150 words. Please read the instructions crefully that are attached. Use the resources that have been attached ONLY.
Week 5
What is Virtue to you? More importantly: is virtue important to our daily lives?
150 words minimum.
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PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
Many more or less important alterations have been made in this translation, which
was first published in 1881, as new editions have from time to time been called for.
The present edition in particular has been revised throughout, and brought into
accordance with Bywater’s text (Oxford, 1890),* which is coming to be recognized,
not in Oxford only, as the received text of the Nicomachean Ethics. I wish gratefully
to acknowledge the debt which, in common with all lovers of Aristotle, I owe to Mr.
Bywater, both for his edition and for his “Contributions to the Textual Criticism of the
Nicomachean Ethics” (Oxford, 1892).
To Mr. Stewart also I wish to express my gratitude, not only for much assistance
derived from his admirable “Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics” (Oxford, 1892), but
also for much kindly and helpful criticism in that work and in a review of my first
edition (Mind, July, 1881). My old friends Mr. A. C. Bradley and Mr. J. Cook Wilson
(Professors now at Glasgow and Oxford respectively) will allow me to repeat my
thanks for the valuable help they gave me when the first edition was passing through
the press. To Mr. F. H. Hall of Oriel, and Mr. L. A. Selby Bigge of my own College, I
am indebted for some corrections in a subsequent edition. To other translators and
commentators I am also under many obligations, which I can only acknowledge in
general terms.
When I have inserted in the text explanatory words of my own, I have enclosed them
in square brackets thus [ ]. A short Index of leading terms and proper names has been
added to this edition (in preparing which I have found Mr. Bywater’s Index of the
greatest service). This Index makes no pretension to completeness or anything
approaching to completeness (except in regard to proper names). Its aim is merely, in
conjunction with the Table of Contents, to help the reader to find the more important
passages bearing on the questions in which he may be specially interested.
F. H. PETERS.
Oxford,May, 189
3.
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BOOK I.
THE END.
1.
In All He Does Man Seeks Same Good As End Or Means.
Every art and every kind of inquiry, and likewise every act and purpose, seems to aim
at some good: and so it has been well said that the good is that at which everything
aims.
But a difference is observable among these aims or ends. What is aimed at is
sometimes the exercise of a faculty, sometimes a certain result beyond that exercise.
And where there is an end beyond the act, there the result is better than the exercise of
the faculty.
Now since there are many kinds of actions and many arts and sciences, it follows that
there are many ends also; e.g. health is the end of medicine, ships of shipbuilding,
victory of the art of war, and wealth of economy.
But when several of these are subordinated to some one art or science,—as the
making of bridles and other trappings to the art of horsemanship, and this in turn,
along with all else that the soldier does, to the art of war, and so on,* —then the end
of the master-art is always more desired than the ends of the subordinate arts, since
these are pursued for its sake. And this is equally true whether the end in view be the
mere exercise of a faculty or something beyond that, as in the above instances.
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2.
THE End Is THE Good; Our Subject Is This And Its Science
Politics.
If then in what we do there be some end which we wish for on its own account,
choosing all the others as means to this, but not every end without exception as a
means to something else (for so we should go on ad infinitum, and desire would be
left void and objectless),—this evidently will be the good or the best of all things.
And surely from a practical point of view it much concerns us to know this good; for
then, like archers shooting at a definite mark, we shall be more likely to attain what
we want.
If this be so, we must try to indicate roughly what it is, and first of all to which of the
arts or sciences it belongs.
It would seem to belong to the supreme art or science, that one which most of all
deserves the name of master-art or master-science.
Now Politics† seems to answer to this description. For it prescribes which of the
sciences a state needs, and which each man shall study, and up to what point; and to it
we see subordinated even the highest arts, such as economy, rhetoric, and the art of
war.
Since then it makes use of the other practical sciences, and since it further ordains
what men are to do and from what to refrain, its end must include the ends of the
others, and must be the proper good of man.
For though this good is the same for the individual and the state, yet the good of the
state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure; and glad as
one would be to do this service for a single individual, to do it for a people and for a
number of states is nobler and more divine.
This then is the aim of the present inquiry, which is a sort of political inquiry.*
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3.
Exactness Not Permitted By Subject Nor To Be Expected By
Student, Who Needs Experience And Training.
We must be content if we can attain to so much precision in our statement as the
subject before us admits of; for the same degree of accuracy is no more to be expected
in all kinds of reasoning than in all kinds of handicraft.
Now the things that are noble and just (with which Politics deals) are so various and
so uncertain, that some think these are merely conventional and not natural
distinctions.
There is a similar uncertainty also about what is good, because good things often do
people harm: men have before now been ruined by wealth, and have lost their lives
through courage.
Our subject, then, and our data being of this nature, we must be content if we can
indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and if, in dealing with matters that are not
amenable to immutable laws, and reasoning from premises that are but probable, we
can arrive at probable conclusions.*
The reader, on his part, should take each of my statements in the same spirit; for it is
the mark of an educated man to require, in each kind of inquiry, just so much
exactness as the subject admits of: it is equally absurd to accept probable reasoning
from a mathematician, and to demand scientific proof from an orator.
But each man can form a judgment about what he knows, and is called “a good judge”
of that—of any special matter when he has received a special education therein, “a
good judge” (without any qualifying epithet) when he has received a universal
education. And hence a young man is not qualified to be a student of Politics; for he
lacks experience of the affairs of life, which form the data and the subject-matter of
Politics.
Further, since he is apt to be swayed by his feelings, he will derive no benefit from a
study whose aim is not speculative but practical.
But in this respect young in character counts the same as young in years; for the
young man’s disqualification is not a matter of time, but is due to the fact that feeling
rules his life and directs all his desires. Men of this character turn the knowledge they
get to no account in practice, as we see with those we call incontinent; but those who
direct their desires and actions by reason will gain much profit from the knowledge of
these matters.
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So much then by way of preface as to the student, and the spirit in which he must
accept what we say, and the object which we propose to ourselves.
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We must reason from
facts accepted without
question by the man
of trained character.
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4.
Men Agree That The Good Is Happiness, But Differ As To
What This Is.
4. Since—to resume—all knowledge and all purpose aims at some good, what is this
which we say is the aim of Politics; or, in other words, what is the highest of all
realizable goods?
As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of
culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well” or to “do well” is
the same as to be “happy.”
But they differ as to what this happiness is, and the masses do not give the same
account of it as the philosophers.
The former take it to be something palpable and plain, as pleasure or wealth or fame;
one man holds it to be this, and another that, and often the same man is of different
minds at different times,—after sickness it is health, and in poverty it is wealth; while
when they are impressed with the consciousness of their ignorance, they admire most
those who say grand things that are above their comprehension.
Some philosophers, on the other hand, have thought that, beside these several good
things, there is an “absolute” good which is the cause of their goodness.
As it would hardly be worth while to review all the opinions that have been held, we
will confine ourselves to those which are most popular, or which seem to have some
foundation in reason.
But we must not omit to notice the distinction that is drawn
between the method of proceeding from your starting-points or
principles, and the method of working up to them. Plato used
with fitness to raise this question, and to ask whether the right
way is from or to your starting-points, as in the race-course you
may run from the judges to the boundary, or vice versâ.
Well, we must start from what is known.
But “what is known” may mean two things: “what is known to us,” which is one
thing, or “what is known” simply, which is another.
I think it is safe to say that we must start from what is known to us.
And on this account nothing but a good moral training can qualify a man to study
what is noble and just—in a word, to study questions of Politics. For the
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undemonstrated fact is here the starting-point, and if this undemonstrated fact be
sufficiently evident to a man, he will not require a “reason why.” Now the man who
has had a good moral training either has already arrived at starting-points or principles
of action, or will easily accept them when pointed out. But he who neither has them
nor will accept them may hear what Hesiod says* —
“The best is he who of himself doth know;
Good too is he who listens to the wise;
But he who neither knows himself nor heeds
The words of others, is a useless man.”
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5.
The Good Cannot Be Pleasure, Nor Honour, Nor Virtue.
Let us now take up the discussion at the point from which we digressed.
It seems that men not unreasonably take their notions of the good or happiness from
the lives actually led, and that the masses who are the least refined suppose it to be
pleasure, which is the reason why they aim at nothing higher than the life of
enjoyment.
For the most conspicuous kinds of life are three: this life of enjoyment, the life of the
statesman, and, thirdly, the contemplative life.
The mass of men show themselves utterly slavish in their preference for the life of
brute beasts, but their views receive consideration because many of those in high
places have the tastes of Sardanapalus.
Men of refinement with a practical turn prefer honour; for I suppose we may say that
honour is the aim of the statesman’s life.
But this seems too superficial to be the good we are seeking: for it appears to depend
upon those who give rather than upon those who receive it; while we have a
presentiment that the good is something that is peculiarly a man’s own and can scarce
be taken away from him.
Moreover, these men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their
own excellence,—at least, they wish to be honoured by men of sense, and by those
who know them, and on the ground of their virtue or excellence. It is plain, then, that
in their view, at any rate, virtue or excellence is better than honour; and perhaps we
should take this to be the end of the statesman’s life, rather than honour.
But virtue or excellence also appears too incomplete to be what we want; for it seems
that a man might have virtue and yet be asleep or be inactive all his life, and,
moreover, might meet with the greatest disasters and misfortunes; and no one would
maintain that such a man is happy, except for argument’s sake. But we will not dwell
on these matters now, for they are sufficiently discussed in the popular treatises.
The third kind of life is the life of contemplation: we will treat of it further on.*
As for the money-making life, it is something quite contrary to nature; and wealth
evidently is not the good of which we are in search, for it is merely useful as a means
to something else. So we might rather take pleasure and virtue or excellence to be
ends than wealth; for they are chosen on their own account. But it seems that not even
they are the end, though much breath has been wasted in attempts to show that they
are.
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6.
Various Arguments To Show Against The Platonists That There
Cannot Be One Universal Good.
Dismissing these views, then, we have now to consider the “universal good,” and to
state the difficulties which it presents; though such an inquiry is not a pleasant task in
view of our friendship for the authors of the doctrine of ideas. But we venture to think
that this is the right course, and that in the interests of truth we ought to sacrifice even
what is nearest to us, especially as we call ourselves philosophers. Both are dear to us,
but it is a sacred duty to give the preference to truth.
In the first place, the authors of this theory themselves did not assert a common idea
in the case of things of which one is prior to the other; and for this reason they did not
hold one common idea of numbers. Now the predicate good is applied to substances
and also to qualities and relations. But that which has independent existence, what we
call “substance,” is logically prior to that which is relative; for the latter is an offshoot
as it were, or [in logical language] an accident of a thing or substance. So [by their
own showing] there cannot be one common idea of these goods.
Secondly, the term good is used in as many different ways as the term “is” or “being:”
we apply the term to substances or independent existences, as God, reason; to
qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as the moderate or due amount; to relatives, as the
useful; to time, as opportunity; to place, as habitation, and so on. It is evident,
therefore, that the word good cannot stand for one and the same notion in all these
various applications; for if it did, the term could not be applied in all the categories,
but in one only.
Thirdly, if the notion were one, since there is but one science of all the things that
come under one idea, there would be but one science of all goods; but as it is, there
are many sciences even of the goods that come under one category; as, for instance,
the science which deals with opportunity in war is strategy, but in disease is medicine;
and the science of the due amount in the matter of food is medicine, but in the matter
of exercise is the science of gymnastic.
Fourthly, one might ask what they mean by the “absolute:” in “absolute man” and
“man” the word “man” has one and the same sense; for in respect of manhood there
will be no difference between them; and if so, neither will there be any difference in
respect of goodness between “absolute good” and “good.”
Fifthly, they do not make the good any more good by making it eternal; a white thing
that lasts a long while is no whiter than what lasts but a day.
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Even if there were, it
would not help us
here.
There seems to be more plausibility in the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, who [in their
table of opposites] place the one on the same side with the good things [instead of
reducing all goods to unity]; and even Speusippus* seems to follow them in this.
However, these points may be reserved for another occasion; but objection may be
taken to what I have said on the ground that the Platonists do not speak in this way of
all goods indiscriminately, but hold that those that are pursued and welcomed on their
own account are called good by reference to one common form or type, while those
things that tend to produce or preserve these goods, or to prevent their opposites, are
called good only as means to these, and in a different sense.
It is evident that there will thus be two classes of goods: one good in themselves, the
other good as means to the former. Let us separate then from the things that are
merely useful those that are good in themselves, and inquire if they are called good by
reference to one common idea or type.
Now what kind of things would one call “good in themselves”?
Surely those things that we pursue even apart from their consequences, such as
wisdom and sight and certain pleasures and certain honours; for although we
sometimes pursue these things as means, no one could refuse to rank them among the
things that are good in themselves.
If these be excluded, nothing is good in itself except the idea; and then the type or
form will be meaningless.*
If however, these are ranked among the things that are good in themselves, then it
must be shown that the goodness of all of them can be defined in the same terms, as
white has the same meaning when applied to snow and to white lead.
But, in fact, we have to give a separate and different account of the goodness of
honour and wisdom and pleasure.
Good, then, is not a term that is applied to all these things alike in the same sense or
with reference to one common idea or form.
But how then do these things come to be called good? for they do not appear to have
received the same name by chance merely. Perhaps it is because they all proceed from
one source, or all conduce to one end; or perhaps it is rather in virtue of some
analogy, just as we call the reason the eye of the soul because it bears the same
relation to the soul that the eye does to the body, and so on.
But we may dismiss these questions at present; for to discuss them in detail belongs
more properly to another branch of philosophy.
And for the same reason we may dismiss the further
consideration of the idea; for even granting that this term good,
which is applied to all these different things, has one and the
same meaning throughout, or that there is an absolute good apart
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from these particulars, it is evident that this good will not be anything that man can
realize or attain: but it is a good of this kind that we are now seeking.
It might, perhaps, be thought that it would nevertheless be well to make ourselves
acquainted with this universal good, with a view to the goods that are attainable and
realizable. With this for a pattern, it may be said, we shall more readily discern our
own good, and discerning achieve it.
There certainly is some plausibility in this argument, but it seems to be at variance
with the existing sciences; for though they are all aiming at some good and striving to
make up their deficiencies, they neglect to inquire about this universal good. And yet
it is scarce likely that the professors of the several arts and sciences should not know,
nor even look for, what would help them so much.
And indeed I am at a loss to know how the weaver or the carpenter would be
furthered in his art by a knowledge of this absolute good, or how a man would be
rendered more able to heal the sick or to command an army by contemplation of the
pure form or idea. For it seems to me that the physician does not even seek for health
in this abstract way, but seeks for the health of man, or rather of some particular man,
for it is individuals that he has to heal.
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7.
The Good Is The Final End, And Happiness Is This.
Leaving these matters, then, let us return once more to the question, what this good
can be of which we are in search.
It seems to be different in different kinds of action and in different arts,—one thing in
medicine and another in war, and so on. What then is the good in each of these cases?
Surely that for the sake of which all else is done. And that in medicine is health, in
war is victory, in building is a house,—a different thing in each different case, but
always, in whatever we do and in whatever we choose, the end. For it is always for
the sake of the end that all else is done.
If then there be one end of all that man does, this end will be the realizable good,—or
these ends, if there be more than one.
By this generalization our argument is brought to the same point as before.* This
point we must try to explain more clearly.
We see that there are many ends. But some of these are chosen only as means, as
wealth, flutes, and the whole class of instruments. And so it is plain that not all ends
are final.
But the best of all things must, we conceive, be something final.
If then there be only one final end, this will be what we are seeking,—or if there be
more than one, then the most final of them.
Now that which is pursued as an end in itself is more final than that which is pursued
as means to something else, and that which is never chosen as means than that which
is chosen both as an end in itself and as means, and that is strictly final which is
always chosen as an end in itself and never as means.
Happiness seems more than anything else to answer to this description: for we always
choose it for itself, and never for the sake of something else; while honour and
pleasure and reason, and all virtue or excellence, we choose partly indeed for
themselves (for, apart from any result, we should choose each of them), but partly
also for the sake of happiness, supposing that they will help to make us happy. But no
one chooses happiness for the sake of these things, or as a means to anything else at
all.
We seem to be led to the same conclusion when we start from the notion of self-
sufficiency.
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To find it we ask,
What is man’s
junction?
The final good is thought to be self-sufficing [or all-sufficing]. In applying this term
we do not regard a man as an individual leading a solitary life, but we also take
account of parents, children, wife, and, in short, friends and fellow-citizens generally,
since man is naturally a social being. Some limit must indeed be set to this; for if you
go on to parents and descendants and friends of friends, you will never come to a stop.
But this we will consider further on: for the present we will take self-sufficing to
mean what by itself makes life desirable and in want of nothing. And happiness is
believed to answer to this description.
And further, happiness is believed to be the most desirable thing in the world, and that
not merely as one among other good things: if it were merely one among other good
things [so that other things could be added to it], it is plain that the addition of the
least of other goods must make it more desirable; for the addition becomes a surplus
of good, and of two goods the greater is always more desirable.
Thus it seems that happiness is something final and self-sufficing, and is the end of all
that man does.
But perhaps the reader thinks that though no one will dispute the
statement that happiness is the best thing in the world, yet a still
more precise definition of it is needed.
This will best be gained, I think, by asking, What is the function of man? For as the
goodness and the excellence of a piper or a sculptor, or the practiser of any art, and
generally of those who have any function or business to do, lies in that function, so
man’s good would seem to lie in his function, if he has one.
But can we suppose that, while a carpenter and a cobbler has a function and a
business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned him by nature?
Nay, surely as his several members, eye and hand and foot, plainly have each his own
function, so we must suppose that man also has some function over and above all
these.
What then is it?
Life evidently he has in common even with the plants, but we want that which is
peculiar to him. We must exclude, therefore, the life of mere nutrition and growth.
Next to this comes the life of sense; but this too he plainly shares with horses and
cattle and all kinds of animals.
There remains then the life whereby he acts—the life of his rational nature,* with its
two sides or divisions, one rational as obeying reason, the other rational as having and
exercising reason.
But as this expression is ambiguous,† we must be understood to mean thereby the life
that consists in the exercise of the faculties; for this seems to be more properly
entitled to the name.
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Resulting definition
of happiness.
The function of man, then, is exercise of his vital faculties [or soul] on one side in
obedience to reason, and on the other side with reason.
But what is called the function of a man of any profession and the function of a man
who is good in that profession are generically the same, e.g. of a harper and of a good
harper; and this holds in all cases without exception, only that in the case of the latter
his superior excellence at his work is added; for we say a harper’s function is to harp,
and a good harper’s to harp well.
(Man’s function then being, as we say, a kind of life—that is to say, exercise of his
faculties and action of various kinds with reason—the good man’s function is to do
this well and beautifully [or nobly]. But the function of anything is done well when it
is done in accordance with the proper excellence of that thing.)‡
If this be so the result is that the good of man is exercise of his
faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue, or, if there be
more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete
virtue.*
But there must also be a full term of years for this exercise;† for one swallow or one
fine day does not make a spring, nor does one day or any small space of time make a
blessed or happy man.
This, then, may be taken as a rough outline of the good; for this, I think, is the proper
method,—first to sketch the outline, and then to fill in the details. But it would seem
that, the outline once fairly drawn, any one can carry on the work and fit in the several
items which time reveals to us or helps us to find. And this indeed is the way in which
the arts and sciences have grown; for it requires no extraordinary genius to fill up the
gaps.
We must bear in mind, however, what was said above, and not demand the same
degree of accuracy in all branches of study, but in each case so much as the subject-
matter admits of and as is proper to that kind of inquiry. The carpenter and the
geometer both look for the right angle, but in different ways: the former only wants
such an approximation to it as his work requires, but the latter wants to know what
constitutes a right angle, or what is its special quality; his aim is to find out the truth.
And so in other cases we must follow the same course, lest we spend more time on
what is immaterial than on the real business in hand.
Nor must we in all cases alike demand the reason why; sometimes it is enough if the
undemonstrated fact be fairly pointed out, as in the case of the starting-points or
principles of a science. Undemonstrated facts always form the first step or starting-
point of a science; and these starting-points or principles are arrived at some in one
way, some in another—some by induction, others by perception, others again by some
kind of training. But in each case we must try to apprehend them in the proper way,
and do our best to define them clearly; for they have great influence upon the
subsequent course of an inquiry. A good start is more than half the race, I think, and
our starting-point or principle, once found, clears up a number of our difficulties.
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8.
This View Harmonizes Various Current Views.
We must not be satisfied, then, with examining this starting-point or principle of ours
as a conclusion from our data, but must also view it in its relation to current opinions
on the subject; for all experience harmonizes with a true principle, but a false one is
soon found to be incompatible with the facts.
Now, good things have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one
hand, and on the other goods of the soul and goods of the body; and the goods of the
soul are commonly said to be goods in the fullest sense, and more good than any
other.
But “actions and exercises of the vital faculties or soul” may be said to be “of the
soul.” So our account is confirmed by this opinion, which is both of long standing and
approved by all who busy themselves with philosophy.
But, indeed, we secure the support of this opinion by the mere statement that certain
actions and exercises are the end; for this implies that it is to be ranked among the
goods of the soul, and not among external goods.
Our account, again, is in harmony with the common saying that the happy man lives
well and does well; for we may say that happiness, according to us, is a living well
and doing well.
And, indeed, all the characteristics that men expect to find in happiness seem to
belong to happiness as we define it.
Some hold it to be virtue or excellence, some prudence, others a kind of wisdom;
others, again, hold it to be all or some of these, with the addition of pleasure, either as
an ingredient or as a necessary accompaniment; and some even include external
prosperity in their account of it.
Now, some of these views have the support of many voices and of old authority;
others have few voices, but those of weight; but it is probable that neither the one side
nor the other is entirely wrong, but that in some one point at least, if not in most, they
are both right.
First, then, the view that happiness is excellence or a kind of excellence harmonizes
with our account; for “exercise of faculties in accordance with excellence” belongs to
excellence.
But I think we may say that it makes no small difference whether the good be
conceived as the mere possession of something, or as its use—as a mere habit or
trained faculty, or as the exercise of that faculty. For the habit or faculty may be
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present, and yet issue in no good result, as when a man is asleep, or in any other way
hindered from his function; but with its exercise this is not possible, for it must show
itself in acts and in good acts. And as at the Olympic games it is not the fairest and
strongest who receive the crown, but those who contend (for among these are the
victors), so in life, too, the winners are those who not only have all the excellences,
but manifest these in deed.
And, further, the life of these men is in itself pleasant. For pleasure is an affection of
the soul, and each man takes pleasure in that which he is said to love,—he who loves
horses in horses, he who loves sight-seeing in sight-seeing, and in the same way he
who loves justice in acts of justice, and generally the lover of excellence or virtue in
virtuous acts or the manifestation of excellence.
And while with most men there is a perpetual conflict between the several things in
which they find pleasure, since these are not naturally pleasant, those who love what
is noble take pleasure in that which is naturally pleasant. For the manifestations of
excellence are naturally pleasant, so that they are both pleasant to them and pleasant
in themselves.
Their life, then, does not need pleasure to be added to it as an appendage, but contains
pleasure in itself.
Indeed, in addition to what we have said, a man is not good at all unless he takes
pleasure in noble deeds. No one would call a man just who did not take pleasure in
doing justice, nor generous who took no pleasure in acts of generosity, and so on.
If this be so, the manifestations of excellence will be pleasant in themselves. But they
are also both good and noble, and that in the highest degree—at least, if the good
man’s judgment about them is right, for this is his judgment.
Happiness, then, is at once the best and noblest and pleasantest thing in the world, and
these are not separated, as the Delian inscription would have them to be:—
“What is most just is noblest, health is best,
Pleasantest is to get your heart’s desire.”
For all these characteristics are united in the best exercises of our faculties; and these,
or some one of them that is better than all the others, we identify with happiness.
But nevertheless happiness plainly requires external goods too, as we said; for it is
impossible, or at least not easy, to act nobly without some furniture of fortune. There
are many things that can only be done through instruments, so to speak, such as
friends and wealth and political influence: and there are some things whose absence
takes the bloom off our happiness, as good birth, the blessing of children, personal
beauty; for a man is not very likely to be happy if he is very ugly in person, or of low
birth, or alone in the world, or childless, and perhaps still less if he has worthless
children or friends, or has lost good ones that he had.
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As we said, then, happiness seems to stand in need of this kind of prosperity; and so
some identify it with good fortune, just as others identify it with excellence.
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9.
It Happiness Acquired, Or The Gift Of Gods Or Of Chance?
This has led people to ask whether happiness is attained by learning, or the formation
of habits, or any other kind of training, or comes by some divine dispensation or even
by chance.
Well, if the Gods do give gifts to men, happiness is likely to be among the number,
more likely, indeed, than anything else, in proportion as it is better than all other
human things.
This belongs more properly to another branch of inquiry; but we may say that even if
it is not heavensent, but comes as a consequence of virtue or some kind of learning or
training, still it seems to be one of the most divine things in the world; for the prize
and aim of virtue would appear to be better than anything else and something divine
and blessed.
Again, if it is thus acquired it will be widely accessible; for it will then be in the
power of all except those who have lost the capacity for excellence to acquire it by
study and diligence.
And if it be better that men should attain happiness in this way rather than by chance,
it is reasonable to suppose that it is so, since in the sphere of nature all things are
arranged in the best possible way, and likewise in the sphere of art, and of each mode
of causation, and most of all in the sphere of the noblest mode of causation. And
indeed it would be too absurd to leave what is noblest and fairest to the dispensation
of chance.
But our definition itself clears up the difficulty;* for happiness was defined as a
certain kind of exercise of the vital faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue.
And of the remaining goods [other than happiness itself], some must be present as
necessary conditions, while others are aids and useful instruments to happiness. And
this agrees with what we said at starting. We then laid down that the end of the art
political is the best of all ends; but the chief business of that art is to make the citizens
of a certain character—that is, good and apt to do what is noble. It is not without
reason, then, that we do not call an ox, or a horse, or any brute happy; for none of
them is able to share in this kind of activity.
For the same reason also a child is not happy; he is as yet, because of his age, unable
to do such things. If we ever call a child happy, it is because we hope he will do them.
For, as we said, happiness requires not only perfect excellence or virtue, but also a full
term of years for its exercise. For our circumstances are liable to many changes and to
all sorts of chances, and it is possible that he who is now most prosperous will in his
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old age meet with great disasters, as is told of Priam in the tales of Troy; and a man
who is thus used by fortune and comes to a miserable end cannot be called happy.
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10.
Can No Man Be Called Happy During Life?
Are we, then, to call no man happy as long as he lives, but to wait for the end, as
Solon said?
And, supposing we have to allow this, do we mean that he actually is happy after he is
dead? Surely that is absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is a kind of
activity or life.
But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon meant not this, but that only
then could we safely apply the term to a man, as being now beyond the reach of evil
and calamity, then here too we find some ground for objection. For it is thought that
both good and evil may in some sort befall a dead man (just as they may befall a
living man, although he is unconscious of them), e.g. honours rendered to him, or the
reverse of these, and again the prosperity or the misfortune of his children and all his
descendants.
But this, too, has its difficulties; for after a man has lived happily to a good old age,
and ended as he lived, it is possible that many changes may befall him in the persons
of his descendants, and that some of them may turn out good and meet with the good
fortune they deserve, and others the reverse. It is evident too that the degree in which
the descendants are related to their ancestors may vary to any extent. And it would be
a strange thing if the dead man were to change with these changes and become happy
and miserable by turns. But it would also be strange to suppose that the dead are not
affected at all, even for a limited time, by the fortunes of their posterity.
But let us return to our former question; for its solution will, perhaps, clear up this
other difficulty.
The saying of Solon may mean that we ought to look for the end and then call a man
happy, not because he now is, but because he once was happy.
But surely it is strange that when he is happy we should refuse to say what is true of
him, because we do not like to apply the term to living men in view of the changes to
which they are liable, and because we hold happiness to be something that endures
and is little liable to change, while the fortunes of one and the same man often
undergo many revolutions: for, it is argued, it is plain that, if we follow the changes of
fortune, we shall call the same man happy and miserable many times over, making the
happy man “a sort of chameleon and one who rests on no sound foundation.”
We reply that it cannot be right thus to follow fortune. For it is not in this that our
weal or woe lies; but, as we said, though good fortune is needed to complete man’s
life, yet it is the excellent employment of his powers that constitutes his happiness, as
the reverse of this constitutes his misery.
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But the discussion of this difficulty leads to a further confirmation of our account. For
nothing human is so constant as the excellent exercise of our faculties. The sciences
themselves seem to be less abiding. And the highest of these exercises* are the most
abiding, because the happy are occupied with them most of all and most continuously
(for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget how to do them† ).
The happy man, then, as we define him, will have this required property of
permanence, and all through life will preserve his character; for he will be occupied
continually, or with the least possible interruption, in excellent deeds and excellent
speculations; and, whatever his fortune be, he will take it in the noblest fashion, and
bear himself always and in all things suitably, since he is truly good and “foursquare
without a flaw.”
But the dispensations of fortune are many, some great, some small. The small ones,
whether good or evil, plainly are of no weight in the scale; but the great ones, when
numerous, will make life happier if they be good; for they help to give a grace to life
themselves, and their use is noble and good; but, if they be evil, will enfeeble and
spoil happiness; for they bring pain, and often impede the exercise of our faculties.
But nevertheless true worth shines out even here, in the calm endurance of many great
misfortunes, not through insensibility, but through nobility and greatness of soul. And
if it is what a man does that determines the character of his life, as we said, then no
happy man will become miserable; for he will never do what is hateful and base. For
we hold that the man who is truly good and wise will bear with dignity whatever
fortune sends, and will always make the best of his circumstances, as a good general
will turn the forces at his command to the best account, and a good shoemaker will
make the best shoe that can be made out of a given piece of leather, and so on with all
other crafts.
If this be so, the happy man will never become miserable, though he will not be truly
happy if he meets with the fate of Priam.
But yet he is not unstable and lightly changed: he will not be moved from his
happiness easily, nor by any ordinary misfortunes, but only by many heavy ones; and
after such, he will not recover his happiness again in a short time, but if at all, only in
a considerable period, which has a certain completeness, and in which he attains to
great and noble things.
We shall meet all objections, then, if we say that a happy man is “one who exercises
his faculties in accordance with perfect excellence, being duly furnished with external
goods, not for any chance time, but for a full term of years:” to which perhaps we
should add, “and who shall continue to live so, and shall die as he lived,” since the
future is veiled to us, but happiness we take to be the end and in all ways perfectly
final or complete.
If this be so, we may say that those living men are blessed or perfectly happy who
both have and shall continue to have these characteristics, but happy as men only.
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11.
Cannot The Fortunes Of Survivors Affect The Dead?
Passing now from this question to that of the fortunes of descendants and of friends
generally, the doctrine that they do not affect the departed at all seems too cold and
too much opposed to popular opinion. But as the things that happen to them are many
and differ in all sorts of ways, and some come home to them more and some less, so
that to discuss them all separately would be a long, indeed an endless task, it will
perhaps be enough to speak of them in general terms and in outline merely.
Now, as of the misfortunes that happen to a man’s self, some have a certain weight
and influence on his life, while others are of less moment, so is it also with what
happens to any of his friends. And, again, it always makes much more difference
whether those who are affected by an occurrence are alive or dead than it does
whether a terrible crime in a tragedy be enacted on the stage or merely supposed to
have already taken place. We must therefore take these differences into account, and
still more, perhaps, the fact that it is a doubtful question whether the dead are at all
accessible to good and ill. For it appears that even if anything that happens, whether
good or evil, does come home to them, yet it is something unsubstantial and slight to
them if not in itself; or if not that, yet at any rate its influence is not of that magnitude
or nature that it can make happy those who are not, or take away their happiness from
those that are.
It seems then—to conclude—that the prosperity, and likewise the adversity, of friends
does affect the dead, but not in such a way or to such an extent as to make the happy
unhappy, or to do anything of the kind.
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12.
Happiness As Absolute End Is Above Praise.
These points being settled, we may now inquire whether happiness is to be ranked
among the goods that we praise, or rather among those that we revere; for it is plainly
not a mere potentiality, but an actual good.
What we praise seems always to be praised as being of a certain quality and having a
certain relation to something. For instance, we praise the just and the courageous man,
and generally the good man, and excellence or virtue, because of what they do or
produce; and we praise also the strong or the swiftfooted man, and so on, because he
has a certain gift or faculty in relation to some good and admirable thing.
This is evident if we consider the praises bestowed on the Gods. The Gods are thereby
made ridiculous by being made relative to man; and this happens because, as we said,
a thing can only be praised in relation to something else.
If, then, praise be proper to such things as we mentioned, it is evident that to the best
things is due, not praise, but something greater and better, as our usage shows; for the
Gods we call blessed and happy, and “blessed” is the term we apply to the most
godlike men.
And so with good things: no one praises happiness as he praises justice, but calls it
blessed, as something better and more divine.
On these grounds Eudoxus is thought to have based a strong argument for the claims
of pleasure to the first prize: for he maintained that the fact that it is not praised,
though it is a good thing, shows that it is higher than the goods we praise, as God and
the good are higher; for these are the standards by reference to which we judge all
other things,—giving praise to excellence or virtue, since it makes us apt to do what is
noble, and passing encomiums on the results of virtue, whether these be bodily or
psychical.
But to refine on these points belongs more properly to those who have made a study
of the subject of encomiums; for us it is plain from what has been said that happiness
is one of the goods which we revere and count as final.
And this further seems to follow from the fact that it is a starting-point or principle:
for everything we do is always done for its sake; but the principle and cause of all
good we hold to be something divine and worthy of reverence.
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13.
Division Of The Faculties And Resulting Division Of The
Virtues.
Since happiness is an exercise of the vital faculties in accordance with perfect virtue
or excellence, we will now inquire about virtue or excellence; for this will probably
help us in our inquiry about happiness.
And indeed the true statesman seems to be especially concerned with virtue, for he
wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. Of this we have an
example in the Cretan and the Lacedæmonian lawgivers, and any others who have
resembled them. But if the inquiry belongs to Politics or the science of the state, it is
plain that it will be in accordance with our original purpose to pursue it.
The virtue or excellence that we are to consider is, of course, the excellence of man;
for it is the good of man and the happiness of man that we started to seek. And by the
excellence of man I mean excellence not of body, but of soul; for happiness we take
to be an activity of the soul.
If this be so, then it is evident that the statesman must have some knowledge of the
soul, just as the man who is to heal the eye or the whole body must have some
knowledge of them, and that the more in proportion as the science of the state is
higher and better than medicine. But all educated physicians take much pains to know
about the body.
As statesmen [or students of Politics], then, we must inquire into the nature of the
soul, but in so doing we must keep our special purpose in view and go only so far as
that requires; for to go into minuter detail would be too laborious for the present
undertaking.
Now, there are certain doctrines about the soul which are stated elsewhere with
sufficient precision, and these we will adopt.
Two parts of the soul are distinguished, an irrational and a rational part.
Whether these are separated as are the parts of the body or any divisible thing, or
whether they are only distinguishable in thought but in fact inseparable, like concave
and convex in the circumference of a circle, makes no difference for our present
purpose.
Of the irrational part, again, one division seems to be common to all things that live,
and to be possessed by plants—I mean that which causes nutrition and growth; for we
must assume that all things that take nourishment have a faculty of this kind, even
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when they are embryos, and have the same faculty when they are full grown; at least,
this is more reasonable than to suppose that they then have a different one.
The excellence of this faculty, then, is plainly one that man shares with other beings,
and not specifically human.
And this is confirmed by the fact that in sleep this part of the soul, or this faculty, is
thought to be most active, while the good and the bad man are undistinguishable when
they are asleep (whence the saying that for half their lives there is no difference
between the happy and the miserable; which indeed is what we should expect; for
sleep is the cessation of the soul from those functions in respect of which it is called
good or bad), except that they are to some slight extent roused by what goes on in
their bodies, with the result that the dreams of the good man are better than those of
ordinary people.
However, we need not pursue this further, and may dismiss the nutritive principle,
since it has no place in the excellence of man.
But there seems to be another vital principle that is irrational, and yet in some way
partakes of reason. In the case of the continent and of the incontinent man alike we
praise the reason or the rational part, for it exhorts them rightly and urges them to do
what is best; but there is plainly present in them another principle besides the rational
one, which fights and struggles against the reason. For just as a paralyzed limb, when
you will to move it to the right, moves on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul;
the incontinent man’s impulses run counter to his reason. Only whereas we see the
refractory member in the case of the body, we do not see it in the case of the soul. But
we must nevertheless, I think, hold that in the soul too there is something beside the
reason, which opposes and runs counter to it (though in what sense it is distinct from
the reason does not matter here).
It seems, however, to partake of reason also, as we said: at least, in the continent man
it submits to the reason; while in the temperate and courageous man we may say it is
still more obedient; for in him it is altogether in harmony with the reason.
The irrational part, then, it appears, is twofold. There is the vegetative faculty, which
has no share of reason; and the faculty of appetite or of desire in general, which in a
manner partakes of reason or is rational as listening to reason and submitting to its
sway,—rational in the sense in which we speak of rational obedience to father or
friends, not in the sense in which we speak of rational apprehension of mathematical
truths. But all advice and all rebuke and exhortation testify that the irrational part is in
some way amenable to reason.
If then we like to say that this part, too, has a share of reason, the rational part also
will have two divisions: one rational in the strict sense as possessing reason in itself,
the other rational as listening to reason as a man listens to his father.
Now, on this division of the faculties is based the division of excellence; for we speak
of intellectual excellences and of moral excellences; wisdom and understanding and
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prudence we call intellectual, liberality and temperance we call moral virtues or
excellences. When we are speaking of a man’s moral character we do not say that he
is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or temperate. But we praise the wise man,
too, for his habit of mind or trained faculty; and a habit or trained faculty that is
praiseworthy is what we call an excellence or virtue.
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BOOK II.
MORAL VIRTUE.
1.
Moral Virtue Is Acquired By The Repetition Of The
Corresponding Acts.
Excellence, then, being of these two kinds, intellectual and moral intellectual
excellence owes its birth and growth mainly to instruction, and so requires time and
experience, while moral excellence is the result of habit or custom (?θος), and has
accordingly in our language received a name formed by a slight change from ?θος.*
From this it is plain that none of the moral excellences or virtues is implanted in us by
nature; for that which is by nature cannot be altered by training. For instance, a stone
naturally tends to fall downwards, and you could not train it to rise upwards, though
you tried to do so by throwing it up ten thousand times, nor could you train fire to
move downwards, nor accustom anything which naturally behaves in one way to
behave in any other way.
The virtues,† then, come neither by nature nor against nature, but nature gives the
capacity for acquiring them, and this is developed by training.
Again, where we do things by nature we get the power first, and put this power forth
in act afterwards: as we plainly see in the case of the senses; for it is not by constantly
seeing and hearing that we acquire those faculties, but, on the contrary, we had the
power first and then used it, instead of acquiring the power by the use. But the virtues
we acquire by doing the acts, as is the case with the arts too. We learn an art by doing
that which we wish to do when we have learned it; we become builders by building,
and harpers by harping. And so by doing just acts we become just, and by doing acts
of temperance and courage we become temperate and courageous.
This is attested, too, by what occurs in states; for the legislators make their citizens
good by training; i.e. this is the wish of all legislators, and those who do not succeed
in this miss their aim, and it is this that distinguishes a good from a bad constitution.
Again, both the moral virtues and the corresponding vices result from and are formed
by the same acts; and this is the case with the arts also. It is by harping that good
harpers and bad harpers alike are produced: and so with builders and the rest; by
building well they will become good builders, and bad builders by building badly.
Indeed, if it were not so, they would not want anybody to teach them, but would all be
born either good or bad at their trades. And it is just the same with the virtues also. It
is by our conduct in our intercourse with other men that we become just or unjust, and
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by acting in circumstances of danger, and training ourselves to feel fear or confidence,
that we become courageous or cowardly. So, too, with our animal appetites and the
passion of anger; for by behaving in this way or in that on the occasions with which
these passions are concerned, some become temperate and gentle, and others
profligate and ill-tempered. In a word, acts of any kind produce habits or characters of
the same kind.
Hence we ought to make sure that our acts be of a certain kind; for the resulting
character varies as they vary. It makes no small difference, therefore, whether a man
be trained from his youth up in this way or in that, but a great difference, or rather all
the difference.
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2.
These Acts Must Be Such As Reason Prescribes; They Can’T
Be Defined Exactly, But Must Be Neither Too Much Nor Too
Little.
But our present inquiry has not, like the rest, a merely speculative aim; we are not
inquiring merely in order to know what excellence or virtue is, but in order to become
good; for otherwise it would profit us nothing. We must ask therefore about these
acts, and see of what kind they are to be; for, as we said, it is they that determine our
habits or character.
First of all, then, that they must be in accordance with right reason is a common
characteristic of them, which we shall here take for granted, reserving for future
discussion* the question what this right reason is, and how it is related to the other
excellences.
But let it be understood, before we go on, that all reasoning on matters of practice
must be in outline merely, and not scientifically exact: for, as we said at starting, the
kind of reasoning to be demanded varies with the subject in hand; and in practical
matters and questions of expediency there are no invariable laws, any more than in
questions of health.
And if our general conclusions are thus inexact, still more inexact is all reasoning
about particular cases; for these fall under no system of scientifically established rules
or traditional maxims, but the agent must always consider for himself what the special
occasion requires, just as in medicine or navigation.
But though this is the case we must try to render what help we can.
First of all, then, we must observe that, in matters of this sort, to fall short and to
exceed are alike fatal. This is plain (to illustrate what we cannot see by what we can
see) in the case of strength and health. Too much and too little exercise alike destroy
strength, and to take too much meat and drink, or to take too little, is equally ruinous
to health, but the fitting amount produces and increases and preserves them. Just so,
then, is it with temperance also, and courage, and the other virtues. The man who
shuns and fears everything and never makes a stand, becomes a coward; while the
man who fears nothing at all, but will face anything, becomes foolhardy. So, too, the
man who takes his fill of any kind of pleasure, and abstains from none, is a profligate,
but the man who shuns all (like him whom we call a “boor”) is devoid of sensibility.*
Thus temperance and courage are destroyed both by excess and defect, but preserved
by moderation.
But habits or types of character are not only produced and preserved and destroyed by
the same occasions and the same means, but they will also manifest themselves in the
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same circumstances. This is the case with palpable things like strength. Strength is
produced by taking plenty of nourishment and doing plenty of hard work, and the
strong man, in turn, has the greatest capacity for these. And the case is the same with
the virtues: by abstaining from pleasure we become temperate, and when we have
become temperate we are best able to abstain. And so with courage: by habituating
ourselves to despise danger, and to face it, we become courageous; and when we have
become courageous, we are best able to face danger.
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3.
Virtue Is In Various Ways Concerned With Pleasure And Pain.
The pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must be taken as a test of the formed
habit or character.
He who abstains from the pleasures of the body and rejoices in the abstinence is
temperate, while he who is vexed at having to abstain is profligate; and again, he who
faces danger with pleasure, or, at any rate, without pain, is courageous, but he to
whom this is painful is a coward.
For moral virtue or excellence is closely concerned with pleasure and pain. It is
pleasure that moves us to do what is base, and pain that moves us to refrain from what
is noble. And therefore, as Plato says, man needs to be so trained from his youth up as
to find pleasure and pain in the right objects. This is what sound education means.
Another reason why virtue has to do with pleasure and pain, is that it has to do with
actions and passions or affections; but every affection and every act is accompanied
by pleasure or pain.
The fact is further attested by the employment of pleasure and pain in correction; they
have a kind of curative property, and a cure is effected by administering the opposite
of the disease.
Again, as we said before, every type of character [or habit or formed faculty] is
essentially relative to, and concerned with, those things that form it for good or for ill;
but it is through pleasure and pain that bad characters are formed—that is to say,
through pursuing and avoiding the wrong pleasures and pains, or pursuing and
avoiding them at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or in any other of the
various ways of going wrong that may be distinguished.
And hence some people go so far as to define the virtues as a kind of impassive or
neutral state of mind. But they err in stating this absolutely, instead of qualifying it by
the addition of the right and wrong manner, time, etc.
We may lay down, therefore, that this kind of excellence [i.e. moral excellence]
makes us do what is best in matters of pleasure and pain, while vice or badness has
the contrary effect. But the following considerations will throw additional light on the
point.*
There are three kinds of things that move us to choose, and three that move us to
avoid them: on the one hand, the beautiful or noble, the advantageous, the pleasant;
on the other hand, the ugly or base, the hurtful, the painful. Now, the good man is apt
to go right, and the bad man to go wrong, about them all, but especially about
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pleasure: for pleasure is not only common to man with animals, but also accompanies
all pursuit or choice; since the noble, and the advantageous also, are pleasant in idea.
Again, the feeling of pleasure has been fostered in us all from our infancy by our
training, and has thus become so engrained in our life that it can scarce be washed
out.* And, indeed, we all more or less make pleasure our test in judging of actions.
For this reason too, then, our whole inquiry must be concerned with these matters;
since to be pleased and pained in the right or the wrong way has great influence on
our actions.
Again, to fight with pleasure is harder than to fight with wrath (which Heraclitus says
is hard), and virtue, like art, is always more concerned with what is harder; for the
harder the task the better is success. For this reason also, then, both [moral] virtue or
excellence and the science of the state must always be concerned with pleasures and
pains; for he that behaves rightly with regard to them will be good, and he that
behaves badly will be bad.
We will take it as established, then, that [moral] excellence or virtue has to do with
pleasures and pains; and that the acts which produce it develop it, and also, when
differently done, destroy it; and that it manifests itself in the same acts which
produced it.
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4.
The Conditions Of Virtuous Action As Distinct From Artistic
Production.
But here we may be asked what we mean by saying that men can become just and
temperate only by doing what is just and temperate: surely, it may be said, if their acts
are just and temperate, they themselves are already just and temperate, as they are
grammarians and musicians if they do what is grammatical and musical.
We may answer, I think, firstly, that this is not quite the case even with the arts. A
man may do something grammatical [or write something correctly] by chance, or at
the prompting of another person: he will not be grammatical till he not only does
something grammatical, but also does it grammatically [or like a grammatical person],
i.e. in virtue of his own knowledge of grammar.
But, secondly, the virtues are not in this point analogous to the arts. The products of
art have their excellence in themselves, and so it is enough if when produced they are
of a certain quality; but in the case of the virtues, a man is not said to act justly or
temperately [or like a just or temperate man] if what he does merely be of a certain
sort—he must also be in a certain state of mind when he does it; i.e., first of all, he
must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it for itself; and,
thirdly, his act must be the expression of a formed and stable character. Now, of these
conditions, only one, the knowledge, is necessary for the possession of any art; but for
the possession of the virtues knowledge is of little or no avail, while the other
conditions that result from repeatedly doing what is just and temperate are not a little
important, but all-important.
The thing that is done, therefore, is called just or temperate when it is such as the just
or temperate man would do; but the man who does it is not just or temperate, unless
he also does it in the spirit of the just or the temperate man.
It is right, then, to say that by doing what is just a man becomes just, and temperate by
doing what is temperate, while without doing thus he has no chance of ever becoming
good.
But most men, instead of doing thus, fly to theories, and fancy that they are
philosophizing and that this will make them good, like a sick man who listens
attentively to what the doctor says and then disobeys all his orders. This sort of
philosophizing will no more produce a healthy habit of mind than this sort of
treatment will produce a healthy habit of body.
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5.
Virtue Not An Emotion, Nor A Faculty, But A Trained Faculty
Or Habit.
We have next to inquire what excellence or virtue is.
A quality of the soul is either (1) a passion or emotion, or (2) a power or faculty, or
(3) a habit or trained faculty; and so virtue must be one of these three. By (1) a
passion or emotion we mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate,
longing, emulation, pity, or generally that which is accompanied by pleasure or pain;
(2) a power or faculty is that in respect of which we are said to be capable of being
affected in any of these ways, as, for instance, that in respect of which we are able to
be angered or pained or to pity; and (3) a habit or trained faculty is that in respect of
which we are well or ill regulated or disposed in the matter of our affections; as, for
instance, in the matter of being angered, we are ill regulated if we are too violent or
too slack, but if we are moderate in our anger we are well regulated. And so with the
rest.
Now, the virtues are not emotions, nor are the vices—(1) because we are not called
good or bad in respect of our emotions, but are called so in respect of our virtues or
vices; (2) because we are neither praised nor blamed in respect of our emotions (a
man is not praised for being afraid or angry, nor blamed for being angry simply, but
for being angry in a particular way), but we are praised or blamed in respect of our
virtues or vices; (3) because we may be angered or frightened without deliberate
choice, but the virtues are a kind of deliberate choice, or at least are impossible
without it; and (4) because in respect of our emotions we are said to be moved, but in
respect of our virtues and vices we are not said to be moved, but to be regulated or
disposed in this way or in that.
For these same reasons also they are not powers or faculties; for we are not called
either good or bad for being merely capable of emotion, nor are we either praised or
blamed for this. And further, while nature gives us our powers or faculties, she does
not make us either good or bad. (This point, however, we have already treated.)
If, then, the virtues be neither emotions nor faculties, it only remains for them to be
habits or trained faculties.
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6.
Viz., The Habit Of Choosing The Mean.
We have thus found the genus to which virtue belongs; but we want to know, not only
that it is a trained faculty, but also what species of trained faculty it is.
We may safely assert that the virtue or excellence of a thing causes that thing both to
be itself in good condition and to perform its function well. The excellence of the eye,
for instance, makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the
eye that we see well. So the proper excellence of the horse makes a horse what he
should be, and makes him good at running, and carrying his rider, and standing a
charge.
If, then, this holds good in all cases, the proper excellence or virtue of man will be the
habit or trained faculty that makes a man good and makes him perform his function
well.
How this is to be done we have already said, but we may exhibit the same conclusion
in another way, by inquiring what the nature of this virtue is.
Now, if we have any quantity, whether continuous or discrete,* it is possible to take
either a larger [or too large], or a smaller [or too small], or an equal [or fair] amount,
and that either absolutely or relatively to our own needs.
By an equal or fair amount I understand a mean amount, or one that lies between
excess and deficiency.
By the absolute mean, or mean relatively to the thing itself, I understand that which is
equidistant from both extremes, and this is one and the same for all.
By the mean relatively to us I understand that which is neither too much nor too little
for us; and this is not one and the same for all.
For instance, if ten be larger [or too large] and two be smaller [or too small], if we
take six we take the mean relatively to the thing itself [or the arithmetical mean]; for it
exceeds one extreme by the same amount by which it is exceeded by the other
extreme: and this is the mean in arithmetical proportion.
But the mean relatively to us cannot be found in this way. If ten pounds of food is too
much for a given man to eat, and two pounds too little, it does not follow that the
trainer will order him six pounds: for that also may perhaps be too much for the man
in question, or too little; too little for Milo, too much for the beginner. The same holds
true in running and wrestling.
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And so we may say generally that a master in any art avoids what is too much and
what is too little, and seeks for the mean and chooses it—not the absolute but the
relative mean.
If, then, every art or science perfects its work in this way, looking to the mean and
bringing its work up to this standard (so that people are wont to say of a good work
that nothing could be taken from it or added to it, implying that excellence is
destroyed by excess or deficiency, but secured by observing the mean; and good
artists, as we say, do in fact keep their eyes fixed on this in all that they do), and if
virtue, like nature, is more exact and better than any art, it follows that virtue also
must aim at the mean—virtue of course meaning moral virtue or excellence; for it has
to do with passions and actions, and it is these that admit of excess and deficiency and
the mean. For instance, it is possible to feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and
generally to be affected pleasantly and painfully, either too much or too little, in either
case wrongly; but to be thus affected at the right times, and on the right occasions, and
towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right fashion, is the
mean course and the best course, and these are characteristics of virtue. And in the
same way our outward acts also admit of excess and deficiency, and the mean or due
amount.
Virtue, then, has to deal with feelings or passions and with outward acts, in which
excess is wrong and deficiency also is blamed, but the mean amount is praised and is
right—both of which are characteristics of virtue.
Virtue, then, is a kind of moderation (μεσότης τις),* inasmuch as it aims at the mean
or moderate amount (τ? μέσον).
Again, there are many ways of going wrong (for evil is infinite in nature, to use a
Pythagorean figure, while good is finite), but only one way of going right; so that the
one is easy and the other hard—easy to miss the mark and hard to hit. On this account
also, then, excess and deficiency are characteristic of vice, hitting the mean is
characteristic of virtue:
“Goodness is simple, ill takes any shape.”
Virtue, then, is a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in
moderation or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, as
determined by reason, i.e. by the reason by which the prudent man would determine
it. And it is a moderation, firstly, inasmuch as it comes in the middle or mean between
two vices, one on the side of excess, the other on the side of defect; and, secondly,
inasmuch as, while these vices fall short of or exceed the due measure in feeling and
in action, it finds and chooses the mean, middling, or moderate amount.
Regarded in its essence, therefore, or according to the definition of its nature, virtue is
a moderation or middle state, but viewed in its relation to what is best and right it is
the extreme of perfection.
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But it is not all actions nor all passions that admit of moderation; there are some
whose very names imply badness, as malevolence, shamelessness, envy, and, among
acts, adultery, theft, murder. These and all other like things are blamed as being bad in
themselves, and not merely in their excess or deficiency. It is impossible therefore to
go right in them; they are always wrong: rightness and wrongness in such things (e.g.
in adultery) does not depend upon whether it is the right person and occasion and
manner, but the mere doing of any one of them is wrong.
It would be equally absurd to look for moderation or excess or deficiency in unjust
cowardly or profligate conduct; for then there would be moderation in excess or
deficiency, and excess in excess, and deficiency in deficiency.
The fact is that just as there can be no excess or deficiency in temperance or courage
because the mean or moderate amount is, in a sense, an extreme, so in these kinds of
conduct also there can be no moderation or excess or deficiency, but the acts are
wrong however they be done. For, to put it generally, there cannot be moderation in
excess or deficiency, nor excess or deficiency in moderation.
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7.
This Must Be Applied To The Several Virtues.
But it is not enough to make these general statements [about virtue and vice]: we must
go on and apply them to particulars [i.e. to the several virtues and vices]. For in
reasoning about matters of conduct general statements are too vague,* and do not
convey so much truth as particular propositions. It is with particulars that conduct is
concerned:† our statements, therefore, when applied to these particulars, should be
found to hold good.
These particulars then [i.e. the several virtues and vices and the several acts and
affections with which they deal], we will take from the following table.‡
Moderation in the feelings of fear and confidence is courage: of those that exceed, he
that exceeds in fearlessness has no name (as often happens), but he that exceeds in
confidence is foolhardy, while he that exceeds in fear, but is deficient in confidence,
is cowardly.
Moderation in respect of certain pleasures and also (though to a less extent) certain
pains is temperance, while excess is profligacy. But defectiveness in the matter of
these pleasures is hardly ever found, and so this sort of people also have as yet
received no name: let us put them down as “void of sensibility.”
In the matter of giving and taking money, moderation is liberality, excess and
deficiency are prodigality and illiberality. But both vices exceed and fall short in
giving and taking in contrary ways: the prodigal exceeds in spending, but falls short in
taking; while the illiberal man exceeds in taking, but falls short in spending. (For the
present we are but giving an outline or summary, and aim at nothing more; we shall
afterwards treat these points in greater detail.)
But, besides these, there are other dispositions in the matter of money: there is a
moderation which is called magnificence (for the magnificent is not the same as the
liberal man: the former deals with large sums, the latter with small), and an excess
which is called bad taste or vulgarity, and a deficiency which is called meanness; and
these vices differ from those which are opposed to liberality: how they differ will be
explained later.
With respect to honour and disgrace, there is a moderation which is high-mindedness,
an excess which may be called vanity, and a deficiency which is little-mindedness.
But just as we said that liberality is related to magnificence, differing only in that it
deals with small sums, so here there is a virtue related to high-mindedness, and
differing only in that it is concerned with small instead of great honours. A man may
have a due desire for honour, and also more or less than a due desire: he that carries
this desire to excess is called ambitious, he that has not enough of it is called
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unambitious, but he that has the due amount has no name. There are also no abstract
names for the characters, except “ambition,” corresponding to ambitious. And on this
account those who occupy the extremes lay claim to the middle place. And in
common parlance, too, the moderate man is sometimes called ambitious and
sometimes unambitious, and sometimes the ambitious man is praised and sometimes
the unambitious. Why this is we will explain afterwards; for the present we will
follow out our plan and enumerate the other types of character.
In the matter of anger also we find excess and deficiency and moderation. The
characters themselves hardly have recognized names, but as the moderate man is here
called gentle, we will call his character gentleness; of those who go into extremes, we
may take the term wrathful for him who exceeds, with wrathfulness for the vice, and
wrathless for him who is deficient, with wrathlessness for his character.
Besides these, there are three kinds of moderation, bearing some resemblance to one
another, and yet different. They all have to do with intercourse in speech and action,
but they differ in that one has to do with the truthfulness of this intercourse, while the
other two have to do with its pleasantness—one of the two with pleasantness in
matters of amusement, the other with pleasantness in all the relations of life. We must
therefore speak of these qualities also in order that we may the more plainly see how,
in all cases, moderation is praiseworthy, while the extreme courses are neither right
nor praiseworthy, but blamable.
In these cases also names are for the most part wanting, but we must try, here as
elsewhere, to coin names ourselves, in order to make our argument clear and easy to
follow.
In the matter of truth, then, let us call him who observes the mean a true [or truthful]
person, and observance of the mean truth [or truthfulness]: pretence, when it
exaggerates, may be called boasting, and the person a boaster; when it understates, let
the names be irony and ironical.
With regard to pleasantness in amusement, he who observes the mean may be called
witty, and his character wittiness; excess may be called buffoonery, and the man a
buffoon; while boorish may stand for the person who is deficient, and boorishness for
his character.
With regard to pleasantness in the other affairs of life, he who makes himself properly
pleasant may be called friendly, and his moderation friendliness; he that exceeds may
be called obsequious if he have no ulterior motive, but a flatterer if he has an eye to
his own advantage; he that is deficient in this respect, and always makes himself
disagreeable, may be called a quarrelsome or peevish fellow.
Moreover, in mere emotions* and in our conduct with regard to them, there are ways
of observing the mean; for instance, shame (α?δώς), is not a virtue, but yet the modest
(α?δήμων) man is praised. For in these matters also we speak of this man as observing
the mean, of that man as going beyond it (as the shame-faced man whom the least
thing makes shy), while he who is deficient in the feeling, or lacks it altogether, is
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called shameless; but the term modest (α?δήμων) is applied to him who observes the
mean.
Righteous indignation, again, hits the mean between envy and malevolence. These
have to do with feelings of pleasure and pain at what happens to our neighbours. A
man is called righteously indignant when he feels pain at the sight of undeserved
prosperity, but your envious man goes beyond him and is pained by the sight of any
one in prosperity, while the malevolent man is so far from being pained that he
actually exults in the misfortunes of his neighbours.
But we shall have another opportunity of discussing these matters.
As for justice, the term is used in more senses than one; we will, therefore, after
disposing of the above questions, distinguish these various senses, and show how each
of these kinds of justice is a kind of moderation.
And then we will treat of the intellectual virtues in the same way.
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8.
The Two Vicious Extremes Are Opposed To One Another And
To The Intermediate Virtue.
There are, as we said, three classes of disposition, viz. two kinds of vice, one marked
by excess, the other by deficiency, and one kind of virtue, the observance of the mean.
Now, each is in a way opposed to each, for the extreme dispositions are opposed both
to the mean or moderate disposition and to one another, while the moderate
disposition is opposed to both the extremes. Just as a quantity which is equal to a
given quantity is also greater when compared with a less, and less when compared
with a greater quantity, so the mean or moderate dispositions exceed as compared
with the defective dispositions, and fall short as compared with the excessive
dispositions, both in feeling and in action; e.g. the courageous man seems foolhardy
as compared with the coward, and cowardly as compared with the foolhardy; and
similarly the temperate man appears profligate in comparison with the insensible, and
insensible in comparison with the profligate man; and the liberal man appears
prodigal by the side of the illiberal man, and illiberal by the side of the prodigal man.
And so the extreme characters try to displace the mean or moderate character, and
each represents him as falling into the opposite extreme, the coward calling the
courageous man foolhardy, the foolhardy calling him coward, and so on in other
cases.
But while the mean and the extremes are thus opposed to one another, the extremes
are strictly contrary to each other rather than to the mean; for they are further removed
from one another than from the mean, as that which is greater than a given magnitude
is further from that which is less, and that which is less is further from that which is
greater, than either the greater or the less is from that which is equal to the given
magnitude.
Sometimes, again, an extreme, when compared with the mean, has a sort of
resemblance to it, as foolhardiness to courage, or prodigality to liberality; but there is
the greatest possible dissimilarity between the extremes.
Again, “things that are as far as possible removed from each other” is the accepted
definition of contraries, so that the further things are removed from each other the
more contrary they are.
In comparison with the mean, however, it is sometimes the deficiency that is the more
opposed, and sometimes the excess; e.g. foolhardiness, which is excess, is not so
much opposed to courage as cowardice, which is deficiency; but insensibility, which
is lack of feeling, is not so much opposed to temperance as profligacy, which is
excess.
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The reasons for this are two. One is the reason derived from the nature of the matter
itself: since one extreme is, in fact, nearer and more similar to the mean, we naturally
do not oppose it to the mean so strongly as the other; e.g. as foolhardiness seems more
similar to courage and nearer to it, and cowardice more dissimilar, we speak of
cowardice as the opposite rather than the other: for that which is further removed from
the mean seems to be more opposed to it.
This, then, is one reason, derived from the nature of the thing itself. Another reason
lies in ourselves: and it is this—those things to which we happen to be more prone by
nature appear to be more opposed to the mean: e.g. our natural inclination is rather
towards indulgence in pleasure, and so we more easily fall into profligate than into
regular habits: those courses, then, in which we are more apt to run to great lengths
are spoken of as more opposed to the mean; and thus profligacy, which is an excess, is
more opposed to temperance than the deficiency is.
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9.
The Mean Hard To Hit, And Is A Matter Of Perception, Not Of
Reasoning.
We have sufficiently explained, then, that moral virtue is moderation or observance of
the mean, and in what sense, viz. (1) as holding a middle position between two vices,
one on the side of excess, and the other on the side of deficiency, and (2) as aiming at
the mean or moderate amount both in feeling and in action.
And on this account it is a hard thing to be good; for finding the middle or the mean in
each case is a hard thing, just as finding the middle or centre of a circle is a thing that
is not within the power of everybody, but only of him who has the requisite
knowledge.
Thus any one can be angry—that is quite easy; any one can give money away or
spend it: but to do these things to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time,
with the right object, and in the right manner, is not what everybody can do, and is by
no means easy; and that is the reason why right doing is rare and praiseworthy and
noble.
He that aims at the mean, then, should first of all strive to avoid that extreme which is
more opposed to it, as Calypso* bids Ulysses—
“Clear of these smoking breakers keep thy ship.”
For of the extremes one is more dangerous, the other less. Since then it is hard to hit
the mean precisely, we must “row when we cannot sail,” as the proverb has it, and
choose the least of two evils; and that will be best effected in the way we have
described.
And secondly we must consider, each for himself, what we are most prone to—for
different natures are inclined to different things—which we may learn by the pleasure
or pain we feel. And then we must bend ourselves in the opposite direction; for by
keeping well away from error we shall fall into the middle course, as we straighten a
bent stick by bending it the other way.
But in all cases we must be especially on our guard against pleasant things, and
against pleasure; for we can scarce judge her impartially. And so, in our behaviour
towards her, we should imitate the behaviour of the old counsellors towards Helen,*
and in all cases repeat their saying: if we dismiss her we shall be less likely to go
wrong.
This then, in outline, is the course by which we shall best be able to hit the mean.
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But it is a hard task, we must admit, especially in a particular case. It is not easy to
determine, for instance, how and with whom one ought to be angry, and upon what
grounds, and for how long; for public opinion sometimes praises those who fall short,
and calls them gentle, and sometimes applies the term manly to those who show a
harsh temper.
In fact, a slight error, whether on the side of excess or deficiency, is not blamed, but
only a considerable error; for then there can be no mistake. But it is hardly possible to
determine by reasoning how far or to what extent a man must err in order to incur
blame; and indeed matters that fall within the scope of perception never can be so
determined. Such matters lie within the region of particulars, and can only be
determined by perception.
So much then is plain, that the middle character is in all cases to be praised, but that
we ought to incline sometimes towards excess, sometimes towards deficiency; for in
this way we shall most easily hit the mean and attain to right doing.
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