
debt crisis of the early 1980s. When the
PRI lost its ability to command support
from peasants, laborers, and business, it
lost not just voters but also the institu
tional underpinnings of its rule.
The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico c h a p t e r 11, page 26/
Case Studies 507
The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico
CA SE STU D Y (continued)
CHAPTER 11, PAGE 267
Key moments in Mexico’s political
economy came in the 1970s, when busi
ness groups grew disenchanted with
the increasingly populist strategies em
ployed by presidents Luis Echevarria and
Jose Lopez Portillo from the 1970s to
1982 and based in part on the discovery
of new oil reserves. Increased govern
ment spending and indebtedness re
sulted in a debt crisis in 1982, during
which Mexico devalued the peso and
moved much more toward a neoliberal
economic model emphasizing markets
and free trade. This in turn alienated the
other part of the PRI’s political base—
labor and peasants— and signaled the
beginning of the end of the party’s tradi
tional form of dominance.
Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity
in Mexico CHAPTER 13, PAGE 309
As you saw in chapter 13, one major
theory of nationalism holds that it is a
product of industrial capitalism. Recall
that this theory is functionalist in that it
takes nationalism and national identity to
emerge because industrial capitalism
needs it, or at least needs some functional
equivalent, to do so. The idea here is that
nationalism’s emphasis on equality and
the importance of vernacular language, as
well as the inherent similarity and frater
nity between co-nationals from different
localities, helps to break down barriers to
geographic and social mobility, and that
an industrial economy with its urbaniza
tion, shift to wage labor, and so forth
cannot function if cultural barriers pre
vent it. This argument, as noted in the
chapter, is plausible.
However, when applied to the em
pirical case of Mexico it becomes diffi
cult to sustain. Mexico begins to see at
least some of its residents acquiring
national consciousness in the years after
and around 1810. Even the Plan of Iguala
(1821), in many ways a conservative docu
ment, uses the language of nationalism,
referring to Mexico in several passages as
“La nation.” (The Plan de Iguala is available
online via Rice University.) In short, there is
no doubt that nationalism was present in
the country during the independence
struggles and even a few years before.
This does not mean, by any stretch,
that national identity had established “he
gemony” in Mexico in this period. In other
words, it does not follow from the fact
that official documents used national lan
guage (1) that all Mexicans thought of
themselves as members of the nation or
(2) that those who did all had the same
idea of the nation (Anna 1998). Some
elites in the early independence years
likely continued to try to hold on to the
sort of identity that had predominated in
the colonial period. Many subaltern per
sons likely thought of themselves in terms
of predominantly local identities, though
careful research by historians has shown
that some subaltern actors did quickly
begin to make use of national identities to
make political claims on elites in Latin
America once these became available
(Mallon 1995). In any case, given that
Mexican industrialization does not get
underway in any meaningful sense until
the Porfiriato, it is essentially impossible
to argue that industrial capitalism pre
cedes and therefore causes the spread
of national identity in this case. Some
might argue that an agriculture- and
mining-based commercial capitalism
was tied to the development of national
ism in Mexico, but this is a different argu
ment and would require considerable
evidence.
Does this mean that we should throw
out arguments about industrial capitalism
causing national identity to emerge or that
this case refutes them categorically? Not
necessarily. First of all, Mexico may turn out
to be exceptional in this regard, and a
scholar cannot know until he/she exam
ines other cases. In other words, maybe
industrial capitalism giving rise to national
ism as seen in Ernest Gellner’s theory is a
common path but not the only possible
one. Second, even if industrial capitalism
did not cause national identity’s emer
gence, it still played an important role in
the story of nationalism in Mexico. It’s just
508 Mexico
CA SE STU DY (continued)
# Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity
C H A P T E R 13, PAG E 309
that its main role in this connection comes
later, when nationalism is an important
ideology in the twentieth century, for ex
ample, during the administration of Lazaro
Cardenas. Nationalism is closely linked to
Cardenas’s populist rhetoric and his corpo
ratist mode of interest mediation (see the
preceding case study discussion), which
itself is closely linked to the emergent
Mexico had a complex indigenous popu
lation— indeed, one of the great human
civilizations— prior to European contact.
In subsequent years people of European
descent have on average fared better in
Mexico than persons of indigenous de
scent, even though the majority of the
Mexican population is of mestizo back
ground and the next largest group is of
predominantly Amerindian ancestry.
Given the country’s history of inequality
and ethnic discrimination, why have in
digenous groups not organized via ethnic
political parties in Mexico?
This sort of question cannot be an
swered definitively, because it is asking, in
essence, about a counter-factual. In other
words, logically, the question is indistin
guishable from the question “What would
have caused ethnic political parties to
have formed in Mexico?” The best way
to provisionally answer such a question is
to generate potential causes that plau
sibly would have increased the probabil
ity of the formation of such parties, but
there is clearly no formula such that “if
industrial order (given that urban workers,
along with agricultural workers, are among
the most important corporate groups).
Indeed, populist politicians like Cardenas
(and like Gaitan in Colombia, and, more re
cently, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, at least
until 2005) used nationalism rather than
orthodox Marxism as the language
through which they aimed to mobilize
characteristic X had been present in Mexi
can society, ethnic parties would have
developed.”
What sorts of features might have en
couraged the formation of ethnicity-
based parties in Mexico? Among others,
we might expect (1) salient and imperme
able boundaries between ethnic groups;
(2) the lack of other frameworks for mobi
lization of the subaltern population; and
(3) the opening of political space within
which such parties could form and have
some prospect of electoral success (since,
from certain points of view, party organi
zation is irrational if it cannot lead to in
creasing a group’s power).
Historically, in Mexico, these condi
tions tended not to apply. While in
equality has been a pervasive feature of
Mexican society and while ethnicity
has been a major dimension of inequality,
the boundaries between ethnic groups
have historically been fluid (Camp
2007: 26). The majority of the country, as
noted before, is of mestizo background
(Krauze 1997; Camp 2007:81), which could
both industrial workers and peasants. Pro
ponents of this industrial-capitalism-cen
tered theory of national identity might be
able to reconstruct a more modest version
of the theory by focusing on this later junc
ture. However, in doing so they will be fo
cusing on something causally downstream
from the actual emergence of Mexican
nationalism.
facilitate some freedom in self-identifica
tion. In addition to the fact that the cul
tural boundary between the categories
“indigenous” and “mestizo” is permeable
(as is, to a more limited extent, the bound
ary between “mestizo” and “white”), the
very predominance of mestizos in the so
ciety undercuts the likelihood of a party
linked to mestizo or indigenous identity.
Moreover, other frameworks— frame
works that preclude mobilization around
specific ethnic identities— have been sa
lient in Mexican political history. Mexican
national identity, at least since the early
twentieth century, has been marked by
the idea of ethnic mixing, most notably in
Jose Vasconcelos’s ([1925] 1997) famous
idea of the “cosmic race,” produced by the
mixing of persons of African, indigenous,
and European descent. Mexican immi
grants in the United States will sometimes
use the word “raza” to refer to their iden
tity as Mexican or Chicano/a. In addition
to this sort of national frame, Mexico’s
revolutionary tradition tended to frame
dissent in relation to class. Thus Zapata’s
W hy Aren’t There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico? CHAPTER 14, PAGE 340
Case Studies 509
____
C A SE STU D Y (continued)
W hy Aren’t There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico? CHAPTER 14, PAGE 340
insurgency during the Revolution, which
included many mestizo and indigenous
actors, largely privileged a peasant or
rural laborer identity rather than an indig
enous identity as such. Further, the cor
poratist mode of interest mediation
developed under the PRI (particularly
under Cardenas), likely cut against ethnic
affiliation, because it again organized
people in relation to their economic ac
tivity rather than their ethnic status. Fi
nally, major political ideologies like
Marxism and liberalism tend to oppose
ethnic mobilization: To the extent that
these were historically operative in
Mexico, they likely mitigated any poten
tial for ethnic mobilization via political
parties.
Finally, Mexican parties were estab
lished at certain critical junctures in
which conditions likely did not favor
ethnic mobilization as the basis for party
affiliation. This should be obvious with
respect to the PRI. The other two major
parties (the PRO, a leftist party composed
of a splinter group formerly of the PRI and
a coalition of communists and socialists,
and PAN, which is a center-right party
with affinities for Christian Democratic
parties) did not concentrate supporters
of a particular ethnic group at their
founding or in subsequent history. The
political closure characteristic of Mexico
during the years of the PRI’s dominance
also did little to increase the likelihood of
the establishment of ethnicity-based po
litical parties.
Does this all mean that ethnicity is un
important in Mexican politics? Not at all.
Indigenous communities have mobilized
in numerous ways (Flernandez Navarro
and Carlsen 2004), and it is always pos
sible that more influential ethnic parties
will emerge in the future. Factors that
might contribute to this possibility could
include the much-documented role of
international NGOs in helping to orga
nize ethnicity-based political mobilization,
the modeling effects of such organization
in other parts of Latin America in recent
years, and the ongoing effects of political
opening and democratic consolidation in
Mexico. One might expect this sort of
outcome to be more likely in areas like
Chiapas, where a larger portion of the
population is indigenous; where historical
discrimination, inequality, and poverty
have been especially high; and where the
EZLN (“Zapatista”) insurgency has been
based.
Research Prompts
1. The “Mexican Miracle” was achieved, in part, through policies of
import substitution. In more recent years, the country has taken
a more market-friendly approach. What would our theories of
development from Chapters 4 and 5 say about this sequence?
2. Think about the years of the PRI’s dominance in Mexico. The
regime was clearly authoritarian, but it had some democratic
elements. Flow would you classify it in terms of the ideas of de
mocracy and authoritarianism discussed in chapters 6 and 7? As
you conduct research, what do you find other scholars saying
about this issue?
3. Do a little outside research to compare the development of na
tional identity in Mexico to other cases (good choices for com
parison might be Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela).
What, if anything, is distinctive about the Mexican case?
4. In the preceding case study on “Why Aren’t There Major Ethnic
Parties in Mexico?” you learned that Mexico’s political parties
have not been organized predominantly along the lines of eth
nicity. Do some research and find a Latin American case where
ethnicity has been a key basis of political organizing. What ac
counts for the difference?
D Nigeria
Key Features o f C o n te m p o r a ry Nigeria
Population: 177,155,754 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 923,768 square kilometers
Head of State: Muhammadu Buhari (president,
2015-present)
Head of Government: Muhammadu Buhari (president,
2015-present)
Capital: Abuja
Year of Independence: 1960
Year of Current Constitution: 1999
Languages: English (official), Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo,
many others
GDP per Capita: $3,006 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
Human Development Index
Ranking (2014):
152nd (low human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014.
PROFILE Introduction
Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and
has been subject to enduring interest among
political scientists for several reasons. Of
these, the two most important are that (1) it
is a prominent example of the perils of oil
dependence (Karl 1997) and (2) it has been
the site of considerable inter-ethnic conflict.
Indeed, these issues, discussed herein, are
not unrelated. Also related are the relative
weakness of Nigerian institutions, develop
ment problems the society has faced, and the
lessons that Nigeria might offer about how
political modernization can take place in a
post-colonial society.
Yet Nigeria is much more than this. A
country of great cultural diversity, Nigeria
has provided the world with Nobel laureates
and other artists, writers, and musicians. It
is the largest society in Africa, and many be
lieve that if it can overcome its history of
underdevelopment and ethnic conflict, it
would have great potential. Indeed, though
there are many concerns, the country has
been democratic for well over a decade, a
source of considerable optimism.
I Hausa and Fulani 29%
Yoruba 2 1%
Igbo/Ibo 18%
H Ijaw 10 %
I Kanuri 4%
I Ibibio 3.5%
I T iv 2.5%
Unspecified/other 12 %
Ethnic Groups in Nigeria
Note that the Nigerian population includes hundreds o f ethnic
groups, but these are the most numerous.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Islam 50%
Christianity 40%
Animism/traditional beliefs I
Religious Affiliation in Nigeria (estimates)
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Profile 511
100 A 200 Miles
” N
H B B B M
512 Nigeria
N ig e ria ’s d iv e rs ity e n co m p asse s b o t h re lig io u s a n d e th n ic
d iffere n ce . I n te rm s o f e th n ic ity , th e r e a re m a n y g ro u p s,
t h o u g h t h e m o s t p ro m in e n t are th e H a u s a a n d F u la n i in th e
n o r th a n d t h e Y o ru b a a n d th e Ig b o in th e s o u th . I n re lig io u s
te rm s , t h e so c ie ty is d iv e rs e as w e ll, w i th a b o u t h a l f th e
p o p u la tio n p r a c tic in g Is la m , a b o u t 4 0 p e rc e n t a d h e r in g to
C h r i s t ia n i ty , a n d t h e r e m a in d e r m o s tly p r a c t ic in g t r a d i
tio n a l A f r ic a n re lig io n s.
Historical Development
B e fo re B ritis h c o lo n ia l ru le , N ig e ria h a d a v a r ie ty o f d iffe r
e n t in d ig e n o u s sta te s tru c tu r e s (F a lo la a n d H e a t o n 2 0 0 8 ).
I n n o r t h e r n N ig e ria , w h e re Is la m h a d m a d e its w a y fro m
A ra b ia c en tu rie s earlier, th e re w ere relatively w e ll-e stab lish e d
sta te s. A m o n g th e la rg e p o p u la tio n o f th e H a u s a – F u la n i
e th n ic g ro u p s — w h ic h to d a y a re th e la r g e s t e th n ic g ro u p in
N ig e ria — th e r e w e re r a th e r la rg e a n d m ilita r ily cap a b le
u n i ts . I n th e s o u th , w h e r e th e Y o ru b a a n d I g b o p e o p le s
p r e d o m in a te in t h e s o u th w e s t a n d s o u th e a s t, resp ec tiv e ly ,
p e o p le g e n e ra lly liv e d in sm a lle r p o litic a l g ro u p s su c h as
v illa g e s o r c lu s te rs o f v illa g es.
I n te r a c tio n w ith E u r o p e a n d th e g lo b a l e c o n o m y to o k
sh a p e th r o u g h e a rly e x p lo ra tio n s b y E u ro p e a n s a n d t h e es
ta b lis h m e n t o f th e slave tr a d e a lo n g th e c o a s t o f W e s t
A fric a , in c lu d in g N ig e ria . T h e P o r tu g u e s e w e re th e firs t to
e sta b lish a tr a d in g p o s t in th e la te 1 4 0 0 s, a n d se v e ra l o th e r
c o u n trie s w e re la te r involved a lo n g th e N ig e ria n c oast. A f t e r
e s ta b lis h in g a u th o r ity th r o u g h a c o m b in a tio n o f m ilita r y
in ti m id a tio n a n d b a r g a i n in g w ith lo c a l g ro u p s , E u r o p e a n
p o w e r s e s ta b li s h e d a t r a d e in w h i c h sla v es w e r e t a k e n to
th e A m e ric a s .
T h e B r i ti s h u l ti m a t e ly b e c a m e t h e p r i n c i p a l fo rc e in
N ig e ria w h e n i n t h e 1 8 0 0 s t h e E u r o p e a n p o w e rs u n d e r to o k
w h a t c a m e to b e k n o w n as th e “S c ra m b le fo r A f r ic a .” T h e
sc ra m b le w as la rg e ly a la n d g ra b a n d a g e o p o litic a l c o n te s t
b e tw e e n G r e a t B r i ta i n , F r a n c e , P o r t u g a l , a n d B e lg iu m ,
w h o s ta k e d t h e i r c la im s to d o m in a te m o s t o f th e te r r ito ry
o n t h e c o n tin e n t; G e r m a n y c la im e d s e v e ra l t e r r it o r ie s as
w e ll, a n d S p a in p la y e d a lesse r ro le, w i t h Ita ly s ta k in g
c la im s o n ly in t h e e a rly t w e n ti e th c e n tu ry . T h e se p o w e rs
m e t a t th e B e rlin C o n fe re n c e i n 1 8 8 4 – 1 8 8 5 a n d d iv id e d t h e
c o n tin e n t in to c o lo n ia l sta te s. M a n y o f th e B ritis h c o lo n ie s
w e re in s o u th e r n a n d e a s te rn A f r ic a , b u t N ig e r ia w a s th e
la r g e s t a n d m o s t im p o r t a n t c o lo n y i n w e s te rn A fric a .
O v e r th e c o u rse o f th e la te n in e te e n th a n d e arly t w e n ti
e th c e n tu rie s , B r ita in in c re a s e d th e e x te n t a n d d e p th o f its
c o lo n iz a tio n o f N ig e ria , slow ly a s s e r tin g a u th o r i ty o v e r th e
v a st la n d . T h is h a p p e n e d th r o u g h a c o m b in a tio n o f m ilita r y
s u b ju g a tio n a n d n e g o tia tio n w i t h N ig e r ia n le a d e rs w illin g
to c o lla b o ra te w i t h t h e B ritis h . T h e sy ste m c a m e to b e
k n o w n as i n d ir e c t ru le (F a lo la a n d H e a to n 2 0 0 8 : 1 1 0 -1 1 6 ;
L a n g e 2 0 0 9 ; D o r w a r d 1986: 4 0 2 – 4 0 4 ) , b e c a u se th e B ritis h
d id n o t s e n d la rg e n u m b e rs o f forces to o c c u p y N ig e ria , b u t
r a th e r s o u g h t t o e x e rt a u th o r ity b y u s in g in d ig e n o u s le a d e rs
as in te r m e d ia r ie s w i t h lo c a l p o p u la tio n s ; in a p e rv e rsio n o f
in d ig e n o u s A f r ic a n fo rm s o f ru le , th is o fte n in v o lv e d th e
a p p o in tm e n t o f v illa g e c h ie fs a n d o th e r c u s to m a ry lea d ers
b y t h e B ritis h a d m in is tr a tiv e a u th o ritie s . T h e sy s te m se rv ed
th e in te re s ts o f t h e c o lo n iz e rs, b u t i t s e t th e to n e fo r a lo n g
r u n o f u n a c c o u n ta b le g o v e rn m e n t acro ss m u c h o f A f r ic a
(cf. M a m d a n i 1996). B y t h e tim e o f t h e F i r s t W o r ld W a r,
th e C o m m is s io n e r F re d e ric k L u g a r d h a d e s ta b lis h e d a
f o rm o f in d ir e c t r u le o ver n e a rly a ll o f p re s e n t-d a y N ig e ria .
H e u n if ie d th e n o r t h e r n a n d s o u th e r n c o lo n ie s i n to a sin g le
p o litic a l u n i t, w h ic h f o rm e d th e b a sis fo r to d a y ’s n a ti o n
s ta te , w i t h its la rg e size a n d its c o n flic ts b e tw e e n re g io n s.
A s W o r ld W a r I I c a m e to a n e n d , t h e E u r o p e a n p o w e rs
h a d i n c r e a s in g d if f ic u lty j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r c o lo n i z a t io n in
m o r a l, e c o n o m ic , o r p o l it i c a l t e r m s . N a t io n a l is ts g a in e d
i n p r o m in e n c e i n m o s t o f t h e c o lo n ie s (see d is c u s s io n in
W il lia m s 1 9 8 4 a n d F a lo la a n d H e a t o n 2 0 0 8 : 1 3 6 -1 5 7 ),
e m p o w e re d in p a r t b y th e i r le a r n in g s in E u r o p e a n d th e
in c re a s in g r e c o g n itio n o f t h e c o n trib u tio n s A fric a n s h a d
m a d e i n t h e w a r. O n e o f N ig e ria ’s le a d in g n a tio n a lis ts w as
N n a m d i A z ik iw e , w h o s e w r itin g s firs t b e c a m e k n o w n in
th e 1 9 3 0 s. B y th e 1 950s, it w a s c le a r t h a t c o lo n ia lis m in
A f r i c a w a s o n its la s t legs.
N ig e r ia a c h ie v e d in d e p e n d e n c e fro m G r e a t B r ita in in
1 960, a lo n g s id e m a n y n e ig h b o r in g c o u n trie s w h o a ch ie v e d
in d e p e n d e n c e fro m F ra n c e t h a t sa m e year. I t re m a in e d a
d o m in io n o f t h e U n i te d K in g d o m u n t il 1 963, m e a n in g it
r e m a in e d p a r t o f th e B ritis h C o m m o n w e a lth a n d n o m i
n a lly c o n s id e re d th e B ritis h m o n a r c h as a c e re m o n ia l h e a d
o f sta te w h ile r e ta in in g p o litic a l in d e p e n d e n c e a n d self-
ru le . T h e firs t p o s t-in d e p e n d e n c e g o v e rn m e n t fo llo w e d a
B r itis h -s ty le p a r lia m e n ta r y sy s te m , b u t N ig e ria b e c a m e a
fe d e ra l re p u b lic in 1963, w i t h th e a fo re m e n tio n e d N n a m d i
A z ik iw e as p re s id e n t. T h e p rin c ip le o f fe d e ra lis m w a s i n s ti
tu te d , a n d t h e g o v e r n in g sy s te m d iv id e d p o w e r b e tw e e n
t h e th r e e re g io n s o f N ig e ria : th e N o r t h e r n re g io n , a n d th e
■ B K |g H j
Profile 513
Historical Development
T i m e l i n e
1500s-1800s Period of slave trade along the coast of West Africa,
including Nigeria; slaves are taken to the Americas.
1995 Abacha regime executes political activist and
author Ken Saro-Wiwa.
1800s- Period of initial establishment of British colonies in
present-day Nigeria; Sokoto Caliphate governs
many of the Hausa-Fulani groups in the north;
1998 Abacha dies suddenly in office, followed soon after
by the sudden and suspicious death of civilian rival
Moshood Abiola.
smaller groups govern among Yoruba, Igbo, other 1999 Nigeria returns to civilian rule under former general
groups in the south. Olusegun Obasanjo.
1850S-1900 Increasing colonization of Nigeria by Great Britain 2003 Obasanjo is reelected for a second term.
1900-1919 Era of Lord Frederick Lugard, British administrator
who establishes indirect rule using traditional
2007 Umaru Yar’Adua is elected president but is in grave
health for most of his presidency.
authorities as intermediaries, and unifies colonies 2008-2011 Tensions worsen between northern Muslims and
of Nigeria southern Christians.
1960 independence from Great Britain 2010 As many as one thousand people are killed in
1966 Military coup overthrows civilian government. clashes between Christians and Muslims in the city
1966-1975 Presidency of military leader Yakubu Gowon of Jos and elsewhere in central Nigeria.
1967-1970 Biafra War 2010 Yar’Adua dies of natural causes; Vice President
1976 Assassination of military leader Murtala Goodluck Jonathan becomes president.
Mohammed (president, 1975-1976) 2011 Goodluck Jonathan is elected to full presidential
1979 Military leader Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979) term.
turns power over to civilian Shehu Shagari. 2011-2015 Increased terrorist activity by Islamist extremist
1983 Military takes control again under
Gen. Muhammadu Buhari.
group Boko Haram, including deadly bombing
of a UN compound in Abuja, kidnapping of
1985-1993 Presidency of military leader Ibrahim Babangida;
human rights abuses worsen.
schoolgirls, and massacres in several towns across
northern Nigeria.
1993 Military holds elections, but annuls them after
apparent victory of businessman Moshood Abiola.
2015 Muhammadu Buhari, a former military dictator, is
elected president, defeating incumbent Goodluck
1993-1998 Presidency of Gen. Sani Abacha; corruption and
human rights abuses reach their worst levels, with
regular torture and execution of dissidents.
Jonathan.
W e s te r n a n d E a s te r n re g io n s in th e s o u th e r n h a l f o f th e
co u n try .
E th n i c a n d r e g io n a l te n s io n s e m e rg e d e a rly o n , as th e
p o p u lo u s n o r t h c a m e to d o m in a te th e p a r lia m e n t in v o te
sp lit a lm o s t p u re ly a lo n g r e g io n a l a n d e th n i c lin e s , a n d th is
re s u lte d i n a c o u p b y e le m e n ts o f t h e m ili ta r y fro m th e Ig b o
e th n i c ity i n t h e E a s te r n re g io n . T h e co u p c a m e t o b e k n o w n
as t h e “Ig b o c o u p .” T h is c h a r a c te riz a tio n h a s b e e n d is p u te d ,
b u t th e n a m e s tu c k a n d sig n a le d t h e in c re a s in g a lie n a tio n
o f th e Ig b o fro m th e n o r t h e r n H a u s a – F u l a n i as w e ll as th e
w e ste rn Y oruba. T h o u g h th e e v e n tu a l m ilita ry leader c h o se n
as p re s id e n t, Y a k u b u G o w o n , w a s fro m c e n tr a l N ig e r ia a n d
w a s se e n as a c o m p ro m is e se le c tio n , th e te n s io n s b e tw e e n
Ig b o s a n d o th e r g ro u p s w o rs e n e d .
I n 1967, t h e N ig e ria n C iv il W a r (also k n o w n as th e B iafra
W a r ) b ro k e o u t, p i t t i n g t h e E a s te r n r e g io n a n d its Ig b o
m a jo rity a g a in s t t h e fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t (F a lo la a n d H e a to n
2 0 0 8 : 1 7 5 -1 8 0 ). T h e c o n flic t w as over au to n o m y , w i th th e
Ig b o se e k in g to e sta b lish t h e in d e p e n d e n t sta te o f B iafra , b u t
th e h o s tility w a s lu b ric a te d b y o il. M u c h o f N ig e ria ’s o il is
fo u n d in th e so u th e a s t, a n d th e Ig b o in th e re g io n a rg u e d
th a t m o re o f th e re so u rce sh o u ld b e tu r n e d in to lo ca l devel
o p m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n b e in g r e d is t r i b u t e d to o t h e r p a r ts o f
N i g e r ia . T h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t, m e a n w h i le , w a n te d to
re ta in th e u n io n b u t a lso th e re so u rce s t h a t o il g u a ra n te e d .
A f t e r th r e e y e ars o f b lo o d y c o n flic t in w h ic h o v e r o n e m illio n
p e o p le d ie d — m o s tly o n th e Ig b o side— th e fe d era l g o v e rn
m e n t w o n th e w a r, a n d N ig e ria r e m a in e d a single c ountry.
514 Nigeria
T h e 1970s saw a n o th e r su c c essio n o f m ili ta r y ru le rs ,
w i th p o w e r p a s s in g to p re s id e n ts M u r t a l a M o h a m m e d (a
n o rth e rn e r), w h o w a s a ssa ss in a te d , a n d t h e n O lu s e g u n
O b a s a n jo (a s o u th w e s te rn Y oruba). O b a s a n jo u ltim a te ly
p ro p o s e d fre e e le c tio n s a n d th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a n e w re
p u b lic , a n d t u r n e d p o w e r o v e r to c iv ilia n le a d e r S h e h u
S h a g a ri, a n o r t h e r n M u s lim . S h a g a ri a n d t h e re p u b lic d id
n o t see o u t th e i r te rm , h o w e v er, as th e m il ita r y se iz e d c o n
tr o l a g a in u n d e r G e n e r a l M u h a m m a d u B u h a ri, c itin g ex
ten siv e c o r ru p tio n a n d fra u d u n d e r S h a g a ri. M i l it a r y ru le
c o n tin u e d u n d e r P re s id e n t I b r a h im B a b a n g id a , w h o ru le d
fro m 1985 to 1 993, b u t g o v e rn in g c o n d itio n s d i d n o t im
prove. I n p a r tic u la r , c o rru p tio n c o n tin u e d u n a b a te d d e sp ite
th e im p r is o n m e n t o f se v e ra l h i g h – r a n k in g officials a n d th e
e x e c u tio n o f v io le n t c rim in a ls . W h i l e B a b a n g id a w a s in i
tia lly p o p u la r, h e c a m e u n d e r p re s s u re to r e d e m o c ra tiz e as
a w ave o f d e m o c ra c y sw e p t acro ss A f r ic a i n t h e e a rly 1 990s.
T h e m ilita r y h e ld ele ctio n s in 1993, b u t w h e n p ro m in e n t
b u sin e ssm a n C h i e f M o s h o o d A b io la lo o k e d to b e th e v ictor,
th e m ilita ry a n n u lle d th e results. T h is p a v ed th e w a y fo r th e
p re sid en c y o f m ilita ry G e n e ra l S a n i A b a c h a (for a n o v erview
o f th is p e rio d , see F alola a n d H e a to n 2 0 0 8 : 2 2 9 -2 3 4 ), w h o
e a rn e d th e d u b io u s d is tin c tio n o f b e in g th e w o rs t d ic ta to r in
N ig e ria ’s le s s -th a n -p ro u d h is to ry o f c o r ru p t a n d a u th o rita r
ia n p re sid e n ts. C o r r u p tio n a n d h u m a n rig h ts abuses re a c h e d
th e ir w o rs t levels u n d e r A b a c h a . T he re g im e s to o d a ccused o f
e n g a g in g in to r tu r e o n a re g u la r basis. I t also e x ec u te d dissi
d e n ts, m o s t n o ta b ly th e a u th o r K e n S a ro -W iw a a n d h is col
lea g u es, w h o h a d b e co m e p ro m in e n t p o litic a l activ ists o f th e
M o v e m e n t fo r t h e S u rv iv a l o f th e O g o n i P e o p le, a n e n v iro n
m e n ta l m o v e m e n t d e c la im in g th e d e g ra d a tio n o f air, w ater,
a n d la n d in N ig e ria ’s o il-ric h N ig e r D e lta . D u r i n g h is re ig n ,
A b a c h a a n d h is fa m ily w e re r u m o re d to have a c c u m u la te d
several b illio n d o lla rs in assets, th o u g h t h e e x ac t a m o u n t
sq u irre le d aw ay overseas h a s n o t b e e n d e te rm in e d . I n 1998,
A b a c h a ’s ru le c am e to a su d d e n e n d w h e n h e d ie d in office.
R u m o rs soon e m e rg e d t h a t h e w a s p o iso n e d ; th e r u m o r
g a in e d in p o p u la rity w h e n h is d e a th w a s so o n fo llo w ed by
th e su d d e n a n d suspicious d e a th o f C h i e f M o s h o o d A b io la,
th e p re su m p tiv e w in n e r o f th e 1993 e lections.
A f t e r A b a c h a , a tr a n s itio n a l m ilita r y g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r
G e n e r a l A b d u ls a la m i A b u b a k a r m o v e d to d r a f t a n e w c o n
s t itu tio n , e sta b lis h a n e w re p u b lic , a n d r e tu r n N ig e r ia to
c iv ilia n r u le b y 1999. I n e le c tio n s t h a t y e ar, fo rm e r g e n e ra l
a n d o n e – tim e m ilita r y p r e s id e n t O lu s e g u n O b a s a n jo w o n
th e p re sid e n c y h a n d ily . T h is C h r is tia n s o u th e r n e r se le c te d
a M u s lim n o r th e r n e r as v ice p re s id e n t a n d g o v e rn e d a t th e
h e a d o f th e P e o p le ’s D e m o c r a tic P a r ty ( P D P ) , w h ic h
c ra f te d a c ro s s – e th n ic c o a litio n . O b a s a n jo re m a in e d re la
tiv e ly p o p u la r in N ig e ria ’s c h a lle n g in g p o litic a l e n v iro n
m e n t a n d w a s r e e le c te d fo r a se c o n d t e r m in 2 0 0 3 . H e t h e n
c e d e d p o w e r in 2 0 0 7 to a n o th e r P D P p re s id e n t, th e M u s lim
n o r th e r n e r U m a r u Y a r’A d u a . Y a r’A d u a w as ill fo r m o s t o f
h is p re sid e n c y , a n d a u th o r ity w a s la rg e ly e x erc ised b y V ice
P re s id e n t G o o d lu c k J o n a th a n a f te r 2 0 0 9 . I n 2 0 1 0 , Y a r’A d u a
d ie d a n d J o n a t h a n b e c a m e p re s id e n t; h e la te r w o n a fu ll
t e r m o f office r u n n i n g as a n in c u m b e n t in 2 0 1 1 .
O n e p o litic a l c h a lle n g e t h a t e m e rg e d is th e fa ct t h a t J o n
a th a n is a s o u th e rn e r. T h is h a s le d som e n o rth e rn e rs to o b jec t
th a t t h e s o u th h a d tw o t u r n s a t h a v in g re c e n t p re sid e n ts,
w ith O b a s a n jo a n d J o n a th a n , w h ile th e n o r th h a d o n ly o ne
p re s id e n t in Y ar’A d u a , a n d t h a t fo r less th a n o ne te rm . T h is is
se e n b y so m e as b re a k in g a n u n w r itte n ru le t h a t p o w e r
sh o u ld b e sy ste m a tic a lly a lte rn a te d b e tw e e n n o r th a n d so u th
to e n su re stability. I n th is te n s e issue, it sh o u ld b e n o te d t h a t
J o n a th a n is a m e m b e r o f th e Ijaw e th n ic g ro u p , a n d n o t o f th e
m o re n u m e ro u s Y o ru b a o r I g b o g ro u p s.
E th n i c a n d r e g io n a l te n s io n s h a v e c o m e to th e fore
a g a in in r e c e n t y e ars in N ig e ria w i t h a s tr in g o f c la sh e s b e
tw e e n C h r is tia n s a n d M u s lim s a n d w i t h th e e m e rg e n c e o f
I s la m is t f u n d a m e n ta lis t g ro u p s. M u c h o f t h e v io le n c e h as
o c c u rre d a lo n g th e c e n tr a l b e lt o f N ig e ria , a lo n g th e fa u lt
lin e b e tw e e n th e M u s lim – d o m in a te d n o r t h a n d th e C h r i s
t ia n – d o m in a te d s o u th . I n c e n tr a l s ta te s su c h as P la te a u a n d
B a u c h i, m o re t h a n o n e th o u s a n d p e o p le w e re k ille d
in c la sh e s in 2 0 1 0 . T h e c ity o f Jo s , c a p ita l o f P la te a u S ta te ,
h a s b e e n th e b ig g e s t fla s h -p o in t, b u t k illin g s have h a p
p e n e d in o t h e r c itie s, to w n s , a n d v illa g e s . O v e r th e s e sam e
y e a rs, th e Is la m is t e x tre m is t g ro u p B o k o H a r a m h a s
e m e rg e d as a s ig n ific a n t t h r e a t to sta b ility , h a v in g c o o rd i
n a te d a n d le d d e a d ly b o m b in g s a n d a tta c k s o f m a rk e ts ,
p o lic e sta tio n s , p o llin g sta tio n s , a n d in te r n a t io n a l a g en c ie s
in c itie s s u c h as B a u c h i a n d th e c a p ita l A b u ja , ov er re c e n t
y e a rs k ill i n g th o u s a n d s o f p e o p le a n d b e c o m in g in te r n a
tio n a lly n o to rio u s fo r its m ass a b d u c tio n o f sc h o o lg irls in
2 0 1 4 . T h e g ro u p calls fo r s tr ic te r e n fo rc e m e n t o f Isla m ic
S h a ria la w in N ig e ria , w h e re i t is a p p lie d to so m e e x te n t in
th e n o r t h e r n sta te s, a n d fo r th e o u tr ig h t re je c tio n o f m o d e rn
e d u c a tio n , a n d h a s c la im e d a n a ffilia tio n w ith IS IS .
N ig e ria ’s h is to r y th u s in c lu d e s l o n g – s ta n d in g te n s io n s
b e tw e e n e th n o – r e g io n a l g ro u p s , w ith re lig io n o v e rla p p in g
th is c o n flic t. I t a lso in c lu d e s a lo n g h is to r y o f c o r ru p t, in e f
fic ie n t, a n d in e ffe c tiv e g o v e rn m e n t, t h o u g h m o s t in d ic a
tio n s a re t h a t t h is h a s slow ly im p ro v e d in th e n e w re p u b lic
sin c e 1999. T h e c o n tin u a tio n o f th e s e tw o b a sic issues
sh a p e s m u c h o f th e re s t o f N ig e ria ’s p o litic s .
Profile 515
Regime and Political Institutions
A c c o rd in g to its c o n s titu tio n , N ig e r ia n o w fo llo w s th e p o li
c y m a k in g p ro c e ss e s t h a t e x is t in m a n y o th e r p re s id e n tia l
sy ste m s, a n d th e sy ste m s h o u ld s o u n d f a m ilia r to s tu d e n ts
w h o a re k n o w le d g e a b le a b o u t A m e r ic a n la w m a k in g . T h e
le g is la tu re p a sse s b ills t h r o u g h b o th h o u s e s — th e N a tio n a l
A s se m b ly a n d th e S e n a te — a n d t h e p re s id e n t sig n s th e b ill
i n to la w o r v e to e s it. I n t h e c a s e o f a v e to , t h e N a t io n a l
A s s e m b ly c a n o v e rrid e th e p r e s id e n t b y a v o te o f tw o – th ir d s
in b o t h c h a m b e rs . L a w s a re su b je c t to c o n s t itu tio n a l re v ie w
b y t h e i n d e p e n d e n t S u p re m e C o u r t . A n d , as a fe d e ra tio n ,
N i g e r ia h a s s t a te s t h a t e x e rc is e c o n s id e r a b le a u t h o r i t y as
w e ll, in a w a y t h a t is s e m i- a u to n o m o u s f r o m t h e c e n t r a l
g o v e rn m e n t.
Regime and Political Institutions
Regime Federal republic, democratically elected since 1999
Administrative Divisions Thirty-six states + Federal Capital Territory (Abuja)
Executive Branch President
Selection of Executive Direct election by national popular vote; runoff among top two candidates if none secures
50 percent in first round; to win in first round, candidate must also secure at least 25 percent
of the vote in at least two-thirds of the states.
Legislative Branch Bicameral
Lower chamber: House of Representatives
Upper chamber: Senate
Judicial Branch Supreme Court, appointed by president, confirmed by Senate
Political Party System Multiparty, but with leading/dominant party
Dominant party: People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
H o w e v e r, th e r e are tw o fe a tu re s o f N ig e r ia n p o litic s
t h a t d ra w th e a tte n tio n o f m o s t o u ts id e o b se rv e rs a n d t h a t
a ffe c t t h e m a k in g o f la w a n d policy. O n e is th e p e rv asiv e
c o rru p tio n in th e sy ste m , w h ic h h a s fa m o u s ly in v o lv e d
b rib e s to la w m a k e rs a n d t h e f t o f sta te asse ts b y p o litic a l
elites. P o litic ia n s h a v e lo n g re c e iv e d “k ic k b a c k s ” o n c o n
tra c ts a n d s h a re d in th e p ro fits o f c o m p a n ie s t h a t receive
g o v e rn m e n t favors. T h is is i n s tr u m e n t a l in la w m a k in g a n d
is p a r t o f th e “p ro c ess.” T h is h a s h a p p e n e d u n d e r b o t h c iv il
ia n a n d m ilita r y re g im e s . T h e se c o n d issu e o f n o te is th e
role o f e th n ic it y a n d p o te n ti a l e th n ic c o n flic t. O n o n e h a n d ,
c o n c e rn s a b o u t e th n ic ity h a v e le d n a tio n a l d e c is io n -m a k e rs
to “b a la n c e ” c e r ta in d e c isio n s a n d t r y t o in c o rp o ra te d iffer
e n t r e g io n a l g ro u p s in to d e c isio n m a k in g , fo r in s ta n c e
th r o u g h th e s tr u c tu r e o f th e le a d in g P e o p le ’s D e m o c ra tic
P a rty . O n th e o t h e r h a n d , e t h n i c ity a n d k in s h ip also re la te
to th e issu e o f u se o f s ta te re so u rc e s fo r p e r s o n a l g a in . P o
litic a l e lites a re e x p e c te d to b r i n g “r e n ts ” h o m e to “t h e ir
p e o p le .” A c o m m o n v ie w h a s b e e n t h a t a n e th n ic g ro u p
h a v in g a p r o m in e n t r e p re s e n ta tiv e i n office m e a n s a c h a n c e
to “e a t” (o r “c h o p ” in N ig e r ia n p a rla n c e ) fro m th e n a tio n a l
p la te .
Political Culture
F o r m a n y o b se rv e rs , t h e w a tc h w o rd fo r N ig e ria ’s p o litic a l
c u ltu r e h a s b e e n corruption. T h e c o u n tr y r o u tin e ly a p p e a rs
a m o n g t h e w o rs t o n lis ts b y T ra n s p a r e n c y I n t e r n a tio n a l
w h e n it r a n k s t h e m o s t c o r ru p t c o u n trie s o n e a r th . P o litic s
h a s b e e n p la g u e d b y c o r ru p tio n fo r d e c a d e s , u n d e r m ilita r y
a n d c iv ilia n re g im e s a lik e . T h e p h e n o m e n o n re a c h e s fro m
re la tiv e ly lo w -le v e l p u b lic s e rv a n ts , s u c h as tra ffic p o lic e
w h o s to p c a rs o n tr u m p e d – u p c h a rg e s lo o k in g fo r a sm all
b rib e , to p re s id e n ts a n d o th e r to p officials. F o rm e r p re s i
d e n t S a n i A b a c h a , a m ilita r y le a d e r, w as r u m o r e d to have
se v e ra l b illio n d o lla rs s ta s h e d aw ay in in te r n a tio n a l b a n k
a c c o u n ts fro m h is f o u r y e ars in office w h e n h e d ie d su d
d e n ly in 1998.
T h e issu e o f c o r ru p tio n is lin k e d to th e d is tr ib u tio n o f
spoils to d iffe re n t g ro u p s. G r o u p s o f p e o p le in N ig e ria
o f te n v ie w e le c te d re p re se n ta tiv e s fro m t h e ir g ro u p as b e in g
re sp o n sib le fo r p r o v id in g fo r a n “e x te n d e d fa m ily ,” a n d a
w h o le e th n ic g ro u p c a n s o m e tim e s b e se e n as j u s t su c h a n
e x te n d e d fam ily. A s t h e sa y in g g o e s in w e s t A fric a , w h e n a
g ro u p h a s e le c te d o n e o f its o w n as a p r o m in e n t p u b lic
fig u re , t h e n “zY is our turn to chop” w h e re , as n o te d b e fo re , to
“c h o p ” m e a n s to eat. A s im ila r p ro v e rb is t h a t a “g o a t e ats
w h e re i t is t e th e re d ,” w h ic h m e a n s t h a t p e o p le w ill m a k e
th e b e s t fo r th e m se lv e s o u t o f w h a te v e r re so u rc e s th e y c a n
re a c h ; b y e x te n sio n , th o s e w o rk in g in s id e th e sta te w ill u se
th e sta te fo r th e b e n e fit o f th e m se lv e s o r t h e ir e x te n d e d
fa m ilie s. P r o m i n e n t b o o k s in th e 1 9 9 0 s h e ld t h a t “A fric a
w o rk s” in its o w n w a y fo r th o s e lin k e d to p o w e r a n d t h a t a
c o m m o n a p p ro a c h is th e “p o litic s o f th e b e lly ” (B a y a rt
1993). T h is d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t N ig e r ia n (o r A fric a n ) c iti
z e n s a p p ro v e o f c o r ru p tio n a n d im p u n ity . R a th e r, i t is to say
t h a t th e c o m p le x p a tr o n – c l i e n t sy ste m s in v o lv e b ro a d e r
c o m m u n itie s t h a n j u s t a h a n d f u l o f c o r ru p t elites.
W h il e c o rru p tio n h a s b e e n a n e n d u r in g p ro b le m , th is
d o e s n o t c a p tu re a ll o f N ig e r ia n p o litic a l life. N ig e ria fea
tu r e s a g r e a t d e a l o f m o b iliz a tio n , a n d th e c itiz e n r y has
o f te n ta k e n o n t h e c e n tr a l g o v e rn m e n t i n v a rio u s w ays. T h e
c o u n tr y w itn e s s e d sig n ific a n t m o v e m e n ts fo r a u to n o m y in
t h e 1 9 9 0 s, n o t to m e n tio n a m a jo r c iv il w a r i n th e 196 0 s
516 Nigeria
Political Economy
N ig e ria h a s a lo w average in c o m e c o m p a re d to m a n y o f th e
c o u n trie s p ro file d in th is b o o k . Y et t h e c o u n tr y is a n e c o
n o m ic g i a n t b y A f r ic a n s ta n d a rd s , d u e to its larg e p o p u la
tio n a n d a p e tro le u m in d u s tr y t h a t is th e so u rc e o f m u c h o f
th e n a tio n ’s revenue. N e w estim a te s su g g est i t is th e larg e st
e conom y in A fric a s o u th o f th e S a h a ra , s u rp a s s in g S o u th
A fric a . N ig e ria is th u s seen as a p a rtic u la rly im p o r ta n t c o u n
tr y in su b -S a h a ra n A fric a , b u t it is a lso seen as re p re se n ta tiv e
o f th e c o n tin e n t w it h its p o v e rty a n d o th e r c h allen g e s.
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t sin g le se c to r in N ig e r ia ’s e c o n o m y is
p e tro le u m e x tra c tio n . O i l re v en u e s a c c o u n t fo r o v e r 90 p e r
c e n t o f e x p o r t e a rn in g s a n d o v e r t h r e e – f o u r th s o f t h e g o v
e r n m e n t’s re v en u e s. T h is a ffe c ts in c o m e s a n d taxes: T he
ov er r e g io n a l a u to n o m y . M a n y m o v e m e n ts h a v e e m e rg e d i n
th e N ig e r D e lta , t h e lo cu s o f m u c h o f N ig e ria ’s o il t h a t is
a lso o n e o f th e p o o re s t a n d m o s t p o llu te d re g io n s o f th e
c o u n try . R e sista n c e th e r e h a s ra n g e d fro m n o n -v io le n t c iti
z e n s ’ p ro te s ts to th e e m e rg e n c e o f a r m e d s e p a ra tis t g ro u p s,
as w e ll as c r im in a l g a n g s s e e k in g p ro fit fro m k id n a p p in g s
o r b a n d itry .
W h i l e th e r e a re c e r ta in “N ig e r ia n ” p o litic a l c h a ra c te ris
tic s, th e r e a re also m a n y d iffe re n t N ig e ria s , a n d th e c o u n tr y
is n o t a c o n flic t-rid d e n d e n o f th ie v e s. T h e re a re a t le a st
th r e e k in d s o f v a ria tio n h e re . T h e firs t is acro ss d iffe re n t
in s tit u t io n s , so m e o f w h ic h h a v e r e p u ta tio n s fo r w o rk in g
q u ite effectively. T h e S u p re m e C o u r t, fo r in s ta n c e , is re la
tiv e ly in d e p e n d e n t a n d re p u ta b le (S u b e ru 2 0 0 8 ). S o to o is
t h e n e w e le c to ra l c o m m is s io n t h a t w as re sp o n sib le fo r
h o ld in g fre e a n d f a ir e le c tio n s in 2 0 1 0 , in a c o u n tr y w h e re
d o in g so is v e ry c h a lle n g in g . T h is c o n tra s ts w i t h th e w o rse
tr a c k re c o rd s o f m a n y e le c te d officials a n d o t h e r i n s t it u
tio n s . T h e se c o n d v a ria tio n is acro ss d iffe re n t sta te s, som e
o f w h ic h h a v e d e v e lo p e d r e p u ta tio n s fo r e ffective g o v e r
n a n c e , o f te n u n d e r e sp e c ia lly d y n a m ic g o v e rn o rs . T h is h a s
b e e n p a r ti c u l a r ly c o n s p ic u o u s m o s t r e c e n tly in L a g o s
S ta te , w h e r e th e c o u n tr y ’s l a r g e s t c ity (L a g o s ) is lo c a te d .
T e n s io n a n d c o n flic t a lso d iffe r b y s ta te , b e in g h ig h e r in
t h e c e n t r a l – n o r t h o f th e c o u n try , a lo n g t h e fa u lt lin e b e
tw e e n C h r is tia n s a n d M u s lim p o p u la tio n s , a n d in th e N ig e r
D e lta . T h e fin a l v a r ia tio n is c h a n g e o v e r tim e . T h e re are
so m e in d ic a to r s t h a t c o r ru p t io n in N ig e r ia is re c e d in g ev er
so s lig h tly , w h ile e t h n i c a n d r e lig io u s v io le n c e m a y b e
w o r s e n in g o n c e a g a in . N ig e r ia ’s p o litic s is n e v e r sta tic , b u t
alw ay s s h iftin g .
c o u n tr y b rin g s in la rg e a m o u n ts o f m o n e y a n d re lie s o n
n a tu r a l re so u rc e s r a th e r t h a n b r o a d -b a s e d ta x e s to s u p p o rt
g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d in g . O i l s h a p e s t h e c o u n tr y ’s p a t t e r n s
o f e c o n o m ic g r o w th a n d in e q u a lity . I n te rm s o f e c o n o m ic
g r o w t h , th e c o u n tr y ’s p e rfo rm a n c e d e p e n d s in p a r t o n th e
in te r n a ti o n a l p ric e fo r o il, t h o u g h N ig e ria ’s d y s fu n c tio n a l
p o litic a l e c o n o m y h a s re p e a te d ly re s u lte d i n t h e s q u a n d e r
in g o f re v e n u e s w h e n th e p ric e fo r N ig e ria ’s m a in e x p o r t is
h ig h . T h e s q u a n d e rin g o f re so u rc e s lin k s to th e fa c t t h a t oil
re v en u e s a re d is tr ib u te d i n v e ry u n e q u a l a n d in e q u ita b le
fa sh io n . O il- p r o d u c in g re g io n s are so m e o f t h e p o o r e s t in
N ig e ria , w h ic h h a s le d to c o n flic ts a n d d e m a n d s fo r a u to n
o m y (as th e b o x e s i n th is c h a p te r n o te). A p a r t f ro m re g io n a l
Case Studies 517
d iffere n ce s, p e rh a p s th e m o s t s tr ik in g in e q u a litie s a re b e
tw e e n th o s e in d iv id u a ls w h o are l in k e d to th e sta te p a tr o n
a ge n e tw o r k a n d t h o s e w h o a re n o t. S ta te e lite s have
s ip h o n e d o f f a la rg e p r o p o r t io n o f n a tio n a l re v e n u e s fo r d e
c ad e s, w it h to p e lites s o c k in g aw ay m illio n s o f d o lla rs w h ile
a la rg e n u m b e r o f N ig e ria n s live o n less t h a n a d o lla r a day.
W h il e p a tro n a g e a n d c o r ru p tio n a re n o t th e o n ly re a so n s
fo r th is , t h e sta te fig u re s p r o m in e n tly i n s h a p in g th e d is t r i
b u tio n o f in c o m e . N ig e ria ’s p o litic a l e c o n o m y th u s re la te s to
its p o litic a l c u ltu re .
T he r u n n i n g t h e m e in N ig e r ia n p o litic s h a s b e e n cor
r u p tio n a n d th e m is u se o f sta te re so u rc e s. I n N ig e ria a n d in
A fric a m o re g e n era lly , th e p a r tic u la r sty le o f p o litic a l e c o n
o m y h a s g iv e n rise to n e w te rm s , s u c h as “n e o p a tr im o n ia l-
ism ” ( B ra tto n a n d V an de W a lle 1997). T h e m a in
im p lic a tio n o f th e s e te rm s is t h a t th o s e in sta te office v ie w
t h e re so u rc e s o f th e sta te as availab le fo r t h e i r o w n p e rs o n a l
u se , r a th e r t h a n fo r p u b lic se rv ice s. S ta te officials a t a ll
levels m a k e u se o f g o v e r n m e n t fu n d s to fa v o r th e m se lv e s
a n d t h e i r o w n f a m ilie s, e th n i c g ro u p s , o r o th e r fa v o re d c o n
s titu e n ts . T h e sy ste m v iew s th e o ffic e h o ld e r as a “p a tr o n ”
a n d th e s e re c ip ie n ts o f re so u rc e s as “c lie n ts ,” fro m w h ic h
c o m e th e te rm s patron-client relations a n d clientelism.
A p a r t fro m th e e x tr a c tio n o f p e tr o le u m (a n d n o w n a tu
r a l gas) a n d t h e re n ts th e s e g e n e ra te , N ig e r ia is a la rg e a n d
re la tiv e ly a d v a n c e d e c o n o m y b y A f r ic a n s ta n d a rd s . T h e
c o u n tr y d o e s h a v e a d e v e lo p e d in d u s tr ia l se c to r, a n d i t is th e
le a d in g m a n u f a c tu r e r in w e s t A f r ic a , t h o u g h it is n o t a
w o rld le a d e r in in d u s t r ia l te c h n o lo g y : M a n y p ro d u c ts are
sim p le c o n s u m e r g o o d s su c h as p ro c e s s e d fo o d s a n d b e v er
a g es, te x tile s , a n d b a sic h o u s e h o ld p r o d u c ts . A g r ic u ltu r e ,
m e a n w h ile , s till e m p lo y s a n e s tim a te d 70 p e r c e n t o f N ig e
r ia n s a n d a c c o u n ts fo r n e a rly o n e – t h i r d o f t h e G D P (C I A
W o r ld F a c tb o o k ). I n u r b a n a re a s, la rg e n u m b e rs o f N ig e ri
a n s w o r k in w h a t is k n o w n as t h e in f o r m a l se c to r, th e
la rg e ly u n r e g u la te d p a r t o f t h e e c o n o m y in w h ic h w o rk e rs
t r y to eke o u t a m o d e s t liv in g w it h o u t fo rm a l c o n tra c ts o r
g u a r a n t e e d w a g e s. A m o n g th e m a n y m illio n s w o rk in g in
N ig e r ia ’s v a s t a n d d y n a m ic i n f o r m a l s e c to r a re s tr e e t v e n
d o rs , h a w k e rs , s m a ll m e rc h a n ts , a n d p ro v id e rs o f a ra n g e o f
s e rv ice s, fro m m e s se n g e rs a n d c o u rie rs to m e c h a n ic shops
o n t h e side o f th e ro a d to a m b u l a n t s h o e -s h in e w o rk e rs.
F in a lly , N ig e r ia is a n A f r ic a n le a d e r in c o m m u n ic a tio n s ,
w i t h m a jo r in d u s trie s r a n g in g fro m m o b ile p h o n e n e tw o rk s
to “N o lly w o o d ,” th e N i g e r ia n film in d u s tr y t h a t d is trib u te s
m o v ie s a cro ss A f r ic a a t a ra te f a s te r t h a n H o lly w o o d itself.
CASESTUDIES
CASE STUDY
j i g g j
W hat Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed?
The Case of Nigeria CHAPTER 3, PAGE 63
Nigeria is one of the world’s paradigmatic
cases of a weak and dysfunctional state. It
is seen as a direct contrast to more suc
cessful and stronger states in East Asia,
such as South Korea or Taiwan (Evans
1995; Kohli 2004). But what does it mean
to have a ‘weak state,” especially in a
country that has long been dominated
by the military and has stood accused
of repression and corruption? Are these
not indicators that the state is overbear
ing, rather than weak? And if a state like
Nigeria is weak, can anything be done to
change it?
Weak states can be defined as those
that fail to establish decision-making
autonomy from actors in society. Weak
states are not autonomous, but instead
succumb to private interests. Their actions
are permeated and infiltrated by private
actors seeking special advantages, often
called rents. These “special interests” can
take a range of forms. They may be indus
trialists and investors that want preferen
tial treatment to ensure their monopoly
advantages or government contracts
(see Bates 1981). Or they can be from the
ethnic group of the president that expects
government to shower favors upon the
president’s home region (Chabal and
Daloz 1999). The use of public monies to
serve private interests is a sign of perme
able boundaries between the state and
society itself. Where there is a lack of a
clear distinction between public and pri
vate, it becomes possible to use public
power for private gain, which results in a
“criminalization of the state” (Bayart, Ellis,
and Hibou 1999). If a state is “strong,” by
contrast, it has the ability to stand up to
special interests and private actors on a
regular basis in order to make decisions
518 Nigeria
C A SE STU D Y (continued)
What is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed?
The Case of Nigeria C H A P T E R 3, PAG E 63
that benefit the whole of society more
broadly.
The term state capacity is also often
used in a similar vein. When a state lacks
capacity, this does not mean the state is
incapable of doing things such as engag
ing in theft, abusing human rights, or rig
ging elections. Rather, a weak state with
little capacity often does these things. It
takes a state with strong capacity to im
plement more challenging and pro
ductive public services, like vaccination
campaigns in remote villages, nationwide
educational investments, or establishment
of a rule of law. Thus, a strong state is de
fined by its ability to make autonomous
decisions on behalf of society at large, not
by its ability to resort to violence and crack
down on dissent.
Some of the most important reforms
for Nigeria’s development would be im
provements in governance and strength
ening of the state. But can this be done?
There are several impediments. Ending
corruption and impunity, and making
public officials more accountable to the
citizenry, is a daunting task. The oil re
source curse (see box on chapter 5, “Why
Are Natural Resources Sometimes a
Curse?”) also compounds the problem.
As suggested by a range of scholars, the
easy money that comes with natural re
sources can weaken a state in certain con
texts (see Karl 1997; Dunning 2008).
The answer to whether Nigeria can
develop a strong state will draw different
responses from comparativists with differ
ent theories of the state. Those more in
clined to think that the state can be
rationally engineered to work correctly
will emphasize the political institutions
that can be put in place and the incen
tives these will provide for actors to re
spond accordingly. Others who believe in
the importance of individual actors will
note that good performance of an institu
tion like the state depends upon the
people who comprise it; finding the right
set of leaders and officials should turn an
institution around in a relatively short
period of time. By contrast, those with a
more structural, cultural, or historical bent
will emphasize that institutions are em
bedded in a set of conditions that make
rapid change difficult: Nigeria is a highly
unequal society with a long history of cor
ruption at this point, and these will slow
any change, preventing the development
of a strong state “overnight.”
There is surely some truth in all of
these elements when it comes to building
a strong state: History and culture matter
for how most individuals perceive the
state and its possibilities, and thus condi
tion outcomes strongly, but better de
signs and better leaders will contribute to
more effective governance than poorly
designed systems and weak leaders. And
most analysts would not adopt extreme
views that deny the importance of several
factors: rationalists understand that cul
ture matters, and culturalists understand
that people respond to incentives, for ex
ample. Yet the analysis of which factors are
most important will condition whether
one thinks transforming the state is feasi
ble in a given span of time, and what steps
can be recommended to get there.
W hy Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse?
The Nigerian Case CHAPTER 5, PAGE 101
Nigeria has the largest population and the
second-largest economy in sub-Saharan
Africa, but it is not a success story. Instead,
Nigeria— a major oil producer— is often
held up as an exemplary case of the “re
source curse.” You would expect that
discovering oil would be very good for an
economy, and in some cases it can be,
especially if the economy is already robust
and diversified when oil is discovered. But
often oil and similar high-value commodi
ties produce unanticipated problems. The
first is called the “Dutch Disease.” Export
ing oil brings in lots of foreign currency.
The ready supply of, say, dollars means
dollars are not seen as valuable relative to
the national currency; the domestic cur
rency rises in value, and this hurts other
Case Studies 519
W hy Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse?
The Nigerian Case C H A P T E R 5, PAG E 101
exports because these goods are expen
sive for foreigners in dollar terms. Along
the same lines, the potential profitability
of oil makes it a magnet for big capital in
vestment, thus crowding out investment
in other industries. Oil-producing coun
tries thus often see other areas of their
economies decline.
Equally important, the global price for
oil is cyclical. Economies like Nigeria tend
to see boom and bust cycles that prevent
them from achieving development. High
prices at one point in time can leave a
country vulnerable to downturns in the
price of its main export commodity.
Nigeria boomed during the 1970s when
oil prices were high, but declined during
the period of low prices in the 1980s (Kohli
2004: 351). More recently, growth has in
creased again as oil prices have risen again,
but Nigeria remains quite dependent on
a single product.
Oil dependence also affects politics,
and often for the worse (Karl 1997; Herbst
2000: 130-133). The easy access to oil
money has a rather subtle effect: It stunts
the growth of important relationships be
tween the state and the society at large.
Politicians can have incentives to make
bad policy in oil-rich countries. ‘Easy
money” from oil can make states such as
Nigeria more likely to simply offer hand
outs to their “clients” and to the populace
during boom times. States with substan
tial cash flows from oil often do not de
velop a capacity to tax the population.
This may sound like a low-tax paradise,
but without taxation, the populace is less
likely to see the government as a set of
institutions to be held accountable for its
governing performance. Rather, citizens
become accustomed to government
simply distributing benefits. This can result
in a destructive relationship between
state and society, especially in oil-produc
ing countries. Such a counterproductive
relationship is not universal, but may be
most likely in places such as Nigeria
with high prior levels of inequality
(cf. Dunning 2008).
In addition to domestic challenges,
the politics of oil and natural resources
also involves international actors such as
oil companies. This is because developing
countries themselves often lack technical
capacity in areas that require advanced
technology, and may also lack the capital
needed for investment, at least at early
stages. Such countries thus commonly
rely on licenses to foreign companies, or
the use of foreign advisors, or joint ven
tures between major multinational com
panies and relatively weak states (Kohli
2004). This leaves another form of depen
dence. The impacts of interactions with
foreign actors are hotly debated, but in
Nigeria low state capacity, partially dating
back to weak state development under
British colonialism, seems not to mix well
with oil. In short, despite the enormous
wealth that Nigerian oil has created for
some, it has left the country with high
levels of poverty and inequality, and with
institutional problems that will make
overcoming these challenges difficult.
Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding
Together or Tearing Apart? CHAPTER 8, PAGE 187
Nigeria is a crucial case in examining
whether constitutional engineering and
design, particularly with regard to federal
ism, can contribute to stability and democ
racy. Federalism has been essential to
efforts to address one of Nigeria’s leading
political challenges: ethnic and regional
divisions. As noted earlier, in the “Historical
Development” section, the subject of
federalism and autonomy came to the
fore most dramatically with the Nigerian
civil war from 1967 to 1970.
A principal tactic of the central gov
ernment to hold the country together has
been to increase the number of states,
which have gone from an original three
regions at independence to thirty-six today.
This happened in a series of steps. Indepen
dent Nigeria began with three regions—
Northern, Western, and Eastern— each of
which was associated with a particular
dominant ethnic group: the Hausa-Fulani,
Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively. The Mid-
West Region was added in 1963. In the
520 Nigeria
Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding
Together or Tearing Apart? C H A P T E R 8, PAG E 187
lead-up to the Nigerian Civil War (see also
the box on the civil war that follows), the
central government moved to reorganize
the four regions into twelve states. The
Civil War then pitted the Eastern region
against the rest of Nigeria, and after the
rebels surrendered, the military govern
ment responded by creating seven more
states in 1976, and two additional states in
1987. In 1991, President Babangida an
nounced that the number of states would
increase to thirty, and six more states were
added in 1996 (Suberu 2001: xxiv-xxvi).
The numbers thus went from three to four
regions, then to twelve states and on to
nineteen to twenty-one to thirty and fi
nally to thirty-six states.
Why would subdividing the states and
increasing their number matter for stabil
ity? The approach has been largely about
ethnic arithmetic (see Suberu 2001). In
Nigeria, the central government has used
the creation of new states in an attempt
to multiply the number of administrative
divisions in Nigeria. The theory was that
this would eliminate the big divisions
between the largest ethnic groups as an
important factor in Nigerian politics, and
would substitute for this new administra
tive boundaries that citizens would focus
on. At the same time, those living in the
newly created states often favored the
proposals for two reasons. First, the
smaller ethnic groups in Nigeria sought
their own states to avoid domination
by the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo.
Second, the creation of states in a partic
ular area meant they would share in the
distribution of the country’s revenues.
This gave incentives for many groups to
favor new states, though at different times
Nigeria’s dominant ethnicities have op
posed plans they believed would weaken
them in the delicate balance of power.
Most new states were created by
the military governments, rather than
through public consultation, and the jus
tifications have ultimately been about na
tional stability (see Suberu 2001: 80). The
creation of states in the 1960s was based
on the idea of balance: No region should
be able to dominate the federation. As
the Civil War approached and the Igbo-
dominated Eastern Region threatened
to secede, the military in power gained
some support from non-lgbos in that
region by offering to grant them new
states (Suberu 2001: 87-89). Similarly, a
panel in the 1970s argued that Nigeria
would not remain stable without further
subdivision; this resulted in the nineteen
states as of 1976 (Suberu 2001:90-91). The
logic played out in slightly different ways
in subsequent divisions, but always with
an eye toward governability. Beyond cre
ating states, the federal government has
taken a number of other steps that sup
ports them, most notably guaranteeing
substantial revenues to the state and local
governments. At the same time, while
creating these states, the central govern
ment has also attempted to centralize
many powers.
Giving different ethnic and regional
groups their own authority and resources
could either improve stability and in
crease the likelihood of democracy, or
harm those prospects. It could help by
allowing each group some say in its own
affairs and some role in government,
preventing winner-takes-all politics in na
tional elections. Or it could draw such
stark dividing lines between groups that it
might give rise to secessionism or civil
war. The Nigerian approach has been to
give more small groups additional say,
and to blur (or redraw) the lines between
the large groups.
Has it succeeded? The evidence can
be interpreted in different ways. On one
hand, Nigeria has remained intact after
the Civil War of the late 1960s, which is a
non-trivial achievement in a society that
is so fractured along ethnic, religious,
and regional fault lines. On the other
hand, the creation of new states has not
ended ethnic or sectarian tensions. Poli
tics in Nigeria is still centered around the
division between the north, the south
west, and the southeast that troubled
the country at independence. The 2015
presidential election, for instance, had
an electorate divided geographically,
with the victor Muhammadu Buhari
winning the north and the southwest,
while the defeated incumbent Goodluck
Jonathan won in his native southeastern
region. The creation of states has cre
ated new divisions in Nigerian politics,
but has not overcome the old divisions
(Suberu 2001:110). Nigeria still witnesses
a spiral of intergroup conflict. Demands
for more states or greater federalism
are unlikely to mitigate conflict at this
point, and may only serve to appease
different groups clamoring for the re
sources that come with getting a state.
Federalism might have changed the nature
of conflict, but it has not necessarily
stopped it.
Case Studies 521
The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations CHAPTER 10, PAGE 241
Over time, Nigeria’s presidencies have seen
their powers increase and decrease in dif
ferent ways, and a brief comparison can
provide insight into what has and has not
changed in the country between military
and-civilian rule. Nigeria has elected civilian
presidents since 1999, when a period of
military rule came to an end. Prior to this,
Nigeria had a parliamentary system in
place from 1960 to 1966, followed by mili
tary rule for all but four years from 1966 to
1999, during which the country lived under
several brutal and corrupt dictators, such
as General Sani Abacha (1993 to 1998).
The civilian presidents since 1999
have included one-time military leaders
Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and cur
rent president Muhammadu Buhari, as
well as Goodluck Jonathan, who was pres
ident from 2010 until his defeat in 2015.
They have earned better reputations for
civil liberties than the military regime, and
the presidents themselves have not stood
directly accused of the titanic forms of
corruption seen previously. While they have
not eradicated abuses and corruption,
they are widely viewed as an improvement
upon military rule.
Despite some improvements, Nigeria’s
core governance problems persist under
the new presidencies, and this shows
how these challenges remain embedded
in the political culture and society As
noted in several instances earlier in this
profile, Nigeria is one of the most corrupt
nations on earth despite some earnest
presidential efforts to tame this problem;
the presidencies have not proved capable
of dramatic advances, but rather modest
and incremental steps that will leave cor
ruption endemic for some time to come.
Corruption pervades much of the state
bureaucracy over which the executive
presides. For many years, positions in the
bureaucracy have been seen as rewards
for kin and supporters, for the salaries and
more importantly for the corruption op
portunities these positions provide. This
form of patronage and clientelism re
mains prominent in Nigerian politics, part
of the calculus of retaining power. Pa
tronage and corruption cut both ways,
giving the executive the opportunity to
buy support but also a sense that it
cannot control the actions of bureaucrats
and is as much a prisoner of the system as
a beneficiary of it.
The Nigerian presidency has formal
powers attached to it, such as the power
to assent to legislation or send it back to
the legislature, where a two-thirds major
ity is required to pass a law without pres
idential assent. Yet there are also major
limitations to presidential action, and some
of these reflect the need to address
Nigeria’s other big challenge besides
corruption: ethnic and regional tension.
To be elected, the president is required to
win a majority of the vote nationally, but
also must win at least 25 percent of the
vote in two-thirds of the states. Formal
and informal requirements hold that po
litical parties should represent the nation’s
federal character, especially the division
between the mostly Christian south and
mostly Muslim north.
The president is also not completely free
to establish his own cabinet, though no
written rules put it this way. The president
is “expected” to choose a vice-president
and ministers from the opposite region of
the country to his place of origin. Also on
this question of federalism, constitution
and legal provisions require the federal
government to send a large portion of
its revenues to the states and local au
thorities (Suberu 2001). This latter point
has important effects on governance:
Because states and local authorities con
trol so much of the national revenue, the
quality of governance can vary a great
deal from place to place across the coun
try. Some states will govern better and
others worse, and the president has less
leverage over this than might be the case
in other countries.
All presidents from 1999 to 2015
were from People’s Democratic Party
(PDP), though the party was defeated by
Buhari and his All Progressives Congress
(APC) in 2015. Each president (of the PDP
or APC) has had a legislative majority,
which gives a degree of partisan power
as well. Yet this too cuts both ways; the
entrenchment of co-partisans makes it
hard to shake up governance: Presidents
must reckon with governors and legisla
tors who have strong bases in their re
spective states. And, to close the circle,
this means that patronage and clien
telism persist.
With its persistent tendency for pa
tronage and the need to balance the pre
carious relationship between north and
south, Nigeria shows that social context
greatly affects the environment in which
presidents operate, regardless of constitu
tional powers. Presidents since the mili
tary leader Sani Abacha may be better
than their military predecessors, but gov
ernance has not been fully cleaned up,
nor will it be for some time regardless of
good or bad presidential intentions.
522 Nigeria
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism
and Ethno-National Conflict in a Post-Colonial Society CH A P T E R 13, PAG E 316
Nigeria is an excellent example of a coun
try where the state-linked national iden
tity needs to compete with other, perhaps
more deeply established, identities and
interests that precede the rise of the na
tional state (Falola and Heaton 2008). Of
course, every case of state-sponsored na
tional identity experiences this conflict to
some extent— national identity can con
flict with other identities like religion, eth
nicity, clan, tribe, or locality— but the
problem has often been acute in post
colonial situations where the state is left
to create a nation out of groups that do
not necessarily identify with each other.
Nigeria was a colony of Great Britain. It
had been the site of many different social
groups before colonialism, most notably
the Hausa-speaking Islamic population of
the northern region, the Yoruba of the
west (many of whom practice traditional
animistic religion), and the Igbo of the
east (who are predominantly Christian).
British colonialism drew all of these
groups together and artificially con
structed a political boundary around
them. This issued in considerable tension
that continues today.
The importance of British colonialism
does not mean Nigerians had no agency
in the creation of the Nigerian nation
state and Nigerian nationalism. Indeed,
many important Nigerian intellectuals
and political actors from at least the late
nineteenth century sought to escape
from British colonialism and to create
an independent state (or independent
states). But it is clear that the idea of “Nige
ria” as a nation was not the single basis for
national loyalty among these nationalists
(Falola and Heaton 2008: 136-157). Some
were Pan-African nationalists and hoped
to craft an identity for a nation much
larger than present-day Nigeria. Others
had their strongest affiliation with their
more local groups, expressing interest in,
say, the Yoruba nation.
British colonial West Africa saw a rela
tively peaceful transition to post-colonial
regimes. But in Nigeria, once the colonial
authority was gone, jealousies and con
flicts became more problematic. Ethnic,
religious, and regional tensions— which
had been present all along— spilled over
into open violence and conflict (as noted
previously). Two coups d’etat in 1966 were
related to these tensions, and the second
of these issued in anti-lgbo violence. In
1967, the mostly Igbo eastern region de
clared itself the independent state of
Biafra. The central government did not
accept the legitimacy of this action, and a
bloody civil war lasted until 1970. The cen
tral government was victorious, and the
Igbo-dominated east remains to this day
part of Nigeria. The war cost many thou
sands of lives directly, and produced
many more deaths as a result of the eco
nomic dislocation and famine it gener
ated, with estimates ranging from one to
three million (Falola and Heaton 2008:
158). In terms of human life and suffering,
it was catastrophic.
Some theories of ethno-national vi
olence would stress the strong ethnic
boundaries and, perhaps, religious mark
ers of identity difference here. Others
would stress the tit-for-tat nature of the
conflict: Igbo people rebelled, this theory
would suggest, because oppression
from the north led them to draw the
rational conclusion that they would be
safer as an independent state. Instru
mental theories would stress that Nigerian
oil reserves are heavily concentrated in
the country’s southeast, noting that the
stakes for both groups extended beyond
ethnic conflict and rivalry, and con
cerned access to and control over Nigeria’s
most important natural resource and the
basis for its economy and for the state’s
revenues.
Debates remain about how to classify
or characterize events like this conflict.
Proponents of the Biafran independence
effort would likely classify these events as
a political or even anti-colonial revolution,
arguing that the central government was
an oppressive external imposition from
which they were attempting to liberate
themselves. Others consider this conflict
to be a civil war, since it took place within
an existing nation-state, regardless of
whether that state itself was constructed
from the outside.
Case Studies 523
Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria:
Disentangling Ethnicity and Religion? CHAPTER 15, PAGE 361
As noted in the previous case study,
Nigeria’s boundaries and structure were
shaped by European colonialism. The
British brought together groups and re
gions that likely would not have been po
litically unified, at least not in the short
run, if not for European involvement. This
has often produced rivalries and tensions,
the most notorious of which was the ca
lamitous Biafran War described previ
ously. The Nigerian state retained control
over all of these groups, however, and
does to this day, though the society has
seen considerable ethno-religious con
flict. One of the major questions of com
parative politics highlighted by this case
is how, if it all, we might disentangle eth
nicity and religion in terms of their effects
on politics. In other words, are these con
flicts about religion, or are they about
ethnicity, or both?
Nigeria has attempted to address its
diversity through federalism. In terms of
religion, while the federal government
maintains formal separation of church
and state, religion finds its way into gov
ernment at the state level (Fox 2008:
272-273). Sharia law is practiced in north
ern majority-Muslim states, though some
of its more radical provisions have not
been exercised. At the same time, people
in non-majority-Muslim states are not
subjected to these laws. In today’s Nigeria,
as noted earlier, it is estimated that about
half of the population is Muslim and
two-fifths Christian, with most of the
balance professing a traditional animistic
faith. Religious conflict remains common,
and the government has struggled in its
efforts to restrain it. Paradoxically, per
haps, intergroup violence has increased
under non-military governments that
have held power since 1999. To some,
this suggests that federalism is not an
effective solution, while others argue
that this is a simplistic conclusion to draw
on the basis of limited evidence (see
Suberu 2001).
Ethno-religious violence in Nigeria is
difficult to sort out, in part because it
probably should not all be classified in
similar terms. Conflicts in the area where
Hausa-Fulani (predominantly Islamic)
populations are contiguous with Igbo
(predominantly Christian) involve both
material interests and, sometimes, ethnic
and religious dimensions. Some of the
violence by minority ethnic groups in
the Niger Delta, however, such as attack
ing oil pipelines, has little to no religious
component.
Some of the most significant events in
Nigeria’s recent timeline have to do with
sectarian or religious strife. As noted in the
“Historical Development” section, conflict
has emerged in many of the states and
cities along the dividing line between
the majority-Muslim north and the
majority-Christian south. The city of Jos,
for one, has witnessed numerous riots and
clashes. The deadliest acts have been per
petrated by Boko Haram, a group of
Islamist fundamentalists whose name
means “Western education is sinful.” They
have claimed responsibility for numerous
bombings and coordinated gun and gre
nade attacks in several states in central
and northern Nigeria, most notably Pla
teau State and Bauchi State. Boko Haram
bombed the United Nations compound in
the capital, Abuja, in 2011. This was fol
lowed by news reports that it seeks to col
laborate and integrate more with al Qaeda
and other related Islamic fundamentalist
groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia and,
more recently, with ISIS. Boko Haram’s vio
lence has increased in recent years and, as
noted previously, includes not just mass
killings but also mass kidnappings. In light
of the tensions in Nigeria, is important to
note that the relationship between instru
mental, ethno-national, and religious mili
tancy is potentially dynamic. Religious
frames may come to be more or less im
portant depending on the context.
Religion is a crucial element in the
balancing act among Nigerian political
elites, as with the People’s Democratic
Party. Former president Goodluck Jonathan
(a southern Christian) faced some oppo
sition in the north, and current president
Muhammadu Buhari (a northern Muslim)
may similarly face some opposition in the
south. Yet one of the important ques
tions is how these efforts at the top to
manage the institutions relate to the
identities, sentiments, and behaviors of
people in society.
524 Nigeria
Research Prompts
1. British colonialism in Nigeria ended over fifty years ago. To what
extent does the legacy of colonialism still affect the politics and
economy of Nigeria today? How can we determine what con
temporary outcomes are the result of historically distant factors
like colonialism as opposed to more recent factors such as the
events of the late 1990s?
2. Nigeria is used by scholars of development as a quintessential
example of economic failure and underperformance. Viewing
the history of Nigeria’s political economy, does Nigeria’s weak
economic performance over the decades give more credence
to proponents of market-led development or state-led develop
ment? What would be the recommendations from both market-
led and state-led development advocates for Nigeria?
3. Compare and contrast Nigeria’s development experience with
one of the other developing countries mentioned in chapter 5:
Brazil, China, or India. What do you learn from the comparison,
and are there any comparative lessons that you can draw for
why development does or does not happen?
4. Consider several of Nigeria’s troubles— such as economic stag
nation, corruption, or conflict— and select one issue of greatest
interest to you. Examine to what extent Nigeria’s challenge ap
plies in another African country, and address how generaliz-
able Nigeria’s experience may be to the continent of Africa as a
whole. In what ways is Nigeria distinctive (or “most different”)
from one or more other African countries, and in what ways is
it comparable (or “most similar”)? If you examine another sub-
Saharan African country and determine that it faces similar
problems or does not face similar problems, which variables
does your finding point to as helping to shape Nigeria’s
outcomes?
5. One key element of Nigeria’s political life seems to be corrup
tion. Can we say this corruption is caused by culture and soci
ety? Or by economic realities? Or political institutions? Which of
these do you find to be the leading the cause, and how can you
know?
6. Conflict in Nigeria has at least three components: ethnic, reli
gious (or sectarian), and regional. Which of these divisions in
Nigerian society is the primary cause of the conflict? Can you
trace the historical evolution of conflicts in Nigeria to determine
which of these is the leading causal factor?
7. Nigeria has implemented numerous institutional reforms to
limit violence and conflict. These include the creation of more
states in the federation and provisions requiring presidents to
win a substantial proportion of the vote across many states. Is it
possible to determine what the effects of these reforms have
been on conflict and ethnic tension? How might you approach
this question and research it to be able to offer an answer? How
might comparative study help?
525
H Russia (Russian Federation)
PROFILE
Key Features o f C o n te m p o r a r y Russia
Population: 142,470,272 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 17,098,242 square kilometers
Head of State: Vladimir Putin (president, 2012-present)
Head of Government: Dmitry Medvedev (premier, May 2012-present)
Capital: Moscow
Year of Independence: The Russian Empire dates back to 1721, and
independent states comprising much of
Russia predate that founding. The current
state became independent of the Soviet
Union in 1991.
Year of Current
Constitution:
1993
Languages: Russian is spoken by most citizens; there are
more than one hundred other languages in the
Russian Federation: Tatar and Ukrainian are
among the most important.
GDP per Capita: $14,612 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
Human Development
Index Ranking (2014):
57th (high human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014.
Introduction
T h e R u s s ia n F e d e r a tio n is, i n g e o g ra p h ic
te rm s , th e la r g e s t c o u n tr y in th e w o rld . Its
la n d is h i g h ly v a rie d , s tr e tc h in g fro m t e m
p e ra te a rea s to th e A rc tic , a n d fro m W e s te r n
E u r o p e to t h e S e a o f J a p a n . Its p e o p le a n d
t h e i r c u ltu r e a re v a rie d as w e ll. B o th its
p e o p le a n d its e x p a n s e o f la n d h a v e c a p tu re d
t h e im a g in a tio n o f w r ite r s fo r g e n e ra tio n s ,
a n d m a n y h a v e fe lt t h a t th e r e is s o m e th in g
in effa b le a b o u t R u ss ia . H o w e v e r, w h a t is o f
s till g r e a te r i n te r e s t a b o u t R u ss ia to c o m
p a ra tiv e p o litic a l a n a ly s ts is th e c o u n tr y ’s
tu m u lt u o u s p o litic a l a n d e c o n o m ic h isto ry .
R u ss ia , as w e w ill see, h a s o v e r t h e la s t c e n
t u r y g o n e fro m b e in g a re a c tio n a r y C z a r is t
r e g im e , to c r e a tin g t h e S o v ie t U n io n , d u r in g
w h i c h it a im e d to c o m p le te ly re m a k e th e
so c ie ty a n d to s p re a d s o c ia lis t re v o lu tio n
a r o u n d th e g lo b e , to w a tc h in g th e S oviet
U n io n c o lla p se , to b e in g re p la c e d b y a re la
tiv e ly w e a k g o v e rn m e n t, a n d finally, u n d e r
V l a d im ir P u t in , to t h e re s to r a tio n o f c e n
t r a li z e d a u th o rity . C o n t e m p o r a r y R u ss ia is
E x h ib it A in p o litic a l s c ie n tis ts ’ e ffo rts to
d e s c rib e s o -c a lle d “h y b r id ” o r “c o m p e titiv e
Russian 79.8%
T artar 3.8%
U krainian 2%
Bashkir 1.2%
Chuvash 1.1%
Unspecified oth er 12.1%
Ethnic Groups in Russia
Note that there are numerous smaller groups as well, including
Chechens, captured in the “unspecified/other” category here.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
1 N o t formally practicing 63—73%
| Russian O rtho do x 15—20%
Islam 10-15%
H O th e r C hristian 2%
Religious Affiliation in Russia, 2006 Estimates of
Practicing Religious Populations
Note that some of those counted as “Russian Orthodox” may be only
nominally so.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
526 Russia (Russian Federation)
A R C T I C
O C E A N East
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NORWAY
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M u rm a n s k
SWEDEN
Laptev
SeaFINLAND
Kara Sga
S a in t
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Y BaikalB a rn a u l
Ir k u ts kKAZAKHSTAN
• N a k h o d k a
‘la d iv o s t o k *TURK.
MONGOLIA
CHINA
a u th o r ita r ia n ” (L e v its k y a n d W a y 2 0 1 0 ) re g im e s d isc u sse d
in c h a p te r 7 o f th is v o lu m e .
R u s s ia ’s 1 917 r e v o lu ti o n s — b o t h t h e o n e t h a t r e m o v e d
t h e t s a r f r o m p o w e r a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t o n e , w h i c h g a v e
t h e B o ls h e v ik s c o n tr o l o f th e s t a te — i n s p i r e d w a v e s o f
im i t a t o r s . T h e S o v ie t U n i o n f o r m e d o n e o f t h e tw o p o le s
in th e C o l d W a r t h a t s t r u c t u r e d g lo b a l a ffa irs fo r h a l f a
c e n tu r y : I t w o u ld b e d if f ic u lt to e x a g g e r a te t h e e x te n t o f
th is l o n g c o n f li c t ’s i m p a c t, e s p e c ia lly o n t h e p o p u l a t i o n s
o f t h o s e c o u n tr i e s w h e r e p ro x y w a r s b e tw e e n th e p o le s
w e re f o u g h t. A t t h e s a m e t im e , t h e S o v ie t U n i o n ’s b r u
ta lity , p a r ti c u l a r ly u n d e r J o s e p h S t a li n , p u s h e d m a n y
g lo b a l p o l it i c a l a c to r s a w a y f r o m s o c ia lis m a n d to w a r d
lib e r a lis m a n d s o c ia l d e m o c ra c y . R u s s ia is a ls o o f in t e r e s t
to s t u d e n ts o f i d e n t i t y p o lit ic s . D e b a t e s a b o u n d c o n c e r n
in g t h e n a tu r e o f R u s s ia n n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y a n d th e
t i m i n g a n d c a u s e s o f its e m e r g e n c e a n d s p r e a d . T h e s e
q u e s tio n s b e c o m e p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m p lic a te d in t h e S o v ie t
y e a rs . A s a M a r x i s t r e g im e , t h e S o v ie t U n i o n w a s offi
c ia lly i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , b u t a n u m b e r o f o b s e rv e rs se e i t as
h a v i n g b e e n a v e h ic le fo r R u s s ia n n a t i o n a l a im s , a n d
S t a li n h i m s e l f w a s a t h e o r i s t o f n a ti o n a l i s m ( S t a li n
1 9 9 4 ). R u s s ia n n a t i o n a l i s m h a s t y p ic a lly b e e n c o n s id e r e d
to f a ll i n t o t h e e t h n i c t y p e ( G r e e n f e ld 1 9 9 2 ), a n d R u s s ia n
h i s t o r y g iv e s n u m e r o u s e x a m p le s o f r e p re s s io n o f e th n i c
m in o r i tie s .
Profile 527
R u ssia ’s p o s t – c o m m u n is t tr a n s it io n is o f p a r tic u l a r in
te re s t to c o m p a ra tiv e a n a ly sts, in p a r t b e c a u se o f t h e p a t
t e r n o f a u th o r i ta r i a n p e rs is te n c e t h a t it reveals. F o r so m e
Historical Development
M a n y a c c o u n ts o f m o d e r n R u s s ia b e g in w i t h P e t e r t h e
G r e a t, w h o in t h e la te s e v e n te e n th c e n t u r y a t t e m p t e d to
f o rc ib ly m o d e r n iz e t h e c o u n tr y . P e t e r w a s n o t th e f i r s t
n o ta b le r u l e r o f R u s s ia , b u t h e is w e ll k n o w n fo r t h e
d e g re e to w h i c h h e c e n tr a lly im p o s e d r e fo rm s o n h is s o
c ie ty (B u s h k o v itc h 2 0 1 2 : 79). S o m e o f t h e s e r e fo rm s
c h a n g e d th e s o c ia l s t r u c t u r e in i m p o r t a n t w a y s. F o r ex
a m p le , h e i m p o s e d a “T a b le o f R a n k s ” t h a t r e – e n g i n e e r e d
t h e R u s s ia n s o c ia l h ie r a r c h y , m a k i n g n o b le s ta tu s d e p e n
d e n t o n s ta te se rv ic e a n d c r e a ti n g th e p o s s ib i lity to
achieve n o b i li t y t h r o u g h p a r t i a l l y m e r it o c r a tic c o m p e t i
t io n (A s c h e r 2 0 0 9 : 6 3; G r e e n f e ld 1 9 9 2 ). H e p e r s o n a l ly
s tu d ie d W e s te r n te c h n iq u e s fo r s h i p b u i ld i n g a n d o t h e r
t e c h n o lo g ie s t h a t h e e x p e c te d w o u ld in c r e a s e R u s s ia ’s
p o w e r a n d p r e s t ig e , a n d h e b r o u g h t f o r e ig n e x p e r ts to
R u s s ia in la rg e n u m b e r s (A s c h e r 2 0 0 9 : 5 8 – 6 5 ) . S o m e
o f h is re fo rm s w e re m o re s y m b o lic as w e ll a n d in v ite d
a c u lt u r a l t u r n to th e W e s t ( H u g h e s 2 0 0 8 : 6 8 – 7 7 ;
B u s h k o v itc h 2 0 1 2 : 8 2 – 8 3 , 9 4 – 9 8 ) . F o r e x a m p le , h e fo r
b a d e n o b le s to w e a r t h e i r c u s t o m a r y b e a r d s a n d d e m a n d e d
c h a n g e s in d re s s . N o t a ll o f t h e s e m o v e s w e re p o p u la r , b u t
t h e r e w a s l it t le d o u b t t h a t R u s s ia u n d e r P e t e r w a s s t r o n
g e r t h a n it h a d b e e n i n p re v io u s y e a rs . R u s s ia p la y e d a
c e n tr a l ro le in t h e G r e a t N o r t h e r n W a r t h a t d r a m a tic a ll y
r e d u c e d S w e d is h p o w e r, m u c h to R u s s ia ’s b e n e f it (A s c h e r
2 0 0 9 : 6 1 – 6 2 ) .
S u b seq u e n t years saw som e d e clin e (A sch e r 2 0 0 9 : 6 6 – 6 7 ) ,
b u t R ussia e n c o u n te re d a n o th e r s tro n g le a d e r in C a th e rin e
th e G re a t, w h o seized th e th r o n e in a c oup d ’e ta t in 1762.
C a th e rin e w as k n o w n as a p a tro n o f th e E u ro p e a n E n lig h t
e n m e n t (on R u ssia n c u ltu re u n d e r C a th e rin e , see H u g h e s
2 0 0 8 : 8 1 -8 8 ). I n th is , as in o th e r th in g s , th e re w as a n a ffin ity
b e tw e e n h e r ru le a n d t h a t o f P e ter, as a g a in sh e t u r n e d to
W e s te rn m o d els as she a im e d to increase R ussia’s p o w e r a n d
sta tu s. S he in cre ased th e a d m in istra tiv e re a c h a n d c e n tra liz a
tio n o f th e state, a n d c o n tin u e d to a sse rt R ussia’s role as a
g e o p o litic al pow er. M o re o v er, she sp re a d W e s te r n ideas
th ro u g h o u t R ussia a n d e ven p a tro n iz e d th e m in W e s te rn
E u ro p e (s u p p o rtin g F re n c h in te lle c tu a ls , for exam ple,
re a s o n , R u s s ia h a s n e v e r d e v e lo p e d a s u s ta in a b le , fu lly
f u n c tio n in g d e m o c rac y . T h e re is m u c h g r i s t h e re fo r th e
m ill o f d e m o c ra tic th e o ry .
e ven w h e n th e y w e re n o t fu lly s u p p o rte d in th e ir h o m e c o u n
try). T h e first h a l f o f th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry saw th e ru le o f
A le x a n d e r I a n d N icolas I. A le x a n d e r is b e s t re m e m b e re d for
le a d in g R u ssia as i t d e fea te d N a p o le o n in h is fa m o u s invasion
(in w h ic h th e F re n c h o c cu p ied M o s c o w b u t w e re e v en tu ally
d e fe a te d b y R u ss ia n re sistan c e a n d t h e h a rs h R u ssia n w inter).
B o th N ic o la s I a n d A le x a n d e r I , th o u g h , p re sid e d over a
p e rio d in w h ic h R u ssia fa ile d to c o n tin u e its p a th o f m o d e rn
iz a tio n (A s c h e r 2 0 0 9 : 8 0 -8 1 ). M u c h o f th is c h a n g e d b e g in
n in g in th e 1860s u n d e r A le x a n d e r I I , w h o im p le m e n te d a
n u m b e r o f re fo rm s. T he m o s t im p o r ta n t w as th e e m a n c ip a
tio n o f th e serfs (B u sh k o v itc h 2 0 1 2 :1 8 8 – 1 9 3 ) a n d state p e as
a n ts, w h ic h c o m m e n c e d b e tw e e n 1861 a n d 1866 (the precise
d a tin g is d e p e n d e n t o n w h e th e r o n e w as a s e r f o r sta te p e as
ant). M a te ria l c o n d itio n s o f p e a s a n ts, th o u g h , in m a n y cases
d id n o t im p ro v e over th e several d ecad es t h a t th e y p a id for th e
la n d th e y received.
T h e f o r m a tio n o f th e R u s s ia n s ta te a n d th e w a y in
w h i c h s ta te s e rv ic e a n d th e e d u c a tio n a l sy s te m l in k e d to
th e s tr a tif ic a tio n sy s te m h a d i m p o r t a n t im p lic a tio n s fo r
R u s s ia ’s f u t u r e , e x a c e rb a te d b y l a t e – n i n e te e n th – c e n t u r y
re fo rm . O n e , p e r h a p s u n in te n d e d , c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e lo n g
se ries o f re fo rm s t h a t r a n f r o m P e te r th e G r e a t ’s y e ars
o n w a r d w a s t h a t e d u c a tio n a l a tt a in m e n t w a s v e ry clo sely
lin k e d to s ta tu s a t t a in m e n t: T o b e a n i n te lle c t u a l w a s v e ry
d e s ira b le . T h is m a d e e d u c a tio n a l a tt a in m e n t a m a jo r d ra w
fo r ta l e n t, a n d s o c io lo g ic a lly a s o c ie ty w i t h a n a g r a r ia n
e c o n o m y a n d re la tiv e ly fe w p r o s p e c ts o u ts id e o f sta te
se rv ic e (in c lu d in g th e m ilita r y ) a n d a n im p o r t a n t, i f n u
m e ric a lly s m a ll, s e g m e n t o f h ig h ly e d u c a te d p e rs o n s is p o
te n tia lly ex p lo siv e (G r e e n f e ld 1 992). R u s s ia n n a tio n a lis m
s p re a d as R u s s ia n lite r a t u r e a n d c u lt u r a l p r o d u c tio n grew .
M o re o v e r, t h a t n a ti o n a lis m a c q u ir e d a stro n g ly p o p u lis t
c o m p o n e n t, e p ito m iz e d i n th e N a r o d n ik , o r “T o th e P e o p le,”
M o v e m e n t in th e e arly 1870s (S e rv ice 2 0 0 9 :1 7 – 1 8 ) . A m o n g
o t h e r th in g s , R u s s ia n in te lle c tu a ls w e n t to live w ith p o o r
p e a s a n ts in h o p e s o f h e lp in g to le a d a m o v e m e n t, w h ic h m e t
w i t h litt le success. H o w e v e r, d is c o n te n t a n d a g ita tio n w o u ld
c o n tin u e . M o s t n o tab ly , T s a r A le x a n d e r I I w a s a ssa ss in a te d
528 Russia (Russian Federation)
H isto rical D e v e lo p m e n t
T i m e l i n e
1682-1725 Reign of Peter the Great, seen as Western-oriented invades the Soviet Union, but ultimately
modernizer of Russia retreats in a major turning point in the war
1762-1796 Reign of Catherine the Great, another Westernizer, in Europe.
patron of philosophers and other intellectuals, but 1945 Soviets occupy Berlin with the fall of Hitler.
nevertheless autocratic and a critic of the French 1946-1989 Cold War, an ideological, military, and economic
Revolution rivalry between the Communist world led by the
1812 Invasion of Russia by Napoleon of France; French Soviet Union and the capitalist, democratic world
reach Moscow, but then retreat and Napoleon is led by the United States
defeated. 1949 Soviets test atomic bomb.
1815 Congress of Vienna 1953 Death of Stalin
1853-1856 Crimean War pits Russia against France, Great 1956 U.S.S.R. cracks down on dissent in Hungary with
Britain, and the Ottoman Empire. invasion.
1861-1866 Beginning of the process of emancipation of the 1957 U.S.S.R. launches Sputnik satellite.
serfs and state peasants 1961 Berlin Wall erected; Soviet Union becomes first
1881 Assassination of Tsar Alexander II country to send man into space.
1905 1905 Revolution (brings about constitutional 1968 U.S.S.R. crushes “Prague Spring” movement in
monarchy) Czechoslovakia.
1917 Russian Revolution(s) that topple the tsar and bring 1972 SALT I treaty as policy of detente between the
the Communists to power U.S.S.R. and the United States commences.
1918-1921 Russian Civil War 1989 Fall of Berlin Wall and collapse of Soviet-led com
1921 Vladimir Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) munism in Eastern and Central Europe (Poland,
1924 Death of Lenin, which leads to Joseph Stalin’s rise Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria,
to prominence Romania); Soviet Union begins to unravel.
1928-1933 First Five Year Plan and introduction of a command 1991 Communist hardliner coup to replace Mikhail
economy Gorbachev results in street mobilizations for
1929 Consolidation of Stalin’s authority; Leon Trotsky is further reform; U.S.S.R. collapses and divides into
forced into exile. fifteen countries; Boris Yeltsin becomes president
1933-1937 Second Five Year Plan of independent Russia.
1935-1938 Period Notable for Stalinist Purges, including 2000 Vladimir Putin is elected president.
1937-1938 mass executions (the “Great Terror”) 2008 Dmitry Medvedev is elected president, with
1938-1941 Third Five Year Plan (ends prematurely due to the Vladimir Putin as prime minister.
Second World War) 2012 Vladimir Putin is re-elected president amid allega
1939 Soviets sign Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi tions of electoral irregularities and widespread
Germany, including secret agreement to divide up public protests; Putin nominates Dmitry Medvedev
Europe; World War II begins in Europe. as prime minister.
1940 Trotsky is murdered in Mexico. 2014 Russia annexes the Crimean peninsula, a
1941 Germany invades Soviet Union. Russian-majority region in neighboring Ukraine,
1941-1945 Soviet involvement in World War II, in which and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine
more than 20 million Soviets die; Hitler seek to join with Russia.
i n 1881. H i s su c c esso r, A le x a n d e r I I I , e n d e a v o re d to u n d o D e m a n d s fo r c h a n g e c a m e to a h e a d in th e f ir s t y e a rs
m a n y o f th e re fo rm s o f t h e p re v io u s d e c a d e s (A s c h e r 2 0 0 9 : o f t h e t w e n ti e t h c e n tu ry . N o te t h a t R u s s ia w a s re la tiv e ly
1 2 5 -1 3 0 ). e x c e p tio n a l in t h is p e r io d (in t h e E u r o p e a n c o n te x t) fo r
Profile 529
s t ill b e in g a n o n – c o n s t it u t io n a l m o n a rc h y . R u s s ia ’s h ig h ly
e d u c a te d , lite r a te , a n d p a r t i a l l y W e s te r n iz e d n o b ility ,
a lo n g w i t h n o n – n o b le in te l le c tu a ls , w e re p a in f u lly a w a re
o f t h i s sig n o f “b a c k w a r d n e s s .” T h e c o u n tr y h a d b e g u n
s ta te – le d in d u s t r ia l iz a t i o n (S e rv ic e 2 0 0 9 : 4 – 5 ) , a n d w h ile
i n d u s tr ia l w o rk e rs w e re o n ly a t in y f r a c tio n o f t h e o v e ra ll
p o p u la tio n , t h e y w e re i m p o r t a n t a g ita to r s c o n c e n tr a t e d in
th e l a r g e s t c itie s i n w h a t w o u ld b e c a lle d t h e R e v o lu tio n o f
1905 ( C a r r [1979] 2 0 0 4 : 2; F i t z p a t r i c k 1 9 94: 3 3 – 3 4 ) . A n
o t h e r c ritic a l fa c to r w a s R u s s ia ’s p o o r s h o w in g a g a in s t
J a p a n i n th e R u s s o -J a p a n e s e W a r , w h ic h s e e m e d to s ig n a l
s ta te w e a k n e s s a n d t h e n e e d fo r r e fo rm . T h e re v o lu tio n
i ts e l f c o n s is te d la rg e ly o f a se rie s o f s tr ik e s a n d o t h e r a c
tio n s ( F i t z p a t r ic k 1 9 94: 3 2 – 3 3 ) . I t a ls o , la m e n ta b ly , u n
le a s h e d a se rie s o f p o g ro m s . T h e g o a ls o f th e
“r e v o lu tio n a r ie s ” v a r ie d c o n sid e ra b ly . S o m e w e re s im p ly
d is a ffe c te d p e a s a n ts a n d u r b a n w o rk e rs . O t h e r s w e re
c o m m itt e d id e o lo g u e s , m o s t n o ta b ly th e P e te r s b u r g
S o v ie t, w h i c h w a s a h a r b in g e r o f t h i n g s t o c o m e . T h e re v
o lu tio n e n d e d w i t h R u s s ia b e c o m in g a c o n s titu tio n a l
m o n a rc h y . F o r m a n y M a r x i s t c o m m e n ta to r s , t h i s m a r k e d
i t as a “b o u rg e o is r e v o lu tio n ,” p o t e n ti a lly s e t ti n g th e sta g e
fo r th e n e x t r e v o lu tio n a r y se q u e n c e , w h ic h t h e y h o p e d
w o u ld issu e i n c o m m u n is m .
T h e y w o u ld n o t h a v e to w a it lo n g , as “t h e ” R u s s ia n
R e v o lu tio n w o u ld e m e rg e in 1917 ( F itz p a t r ic k 1 994; C a r r
[1979] 2 0 0 4 ). T h e y e a rs a f te r th e 190 5 re v o lu tio n saw
a g r a r ia n r e fo rm t h a t w o u ld in c re a s e p riv a te l a n d h o ld i n g as
w e ll as o t h e r c h a n g e s . H o w e v e r, t h e d e cisiv e e v e n t t h a t
h e lp e d to tr ig g e r th e R e v o lu tio n o f 1917 w a s t h e F ir s t
W o r ld W a r. R u s s ia su ffe re d h e a v y lo sse s, a n d its tr o o p s
fa c e d d iffic u lt c o n d itio n s . T h e w a r lo s t p u b lic s u p p o r t , a n d
th e re la tiv e m ilita r y w e a k n e s s o f t h e s ta te t h a t h a d lo s t th e
C r im e a n W a r a n d th e R u s s o -J a p a n e s e W a r w a s a g a in ex
p o s e d . T h e y e a r 1917 w a s t h e k e y y e a r, w i t h tw o c ritic a l
re v o lu tio n a ry sta g e s . I n M a r c h , s t r e e t p ro te s ts le d to th e
f a ll o f th e ts a r a n d h is g o v e rn m e n t. A p ro v is io n a l g o v e rn
m e n t w a s f o r m e d b y t h e le g is la tu r e (th e D u m a ) , b u t i t w a s
s o o n riv a le d b y “S o v ie ts” (c o u n cils) o f w o rk e rs , p e a s a n ts ,
a n d g e n e ra l m ili ta r y p e rs o n n e l in o t h e r p a r ts o f th e c o u n
try . I n s h o r t, i t w a s n o t e n tir e ly c le a r w h o w a s in c h a rg e o f
R u ss ia . B e fo re lo n g t h e B o ls h e v ik s , a ra d ic a l so c ia lis t
g ro u p , to o k o v e r th e S o v ie ts , a n d t h e P ro v is io n a l G o v e r n
m e n t fe ll, le a v in g t h e S o v ie ts in c h a rg e . T h is w o u ld b e fo l
lo w e d b y w i th d r a w a l fro m W o r ld W a r I e a rly t h e n e x t y e a r
a n d o n g o in g c iv il w a r b e tw e e n B o ls h e v ik s (w h o r e n a m e d
th e m se lv e s th e C o m m u n is ts ) a n d M e n s h e v ik s . C o n t r a r y
to L e n i n ’s e x p e c ta tio n s , th e ris e o f t h e S o v ie t U n io n d id
n o t t r i g g e r a w a v e o f s u c c e s s fu l p r o le ta r i a n re v o lu tio n s
th r o u g h o u t E u r o p e (A s c h e r 2 0 0 9 : 1 6 7 -1 6 8 ). T h e n e w
g o v e r n m e n t s o o n b e g a n to in c re a s e th e a lr e a d y n o ta b le
ro le o f t h e s ta te in th e R u s s ia n e c o n o m y , a n d it b e g a n
a g r a r ia n re fo rm s , p i t t i n g p o o r e r p e a s a n ts a g a in s t th o s e
w h o w e re b e t t e r o ff. S o m e o f t h i s w a s r e la x e d w i t h L e n i n ’s
m o re p r a g m a tic “N e w E c o n o m ic P o lic y ,” b e g in n i n g in
1921 (S e rv ic e 2 0 0 9 : 1 2 3 – 1 4 9 ; B u s h k o v itc h 2 0 1 2 : 3 1 8 –
319). L e n i n d ie d in 1 9 2 4 , s e t ti n g o f f a s tr u g g l e w i t h i n th e
p a r t y fo r s u p re m a c y . T h e m a in c o n te n d e r s w e re J o s e p h
S t a li n a n d L e o n T ro ts k y . B y 1 9 2 9 , S ta li n h a d c o n s o lid a te d
h is a u th o r ity , a n d T r o ts k y w a s fo rc e d i n to e x ile (A s c h e r
2 0 0 9 ): H e w o u ld b e m u r d e r e d b y S t a li n ’s a g e n ts , in
M e x ic o , i n 1 9 4 0 . P a r tic u la r ly b e g in n i n g i n t h e 1 9 3 0 s,
S ta lin b e c a m e fa m o u s ly p a r a n o id , a n d t h e S ta li n i s t re g im e
p u r g e d n u m e ro u s a lle g e d o p p o n e n ts , o f te n u s in g “sh o w
t r ia l s ” a n d fo rc e d c o n fe s s io n s i n a n e ffo rt to m a i n t a i n th e
a p p e a ra n c e o f le g itim a c y . T h is b e h a v io r w o u ld c o n tin u e
a f te r th e w a r. M il li o n s d ie d o r w e re im p r is o n e d u n d e r
S ta lin .
T h e S t a li n i s t r e g im e se t o u t to e x te n d s o c ia lis t re v o lu
tio n . T h e fir s t F iv e Y e ar P l a n (1 9 2 8 -1 9 3 3 ) a im e d to b o th
fo rc e ra p id i n d u s t r ia l iz a t i o n a n d to c o lle c tiv iz e a g r ic u l
t u r e ( F i t z p a t r ic k 1 9 9 4 : 1 2 9 -1 4 1 ). I t w a s s o m e w h a t su c
c e s s fu l w i t h r e g a r d to t h e f o r m e r g o a l, b u t th e l a t t e r g o a l
w a s la r g e ly a fa ilu r e in e c o n o m ic a n d h u m a n te r m s , c o s t
in g m ill io n s o f lives (S e rv ic e 2 0 0 9 : 181). T h e S e c o n d
(1 9 3 3 -1 9 3 7 ) a n d T h ir d (1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 1 ) F iv e Y e ar P la n s c o n
t in u e d S t a li n ’s e ffo rts t o a c h ie v e s t a te – l e d f u l l in d u s t r ia l
iz a tio n . T h e la s t o f t h e s e e ffo rts w as d is r u p te d b y th e
in v a s io n o f N a z i G e rm a n y . F o r t h e firs t tw o y e a rs o f t h a t
w a r t h e S o v ie t U n io n r e m a in e d u n in v o lv e d b e c a u se o f a
n o n -a g g re s s io n p a c t t h a t H i t l e r a n d S ta lin h a d sig n e d in
1939 ( K itc h e n 2 0 0 6 : 2 9 7 – 2 9 8 , 3 0 1 – 3 0 4 ) . B u t in 1941
H i t l e r c h a n g e d c o u rs e a n d in v a d e d t h e S o v ie t U n io n
( B u s h k o v itc h 2 0 1 2 : 3 7 8 – 3 8 2 ) . T h e f i g h tin g o n th e e a s te rn
f r o n t ( G e r m a n y f o u g h t t h e S o v ie t U n io n in th e e a s t a n d
t h e o t h e r a llie s in t h e w e s t) w a s b r u t a l a n d th e lo ss o f life
e n o r m o u s . W h i l e t h e a llie s e m e r g e d v ic to r io u s , th e p r o
cess w a s v e ry c o s tly fo r t h e S o v ie t U n io n . A t t h e sa m e
tim e , it e n d e d u p g r e a t ly e x p a n d in g t h e te r r i t o r y c o n
tr o lle d b y th e S o v ie t R e g im e , n o ta b ly E a s te r n E u r o p e a n d
m u c h o f C e n tr a l E u r o p e , w h ic h i n t h e y e a rs a f te r t h e w a r
b e c a m e S o v ie t s a te llite sta te s .
T h e s e t tl e m e n t a t t h e e n d o f W o r ld W a r I I s e t t h e stage
fo r t h e C o ld W a r . T h e S o v ie t U n i o n a n d t h e U n ite d
530 Russia (Russian Federation)
S ta te s — t h o u g h t o f as r e p re s e n ta tiv e s o f tw o , in c o n s is te n t,
v isio n s fo r h o w to o r g a n iz e so c ie ty — -jostled fo r g lo b a l i n
flu e n c e , a n d p ro x y w a rs w e re f o u g h t in a n u m b e r o f d e v e l
o p in g c o u n tr ie s , c a u s in g c o n s id e ra b le s u ffe rin g a n d lo ss o f
life . F o r b o t h sid e s, fe a rs o f t h e p r o s p e c t o f n u c le a r
w a r w e re p a r t o f d a ily life . S t a li n d ie d i n 1 953, a n d w a s
fo llo w e d b y lo n g te r m s fo r tw o c o n s e c u tiv e le a d e rs ,
K h r u s h c h e v a n d B re z h n e v . K h r u s h c h e v a im e d to “d e –
S t a li n iz e ” t h e c o u n try , r e p u d ia tin g th e p u rg e s a n d o th e r
fo rm s o f o p p re s s io n t h a t h a d c la im e d so m a n y , a n d m a k in g
a n u m b e r o f re fo rm s . F iv e y e a r p la n s c o n ti n u e d , h o w e v e r,
a n d n e it h e r o f th e s e le a d e rs se rio u sly c o n s id e re d a n o n
s o c ia lis t m o d e l in e c o n o m ic p o lic y . T h e f a c t t h a t t h e y
c r itic iz e d S t a lin ’s a tr o c itie s s h o u ld n o t le a d u s to c o n c lu d e ,
h o w e v e r, t h a t th e y w e re n o t w i l li n g to r e p re s s c iv ilia n s
th e m s e lv e s , as a n u m b e r o f c itiz e n s o f R u s s ia a n d o f S o v ie t
sa te llite s ta te s w e re t o le a r n (D a v ie s 1996: 1 1 0 2 -1 1 0 4 ;
S e rv ice 2 0 0 9 : 4 3 5 – 5 0 0 ) .
A f te r B re z h n e v ’s d e a th i n 1982, th e r e w as a series o f
s h o rt-liv e d , in c o n s e q u e n tia l leaders u n t il M ik h a il G o rb a c h e v
w as se lected in 1985. G o rb a c h e v e m b a rk e d o n a series o f re
form s (D av ies 1996: 1121; B u sh k o v itc h 2 012: 4 4 8 -4 5 1 ). I n
th e eco n o m ic sp h e re, th is involved try in g to e x p a n d th e role
o f m a rk e ts , so as to p re serv e so c ialism t h r o u g h e n h a n c in g
p ro d u c tiv ity a n d efficiency. I t w as c le ar to all in t h e S oviet
w o rld t h a t c h a n g e w as a foot, a n d once it b e c a m e c le ar t h a t
G o rb a c h e v w o u ld n o t repress p ro te s t in C e n tr a l a n d E a s te rn
E u ro p e w ith th e force t h a t p revious S o v ie t leaders h a d u se d ,
th o s e c o u n trie s b e g a n to se e k in d e p e n d e n c e . P o la n d w a s th e
in itia l leader, a n d its S o lid a rity M o v e m e n t stru g g le d fo r years
in its efforts to b r in g a b o u t a tra n s itio n , w ith a successful a n d
p e ac efu l rev o lu tio n ta k in g place in 1989, fo llo w ed sh o rtly
th e re a fte r b y a w ave o f sim ila r o nes th r o u g h o u t th e re g io n
(A s h 2 002). C o m m u n is t elites in th e S o v ie t U n io n w ere
a la rm e d , n o t surprisingly. E v e n tu a lly som e o f th e m la u n c h e d
a c oup d ’e ta t a g a in s t G o rb a c h e v in a n e ffo rt to re sto re cen
tra liz e d c o ntrol: T he p la n b a c k fire d , a n d w h e n th e d u s t set
tle d B o ris Y eltsin w as in c h a rg e o f th e R u ss ia n F e d e ra tio n
(th e S o v ie t U n io n w as gone).
G o rb a c h e v h a d h o p e d to save th e d re a m o f c o m m u
n ism : Y e ltsin m o v e d to e n d it. H e p re s e n te d h im s e lf as a
d e m o c ra t, t h o u g h h is g o v e rn in g sty le w a s s o m e w h a t a u to
c ratic. H e w as a ble to in a u g u ra te a new , m o re d e m o c ra tic
c o n s titu tio n fo r t h e R u s s ia n F e d e ra tio n a f te r ta k in g a d v a n
ta g e o f a c o n flic t w i t h th e S u p re m e S o v ie t, w h ic h h a d b e e n
e le c te d b e fo re th e c o lla p se o f th e S o v ie t U n io n (S ervice
2 0 0 9 : 5 2 2 -5 2 8 ). F ro m th e b e g in n in g , Y e ltsin e m b ra c e d
ra d ic a l f r e e – m a r k e t re fo rm (M c F a u l 2 0 0 8 : 3 5 9 -3 6 1 ),
q u ic k ly p riv a tiz in g k e y in d u s trie s a n d h e lp in g to c re a te
w h a t c o m m e n ta to rs n o w s o m e tim e s re fe r to as R u ssia ’s
“c ro n y c a p ita lis m .” A re la tiv e ly s m a ll g ro u p o f w e a lth y i n d i
v id u a ls b e n e fite d d is p ro p o rtio n a te ly fro m p riv a tiz a tio n
s c h e m e s, a n d e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm a n c e w a s c o n s is te n tly p o o r
fo r a n u m b e r o f y e a rs, y ie ld in g a n in c re a s e i n p o v e rty
(A s c h e r 2 0 0 9 ; S e rv ice 2 0 0 9 : 5 1 8 -5 1 9 , 5 4 0 – 5 4 1 ) . R u le o f
la w d e c lin e d p re c ip ito u s ly as w e ll (S e rv ice 2 0 0 9 : 519, 534;
B u s h k o v itc h 2 0 1 2 : 4 5 2 -4 5 3 ). E c o n o m ic p ro b le m s w e re
e x a c e rb a te d b y th e d is a p p e a ra n c e o f S o v ie t so c ia l e n title
m e n ts , h o w e v e r im p e r f e c t th is m a y h a v e b e e n . E u p h o r ia
gave w a y to f r u s t r a ti o n a n d , fo r so m e , to n o s ta lg ia (S e rv ice
2 0 0 9 : 529). Y e lts in ’s in c o n s is te n t le a d e rs h ip d id n o t h e lp
m a tte r s , n o r d id t h e w a r in C h e c h n y a . I n 199 9 Y e ltsin
e le v a te d V l a d im ir P u t in , firs t to t h e p o s t o f p r im e m in is te r
a n d t h e n a c tin g p re s id e n t, a n d P u t i n w a s th e n e le c te d
p r e s id e n t in 2 0 0 0 .
R u s s ia u n d e r P u t i n h a s b e e n f r u s t r a t i n g to t h o s e w h o
h o p e d t h a t t h e p o s t- S o v i e t t r a n s i t i o n w o u ld le a d to a l ib
e r a l, r e p r e s e n ta t iv e d e m o c r a c y a n d a f u lly c a p it a lis t e c o n
om y. P u t i n ’s k e y g o a ls s e e m to h a v e b e e n to (1) s o lid if y
h is o w n p o w e r b a s e ; (2) c e n tr a l iz e a u th o r i t y (S e rv ic e
2 0 0 9 : 5 5 2 ); (3) s t r e n g th e n t h e s ta te ; (4) c u rb t h e in flu e n c e
o f t h e b u s in e s s le a d e r s o r “o l ig a r c h s ” w h o m ig h t o p p o s e
h i m a n d h is a llie s ; a n d (5 ) re s u m e a m o re a s s e rtiv e fo r
e ig n p o lic y . U n d e r P u t i n , R u s s ia h a s r e a s s e r te d c o n tr o l
o v e r its t r a d i t i o n a l s p h e re s o f in flu e n c e . N o ta b le e x a m
p le s a re R u s s ia ’s d e c isiv e v ic t o r y o v e r G e o r g ia i n 2 0 0 8
a n d its m i l i t a r y in v o lv e m e n t in n e ig h b o r i n g U k r a i n e , i n
c lu d in g R u s s ia ’s a n n e x a ti o n o f C r im e a in 2 0 1 4 . A s u s
t a i n e d in c r e a s e in o il p ric e s in th e m id – 2 0 0 0 s c o n tr ib u te d
to c o n s is te n t R u s s ia n e c o n o m ic g r o w t h a n d a id e d P u t i n ’s
e ffo rts.
P u t i n h a s s o lid if ie d p e r s o n a l c o n tr o l o f R u s s ia n p o l i
tic s . W h i l e t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a s f o r m a ll y i n d e p e n d e n t
b r a n c h e s , fe w d o u b t h is a u th o r i ty . T h is is p e r h a p s c le a r
e s t i n e le c t o r a l p o liti c s , w h e r e R u s s ia is a c a s e o f s o –
c a l le d “c o m p e titi v e a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m ” ( L e v its k y a n d
W a y 2 0 1 0 ). P u t i n h a s f o r m a l ly s a tis f ie d t h e r u le s r e g a r d
i n g t e r m l im i ts , m o v in g to t h e p o s i t io n o f p r i m e m in i s t e r
w h ile a p r o t e g e , D m i t r y M e d v e d e v , a s c e n d e d to th e
p re s id e n c y . F o r a t im e , c o m m e n ta to r s w o n d e r e d w h e t h e r
a n d to w h a t e x te n t M e d v e d e v w o u ld s ta k e o u t a n i n d e
p e n d e n t lin e . H o w e v e r , i t s o o n b e c a m e c le a r t h a t P u t i n
Profile 531
w o u ld r e m a in t h e c e n t r a l f ig u r e in R u s s ia n p o litic s .
P u t i n w a s r e – e l e c t e d to t h e p r e s id e n c y i n 2 0 1 2 , w i t h n u
m e ro u s a ll e g a tio n s o f e le c to r a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a n d w i d e
s p r e a d p u b lic p r o te s ts . T h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n c h a r a c t e r o f t h e
c o n te m p o r a r y R u s s ia n r e g im e is a ls o re v e a le d b y th e
g o v e r n m e n t ’s s e le c tiv e t a r g e t i n g o f p o l it i c a l o p p o n e n ts
fo r p r o s e c u t i o n (S e rv ic e 2 0 0 9 : 5 5 0 ). A s o f 2 0 1 4 a n d e a rly
2 0 1 5 , as o il p r ic e s h a v e d r o p p e d , t h e r e g im e ’s a u th o r i
t a r i a n i s m a n d m i l i ta r i s m h a v e b e c o m e s t i ll m o re
e v id e n t.
Regime and Political Institutions
F ro m a n in s titu tio n a l p e rs p e c tiv e , R u ss ia is a s e m i-
p re s id e n tia l sy ste m . T h e p r e s id e n t a n d th e p r im e m in is te r
b o t h h a v e c o n sid e ra b le p o w e rs. H o w e v e r, in r e a lity in
re c e n t y e a rs, in s tit u t io n s a re n o t as s tr o n g a n d in d e p e n d e n t
as a re v ie w o f t h e ir f o rm a l f e a tu re s m ig h t lea d us to su p p o s e
(as c a n b e se e n in se v e ra l o f th e case s tu d y b o x e s t h a t
follow ). M o s t o b se rv e rs b e lie v e t h a t e v en in h is y e a rs as
p rim e m in is te r, c u r re n t p r e s id e n t V l a d im ir P u t i n w a s t h e
tr u e d e c isio n m a k e r o n k e y issu e s, n o t th e n – p r e s id e n t
D m i tr i M e d v e d e v . O p t im i s t s m ig h t a rg u e t h a t so m e d e g re e
o f in s t itu tio n a l iz e d d e m o c ra c y p e rsists th r o u g h th is p a t
te rn . A f t e r a ll, P u t i n d id n o t a tt e m p t to ig n o re th e c o n s ti
tu ti o n a l r u le t h a t w o u ld have p r e v e n te d h im fro m h o ld in g
a n o th e r c o n se c u tiv e p re s id e n tia l te rm . P e ss im ists, th o u g h ,
w o u ld n o te t h a t h is p e rs o n a l d e c isio n to r u n a g a in fo r
p r e s id e n t e v en w h ile h is ally, M e d v e d e v , h a d a n o th e r te r m
o f e lig ib ility — a n d th e fa c t t h a t M e d v e d e v d id n o t p u b lic ly
c o n te s t t h is — in d ic a te s t h a t th e i n f o r m a l a n d b a c k s ta g e ex
e rcise o f p o w e r w a s f u n d a m e n ta l h e re . P r e s id e n tia l p o w e rs
a re s tr o n g o n p a p e r. T h e p re s id e n t c a n e v en v e to n o –
c o n fid e n c e v o te s in th e le g is la tu re , th o u g h th e s e are su b je c t
to o v e rrid e in th e D u m a . I n p ra c tic e , th o u g h , in th e c u r re n t
sy s te m , P u t i n ’s p e r s o n a l a u th o r it y se e m s m o re i m p o r ta n t
t h a n fo rm a l p o w e rs (see f u r t h e r d is c u s s io n in t h e case stu d y
f o r c h a p te r 10). P e rs o n a lis m is n o t r e s tr ic te d to th e e x ec u
tiv e its e lf: P o litic a l p a r tie s h a v e c o m e to b e a sso c ia te d w ith
le a d in g i n d iv id u a ls in se v e ra l cases. I n s h o r t, c o n te m p o ra ry
R u s s ia n p o litic s s till h a s so m e m in im a l d e m o c ra tic fea
tu r e s , b u t fe w o b se rv e rs n o w r e g a rd it as a f u n c tio n in g
d e m o c rac y .
R e g im e a n d P olitica l In stitu tio n s
Regime Federal Republic
Administrative Divisions Eighty-three or eighty-five units in the Federation, of which twenty-one (or
twenty-two) are formally republics; since annexation in 2014, Russia has claimed
Crimea as a constituent republic and the Crimean city of Sevastopol as a federal
city, but many Western countries do not diplomatically recognize this change.
Executive Branch Semi-presidential: president and prime minister
Selection of Executive President is elected, and appoints the prime minister.
Legislative Branch Bicameral
Lower chamber: State Duma
Upper chamber: Federation Council
Judicial Branch Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority. A Constitutional Court is
responsible for judicial review. There is a separate Superior Court for economic
issues, called the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation.
Political Party System Russia’s is a multiparty system, though some doubt the independence and
efficacy of some of the parties. Important parties include United Russia (the
party of Putin); the Communist Party; and the Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia.
532 Russia (Russian Federation)
Political Culture
A s n o te d in th e “H is to r ic a l D e v e lo p m e n t” se c tio n o f th e s e
c o u n tr y m a te ria ls , R u ss ia h a s lo n g s tru g g le d w i t h its re la
tio n s h ip w it h W e s te r n E u ro p e . O n e s tr o n g p o litic a l c u l
tu r a l te n d e n c y h a s b e e n to w a r d W e s te r n iz a tio n a n d
m o d e rn iz a tio n . T h is h a s m e a n t d iffe re n t t h in g s a t d iffe re n t
tim e s a n d fo r d iffe re n t c o n s titu e n c ie s , in c lu d in g c o n s t itu
tio n a l m o n a rc h y , d e m o c ra tiz a tio n , e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t,
lite ra ry a n d a r tis tic a c h ie v e m e n t, a n d e v en t h e t u r n to so
c ia lism . A n o th e r te n d e n c y , t h o u g h , h a s p u lle d i n th e o p
p o s ite d ire c tio n , e m p h a s iz in g th e id e a o f a d is tin c tiv e ly
R u ss ia n , Slavic, o r O r th o d o x i d e n tity t h a t is d iffe re n t f ro m ,
a n d p e rh a p s s u p e rio r to , W e s te r n E u r o p e a n c u ltu re .
L in k e d t o t h is h a s b e e n R u ss ia ’s h is to ric a b ility to d o m i
n a te th e n a tio n s in its p e rip h e ry , w h ic h h a s l e n t t h e c o u n tr y
a se n se o f i m p o r t a n t g e o p o litic a l s ta tu s . T h u s i t is h a rd ly
s u rp ris in g t h a t R u s s ia n p o litic a l c u ltu r e a f te r t h e fa ll o f th e
S o v ie t U n io n sh o w e d sig n s o f f r u s t r a ti o n a n d loss, b o r d e r
in g o n w h a t so c io lo g ists c a ll “s ta tu s -in c o n s is te n c y ,” as C e n
tr a l a n d E a s te r n E u ro p e w it h d r e w a n d m o v e d in to t h e o rb it
o f W e s te r n E u r o p e a n d th e U n i te d S ta te s. In d e e d , R u ss ia ’s
c o n c e rn s a b o u t so m e o f th e s e c o u n tr ie s ’ e n tr y in to N A T O
c a n o n ly b e p a r tia lly e x p la in e d in te rm s o f n a tio n a l s e c u rity
in te re s t, as t h is in te re s t is b le n d e d w i t h c o n c e rn s a b o u t n a
tio n a l p rid e a n d th e sense t h a t R u ssia h a s a n a tu r a l o r h is
to ric a lly e sta b lis h e d “r i g h t ” to d o m in a te th e s e c o u n trie s .
M o r e g e n era lly , R u ss ia u n d e r w e n t a tr a n s iti o n fro m b e in g a
so c ie ty t h a t saw i ts e l f as b e in g o n th e “r ig h t side o f h is to ry ,”
w i t h a lle g e d ly sc ie n tific c e r t a in ty o f e v e n tu a l tr iu m p h , to
o n e t h a t saw m u c h o f th e g lo b e v ie w th e so c ie ty ’s p o litic a l
a n d e c o n o m ic s tr u c tu r e s as b a c k w a rd (a j u d g m e n t th a t , as
th e p re c e d in g h is to ric a l n a rra tiv e sh o w s, th e c o u n tr y h a s
lo n g b e e n t r y in g to escape). T h e se te n d e n c ie s h a v e n o d o u b t
f a c ilita te d t h e a u th o r ita r ia n fe a tu re s o f th e R u s s ia n g o v e rn
m e n t in th e P u t i n y e a rs, as h e p re s e n ts h i m s e l f as th e o n e
p e rs o n c a p a b le o f r e s to r in g R u ssia ’s “r i g h t f u l ” p lac e in th e
in te r n a tio n a l s ta tu s h ie ra rc h y (on th e im p o r ta n c e o f re s to r
in g R u ss ia ’s im a g e , see S e rv ice 2 0 0 9 : 549). P u t i n c a n also
d ra w o n n o tio n s m e n tio n e d e a rlie r o f R u ss ia as “d if f e r e n t”
fro m W e s te r n E u r o p e a n d sp e c ia l, a r g u in g t h a t R u s s ia n
d e m o c ra c y is lik e w ise d iffe re n t fro m t h e d e m o c ra c y o f
o t h e r c o u n trie s . A t th e sa m e tim e , so m e sc h o la rs have
p o in te d to s u p p o s e d h ig h levels o f R u s s ia n s u p p o r t fo r
d e m o c ra tic v a lu e s as a c o u n te rw e ig h t to th is s o r t o f n a r ra
tiv e (B ro w n 2 0 0 6 : 3 9 3 -3 9 4 ).
A n o t h e r k e y f e a tu r e o f R u s s ia ’s p o litic a l c u lt u r e in
r e c e n t y e a rs h a s b e e n w id e s p r e a d c o r r u p ti o n . A s a f e a tu r e
o f p o litic a l c u ltu r e , c o r r u p t io n a c ts b o t h d ir e c tly a n d
t h r o u g h p e r c e p tio n s . I n o t h e r w o rd s , th e a c tu a l c o r r u p
t io n p ro d u c e s c e r t a in c o n s e q u e n c e s , b u t p e rc e p tio n s o f
c o r r u p t i o n fa c ilita te c e r t a in k i n d s o f p o litic s . M a n y c o m
m e n ta to r s , b o t h i n R u s s ia a n d a b ro a d , a lle g e t h a t R u s s ia n
e c o n o m ic lib e r a l iz a tio n w a s m is m a n a g e d , le a d in g to o li
g a r c h i c a l p o litic s i n th e 1 9 9 0 s. S u p p o r te r s t r i e d to j u s t if y
P u t i n ’s m o re a u th o r i t a r i a n t u r n as a n e c e s s a ry r e s p o n s e to
s u c h d e v e lo p m e n ts , y e t in c e r ta in r e s p e c ts it h a s le d to
w e a k r u le o f la w a n d o n g o in g c o r r u p ti o n in b o t h e c o n o m
ics a n d p o litic s , e v e n w h ile o r d e r w a s r e s t o r e d (B ro w n
2 0 0 6 : 395).
Political Economy
R u ssia is a f a s c in a tin g case fo r p o litic a l e c o n o m is ts b e ca u se
it h a s w itn e s s e d a s h if t fro m a la rg e ly a g r a r ia n e conom y, to
s ta te -le d i n d u s t r ia liz a tio n a n d c e n tr a l p la n n in g u n d e r th e
S o v ie t U n io n , to a b u m p y t r a n s itio n to a m a r k e t econom y.
T h e S o v ie t sy s te m w a s a c o m m a n d e conom y. T h is m e a n s
t h a t th e sta te w a s re sp o n sib le fo r m a jo r d e cisio n s a b o u t i n
v e s tm e n t, p ro d u c tio n ta rg e ts , a n d th e so c ia l o rg a n iz a tio n o f
e c o n o m ic life . F ro m th e p e rsp e c tiv e o f c o n te m p o ra ry e c o
n o m ic s, th is lea d s to in efficie n cies, since m a rk e ts a re ju d g e d
m o re c a p a b le t h a n sta te f u n c tio n a r ie s o f h a n d lin g th e c o m
p le x a rra y s o f in f o r m a tio n a b o u t p ric in g , supply, a n d
d e m a n d . O v e r t h e lo n g h a u l th e S o v ie t U n io n d i d n o t
m a tc h th e e c o n o m ic p e rfo rm a n c e o f th e a d v a n c e d c a p ita lis t
so c ie tie s. I t d id , h o w e v e r, h a v e p e rio d s o f s tr o n g g r o w th
a n d c le a rly w as su c c e ssfu l in a c h ie v in g in d u s tr ia liz a tio n
(th o u g h th e h u m a n co sts o f t h is w e re v e ry h ig h ). S o m e
w o u ld alle g e t h a t th e S o v ie t sy s te m fa ile d b e c a u se i t d oes
n o t g ive su ffic ie n t in c e n tiv e to e n tr e p r e n e u r ia l a c tiv ity a n d
e n c o u ra g e s a c u ltu r e o f d e p e n d e n c y . I t is h a r d to k n o w h o w
tr u e th is is o f th e R u s s ia n case. O n o n e h a n d , p o p u la r d is
s a tis fa c tio n w i t h th e m a r k e t re fo rm s o f th e 1 9 9 0 s might be
ta k e n to in d ic a te a se n se o f c itiz e n e n ti tle m e n t o f th is so rt.
O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e “sh o c k th e r a p y ” s tra te g y o f R u ss ia n
p riv a tiz a tio n a n d th e p o litic a l a n d e c o n o m ic c o r ru p tio n
t h a t fo llo w e d m ig h t b e to b la m e fo r th is r e a c tio n . P e rh a p s
m o re m e a s u re d e c o n o m ic re fo rm s — w i t h less t u m u ltu o u s
Case Studies 533
e c o n o m ic a n d so c ial c o n se q u e n c e s— w o u ld h a v e m itig a te d
th e im p a c t o f c h a n g e s.
T h e R u s s ia n e c o n o m y saw re la tiv e ly s tr o n g p e rfo rm a n c e
in th e first p a r t o f th is c e n tu ry . R u ssia saw h ig h G D P
g r o w th in t h e 2 0 0 0 s , o w in g in p a r t to h i g h o il p ric e s. T h e
g lo b a l re c e ssio n h i t R u ss ia h a r d in 2 0 0 9 , a n d a f te r a b r ie f
recovery, g r o w th w as e s tim a te d a t o n ly 1.3% in 2 0 1 3 ( C I A
W o r ld F a c tb o o k ). A t p re s e n t, w it h th e r e c e n t fa ll in o il
p ric e s, p o te n tia lly se rio u s e c o n o m ic p ro b le m s lo o m , a n d
th is c o u ld b e e x a c e rb a te d b y in te r n a t io n a l s a n c tio n s a g a in s t
R u s s ia n b a n k s a n d c o m p a n ie s fo llo w in g R u ss ia ’s in c u rs io n
in to U k r a in e in 2 0 1 4 . A s o f 2 0 1 3 , th e c o u n tr y ’s g in i coef
fic ie n t sto o d a t 3 9 .7 ( W o rld B a n k e s tim a te ), w i th a s lig h tly
m o re e q u a l in c o m e d is tr ib u tio n t h a n th e U n ite d S ta te s,
th o u g h m o re u n e q u a l t h a n m o s t o f W e s t e r n E u ro p e . R u ssia
r e m a in s a so c ie ty w i t h a re la tiv e ly h ig h level o f in d u s tr ia l
iz a tio n . O f its G D P , 4 .2 p e r c e n t is p ro d u c e d b y t h e a g ric u l
tu r a l se c to r a n d 37.5 p e rc e n t b y in d u s try , w i t h th e service
se c to r a c c o u n tin g fo r th e r e m a in in g 5 8 .3 p e r c e n t o r so
( C I A W o r ld F a c tb o o k ). T h e o il a n d n a tu r a l g a s in d u s trie s
a re p a rtic u la rly i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n ts o f t h e R u s s ia n
e conom y, a n d th e c o u n tr y d e p e n d s u p o n th e p ro c e e d s o f its
e x p o rts to E u ro p e .
R u ss ia faces a se ries o f so c ia l p ro b le m s l in k e d in d iffe r
e n t w ays to its e c o n o m ic f o r tu n e s , in c lu d in g h ig h ra te s o f
a lc o h o lis m a n d d r u g a d d ic tio n , a h i g h c rim e ra te , re la tiv e ly
lo w life e x p e c ta n c y , a n d a v e ry lo w b i r t h ra te , p a r tic u la r ly
a m o n g e th n ic R u s s ia n s , p r o d u c in g c h a lle n g in g d e m o
g ra p h ic issu e s. A lc o h o lis m h a s lo n g b e e n a p ro b le m in
R u ss ia , b u t i t se e m s to h a v e in c re a s e d d u r in g th e t u m u l t u
o u s y e a rs fo llo w in g th e c o lla p se o f t h e S o v ie t U n io n . T he
sa m e is tr u e o f life e x p e c ta n c y , w h ic h fe ll n o ta b ly as e c o
n o m ic p ro b le m s m o u n te d in t h e y e a rs a f te r th e tra n s itio n .
P o v e r ty j u m p e d d ra m a tic a lly , a n d as c rim in o lo g is ts w o u ld
p r e d ic t, a ll else b e in g e q u a l th is lea d s to in c re a s in g c rim e .
Y e t h e re , as w i t h o t h e r m a jo r so c ia l p ro b le m s fa c e d b y th e
R u s s ia n s ta te to d a y , th e e x p la n a tio n c a n n o t ju s t t u r n t o e c o
n o m ic s. R a th e r, th e fa ilu re o f t h e sta te to e sta b lis h ru le o f
la w a n d th e r e s u ltin g c o r ru p tio n , c ro n y is m , a n d im p u n ity
m e n tio n e d p re v io u s ly — a re n o d o u b t a lso im p lic a te d i n o n
g o in g h ig h ra te s o f c rim e . T h e d e c lin e o f th e e th n ic R u ss ia n
p o p u la tio n is p o te n tia lly q u ite p ro b le m a tic , p a r tic u la r ly
g iv e n th e h ig h levels o f x e n o p h o b ia a n d n a tiv is m a m o n g
e th n ic R u ssia n s: I f th e d e m o g ra p h ic s d o n o t c h a n g e , R u ssia
w ill n e e d to d e p e n d m o re o n i m m ig r a n t la b o r, b u t g iv en
R u ss ia ’s t r a d itio n s , th is m ig h t g e n e ra te f u r t h e r p ro b le m s.
CASESTUDIES
7
Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia CHAPTER 7, PAGE 153
Russia’s political development has been
mixed since the fall of the Soviet Union in
1991. An optimistic burst of activity in the
early 1990s pushed the country from
Soviet rule toward a greater emphasis on
individual rights, but the country is now
widely considered to be under authoritar
ian rule, or at least to be moving decisively
toward centralization. At best, Russia can
be seen as a hybrid regime with many au
thoritarian features that blends in some
elements of electoral democracy. Russia’s
trajectory since 1991 is one in which a de
mocratizing moment has been followed
by a return to more centralized power and
decision making by a closed set of eco
nomic and political elites.
In the early 1990s, as the former Soviet
Union crumbled, Russia moved toward
more open and democratic rule under
the erratic president Boris Yeltsin. The
country also moved to a more open
economy as privatization turned state en
terprises over to private hands. Despite
the excitement of the reforms, the stron
gest lasting image of this period is prob
ably the dysfunctional transfer of
economic power in which Russia
developed only weak state institutions
and lacked a rule of law. This gave rise to a
corrupt network of “oligarchs,” newly
wealthy tycoons that operated in a style
reminiscent of the mafia, especially in the
areas of oil and natural gas. Privatization
was seen going in step with democratiza
tion by giving individuals more freedoms,
but the practice led to the creation of
mega-rich corporate bosses that came to
dominate the economy due to privileged
connections to the state at the time of
privatization. The result was a massive
concentration of wealth in the hands of a
534 Russia (Russian Federation)
CASE STUDY (continued)
Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia c h a p t e r ? ,p a g e 153
few elites who were well connected to
the state. As one observer noted, “an oli
garch’s success, in other words, almost
always depended on his connections to
the government officials in charge of
privatizing the country’s rich energy and
mineral deposits” (Goldman 2004: 36).
The oligarchs exercised considerable con
trol in Russian politics under Yeltsin and
contributed to the breakdown of the rule
of law, even bankrolling Yeltsin’s cam
paign in exchange for options to pur
chase state assets at favorable prices
(Rose, Mishler, and Munro 2006:64).
While the emergence of the oligarchs
thus undermined the rule of law under
Yeltsin in the 1990s, cracking down on
them also compromised democracy and
facilitated the rise of new authoritarianism
under Vladimir Putin. During his presi
dency, Putin used state power to suppress
powerful adversaries, most notably the
oligarchs. A key period was 2003 to 2005.
In that time, the Putin government jailed
Russia’s wealthiest oligarch, the outspo
ken Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and prose
cuted him on charges of tax fraud. The
Putin administration renationalized his oil
firm Yukos, transferring the resources to
the Russian state, in what was widely seen
as a deliberate attack on the power of oli
garchs who might get out of line (for ex
ample, by funding political opponents of
Putin and his allies). The move signaled
that Putin would allow no dissent, though
the government would work with oli
garchs that supported Putin and his ver
sion of “managed democracy” (Colton
and McFaul 2003; Goldman 2004: 36).
Many of the wealthy beneficiaries of Rus
sia’s 1990s privatization have either
learned to work closely with the state or
have been harassed by the state. The oli
garchy has thus increasingly come under
state pressure or state control.
Putin’s centralization of authority has
taken on several forms, and the year 2004
was important on many fronts besides
the crackdown on Khodorkovsky. A major
tragedy altered Russian politics when
separatists in the Caucasus region at
tacked a school and massacred more
than three hundred people, mostly
school children; this terror attack plugged
into Putin’s claims that the rule of law and
security required a strong central hand.
Putin abolished gubernatorial elections in
2004 and increasingly cracked down on
non-governmental organizations over
time (Sharafutdinova 2011: 5; Freedom
House 2011).
One of the key features of Russia’s au
thoritarian rule has thus been the removal
of alternative sources of power. The
moves to sideline those oligarchs who
were critical of Putin’s rule have been part
and parcel of a broader centralization of
power and control. One leading com
mentator notes that Russia is actually
quite similar to other authoritarian re
gimes in middle-income countries: It is
not a totalitarian dictatorship, but “Putin
has reduced the role of parliament, in
creased state control over the media, and
overseen the renationalization of two
major oil companies” (Treisman 2011:342).
The assertion of power over political insti
tutions has gone hand in hand with the
state’s establishment of control over the
economy. We return to Putin and his style
of rule in the case studies that follow.
Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers
In the 2012 elections, Vladimir Putin re
turned to Russia’s presidency, after having
previously been president from 2000 to
2008. What is especially striking about
recent years, however, is the way Putin
exercised substantial executive power
while he was not the president. In fact,
President Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012)
was seen by many as a near-puppet who
never emerged from Putin’s shadow.
Medvedev was widely viewed as Putin’s
protege and as owing his political career
to his predecessor. This case raises the
issue of the formal and informal sources
CHAPTER 10, PAGE 234
of executive power. Putin created a presi
dency that has strong formal powers, but
it is clear his informal powers and control
over much of Russian politics-are even
more significant.
Medvedev’s relative weakness com
pared with Putin was not for a lack of
Case Studies 535
formal powers of the presidency. The
prime minister is appointed by the presi
dent with the consent of the legislature,
the Duma. The prime minister is thus re
sponsible both to the president and to
the Duma, and can be dismissed by either.
Under normal circumstances, the presi
dent would seem to have considerable
authority over the prime minister. In fact,
the dominance of the presidency was
clear during Putin’s first two terms (2000—
2008), but power seemed to remain more
with Putin than with the office of the
presidency once Russia’s strongman
changed offices.
During his first two terms as president,
Putin concentrated authority over secu
rity decisions, the budget, and policymak
ing, especially relative to Russia’s first
elected president, Boris Yeltsin (1991—
1999). Yet Putin seemed to carry similar
power over to the position of prime minis
ter, presiding over the State Duma in the
legislative branch. In a Russia where de
mocracy has been under increasing au
thoritarian pressures, Putin has wielded
extraordinary power over both the execu
tive and legislature, first as president and
then as prime minister. The peculiarity is
that Putin for a time wielded his power as
prime minister in a system in which he
concentrated so much power in the
presidency.
Putin’s apparent dominance of the po
litical system in the period in question was
not spelled out in the constitution. Rather,
the underpinnings of his power were (and
remain) more numerous and less explicit.
He is, for instance, a former head of the
intelligence services (formerly the KGB
under Soviet rule) and tightly linked to the
security apparatus. He also has close link
ages to businesses owned or supported
by the state, some of which are corrupt
and rely upon Putin’s power apparatus for
their power and wealth. Putin exercises
leverage over appointments in the media
and judiciary. These informal sources of
power— which are more a function of the
individual’s leverage than the constitu
tional post that he holds— enabled him to
retain effective control in Russia even
while outside of the presidency. Indeed,
the effects of this can be seen even in the
process that led to Putin’s return to the
presidency. Putin maneuvered in such a
way that the incumbent president de
clared that Putin should reclaim the post,
even though Medvedev was eligible to
run for a second term. Indeed, Medvedev
signed a law extending the next presiden
tial term from four years to six, with the full
knowledge that Putin was likely to run
once again.
One thing is clear: for the period from
1999 to the present, one man has domi
nated Russian politics, even though he
has held different political leadership po
sitions during that time.
Personalism and the Party System in Russia CHAPTER 11, PAGE 265
Russia illustrates the challenge and im
portance of party system institutionaliza
tion. During the Soviet period from 1918
to 1991, the party system was focused on
the single party, the Communist Party.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia became a country where the po
litical party system lost much of its struc
ture. Russia saw some major parties
emerge— and the Communists remained
a minority party— but many of these
came and went. In more recent years,
Vladimir Putin has accumulated more
power, but not through constructing a
well-institutionalized party to contest
democratic elections. On the contrary,
Russia’s poorly institutionalized party
system has facilitated authoritarian ten
dencies even in the absence of single
party rule.
To continue building on the themes of
the previous boxes, the Putin years have
seen significant centralization of power.
But the United Russia party that has
backed Putin has taken a back seat to a
more personal system of rule. As Kathryn
Stoner-Weiss (2006: 114) describes Putin’s
presidency through his first term, he had
“assiduously avoided any official affiliation
with any national political party, prefer
ring instead to rule in a non-transparent
fashion through family members and
longtime friends.”
Personalism is not limited exclusively to
Putin and the United Russia party. Another
leading party has also become associated
with their particular leadership: the Liberal
Democratic Party under the erratic and un
predictable xenophobe Vladimir Zhiri
novsky. Perhaps more significantly, Russians
felt little affinity for parties even after the
transition from Soviet rule to a multiparty
536 Russia (Russian Federation)
Personalism and the Party System in Russia
system in the 1990s (Mainwaring 1998).
President Boris Yeltsin was nominally an in
dependent during his time in office. This
meant that the political party system never
institutionalized before the Putin years; in
stead, Russians generally expressed dissat
isfaction with the emergence of party
options, which may have contributed to
a desire for a strong central hand in the
long run (Sharafutdinova 2011). In other
words, the weak institutionalization of
parties— with their weak links to society
and lack of consistent programmatic alter
natives— facilitated the rise of powerful
actors such as Putin who work around
institutions.
This prevalence of personalism in Rus
sian politics is a clear demonstration of
how political development and political
institutions interact. The box on chapter 7
shows how Russian authoritarianism con
sists of centralized decision making that is
CHAPTER 11, PAGE 265
tightly linked to the personalism of the
president. Similarly, the legislature has
been reshaped in a way that facilitates
central control, while the structure of the
executive seen in chapter 10 clearly facili
tates personalism. In short, the various fea
tures of Russian politics work together to
create a top-down system. Personalism is
thus a theme that shows how the various
institutions of government link to other
features of a society’s political culture.
Karl Marx expected that the great revolu
tion against capitalism would come in a
highly developed capitalist society like
Britain. If he had lived long enough to
see it, he might have been surprised that
it was in Russia where the most iconic
revolution in his name would be made
(Fitzpatrick 1994:26-27).
The setting for the Russian Revolution
of 1917 was made over many years. By the
late nineteenth century, it was clear that
the Czarist regime (Russian monarchs
were called czars) was falling behind the
rest of Europe and needed reform. In
1905, this produced Russia’s so-called lib
eral revolution,” which ended with a weak
constitutional monarchy. However, this
did not stop political agitation. Though
Russia was a largely agrarian society, fig
ures like Leon Trotsky (and Vladimir Lenin,
though he was in exile for many years) as
well as lesser-known figures, led or influ
enced socialist organizing in the face of
ongoing repression. Lenin in particular is
famous for insisting on party discipline
(Fitzpatrick 1994: 30-31): Though his
group was numerically smaller than some
other groups demanding change, their
organization and unanimity may have
been key to their success. Russia’s involve
ment in the First World War weakened the
state’s position in society, and the Czar fell
in early 1917. In the fall, the provisional
government collapsed and the Soviets,
largely controlled by the Bolsheviks, as
sumed increasing authority. Russia with
drew from the First World War in early
1918, and civil war broke out between
groups of “red” and “white” Russians. This
conflict lasted several years, but in the end
the Bolshevik forces were victorious.
Through this process the Soviet Union
was born. Until its demise in 1991, the
Soviet Union declared itself to be a Marxist
revolutionary regime. Among other things,
it aimed to ultimately collectivize all of the
‘means of production,” doing away with
the capitalist division of labor. That is, the
state looked to take over economic activ
ity, from industrial factories to agriculture
to shops. According to Marxist theory, this
would do away once and for all with
exploitation and other classes beyond the
working class. Eventually, there would be
no more need for a coercive state. This is
not what happened in practice. While the
regime was indeed somewhat successful
in redistributing wealth, it was very author
itarian. Indeed, the state became highly
coercive and totalitarian, attempting to
control not just the economy, but even po
litical thought. Especially under Joseph
Stalin, the Soviet Union’s human rights
abuses were legion (Service 2009: 220-
229). Millions were killed by the state. The
regime also came to dominate much of
Central and Eastern Europe.
The Russian Revolution was, however,
without a doubt one of history’s most
dramatic social revolutions. It radically
transformed not just the structure of
politics in Russian society, but the state’s
role in the economy and the nature
of social stratification both within that
society and in the world outside of it. In
fact, by becoming the leading example
of communism, it had a transformative
effect on politics around the world.
Case Studies 537
A number of societies turned to socialism
in the twentieth century, but the most
iconic exemplification of this ideology
was the Soviet Union, brought into being
by the great Russian Revolution discussed
in the previous case study.
It is important to recognize that how
ever much the society violated these
claims, the Soviet Union claimed to be
democratic, indeed, more democratic
than the capitalist West. In essence, de
fenders of this view can draw on early
ideas of Marx’s, that representative de
mocracy is not enough, given that unfree
dom is not just a lack of political
representation but more fundamentally
alienation produced by the division of
labor. Given the Marxist view of history as
class struggle moving inexorably forward,
it was not felt that the “bourgeoisie” or in
dividuals thought to have bourgeois
values and interests at heart ought to be
given representation in a democracy.
Rather, the proletariat was imagined to be
the demos, and methods and practices
many observers would regard as authori
tarian and antidemocratic were said to be
justified in relation to serving their alleged
“class interest.” It is, of course, not hard to
see how such an argument could be ex
ploited by authoritarian party leaders to
their advantage.
The Soviet Union had a number of
aims. While Russia was dominant, and
Americans often thought of the Soviet
Union as “the Russians,” the Soviet Union
claimed to be multinational and based on
class rather than national identity. It came
to incorporate many other societies. It
tried, with considerable success, to force
the ongoing industrialization of its under
lying societies. It tried, with mixed success,
to transform agricultural productivity. Per
haps most important, it aimed to serve as
the vanguard in a global revolution that
would end capitalism everywhere. We
would not want to exaggerate the extent
of ideological uniformity in the Soviet
Union, especially in the early years. First, it is
worth noting that Leninism differed on
certain points from Orthodox Marxism, at
least as understood by some others. In par
ticular, some doubt whether Marx would
have thought Russia, with its relatively brief
period of industrialization and its only very
recent turn to constitutional monarchy (in
its “bourgeois revolution” of 1905), to be
the appropriate site for revolution, as men
tioned in the previous case study, though
Marx and Engels did allude to this possibil
ity in a late, Russian-language edition of the
Communist Manifesto. Lenin, however,
saw conditions as propitious. Moreover,
Lenin emphasized the efficacy of a strong
“vanguard” party leading the revolution
(there were some textual sources in Marx
for this idea, but it is recognized that
Lenin took it further). Beyond variation in
ideology between Lenin and Marx, it is
worth noting that, particularly in the early
years, there were ideological differences
among the leaders of the Soviet Union,
most famously reflected in the conflict be
tween Stalin and Trotsky (who was forced
into exile in Mexico and later killed there).
Stalin’s repression of dissent temporarily
reduced the public expression of ideologi
cal dissent, but his successors partially re
pudiated some of his initiatives.
The ideological conflict between so
cialism and liberalism in the post-war
period issued in the “Cold War,” a period
of intense but indirect conflict between
the Soviet Union and its allies, on one side,
and the United States and its allies on the
other. It may seem hard to imagine now,
but it was by no means clear to all observ
ers that the United States or liberalism
would triumph.
The Soviet Union committed mass
atrocities, especially under Stalin. This
caused many international observers
who were previously sympathetic to
turn against the regime. Indeed, follow
ing the Soviet Union’s weakening and
collapse over the course of the late
twentieth century, many considered the
broader ideology of socialism to be to
tally discredited, though this judgment
has been disputed by those who argue
that the Soviet Union was not a true and
accurate test of socialist ideology.
538 Russia (Russian Federation)
Research Prompts
1. Russia has a notable tradition of authoritarian politics. How
would you account for authoritarian persistence in Russia? What
would the major theories from chapter 7 say about this case?
2. Compare the reforms of Gorbachev to the reforms of Deng
Xiaoping in China. What is similar about the circumstances they
faced, and what are the major differences in this respect? What
was different about their respective strategic approaches to
reform? To what extent can the recent political and economic
trajectories of these two societies be traced to different ap
proaches to and processes of reform?
3. The Russian Revolution of 1917 produced a dramatic series of
political, social, and economic changes. Compare that revolu
tion to the French and Chinese Revolutions. Can a common
causal framework explain all three? What if we add the Iranian
Revolution to the mix?
4. Russia is a useful case for proponents of the idea that the con
temporary world is increasingly populated by “hybrid,” “gray
zone,” and “competitive authoritarian” systems. What does
Russia show us about the democratic status of such systems? Is
a “hybrid” regime half democratic? Or is democratization a
threshold status of which hybrid regimes fall short?
5. Russian politics is characterized by personalism and a high
degree of centralization and authoritarian decision making.
This is reflected in various institutions, as seen in the various
case studies presented above. Would reforming one of these
institutions alter the Russian political culture, or would
changing institutional designs be ineffective without a
deeper change in the culture? If institutional reform would
be helpful, what institution would be the most useful one to
change? Since your answer will be forward-looking and
speculative, what sorts of evidence could you find from com
parative study or from within-case comparison to support
your claim?
539
United Kingdom
PROFILE
Key Features o f the C o n te m p o r a r y United King dom
Population: 63,742,977 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 243,610 square kilometers
Head of State: Queen Elizabeth II (1952-present)
Head of Government: David Cameron (prime minister, 2010-present)
Capital: London
Year of Independence: Never colonized. Political arrangements linking
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England have
changed overtime.
Year of Current
Constitution:
Common law system; there is no formal constitution,
though the Magna Carta dates back to the thirteenth
century.
Languages: English is the majority language. Other languages
include Scots, Scottish Gaelic, Irish, and Welsh.
GDP per Capita: $41,787 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
Human Development
Index Ranking (2014):
14th (very high human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014.
Introduction
I t is o f te n n o t e d t h a t th e U n ite d K in g d o m is
a n is la n d so c iety , a n d t h a t th is h a s h a d im
p o r t a n t im p lic a tio n s fo r its d e v e lo p m e n t. I t
is re la tiv e ly sm a ll, c o m p ris in g o n ly a b o u t
2 4 4 ,0 0 0 s q u a re k ilo m e te rs , a n d y e t in sev
e ra l i m p o r t a n t w ay s it p io n e e re d k e y fe a tu re s
o f m o d e r n p o litic s . W h i l e it lac k s a fo rm a l,
w r i t te n c o n s titu tio n , it w a s p e rh a p s t h e soci
e ty in w h ic h th e id e a o f a “c o n s titu tio n a l
o r d e r ” firs t e m e rg e d . I ts p a r lia m e n t su rv iv e d
th e rise o f a b so lu tism (or, as so m e w o u ld p u t
it, B r ita in n e v e r sa w fu ll-s c a le a b so lu tism a t
all), a n d c o n s t itu tio n a l m o n a rc h y w a s e s ta b
lis h e d early, w i t h th e “G lo rio u s R e v o lu tio n ”
o f 1 6 8 8 -1 6 8 9 . M o re o v e r, m a n y sc h o lars
c o n s id e r i t to h a v e b e e n a m o n g t h e firs t
s o c ie tie s , a n d p o ss ib ly t h e firs t, to e sta b lish
m o d e r n n a tio n a l i d e n tity ( H a s t in g s 1997;
G re e n fe ld 1992; K o h n 1944). F in a lly , B rita in
w a s a le a d c o lo n iz e r, s p re a d in g m a n y o f its
p o litic a l p ra c tic e s a b ro a d . T h e re is a lively
d is c u s s io n a m o n g p o litic a l s c ie n tists a b o u t
w h e th e r B ritis h c o lo n ia lis m p ro d u c e d d e m
o c ra tic i n d e p e n d e n t so c ie tie s fo llo w in g d e
c o lo n iz a tio n (e.g., B e r n h a r d , R e e n o c k , a n d
N o r d s tr o m 2 0 0 4 ).
■ W hite 87.2%
■ Black 3.0%
■ Indian 2.3%
■ Pakistani 1.9%
■ M ixed 2.0%
■ Other 3.7%
Ethnic Groups in the United Kingdom
Note that within the category “white,” more than 80 percent consider
themselves English, with the bulk of the remainder being groups that
consider themselves Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
■ Christianity 59.5%
■ Islam 4.4%
■ Hindu 1.3 %
■ Other 2.0%
■ None 25.7%
■ U n sp e cifie d 7.2%
Religious A ffilia tio n in the United Kingdom
Source: CIA World Factbook.
540 United Kingdom
Edinburi
Newcastle
upon Tynetyne
Liverpool Manchester
• Birmingham
ENGLAND
iardiff FelixstQwi
Bristol \
Southampton
Dover
Falmouth
English Channel
GUERNSEY
ISLAND *
JERSEY
ISLAND
N O R T H
A T L A N T I C
O C E A N
C eltic Sea
SHETLAND
ISLANDS .
Lerwick
HEBRIDES
ORKNEY
ISLANDS ^ c a p a
i Peterhead
SCOTLAND ’ Aberdeen
Dundee/
North
Sea
>
ISLE OF
upon Hull
FRANCE
20 Kilometers
120 Miles
Profile 541
W h i l e th e U n it e d K in g d o m w a s h is t o r ic a ll y a le a d s o
c ie ty in m a n y o f th e s e a re a s , i t is n o w o f te n v ie w e d as
h ig h ly t r a d it io n a li s ti c . U n lik e F r a n c e , i t s ti ll h a s a c o n s ti
t u ti o n a l m o n a rc h y , th o u g h Q u e e n E l i z a b e t h ’s ro le is
la rg e ly s y m b o lic . M o re o v e r, its le g a l s y s te m is a c o m m o n
la w sy s te m in w h ic h t r a d i t io n a l p r a c tic e is d e te r m i n a ti v e
o f o u tc o m e s.
T h e U n ite d K in g d o m , a lo n g w i t h th e U n ite d S ta te s, h a s
b e e n a k e y p r o m o te r o f th e m o d e r n id e o lo g y o f lib e ra lis m ,
h o ld in g t h a t in d iv id u a l rig h ts ; re p re s e n ta tiv e , d e m o c ra tic
g o v e rn m e n t; a n d m a rk e t- d r iv e n e c o n o m ic s a re th e k eys to
p o litic a l m o d e rn ity . T h is is n o t to say t h a t i t h a s la c k e d a
t r a d it io n o f le f t- w in g o r g a n iz in g , a n d t h e le ft i n B r ita in h a s
h is to ric a lly h a d a n u m b e r o f successes, m o s t n o ta b ly i n th e
d e c a d e s im m e d ia te ly fo llo w in g th e S e c o n d W o r ld W a r
(C la rk e 2 0 0 4 : 2 2 1 -2 2 4 ). A m o n g o th e r th in g s , th e B ritis h
le f t p la y e d a k e y role in t h e c o n s tr u c tio n o f th e U n ite d
K in g d o m ’s re la tiv e ly r o b u s t w e lfa re s ta te , in c lu d in g th e
h ig h ly p o p u la r H e a l t h S e rv ice (th e U n ite d K in g d o m ’s
s in g le -p a y e r h e a lt h c are system ).
A s c a n b e se e n in th e p o p u la tio n c h a r t , th e m a jo rity o f
th e p o p u la tio n o f t h e U n i te d K in g d o m is w h ite B rito n s . A s
n o te d , a r o u n d 80 p e rc e n t o f th e s e in d iv id u a ls c o n s id e r
Historical Development
A s n o t e d a lre a d y , t h e U n i t e d K in g d o m (o r G r e a t B r i ta i n ,
a n d b e fo re th e u n i o n w i t h S c o tla n d a n d I r e l a n d , E n g l a n d
its e l f ) is o f t e n v ie w e d as a n “e a r ly m o d e r n i z e r . ” I t w a s
a m o n g t h e f i r s t g r o w t h – o r i e n t e d , m o d e r n e c o n o m ie s
a n d , r e la te d ly , a m o n g t h e f ir s t “c o m m e rc ia l s o c i e ti e s ”
( G r e e n f e ld 2 0 0 1 ). I t w a s th e f ir s t W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n
s o c ie ty to b r e a k f r o m t h e d o m in a n c e o f t h e R o m a n
C a t h o l ic C h u r c h . I t w a s a m o n g t h e f ir s t w i t h a c o n s t i t u
t io n a l o r d e r, t h o u g h i t h a s n o f o r m a l, w r i t t e n , c o n s t it u
t io n . I t s p a r li a m e n t h e lp e d i t to r e s is t ro y a l a b s o lu tis m in
t h e s e v e n te e n th c e n tu r y , t h o u g h th e c o s t o f t h i s w a s c iv il
w a r. I n d e e d , i n t h e m id d le o f t h e s e v e n te e n t h c e n t u r y it
e x is te d as a r e p u b lic , b e f o re t h e R e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e S t u a r t
m o n a r c h y in 1 6 8 8 . S o m e s c h o la r s a r g u e t h a t E n g la n d
w a s t h e f i r s t s o c ie ty to e s ta b lis h a m o d e r n n a t i o n a l
id e n t i t y ( H a s t i n g s 1 9 97; K o h n 1 9 4 4 ; G r e e n f e ld 1 9 9 2 ).
F in a lly , a c c o r d in g to s o m e s c h o la r s (e .g ., P in c u s 2 0 0 9 ) ,
its “G l o r io u s R e v o lu t io n ” o f 1 6 8 8 – 1 6 8 9 w a s t h e firs t
m o d e r n re v o lu tio n .
Y et th is s h o u ld n o t le a d u s to su p p o s e t h a t th e U n ite d
K in g d o m su d d e n ly c am e to a ssu m e a ll o f th e fe a tu re s t h a t
th e m se lv e s to b e E n g lis h , w i t h th e r e m a in d e r id e n tif y in g
th e m s e lv e s as S c o ttis h , N o r t h e r n I r is h , o r W e ls h . A r o u n d
3 p e r c e n t o f t h e U .K . p o p u la tio n is o f A f r ic a n d e sc e n t, w it h
th e m a jo rity o f t h is p o p u la tio n h a v in g d e s c e n d e d fro m im
m ig r a n ts fro m B r ita in ’s fo rm e r C a r ib b e a n a n d A f r ic a n
c o lo n ie s (or h a v in g im m ig r a t e d th em se lv es).
I n re lig io u s te rm s , th e la r g e s t g ro u p in th e U n ite d
K in g d o m , a t n e a r ly 6 0 p e r c e n t, is C h r i s t i a n . H o w e v e r, it
is w o r th k e e p in g s e v e ra l t h in g s i n m in d w h e n y o u i n te r p r e t
t h is . F i r s t , t h e l a r g e s t p o p u l a t i o n w i t h i n t h i s g r o u p is th e
A n g l i c a n C h u r c h , w h ic h is t h e e s ta b l is h e d C h u r c h o f
E n g la n d . S e c o n d , th e o th e r m a jo r g ro u p s w o u ld in clu d e
b o t h o th e r P r o te s ta n t d e n o m in a tio n s as w e ll as R o m a n
C a th o lic s . F in a lly , a la rg e sh a re o f t h is n e a rly 6 0 p e rc e n t is
u n d e r s to o d b y so c ia l s c ie n tists to b e o n ly n o m in a lly
C h r is tia n . I n d e e d , it is o fte n c la im e d t h a t m o re M u s lim s
t h a n A n g lic a n s a tte n d re lig io u s services in th e U n ite d
K in g d o m e a c h w e e k (a fa c t w h ic h , i f tr u e , p o in ts b o th to
lo w levels o f re lig io s ity a m o n g A n g lic a n s a n d h ig h re lig io s
ity a m o n g B ritis h M u s lim s ). I n a n y case, it is c le a r t h a t th e
U n ite d K in g d o m is n o w a re lig io u sly div erse society, a n d
o n e in w h ic h s e c u la riz a tio n h a s b e e n ex te n siv e (B erger,
D a v ie , a n d F o k a s 2 0 0 8 ; B ru c e 2 0 0 4 ).
w e asso c iate w ith p o litic a l m o d e r n ity som e c e n tu rie s ago.
R a th e r, th e p o litic a l h is to r y o f th e B ritis h Isles is a s to ry o f
g r a d u a l c h a n g e w i t h se v e ra l k e y m o m e n ts o f “p u n c tu a te d ”
a n d m o re ra p id tr a n s fo rm a tio n . I n th is se c tio n w e w ill
v e ry b rie fly su rv e y so m e o f t h e k e y p o litic a l d e v e lo p m e n ts
o f th e s e v e n te e n th , e ig h te e n th , n i n e te e n th , a n d tw e n tie th
c e n tu rie s.
I n m u c h o f th e re s t o f E u r o p e , th e s e v e n te e n th c e n tu ry
w a s t h e c e n tu r y o f ro y a l a b s o lu tis m . T h e s ta te g re w as th e
c e n tr a liz in g m o n a r c h m a r g in a l iz e d h is n o b le a n d re lig io u s
o p p o n e n ts . I n E n g la n d , h o w e v er, t h in g s w e re d iffe re n t (for
a n e x c e lle n t o v e rv ie w o f t h is h ig h ly c o m p lic a te d p e rio d , see
K is h la n s k y 1996). P a r lia m e n t re m a in e d p o w e rfu l, a n d
c o u ld o n o c c a sio n s e ffe c tiv e ly re s is t ro y a l e ffo rts to c o lle c t
ta x e s. M o re o v e r, re lig io u s d is s e n t w a s c o m m o n . W h e n th e
k i n g t r ie d to e n fo rc e re lig io u s o rth o d o x y a n d t h e n to force
P a r lia m e n t to c o n s e n t to ta x a tio n , th e C iv il W a r s , w h ic h
p i tt e d t h e “R o u n d h e a d s ” a g a in s t th e ro y a lis t “C a v a lie rs,”
b ro k e o u t. T h e K in g , C h a rle s I , w a s d e p o s e d a n d e v e n tu a lly
e x e c u te d in 1649. O liv e r C ro m w e ll d o m in a te d E n g lis h
(a n d S c o ttis h a n d I ris h ) p o litic s u n t il h is d e a th (K is h la n s k y
542 United Kingdom
H isto rical D e v e lo p m e n t
T i m e l i n e
1215 Magna Carta 1947-1960s Waves of decolonization in India, Africa, the
1530-1534 Break from Rome Caribbean, and elsewhere
1580S-1700 First Wave of English Colonialism 1949 Independence of Ireland (except Northern Ireland)
1600 Establishment of East India Company 1951-1955 Second Churchill Government (Conservative). Con
1642-1651 Civil Wars servative governments will continue until 1964.
1649-1659 Cromwell and the Protectorate (1653-1659) 1956 Suez Crisis
1660 Restoration (Charles II) 1964-1970 James Harold Wilson Government (Labour). Labour
1688-1689 Glorious Revolution (William and Mary) governments will succeed each other until 1979,
1694 Creation of the Bank of England with the exception of the 1970-1974 (Heath) Con
1707 Act of Union (England and Scotland) servative government.
1714 Hanoverians inherit the throne (George I) 1973 United Kingdom joins the Common Market (EC).
1756-1763 Seven Years War 1975 Referendum on Common Market (EC) Membership
1776-1783 American Revolution (Approved)
1798 Major Irish revolt led by Wolfe Tone and 1976-1979 James Callaghan Government (Labour)
the United Irishmen 1979-1990 Margaret Thatcher Government (Conservative).
1801 Act of Union Some efforts to reduce the scope of the welfare
1807 Slave Trade Act state, including notable privatizations.
1832 Reform Act of 1832 1982 Falkland Islands/Malvinas War
1833 Slavery Abolition Act 1990-1997 John Major Government (Conservative)
1867 Voting rights extended 1991 First Iraq War
1911 National Insurance Act (early, very limited welfare 1997 Hong Kong passes from United Kingdom to China.
state development) 1997 Scottish and Welsh voters choose to create their
1914-1918 World War I own legislatures.
1918 Limited women’s suffrage 1997-2007 Tony Blair Government (Labour)
1921 Emergence of Irish Free State 2002 Eurozone begins, but the United Kingdom opts not
1930 Women’s suffrage to participate.
1938 Munich Pact 2003 Beginning of Second Iraq War
1939-1945 World War II 2007-2010 Gordon Brown Government (Labour)
1942 Beveridge Report (very influential in subsequent
welfare state development)
2010-present David Cameron Governments (Conservative/
Liberal Democrats Coalition from 2010 to 2015,
1940-1945 Churchill government Conservative majority after 2015 election)
1945-1951 Labour Government with Clement Atlee as prime
minister. Creation of British welfare state, including
National Health Service (1948).
2014 Scotland referendum on independence fails, with
45% voting for independence and 55% for remain
ing in the United Kingdom.
1996: 1 8 7 -2 1 2 ). O n c e C ro m w e ll w a s g o n e , t h o u g h , th e
c o u n tr y t u r n e d b a c k to th e S tu a r ts , a n d C h a rle s I I w as
c ro w n e d in th e R e s to ra tio n . H e w a s fo llo w e d b y Ja m e s I I ,
w h o w a s c ritic iz e d b e c a u se o f h is C a th o lic le a n in g s . P e r
h a p s m o re im p o r t a n t, Ja m e s I I se t a b o u t to d ra m a tic a lly
s t r e n g th e n th e sta te , in c lu d in g b u ild in g a la rg e r n a v y a n d a
s ta n d in g a rm y (P in c u s 2 0 0 9 ). W i t h th e s u p p o r t o f som e
w e ll-p la c e d B rito n s , how ev er, th e D u t c h S ta d th o ld e r,
W il lia m o f O r a n g e , in v a d e d . H e fa ce d a lm o s t n o re sista n c e ,
a n d h e a n d h is w ife , M a r y (w ho w as a S tu a rt), w e re c ro w n e d
K in g a n d Q u e e n in th e “G lo rio u s R e v o lu tio n .” I n g e n e ra l
t h is p e rio d w itn e s s e d h e ig h te n e d p o litic a l a ctivity, w i th lots
o f coffe e h o u se d isc u ssio n a n d p a m p h le t w r itin g , w h ic h
so m e have a rg u e d le d to th e c re a tio n o f t h e first m o d e rn
“p u b lic s p h e re ” ( H a b e rm a s 1989). I t also w itn e s s e d th e d e
v e lo p m e n t o f th e tw o p a rtie s , th e W h ig s (m o re lib e ra l) a n d
Profile 543
th e T o rie s (m o re c o n se rv a tiv e ) w h o w o u ld d o m in a te B ritis h
p o litic s fo r m a n y y e ars (K is h la n s k y 1996: 3 1 3 -3 3 5 ).
T h e e ig h te e n th c e n tu r y la rg e ly w itn e s s e d a r e tu r n to
s ta b ility (L a n g f o r d 2 0 1 0 ). P o litic a l s t a b iliz a tio n w a s e vi
d e n c e d b y t h e e n d o f J a c o b ite “p r e te n d e r s ” (p e o p le w h o
c la im e d to b e th e tr u e h e irs to th e S t u a r t lin e ) a n d t h e t r a n
s itio n to th e H o u s e o f H a n o v e r. P r im e M i n i s t e r R o b e r t
W a lp o le p ra c tic e d a s o r t o f m a c h in e p o litic s , a n d m a n y
t h i n k o f th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu r y as o n e in w h ic h a k i n d o f
new , c o m m e rc ia l a ris to c ra c y e s ta b lis h e d itself. T h r o u g h o u t
th e c e n tu ry , B r ita in h a d n o ta b le m il ita r y success, b o t h in
th e W a r o f th e S p a n is h S u c c essio n (1 7 0 1 -1 7 1 4 ) a n d i n th e
S e v e n Y ears W a r (1 7 5 6 -1 7 6 3 ), th o u g h it f a ile d in its e ffo rt
to h o ld o n to t h e c o lo n ie s t h a t b e c a m e th e U n it e d S ta te s.
C o m m e rc ia l so c ie ty g re w , a n d in th e se c o n d h a l f o f th e
c e n tu r y B r ita in saw t h e b e g in n i n g s o f th e I n d u s tr ia l R e v o
lu tio n , in w h ic h te c h n o lo g ic a lly a d a p te d m a n u f a c tu r in g ,
e sp e c ia lly o f te x tile s , d ra m a tic a lly e x p a n d e d p r o d u c tiv ity
( H a r v ie 2 0 1 0 : 4 7 5 – 4 8 1 ) . T h is h a d n u m e ro u s c o n se q u e n c e s ,
as it m a d e n e w f o r tu n e s , slow ly b u t su re ly c h a n g e d th e
n a tu r e o f la b o r, a n d le d e v e n tu a lly to th e u r b a n iz a t io n o f
B ritis h society. A t th e sa m e tim e , th e r e is e v id e n c e t h a t a ll
o f th e s e c h a n g e s w e re e x p e rie n c e d b y so m e as d is o rie n tin g .
T h e lite r a tu r e a n d a r t o f t h e e ig h te e n th c e n t u r y sh o w s th is ,
a n d t h e r e w a s a h e ig h te n e d c o n c e rn f o r so c ia l p ro b le m s lik e
p o v e rty a n d s ta rv a tio n , p e rh a p s b e c a u se th e s e w e re i n
c re a s in g ( L a n g f o r d 2 0 1 0 : 4 2 4 – 4 3 8 ) . I n th e re lig io u s field,
n e w fo rm s o f P r o te s t a n tis m e m e rg e d a n d sp re a d , e sp e c ia lly
M e th o d is m , w h ic h w o u ld p la y a c ritic a l role in t h e a b o li
tio n (o f th e sla v ery a n d t h e slave tra d e ) a n d re fo rm m o v e
m e n ts (o f B ritis h p o litic s ) t h a t b e g a n to d e v elo p b y t h e e n d
o f th e c en tu ry .
T h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n tu r y , fo r m u c h o f w h i c h Q u e e n
V ic to ria h e ld t h e th r o n e , w as a tim e o f e x p a n d in g lib e ra l
ism , t h e e x te n sio n o f su ffra g e , a n d t h e so lid ific a tio n a n d ex
p a n s io n o f B ritis h c o lo n ia lism (H a r v ie 2 0 1 0 ; M a t th e w
2010). B e g in n in g e arly in th e la te e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry , a n d
a c c e le ra tin g in t h e n in e te e n th , so m e B ritis h le a d e rs (o ften
W h ig s b u t a lso som e T o rie s) a d v o c a te d e x p a n d in g th e e le c t
o ra te a n d u p d a tin g p a r lia m e n ta r y re p re s e n ta tio n to m a k e it
m o re re p re se n ta tiv e o f th e in d u s tr ia liz in g a n d u r b a n iz in g
so c iety t h a t B r ita in h a d b e c o m e . A t th e sa m e t im e , p o p u la r
a c to rs c a m e to m a k e m o re d e m a n d s o n g o v e r n m e n t (T illy
1 997). T h e R e fo rm A c t o f 1832 e x p a n d e d th e v o te , th o u g h
o n e s ti ll n e e d e d to h a v e p r o p e r t y to v o te e v e n a f te r t h is
a c t. H o w e v e r, so c ia l m o v e m e n t a c tiv ity b e g a n to d e v elo p ,
p e rh a p s m o s t n o ta b ly th e “C h a r t i s t m o v e m e n t,” w h ic h
d r e w o n in d u s tr ia l w o rk e rs a n d u s e d s trik e s a n d d e m o n
s tra tio n s i n its e ffo rt to e x p a n d su ffra g e a n d r e p re s e n ta tio n
(H a r v ie 2 0 1 0 : 4 9 8 – 4 9 9 ) . F u r t h e r v o tin g re fo rm to o k place
in 1867, w h e re su ffra g e w a s e x te n d e d , th o u g h o n ly to
(som e) m a le s a n d in a w a y t h a t b y to d a y ’s s t a n d a rd s w o u ld
s till b e c o n s id e re d h ig h ly re s tric te d .
B r ita in ’s t w e n ti e th – c e n t u r y e x p e rie n c e (lik e t h a t o f
o t h e r a d v a n c e d in d u s t r ia l so c ieties o f th e tim e ) w as larg e ly
s h a p e d b y t h e tw o w o rld w a rs a n d th e G r e a t D e p re s s io n
( M o r g a n 2 0 1 0 b ; C la r k e 2 0 0 4 ). W o r ld W a r I w a s e n o r
m o u sly c o stly in te rm s o f b o t h liv es a n d re s o u rc e s , b u t
B r ita i n a n d its a llie s e m e rg e d v ic to rio u s . V o tin g r ig h ts w e re
f u r t h e r e x te n d e d in th e p o s t- w a r y e a rs, n o ta b ly to w o m e n .
A s o f 1 918, w o m e n o v e r t h i r t y w h o m e t c e r ta in c o n d itio n s
c o u ld v o te , a n d a f te r 1928 a ll m e n a n d w o m e n o v e r tw e n ty –
o n e w e re a ble to e xercise th is rig h t. B r ita in , lik e m o s t o f th e
w o rld , su ffe re d se rio u s e c o n o m ic d iffic u ltie s in th e late
19 2 0 s a n d t h e 1 9 3 0 s. T h e c o u n tr y a im e d to sta y o u t o f
W o r ld W a r I I , a n d P r im e M i n i s t e r N e v ille C h a m b e r la in
fa m o u s ly a p p e a s e d H i t le r a t M u n i c h , b u t th e y w e re e v e n tu
a lly fo rc e d to p a rtic ip a te i n th e w a r a f te r G e r m a n y in v a d e d
P o la n d . W h i l e n o t as m a n y B ritis h so ld ie rs d ie d in W o rld
W a r I I as in W o r ld W a r I , f ig h tin g w a s in te n s e , a n d B rito n s
h a d to face c o n s ta n t G e r m a n a ir ra id s , w h ic h k ille d a n es
t im a te d s ix ty th o u s a n d c iv ilia n s ( M o r g a n 2 0 1 0 b ).
A s w e d isc u ss f u r t h e r la te r in t h is p ro file , in th e p o s t
w a r y e a rs t h e L a b o u r P a r t y w a s a s c e n d a n t, a n d i t w o rk e d to
c o n s tr u c t th e B ritis h w e lfa re sta te (C la rk e 2 0 0 4 : 2 1 6 – 2 4 7 ) .
T h is w e lfa re s ta te h a s b e e n s o m e w h a t re d u c e d in su b s e
q u e n t y e a rs, e s p e c ia lly i n th e a d m i n is tr a tio n o f M a r g a r e t
T h a tc h e r (1 9 7 9 -1 9 9 0 ), b u t i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n ts o f it
h a v e b e e n re m a rk a b ly re s ilie n t ( P ra s a d 2 0 0 6 ). A n o th e r ,
m a jo r, t w e n ti e th – c e n t u r y d e v e lo p m e n t w a s t h e s h r i n k in g
a n d e v e n tu a l d is a p p e a ra n c e o f th e B r itis h E m p ir e (C la rk e
2 0 0 4 ). O n c e i t h a d s tr e tc h e d a cro ss th e g lo b e , b u t in th e
m id – to la te t w e n tie th c e n t u r y a lm o s t a ll o f th e U n ite d
K in g d o m ’s c o lo n ie s a c h ie v e d i n d e p e n d e n c e , th o u g h m o s t
r e ta in e d so m e tie s to B r ita in a n d to e a c h o t h e r t h r o u g h th e
C o m m o n w e a lth o f N a tio n s (in itia lly c a lle d th e B ritis h
C o m m o n w e a lth ) . T h e U n ite d K in g d o m a lso slow ly
a c h ie v e d p a r ti a l, i f c o n tro v e rs ia l, i n te g r a t io n w i t h E u ro p e ,
j o in i n g t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i tie s in 1973, th o u g h it d e
c id e d n o t to a d o p t t h e e u ro , a n d e v en as p o w e rs w e re p a r
tia lly d e v o lv e d to S c o ttis h a n d W e ls h le g is la tu re s in t h e
la te 1 9 9 0 s.
544 United Kingdom
Regime and Political Institutions
G o v e r n m e n t in th e U n ite d K in g d o m is b a s e d o n th e p r in
ciple o f p a r lia m e n ta r y so v e reig n ty , w h ic h h o ld s t h a t P a rlia
m e n t (a n d p a rtic u la rly th e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s ) is th e
su p re m e la w m a k in g b o d y , a n d t h a t w h a te v e r it v o tes in to
la w is d e e m e d c o n s titu tio n a l. A c ts o f P a r lia m e n t a re n o t
su b je c t to ju d ic ia l re v ie w a n d c a n b e o v e r tu r n e d o n ly by
s u b s e q u e n t a cts o f P a rlia m e n t. W h i l e th e le g is la tu re is su
p re m e , th e exec u tiv e b r a n c h o f g o v e r n m e n t is p o w e rfu l,
b e in g le d b y a p r im e m in is te r w h o is se le c te d b y m a jo rity
v o te o f th e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s .
T h e p r im e m in is te r is r o u tin e ly th e le a d e r o f t h e p a r t y
w i n n i n g t h e m o s t se a ts i n th e p a r lia m e n ta r y e le c tio n s ,
a n d h e /s h e in t u r n se le c ts a c a b in e t t h a t p ro p o s e s a n d
p re s e n ts m o s t b ills fo r p a s s a g e i n to la w b y th e b r o a d e r
H o u s e . T h is g o v e r n m e n t re m a in s i n office fo r a te r m o f u p
to five y e a rs , as lo n g as i t m a in ta i n s th e “c o n fid e n c e ” o f th e
H o u s e o f C o m m o n s ; e le c tio n s m u s t b e h e ld a t le a s t e v e ry
five y e a rs , a n d t h e e x e c u tiv e c a n b e r e e le c te d fo r m u ltip le
te rm s . P a r lia m e n t h a s th e p o w e r to “b r i n g d o w n ” th e
p r im e m i n i s t e r ’s g o v e r n m e n t b y a m a jo r ity v o te o f n o c o n
fid e n c e (or b y d e f e a t o f a m a jo r b ill, w h ic h is o f te n in te r
p r e te d as a v o te o f n o c o n fid e n c e ), w h i le t h e p r im e m in i s t e r
h a s t h e p o w e r to d isso lv e P a r lia m e n t a n d a s k t h e m o n a r c h
to c a ll fo r a n e w e le c tio n . D is s o lu tio n m a y h a p p e n e ith e r
w h e n t h e e x e c u tiv e b e lie v e s P a r l ia m e n t is u n a b le to
g o v e rn , o r w h e n th e p r im e m in is t e r se n se s a n e le c to ra l a d
v a n ta g e i n c a l lin g a n e le c tio n . I n g e n e r a l, b ills p r o p o s e d
b y th e p r im e m in i s t e r ’s g o v e r n m e n t a re p a s s e d b y th e
H o u s e o f C o m m o n s , d u e to s t r o n g d is c ip lin e w i t h i n p o
litic a l p a r tie s .
R e g im e a n d P olitical In stitu tio n s
Regime Constitutional monarchy, with parliamentary democracy
Powers in Constitution No formal written constitution; but widely considered to include certain established laws and
rights that are assumed to have constitutional status
Administrative Divisions Great Britain (includes England, Scotland, and Wales) and Northern Ireland; three island
dependencies (Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey); over a dozen overseas territories (British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Falkland Islands, etc.)
Executive Branch Prime minister (and cabinet)
Selection of Executive Elected by House of Commons
Legislative Branch Bicameral Parliament
Lower chamber: House of Commons
Upper chamber: House of Lords
Judicial Branch Interprets statutes, but has no right of judicial review
Political Party System Two-party to three-party system; Conservatives (Tories) and Labour are two main parties;
Liberal Democrats are third party.
D e s p i te t h e p r in c ip le o f p a r li a m e n t a r y s o v e re ig n ty ,
th e r e are so m e p ra c tic a l lim ita tio n s o n P a rlia m e n t. N o m i
nally, th e m o n a rc h c alls e le c tio n s a n d in v ite s w in n in g p a r
tie s to fo rm g o v e rn m e n t, th o u g h th e m o n a r c h ’s ro le is
a lm o s t exclusively c e re m o n ia l r a th e r t h a n p o litic a l. M o r e
su b sta n tiv e ly , P a r lia m e n t i ts e lf is g o v e rn e d b y tr a d itio n s ,
c u sto m s , a n d c o n s titu tio n a l in te rp re ta tio n s : T h o u g h P a rlia
m e n t c o u ld th e o re tic a lly p a ss a n y la w it w a n ts , it ro u tin e ly
stays w i t h in th e b o u n d s o f c o m m o n in te r p r e ta tio n s o f th e
B ritis h c o n s titu tio n . A fin a l r e s tr a i n t o n P a r lia m e n t in
r e c e n t y e a rs h a s se e n so m e d e v o lu tio n o f p o w e r fro m th e
U .K . P a r lia m e n t to asse m b lie s in th e re g io n s o r “c o u n trie s ”
o f t h e U n ite d K in g d o m (th e S c o ttis h P a r lia m e n t a n d th e
W e ls h A s se m b ly ), as w e ll as so m e r e c o g n itio n o f th e p o w e rs
o f th e E u r o p e a n U n io n to le g isla te o n c e r ta in m a tte r s t h a t
are b in d in g o n B ritis h law.
Profile 545
Political Culture
P o litic a l c u ltu r e in th e U n ite d K in g d o m , lik e in o th e r
c o u n trie s , is h e te ro g e n e o u s a n d d y n a m ic a n d th e re fo re h a r d
to p in d o w n . T h e c lassic c o m p a ra tiv e s tu d y o f A l m o n d a n d
V erba (1963) t r e a te d t h e U n ite d K in g d o m as p o s s e s s in g a
v ib r a n t “c ivic c u ltu r e .” S e v e ra l th e m e s , th o u g h , h a v e b e e n
p a r ti c u la r ly i m p o r t a n t in t h e p o liti c a l c u lt u r e o f la t e –
t w e n tie th – a n d tw e n ty – f i r s t – c e n tu r y G r e a t B r ita in a n d a re ,
th e re fo re , w o r t h s p e c ia l m e n tio n .
T h e firs t th e m e c o n c e rn s th e s h i f tin g n a tu r e o f lib e ra l
ism a n d th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n c lass a ffilia tio n a n d p a r ty
loyalty. A h ig h ly s tra tifie d society, th e U n ite d K in g d o m in
th e e arly to m id – tw e n tie th c e n tu r y saw a s tro n g re la tio n
sh ip b e tw e e n w o rk in g -c la s s m e m b e rs h ip a n d L a b o u r P a r ty
su p p o rt. B y th e 1 970s, h o w e v er, th is h a d b e g u n to c h a n g e
(M o r g a n 2 0 1 0 b ). O n o n e h a n d , th is c h a n g e m ig h t b e a t
t r ib u t e d to t h e s ta g fla tio n t h e B ritis h e c o n o m y fa c e d in t h a t
d e ca d e. O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e U n i te d K in g d o m w itn e s s e d
a fa m ilia r p a tte r n i n th e p o litic a l-c u ltu r a l d e v e lo p m e n t o f
p o s t- in d u s tr ia l so c ieties. R is in g in c o m e s a n d a m a jo r s h if t
in t h e c o m p o s itio n o f th e la b o r m a rk e t— a m o v e aw ay fro m
m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d to w a r d s e rv ic e s — h a v e g e n e r a lly
b e e n f o u n d to c h a n g e p o l it i c a l c u l t u r e , r e n d e r i n g it m o re
in d iv id u a li s t ic a n d less t ie d to c o m m u n itie s a n d c la ss e s
( I n g l e h a r t a n d W e lz e l 2 0 0 5 ). B y th e 1 970s, L a b o u r w a s in
c risis, a n d i t w o u ld n o t ta k e p o w e r a g a in u n t il i t h a d c o m e
to r e p re s e n t t h e in te re s ts , a n d m a tc h th e c u ltu r a l sty le, o f
m id d le -c la s s se rv ice s e c to r w o rk e rs ( M o r g a n 2 0 1 0 b ; C la rk e
2 0 0 4 : 4 0 1 -4 3 9 ). T h is “N e w L a b o u r ” h a s h a d to c o n te n d
w ith a r e s u rg e n t lib e ra lis m , w h i c h p r e c e d e d it in t h e fo rm
o f th e re fo rm s o f M a r g a r e t T h a tc h e r ’s g o v e rn m e n ts (1 9 7 9 –
1990) a n d , to a le s se r e x te n t, t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f h e r su c c es
so r J o h n M a jo r (1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 7 ), b u t a lso , m o re re ce n tly ,
fo llo w in g t h e e le c to ra l success o f c u r re n t P r im e M i n i s t e r
D a v id C a m e r o n o f th e C o n s e rv a tiv e P a rty , w h ic h g o v e rn s
w i t h a m a jo rity in 2 0 1 5 . C a m e r o n a n d h is a sso c iates, in a d
d itio n to s c a lin g b a c k a sp e c ts o f th e w e lfa re s ta te , e x p lic itly
s p e a k o f tr a n s f o rm in g B ritis h p o litic a l c u ltu r e , h o p in g to
c re a te w h a t th e y c a ll th e “B ig S o c iety ,” in w h ic h v o lu n
ta r is m a n d c o m m u n ity a c tiv ity p a r tia l ly re p la c e th e a c tio n s
o f th e sta te .
A n o t h e r m a jo r th e m e in th e c h a n g i n g p o litic a l c u ltu re
o f tw e n ti e th – c e n t u r y B r ita in w a s th e re d e fin itio n o f B ritis h
i d e n tity in th e w a k e o f th e c o lla p se o f th e B ritis h E m p ire .
“E m p ir e ” h a d b e e n a k e y a s p e c t o f th e i d e n t ity o f su b je cts o f
t h e U n i te d K in g d o m fo r a t le a s t t h e la te n i n e te e n th a n d
e a rly tw e n t i e th c e n tu rie s (th is is n o t to say t h a t e m p ire w as
u n i m p o r t a n t b e fo re t h is , b u t t h a t t h e im p e r ia l n a tu r e o f
B ritis h n e s s b e c a m e e sp e c ia lly s a lie n t a t th is tim e ). R e la t-
edly, th e ro le o f t h e m o n a r c h y i n B r itis h p o litic a l c u ltu re
h a s g ra d u a lly c h a n g e d . T h e Q u e e n is s till im p o r t a n t, b u t
t h e ro y a l fa m ily h a s fo r so m e tim e n o w b e e n m u c h m o re
d is c u s s e d in g o ssip ta b lo id s t h a n i n p o litic a l n e w sp a p e rs
( M o r g a n 2 0 1 0 b : 674; C la rk e 2 0 0 4 : 3 8 8 , 4 1 8 -4 1 9 ). T h e ir
ro le is la rg e ly sy m b o lic , a n d e v e n s till th e y a re n o t ty p ic a lly
t r e a te d w i t h th e s a m e d e fe re n c e as t h e i r (also sym bolic)
fo re b e a rs fro m t h e e a rly to m id – tw e n t ie th c e n tu r y w e re. A s
is d is c u s s e d la te r, in th e case s tu d y o f n a tio n a l id e n ti ty in
th e U n it e d K in g d o m , to so m e e x te n t t h e s e c h a n g e s have
c o in c id e d w i t h o th e r c h a n g e s in B ritis h id e n tity , in c lu d in g
a g r o w in g re s u rg e n c e o f r e g io n a l- n a tio n a l id e n titie s a n d
t h e g r o w t h o f a m u lti c u ltu r a l u n d e r s ta n d in g o f c itiz e n s h ip
( M o d o o d 2 0 0 7 ). H o w e v e r, t h is s h o u ld n o t le a d u s to su s
p e c t t h a t B ritis h n e s s h a s c e a se d to b e a n i m p o r t a n t fe a tu re
o f p o litic a l c u ltu r e in th e U n i te d K in g d o m . T h e p o p u la tio n
o f th e U n it e d K in g d o m h a s b e e n n o te d fo r its re la tiv e ly
h ig h level o f “e u ro -s k e p tic is m .” T h is c u ltu r a l fe a tu re o f th e
p o p u la tio n h a s i m p o r ta n t p o lic y c o n se q u en c es: F o r e xam ple,
th e U n ite d K in g d o m h a s n e v e r jo in e d th e e u ro z o n e .
Political Economy
A s m e n tio n e d i n o t h e r s e c tio n s o f t h is c o u n tr y p ro file
a n d as d i s c u s s e d i n t h e c a s e s t u d ie s t h a t fo llo w , th e
U n i t e d K in g d o m h a s h a d a c e n t r a l ro le in t h e h i s t o r y o f
g lo b a l p o liti c a l e c o n o m y . I t w a s t h e s ite o f o r ig in fo r
m a n y id e a s a b o u t fre e t r a d e (e v en i f t h e c o u n tr y d i d n o t
a lw ay s p r a c tic e t h e m i f u n s u i t e d to its in te r e s ts ) ; i t h a d
a rg u a b ly t h e f ir s t m o d e r n , g r o w t h – o r i e n t e d e c o n o m y ; it
w a s th e la u n c h i n g p o i n t fo r t h e i n d u s t r ia l re v o lu tio n ; a n d
it p la y e d a n i m p o r t a n t ro le in c o n s t r u c t i n g th e g lo b a l
e c o n o m y t h r o u g h its f o r m a l c o lo n ia lis m a n d i n f o r m a l ef
fo r t s to t r a d e w i t h o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e w o r ld . I t is w o r t h
k e e p i n g i n m in d , t h o u g h , t h e U n i t e d K in g d o m ’s p o l it ic a l
e c o n o m y i n t h e p o s t – w a r w o r ld , as t h e c o u n tr y u n d e r
w e n t e n o r m o u s c h a n g e s i n t h a t p e r io d . T h e tw o m o s t im
p o r t a n t in t h i s c o n n e c ti o n a re (1) th e d e – c o l o n iz a tio n o f
m a n y o f its o v e rs e a s p o s s e s s io n s a n d t h e a c c o m p a n y in g
546 United Kingdom
r e c a li b r a tio n o f B r i ta i n ’s ro le in b o t h g lo b a l p o liti c s a n d
t h e g lo b a l e c o n o m y ; a n d (2) t h e c r e a ti o n o f t h e B r itis h
w e lfa re s ta te . T h e l a t t e r d e v e l o p m e n t is d is c u s s e d f u r t h e r
la te r, in th e c ase s tu d y o n d e v e lo p m e n t in th e U n ite d
K in g d o m .
L ik e m a n y o th e r c o u n trie s t h a t in d u s t r ia liz e d early,
B r ita in h a s b e c o m e a p o s t- in d u s tr ia l eco n o m y , m e a n in g , in
e sse n ce , t h a t services (w h ic h a c c o u n t fo r 7 8 .9 p e rc e n t o f
G D P ) d ra m a tic a lly o u ts trip m a n u f a c tu r in g (2 0 .5 p e rc e n t)
in e c o n o m ic im p o rta n c e . B r ita in is a lso n o ta b le fo r th e
s m a ll sh a re t h a t a g ric u ltu re plays i n its G D P , c o n s titu tin g
o n ly 0 .7 p e rc e n t ( C I A 2 0 1 3 e stim a te ). T h e c o u n tr y is a m o n g
th e w e a lth ie s t c o u n trie s in te rm s o f G D P p e r c a p ita in th e
w o rld ( W o rld B a n k 2 0 1 3 e stim a te : $ 4 1 ,7 8 7 ), a n d its e s ti
m a te d u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te as o f 2 0 1 3 s to o d a t 7.2 p e rc e n t,
re la tiv e ly lo w g iv e n r e c e n t g lo b a l e c o n o m ic d iffic u ltie s . Its
g in i in d e x (w h ic h m e a su re s in c o m e in e q u a lity ) s ta n d s at
3 8 .0 , w h ic h is a r o u n d th e a verage fo r W e s te r n E u r o p e a n
so c ieties w i t h r e d is trib u tiv e w e lfa re s ta te s ( W o rld B a n k
20 1 3 estim ate). A s o f th e m o s t re c e n t e stim a te , th o u g h , it w as
e stim a te d to have a p o v e rty ra te o f over 16 p e rc e n t, w h ic h is
co m p a rativ ely q u ite h ig h ( C I A 2 0 1 3 estim ate).
A s is d isc u sse d in m o re d e ta il in t h e case s tu d ie s t h a t
follow , th e w e lfa re sta te in th e U n ite d K in g d o m h a s fa ce d
p o litic a l o p p o s itio n since t h e e a rly 1 9 8 0 s. A s su c h , it m a k e s
a n in te r e s t in g c o m p a ris o n w i t h F ra n c e , w h ic h saw n o M a r
g a r e t T h a tc h e r a ris e in t h a t d e c a d e (see f u r t h e r d isc u ssio n
in th e F r e n c h case). O n e m a jo r th e o r y fo c u ses o n th e p o lit
ics o f r e tr e n c h m e n t, n o tin g t h a t i n p laces lik e t h e U n ite d
K in g d o m (a n d th e U n ite d S tates), th e w e lfa re sta te w a s c re
a te d b y p a r tie s o n th e le ft in re sp o n se to th e c rises o f th e
m id d le o f th e tw e n ti e th c e n tu r y (th e G r e a t D e p re s s io n a n d
W o r ld W a r I I). T h is c re a te s th e p o s s ib ility o f a s t r id e n t o p
p o s itio n f r o m acro ss t h e s p e c tr u m ( P ra s a d 2 0 0 6 ; H u b e r
a n d S te p h e n s 2 001).
Sources fo r economic data in this discussion: CIA World Fact
book; World Bank World Development Indicators.
CASESTUDIES ►
CASE STUDY
The State in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 3, PAGE 62
As with many other aspects of the politi
cal development of the United Kingdom,
the state in the British Isles, beginning in
England, had strong early development
and then, in some ways, did not later de
velop as rapidly as some cases to which
we might wish to compare it. Scholars
who study the rise of the state point to
late medieval England as a place where
the modem state first started to come
into view (Strayer 1970: 35-48). England
was likely aided in this by several factors.
First, it is a relatively small island, facilitat
ing centralized rule. Second, historically,
the English nobility was in certain re
spects not as strong as its peers on the
continent, and by the time of the rise
of the Tudor monarchy (late fifteenth
century), it had badly damaged itself
through internal conflict, most notably in
the “War of the Roses.” In terms of the
actual mechanics of English state-build
ing, Strayer (1970: 37-38), in his classic ac
count, stresses the late medieval rise of
royal officials, the royal court system, and
the emergence of the Exchequer as key in
this connection. All of these institutions
either increased the king’s role as an arbi
ter of domestic disputes (thus moving in
the direction of the Weberian “monopoly
on legitimate force”) or expanded the
state’s ability to record information and, in
essence, to monitor localities and its deal
ings with them.
As noted previously, England never
fully embraced royal absolutism, which, in
places like France, was a key stage in
modern state-building. In France, the
modern state emerged, in part, as succes
sive kings managed to expand their
power vis-a-vis the nobility. At first glance,
it looks like the English kings of the seven
teenth century failed in this endeavor. But
there is more here than meets the eye.
While it is true that Parliament successfully
resisted royal initiatives, it was not simply
an organ that represented the upper no
bility. Indeed, many of the upper nobility
in the seventeenth century sided with
Charles I rather than Parliament and
Cromwell, though this was by no means
universal. When Charles II and especially
James II, after the Restoration, set about
building a more modern state, with a
Case Studies 547
C A SE STU D Y (continued)
The State in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 3, PAGE 62
more complex bureaucracy, a greater abil
ity to extract resources from its citizens,
and with a modern military, there was re
sistance in the form of the Glorious Revo
lution (Pincus 2009), but this did not stop
the effort. Subsequent monarchs contin
ued James’s state-building efforts in im
portant ways (Kishlansky 1996).
One of the great tensions in the his
tory of British state-building is that the
society produced a relatively strong state
but also, as discussed elsewhere in
this text, an ideology— liberalism— that
seems very suspicious of strong states.
Even today, as mentioned earlier, David
Cameron’s government stresses the “Big
Society,” implying that the private action
of citizens should replace a state that has
allegedly grown too large and powerful.
More generally, the British welfare state is
probably best viewed as an organization
that developed because of factors exter
nal to British politics writ narrow: two
world wars, the Great Depression, and the
changing British class structure. Note that
many of its features, as in the United
States, only developed around World War
II (indeed, in the Labour government that
was elected in 1945), though there were
precedents in the early twentieth century
(Clarke 2004: 59-60). In France, typical ar
guments against preserving the welfare
state in its entirety focus largely on ques
tions like the efficiency of labor markets
and economic competitiveness. In places
like the United Kingdom (and the United
States), there is an alternative, liberal cri
tique of the welfare state as a result of this
tension.
CA SE STU DY
Political Economy of Britain CHAPTER 4, PAGE 77
The United Kingdom may be seen as the
birthplace of the modern world economy.
While not considered a “developing coun
try” today, the British experience has been
the basis of many of the most enduring
research questions in the study of devel
opment, precisely because it is the country
where the massive economic expansion of
the last two centuries started. It was here,
from the late 1700s to the mid-1800s, that
the Industrial Revolution began, giving rise
to the explosion in productivity and rising
incomes that have set the last two centu
ries apart from any other period of human
history.
The desire to understand why the In
dustrial Revolution happened here
rather than somewhere else was the be
ginning of the comparative study of
modern economic development, and
analysts have put forward numerous
theses. The Industrial Revolution con
sisted of a cluster of technological
innovations that drove down costs of
production and brought about rapid in
dustrialization: new inventions (such as
the steam engine), new factory tech
niques (including greater use of machin
ery), and improved infrastructure (such
as railways and improved shipping).
Other factors helped make this set of in
novations work especially well in Britain.
Some argue that the availability of coal
mattered, while others argue that the
country was relatively urbanized. Yet
others suggest that development hap
pened here due to attitudes and culture,
whether in the populace at large or in
the relatively liberal government with its
orientation toward individual economic
rights. Also in the 1800s, Great Britain
consolidated its imperial control over
colonies ranging from Africa to India to
the Caribbean, though it had lost control
of America by 1783. As the Industrial Rev
olution spread, the United Kingdom
became a leader in the globalization that
transformed the world economy from
the late nineteenth century up to the
Great Depression of the 1930s.
Britain was a leader in promoting the
laissez-faire or liberal economic policies
that had been dominant in years before
the Great Depression, but it also was the
home of economist John Maynard
Keynes, who offered a twentieth-century
approach to preventing depression and
taming the business cycle: counter
cyclical government spending. A central
idea of Keynesian economics is that reces
sions and depressions are self-reinforcing
because demand drops as employment
falls and assets lose their value, and that
government spending can halt or reverse
this process by stimulating demand. In
theory, governments could build up sur
pluses in good times and spend as ne
cessary to soften or stop downturns. This
theory was (and remains) hugely influential,
548 United Kingdom
CA SE STU D Y (continued)
Political Economy of Britain CHAPTER 4, PAGE 77
as over the course of the century the state
intervened more in the economy in Britain
and beyond.
After surviving the two world wars
without defeat, the United Kingdom has
remained one of the linchpin economies
of the global order. State involvement in
the economy increased notably after
World War II. The Labour Party, under the
leadership of Clement Atlee, won a plural
ity for the first time in 1945, displacing the
Conservative Party from which both Nev
ille Chamberlain and Winston Churchill
had governed. The British welfare state
was relatively underdeveloped up to this
point, but it grew notably in the post-war
years, particularly through the establish
ment of the National Health Service and
the expansion of public housing initia
tives (called “council houses”), as well as
social insurance (Clarke 2004:216-231).
As in many other advanced industrial
societies, Britain did relatively well in the
post-war years, but by the 1970s had en
tered into recession and “stagflation” (in
flation accompanied by stagnation in
economic growth and wages). This
prompted some rethinking, and one of
the major changes in the country’s eco
nomic policy took place beginning in
1979, when the newly elected Prime Min
ister Margaret Thatcher (the “Iron Lady”)
pushed the economy toward free-market
principles by privatizing state-owned en
terprises (including many council houses,
increasing home-ownership rates in the
process, but also business organizations),
reducing government spending, and de
regulating the economy (Clarke 2004:
358-400). Notably, the Thatcher govern
ment (1979-1990) barely attempted to
scale back some key aspects of the wel
fare state, such as the National Health Ser
vice, given their high levels of public
support (Prasad 2006). Following the era
of Thatcher and her Conservative succes
sor John Major (1990-1997), the govern
ment of Tony Blair (1997-2007) brought in
an era of “New Labour” that largely re
tained a pro-market orientation. Today,
the British economy is actively plugged
into world trade, especially in services,
where the City of London is a top financial
center in the global economy.
No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality
in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 8, PAGE 181
For two countries that are so historically and
culturally intertwined, the United Kingdom
and the United States have dramatically dif
ferent democracies. The United Kingdom is
a constitutional monarchy with no single
constitutional document, no judicial review
of the constitutionality of laws, a prime
minister elected chief executive by the le
gislature, and a principle of legislative su
premacy; this contrasts with the American
republic, centered around a Constitution,
separately elected legislatures and execu
tives, a Supreme Court, and a set of checks
and balances and separations of powers
between government actors.
Many countries follow certain aspects
of the British model, but the aspect most
unique to the United Kingdom is probably
the lack of a single constitutional docu
ment. Rather than one core written char
ter that is amended periodically (as in
most countries), the United Kingdom
deems several documents to have consti
tutional significance. As the country devel
oped its unified political system over the
course of many centuries, several major
acts shaped British political tradition. The
constitutional documents include the
Magna Carta of 1215, but also a range of
other laws of great significance and stat
ure. These include the Bill of Rights of 1689,
which emphasized certain limitations on
the power of the monarchy, and the Acts
of Settlement of 1701, which established
patterns of succession to the throne. In a
sense, it may be said that the United
Kingdom has a “written” constitution, but
one that relies on a range of written docu
ments rather than a single one. More
generally, the “British Constitution” is
partly shaped by tradition, custom, and a
common cultural understanding of basic
laws, powers, and functions of different
political actors.
The British Constitution is one of the
most flexible in the world, at least accord
ing to the law. This is not solely because
the United Kingdom has an “unwritten”
constitution, though this certainly relates
to the question of how the constitution
can be changed. Rather, the flexibility
Case Studies 549
No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality
in the United Kingdom CH A P T E R 8, PAG E 181
comes from the fact that in the British
system, Parliament is sovereign. What
does this mean? When Parliament passes
a law, it is by definition constitutional, as
the legislating body is the highest politi
cal and legal authority in the land. Con
trast this with the United States, in which
the Constitution is the ultimate sovereign
authority: Even Congress and presidents
as must act in accordance with its
principles.
So why does Parliament not simply
overturn long-standing parts of the British
constitution on a whim? Why has there not
been massive “zigzagging” in terms of what
the constitution means, from one election
to the next, as new parties take power and
lose power? In reality, custom and tradition
prevent Parliament from overturning the
founding laws of the polity. Much as Ameri
can political parties would probably not
envision getting rid of core elements of the
Constitution such as the Bill of Rights, even
if they had the supermajority they would
need, so too does the British system exhibit
constitutional stability from one elected
government to the next.
The unwritten constitution and the
fact of parliamentary sovereignty have
one more implication for constitutionality
in the United Kingdom: There is no role for
the judiciary in ruling on whether a law is
constitutional. In most countries, some
judicial body has the power to rule on
whether laws passed by the legislature
are compatible with the written constitu
tion. If that judicial body, such as the Su
preme Court in the United States, finds a
law unconstitutional it may strike it down.
But if Parliament is sovereign and there
is no single constitution, there is no
place for judicial review. Thus, the United
Kingdom had no real “Supreme Court”
until the 2000s, and even now its powers
are limited to specific questions relating to
issues of devolution of power to Scotland
and Wales, along with very restricted re
sponsibilities in the area of legal revision.
This limited judiciary should be of inter
est to Americans accustomed to a different
system with its own controversies, espe
cially the debate in the United States about
whether unelected judges make law from
the bench. This is referred to as “judicial
activism,” and there is one clear way to end
it: End judicial review. One argument
against extensive use of judicial review is
that judiciaries remove contentious issues
from the public arena. According to this ar
gument, debates about the most funda
mental issues in a democracy are now
increasingly fought out by ideologues and
advocates in front of unelected judges.
These issues are thus examined and de
cided upon by small groups and powerful
individuals, and may not be reflective of
broader public opinion. Those arguing
against judicial activism would often prefer
to have society’s most contentious issues
decided in legislatures rather than in
courts. The United Kingdom prevents judi
cial activism by granting Parliament unam
biguous supremacy over the judiciary. One
question for opponents of judicial activism
is thus whether they would be willing to
sacrifice judicial review. Put another way,
judicial review and some judicial activism
are the “flip side” of the checks and bal
ances between branches of government:
The U.K. system forgoes most of these
checks and balances.
Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom
and the Westminster Model CHAPTER 9, PAGE 206
The United Kingdom is called the “Mother of
Parliaments,” as its Parliament dates back to
at least the thirteenth century, when King
John convened the nobility of England as an
advisory council that controlled the econ
omy. In 1215, the nobility sensed the King’s
weak position and need for the support of
nobles to raise revenue for the crown, so
they insisted upon a “Great Charter”— the
Magna Carta— and thereby secured various
rights with respect to property and require
ments for royal consultation of the nobles.
Since that time, Parliament has steadily
gained power relative to the monarch, most
notably beginning in the seventeenth cen
tury with the English Civil Wars and their af
termath (1642-1660), and with the Glorious
Revolution of 1688. Initially comprised of
nobles (lords) and later also of commoners,
these Parliaments evolved from advisory
councils to become powerful legislatures
550 United Kingdom
The Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom
and the Westminster Model
that eventually asserted their sovereignty
over the monarch. These origins can still be
seen today in the existence of the House of
Commons and the House of Lords.
From these origins has come the
system known worldwide as the Westmin
ster system, after the London neighbor
hood where the government resides.
Parliament is considered the country’s su
preme and sovereign political power (see
preceding section on ‘Regime and Politi
cal Institutions”). While parliamentary sov
ereignty is the central fact of the United
Kingdom’s political system, a variety of in
stitutional mechanisms gives the execu
tive substantial power to push legislation
through Parliament. The legislature votes,
but the cabinet and the prime minister for
ward most legislation, on the assumption
that the “backbenchers” in the governing
party will support the government’s pro
posal. This model of parliamentary de
mocracy has been used as a model by
countries around the world, not least be
cause of the influence of Britain’s colonial
empire on many of today’s independent
countries, from the giant India to tiny is
lands in the Caribbean.
In the British parliamentary model, the
House of Commons is now the dominant
chamber. It houses the executive branch
of the prime minister and the cabinet, and
has almost sole responsibility for passing
laws, approving budgets, and holding the
executive accountable; it can cause
the government to fall by a vote of no
confidence. Members of the House of
Commons are chosen in single-member
districts, in a “first-past-the-post” system
in which the largest number of votes in a
district suffices to elect a member of par
liament (MP), even if this is only a plurality
and not a majority. This electoral system is
widely viewed as favoring the largest par
ties and punishing smaller parties.
The House of Lords is marginal by con
trast, as is the monarchy. Though they were
the founding body of Parliament, Lords
progressively lost power to Commons over
the centuries as the United Kingdom mod
ernized and expanded the franchise. Lords
now possesses some limited ability to slow
C H A P T E R 9, PAGE 206
Commons’ policymaking process by re
questing further review. Major reforms in
1999 dramatically reduced the number of
hereditary lords, and debate continues
about eliminating hereditary peerages en
tirely. The queen or king, meanwhile, re
tains powers to invite parties to form a
government or accept a resignation, but
these are almost purely ceremonial.
This Westminster parliamentary
system is partially emulated in many other
countries, though some countries estab
lished their own parliaments and as
semblies independently of the United
Kingdom in their early histories. While the
United Kingdom and its Parliament may
have been the Mother of Parliaments,
there are few other places that precisely
follow the House of Commons/House of
Lords model; in most places with bicam
eral legislatures, the role of the upper
chamber is more explicitly territorial, rep
resenting states, provinces, or regions. The
lower chambers around the world, mean
while, are elected in a variety of different
electoral processes, as chapter 9 shows.
CA SE STUDY
k H National Identity in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 13, PAGE 308
Many scholars see English nationalism as
having developed early. Indeed, some see
England as the first national society (Hast
ings 1997; Greenfeld 1992). Others see it as
the first modern nationalism (Kohn 1944).
Still others see English nationalism as de
veloping rather late (Kumar 2003). As in all
cases, this depends on how one defines
“nationalism.” Those who see English
nationalism as developing early see it as
linked to a number of prominent features
of early modern English society, especially
the distinctively modern political philoso
phy produced in the seventeenth century
as well as the civil wars and the “Glorious
Revolution” discussed earlier.
According to one major argument,
English nationalism emerged in Tudor
England and helped to resolve the status-
inconsistency of upwardly mobile English
persons favored by the Tudor monarchs
(Greenfeld 1992). Before this, the word
nation had referred to elite groups.
Basically, defining England as a nation
amounted to bestowing a kind of status
on socially mobile English persons as a
result of their membership. English
Case Studies 551
CA SE STU D Y (continued)
National Identity in the United Kingdom
nationalism was helped and hindered by
a variety of actors. Queen Elizabeth seems
to have promoted it, and Mary to have op
posed it. English Protestantism contrib
uted to its spread across society and
down the social hierarchy.
Nationalism was clearly institutional
ized as one of the main ways in which the
state would legitimate itself by the estab
lishment of constitutional monarchy in
the late seventeenth century. One thing
that had not been decided once and for
all, though, was the composition of the
body of the nation itself. Over the course
of the “long eighteenth century” British,
rather than English, nationalism was
broadened to include the Scottish and
Northern Irish (Colley 1992). In institu
tional terms, this was accomplished when
union was established in 1707. in cultural
terms, though, it is unclear to what extent
it was successful.
Irish nationalism gained strength with
the movement of the United Irishmen in
the late eighteenth century, and under
went another revival in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Ireland was
granted “home rule” status in 1912, but
civil conflict developed, as the society was
divided between those who favored an
independent, Catholic Ireland and those
(often Protestant) who favored continuing
political ties to Britain. An insurrection led,
finally, to the establishment of the (still de
pendent) Irish Free State in 1921, with its
1937 constitution to follow and its achieve
ment of full independence, as the Repub
lic of Ireland, in 1949.
However, Northern Ireland remained
(and remains to this day) part of the
United Kingdom. Throughout the late
twentieth century considerable violence
was perpetrated by supporters of unifica
tion of the north with the Republic and
supporters of continued ties to England.
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) carried
out terrorist bombings both in Northern
Ireland and in England itself, and both
sides carried out targeted assassinations
and torture. A peace process was initiated
in the 1990s and yielded agreements in
the 2000s. It has been largely successful in
ending the violence.
Scottish and Welsh national identities
also underwent resurgence beginning in
the late nineteenth century. Initially, many
of these efforts were focused on the pres
ervation of cultural traditions, styles of life,
and language. Some came to view British
identity as the imposition of English “in
ternal colonialism” (Hechter 1975). In
recent years, resurgent regional (or per
haps national) identities among some of
these groups, particularly the Scottish,
have led toward efforts to decentralize au
thority and to establish some degree of
regional autonomy (a process that bears
useful comparison with somewhat similar
developments in Spain). Scotland voted
to create its own parliament and Wales its
own assembly in 1997. In 2014, a referen
dum on Scottish independence failed,
but many had expected it to succeed.
The predominant tradition of nation
alism in the United Kingdom, according to
most analysts, has been civic. This, how
ever, should be qualified. In the early
modern period national membership
might have been civic in the sense of
being open to some, but there were clear
boundaries established between English
nationals and members of “out-groups,”
most notably the Irish, American Indians,
and African slaves. English nationalism’s
CHAPTER 13, PAGE 308
civic character, according to many ana
lysts, was on display in the gradual pro
cess via which Great Britain or the United
Kingdom was formed. That is, an ideal of
“Britishness” developed that was inclusive
of (at least some) Welsh, Scottish, and
Northern Irish persons. Its civic character
was also on display, paradoxically, in the
United Kingdom’s imperial identity. The
empire, it was important to note, like all of
European colonialism, was an important
carrier of national identity, and a spur to
the development of modern national
identities in much of the colonial world. It
spread national identity through provid
ing an example, but also through foment
ing resistance (Calhoun 1997:108-110).
Among other things, the British case
shows well that civic nationalism, while
existing in tension with racism, is never
theless compatible with and can reinforce
ethnic hierarchies of various kinds. More
recently, as in a number of other countries
whose national identities have been un
derstood to be civic, there has been some
discussion of whether civic identity is
being replaced by a multicultural model.
Some have maintained that multicultural-
ism is civic or is broadly consistent with
civic political traditions (Modood 2007).
In addition, as in most cases of civic
nationalism, one sees counter-currents
that dispute the civic conception of na
tionhood and propose an ethnic one in its
place. In recent years in Britain this is best
exemplified by the British National Party,
with its sense of “Englishness” as an ethnic
category and its xenophobic attitude
toward immigrants, particularly Muslims
and those from South Asia and the Carib
bean. Fortunately, this party remains
marginal.
552 United Kingdom
Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 15, PAGE 355
The United Kingdom is considered by
many to be the birthplace of liberalism.
The earliest architects of the ideology,
such as John Locke and the Earl of Shaft
esbury, wrote and acted in Britain in the
tumultuous seventeenth century. Later
British thinkers like Adam Smith and David
Ricardo developed liberalism’s core eco
nomic doctrines. In the nineteenth cen
tury, the British philosopher John Stuart
Mill produced what many consider to be
the most forceful and coherent articula
tion of liberal doctrine, providing clear ra
tionales for both its political dimensions,
such as respect for the rights of the indi
vidual and representative government,
and its economic dimensions, which
above all involve reducing state involve
ment in the economy.
Some argue that the United Kingdom
played an important role not only in de
veloping liberalism but also in spreading it.
British colonialism transmitted liberal
ideas to elites in colonial societies. This is
very clear in the cases of settler colonial
ism like today’s United States— which is
considered liberalism’s “lead society’ in
today’s world, essentially replacing the
United Kingdom in this connection— as
well as British Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, but may also be visible in
the societies like India and in the former
British colonial possessions in Africa and
East Asia.
Some would argue that after the
Second World War, liberalism went into
partial retreat in Britain. It is true that the
Labour Party, which dominated for sev
eral decades, blended liberalism and so
cialism into “social democracy.” Perhaps
the most notable change was the estab
lishment of the National Health Service in
1948. Old-fashioned liberals criticized the
creation of a universal health care system
as paternalistic and threatening to indi
vidual choice. More progressive liberals,
though, argued that investments in
human capital and the maintenance of
basic protections against serious depriva
tion are perfectly consistent with and
even help to fulfill the goals and aspira
tions of a liberal and democratic polity.
Liberals closer to the right of the po
litical spectrum typically would view
social democracy as a betrayal, or at least
a watering down, of liberal principles.
Those on the radical left, however, view
the liberalism of the Labour Party as con
servative and reactionary. In some ways
these distinctions have been flattened
out in recent Britain. Beginning in the
1990s, with the rise of Tony Blair’s “Third
Way” leadership strategy in the Labour
Party, the British social democrats have
shown themselves to remain clearly in the
liberal camp.
Research Prompts
1. Compare and contrast state formation in the United Kingdom
and France. What is similar and what is different about the
timing and nature of state-building in each case?
2. Compare and contrast the United States, the United Kingdom,
and one other case on the question of judicial review. Be atten
tive to why you select that other case. In the cases, what are the
relative consequences of having or not having judicial review?
What conclusions can you draw about the costs and benefits of
judicial review?
3. Analyze in comparative perspective the construction of the wel
fare state in the United Kingdom after the Second World War.
What are the major implications of the fact that it was the
Labour Party that constructed it? How does this compare to the
American and French cases?
4. What are the major implications of Britain’s development history
for today’s developing countries? Can these countries simply
repeat Britain’s steps? Why or why not?
5. Some scholars say national identity in the United Kingdom de
veloped in the sixteenth century, others the seventeenth, others
the eighteenth, and some even later. As comparative political
analysts, how do we decide? Stake out an argument for a defin
ition of national identity, and design a project exploring when
this identity emerged in the United Kingdom.
■ H H M R R B I i l i R V !
553
United States
PROFILE
Key Features o f the C o n te m p o r a r y United States
Population: 318,892,103 (estimate, July 2014)
Area: 9,826,675 square kilometers
Head of State: Barack Obama (president, 2009-2017)
Head of Government: Barack Obama (president, 2009-2017)
Capital: Washington, D.C.
Year of Independence: 1776/1783
Year of Current Constitution: 1787 (ratified 1788)
Languages: English; many others, including most
prominently Spanish, other Asian and European
languages
GDP per Capita: $47,199 (World Bankestimate,2013)
Human Development
Index Ranking (2010):
5th (very high human development)
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014.
■ W h ite 79.96%
■ Black 12.85%
Asian 4.43%
I A m erindian/A laskan Native 0.97%
I Pacific Islander/N ative H aw aiian 0.18%
Two or more groups 1.61%
Ethnic Groups in the United States
Note that Hispanics, not captured here as a group because of the categories used
when data is collected in the United States, are estimated to constitute about 15
percent of the population. Most persons of Hispanic ancestry or ethnic
identification show up here in either the “white” or “black” categories.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Introduction
If you were taking this course several de
cades ago, you would likely find the institu
tions and political culture of the United
States held up as the benchmark against
which the politics of other countries could
be compared (and, perhaps, judged). On one
hand this is understandable. If you are a stu
dent in a university in the United States,
there is a reasonably high likelihood that you
already have some familiarity with the basic
political features of this society. If this is the
case, it is natural that you would use this
knowledge as you make comparisons. At the
same time, we need to be careful to not im
plicitly assume that U.S. politics is the
model toward which other societies are (or
should be) headed or the standard against
which they should be judged. It is, of course,
perfectly appropriate for us to draw whatever
| P rotestant C hristianity 51.3%
| R om an C atholicism 23.9%
M orm onism 1.7%
B O th e r C hristianity 1.6%
I Judaism 1.7%
B uddhism 0.7%
f t Islam 0.6%
I O ther/U nspcified 2.5%
B U naffiliated 12.1%
N one 4%
Religious Affiliation in the United States
Note that again these data are dependent on how categories are
determined and measured. Some scholars would want to draw a
distinction within the category of “Protestant Christianity” between
evangelical Christian denominations and ‘mainline’ Protestant
denominations. In recent decades, the former have been growing or at
least maintaining strength while the latter have seen some declines,
and social scientists’ predictions about future trends have varied
(Wuthnow 2007).
Source: CIA World Factbook.
554 United States
GREENLAND
(DEN.)
Anchora<
CANADA
ioston
» New York
Philadelphia
ishington D.C
Francisco C hicago* Detroi
In d ia n a p o lis * ^ - /
Denver
Los Angeles;-
San Diego4 Phoenix/ Oklahoma Memphis
Dallas* #
itonio Houstti
Jacksonville
lew Orleans
MEXICO
NICAR.
400 800 Kilometers
800 Miles
Prudhoe Bay
N O R T H
P A C I F I C
O C E A N
N O R T H
A T L A N T I C
O C E A N
BAHAMAS
x '* •
% - V ? -
G u lfo f
Mexico CUBA
JAMAICA
X
C O L O M B IA
Profile 555
v alue ju d g m e n ts w e lik e a b o u t su c h m a tte r s as c itiz e n s (pro
o r c on), b u t as so c ial s c ie n tists o u r jo b is to b ra c k e t a n y su c h
ju d g m e n ts .
A s s u c h , l e t us n o te se v e ra l k e y fe a tu r e s o f t h e U n it e d
S ta te s t h a t m a k e it e sp e c ia lly i n t e r e s tin g fo r th e s t u d e n t o f
c o m p a ra tiv e p o litic s . F i r s t , i t w a s t h e e a r lie s t la rg e -s c a le
m o d e r n s o c ie ty to e m b ra c e d e m o c r a c y a n d re p u b lic a n is m .
A s su c h , it w a s v ie w e d b y its fo u n d e rs a n d b y s u b s e q u e n t
g e n e ra tio n s as a k i n d o f e x p e r im e n t, a n d w h ile i t is n o
lo n g e r t h e o n ly s u c h e x p e r im e n t, w e c a n s t ill v ie w i t as
o n e . I t h a s b e e n re la tiv e ly s ta b le , g o v e rn e d u n d e r a sin g le
c o n s titu t io n fo r c e n tu r ie s , a n d i t ro s e f r o m b e in g a s u c
c e s sfu l c o m m e rc ia l a n d a g r ic u ltu r a l s o c ie ty to a m a jo r i n
d u s tr ia l p o w e r to a k e y “p o s t - i n d u s t r ia l ” so c iety . I t is a lso ,
a t p re s e n t, la rg e ly w i t h o u t p e e rs in te rm s o f g e o p o litic a l
p o w e r a n d in flu e n c e . S e c o n d , as s c h o la rs sin c e T o c q u e v ille
(see a ls o H a r t z 1955; L ip s e t 1963) h a v e s tre s s e d , t h e
U n it e d S ta te s w a s b o r n as a “n e w ” so c ie ty , m e a n in g t h a t it
o n ly m in im a lly in h e r i t e d t h e so c ia l s t r u c t u r a l fe a tu re s
t h a t a tt e n u a t e d t h e rise o f d e m o c ra c y fo r so m e tim e in th e
E u r o p e a n c o n te x t. T h is a llo w s u s to a s k i n te r e s t in g q u e s
tio n s a b o u t th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n h i s to r ic a l fa c to rs
(lik e l o n g - s ta n d in g p a tt e r n s o f la n d o w n e r s h ip ) a n d v a r i
a bles lik e d e m o c r a t iz a t io n o r t h e f o r m a tio n o f lib e r a l p o
litic a l c u ltu r e , c o m p a r in g t h e U n ite d S ta te s to “O ld
W o r ld ” s o c ie tie s . S c h o la rs d e b a te w h e th e r a n d to w h a t
e x te n t th e U n i te d S ta te s is “e x c e p tio n a l” in its lib e r a l d e
m o c ra c y , its “d e n o m i n a ti o n a l ” a p p r o a c h to o r g a n iz in g th e
p la c e o f re lig io n in p u b lic life ( N i e b u h r 1 929), a n d its re la
tiv e ly w e a k s o c ia lis t t r a d i t io n ( K a u f m a n 2 0 0 2 ). R e la te d to
th e la s t p o in t, w h i le th e U n it e d S ta te s h a s s h a re d w ith
its p e e r s t h e c r e a tio n o f a w e lfa re s ta te o v e r th e la s t n e a r
c e n tu ry , i t s ta n d s o u t a m o n g t h e m a jo r a d v a n c e d i n d u s tr ia l
a n d p o s t - i n d u s tr ia l so c ie tie s fo r th e r e la tiv e w e a k n e s s o f
its w e lfa re s ta te . (N o te : I t is n o t t h a t its s ta te is w e a k b u t
t h a t its w e lfa re f u n c tio n s a re n o t as r o b u s t as t h o s e o f so m e
o th e rs .)
F in a lly , w h ile m a n y so c ieties a re a n d h a v e b e e n n e t d e s
t in a t io n sites fo r i m m ig r a tio n , t h e U n i te d S ta te s , b o t h in its
e x te n t a n d t h e d e g re e to w h ic h t h is is b o u n d u p w i t h th e
c o u n tr y ’s id e n tity , la rg e ly s ta n d s a p a r t in t h e c e n tr a lity o f
im m ig r a ti o n in its h isto ry . T h e s o c ie ty is b o t h e th n ic a lly
a n d re lig io u sly h e te ro g e n e o u s . T h is p e rio d ic a lly p ro d u c e s
te n s io n , a n d w av es o f la rg e -s c a le i m m ig r a tio n h a v e o fte n
b e e n m e t b y w aves o f x e n o p h o b ia a n d in to le ra n c e (K e n n e d y
1999: 1 4 -1 5 ). P e rh a p s re la te d to th is h e te ro g e n e ity is t h e
d e g re e o f re lig io u s p lu ra lis m c h a r a c te ris tic o f th e society, a
fe a tu re t h a t h a s b e e n l in k e d b y so m e sc h o la rs to its c o m
p a ra tiv e ly h i g h levels o f r e lig io s ity ( I a n n a c c o n e , F in k e , a n d
S ta rk 1 997). I n d e e d , th e U n it e d S ta te s is fa r m o re re lig io u s
th a n o n e m ig h t e x p e c t i t to b e b a s e d o n its level o f e c o n o m ic
d e v e lo p m e n t (N o r r is a n d I n g l e h a r t 2 0 0 4 ).
Historical Development
T o d a y ’s U n i te d S ta te s in c lu d e s a re a s t h a t w e re c o lo n iz e d b y
S p a in , t h e N e t h e r la n d s , F ra n c e , a n d E n g la n d . C o n t r a r y to
w h a t s tu d e n ts in th e U n it e d S ta te s m ig h t e x p e c t, fo r m o s t o f
th e c o lo n ia l p e r io d t h e t h i r t e e n c o lo n ie s i n N o r t h A m e ric a
w e re n o t c o n s id e re d th e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f B r ita in ’s c o lo n ia l
p o ssessio n s. C a r ib b e a n so c ie tie s lik e B a rb a d o s a n d J a m a ic a
w e re f a r m o re sig n ific a n t as so u rc e s o f w e a lth ( D u n n [1972]
2 0 0 0 ), as I n d ia la te r w o u ld b e . H o w e v e r, b y th e m id - to late
e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry , th e c ro w n w a s b e c o m in g in c re a s in g ly
in te re s te d in its N o r t h A m e r ic a n c o lo n ie s as b o t h m a rk e ts
fo r B ritis h m a n u f a c tu r e d g o o d s a n d a p o te n tia l so u rc e o f
re v en u e . T h e p o p u la tio n o f c o lo n ia l N o r t h A m e r ic a h a d
so m e n o ta b le c h a ra c te ris tic s , v a r y in g b y r e g io n (F is c h e r
1989). I n th e N o r th e a s t , th e o r ig in a l s e ttle rs w e re la rg e ly
s e e k in g th e fre e d o m to p ra c tic e t h e i r r e lig io n , a n d h e re a
c o m m e rc ia l so c ie ty la te r d e v e lo p e d . L a n d w a s m o re e v e n ly
d is tr ib u te d h e re t h a n in th e s o u th e r n c o lo n ie s (th o u g h
th e r e w a s s till a lo t o f in e q u a lity ), a n d th e r e w a s n o re a l
q u a si-a risto c ra c y . I n th e s o u t h e r n c o lo n ie s, p la n ta tio n a g ri
c u ltu r e d e v e lo p e d . H e r e , m o re la rg e -s c a le la n d h o ld in g
w a s c o m m o n , a n d e lite s liv e d a m o re a ris to c ra tic life.
M o re o v e r, t h e i r o rig in s in B r ita in i ts e l f te n d e d m o re to w a rd
a ris to c ra tic g ro u p s (F is c h e r 1989). W h i l e so m e sla v ery w as
p r a c tic e d in th e N o r t h b e fo re in d e p e n d e n c e , it b e c a m e
th e b a sis o f m u c h o f th e s o u th e r n p la n ta tio n econom y.
W h e n in d e p e n d e n c e w a s e s ta b lis h e d in th e U n ite d S ta te s,
th e m o v e m e n t w a s p r e d o m i n a n t ly le d b y e lite s fro m th e s e
tw o re g io n s .
E v e n a f te r g a in in g in d e p e n d e n c e , it w a s u n c le a r i f th e
n e w n a ti o n w o u ld su rv iv e as a p o lity o r w o u ld sim p ly p rove
v u ln e ra b le to d is in te g r a tio n . A n u m b e r o f v ie w s a b o u t w h a t
sh o u ld re p la c e B ritis h c o lo n ia lis m w e re in c irc u la tio n , b u t
t h e n e w c o u n tr y f in a lly s e ttle d o n t h e c o n s titu tio n a l sy ste m
th a t r e m a in s in p lac e to t h is day; th e C o n s ti tu t io n w a s d e
sig n e d to c o r re c t t h e d e fic ie n c ie s o f t h e “A r tic le s o f C o n
fe d e ra tio n ,” a c h a r t e r t h a t h a d le ft th e g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e
556 United States
Historical Development
Timeline
1600s
1754-1763
1775
1776
1781
1783
1787
1791
1803
1812
1820
1840s
1850s
1861
1863
1865
1870s
1880s
1898
1916-1918
1929
1933-1945
Establishment of early colonial settlements at
Jamestown, Virginia (1607), Plymouth, Massachu
setts (1620), and other sites along the Atlantic coast
French and Indian Wars, conflict between English
and French settlers, along with Native American
allies, in present-day United States and Canada
Beginning of American Revolution after years of
tension between colonies and British Crown over
taxation and representation
Signing of Declaration of Independence
Articles of Confederation take effect as first at
tempt at independent American government.
Surrender of British forces at Yorktown, Virginia,
signifies end of American Revolution.
Constitution drafted, ratified by states in 1788.
Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Con
stitution, takes effect.
Louisiana Purchase
War with Great Britain, ends in 1815
Missouri Compromise attempts to balance power
between northern free states and southern slave
states.
Annexation of Texas and Mexican-American War
greatly expand U.S. territory.
Rising tensions between North and South
Civil War begins.
Emancipation Proclamation
End of Civil War; President Abraham Lincoln
assassinated.
Reconstruction
Peak of the Gilded Age
Spanish-American War
American involvement in World War I on the side
of Allies
Women's suffrage movement results in vote for all
adults.
Great Depression begins, lasts through 1930s.
Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who
champions the New Deal (including Social Security)
and leads the U.S. through most of World War II
1941
1945
1950s-1960s
1963
1963-1969
1969-1974
1974-1977
1977-1981
1981-1989
1989-1993
1993-2001
2001-2009
2009-2017
U.S. enters World War II with Japanese bombing of
Pearl Flarbor, Flawaii.
World War II ends with U.S. dropping of atomic
bombs on Japanese cities Fliroshima and
Nagasaki.
Civil Rights movement, Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) Supreme Court decision; Civil Rights Act
(1964); Voting Rights Act (1965)
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
Presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, who both
increases U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and
expands the welfare state via his "Great Society”
programs
Presidency of Richard Nixon, which included con
tinued war in Vietnam, partial rapprochement with
China, and the decision to float the dollar on cur
rency exchanges rather than pegging its value to
gold; Nixon resigned in August 1974 as he faced
impeachment for the Watergate Scandal.
Presidency of Gerald Ford, which included the end
of the Vietnam War
Presidency of Jimmy Carter, with a renewed
emphasis on human rights in foreign policy
but economic problems domestically
Presidency of Ronald Reagan, which includes par
tial retrenchment of the welfare state and a more
aggressive foreign policy
Presidency of George H. W. Bush, which includes
war in Iraq and end of the Cold War
Presidency of Bill Clinton, which includes notable
economic growth and the fiscal solvency of the
state, the signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and welfare reform
Presidency of George W. Bush, which includes the
September 11 attacks, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and the financial crisis of 2008, causing a major
recession
Presidency of Barack Obama, which includes
ongoing economic difficulties and the passage of
the Affordable Care Act
Profile 557
t h ir t e e n o rig in a l c o lo n ie s excessively d e c e n tr a liz e d , w ith
lit tle c e n tra l p o w e r (for a n a u th o rita tiv e a c c o u n t, see W o o d
[1969] 1998). T h e U .S . C o n s t i tu t i o n e s ta b lis h e d a d iv is io n
o f p o w e rs acro ss t h r e e b ra n c h e s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d a se p a
ra tio n o f p o w e rs b e tw e e n th e c e n tr a l g o v e r n m e n t a n d th e
sta te s. T h e A m e r ic a n C o n s t itu ti o n b e c a m e a n e m b le m a tic
e x a m p le o f a f ra m e w o rk d o c u m e n t t h a t o u tlin e s th e b a sic
sy ste m o f g o v e rn a n c e a n d e sta b lish e s th e p rin c ip le s o f th e
ru le o f la w t h a t “c o n s titu te s ” th e b a sic p o litic a l c o m p a c t.
I t is, i n a se n se , a n o u tlin e fo r p o litic s . C o m p r is e d o f j u s t
seven a rtic le s a n d a sm a ll n u m b e r o f s e c tio n s, t h e e n tire
d o c u m e n t fits c o m fo rta b ly o n to a h a n d f u l o f p a g e s . Y et it
h a s p ro v e d r o b u s t e n o u g h to w it h s t a n d o v e r tw o c e n tu rie s
o f c h a n g e w i t h o n ly tw e n ty -s e v e n a m e n d m e n ts in o v e r tw o
c e n tu rie s , d e sp ite m a jo r e c o n o m ic a n d p o litic a l d e v e lo p
m e n ts , a n d se v e ra l w a rs t h a t c h a lle n g e d th e e x is te n c e o f th e
U n ite d S ta te s as a re p u b lic.
S o m e o f th e a m e n d m e n ts to th e C o n s ti tu tio n have b e e n
s u b s ta n tia l, a n d b ro a d e r so c ia l c h a n g e h a s a lte re d th e
U n ite d S ta te s p o lity c o n sid e ra b ly o v e r th e y e ars. H e r e w e
briefly h ig h li g h t th r e e m a in d e v e lo p m e n ts in t h a t c o n n e c
tio n : th e e x te n s io n o f su ffra g e a n d f u ll p a r tic ip a tio n in th e
life o f t h e s o c ie ty to g ro u p s t h a t w e re o n c e e x c lu d e d ; th e
c re a tio n o f th e m o d e r n p a r ty - s y s te m t h a t h a s d o m in a te d
A m e r ic a n p o litic s n o w fo r d e c a d e s ; a n d th e g r o w th o f th e
s ta te , a n d , in p a r tic u la r , o f th e w e lfa re sta te in th e t w e n ti
e th c en tu ry .
L e t u s b e g in w i t h t h e g r a d u a l e x te n s io n o f f u ll c it iz e n
sh ip . O n o n e h a n d , w i t h its c ivic n a tio n a lis m a n d its
f o u n d in g d e c la r a tio n t h a t “A l l m e n a re c r e a te d e q u a l,” th e
e a rly U n i te d S ta te s w a s a n e x a m p le o f e q u a li ty a n d f r e e
d o m ( W o o d [1969] 1998). O n th e o t h e r h a n d , j u d g e d b y
to d a y ’s s ta n d a rd s , a g r e a t d e a l o f e x c lu sio n a n d in e q u a lity
re m a in e d . T h e c o n s titu tio n a l c o n v e n tio n fa ile d to b a n slav
ery, le a v in g su c h m a tte r s , lik e so m u c h else, u p to th e
sta te s , s e t ti n g u p a m a jo r l a te r s h o w d o w n o v e r t h is issue.
T h e A m e r in d ia n p o p u la tio n w a s la rg e ly c o n s ig n e d to th e
le a s t p ro d u c tiv e la n d , a n d th e “r u le s o f t h e g a m e ” w e re r e
p e a te d ly c h a n g e d o n t h e m as t h e U n i te d S ta te s c o n s is te n tly
fa ile d to a b id e b y p re v io u s tr e a ty a g re e m e n ts . W o m e n ’s
civ il rig h ts w e re a lso n a rro w ly c irc u m s c rib e d . O f c o u rse ,
in e q u a lity w a s fe lt b y o t h e r g ro u p s in o t h e r w a y s, in c lu d in g
class in e q u a lity , b u t w e fo c u s h e re v e ry b rie fly o n t h e e x p e
rie n c e o f A f r ic a n A m e ric a n s .
O v e r th e c o u rse o f th e n i n e te e n t h c e n tu r y te n s io n b u ilt
o v e r th e p e rs is te n c e o f slavery. A b o litio n is ts c a m p a ig n e d
a g a in s t it, w h ile slave o w n e rs a n d t h e i r s u p p o rte rs ju s tifie d
it. P re s id e n ts a n d c o n g re s s m e n w o rk e d to b a la n c e p o w e r
su c h t h a t t h e s ta tu s q u o c o u ld p e rs is t— in w h ic h s o u th e rn
s ta te s c o u ld c o n tin u e sla v e ry a n d n o r t h e r n sta te s c o u ld
m e e k ly o p p o s e i t— b u t e v e n tu a lly th is b e c a m e im p o s sib le .
T h e c o u n tr y ’s d e f in in g e v e n t o f t h e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , th e
C iv il W a r (1 8 6 1 -1 8 6 5 ), w a s fo u g h t o v e r t h is issu e (for an
ov e rv ie w , see M c P h e r s o n 1988). A f t e r f o u r c a la m ito u s
y e a rs, th e U n io n w a s v ic to rio u s. I n th e in itia l p o s t-w a r
y e ars A f r ic a n A m e ric a n s h a d so c ia l a n d e le c to ra l success in
a n u m b e r o f s o u th e r n re g io n s . B u t m u c h o f t h is d e p e n d e d
o n th e p re se n c e o f n o r th e r n tro o p s d u r in g R e c o n s tru c tio n ,
w h ic h e n d e d in th e la te 1870s. A f te r th e e n d o f th is p e rio d ,
lo c a l m a jo rity -g ro u p a c to rs in t h e S o u th u s e d force to r e
e sta b lish exclusive c o n tro l o v e r p o litic a l o rg a n iz a tio n s a n d
t h e n w ro te e x p lic it ra c ia l d is c r im in a tio n in to law , c re a tin g
w h a t w a s c a lle d t h e “J im C r o w S o u t h ” w i t h its s h a rp ra c ia l
se g re g a tio n a n d , in so m e lo c a litie s, t h e t h r e a t o f n o n -o ffic ia l
( b u t to le ra te d ) v io le n c e a g a in s t A f r ic a n A m e ric a n s w h o in
a n y w a y se e m e d to th r e a te n t h is o rder.
A t th e sa m e tim e , A f r i c a n A m e ric a n s w h o m o v e d to
n o r t h e r n c ities in th e “G r e a t M i g r a ti o n ” o f te n d isc o v ere d
t h a t d is c r im in a tio n w a s a lso p r e s e n t t h e r e (for a n evocative
a c c o u n t, see W ilk e r s o n 2 0 1 0 ). J im C r o w o n ly fe ll in th e
face o f so c ia l o rg a n iz in g , so c ia l m o v e m e n t a ctiv ity , a n d ex
te n s iv e litig a tio n . I n d e e d , w h e n th e fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t,
u n d e r p re s s u re , b e g a n to e n fo rc e e q u a l access to v o tin g ,
e d u c a tio n , a n d o t h e r r ig h ts in th e 1 9 6 0 s, i t fa c e d re sista n c e
fro m so m e s o u th e r n p o p u la tio n s a n d e v en fro m sta te -le v e l
le a d e rs lik e G e o rg e W a lla c e ( P a tte r s o n 1996: 5 7 9 -5 8 9 ). I t
w o u ld b e a s tr e tc h to say t h a t th e s e s tru g g le s a re over,
th o u g h tr e m e n d o u s p ro g re s s h a s b e e n m a d e , la rg e ly as a
re s u lt o f t h e c iv il r ig h ts m o v e m e n t. S o c ia l s c ie n tists p o in t to
o n g o in g e v id e n c e o f jo b d is c r im in a tio n , s u b s ta n tia lly lo w e r
in c o m e s a n d a s s e t levels, s u b s ta n tia lly p o o r e r p u b lic h e a lth
in d ic a to rs , a n d h ig h e r in c a r c e r a tio n ra te s a m o n g A f r ic a n
A m e r ic a n s as e v id e n c e t h a t b o t h h is to r ic a l leg a cie s a n d o n
g o in g d is c r im in a tio n re m a in issu es in th e c o u n tr y (B ro w n
e t al. 2 0 0 3 ).
Y ou m a y b e su rp rise d to see t h a t th e ev o lu tio n o f th e
m o d e rn p a r ty system in th e U n ite d S ta te s is lin k e d to th ese
d e v elo p m en ts. O n o n e h a n d , th e fa c t t h a t th e U n ite d States
h a s a tw o - p a rt y system is p a rtia lly a fu n c tio n o f its “w in n e r
ta k e a ll” a p p ro a c h to e le ctio n s, b u t th is does n o t, in a n d o f
itself, e x p la in w h y th e tw o p a rtie s have de v elo p ed as th e y
have a n d lin k e d th em se lv es to t h e in te re s ts a n d s u p p o rt o f th e
g ro u p s t h a t th e y have. I n th e in itia l y ears o f th e re p u b lic, th e
m a jo r c o n flic t w as b e tw e e n so -c a lle d “fe d era lists” a n d
558 United States
“d e m o c ratic rep u b lica n s.” T h e fo rm e r favored s tro n g e r c e n tra l
p o w e r (indeed, b o th g ro u p s w e re p ro p o n e n ts o f “fe d era lism ”
as such), a n a tio n a l b a n k , a n d so fo rth , w h ile th e la tte r g ro u p
felt m o re stro n g ly a b o u t h a v in g a w e a k c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t
w ith s tro n g e r sta te a n d local g o v e rn m e n ts . O v e r tim e , th e
federalists w ere esse n tia lly re p la ce d b y t h e W h ig s . T h e C iv il
W a r, th o u g h , w as a c ritic a l ju n c tu re . A b r a h a m L in c o ln , th e
c a n d id a te o f th e little -k n o w n R e p u b lic a n P a rty , w as e lected
in 1860, a n d th e p a r ty c o m p e titio n t h a t e m e rg ed in subse
q u e n t years m e a n t t h a t th e D e m o c ra ts w o u ld be s tro n g
a m o n g p re d o m in a n tly w h ite vo ters in th e S o u th , a n d R e p u b
licans in th e N o r th . M o re o v er, A fric a n A m e ric a n p o litica l
actors te n d e d to be stro n g ly R e p u b lic an . T h is c h a n g e d in
th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry (K e n n e d y 1999), p a rtic u la rly d u rin g
th e years o f th e G re a t D e p re s sio n , w h e re F r a n k lin D e la n o
R o o se v e lt’s ex p an sio n o f th e w e lfare sta te a p p ea le d to
m a n y g ro u p s o f m in o rity voters, in c lu d in g m a n y A fric a n
A m e ric a n s , w orkers, a n d m em b e rs o f im m ig r a n t g ro u p s. F o r
a tim e , th e re w as considerable te n s io n in th e D e m o c ra tic
P a rty b e tw e e n m o re conservative, o fte n so u th e rn , tra d itio n
a list p a r ty m em b e rs a n d su p p o rte rs o f th e m o re “lib e ra l” (in
th e A m e ric a n sense) tra je c to ry o f th e D e m o c ra tic P a r ty in th e
p o st-w a r years. M o re recently, fo llo w in g R ic h a rd N ix o n ’s
fam o u s “S o u th e rn S tra te g y ” (P a tte rs o n 1996: 702, 741-742),
th e R ep u b lic an s have, q u ite ironically, e stab lish e d th e ir
stro n g e st base in t h e S o u th , a n d re g io n s lik e th e N o r th e a s t
have b e co m e sta u n c h ly D e m o c ra tic — in d e e d , in th e 2 0 0 8
co n g ressio n al e lections, N e w E n g la n d se n t no R e p u b lic an s to
th e H o u s e o f R e presentatives.
T h e w e lfa re sta te in th e U n ite d S ta te s is n o t e sp e c ia lly
ro b u s t i f y o u c o m p a re i t to th o s e fo u n d in o th e r a d v a n c e d
in d u s tr ia l so c ieties su c h as F ra n c e , G e rm a n y , o r th e S c a n
d in a v ia n c o u n trie s . P r o p o n e n ts o f t h e w e lfa re sta te i n th e
U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld , h o w e v er, p o i n t to c e r ta in n o ta b le
a c h ie v e m e n ts. W h i l e th e r e h a d b e e n p re v io u s e ffo rts a t
re g u la tio n a n d im p ro v in g th e c o n d itio n s o f w o rk e rs a n d
o th e r p o p u la tio n s , th e A m e r ic a n w e lfa re sta te w as re a lly
c re a te d i n F r a n k lin D e la n o R o o s e v e lt’s “N e w D e a l ” in th e
193 0 s (K e n n e d y 1999). T h is is th e p e rio d in w h ic h so c ial
se c u rity — th e A m e r ic a n fo rm o f so c ia l in s u ra n c e t h a t b o t h
p ro v id e s r e tir e m e n t b e n e fits a n d also s u p p o r t in th e e v e n t o f
a w a g e e a rn e r’s d is a b ility o r d e a th — w a s e s ta b lis h e d , a lo n g
w i t h so m e fo rm s o f h o u s in g a ssista n c e , p e rio d ic r e lie f p r o
g ra m s m e a n t to p ro v id e w o r k a n d o th e r fo rm s o f a ssista n c e
d u r in g t h e G r e a t D e p re s s io n , a n d in c re a s e d re g u la tio n o f
th e la b o r m a rk e t.
T h e se c o n d m a jo r p e r io d o f c o n s tr u c tio n o f th e A m e r i
c a n w e lfa re sta te ( P a tte r s o n 1996: 5 2 4 - 5 9 2 ) w a s d u r in g th e
p re s id e n c y o f L y n d o n B a in e s J o h n s o n (1 9 6 3 -1 9 6 9 ). H e re ,
m a jo r h e a lt h c a re p ro g ra m s lik e M e d ic a r e (w h ic h p ro v id e s
h e a lt h c are to re tire e s) a n d M e d ic a id (w h ic h p ro v id e s care
to so m e in d iv id u a ls w h o o th e rw is e c o u ld n o t a ffo rd it) w e re
e s ta b lis h e d , as w e re n u m e ro u s o th e r so c ia l w e lfa re p r o
g ra m s s u c h as H e a d S ta r t a n d F o o d S ta m p s (te c h n ic a lly
c a lle d th e S u p p le m e n ta l N u tr itio n A s s is ta n c e P ro g ra m ),
a m o n g o th e rs . B e g in n in g in t h e 1 9 7 0 s, as t h e U .S . e c o n
o m y fa c e d “s ta g fla tio n ” a n d o th e r d iffic u ltie s , a m o v e m e n t
k n o w n to sc h o la rs as “r e tr e n c h m e n t” g a th e r e d s te a m , as in
so m e o th e r c o u n trie s (P ra s a d 2 0 0 6 ).
W h e n R o n a ld R e a g a n t o o k office in 1 9 8 0 , h e d id so
a f te r stro n g ly o p p o s in g th e w e lfa re sta te fe a tu re s e s ta b
lis h e d b y t h e N e w D e a l a n d th e G r e a t S o c ie ty p ro g ra m s .
H o w e v e r, w h ile h e sc a le d b a c k a v a r ie ty o f r e lie f p ro g ra m s ,
k e y f e a tu re s o f t h e w e lfa re sta te p e rs is te d . In d e e d , it w as
u n d e r th e p re s id e n c y o f D e m o c r a t B ill C l in to n t h a t so -
c a lle d “w e lfa re ”— th e A id to F a m ilie s w i t h D e p e n d e n t
C h i ld r e n ( A F D C ) p ro g ra m — w a s “r e fo rm e d .” T h a t is, it
w a s tra n s f o rm e d in to th e m o re r e s tric tiv e T e m p o r a r y A i d
to N e e d y F a m ilie s ( T A N F ) p r o g r a m , a d m in is te r e d via
b lo c k g r a n ts to th e sta te s a n d n o lo n g e r cla ssified as a n “e n
tit l e m e n t ” ( P a tte r s o n 2 0 0 5 : 3 7 4 -3 7 6 ). T h is p a t t e r n o f m id
c e n tu r y w e lfa re sta te e x p a n s io n fo llo w e d b y r e tr e n c h m e n t
b e g in n in g in th e 197 0 s is c o m m o n to o th e r a d v a n c e d in
d u s tr ia l so c ie tie s , e v en i f th e U .S . w e lfa re sta te w a s re la
tiv e ly w e a k to b e g in w ith . In te re s tin g ly , th o u g h , re c e n t
p o litic s h a s in v o lv e d b o t h th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a m a jo r
h e a lth c are b ill t h a t w o u ld e x te n d co v era g e to m o s t o f th e
U .S . p o p u la tio n (s o m e th in g alw ays c o n sp ic u o u s ly a b se n t
fro m th e U .S . w e lfa re sta te ) and a re n e w e d e ffo rt b y o th e r
a c to rs to re fo rm th o s e a sp e c ts o f th e w e lfa re s ta te t h a t h ave,
u n t i l n ow , la rg e ly b e e n stro n g ly d e fe n d e d b y b o t h p a rtie s :
M e d ic a r e a n d S o c ia l S e c u rity . I n s h o rt, t h e issu es t h a t h ave
a n im a te d th e d e b a te a b o u t th e A m e r ic a n w e lfa re s ta te are
s till v e ry m u c h p a r t o f p u b lic d isc u ssio n .
Regime and Political Institutions
T he p re d o m in a n t fe a tu re s o f th e A m e r ic a n p o litic a l sy ste m “c h e c k s a n d b a la n c e s ” b e tw e e n t h e le g is la tu re , t h e e x ec u -
a re th e s e p a ra tio n o f p o w e rs a m o n g v a rio u s levels a n d i n s ti- tiv e , a n d th e ju d ic ia ry , b u t also th e s e p a ra tio n o f p o w e r b e -
tu tio n s o f g o v e rn m e n t. T h is in c lu d e s n o t o n ly th e s e t o f tw e e n th e fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e f if ty sta te s. A t th e
Profile 559
fe d e ra l level, th e U n ite d S ta te s C o n g re s s is a b ic a m e ra l le g
is la tu re c o m p ris e d o f a H o u s e o f R e p re s e n ta tiv e s a n d th e
S e n a te ; th e R e p re s e n ta tiv e s in t h e H o u s e a re se le c te d i n o n e
o f 435 d is tric ts a r o u n d th e c o u n try , w ith e a c h d is tr ic t r e p
re s e n tin g o ver a h a lf - m illio n A m e ric a n s . E v e ry sta te h a s a
m in im u m o f o n e se a t fo r a R e p re s e n ta tiv e in t h e H o u s e , a n d
t h e n u m b e r o f d is tr ic ts p e r s ta te ra n g e s fro m o n e i n t h e le a s t
p o p u lo u s sta te s (such as W y o m in g ) to f if ty - th r e e in C a li
fo rn ia . T h is r e p re s e n ta tio n in t h e H o u s e , w h ic h is ro u g h ly
p r o p o rtio n a l to a s ta te ’s p o p u la tio n , is c o u n te rb a la n c e d b y
t h e tw o S e n a to rs fo r e a c h sta te . E ith e r c h a m b e r c a n p ro p o se
b ills it w ish e s to see b e c o m e law , b u t th e b ill m u s t p ass b o t h
h o u se s o f C o n g re s s , th e n b e s ig n e d in to la w b y t h e p re s i
d e n t. A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e p re s id e n t c a n c h o o se t o v e to t h e b ill,
w h ic h c a n t h e n b e o v e r tu r n e d o n ly b y a t w o - th ir d s m a jo rity
v o te in b o t h h o u se s o f C o n g re s s . I n a d d itio n , th e fe d e ra l
ju d ic ia r y c a n s trik e d o w n law s it d e e m s u n c o n s titu tio n a l.
T h is p ro v id e s th e ju d ic ia l c h e c k o n th e o t h e r b ra n c h e s ; th e
c h e c k o n th e ju d ic ia r y in t u r n is t h a t its ju d g e s a re n o m i
n a te d b y t h e p re s id e n t a n d a p p ro v e d b y t h e S e n a te .
A lo n g s id e th e s e c h e c k s a n d b a la n c e s i n t h e p o lic y m a k
in g p ro c e ss , t h e U n it e d S ta te s a lso e x h ib its a s e p a ra tio n o f
p o w e rs b e tw e e n t h e fe d e ra l (c e n tra l) g o v e r n m e n t a n d th e
sta te s . T h e U n i te d S ta te s w a s a n e a rly le a d e r in e s ta b lis h in g
t h e p r in c ip le o f f e d e ra lis m , in w h ic h b o t h levels o f g o v e rn
m e n t h a v e s ig n ific a n t c o n s titu t io n a l a u th o rity . O n e o f th e
k e y a sp e c ts o f th e C o n s t i t u t i o n is t h e r e s e rv a tio n o f “r e
s id u a l” p o w e rs to t h e sta te s , m e a n in g th e s ta te s h ave a u
t h o r it y o v e r issu e s n o t e x p re ss ly g r a n te d to th e fe d e ra l
g o v e r n m e n t. T h is q u e s tio n o f “s ta te s ’ r ig h ts ” re la tiv e to
fe d e r a l la w w a s th e c r u x o f th e issu e o f sla v e ry u p th r o u g h
th e C iv il W a r , a n d to th is d a y m a n y o f th e b ig g e s t d e b a te s
in A m e r ic a n p o litic s a re o v e r w h e th e r issu e s r a n g in g fro m
w e lfa re to a b o r tio n la w s h o u ld b e t h e re s p o n s ib ility o f th e
fe d e ra l o r s ta te g o v e rn m e n ts . S ta te s a n d lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts
h a v e a g r e a t d e a l o f re s p o n s ib ility i n so c ia l se rv ice s. S ta te s
d o m u c h o f t h e w o r k i n a d m in i s te r i n g p ro g r a m s fo r th e
p o o r (su c h as M e d ic a id a n d in c o m e s u p p o rt), w h ile lo c a li
tie s h a v e e sp e c ia lly s ig n if ic a n t re s p o n s ib ilitie s in e d u c a
tio n . M o r e p e o p le p a r ti c ip a te in e le c te d offices o n sc h o o l
b o a r d s t h a n a n y o t h e r p o s itio n . L o c a l e x e c u tiv e s s u c h as
m a y o rs a lso o v e rsee se rv ice s su c h as lo c a l ro a d s , s a n ita tio n ,
a n d th e p o lic e .
R e g im e a n d P olitica l In stitu tio n s
Regime Federal republic, democratically elected
Administrative Divisions Fifty states, each of which has counties, cities, towns, etc. Also District of Columbia (federal capital)
and several overseas territories and dependencies.
Executive Branch President
Selection of Executive Elected by "electoral college," with delegates awarded depending on popular vote in each state or
electoral district
Legislative Branch Bicameral Congress
House of Representatives (lower chamber) elected in single-member districts
Senate (upper chamber), two senators per state
Judicial Branch Federal court system led by Supreme Court with powers of Constitutional review
Political Party System Two-party system; Democratic Party, Republican Party
Political Culture
A m e r ic a n p o litic a l c u ltu r e , lik e p o litic a l c u ltu r e e v e ry
w h e re , h a s m u ltip le s tre a m s a n d f e a tu re s . H o w e v e r, c e r ta in
k e y t h e m e s s ta n d o u t a n d h a v e b e e n d is c u s s e d a t l e n g t h b y
s c h o la rs in te r e s te d in th is case. T h e se in c lu d e a t r a d i t io n o f
sk e p tic is m o f g o v e r n m e n ta l a u th o rity , w h ic h e x te n d s b a c k
a t le a s t to t h e r e v o lu tio n a ry e ra ( th o u g h A m e ric a n s have
o f te n p u rs u e d g o v e rn m e n ta l a c tio n as w ell); s o -c a lle d
“r u g g e d in d iv id u a lis m ”; th e m u c h -d is c u s s e d A m e ric a n
“f ro n tie r m e n ta lity ”; a n iso la tio n is t te n d e n c y w i t h re sp e c t to
fo re ig n policy, b u t a lo n g s id e a n i m p o r t a n t m il i ta r i s t s tra in ;
a n d th e id e a o f t h e “A m e r ic a n d r e a m ” a n d th e a sso c ia te d
id e a o f m e r ito c r a tic e q u a lity . A l m o n d a n d V e rb a (1963)
a rg u e d t h a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s a case e x h ib itin g s tr o n g
“c ivic c u ltu r e ,” t h o u g h in r e c e n t y e a rs so m e h a v e w o rrie d
a b o u t w h e th e r th is is s till tr u e ( P u t n a m 2 0 0 0 ).
T h e t r a d it io n o f s k e p tic ism o f g o v e r n m e n ta l a u th o r ity
may, to so m e e x te n t, h a v e its o rig in s in t h e e a rly sta g e s o f
c o lo n ia lism . I n th e N e w E n g la n d c o lo n ie s in p a r tic u la r ,
t h e p o p u la tio n w a s, in th e in iti a l sta g e s , la rg e ly th e r e fo r
re a so n s o f re lig io u s in to le ra n c e b a c k h o m e . T h e y liv e d in
f e a r o f E n g lis h a u th o r itie s , a n d t h e y e s ta b lis h e d s tr o n g t r a
d itio n s o f c o m m u n ity re lia n c e a n d lo c a l s e lf-g o v e rn a n c e .
A t t h e v e ry le a st, la te r A m e ric a n s c o u ld lo o k b a c k to t h i n k
ers lik e R o g e r W ill ia m s a n d see th e m as a n tic ip a tin g th e i r
o w n s k e p tic ism o f g o v e r n m e n t in v o lv e m e n t in p riv a te life
(M il le r 1 9 8 3 a , 1983b). T h is w a s c e r ta in ly tr u e o f k e y m e m
b e rs o f th e re v o lu tio n a ry g e n e ra tio n , w h o o b je c te d n o t o n ly
to ta x a tio n w it h o u t c o n s e n t b u t a lso to th e u se o f fo rce B rit
is h a u th o ritie s e x erc ised in s u p p re s s in g t h e i r p ro te s ts .
(S o m e a c c o u n ts o f th e re v o lu tio n , su c h as N a s h 1979, stre ss
a d d itio n a l g rie v a n c e s a n d p o in t to d iffe re n c e s i n so c ia l
class.) W h e n th e c o u n tr y b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t, its fo u n d e rs
c le a rly d id h a v e in m in d “lim ite d g o v e rn m e n t,” a n d g o v
e r n m e n t p o w e rs e x p a n d e d in se v e ra l k e y sta g e s a n d in r e
sp o n s e to c rises a n d c h a n g in g c o n d itio n s in su b s e q u e n t
y ears. S till, h a v in g fo u n d in g d o c u m e n ts a n d tr a d itio n s t h a t
so c le a rly e x p ress s k e p tic ism o f g o v e r n m e n t m e a n s t h a t t h e
p o litic a l c u ltu r e , n o m a t te r h o w m u c h it c h a n g e s , alw ays
h a s th e s e p o in ts o f re fe re n c e . A s a n y o n e w h o e v en d i s ta n tly
fo llo w s A m e r ic a n p o litic s c o u ld a tte s t, th e s e issues re m a in
m u c h d isc u sse d .
Several o f th e o th e r c o m m o n ly c ite d fe atu res o f A m e ric a n
p o litic a l c u ltu r e n o te d p re v io u s ly a re re la te d to th is id e a .
560 United States
T h e n o tio n o f “r u g g e d i n d iv id u a lis m ” c a rrie s th e im a g e o f
sin g le p e rs o n s a n d s m a ll fa m ilie s s tr u g g l in g , w i t h o u t a id ,
a g a i n s t n a tu r e . I n g e n e ra l, c o m p a ra tiv e re s e a rc h e rs fin d a
s tr o n g in d iv i d u a lis t te n d e n c y in A m e r ic a n p o litic a l c u l
t u r e . T h is l in k s to A m e r ic a n s ’ u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f th e
m e r ito c r a tic c h a r a c te r o f th e A m e r ic a n c la ss s tr u c tu r e .
A m e r ic a n s , u n lik e E u r o p e a n s , t e n d to b e lie v e t h a t i n d i
v id u a ls a re la rg e ly r e s p o n s ib le fo r w h e re th e y e n d u p in
life: S o c ie ty is b a s ic a lly fa ir, a n d e v e ry o n e w h o is ta le n te d
a n d w o rk s h a r d h a s a g o o d c h a n c e o f g e tt i n g a h e a d .
I n d e e d , A m e r ic a n s o f te n b e lie v e t h a t th is a lle g e d q u a lity
o f t h e A m e r ic a n c lass s t r u c tu r e is w h a t se ts th e c o u n tr y
a p a r t (th u s t h e “A m e r ic a n d r e a m ”) e v e n t h o u g h c o n s id e r
a ble r e s e a rc h sh o w s t h a t , a t le a s t in r e c e n t y e a rs , th e
A m e r ic a n c la ss s t r u c tu r e is n o m o re o p e n t h a n th e class
s tr u c tu r e s o f m o s t W e s te r n E u r o p e a n c o u n trie s ( H a s k in s ,
Isa a c s, a n d S a w h ill 2 0 0 8 ). T h e n o t io n o f th e “f r o n tie r
m e n ta lity ,” w a s m u c h d is c u s s e d a f te r a fa m o u s a r g u m e n t
p u t fo r w a r d b y h i s t o r ia n F re d e ric k J a c k s o n T u r n e r (1921)
in th e la te n i n e t e e n t h a n d e a rly t w e n t i e th c e n tu rie s .
T u r n e r a n d t h o s e in flu e n c e d b y h i m w o r r ie d a b o u t w h a t
w o u ld b e c o m e o f A m e r ic a n s ’ e n e rg ie s n o w t h a t th e f r o n
t ie r w a s g o n e (b e c a u se w e s tw a r d e x p a n s io n w a s c o m
p le te d ). T h is id e a is b a s e d o n th e r e c o g n itio n t h a t
A m e r ic a n s h a v e h is to r ic a lly t h o u g h t o f th e m s e lv e s in re la
t io n to f o u n d i n g m y th s a b o u t s tr u g g le a g a in s t n a tu r e ,
m a k i n g b o u n t i f u l a n (a lleg e d ly ) u n p o p u la t e d la n d , a n d ,
a g a in , re ly in g o n th e m s e lv e s i n th is s tru g g le . T h e iso la
t io n i s t im p u ls e , d is c u s s e d m o re in o n e o f t h e case s tu d ie s
t h a t fo llo w (“T h e U n it e d S ta te s a n d th e W o r ld ”), a lso is
re la te d a n d a lso h a s lo n g h is to r ic a l ro o ts .
Political Economy
T h e U n it e d S ta te s is t h e w o r l d ’s l a r g e s t e c o n o m y as o f
2 0 1 5 , d e s p ite re c e n t c h a lle n g e s a n d th e rise o f C h in a . T h e
tw e n ti e th c e n t u r y w a s a tim e o f d r a m a tic e x p a n s io n o f
A m e r ic a n m a n u f a c t u r i n g , e p ito m iz e d b y t h e ris e o f th e
a u to m o b ile i n d u s tr y ( K e n n e d y 1 999: 2 0 - 2 1 ) . A s th e
U n it e d S ta te s b e c a m e th e u n d is p u te d i n d u s tr ia l le a d e r o f
t h e fre e w o rld a f te r W o r ld W a r I I , i t a ls o b e c a m e th e
w o r ld ’s le a d in g v oice fo r c a p ita lis m . E c o n o m ic s e tb a c k s
c a m e w i t h t h e G r e a t D e p r e s s io n o f t h e 1 9 3 0 s, th e o il c rises
o f th e 1 9 7 0 s, a n d t h e g lo b a l fin a n c ia l c ris is o f 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 9 ,
b u t t h e A m e r ic a n e c o n o m y c o n tin u e s as a w o r ld le a d e r. B y
th e tw e n ty - f i r s t c e n tu ry , t h e e c o n o m y h a d s h if te d aw ay
fro m lo w - s k ille d , la b o r-in te n s iv e m a n u f a c tu r in g , d u e to
a u to m a tio n a n d in c r e a s in g im p o r ts o f p r o d u c ts b u i l t ov er
seas (a n d , th e r e f o r e , th e o u ts o u r c in g o f m u c h in d u s t r ia l
w o r k to d e v e lo p in g c o u n trie s ). T h e e c o n o m y h a s b e c o m e
m o re “s e r v ic e - o r ie n te d ,” in c lu d i n g m a n y p ro fe s sio n a ls
w i t h c o lle g e d e g re e s a n d m a n y w o r k i n g in r e ta il sales.
I n e q u a l it y h a s in c re a s e d n o ta b ly as th e s e t r e n d s h a v e u n
f o ld e d ( P a t te r s o n 2 0 0 5 : 3 5 1 -3 5 3 ).
T h e U n ite d S ta te s d o e s n o t h a v e th e h ig h e s t G D P p e r
c a p ita , as i t la g s b e h in d se v e ra l s m a ll c o u n trie s t h a t are
b a n k in g c e n te rs a n d se v e ra l o il- e x p o r t in g c o u n trie s w i th
s m a ll p o p u la tio n s . M o re o v e r, in e q u a lity i n th e U n ite d
S ta te s is h ig h c o m p a re d to o t h e r w e a lth y c o u n trie s , a n d
m o re t h a n 10 p e rc e n t o f t h e p o p u la tio n fa lls b e lo w th e
Case Studies 561
p o v e rty lin e . T h is su g g e sts t h a t b y m a n y m e a s u re s , t h e issu e
o f d e v e lo p m e n t is re le v a n t e v en in t h is s e e m in g ly p o w e rfu l
econom y. H e a l t h in d ic a to rs a n d e d u c a tio n la g b e h in d m a n y
c o u n trie s in b o th E u r o p e a n d A s ia . S o m e m in o r it y g ro u p s ,
su c h as A f r ic a n A m e ric a n s , h ave e c o n o m ic a n d so c ia l i n d i
c a to rs t h a t a re m u c h w o rs e o f f t h a n t h e n a tio n a l a verage.
T h is is a lso c le a r w i t h r e s p e c t to so c ia l class. F o r e x a m p le ,
e d u c a tio n level— a p ro x y fo r c lass— is n e g a tiv e ly c o rre la te d
w it h th e lik e lih o o d t h a t A m e ric a n s w il l d ie fro m c h ro n ic
d ise ase o r e v en su ffe r in ju rie s (B e r k m a n 2 0 0 4 ).
T h e A m e r ic a n e c o n o m y faces se v e ra l s ig n ific a n t c h a l
le n g e s a t p re s e n t, e sp e c ia lly a f te r t h e d e e p re c e ssio n o f
2 0 0 7 to 2 0 0 9 a n d t h e slo w re c o v e ry a n d h ig h u n e m p lo y
m e n t t h a t p e rs is te d i n its a f te r m a th . I n t h e s h o r t t e r m (as o f
early 2 0 1 5 ), th e c e n tr a l c h a lle n g e is o n e o f c o n ti n u in g to
re sto re d e m a n d w h ile c a p ita liz in g o n th e m o m e n tu m t h a t
h a s d e v e lo p e d in t h e la b o r m a r k e t, as u n e m p lo y m e n t is
n o w w e ll b e lo w 6% . S o m e a lso w o r r y a b o u t th e siz e a n d
s u s ta in a b ility o f th e n a tio n a l d e b t, a n d so m e a re c o n c e rn e d
t h a t th e im b a la n c e m a y w o rs e n as a r e s u lt o f c o n tin u e d lo w
ta x e s a n d in c re a s e d s p e n d in g fo r a n a g in g p o p u la tio n i n th e
c o m in g y e ars.
D e s p ite th e s e m a n y c h a lle n g e s , th e A m e r ic a n e c o n o m y
is d iv e rs ifie d a n d r o b u s t in m a n y a re a s, a n d it r e m a in s th e
e n v y o f m a n y c o u n trie s a r o u n d t h e w o rld . I t is h o m e to
m a n y o f th e la r g e s t a n d m o s t su c c e ss fu l c o rp o ra tio n s in th e
w o rld a n d is a le a d in g c e n te r o f te c h n o lo g ic a l in n o v a tio n
a n d fin a n c e . T h e U n i te d S ta te s a lso fe a tu re s c o u n tle s s sm a ll
b u s in e s s e s a n d is r e n o w n e d fo r its c u ltu r e o f e n tr e p r e n e u r
sh ip . F in a lly , th e c o u n tr y is w id e ly se e n as h a v in g m u c h o f
th e “s o f t in f r a s tr u c tu r e ” t h a t m a k e s fo r a r e s ilie n t a n d v i
b r a n t e c o n o m y : p r o te c tio n o f p r o p e r t y r ig h ts , d e e p la b o r
a n d c a p ita l m a rk e ts , a n d c lu s te rs o f in n o v a tio n a n d k n o w l
ed g e . A s a re s u lt, th e U n it e d S ta te s c o n tin u e s to d r a w ta le n t
a n d c a p ita l in v e s tm e n t fro m a r o u n d t h e w o rld , a n d it lo o k s
se t to r e m a in a g lo b a l e c o n o m ic p o w e rh o u s e in to th e fu tu re .
CASE STUDIES
Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich?
Will They in the Future? CHAPTER 4, PAGE 72
Development is a process that unfolds over time, and it can be
helpful to consider a range of different cases in comparative per
spective, whether these are different countries at the same point
in time, the same country at different points in time, or other pos
sibilities. As a thought experiment, consider this statement about
the usefulness of tariffs (taxes on foreign goods) and subsidies (or
government support for domestic producers), and guess in
which country the government published this report advocating
for state intervention:
[We should] place tariffs on foreign goods of those
products we wish to encourage, and to apply the
proceeds of that tariff as a subsidy on the production or
manufacture in [this country]. In this way, our companies
have every advantage in their production.
Notice the anti-free-market tone. Is this a statement from Russia?
Communist China? Actually, this excerpt (slightly modified for
clarity) is from one of the Founding Fathers of the United
States: Alexander Hamilton ([1791] 1828: pp. 110-111). Why would
Hamilton argue against free markets and for protectionism and
active government promotion of industry? Because the United
States was a backward country when he was writing in 1791. The
world's leading economy was Great Britain, which had led the
world into the Industrial Revolution. In fact, powerful Britain was
the leading advocate for free trade in the nineteenth century.
Partly due to the protectionist logic laid out by Hamilton, the
United States relied heavily on tariffs for government revenues
through the nineteenth century and up to the 1930s. As early as
the 1800s, northern industry in the United States sought to pro
tect its production by imposing higher tariffs on imported
goods. This culminated in the sky-high Tariff of 1828, the highest
rates in American history. The southern states abhorred the tar
iffs, which raised prices of imported goods, and called it the
"Tariff of Abominations." The resulting dispute contributed to
562 United States
CASE STUDY (continued)
Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich?
Will They in the Future? C H A P T E R 4, PAGE 72
rising tensions before the Civil War. While tariff rates later de
clined, the United States passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff a cen
tury later, which was interpreted as contributing to the Great
Depression.
The United States became the leading advocate for free trade
only after World War II. That is, the United States pushed for free
trade when it was the preeminent economic power in the world.
One theory is that wealthy countries like to “kick away the ladder’
after they have climbed it. That is, the United States and other
wealthy countries succeeded under protectionism, but once
they became dominant powers, they sought to establish rules
that favor the powerful and make everyone else live by them.
This would explain not only the American conversion to a pro-
free-trade stance, but also the British preference for free trade in
the nineteenth century.
Contemporary American economic policy still features a pro
tectionist streak and heavy government spending in several
areas, and not only due to the financial crisis of the late 2000s. For
example, the defense industry depends heavily on government
contracts, and the government is a major consumer of pharma
ceuticals and medical devices through its Medicare program that
provides health care to senior citizens. The U.S. protectionist im
pulse can be seen especially in debates over the rise of China,
which is often accused of unfairtrade practices. American policy
makers and voters routinely lament the low wages, lack of worker
protections, and environmental abuses of Chinese production,
all of which lower the prices of Chinese goods and can make
American goods less competitive. A common response is to ad
vocate for protection of American jobs by putting barriers on
Chinese goods.
Countries change their development strategies over time,
with some periods involving much more state intervention and
other periods less so. Perspectives on free trade also tend to
change depending on a country's economic circumstances. It is
worth remembering that the United States was not always a
paragon of free markets, and it is possible that in the future too it
may have a much less favorable view of whether free markets are
the road to wealth.
CASE STUDY
■ ■ H i
Is Amerisrican Democracy in Trouble?
Many of today's most robust democra
cies have had tumultuous histories.
Think, for instance, of Germany or France,
which over the last two centuries have
seen both democratic and authoritarian
regimes (and, in the former case, per
haps the most notorious totalitarian
regime in modern history). Other coun
tries, though, saw slow and steady de
mocratization over time. The United
Kingdom and the United States stand
out as clear examples of the latter pat
tern. This means that polities like the
United States are securely democratic,
right?
Very few political scientists fear the
imminent demise of American democ
racy, but scholars do vary considerably in
terms of how safely institutionalized they
consider that democracy to be. Think, for
a moment, about what the different theo
ries of democracy discussed in chapter 6
might suggest about this case. What are
the implications of each theory for the
survival of democratic regimes? What risk
factors might increase the probability of
democratic decay?
One worry that some scholars have
voiced concerns rising income inequal
ity (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010). The
CHAPTER 6, PAGE 140
gap between rich and poor Americans is
much wider today than it was several de
cades ago. According to scholars like
Pierson and Hacker, this change has
dangerous implications, and we might
expect it to be self-reinforcing, since the
"beneficiaries" of expanding income in
equality exert disproportionate influ
ence in the political process and might
block efforts to reduce inequality. This
concern links to traditional "moderniza
tion" theories of democracy like that of
Upset (1959,1960) discussed in chapter 6.
Recall that Upset saw a strong middle
class as the backbone of democratic
Case Studies 563
CASE STUDY (continued)
Is American Democracy in Trouble? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 140
regimes, seeing economic development
as, in part, acting indirectly to promote
democratization through creating and
sustaining a middle class. If the middle
class shrinks or its position weakens, an
implication of the theory would be that
one of democracy's "social requisites" is
in decline.
Another worry links to a different
theory of democratization discussed in
the chapter, the “cultural" theory. Some
years ago, political scientist Robert
Putnam (2000; for a similar set of concerns
see Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and
Tipton 1985) published a book called
Bowling Alone, in which he argued that
the habits, tastes, and modes of participa
tion that had been operative in the United
States since its founding, and which
had been documented by Alexis de Toc
queville in the nineteenth century, were in
decline. According to Putnam, the volun
tary tendencies that were conducive to
robust civic participation were giving way
to individualism. The implication, again, is
that the failure to practice democratic
habits— or to maintain a democratic cul
ture of civic participation— could under
mine democratic institutions.
These worries are not shared by all
scholars (for a critique of Putnam's argu
ment, e.g., see Ladd 1999). Some argue
for the resilience of American democratic
institutions in the face of these changes
and some, in fact, suggest that scholars
like Hacker, Pierson, and Putnam exag
gerate the trends in question. Moreover,
the attentive reader will not fail to note
that these very discussions, for perhaps
obvious reasons, enter into American po
litical speech at the highest level and
resonate in politicians' statements and
debates as well as journalistic accounts
of American politics. We encourage you,
though, to think like a comparativist in
coming to judgments about them. Try to
put the comparative approach to work in
thinking about these critical issues.
Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem? CHAPTER 8, PAGE 192
The federal judiciary in the United States
has a significant role in the interpretation
of law and in ruling whether laws are con
stitutional. This role has led to accusations
of 'judicial activism." Because judges can
invalidate laws or add new interpretations
to laws passed by Congress, some argue
that the judiciary is too powerful and that
"unelected judges are legislating from the
bench.” Examples of controversial judicial
decisions can be found in the federal
courts, but they are not limited to these;
they also happen at the state level as well,
such as when the top courts in states such
as Massachusetts, Iowa, and New Jersey
ruled that the state must extend same-
sex marriage rights or equivalent benefits
to gay couples.
Over the years, certain key rulings by
the United States Supreme Court have
proven especially noteworthy. The first of
these, and the one decision that gave
power to subsequent decisions, was Mar-
bury v. Madison in 1803. This ruling as
serted the power of judicial review, a
power the Supreme Court found to be
implicit in the structure of government
established in the Constitution. Several
other key decisions in United States Su
preme Court history can shed light on the
question of judicial activism.
One of the leading decisions in which
judicial action preceded legislative action
was the famous Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) decision. This unanimous (9-0) deci
sion outlawed official racial segregation in
public schools. The ruling predated and
anticipated the civil rights achievements
of the 1960s, with the Supreme Court re
flecting a growing social consensus
among a majority of Americans that racial
segregation should be outlawed. This
ruling had several elements of judicial ac
tivism: It took action when Congress had
not done so, it substantially limited the
extent to which states could make their
own determinations about education, and
it also essentially overturned the long
standing precedent of one of the Supreme
Court's most notorious decisions: Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896), which had established
that "separate but equal" provisions for dif
ferent races were constitutionally permis
sible. This had allowed racial segregation
564 United States
CASE STUDY (continued)
Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem? CHAPTER 8, PAGE 192
to persist. While arguably a textbook in
stance of judicial activism, Brown v. Board of
Education is also widely seen as one of the
Supreme Court's proudest moments.
Other controversial rulings in the his
tory of the U.S. Supreme Court have also
raised the question of judicial activism on
hot-button issues such as slavery in the
nineteenth century, and in the twentieth
century issues of contraception, abortion,
and affirmative action. The case Griswold v.
Connecticut (in 1965) was concerned with
contraception laws; the Supreme Court
ruled that individuals have a constitutional
right of privacy, based on a combined
reading of a number of amendments to
the Constitution. No specific "right to pri
vacy" is found there, but the ruling stated
that this right could be inferred from the
"penumbras and emanations" of other
foundational rights. Critics saw this as
a case of an activist court run amok.
inventing or "discovering" rights that were
not explicitly established in the Constitu
tion. Less than a decade later, Roe v. Wade
(in 1973) ruled that women have a condi
tional right to abortion, depending upon
the trimester of pregnancy, with few re
strictions in the first three months, case-
by-case consideration in the second three
months, and significant restrictions (such
as jeopardizing the life of the mother) in
the final three months. Another case that
drew mixed reactions was Bush v. Gore (in
2000), which ruled that the state of Florida
must stop its recount of the vote tally from
the razor-thin 2000 presidential election
between George W. Bush and Al Gore. This
effectively ended the election dispute and
resulted in George W. Bush's inauguration
as president.
In essence, most major Supreme Court
decisions of great consequence are likely
to have elements of judicial activism,
depending on one's definition of the term.
In fact, many critics of judicial activism do
not wish to criticize all court action, and
would often be happy with courts taking
consequential decisions that overturn
laws and statutes. Rather, critics often have
an interpretation of the Constitution in
mind, and wish judges would rule accord
ing to that interpretation. Perhaps they
view the Constitution as allowing only
quite limited government and lament
courts that read new rights into the Con
stitution. Or perhaps they view the Consti
tution as enabling many tacit rights for
individuals (such as privacy, e.g.) and
regret courts that make decisions they
perceive as limiting these rights. That is,
many critics of judicial activism in some
decisions may look for an active judiciary
in other areas; the debate is as often over
conceptions of rights as it is over what the
judiciary should and should not do.
CASE STUDY
The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or
Functioning by Design? CHAPTER 9, PAGE 217
The "Founding Fathers" of the United
States developed an intricate political
compromise designed to satisfy both the
larger and smaller of the thirteen original
colonies that came together to create the
new nation. Led by James Madison, con
sidered the "Father of the Constitution,"
the founders reserved considerable rights
to those states that the central govern
ment could not infringe upon and backed
up these rights in the form of a Senate
where each state was to have equal repre
sentation, regardless of population. While
the idea of compromise between central
and state power was crucial in the early
development of the country, the balance
of that power has been controversial for
the entire history of the republic. Long
after the acrimonious battles at the
founding over states' rights, and long
after the Civil War settled the question of
state attempts to nullify federal law, the
debate continues.
Some of the leading debates about
how representative democracy truly is in
the United States focus on the function
ing of Congress, and especially the Senate.
Consider one question: Would it seem
democratic if elected officials represent
ing about 12 percent of the population
Case Studies 565
CASE STUDY (continued)
The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or
Functioning by Design? CHAPTER 9, PAGE 217
could block legislation that the other 88
percent wants? Probably not, assuming
the law in question does not violate any
basic civil rights. Yet this could happen in
the United States, at least in theory. The
Senate features significant malapportion
ment and provides major leverage to
smaller and less populous (often rural)
states. There are historical reasons for this,
of course: the "Great Compromise" at the
founding of the American republic cre
ated a bicameral congress and gave the
more populous states more representa
tion in the House of Representatives,
while protecting the interests of the less
populous states by creating a Senate in
which each state would have two
Senators.
The power of a minority in the Senate
can be further enhanced by certain rules
that have been applied with increasing
frequency. For instance, even a minority
of Senators can block legislation, given
the use of such rules as the "filibuster" (or
more formally, a cloture vote), which re
quires a supermajority of sixty out of one
hundred senators to end a debate and
move to a vote on a bill. In the most ex
treme scenario, legislation in the United
States could be stopped by forty-one
senators representing only about 12 per
cent of the country's population. While
this particular configuration is unlikely, it
is clear that groups of as few as forty
senators representing well under half the
population have blocked legislation fa
vored by senators representing a large
majority of the population. In a sense, tol
erating the possibility of gridlock and in
action is the flip side of encouraging
extensive negotiation and requiring su
permajorities to pass legislation.
Representation in the House of Rep
resentatives is also subject to maneuvers
that can distort representation. The dis
tricts for elections depend on the results
of the Census, which takes place every
ten years. As states grow in population,
they may be awarded additional seats
among the 435 in the House, while these
seats are taken away from states declin
ing in population. This realignment gives
rise to redistricting, or the drawing of
new maps that define the boundaries of
congressional districts. The shape of dis
tricts is a hotly contested issue, since it
shapes the likelihood of who is elected to
office. For instance, imagine a large urban
area shaped like a large circle, that is large
enough to merit two congressional seats.
Say the population of the whole area is
comprised of 40 percent Democrats,
mostly located in the urban center, and
60 percent Republicans, mostly located
in the suburbs that ring the city. Should
the map makers draw districts that cut
the circle in half along its diameter with a
straight line? Or should they create one
congressional district for the urban
center and one for the suburbs? The
'straight line" solution might well give
two Republican seats (since Republicans
would outnumber Democrats by a ratio
of 3:2 on either side of the dividing line),
while the "center and ring" solution
would probably give one seat in the
House to each party (since the Demo
crats would dominate in the inner city
and the Republicans in the district in the
suburbs). The chosen solution may be
determined by which party (if either)
controls the redistricting process. In
some instances, the map making be
comes an elaborate process known as
"gerrymandering," in which incumbents
who see an advantage in drawing a map
a certain way create districts with bizarre
shapes designed to help themselves
and/or hurt their political opponents.
The design of the two chambers of
Congress was thus deliberate and useful,
but it has also permitted results that
have led some to say the institutions are
dysfunctional (see Mann and Ornstein
2008). Representation in the United
States Congress was conceived to pro
tect the rights of individuals and politi
cal minorities as well as the principle of
federalism, but the institutions designed
to do so also have certain features that
advantage incumbents and promote
partisanship.
566 United States
The Most Powerful Person in the World"? Checks on
American Presidents C H A P T E R 10, PAGE 231
While the president of the United States
has long been considered the "Leader
of the Free World," these presidents
are part of a system of checks and bal
ances between executives and the other
branches. In fact, while presidents have
the advantage of the "bully pulpit" of the
office and can push for policies they
prefer, they are quite constrained by the
institutional environment in which they
operate. Congress has responsibility for
proposing legislation, and while the
president can choose to sign bills into
law or opt to veto a bill, the president
cannot secure passage of any law with
out the backing of a majority in both
houses of Congress. By contrast, the
Congress can override the president's
veto with a two-thirds majority in both
houses. Congress also controls the
"purse" and can revoke the spending au
thority of the executive branch in some
circumstances, and it is responsible for
executive oversight; for example, it can
demand that executive branch employ
ees appear to testify before the legisla
ture. Finally, the Congress can impeach
the president and bring him/her to trial,
with the possibility of removing the
president from office.
Thus, the word of'the most powerful
person in the world" is not always final.
This has given rise to several historical
oddities. One was the diplomatic work of
President Woodrow Wilson while over
seas after World War I to establish an inter
national League of Nations, only to have
Congress vote down American member
ship upon his return. A similar result
happened with the Kyoto Protocol on
greenhouse gas emissions in the late
1990s. On a more domestic note, the fre
quent fact of divided government regu
larly frustrates presidential intentions. For
instance, President Barack Obama (2009-
present) and his administration have
recently had difficulty passing most sig
nificant legislation through Congress,
since it is controlled by the opposing
party. Even when a president has a major
ity, passing preferred legislation can be
difficult, given the use of institutional ma
neuvers such as the congressional 'filibus
ter' (see chapter 7).
Constraints on the executive also
come from the judiciary, and not just from
congressional resistance. An example was
seen in the recent George W. Bush (2001-
2009) administration, when the Supreme
Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (in
2006) that the administration could not
try detainees in certain military tribunals
and deprive them of access to other
courts; the Rumsfeld named on the losing
side of the argument was the administra
tion's Secretary of Defense and a member
of the president's cabinet. President
Obama and his administration experi
enced challenges in court to the major
health care initiative— the Affordable
Care Act— that the president backed and
that was passed in 2010. The Supreme
Court, though, ultimately found the law
constitutional in a 5-4 vote. The judiciary
interprets constitutional limitations to ex
ecutive power that include prohibitions
on the president usurping powers of state
governments.
Apart from the other branches of
government, many other factors also
limit presidential authority. One of these
is public opinion, to which presidents are
responsive. In part, the influence of
public opinion is mediated through Con
gress, with presidents aware that unpop
ular ideas or proposals have little chance
of passing Congress. Public opinion mat
ters in obvious ways for presidents who
hope to be reelected to a second term,
but also for presidents in their second
terms who are reputed to be thinking of
their historical legacy. By way of example,
efforts by George W. Bush to transform
the popular Social Security program for
senior citizens into a more privatized
system were unsuccessful as citizen re
sponses came out against the proposal.
Beyond public opinion, the influence of
the markets and money also matters: If
stock and bond markets lose confidence
in the government, their declines can
raise costs for government and give the
president less latitude in policy options.
Finally, the international system and cur
rent events beyond the president's con
trol can set the tone for a presidency in
unexpected ways: September 11, 2001,
and the economic recession of 2008-
2009 no doubt reshaped the last two
presidencies in ways not initially intended
by the respective presidents. Altogether,
the checks and balances and other cir
cumstances that limit American presi
dents make the job of the 'most powerful
person in the world" seem much more a
task of accommodating others than
imposing one's will.
Case Studies 567
CASE STUDY
The United States and the World: A Love-Hate
Relationship? CHAPTER 16, PAGE 381
Internationally, the United States is often
viewed as one of the key proponents of
globalization, and as one of the societies
the culture and economy of which have
most benefited from increasing global in-
teg ration.To a considerable extent we con
sider this impression to be correct, though
the story behind how the United States
came to be a key actor in globalization has
some potentially surprising elements.
There has been a long-standing ten
sion in American politics between shut
ting the United States off from the world
and engaging with it. Washington fa
mously urged the United States not to get
involved in foreign wars, and for many
years the United States had a very small
standing army, owing to a strong "isola
tionist” tendency in American political
culture, an isolationism no doubt facili
tated by the country's geographical dis
tance from many potential rivals. The
country was relatively late to imperialism
and did not join in the European powers'
"scramble for Africa." Indeed, where it did
seek influence, such as in the Americas
(Schoultz 1998), it used a combination of
soft and hard power (the sheer number of
historical U.S. military interventions in
Latin America and the Caribbean is as
tounding!) but in most cases without for
mally establishing colonies (see Puerto
Rico and the Philippines for key excep
tions, and many would judge its treat
ment of Cuba under the Platt Amendment
to blur the line here). As noted earlier, in
the box for chapter 10 Woodrow Wilson
was the driving force behind the creation
of the League of Nations, and then the
United States refused to join! Both Presi
dent Wilson in World War I and President
Roosevelt in World War II had to work very
hard to convince the country to partici
pate in those wars. However, through par
ticipating, the United States gradually
began to serve a global role from which it
would be difficult to extricate itself, and
U.S. global involvement accelerated rap
idly after World War II as it worked to help
rebuild Japan and Europe, to counter the
influence of the Soviet Union, and to re
store international order in a manner con
sistent with its interests. Much of the
responsibility for the enforcement of
global order has continued to be shoul
dered by the United States, which was in
strumental in creating NATO, the United
Nations, and international economic
actors like the World Bank and the Interna
tional Monetary Fund. Further, after Brit
ain's relative decline, the United States
emerged as the most important state pro
ponent of economic liberalism, and it has
been instrumental in pushing for trade
agreements like NAFTA and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
As it has assumed these roles, it has,
not surprisingly, generated both admira
tion and resentment. Its position as a pre
eminent global power and as a showcase
of capitalist development can inspire ef
forts at emulation, envy, and anger. This
has been especially true to the extent that
the country has attempted to encourage
or even impose its preferred solutions for
other countries' problems.
Interestingly, some domestic actors
within the United States argue not that
the United States is exerting dispropor
tionate influence on others but, rather,
that global mechanisms threaten the sov
ereignty of the United States. Critics on
both the right and the left sometimes
oppose U.S. efforts to expand free trade,
and some actors (typically on the right)
have even pushed for the United States to
withdraw from the United Nations. In
short, while isolationism is not regarded
as a viable policy option by most analysts,
an isolationist stream in American politi
cal culture is still visible (just ask Ron Paul!).
It is likely that in coming years the
United States will face new pressures and
challenges related to globalization and
the changing global order. China's influ
ence in the Pacific will continue to rise,
and both powers will need to be cautious
as they gradually sort out how they will
interact in the region. Diplomatic relation
ships in the Americas have changed as
well, and the Organization of American
States seems more autonomous from the
United States than in the past. Beyond
these issues of power politics, themselves
traditional in character, the United States
will likely continue to face the following
problems and challenges:
Criminality, from drugs to piracy
Terrorism
Economic globalization and
interdependence
Immigration and demographics
Each of these issues is transnational in
nature. They are about phenomena that
cross borders and affect the domestic
politics of different nation-states. The
rising prevalence of such issues shows
that the twenty-first century will likely be
an era in which comparative politics that
looks at politics within countries will
become ever more integrated with the
study of international relations between
countries.
568 United States
Research Prompts
1. Consider the discussion of basic American political institutions
in this country profile and its accompanying case studies, and
then consider these materials alongside the discussion of the
same institutions in the materials on France and the United
Kingdom. What are the major differences in political institutions
in the countries? What would any large-scale comparative anal
ysis of political institutions in the three countries need to
explain?
2. The "institutional chapters" in this volume have asked you to
move beyond the United States and the United Kingdom in
terms of your thinking about political institutions. In the other
country profile materials, find three cases that differ from the
United States in some important way in terms of political institu
tions. Why are these models so different? What are the advan
tages and disadvantages of each for politics in the respective
countries?
3. Look in the country profiles at discussions of the welfare state
in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United
States. You will see that different welfare states developed at
different paces and with different consequences (for example,
some spend more than others). Flow might you explain these
variations?
4. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have, at differ
ent points in their history, been proponents of protectionism
and then free trade. Based on your reading of these cases and
their profiles, do you expect that we will see the same pattern in
China? Why or why not?
5. Compare and contrast the key points of the politics of ethnicity
in the United States and India. Both countries have pasts that
include racial and ethnic discrimination, and empirical evidence
suggests that both legacies of past discrimination and ongoing
concerns continue to disadvantage some groups in each soci
ety. Does this take place in the same way? Why are there differ
ences in how ethnic diversity is reflected in patterns of political
representation in the two countries?
6. In recent years, the United States has largely promoted globaliza
tion while France has been ambivalent. Explain this difference.
7. From the box on free markets (pp. 561-562), what might Alexander
Flamilton advise today for a country whose economy is based on
producing (for example) bananas for export? Or, if you were an
American diplomat and someone from a developing country
made a case for protectionism, how might you reply if you wished
them to open their markets to American goods? In the study of
development, it is clear that countries— including the United
States— have much to learn from debating the merits of causal
arguments and from examining the cases studies of one another's
experiences. What economic lessons can the United States learn
from other countries?
Notes
C H A P TER 1
1. O f course, we are always curious to know greater historical
detail, such as about w ho C olum bus was, or about fifteenth-
century Spain, or about the first encounters betw een Europeans
and the indigenous peoples o f the Americas. A n d there w ill
rem ain some debate about w hether th e Am ericas were previ
ously discovered by oth er peoples. L earn ing new facts w ill often
force us to reinterpret o ur histories and to understand events
differently. Therefore, attention to factual inform ation is p a rt o f
o ur analysis and a source o f our intellectual curiosity. Yet there
is a fundam ental difference betw een w h y questions and the
closed-ended questions easily answered th ro u gh m em orization
or a quick search.
2. W e em phasize w h y questions here for heuristic p urposes— to
help you learn and discover for yourself. W ell-po sed w h y
questions very often lead to social-scientific explanations.
How ever, as Jo n E lster (2007) rem inds us, w e should not
equate good explanations w ith th e answers to w h y questions.
F u rth erm o re , in actu al social science, th e place w here a w h y
question ends and a h o w question begins can som etim es be
difficult to say.
3. This example, w hich is discussed fu rth e r in chapter 13, is
adapted from Fearon and L aitin 2003.
4. I f one is prim arily interested in th e causes o f education policy
in d ifferent countries, th e safest way to form ulate the question
m ay be “W h a t are th e causes o f education policy?” or “W h y
does education policy vary across countries?” I f one is p rim a r
ily interested in th e consequences o f systems o f governm ent,
one m ig h t ask, “W h a t are th e consequences o f systems o f gov
ernm ent for policy?”
5. There are caveats to th is claim ab o ut th e lack o f laboratories
in com parative politics. In ce rtain circum stances, it is possi
ble to set up co n tro lled ex p erim en ts, an d statistical m etho d s
m ake it possible to co n tro l for m any factors. O u r em phasis
here is on in tro d u c in g q ualitative com parative politics, w here
such experim ents and statistical m etho d s are n o t assum ed to
be available.
6. So to o , for th a t m atte r, do o th e r physical and n a tu ra l scien
tists rely o n in te rp retatio n s, it should be n o ted , b u t th e social
sciences d eal w ith m any facts th a t are n o t “laws o f n a tu re ” or
“laws o f physics.” See discussion in L ieb erso n an d L yn n
2 0 0 2 .
7. For a sophisticated and classic discussion o f these issues, see
W eber 1949.
8. G errin g 2001.
9. C ollier and L evitsky 1997; C ollier a nd A dco ck 1999.
10. This is m u ch debate ab o ut h ow s tan d ard iz ed concepts should
be in political science. Some argue th a t concepts should be
stan d ard iz ed and agreed u po n to m ean th e sam e th in g from
one w ork o f scholarship to th e next. O th e rs argue th a t since
no concept is perfect, scholars should b e free to offer concep
tu a l innovations d ep en ding on th e ir specific projects, so long
as th ey are clear.
11. C on cep tu alizatio n is also ch alleng in g for several additional
reasons. I t is b o u n d up w ith o u r ow n values, m ak in g it chal
leng in g to define issues such as dem o cratizatio n, gender, or
revolutions w ith o u t b rin g in g to m in d lots o f connotations. In
addition, w hile o rd in ary language is precise enough for daily
life, it is often ridd led w ith in te rn a l co n tradictio n and lack o f
conceptual clarity. M a n y concepts have m ultiple and d istin ct
m eanings across different contexts an d from person to person,
lead in g to confusion and m iscom m unication.
12. I n c h a p te r 13 w e d iscuss specific c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n s o f n a
tio n a lis m an d n a tio n a l id e n tity p u t fo rw a rd by various
scholars.
13. This is also som etim es referred to as S arto ri’s “ladder o f gen
erality.” See S artori 1970; C ollier and L evitsky 1997.
14. B erlin 1958.
15. In o rd in ary life, th e am b ig u ity o f w ords and concepts has
som e advantages. F or example, in p olitical discourse (e.g.,
p resid en tial speeches) th e very g en erality o f th e w ord “free
d om ” allows it to serve as a collective sym bol for m ost every
one, because even individuals w ith very d ifferent notions o f
w h a t it m eans to be free can reach public, symbolic agree
m en t. Yet th is is n o t how we w a n t social science to proceed,
given th a t its goals are very d ifferent from th o se o f form ing
a n d m ain tain in g a political co m m u nity or establishing con
sensus in conversation.
16. G errin g 2009.
17. These term s date back to th e w ork o f th e political th eo rist
Jo h n S tu a rt M ill in th e n in ete en th century.
18. I t was tru e historically in W e st A frica th a t urb an residents
h ad greater political freedom s, and one could m ake a sim ilar
case for contem porary C h in a , for example, w here econom ic
liberties and political p artic ip a tio n are g reater along the
coasts th a n in th e interior.
19. T hat is, som e argue th a t social science issues in probabilistic
ra th er th a n d eterm in istic explanations. For an example, again
see L ieberson and L yn n 2002.
20. D u n n in g 2012.
21. K ing, K eohane, and Verba 1994.
22. Przew orski and T eune 1970.
569
570 Notes
C H A P TER 2
1. N ossiter 2014.
2. A clue th a t fu rther explains w hat a hypothesis is can be found in
the word itself, whose etymology includes the prefix h ypo, m ean
ing “less than.” This suggests th at a hypothesis is an idea th at is
“less th an a thesis” u ntil it receives some evidence to support it.
3. W e th a n k one o f our anonym ous reviewers for this
form ulation.
4. I f you are interested in u nd erstanding in more detail w h y this
is the case, you m ight w an t to read a classic book by Karl
Popper (1963) called C onjectures a n d R e fu ta tio n s . Popper argues
th a t scientists should actually t r y to d isp ro ve th eir hypotheses
or conjectures.
5. A long trad itio n o f w ork in th e h istory and p hilosophy o f sci
ence since at least K uhn (1962) gives us reason to be suspi
cious o f such idealized portrayals as descriptions o f how
theories actually change, b u t m ost social scientists th in k th a t
we should a spire to these ideals.
6. The quantitative approach requires some know ledge o f key
descriptive statistics and how to form ulate and te st h y p o th e
ses in a g eneral sense, b u t it also depends u po n know ledge o f
rules o f p robability and probability distributions. Statistical
m ethodologies form alize th e process o f te stin g hypotheses
and allow researchers to speak w ith num erical confidence
about th e precision o f th eir findings.
7. The m ost im p o rta n t w ork m ak in g th is argu m en t is King,
K eohane, and Verba 1994 (or KKV, as it is often called).
8. Brady and C ollier 2 0 0 4 , v an Evera 1997.
9. O r, alternatively, “W h a t does co u ntry A have m ore o f th an
co u ntry B?” For example, it m ay be th a t variable levels o f
h um an capital and education im pact developm ent. C o u n try B
is not presum ably totally lacking in education and h um an
capital, b u t has generally low er levels o f these th in g s.
10. This is p artially adapted from Staffan L in d b erg ’s w ork on d e
m ocratization in A frica (2006: 118).
11. Even more troubling are cases w here we could use another
m athem atical identifier and say X = Y, th a t is, X is defined as
being equal to Y. (To continue th e logic using m athem atical
notation for a m om ent, even X = Y can be a problem. This is
because there is so little separating cause and effect th a t the
argum ent becomes uninteresting.)
12. A t th e tim e o f th is w ritin g , K im J o n g -u n has only held p ow er
for several years follow ing th e d eath o f his father. A ll in d ica
tions, so far, are th a t th e N o rth K orean regim e w ill m aintain
its highly au th o ritarian character u n d er his leadership, th o ug h
perhaps this w ill change.
13. Endogenous comes from en d o -, m eaning “w ithin ,” and -genous,
m eaning “origin,” suggesting th a t th e origin o f a phenom enon
comes from w ith in the phenom enon itself. So i f X causes Y, but
Y also causes X , th en X is causing itself.
14. See, for example, Babbie (2010: 95), w ho w rites o f a closely
related example o f a statistical association betw een ice cream
sales and dro w n in g rates.
15. L einw eber 2007.
16. See L ip set 1959.
17. F or an overview see C assidy 2013.
18. O n e example th a t was hypothesized to exist for a long tim e
was th e supposed “Bradley effect,” in w hich som e A m erican
voters w ould profess to pollsters a preference to vote for an
A frican A m erican candidate, b u t w ould th en vote for a w hite
o p p on ent w hen alone in th e v otin g b oo th . The h ypothesized
reason was th a t som e o f th o se surveyed w ould n o t w an t to
seem to th e pollster th a t th ey h ad a racial preference, even i f
th ey really held one. The result w ould be an overestim ation o f
th e num b er o f voters favoring th e black candidate. I t is u n
clear w h e th er th e bias ever actually existed, and it was not
found in th e 2 00 8 presidential election betw een Barack
O bam a and Jo h n M c C a in , b u t th e example serves to show the
challenges o f collecting reliable data.
19. C en teno 2002.
CH A P TE R 3
1. M o rg an 2007.
2. A nthrop o lo gists and historians have n oted m any k inds o f
states, going back th o usan ds o f years. M o st com parative p o
litical analysis, however, is focused on th e m o d e rn state, and
th u s w e focus exclusively on this form here. T hrou gh o ut the
chapter, we use th e term state to refer to th e “m odern state.”
3. W e b e r 1946: 78.
4. Strayer ([1970] 2005), in a classic study, sees th e state as origi
n atin g in m edieval E urope, particularly in E ng land and
France, b u t his argu m en t is really th a t some o f th e key charac
teristics o f m o dern states were established in th is period. Few
political scientists w ould see tw elfth - or th irte e n th -c e n tu ry
France o r E n g lan d as m odern states.
5. O ver tim e, a num b er o f actors, especially elites, did increas
ingly seek th e k in g ’s protection. See Strayer [1970] 2005. See
also N o rth , W allis, and W ein g a st 2009.
6. Strayer stresses th e im portance o f early efforts o f th e crow n in
France and E n g lan d to establish control over th e law in estab
lish in g state stru ctures. Strayer [1970] 2005: 2 6 -3 3 .
7. T illy [1990] 1992: 69.
8. N o rth , W allis, and W eing ast 2009.
9. For a d iscussion o f som e o f th ese issues, see G iddens 1987.
10. In referring to th e goals o f the state, we are using a k in d o f
shorthand. The state, as such, does not have goals. R ather, the
individuals and groups th a t compose it and m ake claims on it
have goals. However, som etim es such goals become “institu
tion alized ” over tim e, and states carry them on even w hen
nobody is actively cam paigning for them .
11. T illy 1992; Levi 1988.
12. Levi 1988: 2.
13. O n th e concept o f stateness see Evans 1997 and Fukuyam a
2004.
14. O n “state breakd o w n ” as a precondition o f revolution, see
T ocqueville 1983; Skocpol 1979.
15. Perez D ia z 2011.
16. P u tn a m 1993.
17. M ig d al 1988.
18. O stro m 1990: 41.
19. See M ig d al 1988; P u tn a m 1994.
20. W e b e r 1978: 956 -1 00 3 . O n bureaucracy and th e state, see
also Poggi 1990.
Notes 571
21. Poggi 1990: 74-75; G reenfeld 1996.
22. As Strayer ([1970] 2005: 58) puts it, “Sovereignty requires i n
dependence from any outside pow er and final au th o rity over
m en w ho live w ith in certain b oundaries.”
23. Sahlins 1991.
24. H u n tin g to n 1957.
25. W eing ast 1997.
26. M oreover, it does so unequally. See P e ttit and W estern 2 00 4
and W estern 2006.
27. Foucault 1977.
28. N ote th a t this does n o t m ean th a t strong states necessarily tax
a lo t, b u t ju s t th a t th ey tax successfully a nd regularly.
29. The q uintessential example m ay be E n g la n d ’s “G lorious Rev
olution.” See P incus 2009.
30. For example, see Karl 1997.
31. S co tt 1999.
32. Lovem an 2014.
33. H a rd in 1997.
34. H obbes [1651] 1996.
35. For an example o f a th eo ry th a t focuses on p red atory elites,
see Levi 1988.
36. O n w eak states as bein g failures to contain p red atio n, see
Bates 2008. See also N o rth , W allis, and W eing ast 2009, d is
cussed in th e n ex t section.
37. T illy 1992; C en teno 2002.
38. T illy 1992; W . M cN eill 1982. See also D o w n in g 1992.
39. S pruyt 2007.
40. M cN eill and M c N e ill 2003; C h iro t 1994.
41. T illy 1975:42.
42. T illy 1992: 30.
43. C en teno 2002.
44. H e rb s t2 0 0 0 .
45. M a rx 1978:187.
46. Evans, Reuschm eyer, and Skocpol 1985.
47. G orsk i 2003; G reenfeld 1996.
48. G orsk i 2003; Foucault 1977; see also T aylor 2007.
49. A m on g others, G reenfeld (1996) em phasizes nationalism as a
critical prerequisite for th e developm ent o f th e m odern state.
As we shall see, o th er scholars see th e state as th e source o f
national identity. I t is probably closer to th e m ark to see th e
developm ent o f th e state and nation al id en tity as endogenous,
as defined in ch apter 2.
50. G orski 2003: xvi.
51. In m ak in g th is arg u m en t G orsk i is p artly follow ing in th e
footsteps o f th e F rench social th eo rist, M ich el Foucault.
52. G orski 2003: 36.
53. Strayer [1970] 2005.
54. S pruyt 1994; W allerstein [1974] 2011; M eyer e t al. 1997.
55. L en in 1939.
56. W allerstein [1974] 2011.
57. D iM agg io and Pow ell 1983.
58. M eyer and R ow an 1991.
59. For a p artly critical perspective, see W im m e r and F einstein
2 0 1 0 .
60. Strayer [1970] 2005.
61. N o rth , W allis, and W eing ast 1989.
62. C olley 1992.
63. P incus 2009.
64. G reenfeld 1992.
C H A P TE R 4
1. There is another sense in w hich scholars also use th e phrase “p o
litical economy” th a t is beyond the scope o f our text. For some,
it refers to using the m ethods o f economics— especially formal
algebraic m odels o f decision m aking and strategic interaction—
and applying these to political problems. W e occasionally make
reference to these sorts o f approaches throughout the text, espe
cially w hen we draw on “rational choice” or ’’rationalist” th eo
ries, but for the sake o f clarity, we do not use “political economy”
in th at context.
2. The G in i In d ex is a m easure very sim ilar to th e G in i coeffi
cient th a t varies from 0 to 100 instead o f from 0 to 1.
3. This argu m en t, w hich can be found in m o st basic economics
textbooks today, dates originally to R icardo 1817.
4. See W ein g a st and N o r th 1989; N o rth 1990.
5. F or a concise version o f th is, see F rie d m a n 1990.
6. B uchanan 1984: 11.
7. Bell 2001.
8. G reenfeld 2001.
9. E sp in g-A nd ersen 1990.
10. For a critical view see W ilen sk y 1975.
11. A re n d t 1963; Foucault 1977; T aylor 2007.
12. See discussion in P ierson 2 006: 12-14.
13. H ayek [1944] 1994.
14. E sp in g-A nd ersen 1990; H u b e r and Stephens 2001.
15. E sp in g-A nd ersen 1990; H u b e r and Stephens 2001.
16. H ow ard (2007) argues th a t th e U .S. w elfare state is n o t so
m uch sm all o r w eak as it is poorly d esigned.
17. P rasad 2006.
18. M e ttle r 2011.
19. E sp in g-A nd ersen 1990: 29.
20. “A sia’s N ex t R evolution,” The E c o n o m is t, S eptem ber 8, 2012.
21. G o o d m an and P eng 1996.
C H A P TE R 5
1. Sen 1999.
2. P o v erty m ay also be u n d e rsto o d as o c c u rrin g w hen people
are d ep riv ed o f c e rta in ca p ab ilitie s, as w e d iscuss la te r (Sen
1999).
3. Pogge 2008: 103; C ollier 2007.
4. See th e W o rld B an k website: http ://w w w .w orld bank .o rg .
5. See th e U .S. C ensus Bureau website at: http://w w w.census.gov.
6. See Sen 1999 on h ow th is process h as happened in Kerala and
in th e co u ntry o f Sri L anka.
7. This d istin ctio n w as m ade persuasively by Sen 1999.
8. In m any societies, w om en b ear g reater w ork burdens (both
outside and inside th e hom e) yet see fewer o f th e benefits o f
econom ic developm ent. W e discuss th is in ch apter 14.
9. See E scobar 1995.
10. Stiglitz, Sen, and F itoussi 2010.
11. R osen stein-R o d an 1943.
12. See W ein g a st and N o rth 1989.
13. See M aho ney 2010, and Pierson 2 0 0 4 , am ong m any others.
http://www.worldbank.org
http://www.census.gov
572 Notes
14. Tocqueville 1988: 513.
15. O n how th is can contribute to th e p erform ance o f govern
m ent in stitu tion s, see P u tn a m 1995.
16. O n “b on ding ” and “brid g in g ” capital see P u tn a m 2 0 0 0 . O n
“stru ctu ral holes” see B u rt 1992.
17. W e discuss relig io n in politics in ch a p te r 15 (and n ote th e
possible relatio nsh ip b etw een relig io n an d regim e ty p e in
ch apter 6), b u t th e lin k b etw een relig io n and developm ent
m erits som e co m m en t here.
18. N oland and Pack 2004.
19. A lm o nd 1991.
20. L en in 1948 [translated from Russian edition o f 1917].
21. Representative and influential works included A nd re G under
F ra n k ’s C a p ita lism a n d U n d e rd e ve lo p m e n t in L a t i n A m e ric a : H is
to rica l S tu d ie s o f C hile a n d B r a z i l (1967) and W alter R odneys
H o w E u r o p e U nd erd evelo ped A fr ic a (1981).
22. Prebisch 1950.
23. W allerstein 1974.
24. C ardoso and F aletto 1979; Evans 1979.
25. See W o rld B an k 1997. O n e o f th e authors b eh in d th e W o rld
B an k ’s 1997 W o r ld D e v e lo p m e n t R e p o r t was P eter E vans, w ho
was a leading figure in th e revised version o f dependency
theory. A n o th e r lead in g dependency th eo rist, F ernand o
H en riq u e C ardoso, w en t on to becom e p resid en t o f B razil
(1995-2003), w here he u n d erto o k m any p ro -m ark e t reform s
b u t also presided over efforts to build state capacity and
streng th .
26. C ollier 2007.
27. For a sop h istica te d h isto ric al in te rp re ta tio n o f th is , see A c-
em oglu, Jo h n s o n , an d R o b in so n 2 0 0 1 , as o u tlin e d in th e
“In sig h ts ” box.
28. The W o rld Values Survey, available online: h ttp ://w w w
.worldvalues survey.org.
29. Such questions w ere asked in slightly different forms in Evans
1995 and K ohli 2004.
30. K ohli 2004.
31. See A m sd en 1992; K ohli 2 004.
32. A m sden 1992.
CH A P TER 6
1. Indeed, im p o rtant w ork on conceptualizing, defining, and
m easuring dem ocracy and dem ocratization is ongoing in to
day’s political science. See, for example, C oppedge et al. 2011.
2. W h ile th is d istin ctio n betw een pro ced u ral and substantive
definitions is conventionally draw n and im p o rta n t, we w ish
to em phasize t h a t th ere is a grey area betw een th em . G erardo
M u nck, for example, follow ing R ob ert D ah l, defines dem oc
racy as p rocedural b u t sees it as a substantive good. M u n c k
2009: 129.
3. See D a h l 1971, and S ch m itter and Karl 1991, for a concise
summary.
4. O n com petitive au th o ritarian ism , see Levitsky and W ay
2 0 0 2 ,2 0 1 0 (discussed in ch apter 7). O n th e related concept o f
electoral au th o ritarian ism , see Schedler 2006.
5. S ch m itter and Karl 1991.
6. H u n tin g to n 1991; M a rk o ff 1996.
7. L in z and Stepan 1996.
8. See th e discussion in the co u ntry m aterials at th e back o f this
book.
9. A sh 1993: 78.
10. O n th e concept o f dem ocratic consolidation, see Schedler
1998.
11. L in z and S tepan 1996: 5.
12. L ipset 1959,1960; In g leh art and W elzel 2005; Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens 1992.
13. A lm o nd and Verba 1963; P u tn a m 1993.
14. H u n tin g to n 1991; M a rk o ff 1996; for an alternative sort o f
stru ctural/sy stem ic approach, see Bollen 1983.
15. L in z 1990a, 1990b. Stepan and Skach 1993.
16. A n actor-centered theory can be found in th e four-volume
series edited by O ’D onnell, Schm itter, and W h ite h e ad (1986).
See in p articular volume 4, by O ’D on n ell and S chm itter, en
titled Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
About Uncertain Democracies,
17. For a discussion o f the debate about w heth er institutional
change and d em ocratization is a cause or a consequence o f eco
nom ic developm ent, see Glaeser, L a Porta, Lopes de Silanes,
and Shleifer 2004.
18. For m ore on causal m echanism s in social science, see E lster
2007.
19. L ip set 1959,1960.
20. In g le h a rt and W elzel 2005.
21. The b est k now n com parative s tudy o f th is sort is probably still
A lm o n d and Verba 1963.
22. For a scholarly discussion o f some o f these issues, see Fukuyam a
1995.
23. W ia rd a 2001; Veliz 1980.
24. F or one o f th e b etter examples, see W o o d b erry 2011 and
W o o d b erry and S hah 2004.
25. H u n tin g to n 1991.
2 6. H u n tin g to n 1991: 100 -1 06 .
27. M eyer et al. 1997.
28. S tepan 1999.
29. L in z 1990a, 1990b.
30. The broader social th eo ry question underlying th is issue is
often called th e “stru c tu re -a g e n c y problem ,” th e m ain idea o f
w hich is th a t it is often difficult to sort o u t how m uch o f a
social o r p olitical process is due to th e in tentio nal behavior o f
individuals and how m uch o f it is due to social stru ctures or
in stitu tio n al constraints.
31. For one w ell-know n view on variables and “proper nam es” in
research, see P rzew orski and T eune 1970.
32. O ’D o n n ell, S chm itter, and W h ite h e a d , eds. 1986.
33. H u n tin g to n 1991.
34. See P u tn a m 200 0.
35. C ollier, M ahoney, and S eaw right 2004.
36. G eo rg e and B e n n e tt 2005.
C H A P TER 7
1. A do rn o et al. 1950.
2. A ccording to anthropologists and historians, th ere is aston
ishing variability in th e political systems o f h un ter-g atherer
societies, in w hich we spent m o st o f o u r evolutionary history,
b u t in general th ese were m ore eg alitarian th a n th e m ore
http://www
Notes 573
complex societies th a t em erged after th e developm ent o f set
tled agriculture and th e creation o f p re-m o d ern states. See
M cN eill and M cN eill 2003.
3. O n th e d em o cra tic w ave, m e n tio n e d in c h a p te r 6, see
H u n tin g to n 1991. O n co n tem p o rary a u th o ritarian ism , see
L evitsky and W ay 2010.
4. For classic treatm en ts o f d em ocratic breakdow n, see L in z and
Stepan 1978 and Valenzuela 1978.
5. For a th o ug htfu l consideration o f hybrid regimes, see D iam on d
2002.
6. For a sem inal tre a tm e n t o f to ta litarian rule, see A re n d t [1958]
2004.
7. See som e discussion o f th ese issues in th e co u ntry profile
m aterials at th e back o f th is book.
8. See, for example, Z ize k 2002.
9. See, for example, L in z 2 0 0 0 and th e inform ative discussion in
B rooker 2009.
10. O n “sultanistic regim es,” see C hehabi and L in z 1998.
11. For one example, see V allenilla L a n z 1991.
12. O n A frica’s personalistic dictatorships, see Jackson and
Rosberg 1982 and D ecalo 1985.
13. Verbitsky 1996.
14. O ’D o n n ell 1973.
15. Levitsky and W ay (2010: 3) add to th is th e fall o f th e Soviet
U nion and its consequences.
16. C ollier and Levitsky 1997.
17. Z a k a ria 2 0 0 3 .
18. O ’D o n n ell 1994.
19. Schedler 2006.
20. Levitsky and W ay 2 0 0 2 , 2010.
21. This quo te has been attrib u te d to de S oto for m an y years,
and can be fo u nd in th e H a n s M o rg en th au L e c tu re o f th e
C arnegie C o u n c il in 2 002: h ttp ://w w w .ca rn eg iec o u n cil.o rg /
p u b licatio n s/a rch iv e/m o rg e n th a u /9 9 .h tm l (accessed A p ril 7,
2015).
22. Levitsky and W ay 2010.
23. See Brow nlee 2 00 7 and Levitsky and W ay 2010 on th is issue.
24. F or th is reason som e scholars have em p h asized th e im p o r
tance an d p o te n tia l difficu lty o f tra n sitio n in g away from
clientelism as societies d em o cratize. See th e d iscussion in
Fox 1994.
25. C orrales and P en fo ld 2011; Sm ilde and H e llin g e r 2011;
L evitsky and W ay 2010.
26. See th e m any excellent essays in M a h o n e y and T helen (2010)
on historical in stitu tion alism .
27. O n coalitions and in stitu tio n s, see H a ll 2010.
28. Skocpol 1973.
29. This is an im plication o f a num b er o f th e findings o f In g le h a rt
and W elzel 2005.
30. The attentive reader w ill recognize this as key to In g leh art and
W elzel’s neo-m odernization theory o f dem ocratization, dis
cussed in the previous chapter. In g leh art and W elzel, 2005.
31. N o rth , W allis, and W ein g a st 2009.
32. Paige 1997.
33. R oberts 1995.
34. See, for example, M ig d a l 1988, discussed briefly in ch apter 3.
35. Bates 2008.
36. See Jackson and R osberg 19 8 2.
37. G reenfeld 1997.
38. Veliz 1980.
39. P alm er 19 8 0 ; W ia rd a 200 3.
40. A lm o n d and Verba 19 6 3 ; In g le h a rt and W elzel 2005.
4 1. F or a n overview, see W in tro b e 2007.
42. O lson 19 6 5 ; L ich b ach 19 9 5. See also discussion o f these
issues in chapters 11 and 12.
43. K uran 19 9 1.
C H A P TE R 8
1. For an exploration o f co n stitu tio n al design issues relatin g to
th e legislative and executive branches, tw o o f th e leading
w orks are S arto ri 19 9 4 and L ijp h a rt 1999.
2. B enjam in F ran k lin allegedly p u t his w orries to an interested
citizen in P hiladelp hia w ho asked w hat type o f governm ent
th e C o n stitu tio n a l C onvention h ad established, saying the
F ou n ding Fathers b u ilt “a republic, i f you can keep it.”
3. This is som etim es referred to casually as th e “fo u rth b ra n c h ”
o f g overnm ent, th o u g h m ost civil servants and adm inistrators
are technically p a rt o f th e executive b ranch.
4. State-level rulings can be very significant n ot only for state resi
dents (obviously), b u t also in broader national debates, as in
recent years w hen the top courts in states such as M assachusetts,
Iowa, and N ew Jersey ruled th a t th e state m ust extend same-sex
m arriage rights or equivalent benefits to gay couples.
5. The h ig h co u rt may uphold low er co u rt ru ling s by simply re
fu sing to “h ear th e case” o f a challenge o r appeal.
6. Before 2009, th e H ou se o f L ords was for a long tim e a quasi
ju d icial body th a t offered co m m en tary on decisions by the
H ou se o f C om m o n s, b u t could n o t o verrule it.
7. D ep en d in g upon o ne’s historical perspective, federalism may
d ate back to th e ancient w orld, w hen rulers such as A lexander
th e G re at used decen tralized authorities to govern d istan t
p arts o f th e ir far-flung em pires. These rulers used local m ag
istrates, representatives, or agents to ensure governability. A t
o th er points in history, sm all territo ries s ought th e advantages
o f u n itin g certain powers u n d er com m on rule, even w hile
th ey retain ed au th o rity a nd autonom y locally. In m any cases,
th ese arrangem ents could be best ch aracterized as confederal,
w ith examples in clud in g d ifferent “leagues” o f city-states and
u n ited provinces and principalities in E urop e as th e m odern
nation -states cam e in to being.
8. O n th is, see R ik er 196 4 ; Stepan 1999.
9. There are several ways to specify th e concept o f federalism w ith
out specific reference to constitutions. For some scholars, fed
eral countries are determ ined by oth er features: w hether
subnational governm ents have some representation at the na
tional level, usually th ro u gh an upper cham ber in the legislature
(such as a Senate) th a t is designed to defend the interests o f the
subnational units; or independent legislatures at the subnational
level, such as state assemblies, w hich ensure democratically
elected subnational governm ent. See W ibbels 2005.
10 . Exam ples o f sm all federal island n ations are C om oros and
F ederated States o f M icronesia.
1 1 . A s a ch aracter in M o n t y P y th o n a n d th e H o ly G r a il once sug
gested w ith respect to th e divine rig h t o f kings as opposed to
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/
574 Notes
co n stitu tio n al g overnm ent, “pow er is derived from a m andate
from th e masses, n o t from some farcical aquatic ceremony.”
12. The m ost famous early example was th e signing o f th e M a g n a
C arta in E n g lan d in 1215, w hen E ng lish nobles defeated th e
forces o f K ing Jo h n and dem anded th a t he approve a “G reat
C h a rte r” th a t conferred rights to th e n obility and required the
p articipation o f P arliam en t in certain decisions. This was by
no stretch a full-blow n dem ocracy (as th e rights w ere for th e
nob ility and n o t for com m oners), b u t it did establish an im
p o rta n t principle th a t th e ruler was at least p artially con
strain ed by th e w ill o f th o se governed.
13. Exam ples m ig h t be found in th e M id d le E ast, such as w ith
th e H ou se o f Saud in Saudi A rabia.
14. O f course, dem ocratic regim es as w ell m ay fail to enforce cer
ta in co n stitu tio n al rights, since these are regularly subject to
in terp retatio n and are n o t always perfectly im plem ented.
15. H irsc h l 2010.
16. R ik er 1964.
17. See Stepan 1999.
18. See T ie b o u t 1956.
19. T ieb o u t 1956.
20. W ibbels 2005.
21. R odden, E skeland, and L itvack 2003.
22. R odden 2006.
23. See O ates 2005; W eing ast 2009.
24. See W ibbels 2005; R odden 2006; R odden, E skeland, and
L itvack 2003.
25. For an overview, see Km iec 2004.
26. See D w orkin 1977,1986.
27. G e w irtz and G older 2005; M iles and Sunstein 2007.
C H A P TER 9
1. The U nited States is an exception to th e rule am ong d em o
cratic countries, in th a t m any presidents have n o t held elective
office at th e national level prior to th e ir election, instead
com ing often from th e governorship o f a state. I t is for this
reason o f p olitical socialization th a t some scholars p refer p ar
liam entary governm ent— w here th e legislature chooses the
executive— over a system w here th e president is directly
elected: I t w eeds o u t “outsiders” u n fam iliar w ith how the
system works, and favors politicians w ho have com e th ro u g h
th e p olitical system. O f course, a co n trary arg u m en t can be
found am ong those w ho find th e political classes to be too
insular, and w ho w an t outsiders w ho are w illin g to “shake up”
a p olitical establishm ent th a t m ig h t be seen as lazy, or cor
ru p t, or sclerotic.
2. O r, i f retirin g, th ey may w ork to ensure th a t th e ir preferred
candidate takes th e ir place.
3. M ayhew 1974.
4. These qualifications m ay include g ettin g a certain num b er o f
signatures on a p etitio n to sup po rt th e candidacy, or perhaps
m aking a cash deposit (which may be refundable, i f the candi
date polls enough votes in the election). The reason for placing
such restrictions on the ballot is to ensure th a t the electoral
authorities can control th e num ber o f candidates, and th a t elec
tions are contested only by “serious” candidates and parties.
5. M a n y o f th e changes come dow n to how “rem aind ers” are
dealt w ith w hen it comes to assigning seats. The various
m ethods include th e D ’H o n d t m etho d , th e S ainte-L ague
m etho d , and th e largest rem ainder m ethod.
6. See Pow er 2000.
7. In th a t chapter, we discuss th e w ork o f D uverger 1954.
8. See C ox and M cC u b bins 1993; M ezey 1979; Shepsle and
W e in g a st 1981.
9. See th e various chapters in M o rg en stern and N a c if 2002 for
an e x am ination o f p a rty discipline using several L atin A m eri
can cases.
10. There are lim itations on votes o f no confidence in m any coun
tries. A s noted in the G erm any “Case in C ontext,” a vote in th at
country m ust be a “constructive vote o f no confidence,” m ean
ing th a t th e members o f the parliam ent proposing to bring
dow n the governm ent m ust simultaneously propose a new gov
ernm ent to take its place. This is designed to discourage exces
sive “cycling” from one failed governm ent to another.
C H A P TE R 10
1. A berb ach, P u tn a m , and R ockm an 1981.
2. W e em phasize d ire c tly elected presidents in th is section, d istin
guish in g th em from prim e m inisters in th e section on parlia
m entarism . B ut th ere are rare occasions, such as in South
A frica, w here a head o f state is elected in an in d ire c t fashion
as a prim e m inister, yet is called a “president.”
3. A s n oted previously, some p arliam en tary executives are even
called b y th e confusing m oniker o f “P resident.”
4. O n p olitical business cycles, see N ordh au s 1975.
5. This m ay seem self-evident, b u t there is a sub stan tial literature
d ocum entin g th e im p o rtance o f th ese in stitu tio n al designs.
6. E xam ples m ay be th e need for an expression o f nation al u n ity
at a tim e o f w ar or n atio n al trag ed y or sacrifice. U nder these
circum stances, several p arties m ay agree to p u t certain aspects
o f p olitical com petition aside for th e g ood o f th e nation. A n
o th er example is th e desire to create a superm ajority, as in
S ou th A frica, w here th e A frican N atio n a l C ongress h ad a
stro ng m ajority and needed only th e sup po rt o f one or tw o
very sm all parties to have th e superm ajority needed to am end
th e constitution.
7. This m ay be an explicit rule or a com m only accepted norm .
In m any cases, th e cerem onial head o f state (such as th e
k in g or queen) w ill call upon th e largest p a rty to form the
governm ent.
8. Some o f th e m ost significant a nd influential m inistries sought
by coalition partners are th e M in istry o f F inance (or Economy)
and th e M in is try o f F oreign A ffairs, w hich correspond to the
S ecretary o f th e T reasu ry and th e S ecretary o f State in th e
U.S. government, respectively. Coalition partners may prioritize
control over o th er m inistries d ep en ding on th eir interests. For
example, a G reen P arty m ay seek the M in is try o f th e E nv i
ro n m en t, an an ti-im m ig ratio n p a rty m ay w an t th e M in is try
for H om e A ffairs (or Interior), and a ru ra l p a rty representing
farm ers m ay seek to control th e M in is try o f A griculture.
9. This exercise is a m odified version o f th a t used in L ijp h art
(1999).
Notes 575
10. L ijp h art (1999) calls this coalition th e “barg ain in g proposi
tio n ” coalition.
11. L ijp h art (1999) calls th is coalition th e “policy-viable”
coalition.
12. N eu stad t 1960.
13. C ritics o f th e view th a t parliam en tarism is preferable gener
ally argue th a t th e tw o forms are m ore or less equal in th eir
effects, n o t t h a t p residentialism is better.
14. See G eddes 1994.
15. See G eddes 1990.
CH A P TER 11
1. See K irchheim er 1966; K itschelt 1994.
2. K irchheim er 1966.
3. See M ichels 1962: 367.
4. Some A frican countries, such as E th io p ia or T an zania, did
indeed have highly ideological sing le-p arty systems, w hile
m any form er F rench and B elgian colonies in w est and central
A frica h ad sing le-p arty regim es w ith o u t strongly identifiable
ideologies.
5. Z ak aria 1994.
6. L ijp h art 1999: 76-77.
7. See L ijp h art 1999.
8. Laakso and T aagepera 1979.
9. Rae 1968.
10. See M ain w a rin g and Scully 1995.
11. Parties also differ in term s o f how “discip lined ” th ey are. That
is, th ey differ on th e ex tent to w hich p a rty m em bers follow
th e wishes o f th e p a rty leadership. This was considered in th e
chapters on legislatures and executives.
12. M a in w aring and Scully 1995.
13. C ollier and C ollier [1991] 2002; W ia rd a 1997: 73.
14. Lukes [1974] 2005.
15. See S ch m itter 1974.
16. C ollier and C ollier [1991] 2002; K atzenstein 1985.
17. W e are th a n k fu l to an anonym ous reviewer for suggestions
on th e discussion o f au th o ritarian and dem ocratic form s o f
corporatism .
18. There are hybrids and com binations o f th e tw o systems; see
chapter 7 for f u rth e r d etail.
19. Veliz 1980; Z olberg 1966.
20. See S artori 1976: 336.
21. The literature here is extensive, and it relates to issues o f in
cum bent advantage, redistricting, and oth er issues beyond the
scope o f this chapter. A p artia l and early review o f th e question
o f safe seats can be found in M ayhew 1974.
22. M a rx and E ngels [1848] 1998; L en in 1902.
23. See Fukuyam a 1992, am ong others.
24. See D a h l 1989, am ong others.
25. W h e th e r representatives should basically tran slate th e w ill o f
th e m ajority or should exercise in d ep en dent ju d g m e n t after
b eing elected is a source o f co n tin u in g debate, reflecting th e
so-called “m an d ate -in d ep en d en ce controversy” m en tion ed in
ch apter 8.
26. See Evans 1995.
C H A P T E R 12
1. K atz 1999; M a rtin 2008.
2. The basic d istin ctio n betw een class, status, and pow er as d i
m ensions o f social stratification can b e found in W eber 1946.
3. T illy a nd T arrow 2007: 4 -1 1 and passim .
4. T illy a nd T arrow 2007: 5 - 6 .
5. S co tt 1985.
6. A lvarez, D ag n in o , and E scob ar 1998: 16-18.
7. P erez D ia z 2011; Shils 1997: 3 20 -3 25 .
8. A t th e sam e tim e, it is im p o rta n t to rem em ber th a t civil soci
ety is n o t autonom ous from pow er and status. See A lvarez,
D ag n in o , and E scobar 1998: 16-18.
9. T illy a nd T arrow 2007.
10. T arrow 2005.
11. L in d h o lm and Z u q u ete 2010.
12. See O n d e tti 2 00 8 for a d etailed account.
13. M ich els 1962: 3 42 -3 56 .
14. F or a classic acco u nt o f th e U .S . civil rig h ts m ovem ent from
th e perspective o f social m ovem ent theory, see M c A d am
1982.
15. B urns 1997: 4 - 5 ,1 0 - 1 1 , 15.
16. T illy a nd T arrow 2007: 108.
17. T illy a nd T arrow 2007: 2 9 -3 6 , 108.
18. Som e scholars even refer to co n tem p o rary societies as “social
m ovem ent societies.” See T arrow 2011: 5 - 6 , 117-118 and es
pecially th e essays in M eyer and T arrow 1998.
19. I t should be acknow ledged th a t i f th is d istin ctio n holds it is
only a m atte r o f degree.
20. See discussion in P incus 2007: 398-399.
21. H u n tin g to n 1968: 2 6 4 -2 6 6 .
22. B rinto n 1952: 41.
23. Skocpol 1994: 5.
24. Skocpol 1979: 4 -5 .
25. A re n d t 1963; K um ar 2005.
2 6. N o t all scholars agree th a t th e d istin c tio n b etw e en coups
a n d revo lu tion s is easily m ade. F o r m o re o n co n c e p tu a liz
in g an d e x p la in in g coups d ’e ta t, see B elk in an d S chofer
2 0 0 3 ; Jo h n s o n , S later, an d M c G o w a n 1984; an d Pow ell
an d T hyne 2011.
27. In his classic trea tm en t, H u n tin g to n refers to these as the
“eastern m o del” o f revolution. H u n tin g to n 1968: 266-267.
28. Foran 2005.
29. See Stathis K alyvas’s differentiation o f civil w ars from other
form s o f conflict on th ese grounds. Kalyvas 2007: 417.
30. M etelits 2009: 3.
31. Kalyvas suggests th a t revolutions are a ty p e o f civil war, but
n o t everyone agrees. Kalyvas 2007: 417.
32. C enteno notes th a t they partially resembled civil wars. C enteno
2002: 47.
33. O ’L eary and Silke 2007: 3 88 -3 90 .
34. T illy 200 4; O bersch all 2 004: 26.
35. S anderson 2010: 172.
36. T illy 2004: 8 -9 .
37. S enechal de la R oche 200 4: 1-2.
38. Black 200 4: 17.
39. Senechal de la R oche 2 00 4: 2; Black 2004: 16.
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
576 Notes
40. Senechal de la R oche 2 004: 2; Black 2004: 15, 23.
41. O ’L eary and T irm a n 2007: 6-7.
42. G ibbs 1989: 330. B ergesen and L izardo 2004: 38.
43. Pape 2003: 345.
44. Sagem an 2 004: 140.
45. H obsbaw m 1981.
46. S cott 1985.
47. S cott 1985: xvi.
48. Smelser 1962: 1-12.
49. T illy and T arrow 2007: 9-10.
50. Some are fu rther apart th an others. M o st social movements, for
example, have not even the rem otest connection to terrorism.
51. See th e in sigh tful discussion in Buechler 2 004.
52. Smelser 1962.
53. T och 1965.
54. E lster 1998: 5 8 -6 0 .
55. B rinton 1952: 3 3 -3 6 , 278.
56. G u rr 1970: 2 2 -1 2 2 and passim .
57. H u n tin g to n 1968: 275.
58. H u n tin g to n 1968: 277.
59. M c C a rth y an d Z a ld 1987. D o u g M c A d a m , p erh ap s th e
m ost in fluential scholar in th e “political process” o r “political
o p p o rtu n itie s ” school, presen ts th is p ersp ectiv e as a c ritiq u e
o f resource m o b iliz atio n th eo ries. M c A d a m 1982: 2 0 - 3 5 .
H ow ever, w e consider th e m to fall in to th e sam e fam ily o f
th eo ries for o u r p urpo ses in th is in tro d u c to ry textbo o k.
60. G oldstone 1991.
61. See G oldstone 2001 for an overview o f these and related
theories.
62. Some o f these and o th er issues are review ed in G oldstone
2001: 145-147. See also P arsa 2 000.
63. The m ost im p o rta n t works on revolution from a rational choice
perspective are Lichbach 1995,1998. See also C olem an 1990:
4 89 -5 02 ; T ullock 1971; and also F in kel, M uller, and O pp
1989.
64. L ichbach 1998.
65. O lson 1965; L ichbach 1995.
66. This example, w hich illustrates w hat Lichbach calls the “rebel’s
dilem m a,” follows th e p attern o f examples given in Lichbach
1995.
67. O f course, some p olitical o p p o rtu n ity th eo rists are attentive
to cu ltural factors. For example, see M c A d am 1996: 25.
68. H u n t and B enford 2 004: 437 -4 38 .
69. M elucci 1989; C astells, 2010.
70. O n fram in g and “fram e analysis,” see G offm an 1974; G am son
1992; and B enford and Snow 2000.
71. K urzm an 2005.
72. G reenfeld 1995.
73. K um ar 2005; A re n d t 1963.
74. T illy and T arrow 2007.
75. O liver and Jo h n sto n 2 000.
76. Foran 2005.
77. A fu ll analysis, o f course, w ould question th is assum ption,
looking at o th er indicators o f developm ent in o rder to be sure
th a t hig h per capita G D P in th e context o f h ig h in eq u ality
m ay n o t m ask significant sources o f econom ic d iscontent on
th e p a rt o f key populations.
C H A P TER 13
1. Tajfel 1981; Stets and B urke 200 0: 225; Brewer and G ard n er
1996; G reenfeld and E astw oo d 2007.
2. O n sym bolic b oundaries, see L am o n t and M o ln a r 2002.
3. C alh o u n , 1997: 2 -3 .
4. The au th o r w ho has m ost clearly and consistently defined
th em in this way is G reenfeld 1992, 2001. For a p artially
overlapping d efinition see A nd erso n [1983] 1991.
5. This typology was identified by S m ith 1986.
6. S m ith 1986. G reenfeld w ould date th e origins o f nationalism
in six tee n th -ce n tu ry E ng land , b u t considers th is m odern.
7. H ow ever, see G orsk i 2 00 0 for a critique o f o th er scholars’ ap
plication o f m o dern ist conceptualization and definition to
E urop ean cases, argu in g th a t by m ost m o dern ist conceptual
izations a nd definitions, early m o dern p olitical identities were
n a tio n a l. O n conceptualization and tim in g, see C o n n o r 2004.
8. See discussion in S m ith 1995: 3 2-35 . See also Van d en B erghe
1981 and R ushton 2005.
9. S m ith (1995: 3 3 -3 4 ) identities Clifford G e e rtz and Edw ards
Shils as examples.
10. G orsk i 2 0 0 0 ; H astin g s 1997.
11. H astin g s, 1997: 25.
12. S m ith (1995: 5 6 -5 7 ) gets close to th is view.
13. A gain , th e clearest exponent o f th is conceptualization has
been G reenfeld 1992. See also A nd erso n [1983] 1991.
14. G elln er 1983.
15. G reenfeld 1992.
16. G reenfeld 2001.
17. See, for example, K ohn 1944.
18. A g a in , a g ood example o f this view is K ohn 1944.
19. F or a p artia lly critical perspective see B rubaker 1999.
20. B ru baker 1992; G reenfeld 1992.
21. S m ith 1986: 134.
22. G reenfeld 1992.
23. M a rx 2003; H e c h te r 2000: 6-7.
24. H a r ff and G u rr, 2 00 4; Fearon and L aitin , 2003.
25. L aitin 2007.
26. B rubaker and L aitin 1998.
27. B rubaker a nd L a itin 1998; see also V arshney 2002.
28. J o w itt2 0 0 1 .
29. H o ro w itz 1985; V arshney 2002.
30. B rubaker and L aitin 1998.
31. For one typology o f such conflicts, see C h iro t 2001: 7.
32. H a r ff and G u r r 2004.
33. Jo w itt 2001. See also G reenfeld and C h iro t 1994.
34. O n “b arricad ed identities,” see Jo w itt 2001.
35. A k e rlo f and K ranton 2010.
36. L aitin 2007.
37. L aitin 2 0 0 7 uses th e term “cascading” to describe spreading
p articipation in secessionist m ovem ents.
38. See related theories discussed in chapter 12. For th e applica
tion o f these theories to eth n o -n ation al conflict, see H orow itz,
1985, 2001.
39. In ad d ition to H orow itz, see G reenfeld 1992 and Petersen
2 002 on th ese issues.
40. See F earon and L a itin 1996, 2003; L aitin 2007.
41. C ed erm an , W im m er, and M in 2010.
Notes 577
42. For an accessible overview o f research in th is area, see H a r ff
and G u rr 2004.
43. Some scholars o f nationalism have u rged caution about simple
in stitu tio n al policy recom m endations such as dem ocratiza
tion. For an in teresting arg u m en t in th is connection, see
Snyder 2 000.
44. For a classic discussion o f consociationalism, see Lijphart 1977.
For consideration o f th e relative perform ance o f som e conso
ciational systems, see L em arch an d 2007.
45. K aufm an 2001; P ettig re w and T ro pp 2011.
46. V arshney 2002.
47. F or a discussion o f th e com plexities involved in doing so, see
S ik kink 2011; Teitel 2011; and D ru m b l 2007.
48. C h iro t 2001: 2 0 -2 4 .
49. See especially H a r ff and G u rr 2 004.
50. For an example, see H a r ff 2003.
CH A P TER 14
1. W e discuss im m igration fu rth e r in ch apter 16.
2. O n transnationalism see K hagram and L ev itt 2008; O n g 1999.
3. B arth , ed. 1969; see also th e w ork by social id en tity theorists
discussed in chapter 13.
4. A m erican A n th rop o lo gical A ssociation website: R ace: A r e We
S o D iffe r e n t? h ttp ://w w w .u n d ersta n d in g rac e.o rg /h o m e.h tm l.
See also D u ste r 2005.
5. K im m e l2 0 0 0 .
6. Lovenduski 2005: 6.
7. C osta, T erracciano, and M cC rae 2001, th o ug h, find cross-
cu ltu ral v ariation in g ender role stereotypes, n o tin g th a t this
is a problem atic find in g for theories t h a t argue for stro ng evo
lutionary shaping o f g ender roles. There is a v ib ran t debate
about these issues in psychology.
8. E ng land et al. 1994; Eccles 1987.
9. O n th e social c o n struction o f h eterosexuality as th e norm , see
K atz 2007.
10. There is a grow ing com parative literature on L G B T m ove
m ents in different global regions. For example, on L G B T
m ovem ents in L atin A m erica, see C orrales and Pecheny 2010
and de la D eh esa 2010.
11. A m erican A nthropological A ssociation, website: R ace: A r e We
So D iffe r e n t? h ttp ://w w w .un d erstand in g race.org /h o m e.h tm l.
12. O n th e Irish and th e racial category o f “w hiteness” in the
U nited States, see R oediger 1999: 133-163. O n race in L atin
A m erica, see W in n 1992: 271-307.
13. These categories w ere d epicted in so-called casta paintings.
See K atzew 2004.
14. C o rnell a nd H a rtm a n n 1998: 2 2 -2 3 .
15. See, for example, O m i and W in a n t 1994.
16. G ans 2005.
17. Sorenson 2001.
18. F redrickson 2 003; G ans 2005.
19. See th e overview o f th is h istory in Fredrickson 2 003 as w ell as
Pagden 2009, w ho stresses b o th th e im p o rtance a nd th e lim its
o f racist and racist-like attitu d es in colonial expansion, and
C an izares-E sg uerra 2009, w ho suggests th a t th e idea o f race
as justification for colonial dom inatio n was developed by
overseas colonials ra th er th a n E urop ean actors.
20. M a rx 1998.
21. S m ith 1995: 57. N o te t h a t he refers to such groups as “eth n ie .”
22. S m ith fam ously argues th a t n atio n al identities grow out ofb ut
are n o t fully reducible to eth n ic identities.
23. For this reason, some distinguish betw een ethnicity and race on
th e grounds th a t ethnicity may be more a m atter o f choice, w ith
multiple affiliations possible, whereas race may be more a m atter
o f external ascription, and thus inescapable. This perspective is
expressed in Fredrickson 2003, am ong m any other works. For a
fuller discussion o f some o f the differences betw een th e concepts
o f race and ethnicity, see C ornell and H a rtm a n n 1998: 25-35.
24. For discussion o f some o f th ese issues, see T ien d a and O rtiz
1986 and H irsch m a n , A lb a, and Farley 2000.
25. P o sn er2 0 0 5 .
26. For tw o accounts o f m ulticulturalism , one m ore supportive and
th e o th er partially critical, see M o do o d 2007 and G lazer 1997.
27. G an s 2005.
28. In d eed , som e in th e U n ite d States seek th is as well.
29. F or one example, see L ovem an 2009.
30. B row n et al. 2003; P e ttit and W e ste rn 2004.
31. Shapiro 2004.
32. H e rrin g 2002.
33. Pager and S hepherd 2008: 182.
34. B row n et al. 2003.
35. O n “au d it stud ies,” see P ag er and Shepherd 2008: 184-187.
Pager and S heph erd ’s review m ore generally is an excellent
guide to th e state o f cu rren t research on discrim ination.
36. M a rx 1998.
37. H en d erson and Jeydel 2010: 2 3 8 -2 4 2 ; R o th 2 006.
38. M oreover, according to some analysts, g ender inequality
seems to negatively im p act societal-level econom ic perfor
m ance. See D o lla r and G a tti 1999.
39. O n sexual h ara ssm en t, see H e n d e rs o n and Jeydel 2010:
1 2 4 -1 3 0 .
40. H en d erson and Jeydel 2010: 116; Padavic and R eskin 2002:
121-147.
41. For a recent discussion o f these and related issues, see H avem an
and Beresford 2012.
42. For an in te re stin g analysis o f som e o f th e cu ltu ral sources o f
such conflicts, see B lair-L oy 2003 as w ell as H avem an and
Beresford 2012.
43. Padavic and R eskin 2 002: 6 -1 6 . O n consequences o f th is, see
also Blau and K ah n 1992.
44. O n h ealth , education, and related arenas o f in eq u ality and
disadvantage, see th e extended discussion in H en d erso n and
Jeydel 2010: 2 6 6 -3 0 2 .
45. Jasc h ik 2 0 1 1 .
46. O n p olitical u nd errep resentatio n, see Squires 2007: 2 2 -2 4 ,
32 and H en d erso n and Jeydel 2010: 5 -6 .
47. H en d erso n and Jeydel 2010: 2 2-31 .
48. Sainsbury 2005; H o lli and K antola 2005.
49. H ere we use the concept o f “capability” as developed by A m artya
Sen (see chapter 5).
50. In d eed , som e theories suggest th a t econom ic em pow erm ent is
fu n dam en tal. F or example, see B lum berg 1984. For a p ar
tially co n trastin g view em phasizing cu lture and beliefs, see
R idgew ay a nd C orrell 2004.
http://www.understandingrace.org/home.html
http://www.understandingrace.org/home.html
578 Notes
51. For a critical p erspective, see Iz ug b ara 2004.
52. O n th e efficacy o f conditional cash tran sfer program s, see
Raw lings and Rubio 2005 and H an d a and D avis 2006.
53. W eber 1946.
54. As n oted before, p olitical em pow erm ent can take m any
form s, including w om en’s representation in p olitical in stitu
tions. O n w om en’s representation in legislatures, see Sawer,
Trem blay, and T rim ble 2006.
55. H tu n 2004.
56. Lovenduski 2005: 4.
57. See th e essays in Stetson and M a zu r 1995, as w ell as Squires
2007: 3 2-38 .
58. H en d erson and Jeydel 2010: 3 7 -6 4 . For a m odel analysis o f
eth n ic groups’ social m ovem ent m obilization, see Yashar
2005.
59. Van C o tt 2005.
60. O f course, some would argue th a t M ichels’ “iron law o f oligar
chy” still applies in such cases.
61. Kriesi et al. 1992.
62. C astells 2010: xxviii.
63. K rook (2009) m akes th e same p o in t w ith response to success
ful cases o f quota system adoption. She draw s on w ork by
Charles R ag in and others th a t suggests th a t social a nd p o liti
cal outcom es are n o t ju st products o f co n stan t relationships
betw een certain sets o f variables b u t ra th er products o f more
complex in teraction effects.
64. For one strong view on th e relationship betw een th e size o f
eth n ic groups and group affiliation, see Posner 2005.
65. As noted in th e “In sigh ts” box, some o f these factors are h ig h
lighted by Van C o tt 2005.
66. For a review o f these concepts, see ch apter 12.
67. Van C o tt 2005.
68. In d eed , p ro po rtion al representation seems to lead to w om en’s
h olding elected office at a h ig her rate, at least in m ore eco
nom ically developed countries. See M a tla n d 1998.
69. O n the im pact o f cross-cutting affiliations on group p arty for
m ation, in addition to H tu n 2004, see D u n n in g and H arrison
2010. The latter w ork suggests th a t under some conditions
other forms o f cross-cutting affiliation can weaken th e poten
tial for ethnic groups to form political parties.
70. O n quotas and quota systems see Franceschet, K rook, and
Piscopo 2012; K rook 2009; and Squires 2007.
71. K rook 2009: 6 -9 .
72. K rook 2009. See also discussion o f reserved-seat systems in
general (not ju s t for w om en) in R eynolds 2005. M o re gener
ally, for an overlapping approach, know n as consociational-
ism , see L ijp h art 1977.
73. For a m ore detailed discussion o f different types o f quota sys
tem s see K rook 2009. Som e scholars have argued th a t quotas
are n o t as effective at ch ang in g attitud es and behavior as th eir
advocates som etim es claim . See Z etterb e rg 2009.
74. K rook 2009: 7 -9 ; H en d erson and Jeydel 2010: 15.
75. O n th e effectiveness o f quota systems m ore generally, see
K rook 2009; Squires 2007: 53—60; and Franceschet, Krook,
and Piscopo 2012.
76. B ernh ard, R eenock, and N ordstrom 2004.
77. The indicator referred to here is calculated annually in the
U nited N ations H u m a n D evelopm ent R eports, available at
http ://h dr.un d p.org/en /repo rts/. For fu rth e r inform ation on the
G ender-R elated D evelopm ent Index (G D I) and the G ender
E m pow erm ent M easure (G E M ), see h ttp ://h dr.un d p.org/en /
statistics/indices/gdi_gem / (accessed A ug u st 13,2012).
78. H irw a y and M ahadevia 1996.
79. South Africa, incidentally, is ranked tenth, but it is a special case.
C H A P TER 15
1. Fox 2 008.
2. N orris and In g leh art, S a c re d a n d S ec u la r 200 4. N orris and
In g leh art, as w e w ill see later, do believe th a t religion declines
w hen societies m odernize.
3. B ell [1960] 2 0 0 0 ; for a m ore recent version o f th is sort o f
argu m en t, see Fukuyam a 1992.
4. B erger 1967.
5. See discussion in F reston 2008 as w ell as W o o d b erry 2011
and W o o d b erry a nd S hah 2 004.
6. O n th e com plex relationship betw een religion and d em ocratic
politics more generally, see S tepan 200 0.
7. Z ara k o l2 0 1 1 .
8. A pp adu rai 1996; C o ro n il 1997.
9. O n th is p o in t see th e w ritin gs o f P a rth a C hatterjee, am ong
others; for example, see C hatterjee 1993, 1997.
10. O n th e concept o f “soft pow er,” see th e w ork o f Joseph Nye
1990.
11. See th e very in teresting discussion o f Islam ic encounters w ith
W estern m o dern ity in M o ad del 2005.
12. T hough, as scholars like th e an th ro p olog ist T alal A sad (2003)
have p o inted out, w e do n o t always succeed in o ur efforts to
avoid d oing so.
13. For a classic statem en t o f “m o dern ization theory,” see Inkeles
and S m ith 1974 as well as Berger, Berger, and K ellner 1973.
F or a m ore recent version, see In g leh art and W elzel 2005 and
N orris and In g le h a rt 2 004.
14. E isen stadt 2 00 0.
15. This m eans th a t n o t all political beliefs should be th o u g h t o f
as “ideology.” For classic statem ents, see G e e rtz 1973a and
C onverse 1964. For a highly sophisticated discussion o f the
m any ways in w hich th e term h as been used by political scien
tists, see G errin g 1997.
16. U nless your w ardrobe is specifically crafted to express your
political views.
17. Karl M a rx ’s followers go so far as to suggest th a t ideologies
are simply reflections o f underlying class interests.
18. See, for example, Boli 1981.
19. B erger 1974.
20. G reenfeld 1996.
21. O n view ing religion as a “cu ltu ral system ,” see G e e rtz 1973b.
O n transcendence as a key, substantive feature o f religion, see
G reenfeld 1996 and Jam es 1902.
22. For an overview and relatively recent example, see Bruce 2002.
23. B erger 1967.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
http://hdr.undp.org/en/
Notes 579
24. W eber 1958.
25. Berger 1999; Berger, D avie, and Fokas 2008.
26. Stark 1999.
27. K aufm ann 2010.
28. C asanova 1994.
29. Casanova 1994. See also B ell 1977.
30. The concept o f “priv atization ” has b een m ost clearly discussed
by C asanova 1994.
31. N ie b u h r 1929.
32. Juergensm eyer 1993; K epel 1994.
33. F ukuyam a 1992.
34. For an historical overview, see Payne 1995.
35. M a rx 1978b and 1978c.
36. Fox 2008.
37. Fox 2008.
38. B lancarte 2008.
39. O n churches and sects, see th e classic w ork o f W e b e r (1969)
and T roeltsch (1969). O n d enom inationalism as a d istin ct
category, see N ie b u h r 1929 as w ell as C asanova 1994, 2007.
40. I t is im p o rta n t to re m em b er th a t th ese are all “id ea l ty p e s ”
an d th a t in th e re al w o rld w e w ill find m an y exceptions an d
cases th a t do n o t n ea tly fit in to one o r a n o th e r o f th ese
categories.
41. See Jose C asanova’s (2007) th o u g h tfu l com parison o f im m i
g ration and religious pluralism in W estern E urop e and the
U nited States in th is connection.
42. This is closer to N ie b u h r’s classic (1929) view.
43. For a sum m ary, see G orsk i and A ltin o rd u 2008.
44. See, for example, R. S tephen W a rn e r 1993.
45. F in ke and Iannaccone 1993.
46. S tark 1999.
47. Chaves and G orsk i 2001; Voas, C ro ck ett, and O lson 2 00 2.
48. Casanova 1994; Chaves 1994; M a rtin 2005.
49. See discussion o f trad itio n al and m ore recent approaches to
differentiation th eo ry in C haves 1994.
50. S m ith 2003.
51. See L in dh olm and Z uq u ete 2010. O n th e left, see Levitsky
and R oberts 2011.
52. See discussion o f these issues in th e essays in Sm ilde and
H ellin g er 2011.
53. Sm ilde and P ag an 2011.
54. For a partially overlapping argum ent, see Meyer, Boli, Thomas,
and R am irez 1997.
55. C astaneda 2006; W eyland, M a d rid , and H u n te r 2010.
56. The phrase “p in k tide” has been m uch used in th e m edia and
policy discussions o f th e region. See, for example, The E co n o
m is t , “P eru’s R eviving Left: O h! S u s a n a . . . A M ayoral C on test
M ay R ew rite th e C ou n try ’s Political Script,” Septem ber 23,
2010, http://w w w .econom ist.com /node/17106220 (accessed
A ug u st 13, 2012).
57. L ater in the chapter we b egin to establish a typology o f L atin
A m erican leftism . For a more sophisticated effort in this con
nection, see th e essays in Levitsky and R oberts 2011.
58. W eyland, M a d rid , and H u n te r 2010.
59. M c C o y and M yers 2004.
60. P ro po n en ts o f th e C havista g overnm ent w ould argue th a t
contem porary Venezuelan leftism differs from trad itio n al so
cialism in its focus on p articipato ry democracy, a claim th at
has generated m uch debate. See th e discussion in Sm ilde and
H ellin g er 2011; P o n n ia h and E astw oo d 2011. I t is also quite
clear t h a t th e B olivian regim e u n d er Evo M orales is ideologi
cally far m ore innovative th a n o u r sim plifying account here
could be taken to suggest.
61. For an example o f the first type o f research, see H aw kins 2010.
C H A P TE R 16
1. O n interdependence, see K eohane and Nye 1977.
2. See F ried m an 2005.
3. See W o lf 2004.
4. R ogow ski 1987.
5. F or tw o leading perspectives on th is debate, see W o lf 2004
for a perspective favoring th e free m ark e t and S tig litz 2002,
2 0 0 7 o n a critique o f th e in te rn atio n a l financial institutions.
6. Som e o f these “debates” may be explicit and take th e form o f
dialogue, w hile o th er “debates” m ay be m ore im plicit, w ith
th e ir im plications revealed m ore in term s o f decisions and b e
haviors o f th e im m ig ra n t groups.
7. For one o f the recent major statem ents arguing in favor o f as
sim ilation to protect a national identity, see H un tin g to n 2004.
For a classic statem ent about the tendency to essentialize foreign
cultures, particularly those o f the M iddle East, see Said 1978.
8. See BBC N ew s E urop e, “M erk el Says G erm an M u lticu ltu ra l
Society H as F ailed,” available at h ttp ://w w w .bb c.co .u k/new s/
w orld-europe-11559451 (accessed M ay 6, 2012).
9. P h illips 2006.
10. M o d o o d 2007.
11. H u n tin g to n 2004.
12. Portes and R um b au t 2006.
13. F or reports on th is issue, see th e In terg ov ernm ental Panel on
C lim ate C han ge (IP C C ) at h ttp ://w w w .ip cc.ch /.
14. See O stro m 1990.
15. See Singer 2 0 0 4 for a discussion o f th e ethics o f th is debate.
16. O n th e characteristics th a t m ake for successful g overnance o f
th e com m ons, see O stro m 1990.
17. B urke 2004.
18. See N aim 2 003.
19. K eck an d S ik k in k 1998.
20. Ibid.
21. A s o f M a rc h 2 01 5, th e U .S . list o f state sponsors o f te rro r
ism co n sisted o f C u b a , Ira n , S ud an , an d Syria. See h ttp :/ /
w w w .sta te .g o v /j/c t/list/c l4 1 5 1 .h tm (accessed M a rc h 31,
2015). O n A p ril 14, 2015, th e O b a m a ad m in is tra tio n p ro
p osed to rem ove C u b a from th is list, p e n d in g a 45 day
review p erio d , u nless a jo in t reso lu tion o f C on g ress prevents
th e rem oval.
22. Thucydides [n.d.] 1974; M achiavelli [1532] 1984; H obbes
[1651] 1996.
23. W a ltz 1954,1979.
24. W a lt 1998: 31.
25. M earsheim er 2001.
http://www.economist.com/node/17106220
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
http://www.ipcc.ch/
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/cl4151.htm
580 Notes
26. See Jervis 1978. 33. A llison 1971.
27. A xelrod and H am ilto n 1981: 1392. 34. W e n d t 1992.
28. D oyle 1983a: 218. 35. W e n d t 1992.
29. See W a lt 1998: 32. 36. L en in [1917] 1996.
30. M oravcsik 1997: 515. 37. W a ltz 1954.
31. K eohane 1984. 38. P u tn a m 1988.
32. Doyle 1983a, 1983b, 1997. 39. G ou revitch 1978.
Glossary
absolute deprivation A co n ditio n o f b ein g deprived o f resources
below som e given th resh old, as d istin gu ished from r e la tiv e
deprivation.
absolute poverty A conception o f pov erty th a t involves settin g a
certain line below w hich people w ill be defined as poor, ty p i
cally u nd ersto o d in term s o f th e in ab ility to purchase a certain
set o f basic goods o r services,
administration The bureaucracy o f state officials, usually consid
ered p a rt o f th e executive b ran ch , th a t executes policy.
alternative energy E nerg y sources, such as solar or w in d power,
th a t are n o t d erived from fossil fuels,
alternative vote V oting system in w hich voters ra n k candidates
and th e votes o f lo w -ran king candidates are reallocated u n til a
w in n e r is determ ined,
anti-colonial revolutions Revolutions brought by subjugated p op
ulations against colonial powers, typically w ith th e purpose o f
rem oving them so th a t th e society in question can achieve
independence.
apportionment The process by w hich legislative seats are dis
trib u ted am ong g eographic constituencies.
argument The placem ent o f evidence in logical form in sup po rt
o f a position or claim ,
assimilation The p ractice o f b ein g in tegrated in to an o th er cul
tu re, especially w ith respect to im m igration.
audit studies R esearch carried o u t by social scientists to m easure
th e ex tent to w hich h irin g practices are discrim inatory.
authoritarian persistence T he ongoing co n tin u ation o f an au
th o ritarian regim e, such th a t dem ocratic tran sitio n does n o t
take place.
authoritarian regime A n on -dem ocratic regim e,
authoritarianism A form o f g overnm ent o r regim e th a t is non-
dem ocratic.
bellicist theory Theory associated w ith scholars such as C harles
Tilly, w ho argue th a t in terstate w ars w ere decisive in th e cre
ation o f th e m odern state,
bias A preference for o ne idea or perspective over another, espe
cially a preference th a t m ay resu lt in unb alan ced use o f evidence
o r in analytical error,
bicameral legislature L egislature w ith tw o cham bers, w hich m ay
have equal or u nequal powers.
biological determinism T he view th a t a feature o f social life,
such as g ender o r ethnicity, is caused by u nderlying biology.
boundary L ine d raw n sym bolically betw een groups o f people.
brain drain The d ep artu re o r em igration o f skilled and educated
m em bers o f a pop ulatio n, especially w ith reference to develop
in g countries in th e in te rn atio n a l system.
bureaucracy A form o f org an ization th a t, in its ideal form , has
individuals o p eratin g a nd w orking u n d er established, specified,
and com plex rules. In governm ent, th e o rganization o f u n
elected officials, often considered p a r t o f th e executive branch,
th a t im plem ents, executes, and enforces laws and policies.
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime A ty p e o f au th o ritarian
regim e, com m on in L a tin A m erica and elsew here in th e m id - to
late tw e n tieth century, th a t was associated w ith control o f the
state m ore by a group o f elites (often m ilitary) th a n by a single
individual leader.
cabinet The group o f senior officials in th e executive b ran ch , in
cluding m inisters, w ho advise th e head o f g overnm ent or head
o f state.
capital A factor o f econom ic p ro du ctio n consisting o f accum u
lated w ealth or financial resources available for investm ent.
case In com parative analysis, a u n it or exam ple o f a p henom enon
to be studied.
catch-all parties P olitical parties th a t are flexible on th e ir ideo
logical positions and aim to a ttra c t sup po rt from a b road range
o f in te re st groups and voters.
causation The p ro p erty th a t o btains w hen one th in g can be
show n to cause another.
chamber A n assembly or b od y o f a legislature, often referring to
one o f tw o such bodies in a bicam eral legislature.
citizenship A form o f relationship betw een th e state and in d i
viduals subject to its control, in w hich citizens have certain
basic righ ts an d are in som e w ay represented in th e state.
civic nationalism A form o f nationalism th a t says th a t you are a
m em ber o f th e n atio n i f you are a citizen o f its state.
civil rights R ights o f individuals to p articipate in civic life, includ
ing freedom s o f assembly, speech, access to inform ation, and
equal access to in stitu tion s, am ong others.
civil society A space in society outside o f th e organization o f the
state, in w hich citizens come together and organize themselves.
581
582 Glossary
civil wars S ustained m ilitary conflict betw een dom estic actors.
class structure The ongoing and p attern e d relationships b etw een
“classes,” typically und ersto o d as groups o f individuals link ed
to g eth er by econom ic in terest or activity.
clientelism The practice o f exchanging p olitical favors, often in
th e form o f governm ent em ploym ent or services, for p olitical
support.
climate change A set o f changes to th e e a rth ’s clim ate and the
study o f w h a t causes th ese changes.
coalition A group o f tw o or m ore p olitical parties th a t governs by
sharing executive pow er and responsibilities.
collective action A ctio n u nd ertak en by individuals and groups
to p ursue th e ir ends in form ally or in form ally coordinated ways,
often in p ursu it o f some com m on or public g ood such as ex
p anded civil rights or sustainable use o f com m on resources.
collective action research program The nam e given to th e ra
tion al choice th eo ry o f co ntention associated w ith th e w ork o f
M arc Lichbach.
collective behavior A p aradigm for u n d ersta n d in g various forms
o f contention, p op u lar for p a rt o f th e tw e n tieth century, th a t
e m p h asize d th e irra tio n a l, social-p sy ch olog ical d yn am ics o f
protest.
committee In a legislature, a body com posed o f a group o f legis
lators convened to perform a certain set o f tasks.
comparative advantage In in tern ation al trad e, th e idea th a t dif
ferent countries o r territories w ill have different relative advan
tages in the p roduction o f different goods and services, w hich
forms th e basis for gains from trade.
comparative checking The process o f te stin g th e conclusions
from a set o f com parisons ag ainst ad d ition al cases o r evidence.
comparative politics The subfield o f p olitical science th a t aims to
analyze m ultiple cases using th e com parative m ethod.
competitive authoritarianism A form o f governm ent or regim e
th a t allows some p olitical com petition b u t n o t enough to q ual
ify as fully dem ocratic.
concentration (of party system) C o n trastin g w ith frag m en ta
tion , th e extent to w hich p olitical pow er and representation in a
p a rty system are characterized by relatively sm all num bers o f
relatively large parties. (See also fragm entation)
concept A n idea com parativists use to th in k about th e processes
we study.
conceptualization The deliberate process th ro u gh w hich we create
and select social-scientific concepts.
congress A form o f legislature, typically associated w ith a presi
dential system in w hich there is a separation o f powers.
consociational Systems th a t use form al m echanism s to coordinate
different groups sharing access to power.
consociationalism A n in stitu tio n al approach to m an ag in g p o
ten tia l conflict in polities w ith m ultiple groups, one w hich in
volves ensuring th a t t&ch. g r o u p has p olitical representation.
consolidation T he process th ro u g h w h ic h a new d em o cratic
order becom es in stitu tio n aliz ed and therefore m ore likely to
endure.
constituency A group o f voters or a geographic d istric t t h a t leg
islators o r o th er elected officials represent.
constitution F un d am en tal a nd suprem e laws, usually w ritte n in a
ch arter, th a t establish th e basis o f a p olitical system and the
basis for o th er laws.
constitutional design F eatures o f constitu tio n s th a t shape the
basic features o f th e p olitical system , such as separation o f
powers and responsibilities betw een levels o f g overnm ent and
branches o f governm ent.
constitutional monarchy A p olitical system in w hich a m onarch
such as a k ing, queen, o r em peror plays a role as a head o f state,
b u t has pow ers lim ited by a constitution.
constitutional republic A polity w ith o u t a m onarch in w hich the
basic rules o f politics are laid o u t in a c onstitution.
constitutionalism T h e lim ita tio n o f g o v ern m e n t th ro u g h a
constitu tio n .
constructivism In in te rn atio n a l relations, a th eo ry th a t holds
th a t decisions m ade by states need to b e u nd ersto o d in th e con
te x t o f social and p olitical in teractions, and th a t behavior is
shaped by norm s and values as w ell as by narrow ly defined
interests.
constructivism In nationalism studies, th e view th a t n ations are
symbolic constructs and so place g reater em phasis on th e cre
ative efforts o f individuals and groups to define and redefine
th e ir identities.
contention The nam e, m ost associated w ith scholars like Sidney
T arrow and C harles Tilly, referring to th e p u rsu it o f collective
goods largely outside o f form al p olitical institutions.
corporatism A system o f in terest group representation in w hich
c ertain m ajor g roups are officially designated as representatives
o f certain interests, and have a m ore s tru ctu red in teraction w ith
th e g overnm ent in pow er a nd w ith th e state’s adm inistration.
correlation A relationship betw een tw o variables in w hich they
tend to move in eith er th e sam e d irection (positive correlation)
or in opposite directions (negative correlation).
coup d'etat The use o f force or th re a t o f force, typically by the
m ilitary or a coalition involving th e m ilitary, to im pose a non-
electoral change o f governm ent.
critical race theory A m ovem ent in social, political, and legal
th eo ry th a t aim s to discern th e subtle effects o f racism and re
lated form s o f prejudice.
decree A n executive-m ade o rder th a t has th e force o f law, despite
n o t b eing passed th ro u g h a legislature.
deductive reasoning The process o f m oving from general claims
or theories to specific observations or predictions ab o ut a p h e
nom enon or set o f cases.
defensive realism A realist th eo ry th a t holds th a t peace or coop
eration can em erge u n d er specific circum stances, nam ely w hen
Glossary 583
it is easier to defend th a n to attack and w hen states can see
clearly w h a t o th er states’ in tentio ns are.
deflation D eclin e in th e prices o f goods and services, o ften as
sociated w ith depressions o r serious slow dow ns in econom ic
activity.
delegative democracy A hybrid form o f regim e th a t is d em o
cratic b u t involves th e electorate “d elegating” significant au
th o rity to a governm ent.
democracy A form o f regim e associated w ith “ru le by th e people”
th a t signifies rights and liberties for citizens, in clud in g p olitical
rights to p articipate in elections and civil liberties such as free
dom o f speech.
democratic breakdown The process th ro u g h w hich a dem ocratic
regim e p artially o r com pletely loses its d em ocratic status.
democratic consolidation The process thro u gh which, after a tran
sition from authoritarianism , a polity strengthens its democracy.
democratic peace A p henom enon associated w ith liberalism
th a t holds th a t d em ocratic countries w ill rarely i f ever go to w ar
w ith one another.
democratic regime A regim e w ith predom inantly dem ocratic in
stitutions, including basic civil rights and regular, free elections.
democratic transition The process through w hich a non-dem ocratic
regime becomes democratic.
democratization The process o f a regim e becom ing m ore d em o
cratic, including b o th dem ocratic tran sitio n and dem ocratic
consolidation.
denomination A ty p e o f religious o rg an ization , prevalent in the
U nited States am ong o th er places, th a t is v oluntary a nd accepts
th e p rinciple o f religious pluralism .
denominationalism A system o r set o f beliefs th a t privileges d e
nom inatio n al forms o f religious organization.
dependency A th eo ry th a t argues th a t developing countries
can no t simply em brace free trad e because th is w ill lead to ever-
increasing w ealth disparities betw een th em and th e advanced
economies.
dependent variable In hypothesis testin g, th e dep en dent v ari
able is th e effect or outcom e th a t we expect to be acted on (or
have its value altered) by th e in d ep en dent variable.
development A process by w hich a society changes or advances,
often m easured in term s o f econom ic g ro w th , b u t also som e
tim es m easured in term s o f q uality o f life, stan d ard o f living,
access to freedom s and o p p o rtu n itie s, o r o th er indicators.
deviant case (outlier) A case th a t does n o t fit th e p attern p re
dicted by a given theory; also know n as a negative case.
differentiation The process th ro u g h w hich in stitu tio n s becom e
increasingly autonom ous from one another, in clud in g th e re
duction or o th er change in th e linkages betw een religion and
o th er institutions.
diffusion The process th ro u g h w hich a practice o r idea spreads
locally, nationally, and globally.
direct democracy A conception o f dem ocracy th a t places great
em phasis on d ire ct citizen involvem ent in politics, especially
involving plebiscites an d /o r citizen assemblies.
direct election W ith regard to executives, an electoral system in
w hich voters cast a vote d irectly for th e head o f governm ent or
h ead o f state.
dissolving the legislature The practice o f a c h ie f executive dis
b a n d in g th e legislature, o ften accom panied in a dem ocratic
regim e by th e calling for n ew elections.
district system A n electoral system in w hich voters select repre
sentatives from specific g eographic constituencies.
districting The process by w hich d istricts o r o th er geographic
co nstituencies are created for th e purposes o f elections.
dominant-party system P a rty system in w hich a co u ntry con
tains only one large political p a rty th a t predom inates p o liti
cally, o ften controlling th e legislative an d executive branches o f
governm ent.
Eastern nationalism A n an tiqu ated te rm for w h a t is now often
called “eth n ic nation alism .” (See also e th n ic nationalism )
economic management S tates’ efforts to shape th e econom ic
perform ance o f th e ir societies, especially in fiscal and m onetary
policy.
effective number of parties A m easure designed to capture the
num b er o f m eaning fu l p arties in a p a rty system th a t w eights
th e num b er o f parties represented by th e ir size.
electoral authoritarianism A nam e applied to situations in w hich
au th o ritarian regim es nom inally com pete in elections.
elite parties P olitical parties in w hich m em bership and scope
w ere largely restricted to a sm all n um b er o f political elites.
empirical critique A n effort to p o in t to im p o rta n t evidence th a t
does n o t sup po rt a conventional version o f any given theory.
empirical D ra w n from observations o f th e w orld.
employment O n g o in g, re gu lar access to p aid work.
empowerment A n increase in th e social, political, o r econom ic
capabilities o f an in d iv idu al o r group.
endogeneity The nam e given to any circum stance in w hich tw o
variables exh ib it m u tu al o r reciprocal effects.
environmental sustainability The q u a lity th a t one or an o th er
practice has w ith b ein g com patible w ith th e lo n g-term h ea lth o f
th e environm ent.
established religion R eligion th a t is g ran te d official status and
sup po rt by th e state.
ethnic group A group th a t identifies itse lf as having stro ng cul
tu ra l co m m o nality and a shared sense o f lo n g -ru n history,
som etim es th in k in g o f itse lf as a k in d o f kin sh ip group.
ethnic nationalism A form o f nationalism th a t says th a t you are
a m em ber o f th e n ation because o f your ancestry.
ethnicity The q uality th a t one has by id en tify in g w ith or being
ascribed m em bership in an e th n ic group.
584 Glossary
European Union (EU) The p olitical and econom ic u nion o f m any
E urop ean states, n um bering tw enty-eig h t as o f 2015.
everyday resistance Efforts to resist or o b stru ct au th o rity th a t
are n o t clearly organized over tim e, such as w ork stoppages,
slowdowns, and sabotage,
evidence A set o f facts or observations used to support a proposition
or hypothesis.
evolutionary psychology A n approach to th e analysis o f hum an
behavior th a t seeks to explain it alm ost exclusively on th e basis
o f evolutionary theory. (See also sociobiology)
executive order A n order m ade by a c h ie f executive o r top official
to th e bureaucracy th a t determ ines how th e bureaucracy should
enact or in te rp ret th e law.
executive The b ran ch o f governm ent, o r th e individual(s) at the
top o f th a t b ran ch , th a t executes or adm inisters policies and
laws in a country,
executive-legislative relations The set o f p olitical relationships
betw een th e executive b ran ch o f g overnm ent, w hich executes
law s/policies, and th e legislative bran ch , w hich often has the
au th o rity to pass those laws/policies,
export-led growth A strategy for achieving econom ic g ro w th
dep en dent on sending n atu ra l resources or ag ricu ltu ral o r in
dustrial p roducts for sale in foreign m arkets,
externality A n econom ic phenom enon in w hich th e gains and
costs from a given activity do n o t accrue to th e sam e actor,
failed state A state th a t cannot or does not perform its expected
functions.
falsif iability The testability o f a theory or hypothesis. A good hy
pothesis could be logically dem onstrated to be false by evidence,
fascism A n au th o ritarian ideology associated w ith regim es like
th e N azis and th a t o f Italy’s B enito M u ssolin i, favoring au th o ri
tarianism , m ilitarism , and righ t-w ing nationalism .
federalism System o f governm ent w ith co n stitu tio n al design o f
separation o f powers betw een central g overnm ent and subna
tion al g overnm ents,
feminism A social and in tellectual m ovem ent th a t aims to ensure
equal righ ts for w om en and men.
first-past-the-post E lectoral system in w hich th e candidate w ith
th e m ost num b er o f votes is elected, regardless o f w h eth er a
m ajority has been attained.
fiscal measure M e a s u re o f a g o v e rn m e n t’s revenues a n d /o r
expenditures.
fiscal policy B udget settin g, w hich is dep en dent on generating
revenue followed by governm ent spending.
foreign policy The set o f policies tow ard foreign n ations m ade by
a n ation al governm ent.
formal institutions In stitu tio n s th a t are governed by form al rules
and typically link ed to com plex organizations like th e state or
corporations.
formal powers The powers possessed b y a p olitical actor, such as
a c h ie f executive, as a fu n ction o f th e ir co n stitu tio n al o r legal
position.
fragmentation (of party system) C o n tra stin g w ith concentra
tion, th e ex tent to w hich p olitical pow er and representation in a
p a rty system are characterized by relatively large num bers o f
relatively sm all parties. (See also concentration)
framing The way in w hich a given problem or situation is d e
scribed and u nd ersto o d, w ith im plications for how it m ig h t be
addressed.
free rider Som eone w ho benefits from a collective or public good
w ith o u t co n trib u tin g to it.
functional definition D efinition th at aims to define a given phe
nom enon by w hat it does (as opposed to substantive definition).
game theory A set o f approaches to th e study o f strategic inter
action betw een actors, often relying o n m athem atical m odeling
and assum ptions o f th e ra tio n ality o f different actors.
gender C u ltu ra lly c o n stru c te d roles o r id en titie s o ne has by
v irtu e o f b ein g ascribed th e status o f m ale or fem ale, to be dis
tin g u ish ed from b iological sex.
generalizability The q uality th a t a given theory, hypothesis, or
finding has o f b ein g applicable to a w ide num b er o f cases.
genocide Efforts to d im in ish o r destroy a people an d /o r culture.
gerrymandering C reation o f d istricts o f irreg u lar shape or com
position in order to achieve a desired p olitical result.
Gini coefficient The m ost com m on m easure o f incom e in eq u ality
in any given pop ulatio n, usually expressed as a n um ber betw een
0 an d 1, w ith 0 b e in g to ta l e q u ality an d 1 b ein g m ax im a l
inequality.
globalization The increasing in teraction , b o th econom ic and cul
tu ra l, am ong peoples and societies across n ation al borders.
government In th e co n tex t o f executives, th e set o f top elected
executive officials and high-level p olitical appointees th a t shape
and o rie n t policy; also refers to th e broader adm inistrative ap
p aratu s o f th e state.
grand coalition A governing coalition com posed o f tw o or m ore
m ajor p arties th a t hold a superm ajority o f legislative seats and
represent a superm ajority o f th e electorate.
greenhouse gases (GHG) Em issions o f gases such as carbon d i
oxide and m ethane from in d u strial activity and consum ption o f
fossil fuels th a t contributes to clim ate change.
gross domestic product (GDP) The to ta l value o f goods and ser
vices produced in a given co u ntry or territory; p er capita G D P
is divided by th e population.
gross national income (GNI) A m easure o f th e to ta l incom e o f all
o f a c o u n try ’s citizens, w h e th er living in th eir hom e co u ntry or
abroad.
guerrilla tactics M ilita ry techniques designed to produce ongo
ing stalem ate, usually em ployed in situations o f asym m etric
m ilitary capability.
head of government The top executive official responsible for form
ing governments and form ulating and im plem enting policies.
head of state A person w ith executive fu n ction s th a t is a coun
try ’s sym bolic representative, in clud in g elected presidents and
unelected m onarchs.
Glossary 585
historical institutionalism A n approach to th eo rizin g th a t places
em phasis on th e pow er o f in stitu tio n s to shape th e behavior o f
individuals, and how th is operates over tim e.
Human Development Index (HDI) A com posite m easure devel
oped by th e U nited N atio ns to provide a broad view o f annual
developm ent and w ell-being around th e w orld, based on incom e,
life expectancy, and literacy a nd school enrollm ents.
hybrid regime A class o f regim e th a t appears to be n either fully
dem ocratic n or fully au th o ritarian , such as electoral au th o ri
tarian ism , delegative democracy, and illiberal democracy.
hyperinflation E xceedingly h ig h inflation, w hich dram atically
erodes th e value o f m oney over tim e.
hypothesis A specific pred ictio n , derived from a theory, th a t can
be tested against em pirical evidence.
identity The social label ascribed to an individual or group th a t
locates th e individual o r group in political society m ore broadly.
ideology A system atically coordinated and cognitively salient set
o f beliefs focused on politics.
illiberal democracy A polity w ith some dem ocratic features b u t in
w hich political and civil rights are not all guaranteed or protected.
immigration The m ovem ent o f people to foreign countries.
impeachment A process by w h ich a legislature in itiates p roceed
ings to determ in e w h e th er an official, often a to p -ra n k in g ex
ecutive official, should b e rem oved from office.
impersonality A q uality a ttrib u te d by some scholars to m odern
states, w hich are p resum ed to b e less likely to be identified w ith
th e personalities o f th e ir leaders.
independent variable In hypothesis testin g, an in d ep en dent
variable is one th a t we expect to “act o n ” o r change th e value o f
th e d ep en dent variable.
indicator A n elem ent or feature th a t indicates th e presence o f an
underlying factor.
indirect election E lecto ral system in w hich representatives are
chosen by o th er elected officials, ra th er th a n directly by th e citi
zen ry at large. W ith regard to executives, an electoral system in
w hich m ost voters never cast a b allo t d irectly for th e individual
w ho becom es head o f governm ent.
individualization The trea tm en t o f problem s as link ed to th e in
terests o f individuals ra th e r th a n as issues o f com m on concern
o r interest.
inductive reasoning The process o f m oving from specific obser
vations to g eneral claim s.
inequality In th e social sciences, th e d ifferential d istrib u tio n o f
access to goods like pow er, status, and m aterial resources.
infant mortality A m ajor public h ea lth indicator, w hich typically
m easures th e num b er o f infants p er 1,000 b o rn th a t do n o t sur
vive u n til th e age o f one year.
inference The process th ro u g h w hich we aim to te st observable
im plications (often about cause and effect) o f any given th eo ry ;
also refers to conclusions reached th ro u g h th is process.
inflation Increase in th e prices o f goods and services.
informal powers Those pow ers p ossessed by an office holder th a t
are n o t “official” b u t ra th e r based o n custom , convention, or
o th e r sources o f influence.
institution A re gu larized o r p attern e d activity th a t shapes the
behavior o f individuals and groups, in clud in g form al o rg an iza
tions like th e state or p olitical p artie s, as w ell as m ore inform al
in stitu tio n s such as norm s and values. A lso, a social or political
stru ctu re o r set o f practices, in clud in g gov ernm ent organiza
tion s, th a t shapes th e behavior o f individuals and groups.
institutionalism A n approach to th eo rizin g in com parative poli
tics and related fields th a t places em phasis on th e pow er o f in
stitu tio n s to shape th e b ehavior o f individuals..
instrumentalism A ty p e o f explanation in social science t h a t says
th a t you can explain som ething by show ing how its develop
m en t o r p ersistence is in th e (usually m aterial) in terest o f pow
erfu l individuals or groups.
insurgencies C o n te n tio n w ith fo rm alized m ilita ry conflict.
integration I n in te rn atio n a l relations, a process by w hich coun
tries agree to collaborate econom ically o r politically, to m ake
som e decisions collectively an d to shape com m on strategies.
interdependence A relationship in w h ich tw o o r m ore actors
(such as countries) are m u tu ally d ependent.
interest aggregation The process by w hich individuals’ prefer
ences are b ro ug ht to g eth er to m ake collective decisions, often
th ro u g h political p arties an d th e p a rty system.
interest articulation The process by w hich p olitical actors ex
press th e ir dem ands, needs, or w an ts in a political system , often
th ro u g h in terest g roups.
interest groups O rg an ization s th a t m ake dem ands in th e p o liti
cal system on b e h a lf o f th e ir c o n stitu en ts an d m em bers.
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) The set o f in te rn a
tio n al organizations th a t p ush for cooperation betw een coun
tries and w ork for th e prevention or m itig ation o f in tern ation al
conflicts.
international financial institutions (IFIs) M u ltila teral in stitu
tion s, p articularly th e In te rn atio n a l M o n e ta ry F u n d (IM F ) and
th e W o rld B ank, th a t have considerable leverage in in tern a
tio n al economy.
international political economy The study o f how th e economic
relations b etw een countries affect politics an d h ow political re
lations affect econom ies.
international relations The study o f relations betw een countries
and betw een actors in th e in te rn atio n a l system.
international security The study o f issues o f w ar and peace b e
tw een nations and g lobal security and conflict m ore broadly.
international trade The econom ic exchange o f goods, services,
and capital across in te rn atio n a l borders.
iron law of oligarchy The idea, developed by R ob ert M ichels,
th a t collective action always produces new elites.
isomorphism In in stitu tio n al theory, th e quality th a t tw o or
m ore organizations have by v irtu e o f b eing stru cturally very
sim ilar.
586 Glossary
judicial activism T erm used, often pejoratively, to characterize
judicial actions th a t actively rein terpret legislation and thus
im ply exercising powers typically reserved for th e legislative
branch.
judicial review System o f co n stitu tio n al in terp retatio n in w hich
judges rule on th e co n stitu tio n ality o f laws p assed by legislature
and executive.
judiciary The b ranch o f governm ent responsible for th e in te rp re
tatio n o f laws in courts.
lai'cite The French nam e for th e ideal o f a lay state.
lay states States th a t establish a form al separation o f religion and
public life.
legislature A ssem bly or body o f representatives w ith th e author
ity to m ake laws.
level of analysis The level (e.g., individual, organizational, soci
etal) at w hich observations are m ade, o r at w hich causal p ro
cesses operate. In in tern ation al relations, th e different levels
th a t can be th e context o f a study, in clud in g th e individual level,
th e n ation -state level, and th e level o f th e in tern ation al system.
liberalism In p olitical theory, and ideology th a t em phasizes in d i
vidual freedom s, representative dem ocracy, and th e m arket
economy. In in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s, a th e o ry t h a t h olds states
can have d iffere n t preferences an d in te rn a l s tru c tu re s th a t
lead th e m to behave in d ifferent ways, especially w ith regard
to th e co n du ct o f states th a t hold liberal values o f dem ocracy
and free m ark e t com m erce.
libertarianism A form o f liberalism , strongly opposed to social
democracy, th a t is especially concerned to m in im ize th e role o f
governm ent.
life expectancy The average age u n til w hich m em bers o f a soci
ety (or some group w ith in society) live.
literacy rate The percentage o f a pop ulatio n w ho can read.
lower chamber In a bicam eral legislature, th e house th a t ty p i
cally has a larger num ber o f legislators th a n upp er cham bers,
and often represents th e n ation al vote either m ore p ro po rtion
ally or th ro u g h sm aller g eographic constituencies.
m alapportionment A p p o rtio n m e n t in w h ich voters are u n
equally represented in a legislature, such as th ro u gh relatively
greater num bers o f legislators per capita for low -population areas
and lesser num ber o f legislators per capita for high-population
areas.
market-led development A n approach to econom ic m an ag e
m en t in w hich th e state aims to control econom ic behavior as
little as possible.
Marxism In in te rn atio n a l relations, a th eo ry th a t em phasizes the
role o f social classes in shaping politics and hig hligh ts th e role
o f capitalist accum ulation as a prim e driver in in tern ation al
affairs.
mass parties P arties consisting o f large num bers o f citizens as
m em bers and th a t u n d ertak e massive p olitical m obilization.
measurement bias A m easure is biased i f it w ill n o t produce
com parable results for all observations.
measurement error E ith e r an episodic error, such as im properly
recording data, or a system atic error, m eaning th a t a m easure
m en t does n o t fully reflect w hat it is designed to measure.
measurement validity W h e th e r a given m easure effectively cap
tu res or represents w h a t we are researching.
median voter The voter w ho is theoretically exactly in th e m iddle
o f th e d istrib u tio n o f voters.
minimum connected winning coalition A m in im u m w in n in g
coalition in w hich all parties in th e coalition are “con nected ” or
adjacent to one an o th er on th e p olitical spectrum .
minimum size coalition A governing coalition th a t is closest to
th e th resh old needed to govern, typically 50 percent o f th e leg
islative seats plus one seat.
minimum winning coalition A governing coalition th a t contains
no surplus p arties beyond those required to form a government.
mobilization The engagem ent o f individuals and groups in sus
ta in ed contention.
modern state A concept used to d istin gu ish states in th e m odern
w orld from earlier form s o f p olitical centralization; it includes
features such as extensive bureaucracy, cen tralizatio n o f vio
lence, and im personality.
modernism The label applied by A n th o n y S m ith to th o se th e o
ries o f n atio n al id en tity th a t see it as exclusively m odern.
modernity A contested term th a t refers to a type o f society,
typically one experiencing econom ic g ro w th and w ith a
relatively stro ng state, am ong o th er characteristics. ( See also
m odernization)
modernization The process th ro u g h w hich a society becomes
“more m o dern ,” w hich is typically u nd ersto o d to m ean having
an advanced econom y and, som etim es, a dem ocratic polity.
modernization theory A th eo ry th a t traces dem ocracy to broad
social changes, especially econom ic developm ent and th e
changes th a t accom pany it.
monarch A head o f state in a m onarchy, w ho usually in h erits a
p osition for life and may have eith er sub stan tial political powers
or very lim ited cerem onial powers.
monetary policy States’ efforts to shape th e value o f a society’s
currency, often th ro u g h th e use o f a central b an k in th e case o f
a m odern state.
most-different-systems (MDS) A research design in w hich we
com pare cases th a t differ w ith respect to m ultiple factors b u t in
w hich th e outcom e is th e same.
most-similar-systems (MSS) A research design in w hich we
com pare cases th a t are sim ilar w ith respect to a num b er o f fac
tors b u t w ith d istin ct outcomes.
multilateral In in te rn atio n a l relations, th e actions o f th ree or
m ore countries w orking together.
multi-member district (MMD) E lecto ral system in w hich d istrict
constituencies have m ore th a n one representative.
multiparty democracy A dem ocracy in w hich at least tw o p a r
ties com pete for power.
Glossary 587
multiparty system A political p a rty system consisting o f m ore
th a n tw o significant p arties th a t have o pp ortu nities to govern.
nation (the) A group th o u g h t o f as sovereign and equal, typically
com prised o f a large, often geographically bounded population.
national identity A n id en tity th a t locates o ne’s social p osition in
relation to n ation al m em bership.
nationalism The view th a t th e w orld is and should be divided into
n ations th a t are th o u g h t o f by nationalists as sovereign and
egalitarian.
nativism A p olitical a ttitu d e th a t seeks to p ro tec t th e in terests o f
established groups o f residents in a given co u ntry ag ainst th e
interests o f m ore recent im m igrants.
neoliberalism A n id eo lo g ica l te n d e n c y th a t favors lib e ra l d e
m ocracy a nd m arket-led developm ent.
new institutionalism The nam e given to th e tu rn to in stitu tio n al
th eo ry in th e last several decades in econom ics, political sci
ence, and sociology,
nonstate actors In in te rn atio n a l relations, actors in in tern ation al
politics th a t are n o t nation-states; includes m u ltin a tio n al cor
porations, tran sn atio n a l advocacy groups, and in tern ation al
crim in al n etw orks,
normative C on cern ed w ith specifying w hich so rt o f practice or
in stitu tio n is m orally or ethically justified,
nuclear proliferation The expansion o f th e num b er o f countries
and o th er actors possessing nuclear technology,
offensive realism A realist th eo ry th a t holds th a t states w ill seek
to m axim ize th e ir pow er w henever th ey can.
offshoring I n in tern ation al trad e and b usiness, th e p ractice o f an
econom ic actor basing som e o f its services o r processes abroad
ra th er th a n in its dom estic m arket. (See also outsourcing)
open-ended question A question th a t, in principle, is open to
num erous possible answers,
open-list proportional representation E lectoral system in
w hich voters choose a candidate b u t votes are aggregated by p o
litical p arty to determ ine th e allocation o f seats across p arties,
operationalization The process th ro u g h w hich w e m ake a con
cept m easurable,
organization In stitu tio n aliz ed group such as a state, corporation,
p olitical party, social m ovem ent, or in te rn atio n a l body. A lso,
th e ongoing coo rd in ation o f collective action in th e p u rsu it o f
com m on purposes,
outcome T ypically used as a synonym for “effect,” s om ething th a t
is produced o r c hanged in any social o r p olitical process,
outsourcing In in tern ation al trad e and business, th e practice o f
an econom ic actor co n tractin g out to o th e r actors, often over
seas. (See also offshoring)
parliament A ty p e o f legislature, often associated w ith systems
in w hich th e legislators vote on th e leadership o f th e executive
b ran ch and th e form ation o f a g overnm ent,
parliamentarism A system o f g overnm ent in w hich th e head o f
governm ent is elected by and accountable to a p arliam en t or
legislature.
parliamentary sovereignty System in w hich th e co n stitu tio n al
ity o f laws passed b y legislature and executive are n o t subject to
co n stitu tio n al in te rp retatio n by judiciary.
partisan powers T he pow ers accruing to a g overnm ent official,
such as a c h ie f executive, by v irtu e o f th e official’s leverage or
pow er over m em bers o f a political party.
party system institutionalization The degree to w hich a p arty
system is stable and rem ains so over tim e, as m easured by such
characteristics as th e persistence o f p arties, th e stab ility o f th eir
ideologies, an d th e degree to w hich th ey are d istin c t from the
specific individuals th a t lead them .
party system P a tte r n s o f p a rty p o litics c h a ra c te riz e d by th e
num b er o f relevant p artie s in a country.
path dependent The n am e given to historical processes in w hich
fu tu re developm ents are shaped o r p a rtia lly d eterm in ed by
events at previous stages in th o se processes.
patronage The use o f g overnm ent favors, typically in th e form o f
em ploym ent, to g arn er political support.
payoff matrix In g am e-th eo retic m odels, th e d istrib u tio n o f pay
offs to players d ep en ding on th e choices m ade.
peak organization T op associations, such as labo r federations
and large business org an ization s, th a t represen t com m on in ter
ests by b rin g in g to g eth er m any lik e -m in d ed organizations.
perennialism The label applied by A n th o n y S m ith to those th e o
ries o f n ation al id en tity th a t see it as n either exclusively m odern
nor continuous w ith p re-historical form s o f identity.
personalistic dictatorship A form o f au th o ritarian ism in w hich
th e p erso nality o f th e d ictato r is hig hligh ted .
pluralism A system o f in terest group representation in w hich
groups com pete openly to influence g overnm ent decisions and
public policy, an d in w h ich specific groups do n o t have official
preferential access to decision m aking.
political culture T he sym bolically encoded beliefs, values, norm s,
and practices t h a t shape th e form al d istrib u tio n o f pow er in any
given society.
political economy The in teraction o r interrelatio n sh ip betw een
politics and th e econom y in a given co u ntry or internationally,
to include how politics affects econom ies and how economies
affect politics.
political opportunities The availability o f political options to re
dress grievances.
political party A political o rganization th a t seeks to influence
policy, typically by g ettin g candidates and m em bers elected or
appointed to public office.
political revolutions R ev o lutio ns, th e m a in effect o f w h ic h is
to a lte r p o litic a l in s titu tio n s ra th e r th a n social a n d econom ic
s tru c tu re s .
political rights R ig hts o f individuals to p articipate in political
life, in clud in g th e rig h t to political speech, th e rig h t to vote,
and th e rig h t to jo in p olitical associations.
populism A political approach in w h ich leaders, often heads o f
gov ernm ent and top executive b ran ch officials, m ake direct
588 Glossary
appeals to “th e people” and seek to develop d ire ct p olitical ties
w ith th e masses.
portfolio The set o f duties and tasks th a t correspond to a given
m in isterial office.
poverty The state o f bein g poor, as m easured by low incom e,
deprivation, lack o f access to resources, or lim ited econom ic
opportunities.
poverty line A specified th resh old below w hich individuals or
groups are ju d ged to be in poverty.
president A n executive leader th a t typically com bines th e fu n c
tions o f head o f state and head o f g overnm ent, and is n o t d i
rectly responsible to a legislature.
presidentialism A system o f governm ent in w hich a president
serves as c h ie f executive, being in d ep en dent o f th e legislature
and often com bining th e functions o f head o f state and head o f
governm ent.
prime minister A c h ie f executive in a p arliam en tary system o f
governm ent.
primordialism The label applied by A n th o n y S m ith to those
theories o f national id en tity th a t see it as continuous w ith pre-
historical (“p rim o rd ial”) form s o f identity.
prisoner's dilemma (game) A m odel o f a gam e in w hich tw o
actors w ould b enefit from m u tu al cooperation, b u t each has in
dividual incentives to defect from cooperation.
privatization T ran sfer o f control (of a business, industry, or ser
vice) from public to private.
privatization In th e context o f th e social scientific study o f reli
gion, this refers to th e process o f religious practice being con
fined to th e private sphere.
procedural definition of democracy A conception o f dem oc
racy, contrasted w ith a substantive definition, th a t em phasizes
th e m in im al standards, procedures, o r rules th a t a country
should have in place to govern p olitical life.
proportional representation (PR) In its pure form , an electoral
system in w hich voters choose a preferred p a rty and seats are
allocated to parties according to th e percentage o f th e vote th e
p arty w ins.
protectionism In in tern ation al trade, th e p ractice o f a co u ntry
p ro tectin g or giving favor to its ow n dom estic producers.
public goods G oods or services, often provided by a governm ent,
for use by all m em bers o f a society and for w hich one person’s
use o f th e good does n o t com prom ise anyone else’s use o f th e
good. Exam ples include nation al defense, basic in frastru ctu re,
and a health y environm ent.
public sphere The space in w hich public life and deliberation
take place (as opposed to th e “private sphere”).
purchasing power parity (PPP) A n adjustm ent m ade to incom e
m easures to account for differences in cost o f living.
qualitative A form o f analysis th a t aim s to discern relationships
b etw een events o r phenom ena as described in narrative form,
such as an account o f an historical process.
quantitative Q u an titative analysis aims for th e m athem atical
d iscernm ent o f relationships betw een variables, typically in
volving a large num b er o f cases or observations.
race The idea th a t h u m a n beings are d ivided in to different groups,
o ften th o u g h t o f (erroneously) as b iological categories.
racial formation A concept developed by O m i and W in a n t (1994)
th a t describes th e process th ro u g h w hich ideas o f race are con
stru cted and develop over tim e.
racialization The historical process th ro u g h w hich social rela
tions becom e in terp reted in term s o f racial categories.
rational institutionalism A n approach to th eo rizin g in com para
tive politics and related fields th a t places em phasis on th e power
o f in stitu tion s to shape th e behavior o f individuals, one w hich
often focuses on im plications o f in stitu tion s for individuals’
strategic choices.
realism I n in tern ation al relations, a th eo ry th a t treats states in th e
international system largely as acting on th e basis o f n ational self-
interest, defined often in term s o f power, survival, and security.
referendum A p op u lar vote on a specific issue.
regime A form or ty p e o f governm ental system , w ith an emphasis
on in stitu tion s and rules.
regime change A ny m ajor change o f regim e ty p e, in clud in g d e
m o cratizatio n, dem ocratic breakdow n, o r certain types o f au
th o ritarian persistence in w hich one ty p e o f au th o ritarian
regim e gives w ay to another.
regime type The form o f a p olitical regim e, such as dem ocratic
versus au th o ritarian , as w ell as subtypes, such as personalistic
d ictatorships or to ta litarian regimes.
relative deprivation The state o f having o r feeling th a t one has
less th a n o th er m em bers o f one’s reference group (including
o ne’s ow n g roup over time).
religious monopoly The situation in w hich one m ajor religion
dom inates th e religious landscape w ith in a given society (the
opposite o f religious pluralism).
religious pluralism The situation in w hich th ere are m ultiple re
ligious organizations w ith in a given society (the opposite o f
religious monopoly).
religious states States in w hich religion is a key p a rt o f official
politics, often involving religious establishm ent, religious le
g itim ation o f th e state, and restrictions on religious m inorities.
remittances C ash or resources sen t to a hom e country, often to
fam ily and friends, by em igrants.
representation In legislatures, th e process by w hich elected leg
islators reflect th e interests and preferences o f voters in th eir
constituencies.
representative democracy A conception o f dem ocracy in w hich
politicians and in stitu tion s are und ersto o d to represent the
electorate, w ho nevertheless can co n strain th e ir behavior
th ro u g h periodic elections and o th er form s o f participation.
revolution A form o f collective action in w hich som e large-scale,
s tru c tu ra l change is eith er attem pted o r accom plished.
Glossary 589
rule of law A system th a t im poses regu larized rules in a polity,
w ith key criteria in clud in g equal rights, th e re gu lar enforce
m en t o f laws, and th e relative independence o f th e judiciary.
runoff E lectoral system in w hich th e top candidates after a first
ro u nd o f v otin g com pete in one or m ore ad d ition al rounds o f
votin g u n til a candidate receives a majority.
Sartori's ladder of abstraction The idea th a t we can organize
concepts on th e basis o f th e ir specificity o r generality,
scope conditions The conditions or range o f cases for w hich an
argu m en t works.
secularism The ideological com plex th a t favors secular cu lture
(the term is also som etim es used as a synonym for secular cul
tu re m ore generally),
secularization The process th ro u g h w hich (according to some
theories) societies becom e less religious as th ey becom e more
m odern.
security dilemma D ilem m a in w hich each actor in th e interna
tional system expects others to m axim ize th eir own security ad
vantage, and thus builds up power itself, leading to an arms race.
semi-presidential system A m ixed o r hybrid system com bining
aspects o f p residentialism and parliam entarism .
separation of powers The division o f powers in a governm ent
system betw een branches o f g overnm ent or betw een levels o f
governm ent.
single transferable vote (STV) E lecto ral system in w hich voters
ra n k candidates and th e w in ners’ surplus votes are reallocated
to other, low er-ranking candidates u n til a slate o f representa
tives is chosen.
single-member district (SMD) E lectoral system in w hich voters
choose a candidate and th e w in n e r is elected by th e m ost votes
earned or th ro u g h w in n in g a ru n o ff vote,
single-party system A n au th o ritarian system in w hich parties
besides th e single d om in a n t p a rty are b an ned or disallow ed,
social capital A dvantage th a t individuals or groups hold by
v irtu e o f th eir social relationships,
social construction The process th ro u g h w hich socially shared
m eanings and definitions are established and m aintained,
social democracy A n ideological m ovem ent th a t favors b o th
representative dem ocracy w ith respect for basic individual
rights and state action to prom ote relative econom ic and social
equality, viewed by some as a v ariety o f socialism b u t by m ost as
a variety o f liberalism ,
social identity theory A n im p o rta n t th eo ry in social psychology
th a t sees personal identities as lin k ed to and p artially derived
from group identities and roles,
social movement organization A n organization th at has been cre
ated to help m aintain and lead social movement activity over time,
social movements O ng o in g, organized collective action oriented
tow ard a goal o f social change,
social networks S tructures o f social ties and connections am ong
individuals.
social revolutions R evolutions th a t dram atically change social
structures.
socialism A n ideology (or fam ily o f ideologies) th a t em phasizes
econom ic equality as a key goal, to be pursued in large m easure
th ro u g h state action.
sociobiology A n approach to th e study o f societies th a t sees
h u m a n society as governed by th e sam e (evolutionary) p rin ci
ples as an im al societies.
sovereignty The key way th e au th o rity o f th e m odern state is
conceptualized: states are u nd ersto o d to be th e u ltim ate au
th o rity w ith in th e ir specifically d em arcated territories.
state The m ost im p o rta n t form o f political org an ization in
m odern politics, w hich, in its ideal form , is characterized by
cen tralized control o f th e use o f force, b ureaucratic organiza
tio n , and th e provision o f a n u m b er o f public goods.
state breakdown D ra m atic decline in state capacity.
state capacity The ability o f th e state to achieve its objectives,
especially th e abilities to control violence, effectively tax the
p o p ulatio n, and m ain tain w ell-fu n ctio n in g in stitu tion s and the
ru le o f law.
state interventionism A n approach to econom ic m anagem ent in
w hich th e state plays a cen tral role, n o t ju st th ro u g h enforcing
contracts and p ro p erty righ ts b u t th ro u g h active interventions
such as co o rd in ating investm ent, supplying credit, and, in m any
instances, th ro u g h th e establishm ent and ru n n in g o f state-
ow ned enterprises.
state of emergency A condition allowed by some constitutions in
w hich guarantees, rights, or provisions are tem porarily lim ited,
to be justified by emergencies or exceptional circum stances.
state system The co n ditio n th a t m any o f th e m ost im p o rta n t
actors in in tern ation al relations are states, w hich can be und er
stood as system ically lin k ed to one another.
state-led development A n approach to econom ic m anagem ent
in w hich th e state plays a p ro m in e n t role in co o rd in ating the
behavior o f econom ic actors and in terv en in g in th e economy.
strain theory A th eo ry suggesting th a t m ajor social change causes
social “strain” or conflict w hich increases dem and for revolution.
strategic voting V oting in a way th a t does n o t reflect a voter’s
ideal preference, so as to prevent a less-desired outcom e.
structuralism A view in social and p olitical th eo ry holding th a t
social stru ctures, ra th er th a n agents or cu lture, m ake m ost o f
th e difference.
structuralism A n approach to nation alism studies th a t sees big,
difficu lt-to -chang e p arts o f society as d ete rm in in g w hat really
m atters ab o ut n atio n al identity.
subaltern O ccup y in g low er rungs in a hierarchical system.
substantive definition D efin ition th a t aim s to define a given
p heno m en o n by w hat it is ra th e r th a n by w h a t it does (as o p
posed to functional definition).
substantive definition of democracy A conception o f dem oc
racy, co n trasted w ith a procedural definition, th a t views a
590 Glossary
polity ’s dem ocratic status as d ep en dent on th e satisfaction o f
certain substantive ends, such as th e extension o f broad rights or
th e reduction o f incom e inequality.
sustainability The notion, especially used w ith regard to th e en
v iro n m en t, th a t a resource is capable o f being sustained for use
or enjoym ent by fu tu re generations.
term limit R estrictio n on th e num b er o f tim es o r to ta l am o u nt o f
tim e a p olitical official can serve in a given position.
territorial nationalism A ccording to some scholars, a ty p e o f
n ationalism th a t closely resembles civic nationalism , in th a t
m em bership is fu n dam en tally d eterm in ed by w here one is born
o r w here one resides ra th er th a n one’s ancestry.
terrorism The use o f violence to achieve p olitical ends th ro u gh
psychological im pacts on a civilian p opulation.
theocracy A n au th o ritarian state controlled by religious leaders,
or a state w ith very strict religious restrictions t h a t uses religion
as its m ain m ode o f legitim ation.
theoretical critique A n effort to show th a t a given th eo ry has
logical lim itations.
theory A general set o f explanatory claim s about some specifiable
em pirical range.
thesis A statem ent for w hich one argues on th e basis o f evidence.
Third-World revolutions A concept developed by J o h n Foran
holding th a t revolutions in th e developing w orld have special
characteristics.
Tocqueville effect The nam e given by som e scholars to T oc-
queville’s observation th a t ch ang in g relative status positions
were an im p o rta n t factor in some groups p artic ip a tin g in the
F rench Revolution.
totalitarian regime A form o f au th o ritarian regim e th a t aims
to control ev erything about th e lives o f its subject population,
such as in th e Soviet U nion and G erm an y und er th e Nazis.
transgender A n id en tity in w hich one’s g ender does n o t conform
to conventional m atch in g w ith biological sex.
transition The m o vem en t from an a u th o rita ria n regim e to a
dem ocratic one.
transnational Issues or institutions th at cross international borders.
transnational network A n etw o rk o f n o n sta te actors w o rk in g
across state borders.
trust The extent to w hich an individual has confidence in th e reli
ability or g ood conduct o f others.
twenty-first-century socialism The nam e given to supporters o f
governm ents in som e contem porary societies (e.g., Venezuela,
Bolivia) th a t aim s to em phasize th e ir allegedly m ore p articipa
tory a nd dem ocratic features.
two-party system A p olitical p a rty system consisting o f tw o sig
nificant p arties th a t have a duopoly on o pp ortu nities to govern.
underemployment W h e n w orkers are em ployed less th a n they
w ish to be o r below th e ir skill level.
unemployment The lack o f ongoing, regular access to p aid work.
unicameral legislature L egislature w ith a single chamber.
unitarism System o f governm ent in w hich central governm ent is
p red o m in an t and th e powers o f subnational governm ents are
lim ited to those delegated by th e center,
unitary rational actor In in tern ation al relations th eo ry and espe
cially realism , th e idea th a t states act as i f th ey w ere single in d i
viduals capable o f m ak in g decisions on th e basis o f rational
calculations about th e costs and benefits o f different actions.
United Nations The m ajor in te rn atio n a l org an ization w hose
m em bership consists o f m ost o f th e countries in th e w orld, th a t
has th e aim o f preventing and m an ag in g conflict and establish
ing m u ltilateral cooperation on m atters o f in te rn atio n a l law,
econom ics, and h um an developm ent and w ell-being.
upper chamber The cham ber in a bicam eral legislature th a t is
usually sm aller in num ber o f legislators, often representing
larger g eographic constituencies such as states or provinces,
utility The value th a t people derive from resources to w hich they
have access.
variable A n elem ent or factor th a t is likely to change, or vary,
from case to case.
variation D ifference betw een cases in any given study o f com
parative p olitics.
veto A n act o f executive pow er in w hich an executive rejects a law
passed by a legislature.
vote of no confidence A vote taken by a legislature th a t expresses a
lack o f support for th e governm ent or executive, which, i f success
ful, often results in th e dissolution o f th e governm ent and the
calling o f new legislative elections,
welfare state A state th a t aims to provide a basic safety n et for
th e m ost vulnerable elem ents o f its pop ulatio n, often accom
plished th ro u g h social insurance, public h ealth care plans, and
poverty relief.
Western nationalism A n an tiqu ated term for w h a t is now often
called “civic n ationalism .” (See also civic nationalism )
within-case comparison The com parative analysis o f variation
th a t takes place over tim e or in d istin c t p arts o f a single case.
world society theory A th eo ry associated w ith scholars such as
Jo h n M eyer, w ho argue th a t basic o rg an ization al features o f the
state system are cu ltu ral and have diffused globally.
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Credits
PHOTOS
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p. 1: A P P h o to /G u id o B ergm ann; p. 6: A P P h o to /F ranco is M o ri;
p. 11: Kyodo via A P Im ages; p. IS: C o p y rig h t P io tr R ed linski/
C orbis/A P Im ages; p. 17: A P Photo/K w esi O sow u
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A P Im ages; p. 35: A P P h o to /K o re an C e n tra l New s A gency
via K orea N ew s Service
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Im ages/A fter A lexand re de la B orde
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p. 70: A P P ho to /T h an assis Stavrakis; p. 74: A g e n d a E stad o via
A P Im ages; p. 78: A P P h o to /A h n Young-joon; p. 83: Paula
B ro n s te in /G e tty Im ages; p. 91: Kyodo via A P P ho to
C H A P T E R S
p. 96: A P P h o to /S u sa n W alsh; p. 101: A P P h o to /S a u ra b h D as;
p. 110: Y U R I C O R T E Z /A F P /G e tty Im ages
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H e rn a n d e z /L a tin C o n te n t/G e tty Im ages; p. 128; A P P h o to /
S tephen W and erai; p. 133: P arveen N e g i/In d ia T oday G ro u p /
G e tty Im ages
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p. 145: A P Photo/Tsvangirayi M ukw azhi; p. 152: A P P ho to /E steb an
Felix; p. 156: S E R G E I S U P IN S K Y /A F P /G e tty Im ages
C H A P TER 8
p. 171: A P P h o to /N Z H erald , D ean Purcell; p. 174: P A T R IC K
L IN /A F P /G e tty Im ages; p. 179: W ik im edia; p. 185: Press
A ssociation via A P Im ages; p. 191: A P P h o to / M a rtin Bureau
CH A P TER 9
p. 198: A P P h o to /N Z H erald , D ea n P urcell; p. 203: P A T R IC K
L IN /A F P /G e tty Im ages; p. 205: P ress A ssociation via A P
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S trin g er/ G e tty Im ages
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ardo D i Baia; p. 236: G R E G B A K E R /S tafF /G etty Images;
p. 237: A P P h o to /M ich ael Sohn; p. 245: C opyright B ettm an n /
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Baia; p. 259: A P P h o to /S h izu o K ambayashi; p. 261: A P P h o to /
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p. 304: A P P h o to /M ic h e l E uler; p. 312: C h ip S om o d ev illa/G etty
Im ages; p. 314: J E R R Y L A M P E N /A F P /G e tty Im ages
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p. 325: G ustavo M iran d a /G lo b o via G e tty Im ages; p. 327: W illiam
F. C a m p b e ll/T im e p ix /T im e L ife P ic tu re s /G e tty Im ages;
p. 335: A lex W o n g /G e tty Im ages; p. 338: A P P ho to
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617
Index
N ote: page num bers followed by / and / refer to figures and tables respectively.
A A R P , 257
A bacha, Sani, 513, 514, 516, 521
A be, S hinzo, 482/, 489
A biola, M o sh oo d , 513, 514
abortion, 187-88, 564
absolute deprivation, and revolution, 292
absolute poverty, 99
A bubakar, A bdulsalam i, 514
accountability
and democracy, 124
elections and, 215, 233
legislature’s pow er to censure executive
and, 211, 2 2 0 -2 1
Acem oglu, D aro n , 1 08 ,1 1 5 , 162
A c t o f U nion (G reat B ritain, 1707), 67
A cts o f S ettlem en t (U .K ., 1701),
177, 548
A denauer, K onrad, 4 46 , 447
ad m in istration , as term , 229
affirm ative action, 332, 564
A ffordable C are A ct o f 2010 (U.S.),
556, 566
A frica
colonialism in, 512
corporatism in, 266
and dem ocratization, 134
Ebola virus in, 24
econom ic developm ent in, 105,114
electoral systems in, 437
legislatures in, 203
p a rty systems in , 269, 275
personalistic dictatorships in , 150
p residentialism in, 2 4 1 -4 2
state developm ent in, 60
states w ith d om in a n t single p arty, 253,
2 5 4 /2 6 8 - 6 9 , 275
struggle for independence in, 2 6 8 -6 9
A frican N atio nal C ongress (South
A frica), 193, 2 5 9 ,2 5 9 / 260, 390
A hm adinejad, M ah m o u d , 471, 472, 473,
476, 4 77,478
Akerlof, G eorge, 318
A k ih ito (em peror o f Japan), 4 82 /
A lexander I (tsar o f Russia), 527
A lexander I I (tsar o f Russia), 528, 529
A llende, Salvador, 155
A lm o nd , G abriel, 164, 545, 5 5 9 -6 0
A lm o nte, Juan, 500
al Q aeda, 288, 289, 387, 389, 523
alternative energy, 385
alternative vote system , 209, 2 10 /
A m erican A utom obile A ssociation
(A A A ), 257
A m e r ic a n I n d i a n E th n i c R e n e w a l
(N agel), 338
A m erican In d ian s
forced relocation of, 331, 557
R ed P ow er activism , 338, 338/"
status o f id e n tity as, 338
A m erican R evolution, 1 4 2 ,1 4 3 /, 556
A m erin d ian s, 340, 401
A m in , Id i, 150
anti-colonial revolutions, 285—86
ap arth eid in S ou th A frica, 1 0 1 ,1 2 3 ,1 7 1 /
1 7 2 ,1 9 3 ,3 2 7 /3 2 8 ,4 2 2
ap p ortio n m en t, 215—17
A rab Spring, 1 2 5 ,2 7 7 / 278, 2 9 8 -3 0 2 ,
3 0 0 /-3 0 2 /, 478
A rg en tin a
au th o ritarian regim es in , 147, 151
and colonialism , 401, 498
co n stitu tio n of, 182f
d iscrim ination in , 326
federalism in , 189
g ender em pow erm ent in, 345,
345/, 3 4 6 /
in terest g roups in, 256f
p olitical p arties in , 340
p opulism in, 245, 2 4 S f
socialism in , 368, 370
argu m en t
in com parative m etho d , 3 - 6
em pirical v s. norm ative, 6—7
g oo d, characteristics of, 4 2 -4 5 , 4 4 /
arm s races, gam e th eo ry on, 391
A rticles o f C on federatio n , U .S ., 1 36 ,1 75 ,
5 5 5 -5 7 ,5 5 6
A sh , T im o th y G a rto n , 129
A sia
corporatism in, 266, 2 73 -7 4
cu lture of, and democracy, 134
econom ic developm ent in, 1 0 4 -5 , 106
w elfare state developm ent in, 9 2 -9 3
A sian T ig ers, 104, 4 8 2 -8 4 , 4 8 8 -8 9 , 490
A sian values argu m en t, 1 3 4 ,2 6 0 , 421
assembly, rig h t to, in U .S. B ill o f R ights,
1 2 6 -2 7
assim ilation
eth n ic id en tity an d , 331-32
as issue, 382—83
ratio n al choice m odel of, 319
and U .S. as m eltin g p ot, 331
asym m etrical federalism , 186
A ta tu rk , Kem al, 474
A tlee, C lem en t, 542, 548
au d it studies, 332
A ustralia
co n stitu tio n of, 1 8 2 /
electoral system in , 210
g ender em pow erm ent in, 344, 345,
345/, 3 46 /
stock exchange, 7 8 /
and W estern nationalism , 311/
A u stria, co n stitu tio n of, 182f
A ustro-P russian W a r (1866), 443, 4 44
au th o ritarian ism . See also h ybrid (semi
authoritarian) regim es
collectivistic n ationalism and, 313
com petitive, 1 52 ,1 66
definition of, 147
electoral, 152
in L a tin A m erica, 134, 243
as p ressing m odern question, 169
tran sitio ns to, 1 4 8 ,1 5 2 -5 8
au th o ritarian persistence, 1 4 8 ,1 5 3 -5 5
political cu lture theories of, 1 6 3 -6 4 ,
1 6 7 / 168, 1 6 9 /
au th o ritarian regim es
and au th o ritarian persistence, 148,
153-55
b u reau cratic-au th oritarian
regim es, 151
causes of, 1 5 8 -6 6
civil society in, 51
and collective action, barriers to,
1 6 4 -6 6 ,1 6 7 f 1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
constitu tio n s of, 1 8 3 -8 4
corporatism in , 2 66
definition of, 147
dem ocratic breakdow n an d , 124, 137,
1 4 8 ,1 5 5 -5 6
d o m in a n t-p arty systems in , 259
historical in stitu tio n alist theories of,
1 5 9 - 6 0 ,1 6 1 ,1 6 2 ,1 6 7 /1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
and h u m a n rights, 147-48
incom e in eq u ality and, 161—62
legislatures in , 201, 2 02 , 2 04 , 222
personalistic dictatorships, 147,
1 4 9 -5 0 ,1 6 7 ,5 3 5 -3 6
poverty and, 1 6 0 - 6 1 ,167/j 1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
preference falsification in , 165
and p residential decrees, 233
sing le-p arty system s in, 272
618
Index 619
state w eakness/failure and, 1 62 -6 3,
16 I f 1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
theocracies as, 149
to talitarian regim es, 1 48-49
types of, 148-52
in Zim babw e, 146
autocracy, 150
autonomy, o f m o dern state, 50-51
A zikiw e, N n a m d i, 512
B abangida, Ib ra h im , 513, 514, 520
Bachelet, M ichelle, 1 2 5 ,1 2 5 / 326, 368,
369, 370
B ahujan Samaj P arty (BSP), 466
B alkans, genocide in, 305
B angladesh, 305, 457, 458, 459
B ani Sadr, A bolhassan, 471, 472
Basques, 382, 390
Belgium , 1 8 2 / 1 8 3 ,1 8 6 , 373, 431, 448
b ellicist th eo ry o f state developm ent,
5 9 - 6 0 , 62, 63, 68, 450
B enin, 1 9,19 /, 129, 275
B erlin C onference (1 8 84 -8 5), 512
Berlusconi, Silvio, 246
“Beyond th e F ictio n o f Federalism ”
(R odden and W ibbels), 190
B haratiya Jan ata P a rty (BJP), 458, 460,
465, 467
B hutan, 102
B iafran W ar, 316, 513, 516, 5 19 -2 0 , 522
bias, in research, 5 - 6 , 41, 248, 313
bicam eral legislatures, 2 0 2 -3
Bill o f R ights, U .K ., 177,548
Bill o f R ig hts, U .S., 1 2 3 ,1 7 8 , 556
bim odal voter d istrib u tio n , 2 7 0 -7 2 , 2 7 1 /
b in L aden, O sam a, 467
biological determ inism , 3 2 8 -2 9
biological w eapons, 388
bipolar w orld, in in tern ation al
relations, 391
Bism arck, O tto von, 80, 4 4 3 -4 4 , 445, 450
BJP. S ee B haratiya Jan ata P a rty
Black P a n th e r P arty, 283
Black Pow er m ovem ent, 283
Blair, Tony, 542, 548, 552
Blum , L eo n, 431
Bokassa, Jean-B edel, 150
Boko H aram , 513, 514, 523
Boli, Jo h n , 65
Bolivar, Sim on, 349
Bolivia
A m erin d ian p olitical parties in , 340
gender em pow erm ent in, 345, 3 4 6 /
M orales presidency, 326, 3 4 8 /
socialism in, 349, 365, 368, 370
B olsa F a m ilia program (Brazil), 93
B olsheviks, 529, 536
b on ding capital, 108
B otsw ana, p a rty system in, 275
boundaries, o f identity, 327
bourgeoisie, and state developm ent, 60
Bove, Jose, 440
B o w l i n g A lo n e (P utnam ), 563
b rain d rain , 384
B rand t, W illy, 4 46 , 4 4 7 -4 8
B razil
au th o ritarian regim es in, 147
coalitions in , 236
C o n stitu e n t A ssem bly o f 1988, 179f
co n stitu tio n of, 178, 1 8 1 ,1 8 2 / 1 93 -9 6,
4 0 2 ,4 0 4
dem o cratizatio n in, 129, 130, 193, 399,
4 0 2 ,4 0 6 ,4 0 8 ,4 1 1
and dependency theory, 40
d iscrim ination in, 325f 326, 332,
3 3 6 ,4 0 1
econom ic developm ent in, 112, 113,
399, 401, 4 04 , 4 06 , 407
econom y of, 74/, 399/, 4 0 2 -3
electoral system in, 2 08 , 409
em pow erm ent o f w om en in , 335
eth n ic groups in, 3 9 9 / 401, 405
executive stru ctu re in, 2 49/, 405/, 404
federalism in, 189
gender representation in, 410-11
h istory of, 3 9 9 -4 0 1 , 4 0 1 -4
h u m a n capital levels in , 102/
independence of, 399, 402
in eq u ality in, 75, 112, 401, 403, 406,
407, 408
key features of, 3 9 9 -4 0 1 , 399/
L andless W orkers M o vem en t in,
282, 410
legislature in, 209, 4 05/, 405, 409
m ap of, 4 0 0 /
m o dern ization in, 4 0 5 -6
o pening to global econom y and, 407
political c u lture in, 4 0 5 -6
political econom y in, 80, 406
political in stitu tio n s, 4 05/, 405
political p arties in , 4 05/, 409
pov erty in, 7 4 /
presidential decrees in, 233, 234
presidentialism in, 242
race in , 401
religion in, 359, 3 9 9 / 401
representation in, 216, 217
socialism in, 368, 369, 370
w elfare state in , 93
Brezhnev, L eo nid, 530
B R IC countries, 406
b rid g in g capital, 108
B rinto n , C rane, 292, 294
B ritish E ast In d ia Com pany, 457, 458, 542
B row n, G ordo n , 542
B r o w n v . B o a r d o f E d u c a tio n (1954),
5 56-57, 5 6 3 -6 4
B uh ari, M u h a m m ad u , 510/, 513, 514, 520
bully p ulpit, 2 40 , 566
B u n d e s r a t (G erm any), 211, 2 12 , 212/,
451, 452
B u n d e s ta g (G erm any), 212, 223, 451
bureaucracy
and em p o w erm ent o f w om en, 337
executive b ran ch control
over, 2 28 , 229
executive orders to, 233
in m odern states, 49, 5 2-53 , 5 4 /
n eu tra lity of, 229
and public officials, self-interest in, 79
b ureau cratic-au th oritarian regim es, 151
Bush, G eorge H . W ., 556
B ush, G eorge W ., 556, 566
cabinets, 236
C abral, P edro A lvares, 402
C alderon, Felipe, 370, 499, 501
C allag h an , Jam es, 542
C alvinism , and state developm ent, 61-62
C am bodia, genocide in, 305
C am ero n, D avid, 2 2 6 / 539/, 542,
545, 547
C am ero on , p a rty system in, 275
C an ad a
coalitions in, 239
co n stitu tio n of, 1 8 2 /
federalism in, 186
g en der em pow erm ent in, 344, 345,
345/, 3 4 6 /
ju d iciary in, 193
and Kyoto P rotocol, 495
Q uebec n ation alism in, 187
cancer, causes of, 36
capital, in te rn atio n a l flow of, 376
capitalism
F rench am bivalence about, 439
and g ro w th o f w elfare state, 87-89,
90, 93
liberalism on, 354
M a rx on, 60, 6 3 - 6 4 , 357, 365
and m odern societies, 351
and secularization, 3 6 3 -6 4
social d em ocrats o n, 365
C a p ita lis m , S o c ia lis m , a n d D em o c ra cy
(Schum peter), 89
C a p ita lis m a n d F re e d o m (F riedm an), 79
C ardenas, C uauhtem oc, 506
C ardenas, L azaro , 499, 501, 508
C ardoso, F ernand o H en riqu e, 40, 402,
404, 4 06 , 410
C arran za , V enustiano, 499, 501
C arter, Jam es E . “Jim m y,” 137, 472, 556
Casanova, Jose, 358
case, definition of, 13
case studies, 13-14
case selection in, 2 4 7 -5 0
lim itations of, 68
uses of, 65, 68
C astells, M an u el, 338
C atalonia, 47, 337, 382
catch-all p arties, 258
C ath e rin e th e G re a t (tsarina
o f Russia), 527
caudillism o, 500
causation, 3 - 6
causal argu m en ts, 6 -7
v s. correlation, 24, 3 3 -3 8 , 34f 133
and definitional problem , 3 3 -3 4
and endogeneity problem , 3 6 -3 7
■ ■ ■ H P " * * * "
620 Index
causation (C o n tin u e d )
and falsifiability problem , 3 4 -3 5
and interv en in g variable problem , 37
and necessary v s. sufficient cause, 4
and o m itted variable problem , 38
questions about, 2 - 6 , S t, (it
and reverse causality problem , 3 5-36
and spurious correlation problem ,
3 8 -3 9
term inology of, 14
te stin g theories of, 2 7 -2 9
C ederm an, L ars-E rik , 322
censure, o f executive by legislatures, 211,
2 2 0 -2 1 , 233
C enteno, M ig u el A ngel, 42
C e n tra l A frican Republic, personalistic
dictatorship in , 150
C ham berlain, N eville, 446, 543, 548
cham bers, o f legislature, 2 0 2 -3 , 204
C han dra, K anchan, 466
C harlem agne, 427, 429
C harles I (king o f E ngland), 541, 546
C harles I I (king o f E ngland), 542, 546
C harles X (king o f France), 429, 431, 433
C h a rtist m ovem ent, 543
C havez, H ug o , 349, 365, 3 6 6 -6 7 , 368,
369, 370, 478
C h a v ista s , 368, 369
checks and balances. See also ju d icial
review
in F rench system , 432
in G erm an system , 452
in U .K . system , 549
in U .S. system , 2 2 7 ,2 3 0 -3 1 , 558, 566
chem ical w eapons, 388
C h ian g K ai-Shek, 415, 416
C hile
and colonialism , 498
dem ocracy in, 125, 1 2 5 / 137, 155
d iscrim ination in, 326
electoral systems in , 437
liberal governm ent in, 370
p arty system in, 264
socialism in, 368, 369, 370
state terrorism u n d er P in ochet, 288
C h in a
and au th o ritarian persistence, 153,
154, 424
and bureaucratic au th o ritarian ism , 151
co m m u nist regim e in , 357
co m m u nist revolution in, 293, 415,
4 1 6 ,4 2 5 -2 6
C onfucianism and, 418-19, 422
cu ltu ral cohesion in, 414
and d em ocratization, 131, 421—22
d ictatorship in, 417
econom ic developm ent in, 9 8 ,1 0 4 ,
105, 245, 412, 416, 417, 4 19 -2 0,
4 2 0 -2 1 ,4 2 3 , 4 2 4 -2 5 , 463
econom y of, 73, 741, 4121
electoral system in, 417, 424
environm ental d am age in, 98, 384,
3 8 5 / 4 1 6 ,4 2 0 ,4 2 1 , 495
eth n ic autonom y m ovem ents in , 382
eth n ic g roups in , 4 1 2 / 414
executive stru ctu re in, 249/, 418, 4 1 8 /
4 2 3 -2 4
federal features in , 181
genocide in, 305
and global trad e, 377
historical developm ent of, 414-17,
4 2 5 -2 6
h u m a n capital levels in, 102/
in eq u ality in , 421
key features of, 412 -1 4, 4 12 /
la'icism in , 358
leadership of, 4 2 3 -2 4
legislature in, 201, 2 04 , 417, 4 1 8 /
M aoism an d , 416, 417, 418, 419
m ap of, 4 1 3 /
m arket socialism in, 417, 4 1 9 -2 0
and m odern ization , 416
nationalism in, 425
and nuclear w eapons, 388, 481
p olitical cu lture in , 418-19
political econom y in, 419—21
p olitical in stitu tion s in, 417-18, 418/
pop ulatio n policy in, 414, 420
p ov erty in , 420
public satisfaction w ith governm ent
in , 4 2 4 -2 5
reform s in , 153, 416, 417, 4 1 9 -2 0 , 423
religious affiliation in, A \ 2 f i 414
rise of, 489, 567
sing le-p arty ru le in , 1 27 ,1 31 , 2 3 6 ,2 5 9 ,
260, 4 1 2 ,4 1 7 ,4 1 8 /, 4 2 3 -2 5
S pring F estival in , 30/"
T ia n a n m e n Square p rotests, 153,
416, 4 2 3 ,4 2 4
and u n fair trade practices, 420, 421, 562
U .S . b orro w ing from , 421
C hinese C o m m u n ist Party, 153, 154, 260,
4 1 5 ,4 1 6 , 417,419, 4 2 3 -2 5
C hirac, Jacques, 429, 4 3 3 -3 4 , 4 3 6 -3 7
C h ristia n D em ocratic U nion P arty
(G erm any), 446, 447, 452
C h ristianity , evangelical, 11 Of, 364
ch u rch , as term , 359
C h u rc h ill, W in sto n , 542, 548
citizenship
in m odern states, 54
and political p articipation , 51, 255
public education and, 84
in W estern v s. E astern nationalism , 311
civic associations, and redu ctio n o f
eth n o -n a tio n a l violence, 3 21-22
civic cultures o f p articipation , 164
civic n ationalism , 311-13, 311/, 313/,
331, 551
The C iv ic C u ltu r e (A lm ond and Verba),
164, 5 4 5 ,5 5 9 -6 0
civil rights
constitutional guarantees of, 1 7 8 ,1 8 3 -8 4
in dem ocracies, 121-22, 123, 1 2 6 -2 7
for diverse sexual o rientation s, 329
federalism and, 187-88
practical restrictions on, 127
theocracy and, 185
in U .S. B ill o f R ig hts, 1 2 6 -2 7
C ivil R ights A c t o f 1 9 6 4 ,1 4 2 , 556
civil rights m ovem ent, 141, 142, 2 8 0 -8 1 ,
282, 283, 336, 3 3 7 ,5 5 6 ,5 5 7
civil society
definition of, 51, 257
and democracy, 51-52, 124
and developm ent, 107—8
global, 281
social m ovem ents and, 280
C ivil W ar, U .S ., 1 4 1 ,2 4 8 ,2 8 7
civil w ars, 280, 287
The C la sh o f C iv i l i z a t i o n s a n d th e R e m a k i n g
o f W o r ld O rd e r (H u n tin g to n ),
365, 366
class interests
and au th o ritarian ism , 1 6 0 ,1 6 1 ,1 6 3
developm ent and, 111
class stru cture, 284
clientelism , 240
clim ate change, 3 8 5 -8 6 , 494, 495
C linto n , W illia m J. “Bill,” 499, 556, 558
coalitions, 2 3 5 -4 0
g ran d , 2 3 9 ,2 4 7
necessity o f in m u ltip a rty systems, 262
negotiation of, 2 3 7 ,2 3 I f
types of, 2 3 7 -3 9 ,2 3 7 /, 2 3 8 /
C oercion, C a p ita l, a n d E u r o p e a n S ta te s
(Tilly), 60
C olbert, Jean -B aptiste, 435
C old W a r
en d in g of, 374
in te rn atio n a l system d urin g, 135
M a rx ist theories o f in tern ation al
relations an d , 395
nuclear w eapons and, 388, 530
and to talitarian ism , 149
and U .S . v s. Soviet p olitical systems,
2 5 3 ,5 3 7
collective action
barriers to in a u th o ritarian regim es,
1 6 4 - 6 6 , 1 6 7 / 1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
definition of, 164, 279
and ratio n al choice th eo ry o f
revolution, 2 94—95, 2 95 /
collective action (free rider) problem , 273,
2 9 5 ,2 9 5 /, 300, 386, 387, 4 9 5 -9 6
collective action research p ro gram , 294
collective behavior, and contention,
2 8 9 -9 0
collective b ehavior theory, 291
collectivistic nationalism , 3 12 -1 3, 313/
C ollor, Fernando, 402, 404
C olom bia, 2 46 , 340, 370
colonialism
in A frica, 512
and boundaries o f post-colonial states,
316 ,5 23
in Brazil, 399, 401, 402
and developm ent, 108
France and, 431, 440
Index 621
G erm an y and, 445
in In d ia, 455, 457-59, 461, 465
L en in o n, 64
in M exico, 4 9 8 -9 9
and m odernity, 3 50 -5 1, 366
and national identity, 523
in N igeria, 512, 523
as non-dem ocratic, 135-36
ongoing neo-colonial exploitation, 64
and racialization, 330
revolutions against, 2 8 5 -8 6
in S panish A m erica, 399, 401, 4 9 8 -9 9
and spread o f state m odel, 6 3 - 6 4
and u nitarism , 183
U nited K ingdom and, 457-59, 512,
513, 539, 541, 542, 543, 5 4 5 -4 6 ,
547, 550, 551, 552, 555
“The C olonial O rigin s o f C om parative
D evelopm ent” (Acem oglu
et al.), 108
com m ercial liberalism , 393
com m ittees, in legislative decision
m aking, 219, 220
com m on law, in U nited K ingdom , 177, 541
com m unism . S ee also C h in a ; Soviet U nion
collapse of, 8 2 ,1 3 6 , 272
discrediting of, 272, 527, 537
in France, 433, 439
M a rx ist th eo ry on, 356
com m unist p arties, 258, 269
com m unist regim es, 259, 357
C om oros, 182/*
com parative advantage theory, 3 7 8 -9 0 ,
378/
com parative checking, 18-19, 19/, 275
C o m p a r a tiv e L e g is la tu r e s (M ezey), 222
com parative m etho d , 1 4-20 . See also
hypotheses; theories
com parative checking in , 18-19, 19/
critiques in, 3 9 -4 0
generalizability and, 19
m ost-different-system s (M D S )
m etho d , 1 8 ,1 8 /, 1 9 3 -9 6 ,2 4 8
m ost-sim ilar-system s (M SS) design,
1 5 -1 7 ,1 6 /, 114-17, 248
term inology of, 14-15
variables in, 14-15
w ithin -case com parison, 20, 141—4 4
com parative p olitics. See also research
argu m en t in, 3 - 6
case selection in, 2 47-50
concepts in, 9 -1 2
definition of, 4
hypotheticals and counterfactuals in,
2 2 2 -2 3
indicators in, 41, 3 4 4 -4 6
negative cases in, 2 9 8 -3 0 2 , 3 0 0 /- 3 0 2 /
research questions in, 2 - 6 , 5/, 6/
and scientific m etho d , 2 0 -2 1
study o f gender in , 326
study o f race and eth n ic ity in, 326
com petitive au th o ritarian ism , 152, 153,
1 6 6 ,5 2 5 -2 7
C o m p e titiv e A u th o r i t a r ia n i s m (L evitsky
and W ay), 166
concentrated p a rty system s, 262, 263
The C o n c ep t o f R e p r e s e n ta tio n (P itkin), 214
concepts
conceptualization process, 10
definition of, 9
freedom as, 11
good, characteristics of, 9 -1 0
operatio nalizin g of, 11-12, 11/
S a rto ris ladder o f ab straction for, 10
conceptualization, 10
conflict. See also co ntention
as co n stan t in politics, 279
eth n o -n atio n al, 3 1 3 -2 0 , 314
form al in stitu tio n s as chann el for, 279
conflict theories o f state developm ent,
5 8 - 6 0 , 5 8 /
C on fu cian ism , 109, 418-19, 422
C ongress, U .S.
as b icam eral, 2 0 2 -3 , 559
characteristics of, 2 0 4 -5 , 2 0 4 /
checks on p resid en tial pow er, 566
design of, 5 6 4 -6 5
H ou se o f R epresentatives, 217, 559,
559/, 565
legislative process in, 201
pow er to set policy, 222
representation in, 216, 217
Senate, 217, 559, 559/, 565, 566
congresses, characteristics of, 2 0 4 -5 , 2 0 4 /
conscience, freedom of, 1 26 -2 7, 148
conservatism , as ideology, 354
C onservative P a rty (U .K .), 2 05, 207, 207/,
2 5 8 ,2 6 2 - 6 3 ,5 4 5
consociational m echanism s, 2 46 , 321
consolidation phase o f d em ocratization,
1 2 5 ,1 2 9 -3 0
constituencies, 205
co n stitu en t assem blies, 174, 1 7 9f
constitution(s). See also federalism ;
u nitarism
am end in g of, 177-78
o f au th o ritarian regim es, 1 8 3 -8 4
o f Brazil, 178, 1 8 1 ,1 8 2 / 1 93 -9 6,
402, 404
as characteristic representative
dem ocracy, 126
civil rights g u aran teed in, 178, 1 8 3 -8 4
definition of, 174
designs of, 175-76
flexible vs. rigid, 177-78
and form al pow er vs. reality, 220
fu n ction s of, 172-73, 174-75
and ju d icial review, 173, 176, 178-79,
1 9 0 -9 2 , 549
m odern, increasing le n g th of,
177-78, 194
and p arliam en tary sovereignty,
1 7 9 -8 0
pream bles of, 172-73
separation o f pow ers in, 176
social consensus an d , 180
o f S ou th A frica, 1 7 2 ,1 7 3 ,1 7 5 -7 6 ,
1 7 7 -7 8 ,1 9 3 -9 6
o f Soviet U nion, 184
types of, 1 7 6 -8 4
o f U n ite d K ingdom , 177,181, 539
C o n s titu tio n , U.S.
am endm ents to, 177, 557
A rticles o f C on federatio n and,
175, 5 55-57
B ill o f R ights, 1 2 3 ,1 2 6 -2 7 ,1 7 8
and d em o cratizatio n, 136
E stab lish m e n t clause, 127
as federal system , 1 7 5 -7 6 ,1 8 0 , 559
flexibility of, 557
as fo u nd atio n o f en tire p olitical
system , 174-75
influence of, 180
le n g th of, 194
as m odel, 557
pream ble of, 173
separation o f ch u rch and state in, 357
sovereignty of, 548
w ritin g of, 174, 175 ,1 80
co n stitu tio n al conventions, 174
co n stitu tio n al courts, 178-79, 233. See also
ju d icial review
“C onstitutional Dem ocracy” (Lijphart), 247
co n stitu tio n alism , 174, 183
co n stitu tio n al m onarchy, 66, 1 2 6 ,1 8 3 ,
541, 548
co n stitu tio n al republics, 126
co n stitu tio n al theocracy, 184
co n structivist theories o f nationalism ,
3 0 9 -1 0 , 315, 317, 321
co n structivist th eo ry o f in tern ation al
relations, 3 9 4 -9 5
consumer inflation, in selected countries, 74/
contention
causes, theories on, 291
and collective behavior, 2 8 9 -9 0
definition of, 279
types of, 2 7 9 -9 1
corporatism , 2 6 5 -6 7 , 266, 2 73 -7 4
C o rrea, R afael, 368, 370
correlation, 31
v s. causation, 24, 3 3 -3 8 , 3 4£ 133
positive v s. negative, 31
co rrup tion , in Brazil, 405
C o sta R ica, 358
cost o f living, G D P and, 73
coup d ’etats
and dem ocratic breakdow n, 156
v s. revolution, 285
C ox, G ary, 219
crim in al tran sn atio n a l n etw orks, 387, 388
critical race scholarship, 326
critiques
em pirical, 39, 40
th eo retical, 3 9 - 4 0
C rom w ell, O liver, 5 4 1 -4 2 , 546
C uba
and au th o ritarian persistence, 153
co m m u nist regim e in, 357
' ■■ ■' m ; ■ • " f f m ' : ̂ "
622 Index
C uba ( C o n tin u e d )
gender em pow erm ent in, 345, 345/,
3 46 /
laicism in, 358
single-party system in, 259
standard o f living in, 100
as to ta litarian regim e, 149
U .S. a n d ,567
cu ltural changes, and g ro w th o f welfare
state, 87
cu lturalist explanations o f eth n o -n atio n al
conflict, 317
cu ltural theories
o f dem ocratization, 131, 1 34 -3 5,
4 2 2 ,5 6 3
o f revolution, 2 96 -9 7 , 3 00/, 301, 426
o f state developm ent, 6 1 -6 2 , 6 4 -6 5 ,
68, 4 4 9 -5 0 , 518
culture
and authoritarianism , 1 6 3 -6 4 , 1 6 7 f,
1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
and developm ent, 107-10, 116/, 117/
as dynam ic, 134
m ultiple ways o f defining, 134
currency, m onetary policy and, 83
C zechoslovakia, dem ocratization in,
1 29,165
D ah l, R ob ert, 266
D eclaratio n o f Independence (U.S.),
227, 556
decrees, p residential, 233
deductive reasoning, 26
defense, as state fu n ction , 55. See also
in tern ation al security
defensive realism , in in tern ation al
relations, 391
d efinitional problem , 3 3 -3 4
deflation, 75
D e G aulle, C harles, 431, 434, 435
de Klerk, F. W ., 1 7 1 / 422
delegative dem ocracies, 152, 2 4 3 -4 4 , 245
“Delegative D em ocracy” (O ’D onnell), 244
dem ocracy
A sian values and, 134, 260
characteristics of, 120, 121-24
citizen p articipation in, 51
civil rights in, 1 21 -2 2, 123, 1 2 6 -2 7
correlation w ith w ealth, 2 8, 2 9 -3 0 ,
31-33
definitions of, 120, 121, 1 22 -2 4,
141-42
delegative, 152, 2 4 3 -4 4 , 245
direct, 1 28-29
illiberal, 152
inequality and, 5 6 2 -6 3
ju d icial review and, 1 90 -9 2
M arx on, 537
m iddle class and, 33, 1 32 -3 4, 161,
5 6 2 -6 3
m ultiparty, 126
n ationalism and, 307
num ber o f n ations w ith , 120-21
p arliam en tary v s. presidential
systems, 2 4 0 -4 3
p articipatory, 365
peaceful tran sfer o f pow er in , 123, 125
political rights in , 121, 1 2 3 ,1 2 6 , 127
prestige o f after W orld W a r I I , 451
representative, 1 2 6 -2 8
single-party, 127-28
triu m p h o f as n o t inevitable, 169
types of, 1 25 -3 0
D em o c ra c y in A m e r ic a (Tocqueville),
1 0 7 -8 ,1 3 5
dem ocratic breakdow n, 1 2 4 ,1 3 7 , 148,
155-56
dem ocratic C aesarism , 150
dem ocratic consolidation, 125, 1 2 9 -3 0
D em ocratic P a rty (U .S.), 258, 261, 558
D em o cratic P a rty o f Jap an (D JP), 485,
4 8 6 -8 7 , 491
dem ocratic peace theory, 393, 394
dem ocratic regim e, 121
dem ocratic republicanism , 439
dem ocratization, 1 24 -2 5
causes of, 1 3 1 -4 0
civil society and, 51-52
com bining o f m odels on, 138, 1 3 9 -4 0
as concept, 9 -1 0
consolidation phase of, 1 2 5 ,1 2 9 -3 0
and crim e, 505
cu ltu ral theories of, 131, 1 34 -3 5,
4 2 2 ,5 6 3
d efinition of, 124
dem o nstration effect a n d , 136, 137
dom estic in stitu tion s and, 131, 1 36 -3 7
individual and group action and, 131,
1 3 7 -3 9 ,1 3 8 /, 422
in tern ation al s tru ctures and, 131,
1 3 5 -3 6 ,1 3 7
m o dern ization and, 131, 1 32 -3 4 , 422
operationalization o f concept, 1 1 -1 2 ,1 1 /
p artia l, and au th o ritarian
persistence, 153
and poverty, 502
tran sitio n phase of, 125, 129
wave o f in late 2 0 th century, 137, 148,
151, 367, 501
waves of, 1 3 6 ,1 3 7 ,1 3 9
dem ographics
and co nstruction o f race and
ethnicity, 332
eth n ic p olitical p arties and, 339, 340
d em o nstration effect, and
dem ocratization, 1 3 6 ,1 3 7
dem onstrative terrorism , 288
D en g X iaoping, 154, 415, 416, 417, 419,
420, 423
D en m ark , and E U , 374
den om ination, 359
denom inationalism , 3 5 9 -6 0 , 364
dependency theory, 40, 111-12
d ep en dent variable, 14
deprivation, and revolution, 291, 292, 299,
3 00 /, 301, 301/, 302, 302/, 426
D esai, M o rarji, 459
de Soto, H ern a n d o , 152
despotism , 150
d estructive terrorism , 288
developed w orld, and global w arm ing
m itig ation , 3 8 6 -8 7
developing world. See also T hird W orld
and global w arm in g m itigation,
3 8 6 -8 7
and resource curse, 57
revolutions in , 298
and taxation, 57
developm ent. See also econom ic
developm ent
approaches to, 110
colonialism and, 108
and com parative political analysis,
97, 113-14
cultural, 102-3
cu lture as factor in, 107-10, 116/, 117/
definition of, 97-98
and environm ental sustainability, 103
export-led g ro w th, 113
g ender equality and, 100
geography and, 108, 112-13, 116/
in tern ation al s tru ctures and,
1 1 1 -1 2 ,1 1 7 /
in Korea, N o rth v s. S outh, 9 7,11 4-17 ,
116/, 117/
local definitions of, 102-3
m arket-led v s. state-led, 1 0 4 -6 , 107,
117/
p ath dependency in, 107
p olitical in stitu tion s as factor in,
1 06-7, 111, 1 1 5 -1 6 ,1 1 6 /
racial eq u ality and, 100-101
religion and, 109
social indicators of, 9 8-10 0
social in stitu tion s as factor in , 107-8
theories on, 103-14
types of, 98
value systems and, 109-10
deviant cases (outliers), 2 6, 39, 275, 464
D iam o n d , Jared, 113, 114
dictatorship
causes of, 35
d em ocratization an d , 1 2 4 -2 5
party, 151
personalistic, 147, 1 49 -5 0, 167, 5 35 -3 6
differentiation
definition of, 353
o f in stitu tion s, w ith m odern ization ,
3 6 3 -6 4
o f religious in stitu tion s from state,
3 53 ,3 5 8
diffusion o f state as form , theories on,
6 2 - 6 4 ,4 5 0
d ire ct democracy, 1 28 -2 9
d ire ct elections, in presidential
systems, 2 30
d irig is m e , 435
disadvantaged groups, election to p olitical
office, 326
Index 623
The D is c ip lin a r y R e v o lu t i o n (G orski), 62
discrim ination, 326, 328, 329, 332, 333
against e thn ic groups, 326, 332
gender, 326, 3 3 3 -3 4
as ongoing, 326
racial, 326, 332, 561, 5 6 3 -6 4
district-based electoral systems, 33, 2 0 5 -7
challenges presented by, 2 15 -1 8 , 565
and m ixed (hybrid) systems, 2 09 -1 1,
210/, 2 2 2 -2 4
m u lti-m em b er d istricts (M M D s), 207
single-m em ber districts (SM D s),
2 0 5 -7 ,2 1 0 /, 2 1 5 -1 8 ,2 6 8
districting , 2 15-16
D i v i d e d G o v e r n m e n t (Fiorina), 221
divorce, in Brazil, 410-11
DJP. See D em ocratic P a rty o f Japan
dom estic politics, and in tern ation al
relations, 3 9 4 -9 5 , 3 9 6 -9 7
dom in a n t-p arty systems, 2 5 9 -6 1 , 262. See
also sing le-p arty systems
A frican states w ith , 253, 2 5 4 f l
2 6 8 -6 9 ,2 7 5
and corporatism , 266
D ow ns, A nthony, 271
Doyle, M ichael, 393
D reyfus A ffair, 430, 431
drug trafficking, as transnational issue, 375
D urk h eim , E m ile, 363
D u tch D isease, 518-19
D uverger, M aurice, 268
D uverger’s law, 268
E astern nationalism , 311-13, 311/, 313/
E ast G erm any, d em ocratization in,
129,165
E bola virus, 23f 24
E chevarria, L uis, 507
econom ic behavior, social and cu ltural
context of, 90
econom ic crisis o f 2 0 0 7 -0 9 , U .S. and,
7 2 ,5 6 0 ,5 6 1 , 566
econom ic developm ent
d efining of, 40
and environm ental dam age, 384, 385/’
and increase in incom e inequality, 100
M arxists views on, 110-12
m easures of, 71-76, 74/, 103
poor, and developm ent o f
authoritarianism , 163
quality o f state and, 1 05 -6
economic em pow erm ent, 3 35-36
economic functions o f m odern states, 82-86
economic m anagem ent. See also K eynesian
economics; w elfare state
counter-cyclical spending, 76, 83
debate on, 76
as m odern state fu n ction , 8 2 -8 3
E co n o m ic O r ig in s o f D ic ta to r s h ip a n d
D em o c ra cy (A cem oglu and
R obinson), 162
econom ic theories o f state developm ent,
6 0 - 6 4 , 68, 450
A n E c o n o m ic T heory o f D em o cra cy
(D ow ns), 271
econom ists, sup po rt for neoliberalism , 79
econom y (of country). S ee also
developm ent
executive influence o n, 2 4 4 -4 5
federalism ’s im p act on, 1 88 -9 0
globalization an d , 3 7 8 -8 0 , 378f
increasing g overnm ent involvem ent
in, 8 0 -8 1
m arket-led vs. state-led , 7 6 -8 6
measures o f perform ance, 71-76, 74/, 98
economy, global, interdependence of, 377
Ecuador, 340, 345, 346/, 349, 3 6 5 ,3 6 8 , 370
education
as m easure o f developm ent, 9 9 -1 0 0
public, 50, 8 3 - 8 4
effective num b er o f p olitical p arties,
2 6 2 - 6 3 ,2 6 4 /
E g y p t
A rab S pring and, 2 7 7 / 278, 298, 299,
3 0 0 -3 0 1 , 3 0 1 -2 ,3 0 1 /, 3 0 2 /
elections in, 46f
Islam in, 301
m o dern ization in, 479
nationalism in , 474
E isen stadt, S hm uel N ., 366
elections. See also electoral systems
and accountability, 215, 233
b allo t access and, 206
prim ary, 206
quota systems in, 3 4 2 -4 4
electoral au th o ritarian ism , 152
E lecto ral C ollege, 214
electoral m o dern /co lo n ial w orld system,
2 0 8 -9
electoral systems, 2 05 -1 1 . See also
representation
alternative vote system , 209, 2 10 /
district-based systems, 33, 2 05 -7 ,
2 15-17
first-p ast-th e -p o st system , 2 0 6 -7 , 341
in d ire ct election, 210-11
m ixed (hybrid) system s, 2 0 9 -1 1 , 210/,
2 2 2 -2 4 , 451
open-list p ro p o rtio n a l representation,
2 0 8 -9 , 2 10 /
and p a rty d iscipline, 2 1 9 -2 0
and political parties, 2 05 -1 1,26 1 ,2 67 -6 8
p ro p o rtio n a l representation, 2 0 8 -9 ,
210/, 212, 214, 217-18, 268,
3 4 0 -4 1
ra n k in g systems, 2 0 9 -1 0
and representation, 2 15-18
ru n o ff system , 207, 4 3 6 -3 7
single non-transferable vote (S N T V )
system , 491, 492
single-transferable vote (C T V ) system,
2 0 9 -1 0 , 2 10 /
strategic voting, 210
Elfas Calles, P lu tarco , 499, 501
elite p arties, 258
elites, and revolution, 2 8 6 -8 7
E liz ab eth I I (queen o f U nited K ingdom ),
2 2 6 /5 3 9 /, 541
E l Salvador, evangelical C h ristia n ity
in, 1 1 0 /
E m an cip atio n P roclam ation, 141,
1 4 2 ,1 4 3 /, 556
E m b e d d e d A u t o n o m y (Evans), 80
em pirical argu m en ts, 6 -7 , 242
em pirical critiques, 39, 40, 167-69,
167/, 169/
em pirical evidence, 1 2-14 , 27-29
em pirical theories, 25
em ploym ent
d iscrim ination in, 332, 333
as econom ic m easure, 75
in te rn atio n a l trad e and, 379
job outsourcing and, 377
em pow erm ent
definition of, 334
g ro w ing in terest in, 343
indicators of, 3 4 4 -4 6 , 345/, 3 4 6 /
m etho d s of, 3 37-43
sym bolic, 336, 337, 338, 345
types of, 3 3 4 -3 7
The E n d o f H is to r y a n d th e L a s t M a n
(Fukuyam a), 365
endogeneity problem , 3 6 -3 7
energy, alternative sources of, 385
E ng land . See U n ite d K ingdom
en v iro n m en tal dam age
C h in a and, 98, 384, 3 9 5 / 416, 420,
421, 495
and clim ate change, 385
developm ent and, 103, 384, 3 8 5 /
and free rider problem , 386
Jap an and, 4 9 4 -9 5
political difficulty o f addressing,
3 8 6 -8 7
and sustainability, 384, 386
U .S . and, 495
E q u ato rial G u in ea, 40
E sp in g-A nd ersen, G o sta , 91, 9 3 -9 4
established religions, 357
E th io p ia, 182 f 186, 275
eth n ic diversity, increase in, 326
eth n ic equality
and democracy, 124
as m easure o f developm ent, 100-101
e th n ic groups
definition of, 3 30-31
d iscrim ination against, 326, 332
political parties for, 3 3 9 -4 1 , 342,
5 0 8 -9
and rank ed vs. u n ran k e d societies, 320
study o f in com parative politics, 326
E th n i c G ro u ps in C o n flic t (H orow itz), 320
eth n ic ity
and b ou nd aries o f identity, 327-28
as cu ltural co n struct, 331, 332
definition of, 327, 3 30-31
form al and legal reinforcem ent of, 328
v s. race, 3 30 -3 1
state role in co n struction of, 331-32
624 Index
ethn ic nationalism , 311-13, 311/, 313/
e th n o -cu ltu ral com m unity, 308
eth n o -n atio n al conflict
causes of, 3 1 3 -2 0
colonialism and, 316
definition of, 314-15
efforts to reduce, 314, 321-22
p rim o rd ialist approach to, 316-17
EU . See E urop ean U nion
euro (currency), 373, 374, 381, 397, 429,
444, 542
E urope, C e n tra l and E astern
anti-Soviet revolutions in, 285, 446, 530
C old W a r and, 135
an d E astern n ationalism , 311/
move to dem ocracy in, 37
Soviet dom ination of, 135, 530, 532, 536
and trim m in g o f welfare state, 87
E urope, W estern . See also specific cou n tries
and colonial racialization, 330
corporatism in , 2 6 6 -6 7 ,2 7 4
dem ocracy in , 124
and im m igran ts, incorporation of, 332
m edieval, to talitarian -sty le governm ent
in, 149
m odern state developm ent in, 47, 5 9 -6 0
m onarchs in, 228
n o rth ern , corporatism in, 453
referenda in, 128
religion in , 3 6 2 -6 3
secularization in, 353
E urop ean E conom ic C om m unity, 374,
3 8 0 -8 1
E urop ean U nion (E U )
as challenge to m odern state system , 47
com bined economy, size of, 448
econom ic crisis in, 373, 4 44 , 446, 449
h istory o f in tegration in , 3 73 -7 4, 381,
431, 440, 4 44 , 4 46 , 448
and levels o f analysis, 3 9 5 -9 7
m em ber states, 374/'
and n ation al sovereignty, 374, 381, 395
as success o f in tern ation al cooperation,
375, 3 8 0 -8 1
E vans, Peter, 40, 80
everyday resistance, 2 80 , 2 8 9 -9 0
evidence. See also causation
for and against, im p o rtance o f
evaluating, 167-69, 167/, 169/
definition of, 12
em pirical, 12-14
inferences from , 29
m easurem ent issues and, 41-42
q uantitative v s. qualitative, 2 9 -3 0
strong, characteristics of, 12—13, 12/
and te stin g o f theories, 27-29
evolutionary psychology, 307
executive-legislative relations
b alance o f pow er in, 2 3 4 ,2 3 5
electoral systems and, 211-12
executive p ow er to dissolve legislature,
2 32 -3 3
and governing, 2 2 8 ,2 2 9
im p act on representation, 2 2 0 —22
legislative pow er to constrain
executive, 233
in p arliam en tary systems, 2 04/,
2 1 1 -1 2 ,2 2 9 ,2 3 2 ,2 3 5
in presidential system s, 2 0 4 /, 212, 229,
2 3 0 ,2 3 2 ,2 3 5
executive orders, 233
executives. See also executive-legislative
relations; president(s);
presidentialism ; p rim e m inisters
and bureaucracy, control over, 228, 229
in co n stitu tio n s, 176
definition of, 228
econom ic influence of, 2 4 4 -4 5
in federal systems, 181-82
form al pow ers of, 2 3 2 -3 5 , 2 4 1 /
heads o f state v s. heads o f
g overnm ent, 228
hybrid (sem i-presidential) systems,
2 1 2 ,2 2 9 ,2 3 0 /
in fo rm al pow ers, 2 40 , 2 4 1 /
lim its on p ow er of, 233
in p arliam en tary systems, 2 2 9 -3 2 , 2 3 0 /
p artisan powers of, 2 3 5 ,2 4 1 /
and populism , 2 44 , 245, 245f , 250
pow er of, coalitions and, 235—40
powers an d roles of, 2 2 8 -2 9
pow er sharin g in , 2 47
in p residentialism , 2 2 9 -3 2 , 2 3 0 /
roles of, 228
stru ctu re o f in select nations, 2 48 , 2 4 9 /
existential security, and religion, 361
explanatory variable, 14
export-led g ro w th , 113
facts
vs. evidence, 12-13
scholarship as m ore th a n , 2 - 4
failed state, 50
F aletto, E n z o , 40
falsifiability, 3 3 -3 4
fam ily
fem in ist m ovem ent’s changes to, 338
in d u strial capitalism and, 88
fascism
as ideology, 351, 355
in Italy, 274, 355
and sing le-p arty rule, 272
F earon, Jam es, 321-22
federalism , 1 8 0 -8 2
and ap p ortio n m en t, 216
asym m etrical, 186
definition of, 175,181
and dem ocratic rights, 187—88
and developm ent, 465
econom ic im p act of, 1 8 8 -9 0
nations w ith federal systems, 181, 182f
origins of, 1 85 ,1 8 6
and political p arties, 1 8 6 ,1 9 0
and redu ctio n o f eth n o -n atio n al
violence, 321
resource allocation in, 189
responsibilities o f low er levels in, 189
and social stability, 185—87
o f S ou th A frican co n stitu tio n , 175-76
o f U .S. C o n stitu tio n , 1 7 5 -7 6 ,1 8 0 , 559
F ed e ra lism (R iker), 186
“Federalism and D em ocracy” (Stepan), 186
The F e d e ra lis t P a p e rs , 1 80 ,2 74
fem in ist m ovem ent, 336, 338
fem in ist scholarship, 326
F ernand ez, C ristin a, 326, 368, 370
feudalism , 48—49
filibuster, 217, 566
financial in stitu tion s, in tern ation al, 380
F in la n d , 334
F io rin a, M o rris, 221
F irs t A m en dm en t, 1 2 6 -2 7
first-p ast-the-p ost electoral systems,
2 0 6 -7 , 341
F is c a l F ed e ra lism (Oates), 189
fiscal m easures, 75-76
fiscal policy, 83
The Five W ars o f Globalization (Naim), 388
Foran, Jo h n , 298
force, m odern state monopoly on, 48, 4 9 ,5 4
Ford, G erald R ., 556
foreign policy, definition of, 375
form al in stitu tion s, d efinition of, 279
form al powers o f executives, 2 3 2 -3 5 ,2 4 1 /
fossil fuels, and g reenhouse gas
em issions, 385
Fox, V incente, 499, 501
frag m en ted p a rty systems, 2 62 , 263
fram ing, 296
fram in g theories o f revolution, 2 96 -9 7 ,
3 0 0 /, 301, 426
France. See also F rench Revolution
au thoritarian persistence in, 157, 435-36
colonialism and, 431, 440
constitutions of, 1 7 4 ,174/j 429, 431
dem ocratization in, 4 3 5 -3 6
discrim ination in , 429
econom y of, 74/, 427/
electoral system , 4 3 6 -3 7
ethn ic g roups in, 427—29
an d E U , 373, 431, 435, 440
executive stru c tu re in, 249/,
4 3 1 -3 2 ,4 3 2 /
globalization an d , 4 3 9 -4 0
historical developm ent of, 156,
429 -3 1 , 439
hu m a n capital levels in , 102/
im m igration issue in , 382, 383,
42 9 ,4 3 1 , 433
in eq u ality in, 434, 436, 437-38
Ira q W a r an d , 6 f
ju d icial b ran ch in , 191/j 432, 432/
key features of, 427 -2 9, 427/
legislatures in , 2 0 0 , 432, 432/, 438
m ap of, 428f
m o d e rn iza tio n in, 427, 429
M u slim s in, 359, 35 9 f
an d n uclear w eapons, 388
p a rty system in , 264
Index 625
p olitical cu lture in, 4 32-33
political econom y in, 4 3 3 -3 4 , 4 3 9 -4 0
p olitical in stitu tion s, 4 31 -3 2, 432/
political p arties in, 432/
presidential elections in, 230, 231
p rivatization o f religion in, 353,
358 ,3 59
religion in, 427, 4 2 7 f 429, 4 38 -3 9, 4 40
secularism in, 364
sem i-presidential (hybrid) system in,
229, 2 30/, 429, 431 -3 2, 432/
Senate in, 217
state in, 59, 546
statism in , 4 34 -3 5
u nem ploym ent in, 434, 435
welfare state in, 80, 86, 90, 4 3 3 -3 4
and W estern nationalism , 311, 311/,
3 1 2 ,3 1 3 /
and W orld W a r I, 430
and W orld W a r II , 430, 433
Franco, Itam ar, 4 04
Franco-Prussian W ar, 443, 4 44 , 445
freedom , as concept, 11
F reedom H ouse, 121
free m arkets. See m arket-led econom ies
free rider (collective action) problem ,
273, 295, 295/, 386, 387, 4 9 5 -9 6
free trade, 374, 5 4 5 -4 6
F rench R evolution
and au th o ritarian persistence, 4 3 5 -3 6
causes and history of, 429, 437-38
destructive n atu re of, 438
and F rench statism , 435
as m odel for revolution, 285, 286f 438
as social revolution, 284
F riedm an, M ilto n , 79
F ro m M o v e m e n ts to P a r tie s i n L a t i n
A m e r ic a (Van C o tt), 340
Fujim ori, A lb erta, 245
F uk u sh im a nuclear p lan t disaster, 485
F ukuyam a, Francis, 365
fu n ction al in tegration o f society, 363
functions definitions o f religion, 351-52
gam e theory, 162, 382/, 391-93
G a n d h i, In d ira , 458, 459
G a n d h i, M o hand as, 458, 459
G an d h i, Rajiv, 458, 459
G arcia, A lan , 367—68
G asperi, A lcide de, 246
G A T T . S ee G eneral A greem en t o fT ariffs
and T rade
G auck, Joachim , 441/
G bowee, L eym ah, 335/'
G D P. See gross dom estic product
G ellner, E rn est, 3 0 9 -1 0 , 507
G E M . See G en d er E m pow erm ent M easure
gender
and b oundaries o f identity, 327-28
as cu lturally-co nstructed category,
3 28-29
d efinition of, 327
fem inist m ovem ent’s changes to, 338
political p arties based on, 341, 342
study o f in com parative politics, 326
tran sg en d ered identities, 328
gender d iscrim ination , 326, 3 3 3 -3 4
G en d er E m po w erm en t M easure (G E M ),
345, 3 45 /
g ender equality, 100, 124
G en eral A g reem en t o f Tariffs and T rade
(G A T T ), 567
g eneralizability, 19
genocide
efforts to elim inate, 305
in 2 0 th century, 3 0 4 £ 305
as ty p e o f violence, 315
geography, an d developm ent, 108,
1 1 2 -1 3 ,1 1 6 /
G eorge I I I (king o f U n ite d K ingdom ), 227
G erm any. S ee also N azi G erm an y
au th o ritarian ism in , 4 50 -5 1
B u n d e s r a t in , 211, 212, 212/, 451, 452
B u n d e s ta g in, 212, 223, 451
coalitions in , 239
colonialism and, 445
consensus-based politics in, 452-53
co n stitu tio n of, 181, 182^
corporatism in , 4 52-53
d em ocratization in, 443, 4 5 0 -5 1
division in to E ast and W e st, 443, 444,
4 4 6 ,4 5 1
and E astern n ationalism , 311, 311/,
3 1 2 ,3 1 3 /
econom ic g ro w th in , 273, 441, 445, 448
econom ic p olicy of, 448
econom y of, 74/, 4 41/, 448
electoral system in, 1 9 9 ,2 1 2 ,2 2 3 ,4 5 1 -5 2
eth n ic groups in , 441/"
eth n ic nationalism in , 441, 4 5 3 -5 4
and E U , 373, 431, 4 44 , 4 46 , 447,
448, 449
executive stru ctu re in, 249/,
4 4 6 -4 7 , 447/
federal system in, 451, 452
historical developm ent, 4 4 3 -4 6
h u m a n capital levels in, 102/
im m igration issue in, 382
in d ustrializatio n in, 448
in eq u ality in, 449
key features of, 4 4 1 -4 3 , 4 4 1 /
legislature in, 2 0 3 ,2 1 0 -1 1 ,2 3 4 , 4 47,447/
m ap of, 442f
national identity, W orld W a r II and, 446
nationalism in, 443, 4 4 7 -4 8
p a rty system in , 262
political c u lture in , 4 4 7 -4 8
political econom y in, 4 4 8 -4 9
political in stitu tio n s in , 4 4 6 -4 7 , 447/,
451-52
p olitical p arties in, 4 46 , 447/, 450, 452
regim e changes in, 157
religion in, 4 4 1 / 443
reunification of, 374, 443, 4 44 , 446,
447, 449, 451
secularization in , 443
state-b u ild in g process in, 441, 4 4 9 -5 0
u nem ploym ent in, 449
welfare state in, 80, 86, 87, 90, 448, 450
and W o rld W a r I , 443, 444, 445,
448, 450
and W o rld W a r I I , 443, 4 44 , 4 4 5 -4 6 ,
448, 450
g errym and erin g, 216, 565
G han a, 1 4 ,1 6 -1 7 ,1 6 /, 17/, 20, 4 0 ,2 6 4 ,2 7 5
G ill, A ntho n y, 362
G in i coefficient, 74/, 75
global civil society, 281
g lobalization
definition of, 376
France and, 4 3 9 -4 0
M exico and, 496, 503, 504
M u slim o pposition to, 109
protests against, 281
social m ovem ents and, 281
and trad e, 3 7 6 -8 0
U . S . a n d , 567
global sou th , underdevelopm ent in, 111
global w arm in g, 3 8 5 -8 6 , 495
G N I. S ee gross n ation al incom e
G off, P h il, 1 9 8 /
G om e F arias, V alentin, 499
G orbachev, M ik h a il, 528, 530
G orsk i, P h ilip , 62
G o u la rt, Joao, 402
g overnm ent (adm inistrative apparatus),
branches of, 176
g ov ernm ent (ruling officials), 229
g overnm ent in stitu tio n s, 173, 1 84 -8 5.
S ee also executives; interest
groups; ju d icial branch;
legislatures; p olitical p arties
G ow on, Yakubu, 513
g ran d coalitions, 239, 247
G reat B ritain. S ee U n ite d K ingdom
G reat D epression
B razil and, 4 02 , 406, 407
G erm an y and, 445, 448, 450
Jap an and, 486
and rise o f state power, 81
U n ite d K ingdom and, 543
U .S. an d , 5 5 8 ,5 6 0 , 562
an d w elfare state, 91, 546, 547
The G re a t T r a n s fo r m a tio n (Polanyi), 90
G reece, d eb t crisis in, 373, 396f
G reen feld, L iah , 310, 312-13
g reenhouse gas (G H G ) em issions,
385, 494
G reen P arty, 258, 448
gross dom estic p ro du ct (G D P ), 72-73,
74/, 103
gross n atio n al incom e (G N I), 72
group identities, 306
groups, in d em ocratization, 131,
1 3 7 -3 9 ,1 3 8 /
g ue rrilla tactics, 287
G u n s , G erm s a n d S te e l (D iam ond), 114
g un s, and 2 n d A m en dm en t, 127
G u rr, T ed, 292
626 Index
H am as, 390
H a m d a n v . R u m s fe l d (2006), 566
H am ilto n , A lexander, 561
happiness, as m easure o f developm ent,
101-2
H arper, Stephen, 239
H atoyam a, Yukio, 261
H D I. See H u m a n D evelopm ent Index
heads o f g overnm ent, 228
heads o f state, 228
health
and education, correlation b etw een, 36
as m easure o f developm ent, 99
h ea lth care, as fu n ction o f m odern
state, 84
health care access, as m easure o f
developm ent, 99
H e n ry V III (king o f E ngland), 65
heteronorm ativity, 329
h ig h (supreme) courts, 178-79, 233.
See also ju d icial review
H irsch l, R an, 193
historical in stitu tion alism , 107
theories o f au th o ritarian ism in,
1 5 9 -6 0 ,1 6 1 ,1 6 I f 1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
history, end of, 365
H itler, A dolf, 81,147, 149, 431, 444, 445,
446, 4 4 8 ,4 5 0 ,5 3 0 , 543
H obbes, Thom as, 58, 391
H olland e, Francois, 427/, 429
H olocaust, 305, 4 44 , 445, 453
H o n g Kong, 414, 542
H o n g X iu q u a n , 415
H orow itz, D o n a ld L ., 320
H ouse o f C om m ons (U.K.), 550
H ouse o f L ords (U.K.), 550
H ouse o f Representatives, U .S., 217, 559,
559/, 565
H tu n , M a la, 342
H u e rta, V ictorino, 499, 501
H u Jintao, 416, 423
H u m ala, O llan ta, 3 6 7 -6 8
h um an capital, as m easure o f
developm ent, 99—1 0 2 ,1 0 2 /
H u m a n D evelopm ent Index (H D I),
1 0 0 ,1 0 2 /, 433
hum an rights, au th o ritarian regim es and,
147-48
H ungary, dem ocratization in, 129
H u n tin g to n , Sam uel, 136, 137,139, 292,
365, 366
hybrid (sem i-authoritarian) regim es, 148,
1 5 1 -5 2 ,1 5 3 ,1 5 7 -5 8 ,1 6 6
hyperinflation, 75
hypotheses. See also correlation
about fu tu re events, 2 9 -3 0
developm ent of, 9 3 -9 4
evidence and, 29—30
good, characteristics of, 43—44
indicators in , 41
outliers (deviant cases) and, 2 6,
39, 275
in research, 8 -9 , 2 5 -2 7
te stin g of, 3 1-38 , 4 3 - 4 4 , 4 4 /
and theories, 2 6 - 2 7
identity. See also gender; n atio n al identity;
n ationalism
boundaries of, 327
definition of, 306
group, 306
political, types of, 338
social m ovem ents and, 337—39
id en tity utility, 318
ideological conflict, efforts to
un d ersta n d , 367
ideology. See also com m unism ; fascism;
liberalism ; socialism
definition of, 351
m ajor ideologies, 351, 3 5 4 -5 7
m o dern ity and, 349
persistence of, 349—50, 360, 3 6 4 -6 7
as p olitical cu lture, 350
shaping o f p olitical opinions by, 351
im m igran ts. See also assim ilation
discrim ination against, 331, 332
d ocum ented v s. u nd ocu m en ted , 383
tensions w ith natives, 3 8 3 -8 4
im m igration
as issue, 3 8 2 -8 4
nativism and, 384
as tran sn atio n a l issue, 375
and W estern vs. E astern nationalism , 311
im p each m en t o f presidents, 212, 230,
2 3 2 ,2 3 3 ,2 4 1 ,5 6 6
Im p e r ia lis m , th e H ig h e s t S ta g e o f C a p ita lis m
(L enin), 111
im personality, o f m odern state, 5 3 -5 4
im p o rt substitution
in B razil, 113, 403
in M exico, 501, 503
incom e inequality, 73—75. See also specific
co u n trie s
and au th o ritarian ism , 161-62
and democracy, 1 2 4 ,1 3 2
increase in w ith econom ic
developm ent, 100
in d ep en dent variable, 14
In d ia
anti-colonial revolution in, 287, 458, 459
caste system in, 455-57, 461, 462, 465
colonial rule in , 455, 457-59, 461, 465
co n stitu tio n of, 181, 182/,' 458, 460
dem ocracy in, 1 3 3 ,133/j 243, 457, 459,
461, 463, 464
developm ent in , 99
econom ic g ro w th in, 457, 458, 462,
4 6 3 ,4 6 4 - 6 5
econom y of, 74/
e th n ic groups in, 455-57, 4 S S f, 461,
4 6 5 -6 6
eth n ic political parties in , 341, 4 6 5 -6 6
executive stru ctu re in, 2 4 9 /
federalism in , 1 86 ,1 8 9 , 460, 4 6 4 -6 5
governm ent co rrup tion in, 462
governm ent regulation in , 462, 463
group conflict in , 315, 321-22
head o f state in , 228
historical developm ent in , 4 5 7 -6 0
hum an capital levels in , 102/
independence for, 458, 459, 463, 464
in eq u ality in, 461, 465
in te rtw in in g o f dom estic and
in te rn atio n a l politics in , 4 6 6 -6 7
ju d icial system in , 460, 4 61 /
key features of, 455-57, 455/
legal system in, 184
map of, 456f
M u m b ai terro rist atta ck (2008), 458,
460, 467
and nuclear w eapons, 388, 389, 390,
458, 4 5 9 -6 0 , 466, 481
parliam en tary system in, 243, 460,
461/, 464
political cu lture in, 4 61 -6 2
political econom y in, 80, 462
political in stitu tion s in, 4 60 , 461/, 464
political parties in , 458, 459, 461, 461/,
4 6 5 -6 6
poverty in, 457, 460, 462, 463
reform in, 462, 463
religion in , 4 5 5 f 457, 460, 461
rise to global power, 457
security as issue in, 4 6 6 -6 7
stan d ard o f living in , 100
state b uild ing process in, 455
statism in, 459, 462
tensions w ith P ak istan , 389, 4 5 9 -6 0 ,
4 6 6 -6 7
violence and in stab ility in, 4 5 9 -6 0
In d ia n C ongress Party, 458, 459
indicators, 41, 3 4 4 —46
indigenous A m ericans. S ee A m erican
In d ian s
in d ig n a d a s , 281, 2 8 1 /
in d ire ct election, 2 1 0 -1 1 , 2 31-32
individualism , and econom ic
developm ent, 110
individualistic nation alism , 312—13, 3 13 /
in dividualization, and m obilization , 289
individuals
in d em o cratizatio n, 1 3 1 ,1 3 7 -3 9 ,1 3 8 /
fascism o n, 355
liberalism on, 354
Indonesia, 1 8 1 ,1 8 2 / 184
inductive reasoning, 26
in d u strial capitalism
and g ro w th o f w elfare state, 87-89,
9 0 ,9 3
and m o bilization for revolution, 293
and n ationalism , 3 0 9 -1 0
In d u strial R evolution, U .K . as orig in of,
543, 545, 547
inequality. See also incom e inequality;
specific c o u n trie s
and dem ocracy, 5 6 2 -6 3
redu ctio n o f as state role, 85
in fa n t m ortality, 99, 102/
inferences, 29
Index 627
inflation, 74/, 75
in fo rm al powers o f executives, 2 40 , 2 41 /
in fo rm atio n -g ath erin g, in m odern
states, 57
in frastru ctu re, as responsibility o f m odern
state, 85
In g leh art, R onald, 140, 361, 362, 364
In k ath a Freedom P arty (South Africa), 258
in stan t-ru n o ff system , 209
institution(s). See also in tern ation al
institu tion s
definition of, 173
d ifferentiation o f w ith m odern ization ,
3 6 3 -6 4
and em pow erm ent o f w om en and
m inorities, 3 41-43
as factor in dem ocratization, 131,
136-37
as factor in developm ent, 106-7, 111,
1 1 5 -1 6 ,1 1 6 /
form al, d efinition of, 279
and p olitical c u lture, 5 0 2 -3
and reduction o f eth n o -n atio n al
violence, 321
social, as factor in developm ent, 107-8
in stitu tion alism , 106-7. See also h istorical
in stitu tion alism ; new
in stitu tion alism ; rational
in stitu tion alism
in stitu tion alization , o f p a rty systems,
2 6 3 -6 4 , 265
In stitu tio n al R evolutionary Party, M exico
(P R I). See P a r tid o R e v o lu c io n a r io
I n s titu c io n a l
in stitu tio n al theories o f religion, 3 6 3 -6 4
in stru m en ta list views o f nationalism ,
315, 318
insurgencies, 280, 287
integration
in tern ation al in stitu tion s and, 3 8 0 -8 2
regional in stitu tion s and, 3 8 0 -8 1
interdependence, o f global economy, 377
interest aggregation, 257
in terest articulation, 257
in terest groups. See also special in terest
groups
and citizens p articipation, 255
and corporatism , 2 6 5 -6 7 , 2 7 3 -7 4
definition of, 256
and developm ent, 111
examples of, 2 56 -5 7, 256f
functions of, 256
and g ro w th o f w elfare state, 8 9 -9 2
and interest articu latio n, 257
and pluralism , 2 6 4 -6 5 , 266,
2 72 -7 3, 274
variations in state interactions w ith,
2 5 3 -5 4
intergovernm ental organizations, 380
in te rn atio n a l cooperation
increase in after W orld W a r II, 380
in tern ation al in stitu tion s and, 3 9 3 -9 4
in realist theory, 3 92-93
in te rn atio n a l in stitu tion s
financial, 380
and in tegration , 3 8 0 -8 2
and in te rn atio n a l cooperation, 3 9 3 -9 4
o ngoing im p o rtance o f state in, 374,
3 8 1 ,3 9 5
and redu ctio n o f eth n o -n atio n al
violence, 322
In te rn atio n a l M o n e ta ry F u n d (IM F ),
105, 380, 567
in te rn atio n a l political economy, 375
in tern ation al relations
definition of, 375
dom estic politics and, 3 9 4 -9 5 , 3 9 6 -9 7
en v iro n m en tal issues and, 3 8 4 -8 7
globalization and, 3 7 6 -8 0
im m igration as issue in
in tern ation al in stitu tion s an d , 3 8 0 -8 2
m ain areas o f study, 375
nuclear w eapons and, 388
ongoing im p o rtance o f state in, 374,
381, 395
shape o f in te rn atio n a l system and, 391
terrorism and, 3 8 9 -9 0
theories of, 3 9 0 -9 5
and tran sn atio n a l issues, 375-76
tran sn atio n a l n etw orks and, 3 87 -8 8
in te rn atio n a l security, 375, 3 9 0 -9 5
in te rn atio n a l system
and dem ocratization, 131, 1 35 -3 6, 137
econom ic, and developm ent,
111-12, 117/
and state behavior, 391
in te rn atio n a l trad e. S ee trade
in terv en in g variable problem , 37
invisible h an d , 78
IR A . See Irish R epublican A rm y
Iran
A m erican hostage crisis, 472
authoritarian persistence in, 154, 475-76
co n stitu tio n of, 471, 4 7 6 -7 7
dem ocracy and, 4 75 -7 6, 477
econom y of, 74/, 4 6 8 /
eth n ic g roups in , 4 6 8 /
executive system in , 229, 232, 249/,
473, 4 7 3 / 476, 477
foreign influence in, 470—72
g en der d iscrim ination in, 334
G reen R evolution in, 473, 478
historical developm ent of, 4 70-73
hu m a n capital levels in, 102/
ideology of, 3 6 6 -6 7 , 470, 478
Islam ic revolution o f 1979 in, 1 5 0 ,1 5 4 ,
297, 468, 470, 471, 472, 474-75,
478, 4 7 9 -8 0
key features of, 4 6 8 -7 0 , 4 6 8 /
legal system of, 184
legislature in, 473, 473/, 476, 477
map of, A 6 9 f
m o dern ization in, 470, 472, 474, 479
nationalism in, 474
and nuclear w eapons, 388, 389, 390,
4 8 0 -8 1
political c u lture in, 474-75
political in stitu tion s in, 473-74, 473/,
4 75 -7 6, 477
reform s in, 475, 478
religion in, 4 68 £ 470, 472, 477, 478,
4 7 9 -8 0
as religious state, 358
sanctions on, 475, 480
social class in, 474
social m ovem ents in, 281
th eo cracy in, 150, 154, 185, 349, 360,
473 -7 4, 476-77, 4 7 9 -8 0
as th re a t to Israel, 468, 477, 480
as th re a t to U .S. interests, 468, 480
u nem ploym ent in, 475
w om en in, 352f, A l l , A 19
Ir a n - I r a q W ar, 471, 472, 475
Iraq , 321, 474, 479
Irelan d, 6I f 6 8, 3 7 2 / 373, 542, 551
Irish Republican A rm y (IR A ), 3 89 -9 0, 551
iron law o f oligarchy, 282
Is G e n d e r L ike E th nicity? (H tu n ), 342
IS IS , takeover o f Syrian territory, 278
Islam . See also M uslim s
and A rab Spring, 3 0 0 -3 0 1
conservative, resurgence of, 3 6 4 -6 5
and developm ent, 109
as incom patible w ith W est, 366
and legal system s b ased on religious
law, 184
Islam ic State. See ISIS
isom orphism , organizations and, 64
Israel
head o f state in, 228
Ira n ia n th re a t to, 468, A l l
ju d iciary in, 193
legal system in, 184
and nuclear w eapons, 388, 389
p arliam en tary system in, 2 2 1 /
and terro rism , 390
Italy
d eb t crisis in, 373
and E U , 373, 431, 448
fascism in , 274, 355
in stab ility o f g overnm ent in, 246,
247, 248
Itu rb id e, A u g u stin de, 499
Jam es I I (king o f E ng land ), 542, 546, 547
Jan ata P a rty (India), 459
Jan senism , 438
Jap an
atom ic b om bing of, 388, 485, 486, 556
business s tru ctu re in , 488, 490
C hinese rise and, 489
C on fu cian ism and, 418
co n stitu tio n s of, 485, 486
corporatism in, 2 73 -7 4 , 488, 492
d em ocratization in, 486
d o m in a n t-p arty system in, 261
and E astern n ationalism , 313/
econom ic g ro w th in, 273, 448, 4 8 2 -8 4 ,
485, 486, 4 8 8 -8 9 , 490
628 Index
Jap an ( C o n tin u e d )
econom y of, 7A t, 482 1
electoral system in, 210, 486, 491, 492
ethn ic g roups in, 482/j 484
executive stru ctu re in, 2 49 /
gender d iscrim ination in , 335
historical developm ent, 4 8 4 -8 7
h um an capital levels in, 102/
in eq u ality in, 488, 489
key features of, 4 8 2 -8 4 , 4 8 2 /
and Kyoto Protocol, 495
legislature in, 487, 487/, 491
m ap of, 4 8 3 /
m o dern ization in, 4 8 2 -8 4 , 485,
4 8 8 -8 9 , 490
national id en tity in, 310, 493
n ationalism in , 310
opening to W e st, 484, 493
and overfishing, 387
political cu lture in, 488
political econom y in , 4 8 8 -8 9
political in stitu tion s in, 487, 487/
political p arties in, 4 8 6 -8 7 , 487/,
4 91-92
reform in, 489, 491, 492
religion in, 482f 484
resource m an ag em en t and, 4 9 4 -9 5
state-led developm ent in, 8 4 ,1 0 4 ,1 1 5
statism in, 4 8 5 -8 6 , 489, 490, 492
unem ploym ent in, 489
unions in, 488, 490
wars o f late 1 9 th -early 2 0 th
centuries, 415
w elfare state in, 9 1 / 9 2, 490
w om en in, 485, 488, 490, 4 9 3 -9 4
and W orld W a r I, 485, 486
and W orld W a r II, 446, 484, 485,
486, 4 9 2 ,4 9 3
Jiang Z em in , 416, 417, 423
Jim C row laws, 328, 337, 557
Jin n a h , M u h a m m ad A li, 458, 459
J o h n I I (king o f E ngland), 2 00 , 549
J o h n Paul I I (pope), 137
Joh nson , L yndon B., 556, 558
Joh nson , Sim on, 108
Jo n ath a n , G oodluck, 513, 514, 520,
521, 523
“Juan L in x, Presidentialism , and
D em ocracy” (M ain w aring
and Shugart), 243
ju d icial activism , 1 9 0 -9 2 , 549, 5 6 3 -6 4
ju d icial b ranch
and checks and b alances, 230, 566
in constitutions, 176
increasing pow er of, 192
and ju d icial review, 1 7 3 ,1 7 6 ,1 7 8 -7 9 ,
1 9 0 -9 2 , 549
ju d icial in stitu tio n s, and reduction o f
eth n o -n atio n al violence, 322
ju d icial review
as co n stitu tio n al provision, 173, 176,
178-79
elite in te re st and, 193
and ju d icial activism , 1 9 0 -9 2 , 549,
5 6 3 -6 4
lack o f in U .K ., 548
judiciaries, 176. See also ju d icial b ran ch
“K an t, L iberal L egacies, and F oreign
A ffairs” (Doyle), 393
K arm an, Taw akkol, 3 3 5 /
K ennedy, Jo h n F., 556
k e o n k a i, 486, 492
Keynes, Jo h n M ayn ard, 547
Keynesian econom ics, 76, 91, 355, 547—48
K ham enei, A yatollah A li, 1 8 5 / 4 68/, 471,
472, 473, 477
K han , A . Ql , 390
K hatam i, M o h a m m ad , 471, 472, 473,
476, 478
K hodorkovsky, M ik h a il, 534
K hom eini, A yatollah R uh o llah, 185/j 297,
4 7 1 ,4 7 2 ,4 7 3 , 4 77 ,4 78
K hrushchev, N ik ita , 530
K im Jon g-il, 35, 3S f
K im Jo n g -u n , 35, 3S f
K ing, M a rtin L uther, Jr., 142
K irchner, N estor, 368, 370
K ohl, H elm u t, 444, 447
K ohli, A tu l, 107
K oizum i, Jun ichiro, 492
Korea. See also N o r th Korea; S ou th Korea
C on fu cian ism and, 418
Japanese conquest of, 485
K orean W ar, 116, 415
K ranton , R achel, 318
K rook, M o n a L en a, 344
K ubitschek, Juscelino, 402, 403
K unio, Y oshihara, 488
K uran, T im u r, 165, 391
K uru, A h m e t, 364
K urzm an, C harles, 472
Kyoto P rotocol, 495, 566
labor, M a rx on alienation of, 356
labo r m arket, as gendered, 333
L ab ou r P a rty (U.K.), 2 0 7 ,2 0 7 /, 258,
2 6 2 -6 3 ,5 4 2 , 543, 5 4 5 ,5 4 8 , 552
laicism , 358, 427, 438 -3 9, 440
L aitin , D avid, 319, 321-22
L andless W o rk ers M o vem en t (Brazil),
282, 410
L an ga, Pius, 1 9 5 /
L a tin A m erica
auth o ritarian ism in, 1 3 4 ,1 6 3 , 243
cacerolazo p rotests in, 156
corporatism in, 266
delegative dem ocracies in , 152, 2 4 4
d em o cratizatio n in, 129
and dependency theory, 40
d iscrim ination in, 3 2 5 / 3 26, 336
econom ic developm ent in, 105
electoral systems in, 437
im m igration to U .S. from , 382
increasing em pow erm ent o f w om en
in, 1 3 4 -3 5
laicism in , 358, 438
legislatures in, 2 0 2 -3 , 213
n ationalism in, 42
populism in, 245, 2 4 5 /
p residentialism in, 2 4 1 -4 2
racial categories in , 3 2 9 -3 0
revolutions in, 285, 287
socialist g overnm ents in, 349,
365, 367-70
state developm ent in, 60
U .S. interventions in , 567
welfare state in , 93
law. See rule o f law
lay states, 358, 364
LD P. See L ib eral D em ocratic P arty
o fJa p an
L eague o f N ations, 566, 567
learning effects, and w elfare state, 9 2 -9 3
L eb an on , presidential system in, 246
L ee K uan Yew, 1 3 4 ,1 6 3 , 260
leftism , pragm atic, 3 68 -7 0
left w ing
resurgence of, 365
in U nited K ingdom , 541
legal systems, religious law as basis of, 184
L e g is la tiv e L e v i a th a n (Cox and
M cC ubbins), 219
L e g is la tiv e P o litics in L a t i n A m e r ic a
(M orgenstern and Nacif, eds.), 213
legislative process, v ariations in , 201
legislators
and follow ing o f public o pinion vs.
conscience, 2 14 -1 5
and need for reelection, 202
legislatures. See also executive-legislative
relations
ap p ointm en t o f executives by, 201,
2 0 4 - 5 ,2 0 4 /, 2 3 1 -3 2 ,2 3 3 -3 4
at-large m em bers of, 199
in au th o ritarian regim es, 201,
202, 2 0 4 ,2 2 2
bicam eral, 2 0 2 -3
cham bers of, 2 0 2 —3, 2 0 4
in co n stitu tio n s, 176
decision-m aking process in , 2 1 8 -2 0
definition of, 2 0 0
electoral systems for, 2 05 -1 1
executive p ow er to dissolve, 2 3 2 -3 3
in federal system s, 181-82
fu n ction s of, 2 00 , 201—2 , 214
history of, 2 0 0 -2 0 1
nam es for, 204
oversight fu n ction s of, 2 11 -1 2, 566
and pow er o f th e purse, 2 0 1 -2 , 566
types of, 2 0 2 -1 2 , 222
u nicam eral, 2 0 3 —4
L en in , V ladim ir, 64, 111, 292, 528,
5 3 0 ,5 3 6
L e Pen, Jea n -M a rie , 433, 4 3 6 -3 7
L e Pen, M a rin e , 433
less-developed nations, underdevelopm ent
in , 111
level o f analysis, 13, 3 9 5 -9 7
Index 629
L e v i a t h a n (H obbes), 391
Levitsky, Steven, 166
L ew is, Jo h n , 280
L G B T (lesbian, gay,bisexual and
transgender) m ovem ent, 336, 337
L iberal D em ocratic P a rty (U.K.), 207,
207/, 2 6 2 -6 3 , 545
L iberal D em ocratic P a rty o f Jap an (L D P ),
210, 261, 485, 4 8 6 -8 7 , 488,
490, 491-92
liberal in stitu tion alism , 3 9 3 -9 4
liberalism
and denom inationalism , 360
Fukuyam a on triu m p h of, 365
as ideology, 351, 3 54 -5 5
and laicism , 358
as th eo ry o f in te rn atio n a l relations,
3 9 3 -9 4
types of, 354
libertarian ism , 354
Libya
A rab S pring and, 278, 298, 3 0 1 -2 ,
301/, 3 0 2 /
fall o f Q addafi, 1 1 / 278, 298
L ichbach, M arc, 294, 296
life expectancy, 9 9 ,1 0 2 /
L ijp h art, A re n d , 247, 262
L i K eqiang, 2 3 6 / 412/, 416, 423
lim ited g overnm ent. See constitutionalism
L incoln, A brah am , 141, 248, 556, 558
L in z, Juan, 241, 243
Lipset, Seymour M a rtin , 132,161, 5 62 -6 3
L ist, F riedrich, 450
literacy rates, 9 9 -1 0 0 , 102/
local g overnm ents, responsibilities und er
federal system , 189
L ocke, Jo h n , 552
The L o g ic o f C o llective A c tio n (O lson), 273
L on d on bom bings o f 2005, 383
L op ez P ortillo, Jose, 507
L ou is-P hilipp e (king o f France), 429,
430, 436
Louis X IV (king o f France), 429, 434, 438
L ouis X V I (king o f France), 429
L ouis X V III (king o f France), 429,
4 3 0 ,4 3 3
lower cham ber, 203
L ugard, Frederick, 512, 513
L ula da Silva, L uiz Inacio, 2 82 , 326,
368, 369, 370, 402, 4 04 , 4 0 5 -6 ,
4 0 8 ,4 1 0
L uxem bourg, and E U , 373, 431, 448
Macaulay, F iona, 411
M achiavelli, 391
M adero, Francisco, 499, 5 00 -5 0 1
M adiso n, Jam es, 180, 274, 564
M adu ro , N icolas, 155, 365, 368, 369, 370
M agn a C arta, 65,17 7, 2 00 , 542, 548, 549
M ain w aring , S cott, 243
M ajor, Jo h n , 5 4 2 ,5 4 5 , 548
m alap po rtio nm ent, 216-17
M alaysia, co n stitu tio n of, 182^
m andate-independence controversy, 214-15
M and ela, N elson, 1 3 8 ,1 7 1 / 193, 422
M aoism , 419
M ao Z ed o n g , 1 1 6 ,1 3 1 ,1 5 4 , 293, 414,
415, 416, 417, 419, 420, 423, 426
m arket-led developm ent, v s. state-led,
1 0 4 -6 ,1 0 7 ,1 1 7 /
m arket-led econom ies
advantages of, 77-79, 8 0/'
role o f state in, 82
v s. state-led, 76-77, 8 1 -8 2 , 81/
W a sh in g to n C onsensus and, 340,
380, 407
m arketplace o f ideas, 253, 265
m arket socialism , in C h in a , 417, 4 19 -2 0
M a rsh all P lan , 431, 435, 446
M a rx , Karl
on capitalism , 60, 6 3 - 6 4 , 357, 365
on democracy, 537
on division o f labor, 363
on econom ic developm ent, 111
exile from G erm any, 450
influence of, 357
and political economy, 71
on social revolutions, 284
and th eo ry o f revolution, 292, 293, 356,
419, 536
M arx ism
on econom ic developm ent, 110-12
in in te rn atio n a l relations, 395
on w elfare state, developm ent of, 88
mass p arties, 258
m aterial resources, and m o bilization for
revolution, 293, 3 0 0 /
M a x im ilia n I (em peror o f M exico), 429,
499, 500
M c C u b bins, M a tth ew , 219
M D S . See m ost-different-system s (M D S )
m etho d
m easurem ent
o f co u ntry ’s economy, 71-73
o f incom e inequality, 7 3-75
issues in , 4 1 -4 2
m edia, civil society and, 280
m edian p a rty coalitions, 2 3 8 -3 9 , 2 3 8 /
m edian voters, and politics o f tw o -p a rty
system s, 2 6 9 -7 2 , 2 7 0 / 2 7 1 /
M edvedev, D m itry , 2 3 4 f 5 2 5 t, 528, 530,
5 3 4 -3 5
M eiji R esto ratio n, 4 8 4 -8 5 , 493
M enem , C arlos, 245
M erkel, A ng ela, 1 / 2 3 7 / 383, 441/,
4 4 4 ,4 4 7
M exico
a u th o ritarian ism in , 164, 498, 501, 502
b order w ith U .S ., I f /
colonialism in, 4 9 8 -9 9
co n stitu tio n s of, 181, 182£ 499, 500
corporatism in, 266, 267, 5 0 6 -7
d em ocratization in, 121, 129, 137, 501,
503, 505
econom ic crises o f 1 9 8 0 -9 0 s, 501,
5 0 3 -4 , 505, 507
econom ic developm ent in, 496, 498
econom y of, 74/, 4 96 /
em pow erm ent o f w om en in, 335,
345, 3 4 6 /
e th n ic d iscrim ination in, 340
eth n ic g roups in , 4 9 6 f 498, 5 0 8 -9
executive stru ctu re in, 249/, 501, 5 02 /
exogenous shocks in , 498, 505
and g lobalization, 496, 503, 504
historical developm ent in, 4 98-501
h u m a n capital levels in, 102/
im m ig ratio n to U .S. from , 382
independence, 499
in d u strial capitalism in, 309, 5 07 -8
in eq u ality in, 498, 503
key features of, 4 9 6 -9 8 , 4 9 6 /
legislature in, 501, 5 02 /
liberal gov ernm ent in, 370
m ap of, 4 9 ^
M exican R evolution, 498, 499, 503
m o d ern ization in , 500
nationalism in, 309, 5 07 -8
n ation alization s in, 498, 501, 503, 504
o rg an ized crim e in, 498, 501, 5 0 4 -5
political c u lture in, 5 0 2 -3
political econom y in, 5 0 3 -4
political in stitu tio n s, 5 0 1 -2 , 5 02 /
political p artie s in, 501, 502/, 5 0 8 -9
pov erty in, 496, 502, 503
presidential system in, 230
P R I p eriod o f dom inance in, 137,151,
1 5 4 ,1 6 4 , 267, 498, 501, 502,
5 0 5 -7
reform s in, 499, 500, 501, 503, 504
religion in , 4 9 6 / 4 98, 499, 500, 501
ru le o f law issues in, 56, 5 0 4 -5
state stre n g th in, 4 9 6 -9 8 , 500, 501,
503, 5 0 4 -5
u nem ploym ent in, 503
unions in , 506
M eyer, Jo h n , 65
M ezey, M ich ael, 222
M ichels, R ob ert, 258, 282
M icronesia, 182^
m id d le class
and dem ocracy, 33, 1 32 -3 4 , 161,
5 6 2 -6 3
rise o f in C h in a , 419, 422
rise o f in Iran , 472, 474
rise o f in Jap an , 486
M id d le E ast, legislatures in, 203
m ilitary
and d em ocratic b reakdow n, 156
and legitim ate use o f force, 49
and revolution, 302, 3 0 2 /
m ilitary rule
and democracy, 123
and suspension o f co n stitu tio n , 184
M ilosevic, Slobodan, 314 f
M in , B rian, 322
m in im u m connected w in n in g coalition,
2 3 8 ,2 3 8 /
m in im u m rang e coalitions, 238/, 239
630 Index
m in im u m size coalition, 238, 2 3 8 /
m in im u m w in n in g coalition, 2 38, 2 3 8 /
m inorities. See also eth n ic groups; racial
discrim ination
em pow erm ent of, 3 3 4 -4 3
factors influencing representation of,
337-43
representation o f in legislatures, 214
M itte rra n d , F r a n c i s , 429, 434
M M D s . See m u lti-m em b er d istricts
m obilization
barriers to, 289
and g ro w th o f welfare state, 8 9 -9 2
o f revolutions, 284, 293, 294, 3 00/, 425
o f social m ovem ents, 282, 284
m odernist approaches to nationalism , 307,
3 08 -1 0, 311
m odernity
and colonialism , justification of,
350-51
as cu ltural co n struction , 350
definition of, 350
and ideology, 349
as in tern ation al status m arker, 350
opponents of, 3 6 5 -6 7
and religion, 349, 352-53, 358, 3 6 0 -6 4
as term in social science, 351
types of, 366
m odernization
definition of, 350
and dem ocratization, 131, 132 -3 4, 422
as term in social science, 351
M o d e r n i z a t i o n , C u l t u r a l C h a n g e , a n d
D em ocra cy (In g le h a rt and
W elzel), 140
m o dern ization theory, 131, 1 32-34
G h a n a and, 40
In d ia and, 464
m odern societies, characteristics of, 351
m odern states
autonom y of, 50-51
bureaucracy in, 49, 5 2-53 , S A f
cen trality to m odern politics, 4 7 -4 8
characteristics of, 52-55
citizenship in, 54
d efinition of, 49
d urab ility of, 47
econom ic functions of, 8 2 -8 6
functions of, 55-57, 76
im personality of, 5 3 -5 4
in fo rm atio n -g ath erin g in, 57
m onopoly on use o f force, 48, 49, 54
m ovem ents challenging, 47, 68
public education as fu n ction of, 50
regulation o f private p ro perty in, 57
rule o f law in, 49
and sovereignty, 5 4-55
and state capacity, 4 9 -5 0
state-society relationship in, 5 0-52
The M o d e r n W o rld S ystem (W allerstein), 113
M o d i, N aren dra, 455/, 458, 460
M o h am ad , M a h a th ir, 134, 513, 514
m onarchs, as heads o f state, 228
m onarchy
constitu tio n al, 66, 126, 183, 541, 548
replacem ent by co n stitu tio n alism in
E urop e, 183
m o netary policy, 83
M o n ste r R aving L oo n y P a rty (U.K.),
2 0 5 /2 0 6
M o ntgo m ery Bus B oycott, 283, 2 8 3 /
M o ore, B arrin g ton , 160, 161
M orales, Evo, 326, 3 4 8 / 365, 368,
369, 370
m ores, and d em ocratization, 135. S ee also
value systems
M o rg en stern , Scott, 213
M orsi, M o ham m ed , 278
M osaddeq, M o ham m ad , 4 70-71
M oseneke, D ik gang ,
m ost-different-system s (M D S ) m etho d ,
1 8 ,1 8 /, 193 -9 6, 248
m ost-sim ilar-system s (M SS) design,
1 5 -1 7 ,1 6 /, 114-17, 248
M o th ers o f th e D isappeared, 135
M o th ers o f th e P laza de M ayo, 256f
M o vem en t o f L andless W orkers
(M S T ), 282, 410
M S S . See m ost-sim ilar-system s (M SS)
design
M S T . See M ovem ent o f L andless W orkers
M u b a ra k , H o sn i, 278
M ugabe, R ob ert, 145/J146, 167-69
M u g h al E m pire, 457
M u h a m m ad (prophet), 184
M ujica, Jose, 368, 370
M u kh erjee, Pranab, 455/
m ulticu ltu ralism , 331, 3 8 2 -8 3 , 545, 551
m u ltilateral cooperation, 380
m u lti-m em b er districts (M M D s), 207
m u ltip a rty dem ocracies, 126, 272
m u ltip a rty system s, 262
“M u ltiple M o d e rn ities” (E isenstadt), 366
m u ltipo lar w orld, in in tern ation al
relations, 391
m urder, and ice-cream sales, co rrelation
b etw een , 38
M useveni, Yoweri, 1 2 8 /
M u slim B ro th erho od , 278, 301
M u slim L eague (India), 458, 459
M uslim s. S ee also Islam
in France, 359, 359^ 429, 433, 439
fu n dam en talist, in N igeria, 523
in G erm any, 443
in In d ia, 4 5 9 -6 0 , 461, 4 66 , 467
M ussolini, B enito, 274, 355, 356f
M yanm ar, 8 3 / 119/"
N A A C P (N atio n al A ssociation for the
A dvancem ent o f C olored People),
142, 283
N acif, B enito, 213
N A F T A . S ee N o rth A m erican Free T rade
O rg an ization
N agel, Joane, 338
N aim , M oises, 388
N apoleon (em peror o f France), 429,
430, 433, 436, 438, 439, 443,
453, 527, 528
N apoleon I I I (em peror o f France), 429,
430, 433, 436, 443, 500
n ation, definition of, 307
N atio nal A ctio n P a rty (PA N ). See P a r tid o
A cc io n n a c io n a l
N atio nal E n d o w m ent for D em ocracy,
5 1 ,1 3 7
n ation al id en tity
colonialism and, 523
d efinition of, 3 0 6 -7
in Japan, 310, 493
n ationalism
civic, U .S. and, 331
collectivistic vs. individualistic,
3 12 -1 3 , 313/
in colonial A frica, 512
constructivist theories of, 3 09 -1 0 ,
315, 317, 321
dangers o f categorizing, 313
d efinition of, 307
E astern /eth n ic , 311-13, 311/, 313/
on eth n o -n atio n al conflict, causes
of, 3 1 3 -2 0
evolutionary psychology and, 307
historical developm ent of, 493
in stru m en ta list views of, 315, 318
m easurem ent of, 42
m o dern ist approaches to, 307,
3 08 -1 0, 311
p erenn ialist approaches to, 307, 308
p rim o rd ialist approaches to, 3 0 7 -8 ,
311, 315, 3 16-17
ratio n al choice th eo ry of, 318-19, 319/,
321, 322
and revolution, 297
social-psychological approaches to, 320
sociobiology and, 307
and state developm ent, 61
status-inconsistency and, 310
s tru ctu ralist theories of, 3 09-10
types of, 311-13, 311/
W e stern /civ ic/territo rial, 311-13,
311/, 313/
N a tio n a lis m (G reenfeld), 310
N atio nalists, C hinese, 415, 416, 4 2 5 -2 6
N atio nal o f Islam , 283
N atio nal O rg an iz atio n o f W o m en
(N O W ), 2 5 6 -5 7
N atio n a l P a rty (S o uth A frica), 193
N atio n a l R ifle A ssociation (N R A ), 257
N a t i o n s , S ta te s , a n d V iolence (L aitin), 319
N a t i o n s a n d N a t i o n a l i s m (G ellner), 309
nativism , 384
N A T O , 278, 299, 305, 429, 567
n atu ra l experim ents, 21, 115, 322
N axalites, 460
N azi G erm an y
corporatism in, 274
and cu ltu ral origins o f
au th o ritarian ism , 1 63 -6 4
Index 631
E astern n ationalism and, 312
and ethn ic nationalism , 453
G erm an n ationalism and, 447
and H olocaust, 305, 4 44 , 445, 453
and N atio nal Socialism , 81, 137, 355
rise of, 137,155, 431, 445, 450
sing le-p arty system in, 259, 272
and state terrorism , 288
statism in, 81
as to ta litarian regim e, 148, 149
and W orld W a r II , 443, 4 44 , 4 4 5 -4 6 ,
448, 450
negative correlation, 31
N eh ru , Jaw aharlal, 458, 459, 463
n eo-colonial exploitation, 64
neoliberalism , 7 8-79, 8 ( / 407
neorealism , in in te rn atio n a l relations, 391
N etanyahu, Benjam in, 2 2 1 /
N etherland s, and E U , 373, 431, 448
N eves, A ecio, 404
N eves, T ancredo, 402, 404
N ew D eal, 81, 556, 558
new in stitu tion alism , 106
N ew Z ealan d
co n stitu tio n of, 177
electoral system in, 198^ 199,
2 2 2 -2 4 , 2 2 4 /
gender em pow erm ent in, 344, 345,
345/, 3 4 6 /
ju d iciary in, 193
N G O s (nongoverm ental organizations),
and ethn ic p olitical
m obilization, 509
N icaragua, 1 5 2 / 161, 345, 3 46/, 349, 368
Nicolas I (tsar o f Russia), 527
N igeria
au th o ritarian ism in, 513
C ivil W a r o f 1967-70, 316, 513,
5 1 6 ,5 1 9 -2 0 , 522
clientism in, 516, 517, 519, 521
colonialism in, 512, 523
co n stitu tio n of, 181, 182/^ 187
corruption in, 513, 514, 515 -1 6, 517,
518, 521
dem ocracy in, 121, 510
econom y of, 74/, 111, 510/
eth n ic conflict in, 510, 514, 515,
519-20, 521, 523
ethn ic groups in, 5 1 0 / 512
executive stru cture in, 249/, 521
federalism in, 512-13, 519 -2 0, 521, 523
historical d evelopm ent in, 512-14
h um an capital levels in, 102/
independence, 5 12 ,5 13
inequality in, 516-17
key features of, 5 1 0 -1 2 , 510/
m ap of, 5 1 1 /
nation al id en tity in, 523
political cu lture in, 515-16
p olitical economy in, 516-17
political in stitu tion s, 515, 515/, 521
political parties in, 515/, 521
poverty in, 516
presidentialism in, 242
regional autonom y m ovem ents in, 516
religion in, 5 1 0 / 512, 523
religious conflict in, 361
and resource curse, 1 0 0 / 101, 510, 513,
516, 518-19
terrorism in, 513, 514, 523
as w eak state, 63, 510, 517-18
N ixon, R ichard M ., 556, 558
“no confidence” votes, 211, 2 2 0 -2 1 , 232,
2 3 4 -3 5 ,2 4 1 ,4 5 1 -5 2 , 550
n onstate actors, terro rism and, 389
N ordic countries, w elfare state in, 9 3 -9 4
norm ative argu m en ts, 6 -7
norm ative theories, 25
N orris, P ippa, 361, 362, 364
N o rth , D ouglass, 61
N o r th A m erican Free T rad e O rg an ization
(N A F T A ), 380, 4 96 ,4 99 , 504 ,5 67
N o rth e rn Irelan d, 68
N o r th Korea
and au th o ritarian persistence, 153
b order w ith S ou th Korea, 96f 97
developm ent v s. S ou th Korea, 97,
1 14 -1 7,11 6 /, 117/
dictatorship in , 35
legislature in, 202
and nuclear w eapons, 388
sing le-p arty system in, 259
state control o f econom y in, 106
as to ta litarian regim e, 148, 149
N orw ay
and E U , 374
and g en der d iscrim ination , 334
N O W . S ee N atio n a l O rg an iz atio n o f
W om en
“N ow O u t o f N ever” (K uran), 165
N R A . S ee N atio n al R ifle A ssociation
nuclear proliferation, efforts to stop,
388, 4 8 0 -8 1
nuclear weapons
atom ic b om b in g o f Jap an , 388, 485,
4 8 6 ,5 5 6
C old W a r and, 388, 530
in tern ation al relations and, 388
Ira n an d , 388, 389, 390, 4 8 0 -8 1
n ations possessing, 388
reasons for w an tin g , 480
terrorism and, 390
O ates, W allace, 189
O bam a, B arack, 326, 553/, 556, 566
O basanjo, O lusegun, 513, 514, 521
O breg on , A lvaro, 499, 501
O ccupy M ovem ent, 281
O ’D o n n ell, G uillerm o , 139, 244
offensive realism^ in in te rn atio n a l
relations, 391
offshoring, and em ploym ent, 377
oil exporters, and A rab Spring, 300, 301/,
3 0 2 ,3 0 2 /
O lson, M an cu r, 273, 296
o m itted variable problem , 38
o pe n -en d e d q uestions, 5 - 6 , 168
o pen-list p ro po rtion al representation,
2 0 8 -9 ,2 1 0 /, 409
o p e ratio nalizin g o f concepts, 11-12, 11/
O ra n g e R evolution, 155, 1 5 6 /
o rg an ization , o f social m ovem ents, 281
o rg an ization (s)
definition of, 64
and isom orphism , 64
p eak, 2 6 5 -6 6
O rg an iz atio n o f A m erican States, 567
O rteg a, D an iel, 152/^ 368
outcom e, definition of, 14
outliers (deviant cases), 2 6, 39, 275, 464
outsourcing, and em ploym ent, 377
overfishing, Jap an an d , 4 9 4 -9 5
P ahlavi, M o h a m m ad R eza Shah, 470,
471, 472, 479
P ahlavi, R eza Shah, 154, 470, 471, 474
P ak istan
colonial rule in, 457
co n stitu tio n of, 181, 182^
independence for, 458, 459
and nuclear w eapons, 388, 389, 390,
4 5 9 - 6 0 ,4 6 6 ,4 8 1
tensions w ith In d ia, 389, 4 5 9 -6 0 ,
4 6 6 -6 7
P A N . See P a r tid o A c tio n n a c io n a l
P an am a C an al, 3I l f
p arliam en tary sovereignty, 1 79-80
p arliam en tary systems, 2 2 9 -3 2 , 230/.
See also p rim e m in ister
ap p o in tm en t o f executive in, 2 0 4 -5 ,
2 0 4 /, 2 31 -3 2, 2 3 3 -3 4
changes in over tim e, 248
characteristics of, 2 0 4 -5 , 2 0 4 /
coalitions in, 2 3 5 -4 0 , 2 3 I f 2377, 2 3 8 /
and com prom ise, 239, 240, 246
and dem ocracy, 2 4 0 -4 3
executive-legislative relations in, 204/,
2 1 1 -1 2 ,2 3 2 ,2 3 5
“no confidence” votes in, 211, 2 2 0 -2 1 ,
232, 2 3 4 -3 5 , 241, 451-52, 550
and p arliam en tary sovereignty, 1 79-80
pow er sharin g in, 247
v s. presidential system , 2 4 0 -5 0
stab ility of, 2 4 6 -4 7
U .K . as m odel of, 227, 229, 247
P arliam en t o f U .K .
characteristics of, 2 0 4 -5 , 2 0 4 /
and devolution o f power, 544
dissolving o f p arliam en t in, 233, 544
history of, 2 00 , 541, 5 4 9 -5 0
influence of, 206
and p arliam en tary sovereignty, 177,
1 7 9 -8 0 ,1 9 2 , 544, 548 '
as reactive, 222
s tru ctu re of, 203
p aro ch ial cultures, 164
p articipato ry democracy, 365
P a r tid o A c tio n n a t i o n a l [M exico] (PA N ),
501, 503, 5 0 4 -5 , 509
632 Index
P a r tid o de la R e v o lu c io n D e m o c ra tic a
[M exico] (P R D ), 505, 506, 509
P a r tid o R e v o lu c io n a r io I n s titu c io n a l
[M exico] (P R I)
and bureaucratic authoritarianism , 151
corporatism under, 509
and d em ocratization, 503
fo unding of, 499, 501
and organized crim e, 5 0 4 -5
period o f dom inance of, 137, 1 51 ,1 54 ,
164, 267, 498, 501, 502, 5 0 5 -7
state streng th under, 503
P a r tie s a n d P a r t y S yste m s (Sartori), 269
p artisan powers o f executives, 235, 2 41 /
L es P artis Politiques (Duverger), 268
party. S ee p olitical parties
p arty dictatorships, 151
p arty discipline
in Brazil, 409
electoral system and, 2 19 -2 0
in G erm any, 447
P arty o f th e D em ocratic R evolution. See
P a r tid o de l a R e v o lu c io n
D em o c r a tic a [Mexico]
p arty platform s, 255
p a rty systems, 2 5 9 -6 4 . See also single
p a rty systems
definition of, 255
d o m inant p a rty system s, 253, 2 54^
2 5 9 -6 1 , 262
factors shaping, 2 67 -6 9
fragm ented vs. concentrated, 262, 263
in stitu tio n aliz atio n of, 2 6 3 -6 4 , 265
m u ltip a rty systems, 262
in sub -S ah aran A frica, 275
tw o -p arty systems, 2 6 1 -6 2 , 268,
2 6 9 - 7 2 , 2 7 0 / 2 7 1 /
p ath dependency, developm ent and, 107
patronage, 240
payoff m atrix, 391
p eak organizations, 2 6 5 -6 6
Pedro I (king o f Brazil), 402
Pedro I I (king o f Brazil), 402, 403
P ena N ieto, E nriq ue, 154, 370, 496/, 499,
501, 506
p er capita G D P , 72
perenn ialist approaches to n ationalism ,
307, 308
Perez, C arlos A nd res, 245
“The Perils o f Presidentialism ” (L inz), 241
periphery, and dependency theory, 111-12
Peron, Juan and Eva, 2 4 5 f
Perry, M atth ew , 484, 485
p ersonalistic dictatorships, 147, 149-50,
167, 5 35-36
Peru, 245, 340, 3 67-68
P etain, P h ilip p e, 431
P eter th e G re at (tsar o f Russia), 527, 528
P hilippines, dem ocratization in, 129
p h ilo so p h es, 4 32-33
P inera, S ebastian, 125, 125/J 369, 370
P in ochet, A ug u sto, 1 25 ,1 5 5 , 288
P itk in , H a n n a h , 214
plebiscites, 1 28 -2 9
pluralism , 2 6 4 -6 5 , 2 66 , 369
and representation, 2 7 2 -7 3 , 274
Poland, 1 29 ,1 65 , 530
Polanyi, Karl, 89, 90
police, as state fu n ction , 49, 5 5-56
political business cycle, 233
political culture
and au th o ritarian persistence, 1 6 3 -6 4 ,
1 6 7 / 1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
definition of, 350
and dem ocratization, 135
p olitical in stitu tion s and, 5 0 2 -3
political economy. S ee also economy
(of country); specific cou n tries
definition of, 71
econom ic perform ance m easures,
71-76, 74/
h istory o f concept, 71
in tern ation al, 375
political em pow erm ent, 3 3 6 -3 7
in stitu tion s and, 3 4 1 -4 4
p olitical p arties and, 3 39 -4 1
quotas and, 3 4 2 -4 4
social m ovem ents and, 337-39
political in stitu tion s, political culture
a n d , 5 02 -3
P o litic a l M a n (Lipset), 132
p olitical opp ortu nity , and revolution,
2 9 2 -9 3 , 3 00/, 302, 426
P o litic a l O rd e r in C h a n g in g Societies
(H u n tin g to n ), 292
The P o litic a l O r ig in s o f R e lig io u s L ib e r ty
(G ill), 362
political parties. See also p a rty systems;
specific c ou n tries
catch-all, 258
and citizens p articipation , 255
critiques of, 258
d efinition of, 255
developm ent o f from social
m ovem ent, 337
and district-based electoral systems, 206
d istrict-based electoral systems and, 33
effective num b er of, 2 6 2 -6 3 , 2 6 4 /
and election quo ta systems, 343
electoral system influence on, 2 05 -1 1,
261, 2 6 7 -6 8
elite, 258
eth n ic , 3 3 9 -4 1 , 342, 5 0 8 -9
federalism and, 186, 190
gender-based, 341, 342
and g errym and erin g, 216
h istory of, 258
and in terest aggregation, 257
and legislative decision m aking, 2 1 9 -2 0
m ass, 258
and p artisan powers o f executives, 235
p a rty discipline, 2 1 9 -2 0
p latform s of, 255
and pow er sharing, 241
shaping o f p olitical outcom es by,
2 6 9 -7 2 , 339
in U .S., 221, 253, 258, 261
v ariations in num b er of, 253, 255,
2 5 9 -6 2
p olitical revolution, 2 8 4 -8 5
p olitical rights
in democracy, 121, 123, 126, 127
variations b etw een countries, 127
p olitical science, and scientific m ethod,
20-21
political theories o f state developm ent,
5 8 - 6 0 , 5 8 /5 1 8
politicians, socializing o f by legislatures, 202
politics
as area for d ispute over resources, 279
m odern, cen trality o f state to, 4 7 -4 8
and religion, m odern form s of, 3 5 7 -6 0
populism , 244, 245, 2 4 5 / 250
Porfirio D faz, Jose de la C ru z, 498, 499,
5 0 0 ,5 0 4
portfolios, m inisterial, 236
P ortu gal, 355, 373, 374
positive correlation, 31
positive theories. See em pirical theories
positivism , influence in L a tin A m erica,
403, 500
post-colonial states, artificial b oundaries
of, 316
poverty
absolute, 99
au th o ritarian regim es an d , 1 60 -6 1,
16 I f i 168, 1 6 9 /
d efinition of, 98
and democracy, 124
dem o cratizatio n an d , 502
measures of, 9 8 -9 9
and relative deprivation o f revolution,
291, 292, 299, 3 00 /, 301, 301/,
302, 3 02/, 426
poverty line, 9 8 -9 9
poverty rate, 74/
The P ow er o f Id en tity (C astells), 338
PPP. See p u rch asin g pow er p arity
P R . See p ro p o rtio n a l representation
p ragm atic leftism , 3 6 8 -7 0
P R D . See P a r tid o d e la R e v o lu c io n
D e m o c r a tic a [Mexico]
preference falsification, in au th o ritarian
regim es, 165
preferential vote system , 209
president(s)
bully p ulpit of, 2 4 0 , 566
checks on pow er of, 566
as head o f state and government, 228,231
im p each m en t of, 212, 230, 232,
233, 241, 566
in fo rm al pow ers of, 240
roles of, 228
styles o f ru le, variations in , 2 4 3 -4 5
veto pow er of, 2 28 , 230, 232, 234,
4 60 , 559, 566
presid en tialism , 2 2 9 -3 2 , 2 3 0 /
balance o f pow er in, 221
changes in over tim e, 248
Index 633
coalitions and, 236
definition of, 230
and democracy, 2 4 0 -4 3
executive-legislative relations in, 2 04/,
2 1 2 ,2 3 0 , 232, 235
v s. parliam en tary system , 2 4 0 -5 0
pow er sharin g in, 247, 248
U .S. as m odel of, 227, 229, 247
w in n e r-tak e-all elections in, 248
press, freedom of, 1 2 6 -2 7
P R I. See P a rtid o R ev o lu c io n a rio I n s titu c io n a l
prim ary elections, 206, 2 20 , 235, 343
prim e m inisters
ap p ointm en t by legislature, 201,
2 0 4 -5 , 2 0 4 /, 231-32
functions of, 228
p olitical leverage of, 227
pow er o f v s. presidents, 243
U .K ., as m odel, 227, 550
p rim o rd ialist approaches to nationalism ,
3 0 7 -8 , 311, 315, 316-17
p rison ers dilem m a, 382/, 391-93
private property, regulation o f in m odern
states, 57
privatization
in France, 353, 358, 359, 439
neoliberal call for, 78
o f religious in stitu tion s, 353, 358
reversals of, 358
procedural definitions o f democracy,
1 2 1 -2 2 ,1 3 0 ,1 4 1 -4 2
property rights, and developm ent, 106
p roportional representation (PR ), 2 0 8 -9 ,
210/, 2 12, 214, 268
advantages and disadvantages of,
217-18
and ethn ic p olitical p arties, 3 4 0 -4 1
and m ixed (hybrid) systems, 2 09 -1 1,
210/, 2 2 2 -2 4 , 451
o pen-list, 409
protectionism , 380
The P ro te s ta n t E th i c a n d th e S p i r i t o f
C a p ita lis m (W eber), 109
public choice theory, 79
public education, 50, 8 3 -8 4
public goods, state as provider of, 82
public h ea lth program s, as fu n ction o f
m odern state, 84
public officials, as self-interested actors, 79
public o pinion, shaping o f by
legislators, 202
P u b lic R e lig io n s in th e M o d e r n W o rld
(Casanova), 358
public sphere
definition of, 353
o rigin of, 542
privatization o f religious institu tion s
a n d , 353
purchasing pow er p arity (P P P ), 73
P u tin , V ladim ir, I f 153, 155, 234, 234/^
264, 265, 525, 525/, 528, 5 30 -3 1,
532, 5 34 -3 6
P u tn a m , R o b ert, 563
Q addafi, M u am m ar, 11f 278, 298
al Q geda, 288, 289, 387, 389, 523
qualitative evidence, 2 9 -3 0
quantitativ e evidence, 2 9 -3 0
Q uebec, 1 86 ,1 87
questions
good, characteristics of, 43, 4 4 /
o pen-en ded, 5 - 6 , 168
in research, 2 - 6 , 5/, 6 /
quotas
ca n did ate-qu o ta systems, 3 4 2 -4 3
in em pow erm ent o f w om en and
m in o rities, 3 4 2 -4 4
reserved-seat system s, 342
Q u o ta s fo r W o m en in P o litics (K rook), 344
race
and b oundaries o f identity, 327-28
as cu ltural co n struct, 3 2 9 -3 0 , 332
definition of, 327
v s. ethnicity, 3 30 -3 1
form al and legal reinforcem ent of, 328
and Jim C row laws, 328, 337
study o f in com parative politics, 326
racial discrim ination
as ongoing, 326
subtle form s of, 332
in U .S., 561, 5 6 3 -6 4
v ariations in, 332
racial diversity, increase in , 326
racial equality
and dem ocracy, 124
as m easure o f developm ent, 100-101
racial form ation, 330
racialization, 330
R afsanjani, A k b a r H ashem i, 471, 472,
475, 477
Rajai, M o h a m m ad -A li, 471
R am aphosa, C yril, 1 7 1 /
R am irez, Francisco I., 65
ratio n al choice th eo ry
and dem o cratizatio n in France, 436
o f nationalism , 318-19, 319/, 321, 322
and realist th eo ry o f in te rn atio n a l
relations, 391-93
and religious econom ics, 3 6 2 -6 3
o f revolution, 2 9 4 -9 5 , 295/, 299,
3 0 0 /, 319
ratio n al in stitu tio n alism , 1 0 6 -7
theories on au th o ritarian ism , 1 61,162
Reagan, R onald W ., 137, 472, 556, 558
realism , in in te rn atio n a l relations,
3 9 0 -9 3
reasoning, deductive vs. inductive, 26
The R e b e l's D il e m m a (Lichbach), 296
re districtin g , 216, 565
referendum s, 1 28 -2 9, 448
R egalism , 438
regime(s), 121. See also au th o ritarian
regim es
dem ocratic, 121
hybrid (sem i-authoritarian) regim es,
1 4 8 ,1 5 1 -5 2 ,1 5 3 ,1 5 7 -5 8 ,1 6 6
m aintenance, strategies for, 154-55
types of, 124
regim e change, 124. See also dem ocratic
breakdow n; dem ocratization
regional organizations, 3 8 0 -8 1
R ein h art, C arm en , 41
relative deprivation, and revolution, 291,
292, 299, 3 0 0 /, 301, 301/, 302,
302/, 426
religion. S ee also specific c o u n trie s
and dem o cratizatio n, 134
developm ent and, 109
established religions, 357
freedom of, in U .S. Bill o f R ights,
1 2 6 -2 7
fu n ction s definitions of, 351-52
in d u strial capitalism and, 88
in stitu tio n al theories of, 3 6 3 -6 4
m o dern ity and, 349, 3 52 -5 3, 358,
3 6 0 -6 4
persistence of, 3 4 9 -5 0 , 353, 360,
3 6 4 -6 5
as political cu lture, 350
in politics, m o dern forms of, 3 5 7 -6 0
prevalence o f globally, 349, 353, 362
relation to state, v ariations in, 353, 357
religious econom ics approach to,
3 6 2 -6 3
and state developm ent, 6 1-62
substantive definitions of, 351, 352
religious conflict, 3 5 3 -5 4
den om inatio n alism and, 360
efforts to u n d ersta n d , 367
religious econom ics school, 3 6 2 -6 3
religious in stitu tion s
differentiation o f from state, 353, 358
m o dern ity and, 353
priv atization of, 353, 358, 359
religious law, legal system s based on, 184
religious m arket, 3 6 2 -6 3
religious monopoly, 363
religious pluralism , 359, 3 6 2 -6 3
religious states, 358
religious toleration, origins of, 3 6 2 -6 3
rem ittances, from im m igran ts, 384
re n t seeking, in w eak states, 517
representation. S ee also electoral systems
ap p ortio n m en t, 2 15 -1 7
as cen tral fu n ction o f legislatures, 214
definition of, as issue, 213
d istric tin g , 2 15-16
electoral systems and, 2 15-18
and executive-legislative relations,
im p act of, 2 2 0 -2 2
and follow ing o f public opinion vs.
conscience, 2 14-15
legislative decision m ak in g and, 2 18-20
m alap po rtio nm ent, 2 16-17
varying p attern s of, 2 13 -1 5
o f w om en and m inorities, factors
influencing, 337-43
representative democracy, 1 26 -2 8
R epublican P a rty (U.S.), 258, 261, 558
634 Index
R epublic o f Irelan d, 68
research. S ee also hypotheses; theories
bias in, 5 - 6 , 41, 248
em pirical evidence in, 12-14
good, characteristics of, 4 2 -4 5 , 4 4 /
In te rn e t resources and, 3, 12
level o f analysis in, 13, 3 9 5 -9 7
m easurem ent issues in, 4 1-42
o rig in ality in, 4 3 - 4 4
outliers (deviant cases) in , 26, 39, 275
problem -solving in, 7 -9
quantitative v s. qualitative, 21
questions in, 2 - 6 , 5/, 6/
scholarly literature and, 19, 43, 44
small-iV w . large-TVstudies, 14, 30,
321-22
thesis in, 27
resistance, everyday form s of, 280
resource curse, 57, 101
N igeria and, 1 0 ( / 101, 510, 513, 516,
518-19
reverse causality problem , 3 5-36
revolution
from above v s. below, 2 8 6 -8 7
A rab S pring as, 125, 2 1 1 f 278,
2 9 8 - 3 0 2 ,3 0 0 /-3 0 2 /
causes, theories on, 2 91-98
d efinition of, 279, 284
and dem ocratic breakdow n, 156
enabling conditions for, 2 97 -9 8
issues surrounding, 279
M a rx on, 284, 292, 293, 356, 419, 536
m obilization of, 284, 293, 294,
3 00 /, 425
rational choice th eo ry of, 2 9 4 -9 5 , 295/,
299, 3 00/, 319
social, 2 7 9 -8 0 , 284
types of, 2 8 4 -8 7
R icardo, D avid, 552
righ t w ing, resurgence of, 3 6 4 -6 5
Riker, W illia m , 186
The R is e a n d D e c lin e o f N a t i o n s (Olson), 273
R obespierre, 438
R obinson, Jam es A ., 1 08 ,1 15 , 162
R odden, Jo n ath a n , 190
R o e v . W ade (1973), 191, 564
Rogoff, K enneth, 41
Roosevelt, F ran k lin D ., 81, 248, 556, 558
R ouhani, H assan, 468/, 471, 473, 477, 478
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 439
Rousseff, D ilm a , 282, 3 2 5 / 326, 368, 369,
370, 399/, 402, 404, 406, 410
ru le o f law
in M exico, as issue, 56, 5 0 4 -5
in m odern states, 4 8 -4 9
ru n o ff systems, 207, 4 3 6 -3 7
Russia
aggressive foreign policy of, 530, 533
alcoholism and d ru g addiction in, 533
au th o ritarian ism in, 149, 153, 1 5 8 ,1 6 2 ,
525-27, 5 30 -3 1 , 532, 5 3 3 -3 4
co m m u nist regim e in, 357
co n stitu tio n of, 181, 182 f
corruption in, 532
crony capitalism in, 530, 5 33 -3 4
and delegative democracy, 244
democracy in, 5 2 7 ,5 3 0 ,5 3 1 ,5 3 2 ,5 3 3 -3 4
dem ocratic b reakd o w n in, 155
and E astern nationalism , 311, 311/, 313/
econom y of, 74/
electoral system in, 208
em ancipation o f serfs in, 527, 528
eth n ic g roups in , S 2 S f
executive in, 233, 234, 2 49/, 531, 531/,
5 34 -3 5
historical developm ent in, 162, 527-31
hum an capital levels in, 102/
hum an righ ts abuses in, 531
hybrid regim e in , 153
in d ustrializatio n in, 529, 533
in eq u ality in , 533
key features of, 525-27, 525/
and Kyoto P rotocol, 495
legislature in, 531/, 534
nation al id en tity in, 527, 532
nationalism in, 527, 529
and nuclear w eapons, 388
oligarchs in , 5 3 3 -3 4
personalism in, 5 35-36
p olitical cu lture in, 532
p olitical econom y in , 532-33
p olitical in stitu tion s in, 531, 531/
p olitical p arties in, 265, 531/, 5 35-36
poverty in, 533
priv atization and free m arket reform s
i n , 5 3 0 ,5 3 2 -3 4
religion in, S 2 S f
and rule o f law, 530, 532
sanctions against, 533
and shock o f lo st em pire, 532
statism in, 532
support for return to communism in, 252/'
W estern ization in , 527, 529, 532
R ussian R evolution o f 1905, 528, 529
R ussian R evolution o f 1917, 284, 292,
445, 527, 529, 5 3 6 -3 7
Russo-Japanese W a r (1 9 0 4 -0 5 ), 485,
4 9 3 ,5 2 9
R w anda, genocide in , 3 0 4 f 305
S a c re d a n d S ec u la r (N orris and In g leh art),
361, 362, 364
Sagem an, M a rk , 289
Salinas de G o rta ri, C arlos, 499, 501
sam e-sex m arriage, 191, 329
sam e-sex relationships, d iscrim ination
against, 329
Santa A n n a , A nton io L o p ez de, 500
Santos, Ju a n , 370
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 429, 4 3 3 -3 4 , 435
Sarney, Jose, 402, 404
Saro-W iw a, Ken, 513, 514
Sartori, G iovanni, 269
S arto ri’s ladder o f abstraction, 10, 311
satisfaction, as m easure o f developm ent,
101-2
Saudi A rabia, 1 84 ,1 8 5 , 278, 2 9 9 -3 0 2 ,
3 0 1 /-3 0 2 /, 358
Scandinavia, 8 5 -8 6 , 90, 9 3 -9 4 , 203, 334
Schengen area, 381
Schm itter, P hilip p e C ., 139
Schroder, G erh a rd , 447
Schum peter, Joseph, 89
S C L C . See S outhern C h ristian
L eadership C onference
scope conditions, 40
Scotland, 47, 6 7 -6 8 , 337, 542, 543, 551
Scott, Jam es, 57, 289
secessionist m ovem ents
as challenge to m odern state system ,
4 7,68
federal system and, 1 85-86
Second A m en dm en t, U .S., 127
sect, as term , 359
secularism
assertive vs. passive, 364
definition of, 350
m o dern ity and, 350
S e c u la rism a n d S ta te P olicies T o w a r d
R e lig io n (K uru), 364
secularization, 352-53
in E urope, 353
m o dern ity and, 3 52 -5 3, 358, 3 61-62
reversals of, 358
security dilem m a, gam e th eo ry on, 391
Seko, M o b u tu Sese, 150
sem i-periphery, and dependency theory,
111-12
sem i-presidential (hybrid) systems,
212, 229, 2 3 0 /
Senate, U .S., 217, 559, 559/, 565, 566
Seneca Falls C on v en tio n , 142
separation o f church and state, in U .S.
C o n stitu tio n , 357
separation o f pow ers, 176, 233
Septem ber 11th te rro rist attacks, 387,
389, 566
services
in tern ation al trad e in, 3 7 6 -7 7
public v s. private provision of, 85
sex, v s. gender, 3 2 8 -2 9
sexual o rientation , 329
Shaftesbury, E arl of, 552
Shagari, Shehu, 513, 514
s h a r ia law, legal systems based on, 184
S hugart, M a tth ew , 243
Singapore, 418
Singh, M a n m o h a n , 458, 460, 463
single-m em ber d istricts (S M D s), 2 05 -7 ,
210/, 2 1 5 -1 8 , 268
single n on -tran sferab le vote (S N T V )
system , 491, 492
s in g le -p arty system s, 2 5 9 -6 1 . See also
d o m in a n t p a rty systems
argu m en ts for, 2 6 0 -6 1
in a u th o ritarian regim es, 148, 2 59 ,2 72
in C h in a , 127, 131, 236, 259, 260, 412,
417, 418/, 4 2 3 -2 5
in dem ocracies, 127-28
Index 635
origins of, 255
in Soviet U nion, 253
single-transferable vote (C T V ) system,
2 0 9 -1 0 , 2 10 /
Sino-Japanese W a r (1894-95), 485, 493
Skocpol, T heda, 294, 298
slavery, 332
in Brazil, 401, 403, 407
N igeria and, 512, 513
U.S. and, 1 4 2 ,1 43 /, 555, 557, 559, 564
S M D s. See single-m em ber d istricts
Sm ith, A dam , 71, 78, 363, 393, 552
S m ith, C hloe, 2 0 1 /
S m ith, Jo h n , 2 0 1 /
S N C C . See S tu dent N onviolent
C o o rd in atin g C o m m ittee
snow balling, in d em ocratization, 137
social capital, and developm ent, 108
social constructionism , on gender, 3 28 -2 9
social dem ocracy
origins of, 357
rise of, 365
as ty p e o f liberalism , 354
U nited K ingdom and, 552
Social D em ocratic P a rty (G erm any), 446,
447, 452
social id en tity theory, 306
social indicators o f developm ent, 9 8 -1 0 0
social in stitu tion s, as factor in
developm ent, 107-8
social insurance program s, 80, 86. See also
w elfare state
socialism. See also com m unism
as ideology, 351, 3 5 6 -5 7
and lai'cism, 358
in L atin A m erica, 349, 365, 367-70
tw enty-first century, 349, 3 6 5 -6 6
socialist p arties, as mass p arties, 258
social m edia, A rab Spring and, 300
social m obility, and m odern societies, 351
social movem ents, 2 8 0 -8 4
definition of, 2 7 9 -8 0
and em pow erm ent o f w om en and
m inorities, 336, 337-39
id en tity and, 337-39
v s. in terest groups, 257
and iron law o f oligarchy, 282
m obilization of, 282, 284
tactics of, 280
social netw orks, social m ovem ents
and, 280
The S o c ia l O rig in s o f D ic ta to r s h ip a n d
D em o cra cy, 160, 161
social outcom es, as m easure o f
developm ent, 9 9 -1 0 0
social-psychological approaches to
nationalism , 320
social revolutions, 2 7 9 -8 0 , 284
S o c ia l T heory o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l P olitics
(W endt), 394
society
fu n ction al in tegration of, 363
as increasing tran sn atio nal, 326
m o dern state relationship w ith , 5 0 -5 2
sociobiology, 307
S olid arity m ovem ent (Poland), 281
Som alia, 50
Som oza family, 161
S ou th A frica
and ap arth eid, 1 0 1 ,1 2 3 ,1 7 1 / 1 7 2 ,1 9 3 ,
32 1 f 3 2 8 ,4 2 2
co n stitu tio n of, 172, 1 73 ,1 7 5 -7 6 ,
1 7 7 -7 8 ,1 8 2 / 1 93-96
de-escalation o f eth n ic conflict in, 322
dem o cratizatio n in, 138
electoral system in , 2 08
ju d iciary in, 193, 195 f
political p arties in, 258, 259, 2 5 9 f 260,
2 6 8 -6 9 , 275
and terrorism , 390
S ou th ern B aptist C on v en tio n , 142
S ou th ern C h ris tia n L eadership
C onference (S C L C ), 282
S ou th ern R hodesia, 146
S ou th Korea
border w ith N o r th Korea, 96 f 97
corporatism in , 2 73 -7 4
developm ent vs. N o rth Korea, 97,11 3,
1 14 -1 7,11 6 /, 117/
econom y of, 74/
h u m a n capital levels in , 102/
political econom y in, 80, 81/
The S o v e r e ig n S ta te a n d I t s C o m p e tito rs
(Spruyt), 64
sovereignty
definitions of, 54
Iran ia n theocracy and, 476
in m odern state, 5 4-55
Soviet U nion (U SSR)
au th o ritarian ism in , 536
and C old W ar, 526, 528
collapse of, 1 05 ,1 5 3 , 365, 443, 446,
462, 525, 530, 532, 535
co m m u nist regim e in , 357
co n stitu tio n of, 184
and cu ltu ral o rigins o f
au th o ritarian ism , 1 6 3 -6 4
d om inatio n o f cen tral and eastern
E urop e, 135, 530, 532, 536
genocide in , 305
hu m a n righ ts violations in, 527, 528,
529, 536
lai'cism in, 358
m arket reform s in, 530
and M a rx ist econom ic theory, 111
as m odel for state-led developm ent,
105,116
as m u ltinatio n al, 537
and nuclear w eapons, 528
as sing le-p arty to ta litarian state, 253
and socialism , d iscreditin g of, 272,
5 2 6 ,5 3 7
and state terro rism , 288
statism in, 529, 532
as to ta litarian regim e, 148, 149
and W o rld W a r II , 4 46 , 528, 5 2 9 -3 0
Spain
co n stitu tio n of, 181, 182 f
d eb t crisis in , 373
eth n ic autonom y m ovem ents in, 382
and E U , 374
fascism in, 355
federalism in , 186
gender em powerm ent in, 345,
345/, 3 46 /
g ender em pow erm ent in form er
colonies of, 3 4 5 -4 6 , 345/, 3 4 6 /
p a rty system in, 261
social m ovem ents in, 281, 2 8 1 /
special in terest groups
and capitalism , 111
and legislators, pressure on, 202
p luralism and, 273
w eak states and, 517
W o rld W a r I I and, 273, 4 4 8 -4 9 , 492
speech, freedom of, in U .S. Bill o f R ights,
1 2 6 -2 7
Spruyt, H e n d rik , 64
spurious correlation problem , 38-39
S talin, Joseph, 111, 1 4 7 ,1 4 8 ,1 4 9 , 252f
4 46 , 526, 528, 5 2 9 -3 0 , 536, 537
stan d ard o f living, as m easure o f
developm ent, 100
S tanton, E liz a b e th Cady, 142
Stark, R odney, 362
state(s). See also m odern state
behavior, in te rn atio n a l system and, 391
breakdow n of, and revolution, 2 9 2 -9 3 ,
294, 298
definition of, 48
differentiation o f religious in stitu tion s
from , 353, 358
diffusion of, th eo ries on, 6 2 - 6 4
and ethnicity, co n struction of, 331-32
failed, 50
functions of, 55—57
g ro w th o f role, causes of, 8 0 -8 1 , 8 6-93
ongoing im p o rtance o f in in tern ation al
relations, 374, 381, 395
pressures on from above and below,
3 81 -8 2
relation to religion, variations in,
3 5 3 ,3 5 7
resource curse and, 519
as u n itary ratio n al actors, 391
w eak, and em ergence o f
au th o ritarian ism , 1 62 -6 3, 16I f
1 6 8 ,1 6 9 /
w eak, characteristics of, 517-18
state, em ergence o f
in G erm any, 4 4 9 -5 0
theories on, 47, 5 7 -6 2 , 68
in U nited K ingdom , 62, 6 5 -6 8 ,
6 6 f - 6 7 f 5 4 6 -4 7
state capacity, 4 9 -5 0 , 518
and revolution, 302, 3 02 /
state capitalism , fascism and, 355
S ta te - D ir e c te d D e v e lo p m e n t (Kohli), 107
state fem inism , 3 3 6 -3 7
636 Index
state g overnm ents, responsibilities und er
federal system , 189
state interventionism , 7 9 -8 0
state-led developm ent
in A sia, 104 -5
in Japan, 8 4 ,1 0 4
vs. m arket-led, 104—6, 107, 117/
Soviet U nion as m odel for, 105
state-led economies
argum ents for, 7 9 -8 1 , 82
v s. m arket-led, 76-77, 81—82, 81/
state o f emergency, 233
S ta te s a n d S o c ia l R e v o lu tio n s (Skocpol), 294
state system , d efinition of, 58
state terrorism , 288
statistical m ethods, 8 -9
status-inconsistency, 310
Stepan, A lfred , 186
stereotyping, 13, 313, 418
strain theory, 291
strategic voting, 2 1 0 ,2 7 0
stratification systems, and n ationalism , 310
structuralist theories o f nationalism,
309-10
structuralist theories o f revolution,
294 ,2 98
S tu dent N onviolent C oo rd in atin g
C om m ittee (SN C C ), 2 8 0 -8 1 , 283
subalterns
definition of, 286
and everyday resistance, 2 8 9 -9 0
and revolution, 2 8 6 -8 7
subject cultures, 164
sub-national groups, pressures on state
from , 381—82
substantive definitions o f democracy,
1 2 3 -2 4 ,1 4 2
substantive definitions o f religion, 351, 352
Sudan, genocide in, 305
sultanism , 149—50
Sun Yat-sen, 415, 416
Suprem e C o u rt, U .S., 178-79
and ju d icial activism , 191-92, 5 6 3 -6 4
supreme (high) courts, 178-79, 233. See
also judicial review
sustainability, 384, 386
Suu Kyi, A un g San, l Y ) f
SVT. See single-transferable vote (C T V )
system
Sweden, 334
Sw itzerland, 1 8 0 ,1 8 2 / 183, 374
Syria, 153, 299, 300, 3 0 1 -2 , 301/, 302/,
474, 479
T aiping Rebellion, 415, 425
T aiw an, 415, 485
T a k in g P o w e r (Foran), 298
T am il T ig ers, 390
T anzania, political p arties in, 268 —69
Tarrow , Sidney, 279
taxation
and alienation o f citizens, 56
and em ergence o f state, 59, 60
as state fu n ction , 49, 5 6 -5 7
V alue-A dded T ax, 434
term lim its, 233
terrorism , 287—89, 3 8 9 -9 0
definition of, 2 80 , 2 8 7 -8 8 , 389
M u m bai te rro rist attack (2008), 458,
4 6 0 ,4 6 7
in N igeria, 513, 514, 523
nuclear w eapons an d , 390
R ussia and, 534
S eptem ber 11th terro rist attacks,
3 87 ,3 89 , 566
T okyo subway sarin attack , 485
types of, 2 8 8 -8 9
U .S. a n d ,567
terro rist groups, 387, 3 8 9 -9 0
terro rist netw orks, 289
Texas, independence of, 499, 500
T hatcher, M a rg are t, 87, 542, 543, 545,
546, 548
theocracies, 1 4 9 ,1 8 4 ,1 8 5 , 3 0 2 /
th eo retical critiques, 3 9 - 4 0
theories
definition of, 25
developm ent and uses of, 27—29
h ypotheses an d , 2 6 - 2 7
norm ative v s. em pirical, 25
scope conditions and, 40
synthesis and developm ent of, 62
T heory o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l P olitics
(W altz), 391
Thesis, 27
The T h ir d W a v e (H u n tin g to n ), 137
T hird W orld. See also developing w orld
C old W a r and, 135
underdevelopm ent in, M a rx ist views
on, 111
T hird W o rld revolutions, 286
Thom as, G eorge M ., 65
Three W orlds o f W elfare C a p ita lis m
(E sping-A ndersen), 91, 9 3 -9 4
Thucydides, 391
T ia n a n m e n Square protests (C hina), 153,
416, 4 2 3 ,4 2 4
Tilly, C harles, 60, 279
T ocqueville, A lexis de, 1 07 -8 , 135, 292,
294, 4 3 6 ,5 6 3
T ocqueville effect, 291
Togo, and com parative m etho d , 1 4,16 -1 7,
16/, 1 9 ,1 9 /, 2 0
toleration, religious, origins of, 3 6 2 -6 3
T ory p a rty (U.K.), 5 4 2 -4 3
to ta litarian regim es, 148 -4 9, 274
T o w a r d s J u ris to c r a c y (H irschl), 193
trad e, 3 7 6 -8 0
com parative advantage th eo ry of,
3 7 8 -8 0 ,3 7 8 /
free trad e, 374, 5 4 5 -4 6
globalization and, 3 7 6 -8 0
protectionism and, 380
“The T ragedy o f th e C om m o n s”
(H a rd in ), 386
transgendered identities, 328
tran sitio n phase o f d em ocratization,
1 2 5 ,1 2 9
T r a n s itio n s f r o m A u t h o r i t a r ia n R u l e
(O ’D o n n ell e t al., eds.), 138, 139
tran sn atio n a l issues, 375—76
tran sn atio n a l netw orks, 3 8 7 -8 8
T rea ty o f R om e (1957), 431, 444
T rea ty o f W e stp h alia (1648), 4 4 3 -4 4
T rotsky, L eon, 528, 529, 536, 537
T ru m an , H arry , 486
tru s t, and developm ent, 1 0 8 ,1 0 9
T ru st: The S o c ia l V ir tu e s a n d th e C re a tio n
o f P ro s p e r ity (Fukuyam a), 109
T unisia, A rab S pring and, 278, 2 9 8 ,2 9 9 ,
2 9 9 /3 0 0 ,3 0 1 - 2 ,3 0 1 / , 3 02 /
Turkey, 184, 364
tw o -p a rty system s, 2 6 1 -6 2
circum stances encouraging, 268
shaping o f p olitical outcom es by,
2 6 9 - 7 2 , 2 7 0 / 2 7 1 /
typologies
in disaggregation o f concepts, 367
o f nationalism , 311-13, 311/
ty ra n n y o f th e majority, 126
U ganda
personalistic dictatorship in , 150
and p olitical p arties, 260
sing le-p arty ru le in, 1 2 7 -2 8 ,1 2 8 f
U ighur eth n ic group (C hina), 382
U kraine
dem ocratic breakdow n in, 155
O rang e R evolution in, 1 5 5 ,1 5 < /
U n d e r s ta n d in g T erro r N e t w o r k s
(Sagem an), 289
unem ploym ent, as econom ic m easure, 75
U N H C R . S ee U n ite d N atio ns H ig h
C om m ission for Refugees
unicam eral legislatures, 2 0 3 - 4
U N IC E F , 380
unions
and corporatism , 2 6 5 -6 6
and developm ent o f w elfare state, 90
in Jap an , 488, 490
and m o bilization for revolution, 293
unipo lar w orld, in in tern ation al
relations, 391
u nitarism , 1 76 ,1 82 —83, 185
u n itary ra tio n al actors, states as, 391
U n ite d A rab E m ira te s, co n stitu tio n
of, 1 8 2 /
U n ite d K in gd o m (U.K.). See also
P arlia m en t o f U .K .
b allo t access in , 206
and B ritish E m pire, 543, 545
C ivil W ars in , 5 4 1 -4 2 , 549
coalitions in , 239
and colonialism , 457-59, 512, 513, 539,
541, 542, 543, 5 4 5 -4 6 , 547, 550,
551, 552, 555
com m on law system , 177, 541
as co n stitu tio n al m onarchy, 126,
541, 548
Index 637
co n stitu tio n of, 177,181, 539, 541,
5 4 8 -4 9
econom ic perform ance after W orld
W a r II, 273
economy of, 74/, 539/
elections in, 2 0 S f
electoral system in, 207, 2 07 /
ethn ic groups in , 539f 541
and E U , 374, 542, 543, 544, 545
executive stru ctu re in, 2 49/, 544,
5 44/, 550
gender em pow erm ent in form er
colonies of, 3 4 4 -4 6 , 345/, 3 4 6 /
global cu ltural influence of, 545,
5 4 7 -4 8 , 550, 551, 552
globalization and, 548
G lorious Revolution o f 1 68 8-89 in,
539, 541, 542, 547, 549
historical developm ent in , 6 5 -6 8 ,
5 41-43
h um an capital levels in, 102/
and Industrial Revolution, 5 4 3 ,5 4 5 , 547
inequality in, 546
Islam ic im m igran ts in , 383
and ju d icial review, lack of, 192, 549
key features of, 5 39 -4 1, 539/
and K eynesianism , 355
legal system in, 184
and liberalism , 355, 541, 545,
547, 552
m ap of, 540/*
and m odernity, 541, 542, 545, 550
m onarchs role in, 227, 544, 545
N atio nal H ea lth Service in, 541, 542,
5 48 ,5 5 2
n ational id en tity in, 539, 545
nationalism in, 308, 550-51
and nuclear weapons, 388
p olitical cu lture in, 545
political economy in, 77, 81/, 5 4 5 -4 6 ,
5 47-48
political institu tion s in, 544, 5 4 4 /
political p arties in, 207, 207/, 258,
5 42 -4 3
poverty in, 546
religion in, 5 3 9 f 541, 551
state developm ent in, 62, 6 5 -6 8 ,
6 6 f - 6 7 f , 5 4 6 - 4 7
statism in, 548
terrorism and, 383
welfare state in, 87, 541, 542, 543, 546,
547, 548
and W estern nationalism , 311, 311/,
313/
U nited N ations (U N )
functions of, 380
H u m a n D evelopm ent Index (H D I), 100
U .S .a n d ,567
U nited N ations D evelopm ent
Program m e, and p overty
m easurem ent, 9 8 -9 9
U n ite d N ations H ig h C om m ission for
Refugees (U N H C R ), 380
U n ite d States (U .S.). See also C ongress,
U .S.; C o n stitu tio n , U .S.
and A m erican D ream , 559, 560
and capitalism , 560, 567
citizen sh ip oaths, 312 f
and civic nationalism , 331
C ivil W a r in, 556, 557, 559, 562, 564
as co n stitu tio n al republic, 126
and cu lture o f en trepreneurship, 561
dem ocracy in, 120, 1 2 4 ,1 3 5 , 140,
1 4 1 -4 4 ,1 4 3 /, 5 6 2 -6 3
and d em ocratization, 130
d en om inatio n alism in, 3 5 9 -6 0
d iscrim ination in, 326, 331, 557, 561,
5 6 3 -6 4
divided g overnm ent in, 221
econom ic p erform ance in, 72
econom y of, 74/, 553/
electoral system in, 2 2 3 -2 4 , 437
eth n ic g roups in, 5 5 3 /
exceptionalism of, 555
executive stru ctu re in , 2 49/, 566
fiscal p roblem s lo n g-term , 72
foreign policy, terro rism and, 390
freedom as core value in, 11f
fu tu re challenges for, 567
gender em p o w erm ent in, 344, 345,
345/, 3 4 6 /
geographical advantages of, 112
global cu ltural influence of, 439
and g lobalization, 567
and global order, 567
and G re at Recession o f 2 0 0 8 , 72
historical developm ent in, 555-58
h um an capital levels in, 102/
hyphenated A m ericans, 331
im m igration as issue in, 382, 555, 567
in eq u ality in, 73, 75, 124, 140, 557,
5 6 0 ,5 6 2 -6 3
isolationism and, 560, 567
ju d icial activism in , 1 9 0 -9 2 , 5 6 3 -6 4
key features of, 553 -5 5, 553/
as liberal dem ocracy, 253
and liberalism , 541
m ap of, 5 5 4 f
“m eltin g p o t” m etap ho r for, 331
M exican rule o f law issues and, 504, 505
as m odel, 553-55
and m u lticu ltu ralism , 331
as n ation o f im m igran ts, 384
and nuclear w eapons, 388
and P ak istan , 467
political cu lture in , 5 5 9 -6 0
p olitical econom y in , 72, 81/, 5 6 0 -6 1
political in stitu tio n s in, 558-59, 559/
p olitical p arties in, 221, 253, 258, 261,
557-58
as polluter, 495
poverty in, 5 6 0 -6 1
poverty line in, 99
relations w ith th e w orld, 381
religion in , 353, 357, 361, 5 5 3 / 555
religious pluralism in, 362
secularism in, 364
and slavery, 142,143/, 555, 557, 559, 564
and socialism , w eak trad itio n of, 555
stability of, 555
terro rist attacks on, 390 {See also
Septem ber 11th terro rist attacks)
trad e protectionism in, 5 61-62
unem ploym ent in, 561
welfare state in , 8 5 -8 6 , 90, 555, 556,
5 57 ,5 58 , 566
and W estern nationalism , 311/, 313/
and W o rld W a r II , 446
U n ite d States A gency for In tern ation al
D evelopm ent, 51
u pp er cham ber, 2 03 , 2 16 -1 7
U ribe, A lvaro, 370
U ruguay, 345/, 368, 370
U S SR . S ee S oviet U nion
utility, 102
id en tity utility, 318
Vajpayee, A ta l B ihari, 458
Vails, M an u el, 427/
value systems
and d em o cratizatio n, 135
and developm ent, 109-10
Van C o tt, D o n n a L ee, 340
Vargas, G etu lio , 402, 403
variables. See also correlation
in com parative m eth o d , 1 4-15, 44
d ep en dent, 14
in d ep en dent, 14
variations, in com parative analysis, 15
Varshney, A sh u to sh , 321
Vasconcelos, Jose, 508
V azquez, T abare, 368, 370
Venezuela
A m erin d ia n p olitical parties in, 340
and colonialism , 401, 498
co n stitu tio n of, 182/*
dem ocratic b reakd o w n in , 1 55 ,1 5 7 -5 8
ideology of, 3 6 6 -6 7
populism in, 245
socialism in, 349, 365, 368, 369, 370
Verba, Sidney, 164, 545, 5 5 9 -6 0
veto pow er o f presidents, 2 28 , 230, 2 32,
234, 460, 559, 566
V ietnam
co m m u nist regim e in, 357
C o n fu cian ism an d , 418
V illa, Francisco “Pancho,” 498, 5 00 -5 01
violence, types of, 315
V iolence a n d S o c ia l O rd ers (N o rth , W allis,
and W eingast), 61
voting, obligatory, in Brazil, 405
votin g rights
in dem ocracy, 126
expansion o f over tim e, 201
in U .K ., 543
and U .S. democracy, 1 41 ,142, 557
for w om en, 141, 142, 201, 334,
410, 485
V oting R ights A c t o f 1 9 6 5 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 2 , 556
638 Index
W ales, 6 7 -6 8 , 67f 3 3 7 ,5 4 3 ,5 5 1
W allace, G eorge, 557
W allerstein, Im m anu el, 113
W allis, Jo h n , 61
W alpole, R ob ert, 543
W altz , K en n eth , 391
war, and orig in o f th e state, 59—60
W a sh in g to n C onsensus, 340, 380, 407
Way, L ucan A ., 166
w ealth, correlation w ith democracy, 2 8,
2 9 - 3 0 ,3 1 - 3 3
The W e a lth o f N a t i o n s (Sm ith), 78
W eber, M a x , 48, 109, 473
W eim ar Republic, 1 3 7 ,1 5 5 ,1 6 2 , 443,
4 44 , 445, 448, 450
W eingast, Barry, 61
welfare state. See also specific c ou n tries
affordability of, as issue, 86
conservative views on, 88, 89
and decom m odification o f
individuals, 91
definition of, 85
emergence, theories on causes of, 86—93
and increasing governm ent involvem ent
in economy, 8 0 -8 1
M a rx ist views on, 88
as m odern state responsibility, 8 5 -8 6
in N ordic countries, 93—94
reduction of, states’ im plem enting, 87
in Scandinavia, 85—86, 90
types of, 91
W elzel, C h ristia n , 140
W end t, A lexander, 394
W essels, L eon, 1 7 1 /
W estern civilization, Islam as
incom patible w ith , 366
W estern nationalism , 311-13, 311/, 3 13 /
W esterw elle, G uido, 2 3 I f
W estm in ste r System, 2 06 , 549, 550
W h ig P a rty (U.K.), 5 4 2 -4 3
W h ite h e ad , L aurence, 139
W H O . S ee W o rld H e a lth O rg an ization
W ho G o v e rn s ? (D ahl), 266
W h y M e n R e b e l (G urr), 292
W h y N a t i o n s F a i l (A cem oglu and
Robinson), 115
W ib b els, E rik , 190
W ilh e lm I (kaiser o f G erm any), 450
W ilh e lm I I (kaiser o f G erm any), 443, 450
W illia m o f O rang e, 542
W ilso n , Jam es H ow ard , 542
W ilso n , W oodrow , 176, 566, 567
W im m er, A nd reas, 322
w ith in -case com parison, 2 0 ,1 4 1 - 4 4
w om en. See also g ender d iscrim ination
election quo ta systems for, 3 4 2 -4 4
factors influencing political
representation of, 3 37-43
in Iran , 477, 479
in Jap an , 485, 488, 490, 4 9 3 -9 4
representation o f in legislatures, 214
sm all business loans to, 3 3 5 -3 6
superior p erform ance in educational
system , 334
in U .S., 557
violence against, in I n d ia, 460
votin g righ ts for, 141, 1 42 ,2 0 1 , 334,
410, 485
w om en, em pow erm ent o f
in Brazil, 410-11
indicators of, 3 4 4 —4 6, 345/, 3 4 6 /
in L atin A m erica, 134—35
m ethods of, 3 37-43
types of, 3 3 4 -3 7
w om en’s cooperatives, 335—36
w om en’s m ovem ent, 336, 338
W o rld B ank, 51, 9 8 - 9 9 ,1 0 5 , 380, 567
W o rld H e a lth O rg an iz atio n (W H O ), 380
w orld p olity theory, 6 4 -6 5
W o rld Social F orum , 281
“W o rld Society and th e N atio n -S tate”
(M eyer e t al.), 65
w orld society theory, 6 4 - 6 5
W o rld T rad e O rg an iz atio n (W T O ), 416
W o rld Values Survey, 113, 361
W o rld W a r I
France and, 4 30 -3 1
G erm an y and, 443, 4 44 , 445, 448, 450
Ira n and, 470
Jap an and, 485, 486
and rise o f state power, 80
Russia and, 5 29 ,5 36
U n ite d K ingdom and, 543
U .S . and, 556, 567
W o rld W a r II
and atom ic b om bing o f Japan, 388
C h in a and, 415
and executive control, expansion
of, 248
France and, 431, 433
G erm an y an d , 443, 4 44 , 4 4 5 -4 6 ,
448, 450
Iran and, 470
Jap an a n d , 4 46 , 484, 485, 486,
4 9 2 ,4 9 3
Soviet U nion and, 446, 528, 5 29 -3 0
state-led developm ent follow ing,
1 0 4 -5 ,4 4 8 -4 9
U nited K ingdom and, 543
U .S . and, 556, 567
and w elfare state, 91, 546
X i Jinp in g , 236f 412/, 416, 423
x variable, 14
Yar’A du a, U m aru, 5 13 ,5 1 4 , 521
Yeltsin, Boris, 153, 528, 530, 533, 534,
535, 536
y variable, 14
Z aire (now D em o cratic R epublic o f the
C ongo)
personalistic d ictatorsh ip in, 150
political econom y in , 80
Z ap ata, E m ilian o, 498, 5 00 , 508—9
Z ap atista insurgency, 499, 509
Z ed illo , E rn esto , 499
Z hirinovsky, V ladim ir, 535
Z im babw e, a u th o ritarian regim e in, 146,
1 6 7 -6 9 ,1 6 7 /, 169/
Z ollverein, 450
Z u m a , Jacob, 2 5 9 f
Takes an integrative
a p p ro ach to the
re la tio n sh ip
between big them es
and co u n try c a se
stu d ie s and
pro vide s stu d e n ts
w ith the to o ls
to think critically,
an alyze the
w orld, and “do”
com parative politics
O X r O R D
U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S
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H More so than any other textbook on the market, Comparative
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M I am impressed by the way that Comparative Politics, Second
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P L E A S E S E E TH E PR
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